

Titlepage

p 1

DE QUATUOR OPPOSITIS

by

George Schaller, O.P.

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

St. Stephen's Priory
The Dominican House of Philosophy
Dover, Massachusetts
1964

Contents

[Chapter 1: The greatest opposition is contradiction and in the second place there is privative opposition](#)

[Chapter 2: Concerning contrary opposition which, in a greater degree than privation, departs from the notion of contradiction](#)

[Chapter 3: Concerning relative opposition](#)

[Chapter 4: The manner by which the different modes of change follow the aforementioned oppositions](#)

[Chapter 5: The process by which one contrary arises from another contrary](#)

Chapter I. The greatest opposition is contradiction and in the second place there is privative opposition.

p 40

582 Since there are, as is stated in the *Categories* (1), four oppositions, hence we briefly intend to treat of these.

p 40

Now first we must consider that opposition of contradiction is primary and is stronger than the other modes of opposition. The Philosopher, in the *Posterior Analytics* (2), offers the reason for this superiority when he says that "contradiction is opposition which of its nature excludes an intermediate;" for an intermediate shows an agreement of distant things and for this reason weakens the notion of opposition. Therefore all other modes of opposition weaken the notion of contradictory opposition, since in all other oppositions an intermediate is to be found. Truly these other oppositions have an intermediate: but some more and some less: and hence, according to these different degrees, they participate in the notion of contradictory opposition and consequently are opposed in different degrees.

p 40

For the first in each genus is the cause of those things which are contained in that genus, as is made clear in the second book of the *Metaphysics* (3). Consequently, the more things participate in the formality of that which is first in the genus of opposition, the less they share in a mean.

p 41

But to agree in an intermediate can be *twofold*.

p 41

Some things share in a mean of the same genus to which they belong, as well as in a common matter, as white and black agree in the intermediate color and also in a subject. Again some things share only in a community of matter, as immediate contraries, privation and habitus; for immediate contraries have a common subject, as also in the case with privation and habitus.

p 41

583 But among these there is a difference, because in certain things privatively opposed the order to the subject is maintained, and so the process of return from privation to habitus cannot occur; similarly this is so with certain immediate contraries, as for example with certain diseases which are incurable. Consequently in these, as in privatives, there does not remain in the subject any virtue for the habitus. But there are other immediate contraries, like health and disease, which are related to their subject indifferently and not in a certain order for the potency for one is not derived from the other (4).

p 41

In relatives, however, an agreement is not present in either way: because relatives do not have a common subject. For the same person is not a father and a son according as the father refers to the son. Nor do they agree in the intermediate of their genus, since relatives do not admit of degrees. But they do possess a certain particular mode of agreement, because one of these, according to what it is, depends on the other; for relatives, according to the Philosopher (5), mutually include, demand and destroy each other.

p 42

But none of the above is found in contradictories; for contradictories do not have the intermediate of a genus, since the other extreme is non-being absolutely outside of every genus; nor can they agree in a subject, since non-being is not able to have a subject, not even that, namely substance, which contains the perfect notion of being; nor do they communicate in terms of their concepts as relatives do; for being does

not demand its opposite, namely non-being, as father demands son. And therefore contradiction absolutely is that which of its nature lacks an intermediate; hence those things contradictorily opposed agree in no degree and are opposed in the greatest degree.

p 42

584 Other modes of opposition follow upon the opposition of contradiction in a certain order. Therefore opposition is revealed in these in different degrees.

p 42

Thus those things opposed privatively holds the first place after contradiction, since they do not possess an intermediate of their genus, as do some contraries; nor have a mutual dependence as relatives, since they do not have a common subject. In these, however, one extreme, namely the privation, of itself posits nothing; whence from its nature it is negation and non-being; for privations, according to the Philosopher (6), are of the genus of non-being. And since privation is not an absolute negation but of a habitus which needs a subject, it is a negation in a subject; for privation from its nature is like one extreme of a contradiction but because of the habitus which it follows, it is determinately related to a subject and to the category of its habitus; for which reason privation is negation in a genus and also in a subject, as has been said.

p 43

Still it must be noted that they do not entirely agree in a subject, because privation when it is present, takes from the subject the formality of contrariety previously possessed, since the habitus cannot be reinstated (7). Yet not every contrariety does accomplish this. Whence it is clear that those things privatively opposed are in a very great degree opposed, and participate in the notion of contradiction in a eminent degree.

p 43

585 From this it is easily shown to what and in what manner privation is naturally opposed.

p 43

Privation receives what it possess of opposition from contradictories, where there is found absolute negation, namely non-being. But though privation of itself belongs to the genus of non-being, for by its nature it touches the meaner extreme of contradiction which is the maximum of opposites, it nonetheless falls short of that extreme (the secondary always falls short of the primary) by determinately associating it with a subject and a genus. Privation, therefore, is directly opposed to some being in a subject, just as it is being the absolute sense to which non-being in the same sense is primarily and directly opposed.

p 44

Therefore just as non-being, which is one extreme of contradiction, is completely opposed to being and this in an absolute, primary and per se manner, and subsequently it is opposed to that which *esse simpliciter* follows, as, e.g., the substantial form or even matter, for matter is something demanded to have a total being. Likewise non-being in a subject, which is privation, is primarily and directly opposed to some being which naturally is to be found in that subject; but it is subsequently inimical to that which this kind of *esse* follows, namely the habitus.

p 44

586 For in the order of formal principles the primary principle is existence, because existence is first act, nor is anything said to be in act except through existence; for someone does not have health in act unless health has been existentially placed in him; wherefore every form follows existence itself in the order of acts or formal principles, as has been said.

n 45

p 45

But it is the converse when it is a question of inherence. For form inheres primarily, and through the form, existence itself inheres; and therefore, when considering inherence, existence follows the form. This is easily seen in material things, as for example in a stone, where existence is not primarily the act of the form itself, but of the thing itself, namely the stone; but it is the act of the matter and the form subsequently. For we see that existence in this type of a thing is through an intermediate and is related to the form as if remotely; for the very existence in a stone is immediately and primarily the actuality of the thing, and through the thing itself it is the act of the form of such a thing, not as of being, but as of that by which something is.

p 45

587 From which it is evident that existence is primary in the order of acts rather than the form. But because matter has to be joined immediately with the form, to which it is proportioned, there results from this union a composite whose act is existence itself; so form is the medium in acquiring existence for matter and for the composite itself, because there would be no composite unless the form should be inhering in the matter. And therefore according to inherence, form is first and existence is secondary, as has been said.

p 46

Privation, insofar as it approximates the opposition of contradiction, namely non-being, which is to negate first act, is directly opposed to some existence, and as a consequence, is opposed to that which that existence follows; but according as it lacks something of contradiction, since it is conceived as in a subject and in the manner of something inhering, it is primarily opposed to possession because possession is first in the order of inherence, as has been said. But it is clear that this belongs to privation insofar as it departs from the perfect formality of opposition.

p 46

588 Therefore from what has been said, it is evident that more is required from privative opposition than for contradiction; still, that which privative opposition adds, does not increase the notion of opposition but lessens it (8).

p 46

A doubt however arises in reference to how contradictory opposition is greater than the privative (9). Since opposition is nothing more than a moving away of a potency from act, as heat causes the potency of its subject to move from cold, and privation entirely removes from its subject the potency to possession, since it is impossible that possession be restored after privation, whence, (since) nature can no more make sight out of blindness than being from non-being; sight and blindness seem to be opposed no less than being and non-being.

p 47

It should be noted however that in a *twofold fashion* something can separate a potency from act. *In one way* by removing the potency itself, so that nothing of it remains; and in this way a potency is removed from act in contradictory opposition, because in absolute non-being there is no potency to existence. *In another way* by interposing an obstacle, to prevent the potency from becoming actual. But this can be done *in two ways*: *one way*, for a time and in a changeable manner, as whiteness causes its subject to move from blackness (10); *in another way*, in an immovable fashion, and thus privation removes the potency of its subject for possession, not that the potency is completely removed, but because an insurmountable obstacle is placed in the subject itself. For these reasons it is said that privation takes away the potency for an act. Whence it is a greater miracle to create souls, although this is less wondered at, than to give sight to a blind person; which because it is rarer, is thought to be more wonderful.

Chapter II. Concerning contrary opposition which, in a greater degree than privation, departs from the notion of contradiction.

p 48

589 After privation there follows contrary opposition, in which there is found a greater agreement than in the previous types. Still there is present in contrary opposition a certain likeness to the above mentioned opposites, and whatever there is of the nature of opposition, in contrary opposition, is produced through the participation of privative and contradictory oppositions.

p 48

For certain contraries do not have an intermediate of their nature, as is the case with the healthy and diseased, according to the Philosopher (1); still they do agree in a subject, and in those where a return does not occur, as from sickness to health, there is a closer resemblance to the nature of privation; but in others in which a return does occur, the resemblance to the nature of privation is less. Nevertheless in all contraries one extreme always is like a privation, and the other as a possession.

p 48

Privation and possession then constitute contrariety, as is said in the first book of the *Physics* (2), and so all contrarieties are reduced to possession and privation as to the primary opposition which is in a genus; but all contrarieties are reduced to opposition of contradiction as to the absolutely primary opposition.

p 49

590 For in opposition of contradiction one extreme is nothing absolutely, and the absolute nothing standing for the subject, since its more noble extreme, i.e., in the instance of that in which being's formality is most perfectly realized, namely substance. For according to the Philosopher (3), substance is that to which it does not belong to be in a subject.

p 49

In privative opposition, indeed, the meaner extreme is absolute nothing, since it is of the genus of non-being; still it points to something as its subject: which is evident from its other extreme and this is the habitus itself, which requires a subject: for the more perfect extreme always brings the less perfect to the subject, if the former has a subject and if it does not, neither will the other extreme.

p 49

In contrary opposition however both extremes are something real, although the more imperfect is less of being: for which reason the Philosopher says, in the book *On Sense and Sensation* (4), that to be in a state of blackness is a privation of whiteness; and similarly both extremes require the same subject. Whence it is necessary that contrary opposition departs in a greater degree than privation from the notion of contradictory opposition.

p 49

Yet whatever is of the nature of opposition in this. is derived totally through the nature of contradiction.

insofar, namely, as one extreme pertains to being, the other to non-being. For white and black are white and non-white, just as seeing and blind are seeing and non-seeing, and in contradiction being and non-being; but with a difference: for being and non-being, in an absolute contradiction, are taken universally, but in privation the non-seeing is not taken universally: for a stone is non-seeing, however its non-seeing is not opposed to seeing through the medium of privation, but only that non-seeing that has been naturally constituted to see; but this is a non-seeing taken in particular. Similarly non-white is opposed to white just as is black; not indeed as the non-white of an Ethiopian but as the non-white that has been naturally constituted to be white.

p 50

591 Therefore from what has been said it is clear that contradiction, precisely as contradiction, denies nothing in a genus but simply what is outside a genus. The fact that contradictory propositions are commonly contained in a genus, as for example: "Man is white," "man is not white," "man runs," "man does not run," does not arise from the nature of absolute contradiction but by reason of the reduction of contrary propositions into contradictions, from which they receive the nature of opposition: for the same man is a black man and a non-white man, man not running and a man standing. And therefore all such contradictions have their extremes in a genus.

p 51

592 Thus it is that sophists were deceived thinking that the other extreme of contradiction, namely non-being was contained in a genus, because they saw that one proposition is not the contradictory of another unless the same thing be truly affirmed and falsely denied of the same subject and at the same time, which they conceded, in the case of contrary predicates resolved into contradictories; which contrary predicates must have a community of subject and genus, as is evident concerning white which is opposed to the state of blackness; for that which absolutely does not exist, is not white; for this proposition is true in which there is denied the existence of white about that which does not exist, just as that is a true proposition in which the existence of that which is, is affirmed. And therefore when it is said that "Socrates is white," "Socrates is not white," this is not an absolute contradiction, but a contradiction participated in by contraries, namely by white and black. Consequently both extremes, in all such propositions, are in a genus.

p 51

593 But in absolute contradictories neither extreme is in a genus: as they are being and non-being. For it is clear that being is not in a genus, nor its opposite. And therefore, just as all things which are in a genus are reduced to being which is not in a genus so all opposition of things existing in a genus is resolved into that opposition whose terms are not in a genus. And just as the degree of perfections of things is in proportion to their participation in being, as substance is more perfect than accident, because there is found in substance the perfect formality of being; so oppositions of the things are more perfect in the genus of opposition in proportion to the degree of their approach to a sharing in the opposition whose extreme is being; and this is found in privation and possession, which are the extremes of the primary opposition pertaining to substance.

Chapter III. Concerning relative opposition.

p 53

594 Relative opposition has the minimal share in contradiction, not because it has an intermediate of its own kind, which diminishes the formality of opposition in the other types, but because it does not require extremes which are really distinct.

p 53

For there are certain relations which result from the operation of the intellect, as is the case with relation of identity and with genus, species and the like, in which there is no diversity except that which is constituted by the intellect. In other relatives however, which are founded upon quantity or action, a real diversity is present, as for example double and half, father and son, and the like. But in all other oppositions diverse extremes are to be found, as is evident from white and black, which are contraries, and from sight and blindness, which are privative opposites.

p 53

In absolute contradictories it is true, the extremes are not diverse in reality, since non-being is not some real thing. Nevertheless the extremes of a contradiction are in every instance not really identical: but at times this is lacking in relatives, as has been said. Even in other relatives, whose being consist in a reference, there is still a lesser degree of participation in contradiction than in other types because of the mutual dependence among the former. The extremes of other oppositions neither include nor posit each other. Moreover, if one is present, it renders the presence of the other impossible: and this condition is universally true in all opposites which share a subject, as is the case with white and black, sight and blindness. Therefore the subject is changed in reference to these according as it surrenders one thing and acquires another; and so the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.

Chapter IV. The manner by which the different modes of change follow the aforementioned oppositions.

p 55

595 Now the task that remains is to investigate the modes of change which follow the aforementioned oppositions.

p 55

Hence it should be noted that according to the doctrine even of the philosophers things are brought into existence by God: whence God not only is the cause of the motion of the heavens, but also of its substance, as the Philosopher says (1). Therefore just as something comes to be from its opposite in the order of nature, as the existence of an animal comes from the non-existence of an animal, so an absolute existence, which is the proper effect of God, necessarily, emanates from absolute non-existence; and this is

the other extreme of the contradiction: not that non-existence itself should by time precede existence itself, but only by nature.

p 55

Therefore the proper causality of God attains the extremes of contradiction, which are outside of a genus, and hence His action necessarily presupposes nothing: and this action is creation, which is not contained in the class of movements since it does not have any subject as the principle of its movement: and movement always is in the mobile as in a subject. Thus it is that this action is His alone and is communicated to no creature. For the action of a thing does not exceed the principles of that thing through which it acts. But every created thing is in a genus. Whence it is impossible that a creature attain as the subject of its action something that is not contained in a genus. But such things are being and non-being, which are the extremes of contradiction and creation. And therefore no creature can create.

p 56

596 In order to make this evident it is necessary to note that existence is related to creation and generation in different ways.

p 56

For existence, according to the author of the book *On Causes* (2), is the first of created things: not that creation is in existence itself as in a subject, since passive creation is an accident which requires the presence of a subject, but it is in the created thing as in a subject. But creation, insofar as it is a relation, terminates the reference (3) per se in the very existence of the created thing, and through the existence itself, in the thing.

p 56

This is evident, since the extreme of the relation itself is really in the creature; which would not happen, unless the creature should really have existence. But existence itself is receptive of no accident, but the subject which exists is that which is receptive. Wherefore in a thing having existence according to what the relation has in common with other accidents (4), the relation pertains to the thing; but according to its proper formality, which is to be referred to another, it pertains per se to the very existence of the thing, through which the thing is referred to God. For the divine existence is the ultimate explanation for creation, since through creation everything commonly approaches in participating in existence, to the extent that it is possible for these to do so, but not to participate in the divine nature; for this is not participated in by creatures, although there be there existence, nature, wisdom and power or other like qualities; for things of this kind do appear in a few things.

p 57

597 In generation however, the thing generated is not brought to participate in the existence of the generator, but to participate in its nature; otherwise, since existence pertains to the individual substance, in such a nature there would be participation in the individual substance, and thus Socrates would generate Socrates; wherefore in generation, Socrates does not generate Socrates, since the individual substance does not have but one individual, incommunicable existence, but man generates man; for the nature remains one according to the formality of the nature, since the definition is one. Still God does not create God; for God is the name of a nature, just like man is; being however creates being; therefore the relation of a creature to God is founded on the existence of the creature.

p 58

But the relation of one thing to another principally is founded on the things themselves, as has been said; therefore action of a creature properly is terminated in the thing (hence, a composite, according to the Philosopher. in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* (5). is that which is generated. For the composite has

the nature of the generator); as a consequence, in the very existence, since existence is of the composite.

p 58

But the action of God by which he produces the total thing simultaneously constituted from its principles, terminates in existence itself, which is most formal and intimate in a thing, since in the very existence of the thing the other extreme of relation is safeguarded, as has been said.

p 58

598 From what has been said therefore, it is manifest that the action of God, which is called creation, produces the total thing together with its principles, from which the thing is constituted in its existence, which is the object of creation, as has been said. And therefore those things are not said to be created of which there is no such existence, such as, e.g., the material form and matter, or even the very properties of such a thing; but all these rather are said to be concreated.

p 59

The human soul, however, though a form, since it has a *per se esse*, even though this has been acquired in the body and not outside the body, and also, it is not produced from matter as other forms, is more properly said to be created than are other forms.

p 59

For if there is considered the term of inception, which is nothing, or absolute non-being, since the soul does not arise from any matter, it is absolutely created. But if we should consider the term of completion, which is existence in which creation is terminated: and existence does not accrue to the human soul in its beginning but to the man, as Avicenna (6) taught; then the term of completion is not said to be created. But this same existence of the soul which is not found in other forms, is communicated to the body. And so creation is intermingled in the generation of man. For in other works of nature or art, in which things matter is not produced in its essence, but the composite through the change of matter, creation is only presupposed.

p 59

599 A difficulty can arise concerning the aforesaid.

p 59

For since existence is the term of creation, as has been said, not only is the composite, which subsists, said to exist, but also the matter itself, or even the accidents themselves; hence it seems that creation should be terminated in the matter and in the accidents; for everything which has an essence in extra-mental reality, necessarily will acquire existence through the nature of its essence; and if existence is acquired by these through some other thing, nothing is acquired. Hence some kind of contradiction seems to be implied when it is said: "Matter is a certain essence, but without existence:" that it is an essence, means it exists in some way, it would seem, and if it exists, it has existence; for that which is without existence, does not have existence. Whence it seems that an essence which is posited without existence, at the same time has existence and does not have existence.

p 60

600 To answer this difficulty we should note that while, as Boethius observes, what exists, might have added to itself something extraneous to its nature, existence itself cannot receive anything that is not pertinent to it; and hence separated existence, which is God, is most simple. But when, then, in anything whatsoever something is found in addition to the nature of the thing itself, as if coming to it from without, it is certain that that thing is not the same as its existence; and this is common to all creatures. For in all

creatures there are certain accidents besides that which pertains to the species of the thing and in this all creatures differ from God.

p 61

601 Furthermore, in the creatures themselves there is a difference: because *in certain creatures* the thing existing in the nature and the nature itself are the same insofar as it is that which pertains to the genus of the thing, even though the thing existing in a nature will be the subject of the accidents. And so it differs from the nature, because in the former there is the individual substance of the species with all the things surrounding it and these are the accidents which follow the individual. But the thing existing in the nature and the nature are the same, each in itself perfectly corresponding to the notion of the species and individual (7).

p 61

But *in others*, as in material things, the individual or the thing existing in a nature differs from the nature itself not only through accidents which are connected to the individual, as for example, quantity and the like, but through something which pertains to its own genus. Thus just as the formality of genus and difference in these are not taken from one simple thing, but the formality of genus is taken from matter, and the formality of difference from form; so in these the formality of species arises from one source, namely from the form; and the formality of individual arises from another source, as it is from matter. For the form determines the species and therefore the difference is said to constitute the species and the matter the individual.

p 62

602 Therefore it is clear that in material things an individual differs from a species through something pertaining to its own genus, and not only by its accidents. But in simple things as individual differs from the species only by its accidents and not by something pertaining to its genus, and therefore in these there are as many species as there are individuals.

p 62

But because it has been said that the notion of genus is taken from matter, that of difference from form, and that the matter causes the individual and the form causes the species: therefore it should be understood that "the difference is taken from the form" and "the form constituting the species" are the same: since a difference, taken as specific, determines a species; that "the genus be taken from the matter" and that "the matter causes the individual" are the same: since a genus is formed by an act of the intellect abstracting the universal from the particular matter, which is the principle of individuation. Hence it is that just as matter rather than form is primary in the constitution of things, so genus rather than the difference is primary.

p 62

603 Therefore from what has been said, it is manifest that in God alone existence, nature and individual substance are the same in all ways. But in immaterial things the nature and the individual substance are the same in all those things which pertain to the same genus. But in composed things all the aforementioned are different from each other.

p 63

Therefore in God existence equally belongs to the nature itself and to the thing existing in the nature, and hence the divine nature (8) does not acquire existence from some individual substance of the divine nature; and therefore the divine essence is the existent, although this is not signified as that which has existence but as that by which something exists.

p 63

But that the divine essence is the existent is clear, since nothing operates unless that it has existence. However, since the divine essence creates and governs all things it necessarily has existence. Consequently, it is not necessary to place in the divinity some individual substance of the essence, so that the essence might have existence, even though the mode of an individual substance, which is to have existence, is not (9) found; but it is due to the perfection of the divine essence itself that it is its own existence, and therefore not only is it that by which something is, but in itself, it is the perfectly subsistent and the perfectly existent.

p 63

604 But in simple things, since the individual substance and the essence are the same, as has been said, and differ according to reason, essence necessarily will be that which exist just as is the absolutely individual substance. However, as they differ by reason: for an essence is that by which something exists, and the individual substance is that which exists; therefore since essence is not its own existence, essence in these things is said to have existence through the individual substance, nevertheless, they are the same in reality, as has been said.

p 64

On the other hand, in material things, in which the thing existing in the nature and the nature itself differ, and both differ from existence itself, as has been said: the nature (10) does not have existence unless in the thing existing in the nature, which is the existent, for in every instance, the individual substance in every nature is the existent in that nature.

p 64

605 Moreover, according to the Philosopher, in the Predicaments (11), the individual substance and the thing existing in the nature in the genus of substance, is first substance, to which it belongs to exist per se, as is said in the same work, and not in another like an accident or a part; and not only this, but it is not predicated of another, by which it differs from second substances, which are predicated of others, although they are not in others.

p 64

Since then, it is proper to an individual substance contained in the genus of substance to exist per se: all others, as accidents and parts and the universals themselves, which the intellect constructs, do not subsist per se, but depend on first substance, which, when it is destroyed, it is impossible that something of these others remain under their proper formalities: as man or animal does not remain once each and every individual has been destroyed, nor will something remain which possess the formality of a part of these things, nor some accident of these, once the individuals themselves have been destroyed; essence in material things does not have existence, since it differs from its existence; but the individual substance itself is that which exists, from which, again, essence itself differs.

p 65

Whence, in material things existence does not follow essence except when the principles of the essence, namely matter and form, constitute the individual substance existing per se, which is first substance, which cannot be dependent on another, but subsists per se in perfect existence. Hence it is manifest that the parts of animate things, as hands and feet and the like, which are in proximate potency especially to the act which accrues to them solely by a division from the whole and without a production of some new essence, have, then, another existence altogether, which does not follow from the aforementioned essence, because its principles do not constitute some other actually existing thing or first substance, to which it is proper to have existence per se, and which latter belongs to the essence through the suppositum and not otherwise, since the essence does not have existence unless through the individual substance itself, of which it is to have existence as has been said

have existence, as has been said.

p 66

606 Hence from what has been said, it follows that it is not permissible to say that everything about which a proposition can be formed, has real existence, I mean the existence that follows essence. Therefore when it is said "Blindness is in the eye" it is not meant that blindness has existence following an essence, since privation does not have an essence, but rather there is signified that the eye lacks a certain perfection.

p 66

Similarly when it is said "First matter is *per accidens* non-being," this is not intended to mean that some existence follows the essence of matter itself, because it would be an act which of itself is not found in first matter, since it is pure potency, but what is signified is that the essence of matter is subjected to privation, for which reason it is called non-being, not absolutely, which is nothing, but only *in a certain genus*: as it is the privation itself which is the sharer of absolute non-being, which is the other extreme of contradiction and is closer than the other extreme of contraries, which places something in the nature of the thing itself. And because of this, the holy Augustine (12) says that matter is almost nothing; which is because of the privation it has conjoined with it.

p 67

607 From what has been said it is easy to solve those objections which were mentioned above.

p 67

For only that is said to be created which has existence; and this is the individual or first substance, whose act is existence per se. But matter is not said to exist unless through such an individual substance, as is also the case with accidents. And therefore they are said to be concreated rather than created. Nor is there an implication of a contradiction in the statement that "Matter is a certain essence," if its existence does not follow the essence itself: because when it is said that matter is a certain essence, the same thing is predicated of itself, because matter is its essence and this is true of all simple things. But this does not denote that some existence follows an essence, because in all created things existence differs from the thing itself. Nor is it necessary that whenever "is" is place in some proposition that some existence correspond in the reality, as has been said.

Chapter V. The process by which one contrary arises from another contrary.

p 68

608 Now there remains to be shown the process by which one contrary arises from another contrary. Since change between extremes of a contradiction or from privation to possession cannot be made through nature, as has been said, for there are no changes of this sort; hence it remains that change through nature is only between contraries, between which, according to the Philosopher (1), motion is had.

p 68

609 It should be understood therefore that contraries are properly found in active and passive qualities, which are peculiar properties of natural bodies. Whence a body cannot be despoiled of these qualities, unless it is corrupted, as heat cannot be removed from fire unless the fire is corrupted; for the heat of the fire inseparably follows the substantial form of the fire itself, and consequently, once the heat has corrupted the fire necessarily will corrupt.

p 68

Moreover, alteration which consists in action and passion, takes place in terms of these qualities. Indeed they are properly termed passions, for through these something is always rejected from the thing. And hence when a perfect alteration is effected and this is completed, the contrary quality necessarily is rejected, and its subject, which is an actual being, is corrupted; and nothing remains except first matter alone under a newly induced form since, according to the Philosopher in the book Generation and Corruption (2), the corruption of one thing is the generation of another. Whence it is impossible that generation come about without a preceding alteration.

p 69

610 And this is evident, when from one element another element arises, which are qualitative contraries, as is fire and water; but in those which qualitatively agree, as in those things having a common factor, as is fire and air, an alteration does not seem to be so evident. But because it is impossible that the same quality remain in diverse bodies, since an accident does not pass from one subject into another, it will be necessary that an alteration take place in the generation of fire from air. Therefore it should be perceived that alteration occurs in different ways.

p 69

611 For every quality of natural bodies has two terms: hence the quality is not found beyond or below these. Therefore the nature of an alteration must be examined in the light of this: for it is one thing in beings that are generated through intensification, and another in beings that are generated through the process of remission.

p 69

For when fire is generated from air, the generation takes place through an intensity of the air's heat and for this reason none of the heat is removed throughout the whole alteration but it is always intensified. And because it has a term beyond which it cannot be intensified, when the heat of the fire is intensified beyond this term the total amount of the air's heat is at once removed and not by the removal of one part after another; whence the privation produced in the air more thoroughly expels something, not by a gradual reduction of part after part, but because of its intensification it more and more promotes the simultaneous removal of the totality.

p 70

But when air comes from fire, the heat of the fire is gradually lessened; for this occurs through a remission. For just as we see that fire in foreign matter, as in wood, has less heat than in its proper matter, so when its matter is disposed to another form so much more of its heat is decreased, and the greater it is disposed, the greater will the heat be diminished. And similarly when elements not having a common factor are generated from themselves, alteration always occurs through remission.

p 70

612 When therefore the Philosopher says (3) that change is easier in those things having a common factor, this does not mean that the same quality remains in both, but that lesser resistance and a lesser distance of potency from act is in elements sharing in a common factor than in others: which is evident from this that the total amount of the heat of the air remains along with that of fire right up to its corruption. But still it

should be noted that in elements having a common factor, as fire and air, one more readily arises from the other of these than in a converse order, for fire more readily arises from air, than air from fire, because the quality of fire among all elementary qualities is especially active and therefore it is not very easily acted upon.

p 71

613 But in mixed bodies the terms, within which the nature of the thing is preserved, are taken in different ways: *one way* on the part of the mixture itself; another way on the part of the different species, for which there are required different proportions of the mixed elements.

p 71

On the part of *the mixture itself* there are terms, which when they have been passed a simple element immediately arises, whose power was dominant over the other elements in the mixture. But on the part of *the proportion* of the mixed elements, since this is required for different forms (4) and for different existences, there are likewise terms. And therefore, when one proportion is lacking, a form giving a new existence follows.

p 71

614 Still it should be considered that one form of a mixed body, as for example the human soul, is not preserved in some indivisible of the same proportion, but with a certain latitude, yet within fixed terms of the nature; and it does not necessarily follow that when one term is exceeded, the form of a simple element is immediately induced, rather another mixed thing can follow. Whence the terms of a mixture, taken absolutely, within which the nature of the mixed thing can be preserved, are more distant from themselves, than the terms within which man or an animate thing, whatsoever, is preserved.

p 72

But when the terms themselves of a mixture, taken absolutely, have been passed nothing results except a simple thing: whence since the simple element, into which the mixed thing is resolved, is ultimate, necessarily the simple element was first in its constitution, not only as a potency, but, according to the Philosopher (5), as that whose power remains in the mixed thing; and this power is changed from one proportion to another, by generating and corrupting the species of the mixed thing, until it has been brought back to the proper nature.

p 72

615 Hence when one mixed thing comes from another, it is not necessary that the elements again agree; furthermore, the powers of the elements, by causing different proportions of the mixture, cause diverse mixed things; therefore when death comes from a living thing both are preserved within the terms of the mixture, but not within the terms of the proportion required for a determined species. But when a simple element comes from a mixed thing, not only is the term of the proportion of the mixed elements passed but also the terms of the mixture; nevertheless both are effected through the power of the elementary forms which, according to the Philosopher (6), remain in the mixed thing.

p 73

616 From this it is clear that the power of the dominant elemental form in a mixture has the ability not only to dissolve the mixture, but to change it from one set of proportions among the components to another until its own form is absolutely predominant. And therefore, although the form of a cadaver is not virtually present in a living body: the cadaver does not enter into the structure of the living body, though it effects whatever is contained in the virtue of the other, as is manifested in the case of the elements constituting a mixture: there is nonetheless in the living body an elemental power which by nature tends to dissolve that proportion among the mixed elements which safeguards life: and consequent on it another form appears

proportion among the mixed elements which generates life, and consequent on it another form appears giving a new being. For it is evident that there was no power acting through that form (*forma cadaveris*) in the mixture, which would be the case were the form virtually in the mixture; but that form was in the mixture not by reason of its own power but by that of the elemental form, as has been said.

p 74

617 From what has been said, it is manifest that, although the extremes of absolute contradiction and also of privative opposition are not subjected to created potency, still the extremes of contrariety are subjected to it: for both place something in extra-mental reality. And therefore, it is clear that one extreme of contrariety removes to a lesser degree the potency of matter from the act of the other extreme, than in contradiction or privative opposition; which latter cannot be effected except by an infinite power, as has been said.

p 74

But a difficulty can arise about this because the terms of physical generation are being and non-being, which are contradictories: and also because absolute generation terminates in a substance. But nothing is contrary to substance, according to the Philosopher (7). Hence from these two it seems that the extremes of contradiction are more subject to a natural power than the extremes of contrariety.

p 74

618 Hence to clarify this one must consider that existence is the term of generation; and thus no matter how much is acquired prior to existence itself, the thing is not said to be generated: and this is, according to the Philosopher (8), to exist unqualifiedly. And because one thing cannot simultaneously possess two diverse unqualified existences; and moreover any existence other than an unqualified one is not to be found in substance but in accidents in which there is variability; therefore upon the advent of one existence some other is always lost and vice versa; and so, according to the Philosopher (9), generation and corruption follow each other.

p 75

But this existence is not existence in common, but this or that composed existence in a determined species; for every natural agent is in some species, and therefore its action does not extend to existence which is not in its species, such as is existence taken in common, which is the other extreme of an absolute contradiction, as has been said. Similarly, non-being, which is the term of inception in simple generation, is not absolute non-being but this particular non-being; for, according to the Philosopher to be something but not in act is to be it in potency.

p 75

But to a being in potency there necessarily is joined another actual being, because there is never a being in pure potency without some act; otherwise matter would exist without form. And for this reason these extremes are subjected to a natural power; for being in potency insofar as it is conjoined to an actual thing is subject to a natural agent; for a natural agent always requires an actual subject in which it acts. And therefore the end of its action is the removal of the prior act and the induction of a new act.

p 76

619 From these notions it is manifest that non-being is not simple outside of any genus, but is a negation of something existing within a genus (10), as a principle is in a genus. For an act is one of those principles which are in a genus; because a genus is divided by act and potency: therefore negation of this or that act pertains to the same genus, because it negates in that genus and not in another: hence the non-being, which is the term in absolute generation, pertains to the genus of substance. Therefore a contradiction is found between these extremes through reduction, as has been said above concerning non-white, which is opposed to black: for nothing which is non-white is so non-white that it is not black (11) or an intermediate

COLOR.

p 76

620 Still the reduction of this last opposition into contradiction occurs differently in one and the other cases: for in those qualities both extremes are something actual in themselves, as blackness and whiteness. And therefore a negation can be taken from both parts, for black and non-black can be substituted for white and non-white.

p 76

But in absolute generation one extreme is not something actual in itself, as is evident in the case of first matter, although it must have a conjoined act (12). And hence a negation cannot be taken from both parts, but only from one. Therefore a reduction of contrary extremes into contradictories is effected in absolute generation, because one term, namely this or that being acquired through generation, is by its quality opposed to the quality of the act joined to the being in potency, as fire is said to be contrary to water because of the nature of heat and cold. Therefore just as one says that the non-white, which is black or an intermediate, is opposed to white, and not any other non-white; so this non-actual being or this being in potency, to which there is joined some other actual being, is opposed to this actual being.

p 77

621 Therefore from what has been said it is clear that to the other extreme of an absolute contradiction, namely to being, both extremes of generation pertain, namely this being and this non-being, which is being in potency. For being in potency in some way pertains to being. But by comparing one of these to the other, being in potency is, as it were, non-being, because that which is in potency, according to the Philosopher, does not yet exist; and similarly a white being and a non-white being, which is a black being or an intermediate color, pertain to being, although a non-white being or a black being compared to a white being is in a certain manner a non-being, since it reflects the meaner extreme of the contradiction.

p 78

622 But it is clear from what has been said that these are not absolute contradictories. For, according to the Philosopher (13), non-being, which is one extreme of generation, is not absolute non-being but that non-being which is the same as being in potency. And hence, it is manifest that for such a non-being and the opposite being, there is a common subject, namely matter; and this is the same concerning black or non-white, which has the same common subject as white. For there is a common subject of these which is an intermediate being. But contradictories do not have an intermediate, according to the Philosopher (14), as has been said above. Whence, these are contradictories through reduction of other oppositions into contradictories, because contradictory opposition is included in all other oppositions, as has been said above, as the prior is included in its posterior.

p 78

623 The sophists object to all this, saying that both extremes of contradiction are in a genus: their reason is because that which is nothing, can negate nothing: hence non-being, which is outside a genus, negates nothing. Also they add that contraries can at the same time be false, while this cannot be so with contradictories. Hence according to them, it does not seem that contrary opposition can be reduced to contradictories.

p 79

624 Therefore it should be said to these persons that *in one way* being is used to signify the truth of a proposition, as is said in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* (15): for true is the negation of being about something which is not, as its affirmation is concerning that which is; and, on the other hand, a false affirmation of a being will necessarily be about that which is not and the negation of being about that which

is. For an enunciation is called true or false, according to the Philosopher (16), by reason of the fact that a thing is or is not. And hence, that which is nothing does not deny anything which is being but denies something which is not being.

p 79

And therefore "what is nothing, denies nothing" can be taken *in two ways*.

p 79

In one way on the part of the predicate: and this is that which is denied; and so it is true that which is nothing denies nothing, because that which is not nothing is something, and to be something is something, and this is denied through one of the contradictories.

p 79

In another way on the part of the subject, and so being can be removed from that which truly is not. Hence, since to deny pertains to the composition, which is common to the subject and the predicate, that, since on the part of the subject it has nothing, possesses the formality of non-being; but on the part of the predicate, the composition itself has something; and therefore on the part of the subject it removes the nature of the thing and the role of the subject; but on the part of the predicate, it does not remove the nature but only the inherence.

p 80

625 And that they say contraries are able to be false at the same time, but not contradictories, this occurs in propositions by reason of the signs which in contraries, from both parts, are universal, in contradictories, however, this is not so, but only on one part.

p 80

For when some predicate is contingently in some subject, it cannot be universally affirmed or denied about that except falsely; and therefore falsity, which is in such propositions, occurs because what is assumed as the subject of the contraries is not the subject by reason of itself but by reason of something belonging to it, which is, however, incapable of being denominated such in itself. Hence falsity arises on the part of the subject and not on the part of the contraries: and therefore it is caused from the addition of the signs; for signs have to be added to subjects.

p 80

But if only the nature of these contraries are considered, between which there is opposition, there will not be a community in falsity. For if a subject, insofar as it is naturally subjected to contraries, as e.g., a body, is employed, it is impossible to simultaneously falsely affirm and deny about it one member of the contraries: as for example, if some man is taken as the subject of health and disease, the affirmation of one contrary concerning him, is the negation of the very thing, which is the affirmation of the other; and therefore neither are they true nor false at the same time, just as absolute contradictories are not true or false at the same time.

p 81

626 Therefore when something is contrarily found in opposites, it should be determined whether this is on the part of the subject or on the part of the extremes. If it is on the part of the extremes it must be attributed to opposition essentially. But if it is on the part of the subject it is only attributed accidentally. And hence it happens that two contrary propositions are at the same time false on the part of the subject of the proposition and not by reason of the extremes, as has been said. And therefore when one of the extremes is denied concerning some subject, as e.g., white, it is evident that this negation supposes something from which it removes whiteness, namely the subject, and also that which is removed

which it removes whiteness, namely the subject, and also that which is removed.

p 81

But in absolute contradictories something in the manner of a subject is not presupposed (17), since they do not have an intermediate, as has been said. But there is not change in relative opposites; nevertheless sometimes the relation itself follows change, as do relative which follow generation naturally. But in other genera, upon which the relation is founded, there is either change between the extremes themselves, as generation between being and non-being, and this pertains to the genus of substance; or the genus itself consists in change itself, as action and passion. But change has many species, as is evident in the book of the *Physics* (18), but motion, which is one species, is contained only in three genera, as is evident in this same work (19).

p 82

And these words which have been written about the four opposites, should be adequate.