Titlepage

p iii

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
ON
The Virtues
(IN GENERAL)

Translated
with
Introduction and Notes
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p iii

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p iii

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p v

Affectionately
Dedicated
to
My Mother and Father

p vi

He composed a substantial moral theology, capable of directing all human acts in accordance with the supernatural last end of man. And so he is the perfect theologian, so he gives infallible rules and precepts of life not only for individuals, but also for civil and domestic society which is also the object of moral science, both economic and politic . . .

p vi

His eminence in the learning of asceticism is no less remarkable; for he brought the whole science of morals back to the theory of the virtues and gifts, and marvellously defined both the science and the theory in relation to the various conditions of man, both those who desire to live the ordinary life and those who desire to attain to Christian perfection and fullness of spirit, in the active no less than in the contemplative life. If anyone, therefore, desires to understand fully all the implications of the commandment to love God, the growth of charity and the conjoined gifts of the Holy Ghost, the difference between the various states of life . . . and the nature and value of each, all these and other questions of ascetical and mystical theology, he must have recourse in the first place to the Angelic Doctor.

—Pius XI, Encyclical Studiorum
Ducem, June, 29, 1923.

Table of Contents

Translator's Introduction

1. THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS †1

Text-books, learned monographs, articles, treatises, and commentaries—even the best of these—fail in one way or another to provide a complete and perfect understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas

way or another to provide a complete and perfect understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. Before all else, the works themselves of the Angelic Doctor must be zealously sought out. Massoulié voiced this incontrovertible truth when he advised: "If you wish to understand St. Thomas, read him; he is his own best interpreter." This is not to belittle secondary sources; it is but to acclaim the Primary.

p ix

Which works of Thomas should be read? The ultimate answer is, of course: read everything he has written. To narrow the field, the *Summa Theologiae* must certainly be read; it is the very best of Thomas. No other single work of his will prove so rewarding of the amount of time and effort expended on it as this, his masterpiece. But note carefully: the *Summa Theologiae* is a profound and genuinely concise *synthesis*, the rich, ripe fruit of Aquinas' intellectual and spiritual maturity. That it may be taken up and studied with supreme joy and profit, it is eminently wise, not to say imperative, to become acquainted with St. Thomas' other, more particularized works. The mind of Thomas will reveal itself all the more clearly and forcefully in the vast ocean of the great *Summa* after a judicious and extended examination has been undertaken of the several streams which flowed up to it. In writing the *Summa*, St. Thomas himself presupposed on the part of the reader or student a knowledge of philosophy and some acquaintance with the principle truths of faith or Sacred Scripture. This presupposition is often laid aside in his other writings; so that in these very works the doctrines which receive but brief notice in various places in the *Summa* may be traced out, in ordered, complete fashion, sometimes with an astounding wealth of historical and scientific detail. The same arguments masterfully arrayed in the *Summa Theologiae* will be presented in these less known works, often in much greater elaboration.

p x

Among these other works of St. Thomas, the most outstanding are the *Disputed Questions* (*Quaestiones Disputatae*). As Master in Sacred Theology, St. Thomas conducted 'ordinary' disputations once every week from 1256 to 1259, and twice weekly from 1265 to 1272. The number of these exercises thus runs into the hundreds, whereas most of Thomas' contemporaries can be credited with no more than a few dozen. An eminent contemporary theologian, Matthias von Scheeben, has remarked concerning these Questions of Aquinas': "They are in a certain sense the golden key to an intelligent grasp of the Holy Doctor's other works." †2

p x

The Disputed Questions in their present form are the outcome of three stages in the academic exercises previously mentioned. At the first session the Master proposed a general or specific topic of his own choice, which was to be the subject of the disputation, e.g.: truth, evil, the power of God, the Angels, etc. A Bachelor or other qualified subordinate appointed by the Master would then state the question, clearly and succinctly, pointing up such controversy as surrounded it, either currently or in the past. Those present, both students and masters (especially, it would seem, the latter) raised objections to the thesis thus briefly stated, or brought forth difficulties which demanded solution. The Bachelor or the Master himself replied to these objections immediately, at the same time fully exposing the true, positive doctrine. Thus went the first and most solemn session. The discussions lasted over as long a period of time—days, weeks, or even months †3-as the subject warranted. All objections were solved, difficulties removed as far as possible, and the complete doctrine presented.

p x

At the next session, the Master summed up all that had preceded in the course of the dispute, and personally and definitively resolved the question at hand. Only one who enjoyed the rank of *Magister* had the power and the right to pronounce finally or "determine" a question.

p xi

Lastly, the proceedings were written up, either by the Master himself or through others. If it seemed

Lastly, the proceedings were written up, either by the Master himself or through others. If it seemed opportune, these were published, in the form of articles and questions. This final, published version is what we know today as the *Disputed Questions*. †4

p xi

The method followed by St. Thomas in the *Disputed Questions* may be conveniently described by a comparison of it with that employed in his *Summa Theologiae*. The latter work is professedly aimed at instructing beginners. Hence the concise, direct style and, as far as possible, avoidance of abstruse and involved questions. The number of questions and articles is reduced to a minimum, and these are arranged according to the order of discipline, or pedagogy, for the benefit of students not far advanced. †5

p xi

On the other hand, the *Disputed Questions*, being the finished product of intense and elevated academic discussion, will be more readily appreciated by the more proficient student and by the professor. The articles are arranged, not according to the order of discipline, necessarily, but as those present at the disputation required, or as the occasion arose. In these truly *magisterial* works, St. Thomas at times refers explicitly to and solves the most pressing doctrinal problems of his day. There is a decidedly professional tone to this treatment, always lucid and rigorous and often quite extensive. The holy Doctor writes manifestly from a marvelous abundance of the most exquisite erudition and profound contemplation.

p xi

The format of the articles in all the *Disputed Questions* will be recognized immediately by one familiar with the *Summa Theologiae*. Each article has four component parts, prefaced by a statement in which the subject matter of the article is indicated, thus: "In this article the question is . . ." A contradictory (rarely a contrary) proposition then introduces the objections, thus: "It would seem that . . ." The number of objections or difficulties (*dubitabilia*: doubts or problems) in a single article is frequently large, much greater, usually, than in a parallel article of the *Summa*. These objections represent genuine difficulties; they are not mere straw figures, but push every possible angle of attack, striking at the very heart of the question at hand. Some of the objections raise difficulties of logic—something rarely seen in the *Summa*—and many reach to the utmost metaphysical foundations of reality, natural and supernatural. An occasional contrary argument may be inserted among the objections; this is answered at once, before proceeding with the next objection. In the formal statements *On the contrary*, one or more authorities are generally cited in favor of the thesis which St. Thomas himself will defend. Should the reasons adduced by any of these authorities require correction or further distinction, these are made either at the beginning of the *Solutio* or Body of the Article, or in the replies to the objections. The solution begins with the stock phrase "I reply." One or more distinctions are drawn at the outset, upon which the resolution of the question is to be based. Lastly, the objections are answered, one by one, directly and conclusively.

p xii

Before setting forth his own mind on the truth of things, in the Body of the article, St. Thomas not infrequently constructs a very gratifying historical apparatus, something seldom done in the *Summa Theologiae*. The actual solution is skillfully reduced to its proper, proximate principles, when this is called for. Nothing is ever gratuitously affirmed or denied. Guided and moved always by the sole desire to defend and expose the truth, St. Thomas meets difficulties squarely, never lightly dismissing or sidestepping the opinions of his adversaries.

p xii

It cannot be denied, certainly, that for conciseness and orderly, progressive arrangement, the *Summa*, excells the *Disputed Questions*. However, the latter are uniformly superior in historical syntheses of opinions, breadth and inclusiveness of doctrine, and refutation of errors current in St. Thomas' day. It would not be an exaggeration to characterize many of the articles of the *Summa Theologiae* as more or less

would not be an exaggeration to characterize many of the articles of the *Summa Theologiae* as more or less compressed transcriptions of corresponding questions treated in Thomas' magisterial works, the *Disputed Questions*. At the same time, as Pere Coconnier observes: "The *Disputed Questions* in many instances would seem to be nothing other than a most illuminating and faithful commentary on the *Summa Theologiae*." †6

p xii

Ever mindful of ancient and contemporary controversies, St. Thomas has in fact given us a set of *disputed* Questions. Yet a question argued by the Angelic Doctor is practically a defined, in the sense of ultimately resolved, question. He exposes doctrine as a master, with sure, forceful expression, passing over personal prejudice in his burning love for truth, and truth alone. The venerable Dominican theologian, Fr. Xantes Marialis (+1660), who has edited many of St. Thomas' works, declared, in the preface to his Commentaries on the *Disputed Questions*: "I am eighty years old and have been engaged in studies from my youth. I declare in all sincerity that I have profited far more in these three or four years I have spent in editing these Questions than in the entire preceding course of my life." †7

p xiii

2. ON THE VIRTUES IN GENERAL

A. General Plan, nature of the work, date of composition.

The Virtues in General is one of five *Disputed Questions* on the virtues composed by St. Thomas during his second sojourn in Paris. The five Questions are commonly listed in the following order: 1. *The Virtues in General* (*De Virtutibus in Communi*), 2. *On Charity* (*De Caritate*), c. *On Fraternal Correction* (*De Correctione Fraterna*), 4. *On Hope* (*De Spe*), 5. *The Cardinal Virtues* (*De Virtutibus Cardinalibus*). The titles plainly indicate that these Questions do not form an integral, organically coherent tract on the virtues, nor did the author intend that they should. Like the other *Disputed Questions*, these five were argued and subsequently written during different years, as the occasion required, with no conscious or resulting connection between them other than the similarity of their subject matter.

p xiii

The Virtues in General is rightly placed before the other four Questions, in keeping with the Aristotelian principle of proceeding from the universal to the particular, from general principles to specific applications. Moreover, the present Question is easily seen to be the most sweeping and penetrating of the series. In this work, St. Thomas lays the solid, indispensable foundations for the Questions which are to follow, by an analysis of the very nature of virtue, its increase, its kinds, whether it is in the mean, and other basic issues.

p xiii

That the Question on *The Virtues in General* was conducted by St. Thomas for his more advanced students, we may infer from the close preciseness of its methods and the exhaustive treatment of its matter. The work comprises thirteen articles and may be divided into four parts: 1) The definition or nature of virtue (Articles 1 and 2); 2) The subject of virtue (Articles 3 to 7); 3) The efficient cause of virtue (Articles 8 to 10); 4) Properties and kinds of virtue (Articles 11 to 13). It will be recognized that the first three sections correspond to what may be considered, respectively, as the formal, material, and efficient causes of virtue. The final cause of virtue, which is to make its subject *good*, is delineated by St. Thomas throughout the entire treatise, but particularly in the first two Articles. This division contains all the pertinent elements included in the tract on the virtues in the *Summa*, I-II, qq. 55-67, with the exception of

pertinent elements included in the tract on the virtues in the *Summa*, I-II, qq. 55-67, with the exception of certain properties of virtue, such as their connection and duration (q. 65 and q. 67), and certain detailed distinctions and comparisons among the virtues (qq. 59 and 60). The other locus for Aquinas' doctrines on the virtues in general is his commentary on the second Book of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. Here, of course, it is a question of acquired or natural virtues only, not at all of those which exceed our natural power of attainment and are infused by God. Nevertheless, the universal, essential notes attached to virtue as such, not considering its efficient or formal cause, are taken over by St. Thomas from the *Ethics*, and adapted and applied to the virtues as these are understood in the present *Disputed Question*.

p xiv

This *Question* is not formally a purely philosophical inquiry or disquisition; it is supernatural Ethics, moral, sacred Theology in the fullest sense. The holy Doctor follows Aristotle as far as the Philosopher can lead him but throughout the entire work it is clearly a question of Christian virtue, and not properly of the acquired habits known to the pagan Greeks. Virtue is not an end in itself (and this is true for Aristotle, as well as for the Christian moralist): it is primarily a means, ordered to the attainment of supreme happiness, the Beatific Vision, which is man's true end. Thus in the *Compendium of Theology*, St. Thomas observes: "There is such a definite way of arriving at happiness, namely, the practice of virtue. Nothing will reach its end unless it performs well the operations proper to it. A plant will not bear fruit if the procedure natural to it is not followed. A runner will not win a trophy or a soldier a citation, unless each of them carries out his proper functions. To say that a man discharges his proper office is equivalent to saying that he acts virtuously; for the virtue of any being is that which makes its possessor good and also makes his work good, as is stated in the second book of the *Ethics* (II, 6; 1106 a 15). Accordingly, since the ultimate end of man is eternal life, of which we spoke previously (chap. 150), not all attain it, but only those who act as virtue requires." †8 As God is the efficient Cause of infused virtue, so He is its ultimate End, or rather the End which man attains through virtue. "Besides, as we have said above, not natural things alone but also human affairs, are contained under divine providence, and this not only in general but in particular (cf. chaps. 123, 133, 143). But He who has care of individual men has disposal of the rewards to be assigned for virtues and of the punishments to be inflicted for sin. For punishment has a medicinal value with regard to sin and restores right order when violated by sin, as we stated above (chap. 121); and the reward of virtue is happiness, to be granted by God's goodness. Therefore God will not grant happiness to those who act against virtue, but will assign as punishment the opposite of happiness, namely, extreme wretchedness." †9 The two orders, of nature and of grace, are unequivocally and repeatedly distinguished, although never set at odds against each other. Thus the sources drawn upon by St. Thomas include Sacred Scripture, the Greek and Latin Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and a few early scholastic theologians, as well as Aristotle and one or two other Greek and Latin philosophers.

p xv

St. Thomas delivered his *Disputed Questions* on the virtues while he held the Chair of Sacred Theology for the second time at the University of Paris. In 1269, Louis IX, the Saint-King of France, invited him back to the world-renowned seat of learning where Thomas had shone with unrivaled splendor a decade earlier. The next year Thomas defended certain of the theological theses he had proposed against the redoubtable Franciscan, Master John Peckham. In 1272 he left Paris once again, nor was he ever to return. During these three years, from 1269 to 1272, Aquinas' literary output was truly amazing. Among the fruits of his labors at this period were his magnificent Commentaries on Job and on the Gospel according to St. John, commentaries on five or six works of Aristotle, seven of his twelve *Quodlibeta*, †10 over a dozen Opuscula, and, most important, the entire *Pars Secunda* of the *Summa Theologiae*. Lastly, besides the five on the virtues, there were other *Disputed Questions*, on a variety of subjects.

p xvi

Critical authorities disagree to some extent as regards the date of composition of these five *Questions* on the virtues. They are, at best, unanimous in assigning all five to St. Thomas' second stay in Paris, between

the years 1269-1272. †11 Synave †12 and Grabmann †13 indicate this three year period as the time of composition. Père Mandonnet narrows the span to the years 1270-1272. †14 Finally, Van Steenberghen †15 and others would date these Questions some time after *De Malo*, which they hold was written during the years 1271-1272. We are content, for present purposes, to accept the date more commonly agreed on, 1269-1272, when St. Thomas taught at Paris for the second time.

p xvi

B. Significance of a Treatise on the Virtues

In those fruitful years of the age of faith the importance of the study of virtue was universally recognized; the number of Questions devoted to the penetration of the truths involved and the thoroughness of the discussion vouch for the intense and appreciative interest of the participants. Indeed, as has been remarked, all the *Disputed Questions* are indicative of the topics of contemporary concern. Yet, the golden era of Catholic thought was quite aware that the principles sought and the truths unfolded were timeless as well as timely; that in very fact it was the ultimacy and fundamental character of the considerations which were the source of their vitality and gave solidity to their application.

p xvii

Today, while the need of scientific and accurate understanding of virtue is, if anything, far more urgent, the importance of such a study is either belittled or, more widely, ignored. The context of truth, in which virtue takes an outstanding role, has been swept from the modern mind. The magnificent affirmations of the nature of man, his world, and his God, articulated with growing clarity by pagan Greeks and Christian scholastics, have been replaced solely by denials. Ironically, those denials, proffered as necessary steps to what was to be, in Bacon's phrase, "the enlargement of man unto all things possible," have succeeded only in negating man himself. Never has man been so powerless, his world so small, his goals so empty, their achievement so frustrating. In making himself—a distorted, warped, and partial self—the measure of all things, man has seen his project of creating a new world hasten to the world's destruction. The "heaven on earth" envisioned as proximate to the grasp of human science and the inevitable term of a beneficent evolution has revealed qualities more symptomatic of the conditions of hell.

p xvii

The characterization of the modern mind and the modern world as hellish is no mere rhetorical exaggeration; doctrinal substantiation can be indicated. Nor is this to be sought solely in rampant pride and greed, constant strife, increasing selfishness, bestiality, hate and brutality. A defining trait of hell is the presence of wills, whether angelic or human, stubborn in maintaining their own absolute ultimacy. Such a will bows to no rule, acknowledges no measure beyond itself. For such a will intelligence performs no directive function; it can but be that will's most cunning and most useful slave. The limitations imposed by its nature occasion not restraint but constant straining; external violence issues at most in rebellious subjection.

p xvii

The seed of the modern mind and world was sown in the subjectivism revived in the Renaissance, called sacred in the religious revolt of the sixteenth century, brought to fruit in the materialism, naturalism, atheism of recent generations. The autonomy and ultimacy of the human will is proposed doctrinally, defended practically, made the justification and explanation of the present and the promise, good and bad, of the future. The denial of the human soul and its eternal destiny, the exclusion of God, the sensualism, relativism, and anti-dogmatism of contemporary theorizing are but facets of the will's refusal to admit any rule outside itself. The function of intelligence to grasp reality is negated even to the denial of reality itself, lest the will be forced to acknowledge itself in any way not measuring but measured. On such a basis

lest the will be forced to acknowledge itself in any way not measuring but measured. On such a basis moral science as normative of human living, directive of human aspirations, cannot but tend to vanish and be replaced by arts, whether called creative or healing. The intelligence is employed increasingly as a mere technological and therapeutic instrument. The result is, and cannot be otherwise than, an individual and international anarchy, a continuity of violence interrupted only by latent rebellion.

p xviii

The Christian insistence on the good life is more than timely; for an age which has all but lost sight of the true end of human life and of the indispensable means of attaining that end, emphasis on morals is imperative. It would not be presumptuous to assert that the most glaring deficiencies in private and social life today may be traced, in one significant area, to chaotic ignorance of orthodox moral standards. The special importance, now, of the study of virtue derives from this state of man and his world. The widespread misery and dissatisfaction consequent upon man's attempt to be an arbitrary, arrogant god affords springboard for a new focussing upon the true conditions of human happiness. Where the efforts to restore to truth its rightful place in terms of restatement of the doctrines of metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology, and psychology have met with rebuff, the expansion and enrichment of man inherent in Christian living gives hope of attracting men to Christian moral teaching. The goals proposed by and to the will of man revolted from God have of necessity been distortions of the true ends divinely given to human nature. Experiment has given each personal experience of those distortions; the time is ripe to reveal the truths they hide. The words by which the human spirit has been enticed to revolt from God have proved themselves to be rendered meaningless by that very revolt; only the return to God can give them fruitfulness.

p xix

The intrinsically theo-centric slant of Christian moral science must be insisted on and properly emphasized. In an excellent chapter on *Morality and Happiness*, †16 Father Vann voices this emphasis with striking simplicity: "Morality is the means whereby the self is brought gradually into conformity with the divine life, and therefore is the means whereby the desire for God is both expressed and fulfilled . . . if you will the end you necessarily will also the means to the end—and the means to God is morality in its fullness as a life of love and worship." And speaking of the ineluctable orientation of Thomistic moral ensemble, the same author notes that: "For St. Thomas, the moral life is simply the *motus in Deum*, the movement of the personality to fullness of life in God. A great deal of harm has been done by simply lifting the second part of the *Summa Theologica* out of its place in the whole work, and treating it as though it thus in isolation gave a complete picture of St. Thomas' view of the moral life. The second part is precisely a part of a whole. It is determined by what precedes and what follows ["by what follows": Christ, the uniquely perfect Exemplar of virtuous living!] In isolation therefore it is like a severed human hand. The *Summa* as a whole describes a circular movement, from God and back to God; man shares, and in a special way, in this cosmic process; and it is the whole man who thus shares, it is the whole psycho-physical personality, made in the image of the Creator." †17

p xix

In the work of restoring man to God, the world, and himself, by way of Christian moral teaching, the understanding of the virtues is of incalculable force. Thomas himself strongly affirms that practical science or Ethics is not sufficient to direct one's moral actions; for without the directive and regulative influence of the virtues a man may possess science and yet sin against virtue. †18 Yet the fundamental principles, the broad, governing outlines of successful moral living are to be found in the several considerations of the science of morals—*de facto*, of moral Theology. Without an understanding of virtue it is impossible fully to understand man, what he is and what is his destiny. Virtue is, after all, human happiness as it is lived out, attained in this life and in this world, as well as the road to the eternal happiness of heaven. Virtue further affords the key to the understanding of law, of the mission of the state, of the man we each might be (and must be, under pain of misery).

p xx

Apart from the consideration of virtue, law is without mooring. As such, law is ordered to the promotion of virtue. †19 If virtue remains hidden, or the concept of virtue is distorted, then law becomes tyranny or the monstrosity of being a man-made self-destruction. Because law has been divorced from virtue, it has been rendered unintelligible in itself, a thing of blind authority, exercised without reason and at the whim of the powerful; it has become a prime weapon in restricting human rights, instead of protecting and expanding them; it has become hateful, something to be circumvented, often despised. This attitude has been extended even to the laws of God. Emphasis upon law apart from virtue is a natural consequence of a doctrine (Protestantism) which reserves happiness to the few chosen (the self-righteous) and condemns the multitude. Because the privilege of virtue is for the few, the curb and check of law is for the many. Religion becomes a list of Thou shalt nots. The commandments are not gratefully reverenced as gifts lovingly given by a beneficent God to guide His people to happiness; they are regarded as the anathemas of a wrathful deity imposing punishment and breathing threats upon a wayward human race. They are rejected as thwarting natural impulses whereas they were given to unfold the powers of men to the influence and sharing of the divine life. Thus the Puritans turned from the concept of virtue as happiness and so made supreme virtues of intolerance and the hoarding of money and material wealth, and vices of joy and laughter and good fellowship. Oddly enough, their descendants have reversed, and find in the latter the only worthwhile virtues—see any issue of *Reader's Digest*. The fundamental distortion was the preference of pride to humility; and so Van Wyck Brooks tells of a New England woman who haughtily refused to kneel before God, Who was to her at best an equal.

p xx

So also the dignity of civil society is to be found in its aptitude to achieve and stabilize the conditions of human happiness. That happiness, in its realization of man's capacities and possibilities, consists particularly in the virtue of each member of society. How frighteningly true is this in a democratic state, where all, and not merely the heads of government, must be wise and good, since all retain by real participation the powers which they have freely delegated! A godless regime must lose sight of individual, personal happiness, and make the only virtue to be subservience to its almighty power. Man is emptied of his right to happiness—and so, of his right to be. The obedience owed to God, which unfolds the rich possibilities of man, gives way to slavery to the state unto the destruction of man. Such an oppressive regime well illustrates the relations maintaining between the intellectual and moral virtues: the truth must be hidden, lest men discover how to be men.

p xxi

At the opposite extreme, for long certain Western nations exaggerated the development of the individual at the expense of the common good. These very powers are gradually leaning (where they have not already fallen) to a position wherein the greatest virtue will be personal security. The drive of personal selfishness whereby so many peoples have grown great and strong is now backfiring. Little of nature remains to be exploited (except by modern science, which carries on its exploitation under the guise of intellectual or humanitarian progress), so men are turning to the exploitation of government. Specifically, illustration is afforded of the relation between the natural and supernatural virtues. Were there no original sin, natural virtue might develop in "our way of life." Because of original sin, supernatural help is needed, and supernatural light to indicate criteria in the (healing and) perfecting of human nature. A multiplication of laws and statutes cannot substitute for the inner understanding of man as God's image and the fortified urge to maintain and develop this tremendous privilege and gift.

p xxi

The modern world cast loose the traditions of Christianity. It became ignorant of man as he is, his nobility of destiny, his immortal soul, his relation to his fellow-men and to God. In very fact, the truth and good of

virtue is at the root of man's well-being, personally and socially, naturally and supernaturally. Man can be led by ideals. He may be led to know what he is by a clear picture of what he can become. That picture is to be seen in the delineation of virtue. Therein is the outline—more, the concrete flesh and blood and sinews—of man fully developed as man. He may learn to know his powers by learning of the greatness of those powers in their virtuous perfection. He can be brought to a realization of the tremendous strength of his intellect in that intellect's expansion by true science and especially by wisdom. He may discover the emptiness and futility of selfish, rootless living in the richness of a peace rising out of Charity, of a meal made satisfactory by temperance, of work promoted by and promoting justice, etc. If he once sees virtue, not as an ogre of frustration, but as the vital element in each happy day of a happy man's living—then will the pride and greed and lust that dominates so much of human existence be overthrown.

p xxii

Most importantly will the understanding of virtue lead to the understanding of God. He is reflected in the depths of the sea, in the beauty of the sky, in the vibrant fertility of the earth. But nowhere is He reflected, in His very being and inner life, as in the perfection of man by virtue. There alone can we learn of the love, the justice, the goodness, the wisdom of God—of the meaning of Father, Son, and Spirit. We shall find God most excellently here on earth in the living of men, in the individual and in society; and, pre-eminently, in the God Man, the divine Model of virtue, and in His universal Church, the nursery and garden of virtue. In an extraordinarily beautiful passage, St. Thomas portrays Our Lord as the unique and supreme Model of all the virtues. This Divine exemplarism shines forth with particular force and brilliance in the blessed Passion and Death of Christ: "Christ also wished to die that His death might be an example of perfect virtue for us. He gave an example of charity, for 'greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends' (John 15:13) . . . By His death Christ also gave an example of fortitude, which does not abandon justice in the face of adversity; refusal to give up the practice of virtue even under fear of death seems to pertain most emphatically to fortitude . . . In not refusing to die for truth, Christ overcame the fear of dying, which is the reason men for the most part are subject to the slavery of sin. Further, He gave an example of patience, a virtue that prevents sorrow from overwhelming man in time of adversity; the greater the trials, the more splendidly does the virtue of patience shine forth in them . . . Lastly, Our Lord gave an example of obedience; for the more difficult are the precepts one obeys, the more praiseworthy is the obedience. But the most difficult of all the objects of obedience is death. Hence, to commend the perfect obedience of Christ, the Apostle says, in Philippians 2:8, that He was obedient to the Father even unto death." †20

p xxiii

It is in Jesus Christ that the Christian will find the sole divinely efficacious, and concrete personification of true virtue. Christ could indeed have said: "Learn of Me, for I am meek and humble of heart, and possess all the other virtues which you need to learn." But because simple things are to be grasped before composed, the Second Part of the *Summa*, wherein the elements of the moral life are studied in their essential simplicity and organic hierarchy, comes before the Third Part, wherein these life-giving elements are shown in their Divine concretization, in the Incarnate Son of God.

p xxiii

Father Vincent McNabb, O.P. went so far as to predict that the Church may well be entering on an era when definitions about morals will be imperative. The evidence of popular ignorance and misconceptions concerning the moral nature of man is appalling. Man is the image of God: virtue is that imaging dynamically realized. The greatness of virtue and its import to human living is to be grasped most perfectly in the greatest of the virtues, Charity. Therein is revealed the potentiality of man in its ultimate realization (*Virtus est ultimum de potentia*). Therein does man regain paradise, the complete development of all his powers in God. The moralist must face this glorious challenge. He can thank God that in these times, when so much is confused and uncertain, he has the sane and solid teaching of the Church's *Common Doctor*. "If anyone, therefore, desires to understand fully . . . all these and other questions of ascetical and mystical

theology, he must have recourse in the first place to the Angelic Doctor."

p xxiii

THE TRANSLATION

It is chiefly hoped that this translation of St. Thomas's *De Virtutibus in Communi* will render available the eminent doctrine in which the work abounds to the reader who cannot easily or conveniently consult the Latin text. In one of his Opuscula, †21 the Angelic Doctor distinguishes two elements which should be required of every creditable translation. The first, and more necessary quality is a faithful reproduction of the thought of the original—as Thomas expresses it: "Hence it is the business of a good translator . . . to preserve the sense." The second desideratum is a smooth presentation of this thought-content in easy, idiomatic style. Thus, St. Thomas adds: "let him, however, adapt his manner of speaking according to the peculiarities of the language into which he is translating." Unfortunately, the simple, unadorned, properly technical language employed by St. Thomas in the Latin text does not submit readily to an equally smooth, idiomatic rendering into English. Hence the inevitable obscurity or thinness resulting here and there in the course of translation. Thomas himself warns against too literal a translation: "When things which sound perfectly all right in one language are translated word for word into another tongue, it is no wonder if any difficulties arise." For this reason, certain words and phrases, such as *per se, ratio, differentia*, have in some instances been left untranslated. At times the particular signification of a word is explained in a footnote. Where the precise meaning of a phrase or clause has seemed obscured, lost, or practically distorted in an English rendition, the Latin has been supplied, in parentheses. It need not be pointed out that many—indeed, most of these terms have more than one connotation. They enjoy an analogical extension to various significations, and are often used in a definitely limited, technical sense in context. Consequently, it will be obvious that the notes appended to the text are not meant to provide exhaustive clarification on each occasion. Above all, and no more than this, the aim has been to furnish readers of English with the complete and exact thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.

p xxiv

As far as is known, this is the first and only translation into English of *De Virtutibus in Communi*. The Marietti edition of *Quaestiones Disputatae*, 1949 has been chiefly used for the work of translation while the Parma edition, *Opera Omnia*, 1852-72, and the Vivès Edition, *Opera Omnia, Paris*, 1882, have also been consulted. †22 Regrettably, none of the texts found in these editions enjoys a thoroughly critical status, although all are considered sufficiently reliable. The four other *Disputed Questions* in this series on the virtues are now in the course of translation by members of the Dominican Province of St. Joseph. They will appear successively, it is hoped, at a later date.

p xxv

The first footnote in each article refers to other works of St. Thomas where the same or a similar question is treated. These parallel passages, and especially those in the *Summa*, may always be consulted with profit. All footnotes to the text have been provided by the translator. Whenever possible, they give the exact location of references made by St. Thomas to the works of other authors, as well as parallel passages in the other works of Thomas himself. Where it has been impossible for the translator to locate an exact reference, this fact has been noted and the closest available passage has been suggested.

p xxv

Although the four-fold general division of the present question, mentioned above and outlined below, was

not explicitly adverted to by the Angelic Doctor, his intent is unquestionably indicated by the arrangement of the articles. The work should be read in this order, for each succeeding article both assumes its predecessors and adds to them. Above all, the doctrine presented in the present work must be seen and grasped in its proper doctrinal context. A knowledge of what a habit is, is immediately presupposed, for virtue is a species of habit. The scientific interpretation and analysis of virtue depend not only on the main issues of ethics and psychology, but even more upon the co-ordination of these issues. The current trend among those outside the scholastic tradition is to reduce both to a purely physical investigation, an erratic conglomeration of anthropology and experimental psychology.

p xxv

In St. Thomas' doctrine, on the other hand, there is evolved a penetrating outline of the virtues, entirely adequate and satisfying from a psychological as well as from an ethical point of view. He studies the natural aspects of virtue, for these are the essential basis on which the supernatural perfections are built. These perfections are, it is true, supernatural, but the powers in which they inhere are natural. Consequently, the specific end and need of the natural faculty, *salvatis salvandis*, are in some way the *raison d'être* of the supernatural just as they are of the natural virtue. Hence also Thomas proceeds by way of what we know directly, concerning natural virtue, as the surest and most intelligible approach to supernatural virtue, which we know only indirectly and by analogy. To sum it up: "It is possible, therefore, to establish at once a certain broad likeness and distinction between natural and supernatural virtues. Both kinds of virtue perfect the faculties in respect of their proper objects . . . Both imply an habitual orientation in the faculty concerned deriving from the control of a well-disposed will. On the other hand, a notable difference arises from the nature of the ultimate end in each case. In the case of natural virtue the norm or measure of virtue is natural good, natural beatitude. In the case of supernatural virtue the norm of virtue is supernatural good, supernatural beatitude. Whence it follows that, though the proximate objects of the various faculties remain materially the same . . . the formality or 'reason why' of those objects, which derives from the ultimate end, is vastly different. Further, since the ultimate end is supernatural, the virtue commensurate to the attainment of that end is supernatural. In other words, supernatural virtue cannot merely be the result of repeated natural operation. Hence, whereas natural virtue is acquired by repeated acts, supernatural virtue must be a gratuitous gift from above." †23 A brief analysis of Aquinas' mode of procedure in this Question on the virtues, together with a critique of this method may bring out more emphatically for the reader the wise, realistic handling the holy Doctor has achieved of a difficult and important subject. As regards the analysis, each of the articles has been outlined, to facilitate mastery of the form and contents. These outlines will be found in Appendix I, p. 124. Technical notes on a number of points of doctrine or modes of treatment are included in a second Appendix, p. 138. Appendix III, p. 177 contains a complete Bibliography of the authors and their works cited or quoted by St. Thomas; while a last Appendix, p. 180 lists sources referred to or used by the translator.

p xxvii

It would be tragic, as well as ironic, if all these appurtenances, supplied by the translator for the precise purpose of aiding the reader in attaining a more perfect understanding of St. Thomas' doctrine, should prove rather a distraction, not to say positive hindrance, in achieving this aim. Thomas has not wasted a word; he has spoken clearly and with the unchallengable authority of truth. Go to Thomas: read him carefully and thoughtfully. The text of Thomas, here translated, is the essence and whole intrinsic reason for this book. These are golden words and will not fail to enrich the stimulated mind. Let us add, however, that they are meant to do more even than this. With an eye to this further aim, Thomas himself tells us that a moral consideration, since it concerns human actions, is made perfect only when it is realized in practical details. The virtues are *operative* habits, and of these the greatest is charity. Charity is a promise of the ineffable bliss of vision, for only when we are "rooted and founded in Charity" shall we be "able to comprehend with the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth; to know also the Charity of Christ, and to be filled unto all the goodness of God" (Eph. 3/17).

I owe a debt of profound gratitude to Father Ferrer Smith, O.P., S.T.D. for his immense help in the writing of this Introduction, and to Bro. Ignatius Hanson, O.P. for typing the manuscript.

JOHN PATRICK REID, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Feast of Our Lady, Patroness of the Order of Preachers
Dec. 22, 1950

Abbreviations

p xxviii

S. Th.	*Summa Theologiae*
I	First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*
I-II	First Part of the Second Part
II-II	Second Part of the Second Part
III	Third Part
Suppl.	Supplement to the Third Part
C.G.I., 2	*Contra Gentiles*, Book I, Chapter 2
I Sent. d. 4	Commentary on the First Book of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, distinction 4
q., qu., or quest.	question
qla.	*quaestiuncula* — a subdivision used in Sent.
a. or art.	article
a. 2 c. or in corp.	article 2, in the body of the article
Prol.	Prologue
obj.	objection
S. c.	*Sed contra* (on the contrary)
ad 1	reply to obj. 1
De Verit.	Disputed Question *De Veritatae*
Qdlb.	Quodlibetal Questions
In ad Rom.	Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans
II Ethics c. 6	Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6
Metaphys.	Metaphysics
PG	Greek Fathers, Migne
PL	Latin Fathers, Migne
Vulg.	Vulgate
l. or lect.	or lesson
Sol.	Solution

Outline of the Question

p xxix

Outline of the Entire Question

1. The definition or nature of virtue (formal cause)
    a. Genus: Virtues are habits Art. 1
    b. Species: St. Augustine's definition Art. 2

2. The subject of virtue (material cause *in which*)
    a. In general: A power of the soul Art. 3
    b. In particular
        (1) Appetitive powers
            (a) Irascible and concupiscible appetites Art. 4
            (b) The will Art. 5
        (2) Cognitive powers
            (a) The practical intellect Art. 6
            (b) The speculative intellect Art. 7

3. The efficient cause of virtue
    a. Nature Art. 8
    b. Acts of ours Art. 9
    c. Infusion by God Art. 10

4. Certain properties and the distinction of the virtues
    a. Increase in virtue Art. 11
    b. The distinction of the virtues Art. 12
    c. Virtue lies in the mean Art. 13

Article 1

p 1

ARTICLE 1

In this article the question is: **Whether virtues are habits**. †1

It would seem that they are not, but rather that they are acts.

p 1
OBJECTIONS:

1. Augustine says, in his book of *Retractations*, †2 that virtue is the good use of free will. But the use of free will is an act. Therefore virtue is an act.

p 1
2. Further, a reward is not due anyone, save because of an act. But everyone who possesses virtue deserves a reward; for whoever dies with charity in his soul will attain beatitude. Therefore virtue is merit. But merit is an act. Therefore virtue is an act.

p 1
3. Further, the more something in us resembles God, so much the better is it. But we are made to resemble God especially in so far as we are in act, because He is Pure Act. Act, then, is what is best in us. Now virtues are the best things we possess, as Augustine says in his book *De Libero Arbitrio*. †3 Therefore, virtues are acts.

p 1
4. Further, the perfections of this life correspond to the perfections of Heaven. But the perfection of Heaven is an act, according to the Philosopher. †4 Therefore, the perfection of this life, namely virtue, is also an act.

p 1
5. Further, contraries are found in the same genus, wherein they mutually exclude each other. But a sinful act destroys virtue by reason of its opposition to the latter. Therefore, virtue is in the genus of act.

p 1
6. Further, the Philosopher says, in *De Caelo*, †5 that virtue is the limit of power: †6 but the limit of potency is act. Therefore, virtue is an act.

p 2
7. Further, the rational part is nobler and more perfect than the sensitive part. But the sensitive powers have their own operations, with no habit or quality acting as a mean. Neither, therefore, should habits be assigned to the intellective power, by means of which this power might perform a perfect operation.

p 2
8. Further, the Philosopher says, in the *Physics*, †7 that virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best. But the best of anything is act. Now a disposition is in the same genus as that to which it disposes. Therefore, virtue is an act.

p 2
9. Further, Augustine says, in his book *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, †8 that virtue is the order of love. But order, as he himself says in *De Civitate Dei*, †9 is the disposing of equal and unequal elements, assigning to each its own place. Therefore, virtue is a disposition, and not a habit.

p 2
10. Further, a habit is a quality difficult to change (*qualitas de difficili mobilis*). But virtue is easily lost, since a single act of mortal sin will erase it. Therefore, virtue is not a habit.

p 2

11. Further, if we do need certain habits such as virtue may be, we need them either for natural acts or for meritorious, supernatural acts. Now we do not need such habits for natural operations: for if any nature, even sensitive †10 and senseless, can perform its own operation without a habit, a fortiori a rational being can do so. Neither do we need such habits for meritorious acts, because God works these in us: Phil. 2/13: "Who worketh in us (Douay: in you) both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will." Therefore, virtues are in no way habits.

p 2

12. Further, every agent acting according to its nature or form always acts conformably to the exigencies of that nature; as what is hot always acts by heating. If, then, there is in the mind †11 an habitual form called a virtue, the one possessing it will necessarily act in conformity with it. But this is false: for if it were true, anyone who had virtue would be confirmed in it. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

p 2

13. Further, habits reside in powers in order to give them ease in operation. But for acts of virtue we do not need anything to give us this facility, as it seems. The reason is that such acts consist chiefly in election and volition: and nothing is easier than what is established in the will. †12 Therefore, virtues are not habits.

p 3

14. Further, no effect can be nobler than its cause. But if virtue is a habit, it will be a cause of act, which is nobler than habit. Therefore, it would seem that virtue is not a habit.

p 3

15. Further, mean and extremes pertain to the same genus. †13 But moral virtue is a mean between two passions; and passions are in the class of acts. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

p 3

ON THE CONTRARY,

1. Virtue, according to Augustine, †14 is a good quality of the mind. Now it can be in no species of quality other than the first, which is habit. Therefore virtue is a habit.

p 3

2. Further, the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, †15 that virtue is a habit of choosing found in the soul.

p 3

3. Further, virtues remain in us while we are asleep, for they are lost only through mortal sin. Now while we are sleeping we are not performing virtuous acts, since we do not enjoy the use of our free will. Therefore, virtues are not acts.

p 3

I reply that virtue, from its very name, †16 denotes the perfection of a power (*potentiae complementum*); hence it is also called a force (vis), whereby a thing is enabled to perform its proper operation or movement, with all its strength. For virtue, according to its nominal definition, indicates a power's perfection; whence the Philosopher says, in *De Caelo*, †17 that virtue is the limit of a thing's power. Since a power is ordained to act, the perfection or completion of a power consists in its performing a perfect operation. Now since the end of an agent is its operation, for, according to the Philosopher, in *De Caelo*, †18 everything exists for its proper operation as for its proximate end, each thing is good insofar as it is

†18 everything exists for its proper operation as for its proximate end, each thing is good insofar as it is perfectly ordered to its end. Thus it is that virtue makes its possessor and his action (*opus*) good, as it says in the *Ethics*. †19 In this respect it is also evident that virtue is a disposition of what is perfect for what is best in it, as we read in the *Physics* †20

p 4

All of this is applicable to the virtue or power of anything whatsoever. For the strength (*virtus*) of a horse is what makes it good and its action good also; likewise the virtue †21 of a stone, of a man, or of any other thing.

p 4

However, the complexion of powers varies according to the diverse kinds of powers. One type of power is active only; another is only acted on or moved; still another is both active and acted on.

p 4

A power which is only active does not need to receive anything in order to be the principle of an action; hence the force (*virtus*) of such a power is nothing other than the power itself. Of this type are the Divine Power, the agent intellect, and natural powers. The virtues of these powers are not habits, but the powers themselves, complete in themselves.

p 4

Powers are purely acted upon or passive which do not act unless moved by another; nor does it rest with them to act or not to act, but they must act on the impetus of the force which moves them. Such are the sensitive powers considered in themselves. Wherefore, in the *Ethics* †22 it says that the senses are not principles of act. These powers are actualized by something added to them. Nor does this added force remain in them as a form in its subject, but only as a passion, an example of which is the visual species impressed on the pupil of the eye. Hence, neither are the "virtues" of these powers habits, but rather the powers themselves, when they are actually receiving the impressions of their active objects.

p 4

Those powers are both active and acted on which are moved by their active objects so that they are not determined by these objects to one thing; but it is in them to act, or not, as being in some way possessed of reason. †23 These powers are brought to complete actualization by something superadded to them, which does not inhere in them as a mere passion, but as a form residing and remaining in a subject. However, this occurs in such a manner that the power is not bound by them of necessity to one thing; for if such were the case, the power would not be master of its own act. The virtues of these powers are not the powers themselves, nor are they passions, as in the sense powers; neither are they qualities which operate of necessity, as are the qualities of natural things. Rather they are habits, by which a man can act when he wills, as the Commentator says in *De Anima*. †24 And Augustine remarks, in his book *De Bono Coniugali*, †25 that a habit is that by which one acts at the opportune moment.

p 5

Thus it is clear that virtues are habits. It is further evident how habits differ from the second and third species of quality, and from the fourth, for figure in itself bespeaks no order to act.

p 5

From this it can also be seen that we need virtuous habits for three reasons:

p 5

First, that there may be uniformity in our acts. For those things which depend solely on human actions are

First, that there may be uniformity in our acts. For those things which depend solely on human actions are easily varied, unless they are firmly fixed by some habitual inclination.

p 5

Secondly that a perfect operation be readily performed. For unless the rational powers in some way are inclined by a habit to one definite object, it will always be necessary, whenever it is time to act, to begin an inquiry concerning the manner in which to act. This is evident in one who lacks the habit of science and yet wishes to consider a speculative question; and in one who wants to act virtuously, although he lacks the habit of virtue. Hence, the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, †26 that things done suddenly are done from habit.

p 5

Thirdly, that a perfect operation be performed with pleasure. This is effected by a habit which, inasmuch as it becomes a second nature, renders natural the acts proper to it, so that it is delightful to perform them. For what is conveniently accomplished is pleasurable. Hence, in the *Ethics*, †27 the Philosopher observes that taking delight in an action is a sign of a habit.

p 6

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue, like power, may be taken in two ways. First, materially: thus we say that what we are capable of is in our power. And in this sense Augustine says that the good use of free will is a virtue. Secondly, essentially: in this sense neither power nor virtue is an act.

p 6

2. To merit has two meanings. The first is proper, and is nothing other than performing some act for which a man may justly acquire a reward for himself. By a second, improper signification, any condition which in any way makes a man worthy is called merit: as when we say that the race of Priam merits empire, as being worthy to rule.

p 6

A reward may be due to merit, in one sense, because of an habitual quality which makes one worthy of reward: thus it is due to baptized infants. Again, it may be due to actual merit; in this sense it is due, not to habitual virtue (alone), but to a virtuous act. It is bestowed, nevertheless, in a way even on infants, by reason of actual merit, insofar as by the actual merit of Christ the sacrament has its efficacy, regenerating us unto life.

p 6

3. Augustine says that virtues are a supreme good, not absolutely (*simpliciter*), but in a certain genus; just as fire is said to be the subtlest of bodies. Hence it does not follow that there is nothing in us better than the virtues; but the truth is that the latter are among those things which are supreme goods in their own genus.

p 6

4. Just as in this life there is an habitual perfection, namely virtue, and an actual perfection, which is a virtuous act; so also in Heaven, happiness is actual perfection, proceeding from a consummated habit. Wherefore the Philosopher also says, in the *Ethics*, †28 that happiness is an act of perfect virtue.

p 6

5. A vicious act directly excludes a virtuous act, being its contrary; whereas it removes a virtuous habit accidentally, inasmuch as it cuts one off from the Cause of infused virtue, that is, from God. Hence Is

accidentally, inasmuch as it cuts one off from the Cause of infused virtue, that is, from God. Hence Is. 59/2: "But your iniquities have divided between you and your God." For this reason, the acquired virtues are not destroyed by one vicious act alone.

p 7

6. This definition of the Philosopher's can be understood in two ways. In one sense, materially, understanding virtue as that of which virtue is capable (*id in quod virtus potest*), which is the extreme limit of a power; just as the strength of a man who can carry a hundred pounds consists in the ability of carrying that number of pounds, and not in the ability of carrying a mere sixty pounds. In another sense, we can understand the definition in its essential meaning, in which virtue is said to be the limit of power because it designates the actualization of a power, whether or not that by which the power is actualized be other than the power itself.

p 7

7. There is no similarity here between the sensitive and the rational powers, as has been said. †29

p 7

8. A disposition for something is that by which one is moved to attain that thing. Now motion sometimes has its term in the same genus as itself; for instance, the movement †30 of alteration is a quality; hence a disposition to this term will always be in the same genus as the term itself. On the other hand, sometimes it has a term of another genus, e.g. when the term of an alteration is a substantial form. Thus, a disposition is not always of the same genus as that for which it disposes: heat, for instance, is a disposition for the substantial form of fire. †31

p 7

9. A disposition may be considered in three ways. First, as that by which matter is disposed to receive form, as heat is a disposition for the form of fire. Secondly, as that by which an agent is disposed to act, as swiftness is a disposition for running. Thirdly, the ordination of things to each other is said to be a disposition. This last is the sense in which disposition is used by Augustine. A disposition in the first sense is distinct from a habit; while virtue itself is a disposition of the second type.

p 7

10. No thing is so stable that it may not of itself suddenly fail, should its causes fail to sustain it. Wherefore, it is no wonder if infused virtue is lost, should union with God be broken by mortal sin. Nor does this argue against the stability (*immobilitati*) of virtue itself, which stability is effective only as long as its Cause remains.

p 8

11. We need a habit for both types of operation: for natural operations, for the three reasons stated above (in the Body of the Article); for meritorious acts, moreover, that our natural powers may be elevated by an infused habit to what is above their nature. Nor does this destroy the working of God in us; for He so acts in us that we also act. Hence we need a habit to act sufficiently well.

p 8

12. Every form is received in its subject according to the nature of that subject. Now it is proper to a rational power to be capable of (choosing between) opposites, that is, to be master of its own act. Hence a rational power cannot be forced to act always in the same way, by the reception of an habitual form or habit; rather it can act or not act.

p 8

13. That which consists merely in the act of choice is, at least to a certain extent, easy to perform; but that it be done in a proper manner, namely with dispatch, firmness, and enjoyment, is not easy. Consequently, for the latter we need virtuous habits.

p 8
14. All movements of brutes or of men which begin anew proceed from some mover which in turn is moved, and depend on something already existing. And so habits do not of themselves elicit acts, but must be put into operation by an agent.

p 8
15. Virtue is a mean between passions, not as a sort of intermediary passion, but as an act which constitutes the mean in the passions themselves.

Article 2

p 9
ARTICLE 2

In this article the question is: **Whether Saint Augustine's definition of virtue is a good one**. †1

St. Augustine says: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use; which God works in us, without us." †2
It would seem that this is not a good definition.

p 9
OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue is a kind of goodness. If, then, it is good, it is so either by its own goodness, or by the goodness of something else. If the latter, we have an infinite process; if the former, virtue becomes the primary good, because only the first good is good per se.

p 9
2. Further, that which is common to all being should not be placed in the definition of any one thing. But goodness, which is convertible with being, is common to all being. Therefore, it should not be included in the definition of virtue.

p 9
3. Further, as good is in moral beings, so is it in natural beings. But good and bad do not vary the species of natural things. Neither, therefore, should 'good' be placed in the definition of virtue, as though it were the specific difference of virtue.

p 9

4. Further a *differentia* is not included in the definition of its genus. But good is included in the definition of quality, just as being is. Consequently, it should not be added to the definition of virtue, so as to say that: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, etc."

p 9

5. Further, evil and good are opposites. But evil does not constitute any species, since it is a privation; neither, therefore, does good. Thus goodness must not be placed as an essential *differentia* in the definition of virtue.

p 9

6. Further, goodness is more universal than quality. Therefore, one quality does not differ from another by its goodness; for which reason goodness should not be placed in the definition of virtue, as though it were the differentia of that quality.

p 10

7. Further, nothing is made up of two acts. But goodness denotes a certain act, and quality likewise. It is improper, then, to say that virtue is a 'good quality.'

p 10

8. Further, what is predicated in the abstract is not predicated in the concrete; thus whiteness is a color, it is not something colored. But goodness is predicated of virtue in the abstract. Therefore, it is not predicated of it in the concrete; and so it is incorrect to say that virtue is a 'good quality.'

p 10

9. Further, no *differentia* is predicated in the abstract of a species; wherefore, Avicenna says †3 that man is not rationality but a rational being. But virtue is goodness. Therefore, goodness is not the *differentia* of virtue; hence we cannot truly say that virtue is a 'good quality.'

p 10

10. Further, a moral evil is called a vice. Therefore, moral good is the same as virtue; and therefore, goodness should not be included in the definition of virtue, or else the same thing would define itself.

p 10

11. Further, mind refers to the intellect. But virtue pertains rather to the will (*affectum*). Therefore, it is wrong to say that virtue is a good quality of the 'mind.' †4

p 10

12. Further, according to Augustine, †5 mind denotes the higher part of the soul. But there are some virtues in the lower powers. Therefore, it is not suitable to say, in the definition of virtue, 'a good quality of the mind.'

p 10

13. Further, the subject of virtue is a power, and not the essence of the soul. But mind seems to designate the essence of the soul; for Augustine †6 says that in mind there are understanding, memory, and will. Therefore 'mind' is not to be placed in the definition of virtue.

p 10

14. Further, that which is proper to a species should not be included in the definition of its genus. But

righteousness (*rectitudo)* is proper to justice. Hence righteousness should not be placed in the definition of virtue, as it is in Augustine's definition: 'a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously.'

p 11

15. Further, in living things to live is to be (*vivere viventibus est esse*). But virtue does not perfect one in being but in acting. Therefore, we should not say 'by which we live righteously.'

p 11

16. Further, whoever takes pride in a certain thing makes a bad use of it. But some are proud of their virtues. Therefore, one can make a bad use of virtues.

p 11

17. Further, in his book *De Libero Arbitrio* †7 Augustine says that it is only of the supreme goods that no one makes bad use. But virtue is not one of the highest goods, because the latter are sought for their own sake, which is not so with virtues, since these are desired for the sake of something else, namely for happiness. Therefore, it is improper to say: 'of which no one can make bad use.'

p 11

18. Further, a thing is generated, nourished, and increased by the same cause. But virtue is nourished and increased by our acts, for the diminution of cupidity †8 is the increase of charity. Therefore, virtue is generated by our acts, so that it is incorrect to place in the definition: 'which God works in us, without us.'

p 11

19. Further, that which removes an impediment is regarded as a mover and cause. But, in a certain sense, free will removes the impediments to virtue. Therefore, free will is, to this extent, the cause of virtue, so that it is not right to say that God works virtue in us without us.

p 11

20. Further, Augustine says †9 "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." Therefore, the conclusion is as above.

p 11

21. Lastly, this definition seems to be proper to grace. But virtue and grace are not one and the same thing. Consequently, virtue is not well-defined by Augustine.

p 11

I reply: We must hold that Augustine's is the true definition of virtue, even if the last phrase be omitted; and that it is suitable for every human virtue.

p 11

For, as we have said (in the preceding article), virtue ultimately disposes a power for perfect act: but this perfect act is the end to which a power or agent is ordered: hence virtue renders good both the power and the agent, as we have already observed (*ibid*). Therefore, in the definition of virtue, one element is included which pertains to the perfection of the act, and another which pertains to the perfection of the power or agent.

p 12

Now two things are required for the perfection of an act. It is necessary that the act be a good one, and that the habit cannot be the principle of a contrary act. For that which is the principle of both a good and a bad

act cannot in itself be the perfect principle of a good act, since a habit is the perfection of a power. Hence it must be the principle of an act which is wholly good and in no way bad. For this reason, the Philosopher says in the *Ethics*, †10 that opinion, which can be true or false, is not a virtue; but science, which is had only of truth, is a virtue. The first requirement is indicated in the words: 'by which we live righteously;' the second, by the phrase: 'of which no one can make bad use.'

p 12

With regard to the fact that virtue makes its subject good, three things must be considered. The first is the subject itself, and this is determined by the word 'mind;' for a human virtue can reside only in that part of man by which he is truly human. Secondly, the perfection of the intellect, †11 which is designated by the word 'good;' for goodness bespeaks an order to an end. Thirdly, the manner in which the virtue inheres in its subject is shown by the word 'quality;' for virtue does not inhere as a passion, but as a habit, as was said above (preceding art.).

p 12

All of this belongs to both moral and intellectual virtue, to theological, to acquired, and to infused virtue. The phrase which Augustine adds: 'which God works in us, without us,' applies only to infused virtue. †12

p 12

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Just as accidents are called beings, not because they subsist, but because there is some being in them; so virtue is said to be good, not as though it were itself (its own) good, but as that by which something is good. Hence it is not necessary that virtue be good thanks to the goodness of another, as though it were informed by the goodness of something else.

p 13

2. The good which is convertible with being is not that which is here placed in the definition of virtue; rather it is that goodness which is ordered to a moral act.

p 13

3. Acts are distinguished according to the diverse forms of their agents, as heating and freezing. †13 Now good and evil are, as it were, the form and object of the will—since an agent always impresses its own form on a patient and a mover does the same on the object being moved. Hence moral acts, the principle of which is the will, are specifically diversified according to good and evil. However, the principle of natural acts is not the end, but some form. Therefore, in natural things, species of acts are not distinguished according to good and evil, as are moral acts.

p 13

4. Moral goodness is not included in the notion of quality; hence the objection proves nothing.

p 13

5. Evil constitutes a species, not insofar as it is a privation, but by reason of the subject of the privation, when that subject is lacking in some good. This is how evil constitutes a species.

p 13

6. This objection relates to natural, not moral good; it is the latter which is placed in the definition of virtue.

p 13

7. Goodness implies no good other than virtue itself, as is clear from what has been said. For virtue is essentially a quality; hence it is manifest that 'good' and 'quality' do not bespeak diverse acts, but one and the same act.

p 13

8. This objection errs with respect to the transcendentals, which embrace all being. For essence is being, and goodness is good, and unity is one; whereas whiteness cannot be called white. The reason is that whatever is grasped by the intellect must fall under the notion of being and, consequently, of goodness and of oneness. Thus essence and goodness and unity cannot be understood save under the aspect of good, one, and being. This is why goodness can be called good, and unity, one.

p 14

(*The following is an addition made by Fr. Vincent de Castronovo, O.P., venerable professor of Sacred Theology.*) †14

9. *Differentia*, like genus, is predicated essentially of a species, and not denominatively. Therefore, if the species is something subsisting and composed, *differentia* is not predicated of it in the abstract, but in the concrete.

p 14

For in composed substances, concrete terms, which signify a composite, are said properly of a predicable, as species or genus; for example, man or animal. Hence, if a *differentia* is to be predicated essentially of such a species, it must be expressed in the concrete. Otherwise it would not signify the entire being of the species.

p 14

But if the species is a simple form (as accidents are, in which concrete terms are not placed as in a predicable, as species or genera, e.g. black and white, save reductively; but only as they are expressed in the abstract, e.g. whiteness, music, justice, and virtue in general), both genus and *differentia* are predicated of it in the abstract. Consequently, just as virtue is essentially a quality, so also is the goodness of reason or moral goodness.

p 15

10. Moral goodness is predicated of a good act, a good habit, and an object that is morally good. Similarly, moral evil is predicated of an evil act, which is sin, and of an evil habit, which is vice. Hence virtue is that which makes its subject good and his acts morally good; whereas vice is that which makes the vicious person evil and his acts morally bad. Thus moral evil is not the same as vice; for vice refers to a habit, while moral evil is attributed to acts and to objects, as well as to habits. For the same reason, moral good is not identical with virtue, since the former is also predicated of acts.

p 15

In virtue itself we may consider three things:

p 15

The first is what the essence of virtue immediately signifies: virtue denotes a certain disposition whereby one is disposed well and properly, according to one's nature. In the *Physics*, †15 the Philosopher says that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: now by a perfect thing I mean that which is properly disposed, according to its nature." In this regard, vice is opposed to virtue, because it denotes that

a thing is disposed contrary to its nature. Hence Augustine says, in *De Libero Arbitrio* †16 "Whatever you observe lacking in the perfection of a nature you may well call vice; because the vice of anything is evidently the result of its not being properly disposed according to its nature."

p 15

Secondly, we must consider what follows upon the essence of virtue, what virtue itself entails as a consequent. Virtue denotes a certain moral goodness which makes its possessor good. For the goodness of each thing consists in its being aptly disposed in the manner befitting its nature. Now this is what virtue effects, as has been said; and so malice is opposed to virtue.

p 15

Thirdly, we must consider that to which virtue is ordained, namely, a good act. For virtue is ordered to an act which is good and fitting and properly in accord with reason. Hence virtue is the perfection of a power as ordered to its act; not only making one who has it good, but also rendering his action good. In this sense sin is opposed to virtue, for sin properly bespeaks an inordinate act.

p 16

From this it is clear that vicious habits, vice, and sin can be called moral evils, and that virtue is a type of moral good, and not vice-versa. †17

p 16

11. 'Mind' is taken here as it includes all the rational powers; hence it comprises both the intellect and the will. For the will is by its essence a rational power. However, virtues can reside in the intellect as well as in the will. †18 Intellectual virtues facilitate the operations of this faculty, although they do not insure a good use of the faculty. But the moral virtues, and others †19 which are virtues in an absolute sense, informing the will with the power of acting well, also make for the good use of the will, insofar as by them one uses this faculty rightly and well. Thus justice effects, not only that a man be prompt in doing just things, but also that he actually do them in a just manner. On the other hand, grammar provides one with the ability of speaking correctly and coherently, but it does not make a man always speak in a becoming manner, for the grammarian may sometimes employ barbarisms or solecisms.

p 16

From all of which it is plain that virtue pertains to the appetitive and to the intellective powers, both of which are included in the term 'mind.'

p 16

12. By the word 'mind' is meant the power which elicits acts of which man is master, which are properly called human. The powers of this sort are the reason and the will, which are the first moving principles, commanding acts of which man is master. These powers are said to be rational by their very essence. Moreover, the irascible and concupiscible appetites, inasmuch as they participate in reason, are principles of human acts, as moved movers. For they are moved by the higher appetite when they obey it. In this way, since they participate in reason and have been constituted apt to obey reason, they can be the subject of human virtue. †20

p 16

Hence it is evident that the intellect and the will are the first principles of human acts, as moving and imperating them; †21 the sense appetite is a secondary principle, a moved mover. Powers of this kind, then, which are included under the term 'mind,' can be the subject of virtue.

p 17

p 17

Mind denotes a power which is rational, either essentially or by participation. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites are rational powers by participation; and for this reason they can be the subject of virtue, insofar as they participate in (the powers of the) mind. †22

p 17

13. Mind signifies the highest power of the soul. Hence, since the divine image is imprinted on what is highest in our being, it must be said that this image is not in the very essence of the soul, †23 but only in the intellectual power, which is the supreme faculty of the soul. Thus, insofar as God's image is in it, mind signifies a power of the soul, and not its essence. Wherefore, mind comprises those powers which are independent in their operations of matter and of the conditions of matter. In mind there are understanding, memory and will—not as accidents in a subject, but as parts of a whole. †24

p 17

14. Righteousness is two-fold. One is a special type, which regards only exterior objects which fall to man's use; and these things are the proper matter of justice. Hence this kind of righteousness is proper to justice, and is not placed in the definition of virtue. Another type is righteousness in a general sense, which denotes ordination to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will. Such righteousness is common to every virtue and so is included in the definition of virtue itself.

p 17

15. Life may be understood in two ways.

p 17

First, life may signify the being of the living thing; in this sense it pertains to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of being in living things. Thus, in the *De Anima*, †25 the Philosopher says that in living things, living is being. Taken in this sense, 'living' does not belong in the definition of virtue.

p 18

Secondly, life may denote the operation of the living thing: thus the acts of understanding and of sense knowledge are types of life. Hence the operation which a man finds supremely delightful and in which he chiefly occupies himself is said to be his life. And so, in the *Metaphysics*, †26 the Philosopher remarks that the race of men live by art and reasoning, i.e. they act thus. In this sense, 'life' is placed in the definition of virtue, because by virtue a man lives rightly, i.e. by it he acts rightly.

p 18

16. The bad use of virtue can be understood in two ways.

p 18

First, of virtue as an object. A man can make a bad use of virtue as an object when, for example, he has an evil regard for it, or hates it, or is proud of it.

p 18

Secondly, of virtue as the principle eliciting some bad use: when the bad use itself is elicited by virtue. In this way no one can make a bad use of virtue, for virtue is a habit which always inclines one to good. This is so because every virtue enables a faculty to act well, and some virtues both do this and insure a good use of the faculty. They insure this good use by making one use the faculty well; of this type are the virtues which pertain to the appetitive power. For example, justice effects not only that a man be of a ready will to perform just deeds, but also that he act justly. †27

p 18

17. Only the supreme goods are those which no one can use badly as objects, because these goods are desirable for their own sake, and cannot be hated by anyone. But a man can make a bad use of virtue as an object, because virtues are not the highest goods, as has been said above (Art. 1 ad 3); although he cannot use them badly as an elicitive principle.

p 18

Indeed there is no necessity that that, of which one cannot make bad use as the elicitive principle of the bad use, be a supreme good. It may even be said, as Augustine does here, that virtue is numbered among the highest goods, insofar as by it a man is ordered to the supreme good, which is God. On this count, no one uses virtues badly.

p 19

18. Just as acquired virtues are increased and fostered by the (same sort of) acts which caused them, so the infused virtues are increased by the action of God, by Whom they are caused.

p 19

Yet our own acts may dispose us for the increase of charity and the infused virtues. Thus, to receive charity from its source, a man prepares and disposes himself by doing what lies in him, in order to receive this charity from God. Even further than this, our acts can merit an increase of charity, inasmuch as they presuppose charity, which is the principle of merit. But no one can merit to obtain charity in the first place, for without charity itself there can be no merit.

p 19

Hence it is clear that charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by our acts, but only dispositively and meritoriously (*non augentur active . . . sed tantum dispositive et meritorie*). They are actively increased by the action of God, Who perfects and conserves the charity which He has previously infused. †28

p 19

19. Sin is the impediment to virtue. Now free will, without the action of God, is not of itself sufficient to remove sin, because only God can effectively blot out our iniquities and forgive our sins. Moreover, the Holy Spirit, moving the heart of man to a greater or less degree, according to His Divine Will, precedes every disposition, preparation, or effort of free will before the influx of charity. For sin is not forgiven without grace; thus, Rom. 3/24: "Being justified freely by His grace." †29

p 19

20. Infused virtue is caused in us by God, without any action on our part, not, however, without our consent. And so God does not justify us without our consent, for when we are justified we consent to the justice of God by the movement of our own free will. Nevertheless, this movement is not the cause of the grace which formally justifies, but rather its effect; so that the entire operation belongs to grace and to God, Who, while He justifies, efficaciously infuses grace into our hearts. Indeed, those effects which we accomplish by ourselves, of which we are the cause, God Himself causes in us, but not without any action of ours: for He works in every will and in every nature. †30

p 20

21. The definition of virtue, once it is correctly understood, does not apply to grace. For, although grace belongs reductively to the first species of quality, it is not an operative habit, as virtue is, because it is not immediately ordered to operation. It is rather like a character (*habitudo*) which bestows a certain spiritual

immediately ordered to operation. It is rather like a character (*habitus*) which bestows a certain spiritual, Divine being on the soul, and is presupposed by the infused virtues as their root and principle. Grace is to the essence of the soul what health is to the body. Therefore, Chrysostom says †31 that grace is the health of the soul. It is not reckoned among the sciences, nor among the virtues, nor among any of the qualities which the philosophers have enumerated, for they know only those accidents of the soul which are ordered to acts proportionate to human nature.

p 20

Therefore, virtue is essentially an operative habit, whereas grace is not an operative habit, but a kind of supernatural participation in the Divine Nature (*quaedam supernaturalis participatio divinae naturae*), by the reception of which we are said to be regenerated as sons of God (as we read in 1 Peter 1/4).

p 20

Hence, just as the natural light of reason is the root and principle of acquired virtue; so the light of grace, which is a participation in the Divine Nature, dwelling in the very essence of the soul in the form of a certain character (*habilitas*), is the root and principle of infused virtue.

p 20

Moreover, virtue is a good quality, which makes its possessor good. Now this goodness, which virtue confers on one who has virtue, is a perfection ordered to operation, of which it is the immediate principle. But the goodness which grace bestows on the soul is a perfection, not ordered immediately to operation, but to a certain spiritual, Divine being, whereby those who enjoy grace are, in a sense, formed to the likeness of God. For this reason they are said to be pleasing to God as sons. Wherefore, the 'good' mentioned in the definition of virtue bespeaks a certain nature already pre-existing—which is the Divine nature, essentially or by participation. †32 Now such good is not attributed to grace, save as to the root and principle of such goodness in man, which grace is.

p 21

'Mind,' also, as it is included in the definition of virtue, signifies the subject of virtue, namely, a power of the soul; whereas in the definition of grace, the subject of grace is the essence of the soul.

p 21

Likewise, 'life,' as found in the definition of virtue, implies an operation, of which virtue itself is the immediate principle; whereas, when it is attributed to grace, life denotes a certain Divine being, of which grace is the immediate principle. In the latter instance it does not refer to any operation, for grace is not ordered to any, save by means of virtue.

p 21

Lastly, virtue is said to be the disposition of a perfect thing to what is best, insofar as it perfects a power with regard to operation, by which a thing attains its end. In this sense, grace is not a disposition of what is perfect to what is best for it: both because it does not primarily perfect a power but the essence of the soul, and also because it has not an operation for its proximate effect, but rather a certain type of Divine being. From this it is evident that the definition of virtue is not to be applied to grace.
(*End of the addition of Vincent de Castronovo*)

Article 3

p 22

ARTICLE 3

In this article the question is: **Whether a power of the soul can be the subject of virtue**. †1

It would seem that it cannot.

p 22

OBJECTIONS:

1. According to Augustine, †2 virtue is that by which we live righteously. But we live, not by any power of the soul, but by its very essence. Therefore, no power of the soul is the subject of virtue.

p 22

2. Further, grace is nobler in being than nature. But natural being †3 exists by the essence of the soul, which latter is nobler than its powers, since it is their principle. Therefore, the essence of grace, which exists through the virtues, †4 does not reside in the powers of the soul, and neither is any power the subject of virtue.

p 22

3. Further, an accident cannot be a subject. But a power of the soul is in the class of accidents; for natural potency and impotency belong to the second species of quality. Therefore, a power of the soul cannot be the subject of virtue.

p 22

4. Further, if one power of the soul is the subject of virtue, any power can be such, since every power may be attacked by vices, which the virtues are ordered to overcome. But not every power of the soul can be the subject of virtue, as will be shown later. †5 Therefore, a power cannot be the subject of virtue.

p 22

5. Further, active principles in nature, such as heat and cold, are not the subject of other active principles. But the powers of the soul are types of active principles, for they are the principles of the soul's operations. Therefore, they cannot be the subject of other accidents.

p 22

6. Further, the subject of a power is the soul. If then a power be the subject of another accident, for an equal reason that accident may be the subject of yet another accident, and so on, *ad infinitum*: which is impossible. Therefore, no power of the soul is the subject of virtue.

p 23

7. Further, in the *Posterior Analytics*, †6 it says that there is no quality of a quality. But a power of the soul is a quality, of the second species, while virtue is of the first species of quality. Therefore, a power of the soul cannot be the subject of virtue.

p 23

ON THE CONTRARY

ON THE CONTRARY

1. What performs an action is the principle of that action. But the powers of the soul elicit virtuous acts. Therefore they possess also the virtues themselves.

p 23

2. Moreover, the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, †7 that the intellectual virtues are rational in their essence, and that the moral virtues are rational by participation. But 'rational in essence and by participation' signifies the powers of the soul. Hence powers of the soul are subjects of virtues.

p 23

I reply: A subject is related to an accident in three ways. First, as providing it with support; for an accident does not subsist by itself, but is upheld by a subject. Secondly, as potency to act; for the subject stands to an accident as the potential to the actual. Hence accident is said to be a form. Thirdly, as cause to effect; for the principles of the subject are per se the principles of its accident.

p 23

With regard to the first relation of subject to accident, one accident cannot be the subject of another. Since no accident subsists of itself, it cannot support another accident: unless, perhaps, it may be said to do so inasmuch as it is itself upheld by a subject.

p 23

As for the other two ways in which subject and accident are related, one accident may act as subject of another: for one is in potency to another, as the medium (*diaphanus* †8 is to light, and surface to color. Again, one accident can be the cause of another, as a humor is the cause of taste. In this way, one accident is said to be the subject of another accident. Not that one accident can furnish support for another; but because a subject receives one accident through the medium of another. In this manner is a power of the soul designated as the subject of a habit.

p 24

A habit is related to a power of the soul as act to potency; since, of itself, the power is undetermined, and is determined to this or that by a habit. Moreover, acquired habits are caused by the powers as principles. Consequently, it must be admitted that the powers are the subjects of virtues, because it is through the medium of a power that a virtue dwells in the soul.

p 24

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. *Life*, as it appears in the definition of virtue, refers to action, as was said above (in the preceding Art.).

p 24

2. The soul receives spiritual being, not through the virtues, but through grace. For grace is the principle of spiritual being, whereas virtue is the principle of spiritual operation.

p 24

3. A power is not of itself a subject, but inasmuch as it is sustained by the soul.

p 24

4. We are speaking here of human virtues; †9 hence those powers which can in no way be called human,

which the command of reason in no way reaches, namely, the vegetative powers of the soul, cannot be the subjects of virtue. Nevertheless, every assault of vice which rises from these powers †10 takes place through the sense appetite, which the command of reason does reach, so that this appetite may be called human, and may be the subject of human virtue.

p 24

5. Of the powers of the soul, the only (purely) active ones are the agent intellect and the powers of the vegetative soul, which are not the subjects of any habits. †11 The other powers of the soul are initially passive: principles, nonetheless, of the soul's actions, when moved by their active objects,

p 24

6. There is no need of an infinite process, because one will arrive at some accident which is not in potency to any other accident.

p 24

7. There is no quality of a quality in such a way that the latter is of itself the subject of the former. Nor does our position hold that there is, as has been said above (in the body of the article).

Article 4

p 25

ARTICLE 4

In this article the question is: **Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue**. †1

It would seem that they cannot.

p 25

OBJECTIONS:

1. Contraries refer naturally to one and the same subject. But the contrary of virtue is mortal sin, which cannot reside in sensuality, the parts of which are the irascible and concupiscible appetites. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible appetites cannot be the subject of virtue.

p 25

2. Further, habits and their acts belong to the same power. But the principle act of virtue is choice, according to the Philosopher, in the *Ethics*, †2 which cannot be the act of the irascible or concupiscible appetites. Neither then can virtuous habits dwell in the irascible and concupiscible appetites.

p 25

3. Further, no corruptible thing is the subject of what is enduring or everlasting: thus Augustine proves †3 that the soul is immortal because it is the subject of virtue, which is eternal. But the irascible and

concupiscible powers, like the other sense powers, do not remain after the dissolution of the body, as some hold; whereas the virtues remain. For justice is perpetual and immortal, as we are told in Wisd. 1:15, and the same may be said of all the virtues. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible parts cannot be the subject of virtues.

p 25

4. Further, the irascible and concupiscible powers have a bodily organ. If, then, there be virtues in these powers, they must reside in a bodily organ. Hence they could be grasped by the imagination or phantasy: and so would not be perceptible only to the mind. But Augustine says of justice that it is a righteousness perceptible to the mind alone.

p 25

5. But it might be objected that the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue insofar as they participate to some extent in reason.—On the contrary, the irascible and concupiscible appetites are said to participate in reason inasmuch as by reason they may be ordered. But the order of reason cannot support virtue, since this order is not a subsisting thing. Therefore, neither can the irascible and concupiscible parts, insofar as they participate in reason, be the subject of virtue.

p 26

6. Further, just as the irascible and concupiscible powers, which constitute the sense appetite, are subservient to reason; so also are the sense apprehensive powers. But in no sensitive apprehensive power can virtue reside. Therefore, neither can virtue be found in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

p 26

7. Further, if the order of reason can be participated by the irascible and concupiscible powers, the rebellion against reason of sensuality, which contains these two powers, could be diminished to some extent. But this rebellion is not infinite, for sensuality is a finite power, and there cannot be an infinite act of a finite power. Therefore, this same rebellion could be completely suppressed; for every finite thing will eventually be consumed, if a part of it is taken away a number of times, as the Philosopher states, in the *Physics*. †4 Thus sensuality could be totally suppressed in this life—which is impossible.

p 26

8. But it might be objected that God, Who infuses virtue, could completely overcome the aforesaid rebellion, and that it is from our part that it may not be totally suppressed.—On the contrary, man is what he is by the fact that he is rational, since by rationality his species is determined. †5 Hence the more what is in man is subject to reason, so much the more does it belong to human nature. Now the lower powers of the soul would be especially subject to reason, if the aforesaid rebellion were completely put down. This would be most agreeable to human nature, and so there is on our part no hindrance to the total suppression of the rebellion under discussion.

p 26

9. Further, for the ratio of virtue it is not sufficient that sin be avoided. For the perfection of justice consists in what the Psalmist urges, Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil and do good." But it pertains to the irascible appetite only to detest evil, as we are told in the book *De Spiritu et Anima*. Therefore, in the irascible part, at least, there can be no virtue.

p 27

10. In the same book (*De Spiritu et Anima*) we read that by reason the virtues are desired, whereas by the irascible appetite the vices are hated. But the desire for virtue and virtue itself are in the same subject, since each thing desires its own perfection. Therefore, all virtue is in the reason, and not in the irascible and

each thing desires its own perfection. Therefore, all virtue is in the reason, and not in the irascible and concupiscible parts.

p 27

11. Further, in no power can there be a habit which is merely acted on, and does not act, from the fact that a habit is that by which a man acts when he wills, as the Commentator says, in *De Anima*. †6 But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not act, but are acted upon, because the senses are master of no act, as it says in the *Ethics* †7 Therefore, there can be no virtuous habit in the irascible and concupiscible appetites.

p 27

12. Further, a proper subject is proportionate to its proper passion. But virtue is proportionate to reason, and not to the irascible and concupiscible parts, which we share in common with the brutes. Therefore, virtue, like reason, is in men alone; hence every virtue is in the rational and not in the irascible and concupiscible parts.

p 27

13. Further, on Rom. 7, the Gloss †8 says: "The law is good, which, when it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evil." Hence all vices pertain to the concupiscible part, wherein concupiscence arises. But virtues and vices claim the same subject. †9 Therefore, virtues are not in the irascible part, although they may be in the concupiscible.

p 27

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. The Philosopher says †10 of fortitude and temperance that they belong to the irrational powers. Now these powers, i.e. the sense appetites, are the irascible and concupiscible, as stated in *De Anima*. †11 Therefore there can be virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

p 28

2. Further, venial sin disposes to mortal. But the perfection of and the disposition to something are in the same subject. Since, therefore, there may be venial sin in the irascible and concupiscible parts (for the act of sensuality is the first to be aroused, as the Gloss on Rom. 8 notes), so mortal sin can be found there, and consequently, virtue also, which is the contrary of mortal sin.

p 28

3. Further, means and extremes are in the same subject. But virtue is a certain mean †12 between contrary passions; for example, fortitude is a mean between fear and rashness, while temperance is a mean between excess and defect in concupiscible pleasures. Therefore, since these passions are in the concupiscible and irascible appetites, it would seem that virtue may also reside in them.

p 28

I reply: All authorities are in partial agreement on this question, but also in partial conflict among themselves.

p 28

Everyone concedes that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, as temperance in the concupiscible, and fortitude in the irascible appetite. But in this very agreement, there are shades of different opinions.

p 28

Some authors distinguish a two-fold irascible and concupiscible part: one in the higher, and another in the lower part of the soul. For they say that the irascible and concupiscible powers which are in the superior part of the soul, since they pertain to man's nature, can be the subject of virtue; not, however, those powers which reside in the inferior part, because these belong to sensual and brute nature.

p 28

But this position is the subject of another inquiry: whether in the higher part of the soul two powers may be distinguished, one the irascible and the other the concupiscible, properly speaking. Nevertheless, no matter how this question may be answered, we must admit certain virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are in the lower appetite, according to what the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*. †13 Others also admit this, for it is evidently true.

p 28

Since virtue, as was said above (Art. 1 and 2), denotes the actualization (*complementum*) of a power, and since a power is ordered to act, human virtue must be assigned to whatever power is a principle of a human act. Now we call an act human, not which may be performed by man in any way whatsoever—for in some acts, plants, brutes, and men share—but which is proper to man. Now among other things, it is proper to man that he be master of his own acts. Consequently, any act of which man is the master is properly a human act; but not those acts over which man has no control, even though they may take place in a man, for example, digestion, and growth, and others of this sort. Therefore, in whatever power there is a principle of an act such as man is master of, human virtue can reside.

p 29

It must be observed that there are three types of principles of acts of this kind. The first is as the primary mover and source of command: this is reason or free will. The second is a moved mover, as the sense appetite, which is moved by the higher appetite when it obeys the latter, and then it in turn moves the external members by its command. The third is a type of principle which is purely passive, in this regard, viz, the external members.

p 29

Both the external member and the lower appetite are moved by the higher part of the soul, but each in a different way. For the external member obeys at the nod of the superior commanding faculty, without any resistance according to the natural order of things, unless there be some impediment: this is evident in the hand and foot. However, the inferior appetite has an inclination proper to its own nature, so that it does not obey at the mere nod of the superior appetite, but sometimes rebels. Hence Aristotle says, in the *Politics*, †14 that the soul rules the body (the external members) as a despot, as a master rules a slave who has not the power of resisting any command of his master. On the contrary, reason rules the inferior parts of the soul (the lower, sense appetites) with a royal and political sway, i.e. as kings and princes rule over cities of free men, who have the right and power to rebel against some of the precepts of their king or prince.

p 29

It follows then that there is no need in an external member for anything to perfect a human act, besides the (innate) dispositions whereby such a member is, of its very nature, ordered to be moved by reason. But in the lower appetite, which can refuse to obey reason, something is required whereby it may perform without resistance the act which reason commands.

p 30

For if the immediate principle of an act be imperfect, the operation will necessarily be imperfect, no matter

how perfect any higher principle may be. †15 Therefore, if the inferior appetite were not perfectly disposed to follow the command of reason, an act proceeding from this appetite, as from its proximate principle, would not be perfectly good, since there would be a certain revolt on the part of the sense appetite. As a result, sadness would overcome the lower appetite because of the violent movement inflicted on it by the higher faculty, as is the case with one who has vehement passion which, nevertheless, he does not indulge, because reason forbids it.

p 30

When, therefore, man has to encounter in his actions objects of the sense appetite, in order that his actions may be good, he needs some disposition or perfection in his sense appetite, whereby it may easily obey reason and this we call virtue.

p 30

Consequently, any virtue which regards those objects which pertain properly to the irascible power, as fortitude concerns fear and daring, magnaminity concerns arduous, hoped-for goods, meekness concerns anger, this virtue is said to reside in the same irascible part as in its subject. When a virtue has to do with the proper objects of the concupiscible appetite it is said to be in the concupiscible appetite as in its subject: as chastity, which regards sexual pleasures, and sobriety and abstinence, which regulate pleasures of food and drink.

p 30

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue and mortal sin can be considered in two ways: according to the act and according to the habit.

p 30

An act of the concupiscible and irascible powers, if it be looked at in itself, is not a mortal sin; and yet it does concur in an act of mortal sin when, under the movement or consent of reason, it goes after what is contrary to Divine Law. Similarly, the same acts (of the sense appetites) cannot be called virtuous acts, if taken merely in themselves; but only when they concur in obeying the command of reason, are they virtuous. Thus acts of mortal sin and acts of virtue do pertain, in some way, to the irascible and concupiscible powers. Hence habits of the same may be found in both these powers.

p 31

The truth is that, just as a virtuous act consists in the irascible and concupiscible powers' obeying reason; so an act of sin consists in this, that reason is drawn to follow the inclination of the irascible and concupiscible appetite. Hence, frequently, sins of the irascible and concupiscible parts are attributed to reason as to their proximate cause; and, by the same token, virtues of the lower appetites may also be attributed to reason.

p 31

2. There can be no virtuous act on the part of the irascible or concupiscible power independently of reason, as has been pointed out. For the chief element in a virtuous act, namely, choice, †16 belongs to reason; as in any operation the action of the agent is of greater importance than its counterpart (*passio*) in the patient. Thus, reason commands the irascible and concupiscible powers. Thence we do not say that there is virtue in the irascible or concupiscible appetites to such an extent that the entire virtuous act, or even a greater part of it, is due to them; but only insofar as by a virtuous habit the final perfection of goodness (*ultimum complementum bonitatis*) is conferred on the virtuous act from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible powers follow the order of reason without any difficulty.

p 31

3. Granted that the irascible and concupiscible parts do not remain actually in the separated soul; still, they do remain radically (*radice*): for the essence of the soul is the root (*radix*) of its powers. Similarly, the virtues which are ascribed to the irascible and concupiscible powers remain in the reason radically; for reason is the root of all the virtues, as will be shown later. †17

p 31

4. There is a certain gradation in forms. Some forms and powers are totally confined to matter, so that every action of theirs is material. This is exemplified in the forms of the elements. But the intellect is completely free of matter, hence its operation is not shared by the body. Finally, the irascible and concupiscible powers stand mid-way between these two extremes. That they make use of a bodily organ is clear from the bodily mutation which accompanies their acts. Again, that they are to some degree above the purely material state is evidenced by the fact that they are moved by the act of command (*imperium*), †18 and that they obey reason. And so there is virtue in them, insofar as they are elevated above matter and obey reason.

p 32

5. Although the order of reason, in which the irascible and concupiscible powers participate, is not a subsisting thing, nor can it be a subject per se; nevertheless, it can be the reason why something is a subject.

p 32

6. The sense cognitive powers are prior in nature to reason, seeing that reason receives its primary forms from them. However, the sense appetitive powers naturally follow the order of reason, since the inferior appetite is naturally constituted to obey the superior. Thus the order in each instance is the reverse.

p 32

7. The complete rebellion of the irascible and concupiscible appetites against reason cannot be suppressed by virtue, because by their very nature the irascible and concupiscible powers tend to a sensible good, and this is sometimes contrary to the dictate of reason. However this total suppression could be accomplished by Divine power, which is mighty enough even to change natures. †19 Nevertheless, this rebellion is lessened by virtue inasmuch as the aforesaid appetites are trained to be subject to reason. Thus, from the dominion of reason over them, they may enjoy extrinsically that which pertains to reason intrinsically. Yet of themselves they may retain something of their own proper inclinations, which are at times contrary to reason.

p 32

8. Although it is true that in man the principal element is what pertains to reason; still, for the integrity of human nature, there are required, not only reason, but also the lower powers of the soul, and the body itself. Thus, from the condition of human nature left to itself, †20 something rebelling against reason arises in the inferior powers of the soul, because these powers have their own proper tendencies. It was otherwise in the state of innocence, and is otherwise too in the state of glory, where reason enjoys the power, from union with God, of holding perfectly under its sway the lower powers.

p 32

9. To detest evil, as it is said to pertain to the irascible part, implies not only a turning away from evil, but also a certain movement of the irascible power towards the destruction of evil. Such is the case with one who not only flees evil, but is moved to punish evil by destroying it: for this is to do something good. Although the detestation of evil may belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers, this is not the only

act which they can elicit. For it also pertains to the irascible power to pursue the arduous good; in which pursuit there are the passions, not only of anger and daring, but also of hope.

p 33

10. We must accept these words, not as they may sound literally, but with a certain allowance. For in every power of the soul there is a desire for its proper good: thus the irascible appetite desires victory, as the concupiscible appetite seeks pleasure. But because the concupiscible appetite is moved towards what is good for the whole animal, simply or absolutely, all desire for good is appropriated to it. †21

p 33

11. Although, considered in themselves, the irascible and concupiscible powers are acted on and not active; nevertheless, insofar as in man they participate to some extent in reason, they also act, in a certain sense, and are not completely acted upon. So the Philosopher says, in the *Politics*, †22 that the dominion of reason over these powers is political, for powers of this sort have their own proper movements, wherein they do not entirely obey reason. On the other hand, the rule of the soul over the body is not royal but despotic; because the bodily members obey the mere nod of the soul, as regards movement.

p 33

12. Although these powers are found in brutes, nevertheless, in them they do not participate in reason. Hence in brutes the same powers cannot have moral virtues.

p 33

13. All evils pertain to concupiscence as to their primary fount, but not as to their first principle. For all the passions arise from the irascible and concupiscible parts, as is shown in the tract on the passions of the soul. †23 Even perversity of reason and will often result from passion. Or we might answer that by concupiscence the Apostle means, not only what is proper to the concupiscible appetite, but what is common to the entire appetitive part, in each power of which some concupiscence is found, about which sin can be committed. Nor is it possible to sin otherwise than by concupiscence or desire.

Article 5

p 34

ARTICLE 5

In this article the question is: **Whether the will is the subject of virtue**. †1

It would seem that it is.

p 34

OBJECTIONS:

1. A greater perfection is required in one who commands, that he may do so rightly, than in one who obeys, that he may rightly fulfill a command. The reason for this is that the one who carries out a command

is ordered by the one who commands. But the will is related to a virtuous act as commanding it, whereas the irascible and concupiscible powers are the faculties which obey its command and perform the act. Since there is virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers, as in a subject, it would seem that, a fortiori, there should be virtue in the will.

p 34

2. It might be objected that the natural inclination of the will to good suffices for its rectitude. We naturally desire the end; hence there is no need of our being rectified by an added virtuous habit.—On the contrary, the will is concerned, not only with the ultimate end, but with other ends as well. As regards these other ends, the will can desire them either rightly or wrongly: Good men present good ends to themselves; bad man seek evil ends. Thus we read in the *Ethics*; †2"Such as each man is, so does the end seem to him." Therefore, for the rectitude and perfection of the will, a virtuous habit is required.

p 34

3. Further, in the cognitive part of the soul there is natural knowledge, namely, of principles; and with respect to this knowledge there is in us the intellectual virtue of understanding, which is the habit of first principles. Consequently, there should be some virtue in the will with respect to that to which it is naturally inclined.

p 34

4. Further, just as there is moral virtue to regulate the passions, as temperance and fortitude; so also there is virtue with regard to operations, namely, justice. Now the will acts without any passion, while the irascible and concupiscible powers operate from passion. Therefore, just as there is moral virtue in the irascible and concupiscible appetites, so also in the will.

p 35

5. Further, in the *Ethics*, †3 the Philosopher says that love or friendship arises from a passion. But friendship is the result of choice, and the love which is without passion is an act of the will. †4 Since, therefore, friendship may be either with or without passion, according to the *Ethics*, it would seem that there is virtue in the will, as in a subject.

p 35

6. Further, charity is the most excellent (*potissima*) of the virtues, as the Apostle declares, in 1 Cor. 13:13. But only the will can be the subject of charity, for the lower concupiscible appetite, which extends only to sensible goods, cannot be its subject. Therefore, the will is the subject of virtue.

p 35

7. Further, according to Augustine, we are immediately united to God especially by our will. But that which unites us to God is virtue. Therefore, it would seem that there is virtue in the will as in a subject.

p 35

8. Further, happiness is in the will, according to Hugh of St. Victor. Now virtues are certain dispositions to happiness. But since a disposition to and the perfection of anything reside in the same subject, it would seem that virtue resides in the will, as in a subject.

p 35

9. Further, according to Augustine, †5 it is the will by which we sin or live righteously. But a righteous life derives from virtue. Hence Augustine remarks in *Contra Iulianum*, †6 that virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously. Therefore, there is virtue in the will.

p 35

10. Further, contraries refer naturally to the same subject. Now the contrary of virtue is sin. Therefore, since every sin lies in the will, as Augustine says, it would seem that virtue is in the same faculty.

p 35

11. Further, human virtue should be assigned to that part of the soul which is proper to man. But the will is proper to man, as also the reason, as being closer to reason than are the irascible and concupiscible powers. But since the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subjects of virtue, it would seem that, a fortiori, so is the will.

p 36

ON THE CONTRARY

1. Every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as we learn from the Philosopher, at the end of I *Ethics*. †7 Moral virtue has for its subject that which is rational, not by its essence, but by participation; whereas intellectual virtue has for its subject what is rational in its essence. Since the will falls under neither type of subject: because it is neither a cognitive power, which is rational in its essence, nor does it belong in the irrational part of the soul, which is rational only by participation; it would seem that the will can in no way be the subject of virtue.

p 36

2. Further, there should not be many virtues ordered to the same act. But this would be the case, if the will were the subject of virtue; because it has been shown (in the preceding Art.) that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers; and, since in some sense the will is concerned with the acts of these powers, †8 it would have to follow that there were certain virtues in the will which ordered these same acts. Therefore, it must be admitted that the will is not the subject of virtue.

p 36

I reply: By a virtuous habit the power which possesses it acquires the perfection of its act. †9 Hence no virtuous habit is necessary for an act to which a power is inclined by its very nature. For virtue ordains powers to good; it is virtue which makes one who possesses it good and renders his operation good.

p 36

Now what virtue effects in other powers, the will enjoys by its very nature: for its object is the good. The will tends towards good in the same manner as the concupiscible appetite tends towards what is pleasurable, and as hearing is keyed to sound. Hence the will does not need any virtuous habit, inclining it to the good which is proportionate to it, because it tends towards this by its very nature as a power. However, it does need a virtuous habit to pursue the good which exceeds its proportions as a power.

p 37

Since the appetite of every subject tends to the good proper to that subject, a good can exceed the proportion of the will in two ways: first, by reason of the species, secondly, by reason of the individual.

p 37

A good may exceed the proportion of the will to its object by reason of the species of man, so that the will must be elevated to tend to this good, which exceeds the limits of human good: and by human I mean what man is capable of by his own natural powers. Now the Divine good is above human good, and to this Divine good the will of man is elevated by charity and by hope.

p 37

A good may also exceed a man's natural capacity by reason of the man as an individual, in this sense, that he seeks that which is good for another man, although his will is not carried beyond the limits of human good. Thus justice and all the virtues which regard a man's dealings with others, as liberality and the rest, perfect the will. For justice is "another's good," as the Philosopher says in the *Ethics*. †10

p 37

Consequently, there are two virtues which have the will as their subject, and these are charity and justice. A sign of this is that, although these virtues pertain to the appetite, still they do not regard the passions, as do temperance and fortitude, from which it is clear that they do not reside in the sense appetite, where the passions are found, but in the rational appetite, which is the will, and in which there are no passions. For every passion is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in the *Physics*. †11 For the same reason, those virtues which control the passions, as fortitude with respect to fear and daring, and temperance as regards the concupiscible pleasures, must be in the sensitive appetite. Nor is it necessary that there be any virtue in the will as regards those passions, because the good in them is what is according to reason. Now the will is naturally ordained to this good, by its very constitution as a power, since the good of reason is the proper object of the will.

p 37

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. The judgment of reason is sufficient for the will's commands; for the will naturally desires what is good according to reason, as the concupiscible appetite desires sensible pleasure.

p 38

2. The natural inclination of the will tends not only towards the ultimate end, but also to good presented to it by reason. For the object of the will is understood good, to which this faculty is naturally ordered, as any power is to its object, which is the good proper to it, as was said above (in the body of the Art.). Yet a man may sin as regards this very object, insofar as the judgment of reason is clouded by passion.

p 38

3. Knowledge is had through an intentional species. The intellectual power is not sufficient by itself for knowing, but must receive a species from sensible objects. Consequently, we need a habit even for those things which we know naturally, a habit which in some way begins in the senses, as it says at the end of II *Posterior Analytics*. †12 But the will is unlike the intellect in this respect, because it does not need any species in order to will.

p 38

4. The virtues which regulate the passions are in the lower appetite. No virtue is required in the higher appetite for these passions, for the reason already stated (in the body of the Art.).

p 38

5. Friendship is not properly a virtue, but consequent upon virtue. From the fact that a man is virtuous, it follows that he loves those like himself. But it is otherwise with charity, which is a certain friendship with God, elevating man to what surpasses his natural good. Hence charity is in the will, as we have said (in the body of the Art.).

p 38

From what has been said, the answer to the sixth and seventh objections is evident, for the virtue which

From what has been said, the answer to the sixth and seventh objections is evident, for the virtue which unites the will to God is charity.

p 38

8. Certain things are required as dispositions for happiness, such as acts of the moral virtues, by which impediments to happiness are removed: impediments such as mental disquietude, resulting from the passions and from external disturbances.

p 38

Complete beatitude consists essentially in an act of the reason or intellect. For the happiness of contemplation is nothing other than the perfect contemplation of supreme Truth; whereas the happiness of the active life is an act of prudence by which a man governs himself and those around him.

p 38

In beatitude there is an added perfection, namely delight, which perfects happiness as beauty graces youth, as we are told in the *Ethics*. †13 This added perfection pertains to the will. If we are speaking of heavenly beatitude, which is promised to the saints, it is charity which perfects the will and orders it to the perfection of happiness.

p 39

But if we are speaking of the happiness of contemplation, which the philosophers have treated, the will is ordered to this sort of delight by natural desire. Thus it is evident that all the virtues need not reside in the will.

p 39

9. It is by the will, which commands all our acts, both virtuous and vicious, that we both live righteously and sin; but not as though it were the will which elicited all of these acts. Hence it is not necessary that the will be the proximate subject of every virtue.

p 39

10. Every sin is traceable to the will as to its cause insofar as every sin is committed with the will's consent. But it need not follow that every sin be in the will as in its subject, for gluttony and lust are in the concupiscible appetite, while pride is in the irascible. †14

p 39

11. From the propinquity of the will to reason, it happens that the will is in harmony with reason by its very nature as a power. Hence it does not need an added virtue for this, as do the inferior powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible.

p 39

In reply to the first objection raised On the Contrary, it must be said that charity and hope, which are in the will, are not included in this division of the Philosopher's; for they are of another class of virtues, called the theological virtues. But justice is one of the moral virtues; for the will, like other appetites, participates in reason insofar as it is directed by reason. Although the will belongs to the same nature as the intellective part, still, it does not pertain to the power of reason itself.

p 39

To the second objection On the Contrary, it must be replied that there need be no virtue in the will as regards those acts for which there is virtue in the irascible and concupiscible parts, for the reason given

above (in the body of the Art.).

Article 6

p 40

ARTICLE 6

In this article the question is: **Whether there is virtue in the practical intellect as in a subject**. †1

It would seem that there is not.

p 40

OBJECTIONS:

1. According to the Philosopher, †2 knowledge is of little or no value for virtue. Now he is speaking here of practical knowledge, as is clear when he goes on to say that many do not do things of which they have knowledge. But knowledge ordered to action is in the practical intellect. Therefore, the practical intellect cannot be the subject of virtue.

p 40

2. Further, a man cannot act rightly without virtue. But one can act rightly with even an imperfect practical intellect, since he can be instructed by another man as to what he must do. Therefore, the perfection of the practical intellect is not a virtue.

p 40

3. Further, the more one turns away from virtue, so much the greater is his sin. But a lack of perfection in the practical intellect lessens one's guilt; for ignorance excuses, either partially or wholly, from sin. Therefore, the perfection of the practical intellect cannot be a virtue.

p 40

4. Further, according to Cicero †3 virtue operates after the manner of nature (like a second nature). But this is contrary to the way in which reason or the practical intellect operates. This is clear from the *Physics*, †4 where a natural agent is distinguished from one which acts from reason. Therefore, it would seem that there is virtue in the practical intellect.

p 40

5. Further, goodness and truth are formally different, in their proper notions (*rationes*). But a formal difference of objects diversifies habits. Since, therefore, the object of virtue is the good, while the perfection of the practical intellect is truth—as ordained to action; it would seem that virtue is not the perfection of the practical intellect.

p 41

6. Further, according to the Philosopher, †5 virtue is a voluntary habit. But the habits of the practical

intellect differ from those of the will or of the appetitive part. Therefore, the habits which are in the practical intellect are not virtues; and so the practical intellect cannot be the subject of virtue.

p 41

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Prudence is one of the four cardinal virtues; and yet its subject is the practical intellect.†6 Therefore, the practical intellect can be the subject of virtue.

p 41

2. Further, human virtue is that which resides in a human power as in its subject. But the practical intellect is more a human power than are the irascible and concupiscible appetites; as what is such by its essence is more such than what is such only by participation. Therefore, the practical intellect can be the subject of human virtue.

p 41

3. Further, the cause whereby a thing is such is still more so (*propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis*). But virtue resides in the affective part on account of reason, since virtue is assigned to the affective part when the latter obeys reason. Therefore, a fortiori, there should be virtue in the practical intellect.

p 41

I reply: Between natural and rational virtues,†7 there is difference, that a natural virtue is determined to one thing, whereas a rational virtue may have many objects (from which to choose).

p 41

The sensitive or rational appetite must be inclined to its own appetible object by some preceding apprehension, for inclination towards an end, without previous knowledge, pertains to a natural appetite, as when a heavy object tends towards the center of gravity. Since the object of both the sensitive and the rational appetite must be some apprehended good, where this good is uniform, there can be a natural inclination in the appetite, following a natural judgement in the cognitive power, as happens in brutes.

p 41

Since brutes are capable of few operations, on account of the weakness of the active principle in them, which extends to few objects, in all animals of the same species there is one uniform good. Hence they are inclined by a natural appetite to this good, and by their cognitive power they form a natural judgment of it as their proper, uniform good. Thus by a natural judgement and inclination of this sort, every sparrow builds its nest in the same way, and every spider spins its web in a uniform fashion. The same is to be observed of all other brutes.

p 42

Now man is capable of many and diverse operations because of the superiority of his active principle, namely, his soul, the power of which extends, in a certain sense, to an infinite variety of objects. Consequently, a natural appetite for good would not suffice for man, nor a natural judgement, to enable him to act correctly, unless it were more fully determined and perfected.

p 42

Man is inclined, indeed, by a natural appetite to desire his own good; but since this good of his consists in many and varied things, there could be in man no natural appetite for this determined good, fulfilling all the conditions required that it be good for him. The reason for this is that man's good is of manyfold diversity,

according to the diverse conditions of persons, times, places, and so forth.

p 42

For the same reason, natural judgement is not enough, because it is uniform and so does not suffice for determining human good. Hence man should seek and judge his own proper good, according to all the conditions under which it is here and now to be sought, through reason, which is able to consider diverse aspects of things. For this function, practical reason without a perfecting habit, is like the speculative reason, without the habit of science, trying to form a judgement on some scientific conclusion: which, certainly, it could do only imperfectly and with difficulty.

p 42

Just as the speculative reason must be perfected by the habit of science, that it may judge correctly concerning the objects of knowledge which pertain to science; so the practical reason must be perfected by some habit, that it may judge rightly concerning human good in each single act to be performed. This virtue is called prudence, the subject of which is the practical reason. It perfects all the moral virtues, which reside in the appetitive part, each of which has an inclination to some type of human good: as justice inclines one to the good which is equality in those things which men share in their community life with one another; temperance, inclining one to the good which consists in restraining oneself in concupiscible pleasures; and similarly for each of the other virtues.

p 43

Now each of these virtues may act in a variety of ways; nor do they operate in the same way in everyone. Hence prudence is required, to establish the right mode in all of them. Thus rectitude and the complete perfection of goodness is derived in all the other virtues from prudence, so that, in the *Ethics*, †8 the Philosopher says that the mean in moral virtue is determined by right reason. All the habits of the appetitive part derive their status as virtue from this rectitude and perfection of goodness; from which it follows that prudence is the cause of all the virtues of the appetitive part, which are called moral virtues. Moreover, Gregory says, in his *Moralia*, †9 that the other virtues, unless they act prudently with respect to appetible objects, cannot in truth be called virtues.

p 43

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. In this passage the Philosopher is speaking of practical science; †10 but prudence implies more than practical science. For it belongs to practical science to form a universal judgment on what things are to be done, as: fornication is evil, theft must not be committed, and so on. However, once we have this science, the judgment of reason may direct us falsely in a particular act; hence science is said to be of little value for virtue, because even when a man possesses science, he may sin against virtue.

p 43

It is the office of prudence to judge correctly concerning individual acts, exactly as they are to be done here and now: and this judgment is corrupted by sin. Therefore, while prudence remains, a man will not sin. Clearly then prudence is, not of meagre, but of tremendous importance for virtue—indeed, it is the cause of virtue itself, as was said above (in the body of the Art.).

p 43

2. A man can take counsel from another concerning what must be done in general; †11 but that he judge correctly in each act, and overcome all his passions, can be effected only by the virtue of prudence. Without this there can be no virtue.

p 44

3. The ignorance which is opposed to prudence is ignorance in choice, according to which every evil man is ignorant. This arises from the fact that the judgment of reason is hindered by the inclination of the appetite: which does not excuse from sin, but rather constitutes it. †12 But the ignorance which is opposed to practical knowledge does excuse or at least lessen the guilt of sin. †13

p 44

4. Cicero's words are to be understood with regard to the inclination of the appetite tending to some common good, e.g. acting bravely, or something similar. But unless such an inclination were directed by the judgement of reason, it would frequently be led away over-hastily, and the more so, the more vehement it was. The Philosopher, in the *Ethics*, †14 cites the example of the blind man who, the more swiftly he is running, is knocked down so much the more forcefully, when he strikes a wall.

p 44

5. Goodness and truth are objects of two parts of the soul, namely, the intellective and the appetitive parts. Now these two parts are so inter-related, that both operate in the other's act: thus, the will wills the intellect to know, and the intellect knows that the will wills. Therefore these two, goodness and truth, include each other: for goodness is true, insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect, i.e. as the intellect knows that the will wills the good, or, in another way, insofar as the intellect itself understands that something is good. Similarly, truth itself is a certain good of the intellect, which also falls under the will as an object, insofar as a man wills to understand the truth. †15

p 44

Nevertheless, the truth of the practical intellect is goodness, which is also the end of action: for goodness does not move the appetite, save when it is apprehended. Hence there is nothing to prohibit virtue from being in the practical intellect.

p 44

6. In this part of the *Ethics*, †16 the Philosopher is defining moral virtue: he treats of intellectual virtue in VI *Ethics*, Chapters 1 to 7. Now the virtue which is in the practical intellect is not moral but intellectual: indeed, the Philosopher himself places prudence among the intellectual virtues, in II *Ethics*, 5 and 8. †17

Article 7

p 46

ARTICLE 7

In this article the question is: **Whether there is virtue in the speculative intellect**. †1

It would seem that there is not.

p 46

OBJECTIONS:

OBJECTIONS:

1. Every virtue is ordered to action: It is virtue which renders an action good. †2 But the speculative intellect is not ordained to action: for it says nothing about imitating or avoiding, as is clear from the *De Anima*. †3 Therefore, there can be no virtue in the speculative intellect.

p 46

2. Further, virtue is that which makes the one who has it good, as it is stated in the *Ethics*. †4 But habits of the speculative intellect do not make one who has them good; a man is not said to be good because he has science. Therefore, the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.

p 46

3. Further, the speculative intellect is especially perfected by the habit of science. Now science is not a virtue, as is evident from the fact that it is distinguished from the virtues. Thus in the first species of quality there are habit and disposition; and habit is further divided into habits of science and of virtue. †5 Therefore, there is no virtue in the speculative intellect.

p 46

4. Further, every virtue is ordered to happiness, which is the crown of virtue. But the speculative intellect is not ordered to anything: the speculative sciences are not sought for their utility but for their own sake, as it says in the *Metaphysics*. †6 Therefore, there can be no virtue in the speculative intellect.

p 46

5. Further, a virtuous act is meritorious. But mere knowledge does not suffice for merit; indeed: "To him who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin," as we read in Jas. 4:17. Therefore, there is no virtue in the speculative intellect.

p 47

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Faith is in the speculative intellect, since its object is the First Truth. †7 But faith is a virtue. Therefore, the speculative intellect can be the subject of virtue.

p 47

2. Further, truth and goodness are equally noble, for they include each other: Truth is a kind of good, and goodness is something true; and both are common to all being. Therefore, if there can be virtue in the will, †8 the object of which is the good, it follows that there can be virtue in the speculative intellect, the object of which is truth.

p 47

I reply: In every subject virtue bespeaks a relation to goodness: for, as the Philosopher remarks, in the *Ethics*, †9 the virtue of each thing is that which makes the one who has it good and renders his operation good. Thus the strength (*virtus*) of a horse is that which makes it a good horse, makes it run well and carry a rider well—which is the work (operation) of a horse. Hence a habit will partake of the nature of a virtue from its being ordered to good.

p 47

Now this can happen in two ways: first, formally; secondly, materially. Formally, when a habit is ordered to good under the very ratio of good; materially, when it is ordered to good, but not as such.

p 47

Good under its proper formality is the subject of the appetitive part only; for the good is that which all desire. Consequently, those habits which either reside in or depend upon the appetitive part are formally ordained to the good. For this reason, they possess the nature of virtue in a most eminent sense. Those habits which neither inhere in nor depend on the appetitive part can, indeed, be materially ordered to the good, but not formally, under the aspect of goodness. Hence they can be called virtues to a certain extent, although not in as proper a sense as the other type of habit (moral virtue).

p 47

It must be observed that both the speculative and the practical intellect can be perfected by a habit in two ways. In one way, absolutely and in itself, as it precedes volition, moving the will to act; in another way, as it follows upon volition, eliciting its act at the command of the will. This is possible because, as has been said, †10 these two powers, intellect and will, mutually accompany each other.

p 48

Those habits which are in the practical or the speculative intellect in the first way can in some sense be called virtues, although not with the perfection of true virtue. In this manner, in the speculative intellect there are understanding, science, and wisdom, and in the practical intellect there is art. For a man is said to have understanding or science when his intellect has been perfected to know the truth, which is the intellect's good. Although this truth can be something willed, as when a man wills to know the truth, nevertheless, it is not in this respect that the aforesaid habits are brought to perfection. For it does not follow from the fact that a man has science that he be moved to will the consideration of the truth, but only that he be capable of doing so. Hence the consideration itself of truth is not science insofar as it is the object of volition, but according as it tends directly to its object. The like may be said of art with respect to the practical intellect: art does not perfect a man so that he wills to produce good works according to the canons of art; but solely so that he knows how and is capable of doing so.

p 48

The habits of the speculative or of the practical intellect have in a truer sense the nature of virtue, to the extent that the intellect follows the will. To this extent a man is not merely made capable of acting rightly, or given the knowledge of how to act rightly, but also willing to do so. This is illustrated, in different ways, in faith and in prudence.

p 48

Faith perfects the speculative intellect according as the latter is commanded to embrace it by the will, as is clear from the act of faith itself. For a man does not assent to those things which are above human reason, save because he wills to do so, as Augustine says †11 that a man cannot believe unless he is willing. Further, faith dwells in the speculative intellect when the latter is subject to the command of the will, just as there is temperance in the concupiscible appetite when the latter obeys the command of reason. Hence the will commands the intellect in believing, not only as to the placing of the act, but also as to the determining of its object. Thus the intellect assents to a determined article of belief at the command of the will, just as the concupiscible power tends, by temperance, to a mean determined by reason.

p 49

Now prudence is in the intellect or practical reason as has been noted (in the preceding Art.): not in such a way that the object of prudence is determined by the will, but only the end thereof; the object it determines for itself. Presupposing the end, namely, the good, from the will, prudence seeks the means to attain and conserve this good.

p 49

From what has been said, it is evident that habits exist in the intellect in a manner which is different from the way in which they exist in the will.

p 49

Some habits depend in no wise on the will, save as regards their use—and this only accidentally, since this use of habits depends in one sense on the will and in another on the habits themselves. Examples of this type of habit are science, wisdom, and art. A man is not so perfected by these habits that he actually wills to use them well, but only that he is capable of so using them.

p 49

On the other hand, there is an intellectual habit which depends on the will for its principle: for in things to be done the principle is the end. This habit is prudence.

p 49

Another habit has its object determined by the will: and this habit is faith. Although all of these habits may in some way be called virtues, it is the habits of the second and last type which have the nature of virtue more perfectly and properly. However, it does not follow from this that they are nobler or more perfect habits. †12

p 49

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. A habit of the speculative intellect is ordered to its own proper act, namely, to the consideration of truth, which it perfects. It is not ordered to any exterior act as an end, but has its end in its own proper act.

p 49

On the contrary, the practical intellect is ordered to an exterior act as to its end: for the consideration of what must be done or made †13 does not pertain to the practical intellect, save for the sake of actually doing or making. †14

p 50

Thus a habit of the speculative intellect renders its act good in a nobler fashion than a habit of the practical intellect, since the former regards the end, while the latter looks to the mean. However, a habit of the practical intellect, from the fact that it orders one to good under the aspect of good, more properly has the nature of virtue, as it is presupposed to the will.

p 50

2. A man is not said to be good absolutely because he may be good in some part, but because he is wholly good; and this he is when his will is good. For the will commands the acts of all of man's powers, since each act is the good for that particular power. Hence only he is said to be a good man absolutely, who has a good will. †15

p 50

A man who is good in one of his powers, without having a good will, is said to be good as regards that power, e.g. because he has good vision or hearing, or sees or hears well.

p 50

It is clear then that a man is not said to be absolutely good from the fact that he has science, but only to

have a good mind or a good understanding. The like may be said of art and of other habits of this sort.

p 50

3. Science is distinguished from moral virtue, and yet is itself an intellectual virtue; or it may be divided against virtue properly so-called: in which case it is not itself virtue, as was said above (in the body of the article). †16

p 50

4. The speculative intellect is not ordered to anything outside itself; it is ordered to its own act as to its end. Now ultimate happiness, which is contemplation, consists in such an act. Hence acts of the speculative intellect are closer in likeness to beatitude than are the habits of the practical intellect. Yet the habits of the practical intellect are perhaps closer by way of preparation or merit. †17

p 51

5. A man can merit by an act of science or a similar habit when the act is commanded by the will, without which there is no merit. Nevertheless, science does not perfect the intellect precisely for this purpose, as we have said (in the body of the Art.). For the possession of science does not make a man willing to use it well, but only capable of using it well. So it is that a bad will is not opposed to science or to art, as it is to prudence, faith, or temperance. Hence the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, †18 that one who voluntarily sins in exterior acts is less prudent, although the contrary may be true in science and art. For a grammarian who unwittingly makes a grammatical error appears to have little knowledge of grammar.

Article 8

p 52

ARTICLE 8

In this article the question is: **Whether virtues are in us by nature**. †1

It would seem that they are.

p 52

OBJECTIONS:

1. Damascene says, in *De Orthodox. Fide*: †2"There are natural virtues which are in all of us naturally and equally."

p 52

2. Further, on Matt. 4:23: "And Jesus went about all Galilee teaching," the Gloss (*ordinaria*) comments: "He taught natural virtues, namely, chastity, justice, and humility, such as a man has by nature."

p 52

3. Further, in Rom. 2:14 it says that men who have not the law do naturally those things that are of the law,

3. Further, in Rom. 2:14 it says that men who have not the law do naturally those things that are of the law. But the law commands virtuous acts. Therefore, men naturally perform acts of virtue; and so it would seem that virtue is from nature.

p 52

4. Further, in a sermon to his monks †3 Anthony declares: "If the will should mutilate nature, this would be perverse. Let the condition of nature be safeguarded, and virtue is the result." In the same sermon he tells them that natural adornment suffices for man. But this would not be so, if virtues were not natural. Therefore, virtues are natural.

p 52

5. Further, Cicero says †4 that uprightness of soul is ours by nature. But this seems to refer to magnanimity. Therefore, magnanimity is ours by nature, and, for the same reason, other virtues.

p 52

6. Further, to perform a virtuous deed all that is required is the capability, the will, and the knowledge of good. But knowledge of the good is in us by nature, as Augustine remarks in *De Libero Arbitrio*. †5 The will to good is also in man by nature, as the same author states, in *De Genesi ad litteram*. Likewise, the power to do good is in man naturally, since the will is master of its own act. Therefore, nature suffices for an act of virtue, and virtue is man's naturally, at least in its inchoative stage.

p 53

7. But it might be objected that virtue is natural to man as to its beginning, but that the perfection of virtue is not from nature.—On the contrary, Damascene says in *De Orthodox. Fide*: †6"As long as we adhere to what is according to nature, we are virtuous. As soon as we fall away from what is natural, from virtue, we fall into what is unnatural and malicious." From this it is clear that it is according to our nature to turn away from malice. But this is the work of perfect virtue. Therefore, the perfection of virtue is from nature.

p 53

8. Further, since virtue is a form, it is simple and lacks parts. If, therefore, it is from nature according to one of its aspects, †7 it would seem that it must be completely from nature.

p 53

9. Further, man is nobler and more perfect than irrational creatures. But other creatures have from nature a sufficiency of those things which pertain to their perfection. Since the virtues are among man's perfections, it would seem that they are in man by nature.

p 53

10. But it might be objected that this cannot be, because men's perfection consists in many and diverse things, whereas nature is ordered to one thing. †8-On the contrary, the inclination of virtue is also to one thing, as is that of nature. For Cicero describes virtue as a habit, in the likeness of a nature, which is in conformity with reason. †9 Therefore, nothing prohibits virtue from being in man from nature.

p 53

11. Further, virtue consists in a mean. But a mean is determined to one point. Therefore, nothing prohibits the inclination of nature from being determined to what is virtuous.

p 53

12. Further, sin is the privation of measure, species, and order. †10 But sin is also the privation of virtue. Therefore, virtue consists in measure, species, and order. Now measure, species, and order are natural to

Therefore, virtue consists in measure, species, and order. Now measure, species, and order are natural to man. †11 Therefore, virtue is natural to man.

p 54

13. Further, the appetitive part of the soul follows the cognitive part. But in the cognitive part there is a natural habit, namely, the understanding of principles. So also in the appetitive or affective part, which is the subject of virtue, there is a natural habit. Thus it would seem that some virtue is natural.

p 54

14. Further, the natural is that of which the principle is within (*naturale est cuius principium est intra*.); as to be borne upwards is natural to fire, because the principle of this movement is in that which is moved. But the principle of virtue is in man. Therefore, virtue is natural to man.

p 54

15. Further, that is itself natural, the seed of which is natural. But the seed of virtue is natural; for a Gloss observes, on Heb. 1, †12 that God willed to plant in every soul the seeds of wisdom and understanding. Therefore, it would seem that virtue is natural.

p 54

16. Further, contraries are of the same genus. But the contrary of virtue is malice. Now malice is natural to us, for we read, in Wisd. 12:10, that: "their malice (was) natural;" and in Eph. 2:3: "we . . . were by nature children of wrath." Therefore, it would seem that virtue is natural.

p 54

17. Further, it is natural that the lower powers be subject to reason. The Philosopher says, in *De Anima*, †13 that the higher appetite, which is that of reason, moves the lower, which belongs to the sensitive part, as a higher sphere moves a lower sphere. †14 Now moral virtue consists in the subordination of the lower powers to reason. Therefore, these virtues are natural.

p 54

18. Further, that a movement be natural, a natural aptitude in the interior passive principle suffices. Thus the generation of simple bodies is said to be natural, as well as the movement of the heavenly bodies. For the active principle of the celestial bodies is not nature, but an intellect, †15 while the principle of the generation of simple bodies is extrinsic. But there is in man a natural aptitude for virtue; as the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*: †16"we are adapted by nature to receive them (the virtues) and are made perfect (in them) by habit." Therefore, it would seem that virtues are natural.

p 55

19. Further, that which is in man from birth is natural. But according to the Philosopher, in the *Ethics*, †17 some men truly seem to be brave and temperate from birth, and well-disposed as regards the other virtues. In Job 31:18 it is written: "From my infancy mercy grew up in me: and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore, virtues are natural to man.

p 55

20. Further, nature is not deficient in necessaries. But virtues are necessary for man to attain the end to which he is naturally ordered, i.e. happiness, which consists in an act of perfect virtue. Therefore, man has virtues from nature.

p 55

ON THE CONTRARY:

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Natural properties are not lost through sin; hence Dionysius says, in *De Divin. Nomin.*, †18 that the natural gifts of the demons remain in them. But virtues are lost through sin. Therefore, they are not natural.

p 55

2. Further, neither habitual activity nor lack of it affect those things which are from nature and which inhere naturally. But virtuous habits we can both acquire and lose. Therefore, virtuous habits are not natural.

p 55

3. Further, those things which are in us naturally are in every one of us. But virtues are not universally in all of us, since in some there are vices contrary to virtue.

p 55

4. Further, we neither acquire nor lose merit by natural things, because they are always in us. But we merit by virtue, just as we lose merit by vice. Therefore, virtues and vices are not natural.

p 55

I reply: There are diverse opinions regarding the acquiring of the sciences and the virtues, according as opinions differ concerning the production of natural forms.

p 55

For there have been some who held that forms pre-exist in matter actually, although in a latent state, and that they are brought from a hidden to a manifest state by a natural agent. This was the opinion of Anaxagoras, †19 whose position was that all things are in everything, so that from all things all things can be produced.

p 56

Others said that forms exist completely extrinsic to things, which have them either by participation in ideas, as Plato held, †20 or from some agent intellect, as Avicenna taught; †21 and that natural agents do no more than dispose matter for form.

p 56

The third view is the mean (*via media*) proposed by Aristotle, in *De Generatione Animalium*, †22 which states that forms preexist in matter potentially, but are reduced to act by an external natural agent.

p 56

Likewise with regard to the sciences and virtues, some have said that they are in us by nature, and that study serves merely to remove the impediments to science and virtue. This seems to have been Plato's doctrine, †23 when he teaches that the sciences and virtues are caused in us by participation in separated forms; but that the soul has been prevented from making use of them by its union with the body. Thus the impediment should be removed by application in the sciences and exercise in the virtues.

p 56

Others †24 have said that science and virtue are in us from the action of an agent intellect, for which influence man is disposed by study and exercise.

p 56

There is a third, mediate opinion, which holds that there is in us from nature an aptitude for the sciences

and virtues, but that their perfection is not in us naturally. †25 This is the best opinion. Just as the strength (*virtus*) of natural agents in no way diminishes natural forms; †26 so as regards the acquirement of science and virtue, study and exercise conserve their efficacy.

p 57

It should be noted that an aptitude for a perfection or form can be in a subject in two ways. First, according to some passive potency only; as in the matter of air there is an aptitude for the form of fire. Secondly, according to both an active and a passive potency at the same time; as in a body capable of health there is a natural aptitude for health, because the body is (naturally) susceptive of health. In this second way there is in man a natural aptitude for virtue; partly from the nature of the species, whereby this aptitude is common to all men, and partly from the nature of the individual, according as some are more aptly disposed for virtue than others.

p 57

In confirmation it may be observed that in man three powers can be the subjects of virtue, as is clear from what has been said above. †27 These are: the intellect, the will, and the lower appetite, which comprises the concupiscible and irascible parts. In each of these we must consider in some way both the susceptibility for and the active principle of virtue.

p 57

In the intellective part, it is evident, there are the possible intellect, which is potential to all intelligible beings †28 in the knowledge of which being intellectual virtue consists; and the active intellect, by the light of which objects are made actually intelligible. †29 Of these intelligible objects, some are naturally known to man from the outset, without any study or inquiry: among these are first principles—not only of the speculative order, e.g. "Every whole is greater than its part," and such like, but also of the practical order, as "Evil is to be avoided," and so forth. These naturally known truths are the principles of all the subsequent knowledge which is acquired by study, whether it be practical or speculative. †30

p 57

Similarly, with respect to the will there is quite manifestly some natural active principle. For the will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end. Now in actions the end has the ratio of a natural principle. †31 Therefore, the inclination of the will is a kind of active principle with respect to every disposition acquired by exercise in the affective part. The will itself, insofar as it is a power free to choose between any two alternative means, is certainly susceptible of an habitual inclination to this or that means to the end.

p 58

Furthermore, the concupiscible and irascible appetites are apt by nature to obey reason: hence they are naturally susceptive of virtue, which perfects them and disposes them to follow the good which reason proposes.

p 58

These inchoative states of virtue are present in man from the nature of the human species; wherefore, they are common to all men.

p 58

There is an initial stage of virtue which corresponds to the nature of an individual, wherein one man, by his natural complexion or from some impression of the heavenly bodies, †32 is inclined to acts of some virtue. This inclination is the beginning of virtue; however, it is not perfect virtue, because for perfect virtue the mean or measure of reason is required. For this reason, in the definition of virtue, †33 we say that it

chooses the mean which accords with right reason. If one should follow a natural inclination without the discretion of reason, he would frequently sin. Just as this beginning of virtue, without the work of reason, has not the nature of perfect virtue, so neither does any of the others mentioned above.

p 58

For we arrive by the inquiry of reason from universal principles to particular applications. Moreover, by the use of reason a man is led from a desire for the ultimate end to those means which are appropriate to this end. Reason itself, by commanding the irascible and concupiscible powers, subjects them to itself. Hence the work of reason is clearly required for the completion of virtue, whether it be virtue in the intellect, the will, or the irascible and concupiscible powers.

p 59

The perfection of virtue lies in this: that the beginning of virtue in the higher part orders virtue in the lower. Thus a man is made apt for the virtue which is in the will both by the beginning of virtue which resides therein, and by that which is in the intellect. He is made apt for virtue in the irascible and concupiscible parts by the beginnings of virtue in them, and by that which is in the higher powers; but not vice-versa. From this it is also clear that reason, which is the superior faculty, works for the perfection of all the virtues.

p 59

Reason as an operative principle is distinguished from nature as an operative principle, as we read in the *Physics*, †34 by the fact that the rational power is capable of considering contraries, whereas nature is ordered to one thing alone. Therefore, the perfection of virtue is manifestly not from nature, but from reason.

p 59

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtues are said to be natural with respect to the natural beginnings of virtue which are in man, not with respect to their perfection.

p 59

The same may be said in reply to the second, third, fourth, and fifth objections.

p 59

6. The capability of good is in us simply from nature in that our powers are natural; whereas willing and knowing are in us in some degree by nature, that is, in a broad and inchoative state. But this does not suffice for virtue. A good act that is the effect of virtue requires that a man attain a good result promptly and infallibly, and for the most part. But a man cannot do this without a virtuous habit. †35 Thus it is evident that a man can know in a general way how to produce a work of art, for example, how to conduct an argument, how to cut, or something of this sort; but that he do so promptly and without any mistake, he must have the habit of art. And the same is true of virtue.

p 59

7. By nature a man does have, to a certain extent, the power to turn away from malice. But that he do so promptly and infallibly, a virtuous habit is required.

p 59

8. Virtue is not said to be partially from nature as though some 'part' of it were so and another part not; but because it is from nature in an imperfect manner of being, namely, potentially and according to an aptitude

because it is from nature in an imperfect manner of being, namely, potentially and according to an aptitude.

p 60

9. God is per se perfectly good; hence He needs nothing to attain goodness. The higher substances, †36 those closer to Him, need place only a few acts to attain from Him their perfect goodness. But man, who is more remote, needs more things to acquire perfect goodness, because he is capable of beatitude. Finally, creatures which have no capacity for beatitude need fewer things to attain their perfection than does man to attain his. Wherefore, man is nobler than these other creatures, even though he stands in relatively greater need. Thus one who can obtain perfect health by much exercise is better disposed than another, who can reach only imperfect health, although with little effort.

p 60

10. There can also be a natural inclination to those things which are the object of one virtue. But there can be no inclination from nature to the objects of all the virtues, because a natural disposition which inclines to one virtue inclines to the contrary of another virtue: for example, one who is naturally disposed to fortitude, which consists in pursuing arduous goods, is less disposed to meekness, which consists in restraining the passions of the irascible appetite. Consequently, we observe that animals which are naturally inclined to the act of one "virtue," †37 are inclined to a vice contrary to another virtue: as the lion, which is naturally daring, is also naturally cruel.

p 60

Now a natural inclination to this or that virtue suffices for other animals, which are incapable of obtaining the perfect good of virtue, and attain only some sort of limited good. However, men are constituted to attain the perfection of virtuous good; and so they require an inclination to all virtuous acts: which, since it cannot be from nature, must flow from reason, wherein the seeds of all the virtues reside.

p 60

11. The mean in virtue is not determined by nature, as is the center of the earth, towards which heavy objects tend; rather the virtuous mean must be determined according to right reason, as it says in the *Ethics*. †38 For what is the mean for one man is less than or more than the mean for another.

p 61

12. Measure, species, and order constitute every sort of good, as Augustine says, in his book *De Natura Boni*. †39 Hence, the measure, species, and order in which natural good consists are naturally in man, nor are they lost by sin. Sin is rather said to be the privation of measure, species, and order insofar as these constitute virtuous good.

p 61

13. The will does not operate through the information of any species, as does the possible intellect; and so no natural habit is required in the will for natural desire. This is especially true since the will is moved by a natural habit in the intellect, inasmuch as the good understood is the object of the will.

p 61

14. Although the beginnings of virtue, namely, man's rational powers, may be in man, nevertheless, this principle or beginning of virtue does not act as nature does, so that what proceeds from it is not said to be from nature.

p 61

The same may be said in reply to the fifteenth objection.

p 61

16. Their malice was natural in that it became so eventually, by constant repetition of wicked deeds, since custom is a "second nature." But we were by nature sons of wrath because of original sin, which is the sin of our nature. †40

p 61

17. It is natural that the lower powers be subject to reason, but not that they be subject by some habit.

p 61

18. Movement is said to be natural where there is a natural aptitude for it in the mobile being, i.e. when the mover moves it to one thing determined naturally, as the cause of formation of the elements (*sicut generans in elementis*) and the mover of the heavenly bodies. But such is not the case in the matter at hand; hence the reasoning does not follow.

p 61

19. That natural inclination to virtue whereby some are, almost immediately from birth, brave and temperate, does not suffice for perfect virtue, as has been said.

p 61

20. Nature does not fail man in necessaries, for although it does not provide everything that is necessary, still it does give him the power of using his reason to acquire everything he needs and whatever may serve his needs.

Article 9

p 62

ARTICLE 9

In this article the question is: **Whether virtues are acquired by acts**. †1

It would seem that they are not.

p 62

OBJECTIONS:

1. Augustine says in *Contra Iulianum*, †2 that virtue is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously, of which no one can make a bad use, which God works in us without us." But God does not work in us that which we do by our own acts.

p 62

2. Further, on the words of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: "All that is not of faith is sin," Augustine remarks †3 that: "The whole life of an unbeliever is sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where

knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery, even in the best behaved people." From this it is evident that there can be no virtue without faith. Now faith comes, not from any acts of ours, but from grace, as the Apostle clearly insists, in Ephes. 2:1: "By grace you are saved through faith: and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore, virtue cannot be caused by any acts of ours.

p 62

3. Further, Bernard says that a man labors in vain for virtue, unless he realizes that he must hope for it from God. Now what must be hoped for from God is not caused by our acts. Therefore, virtue is not caused by our acts.

p 62

4. Further, continence is one of the lesser virtues, as the Philosopher points out, in the *Ethics*. †4 But there is no continence in us save as a gift of God; for we read, in Wisd. 8:21: "And I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore, we cannot acquire virtue from our own acts, but only from the hand of God.

p 63

5. Further, Augustine says †5 that a man cannot avoid sin without grace. But sin is avoided through virtue, for a man cannot be vicious and virtuous at the same time. Therefore, virtue cannot be had without grace: it cannot be acquired by our acts.

p 63

6. Further, by virtue we attain beatitude, for happiness is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*. †6 Therefore, if virtue may be acquired by our own acts, we are able, by these same acts, to attain to eternal life, the ultimate happiness of man, without grace. But this is contrary to what the Apostle says, in Rom. 6:23: "the grace of God, life everlasting."

p 63

7. Further, according to Augustine, in his book *De Libero Arbitrio*, †7 virtue is counted among the greatest goods, because no one can make bad use of virtue. But the highest goods are from God, as we are told in Jas. 1:17: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights." Therefore, it would seem that virtue is in us only by the gift of God.

p 63

8. Further, as Augustine, says in *De Libero Arbitrio*, †8 nothing can form itself. But virtue is a certain form in the soul. Therefore, a man cannot cause virtue in himself by his own acts.

p 63

9. Further, just as the intellect is at first essentially in potency to knowledge, so is the affective power to virtue. But in order that the intellect, essentially in potency, be reduced to the actual possession of science, it needs an extrinsic mover, namely, a teacher. Similarly, that a man actually acquire virtue, he needs some extrinsic agent; his own acts are insufficient.

p 63

10. Further, a thing is acquired by being received. But action takes place, not by reception but by the putting forth or performance of the action by the agent. Therefore, we do not acquire virtue by performing acts.

p 64

11. Further, if virtue is acquired in us by some act of ours, this is either by one act or many. But it is not had by one; for a man is not made studious by studying only once, as we are reminded in the *Ethics*. †9 Nor is virtue acquired by many acts; because several acts, since they are not simultaneous, cannot simultaneously bring about any determined effect. Therefore, it would seem that virtue is in no way caused in us by our acts.

p 64

12. Further, Avicenna observes that virtue is a power essentially attributed to things, enabling them to perform their operations. But that which is essentially attributed to a thing is not caused by any of its acts. Therefore, virtue is not caused by the acts of one who possesses virtue.

p 64

13. Further, if virtue is caused by our acts, this is either by virtuous or by vicious acts. It cannot be by vicious acts, because these rather destroy virtue; nor by virtuous acts, because these presuppose virtue. Therefore, virtue is in no way caused in us by our acts.

p 64

14. But it might be objected that virtue may be caused by imperfect virtuous acts.—On the contrary, nothing can act beyond the powers of its nature. Therefore, if the acts preceding virtue are imperfect, it would seem that they can never cause perfect virtue.

p 64

15. Further, virtue is the limit of a power, as it says in *De Caelo*. †10 But a power is natural. Therefore, virtue is natural, and is not acquired by acts.

p 64

16. Further, we read in the *Ethics* †11 that virtue is that which makes its possessor good. But man is good in his very nature. Therefore, a man's virtue is his by nature, and is not acquired by acts.

p 64

17. Further, no new habit is acquired by the frequent repetition of a natural act.

p 64

18. Further, everything has its being from its form. But grace is the form of the virtues: for without grace the virtues are said to be uninformed. Therefore, the virtues are caused by grace, and not by acts.

p 65

19. Further, according to the Apostle, 2 Cor. 2:19: "power is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is a passion rather than an action. Therefore, virtue is caused by a passion rather than by an action.

p 65

20. Further, since virtue is a quality, a change in virtue would seem to be an alteration, for alteration is a change in quality. But alteration is a passion, which resides only in the sensitive part of the soul, as the Philosopher demonstrates in the *Physics*. †12 Therefore, if virtue is acquired by our acts, through some sort of passion and alteration, it must follow that virtue is in the sensitive part: which is contrary to Augustine's statement †13 that virtue is a good quality of the mind.

p 65

21. Further, by virtue one chooses rightly concerning the end, as it says in the *Ethics*. †14 But to choose

21. Further, by virtue one chooses rightly concerning the end, as it says in the *Ethics*. †14 But to choose rightly with respect to the end does not appear to be within our power: because as each man is, so does the end seem to him, as we read in the *Ethics*. †15 But a man is what he is from some natural complexion in his make-up or from some impression of a heavenly body. Therefore, it is not in our power to acquire virtue; so that they are not caused by our acts.

p 65

22. Further, we neither acquire by habit nor lose by neglect those things which are natural. But in some men there are natural inclinations, both to certain virtues and to certain vices. Consequently, such inclinations cannot be removed by habitually repeated acts. But as long as the evil inclinations remain in us, there can be no virtues in us. Therefore, we cannot acquire virtues by acts.

p 65

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Dionysius says, in *De Divin. Nominibus*, †16 that good is more powerful than evil. But vicious habits are caused in us by evil actions. Therefore virtuous habits are caused in us by good acts.

p 65

2. Further, according to the Philosopher, in the *Ethics*, †17 we become studious by repeated acts. But studiousness is a virtue. Therefore, virtue is caused in us by acts.

p 66

3. Further, generation and corruption are from contraries. But virtue is corrupted by bad acts. Therefore, it is engendered from good acts.

p 66

I reply: Since virtue is the limit to which a power extends in operation, and which makes it a good operation, it is evident that the virtue (*virtus*) of anything is that by which is produces a good operation. But each thing is good insofar as it is rightly ordered to its end. Therefore, each thing is good and acts well through its own proper virtue.

p 66

Now the good of one thing is not the same as the good of other things, for of diverse subjects capable of perfection, there are diverse perfections. Thus the good of man is different from the good of a horse or a stone. Even for man himself there are various kinds of goods, according to various considerations.

p 66

For the good of man as man is not the same as his good insofar as he is a citizen.

p 66

The good of man as such is that his reason be perfected by knowledge of the truth and that his lower appetites be subjected to the rule of reason, for man is human precisely because he is rational. However, the good of man as a citizen is that he serve, in society, the interests of the common good. Hence the Philosopher remarks, in the *Politics*, †18 that it is not the same virtue which makes a man a good man and makes him a good citizen.

p 66

Now a man is not only a citizen of an earthly state, but he is also a citizen of the heavenly Jerusalem, where

the Lord rules, where the angels and all the saints are the citizens, whether they reign in glory and are at rest in their true country, or whether they are as yet pilgrims on this earth, according to the words of the Apostle, Eph. 2:19: "you are fellow-citizens of the saints and the domestics of God, etc." That a man be a citizen of this city, human nature of itself is inadequate, but he must be elevated to it by the grace of God. Clearly, those virtues which a man has insofar as he is a citizen of this heavenly city cannot be acquired by him through his own natural powers. Wherefore, they are not caused by our acts, but are infused into us by the gift of God.

p 66

On the other hand, the virtues which a man has according to his human nature, or as he is a member of this earthly city, do not exceed the powers of human nature. Consequently, a man can acquire them by his own natural powers, from his own acts, as is clearly the case.

p 67

For when a man has a natural aptitude for some perfection, if this aptitude be in a passive principle only, he can acquire the perfection, not by his own activity, but from the action of an exterior natural agent. Thus does the ether receive light from the sun. But if he has a natural aptitude for some perfection, and this aptitude be according to both an active and a passive principle at the same time, in this case he can attain the perfection through his own activity. Thus the body of a sick man has a natural aptitude for health: Because the subject is naturally receptive of health, on account of the natural active power which is in a man to heal him (or: to make him healthy), the sick man may gradually be healed, without the action of any external agent. †19

p 67

It was shown in the preceding article that man has a natural aptitude for virtue in both an active and passive principle, which is apparent from the very order of the principles among themselves. For in the intellective part there is as it were a passive principle, namely, the possible intellect, which is perfected by the action of the agent intellect. The intellect in act moves the will, for the good of the intellect is an end which attracts the appetite. The will, moved by reason, in its turn naturally moves the sensitive appetite, i.e. the irascible and concupiscible powers which are ordered as to obey reason. Hence it is also evident that any virtue which makes a man's operations good has its own act in man, who can actively reduce this virtuous power to act, whether it be in the intellect, the will, or the irascible and concupiscible parts.

p 67

Now virtue is reduced to act in diverse ways in the intellective and in the appetitive parts. The action of the intellect, and of every cognitive power, is in some manner an assimilation to the object of knowledge. Wherefore, intellectual virtue operates in the intellective part in such a way that by the agent intellect intelligible species are presented, either actually or habitually. The action of appetitive virtue consists in a certain inclination towards an appetible object. Therefore, in order that there be virtue in the appetitive part, an inclination must be given it to some determined object.

p 68

It must be noted that the inclination of natural things follows upon their form; and it is to one object, in keeping with the exigency of the form. †20 As long as this form remains, such an inclination cannot be removed, nor a contrary tendency introduced. For this reason, natural things neither acquire anything by habit, nor lose anything by loss of habit. For example, no matter how often a stone is thrown upwards, it never becomes habituated to this upward movement, but remains always inclined to a downward movement. †21 But things which are indifferent to one or another object †22 do not have a form which inclines them to one determined thing; they are directed to one object rather than another by their own proper movement. By this inclination they are to a certain extent disposed towards this particular object;

and after they have been many times so disposed or determined, they become determined to this same object by their own proper movement. A determined inclination to it is established in them, so that this disposition, once received, is as it were a sort of form which tends, as nature would, to one thing. It is on this count that custom or habit is said to be a second nature. †23

p 68

Because the appetitive power †24 enjoys freedom of choice, it does not tend to one thing unless it be determined to it in some way by reason. When reason has frequently inclined the appetite to some one object, a certain disposition is acquired by and firmly fixed in the appetitive power (the will), whereby it is inclined to the one thing to which it has become habituated. This disposition thus established is a virtuous habit.

p 68

Hence if the matter be correctly considered, the virtue of the appetitive part is nothing other than a certain disposition of form stamped and impressed in the appetitive power by reason. Consequently, no matter how strong a disposition in the appetite to some form may be, it cannot have the nature of a virtue unless there be something in it of reason. And so in the definition of virtue reason is included: for the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, †25 that virtue is a habit of choosing, residing in the mind, of a determined nature such as a wise man will decide.

p 69

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Augustine is speaking of the virtues which are ordained to eternal beatitude.

p 69

The same answer applies to the second, third, and fourth objections.

p 69

5. An acquired virtue makes one turn away from sin, not always but in most cases, because those things which spring from nature turn out in most cases (*ea quae naturaliter accidunt, ut in pluribus eveniunt*). It does not follow from this that a man may be at the same time virtuous and vicious, for one act of a power does not destroy an acquired habit, whether it be vicious or virtuous. Nor can a man avoid all sin by an acquired virtue, for one cannot, by acquired virtue, avoid the sin of infidelity or the other sins which are opposed to the infused virtues.

p 69

6. We do not attain heavenly beatitude through acquired virtues, but we do attain a certain happiness which man can acquire through his own natural powers. Here on earth this happiness it attained by an act of perfect virtue, of which Aristotle treats in his *Metaphysics*. †26

p 69

7. Acquired virtue is not a supreme good absolutely, but supreme in the order of human goods; whereas infused virtue is a supreme good absolutely, since by it man is ordered to the Supreme Good, which is God.

p 69

8. The same thing cannot form itself in its entirety. But when in anything there is an active and a passive principle, it can form itself according to certain of its parts, so that one part will be forming and another

formed. Thus a thing moves itself in such a way that one of its parts is the mover and another is the thing moved, as it says in the *Physics*. †27 Such is the case in the formation (*generatione*) of virtues, as has been shown.

p 69

9. Just as the intellect acquires science, not only by invention but also by doctrine, which is received from another, so also in the acquisition of virtue man is aided by the correction and discipline imposed upon him by another. The more disposed a man is to virtue, the less does he need these extrinsic aids, just as, the keener a man's intellect is, so much the less does he need to be taught by another.

p 70

10. The active and passive powers in man both concur in his operations. Insofar as they are active, powers give forth (*fiat emissio*) and receive nothing; on the contrary, it is proper to the passive powers as such to acquire something by reception. Hence in a power which is active only, e.g. the agent intellect, no habit is acquired by acts. †28

p 70

11. The more efficacious is an agent's action, so much the more quickly does it produce a form. And so we see in intellectual operations that we acquire science by a single cogent demonstration; whereas opinion, although of less value than science, is not formed by one dialectical syllogism alone, but many are required, on account of their weakness.

p 70

Thus in exterior actions the operations of the soul are not as efficacious as they are in matters of demonstration, because things to be done are contingent and only probable. Hence one act is not enough to cause virtue, but many acts are required. Although these several acts may not be simultaneous, still they are able to cause a virtuous habit, because the first act sets up a certain disposition, and the second act, finding the matter disposed, disposes it yet further, and the third act still more, and so the ultimate act, acting with the force of all the preceding acts behind it, completes the formation of virtue—as may be illustrated by the example of many drops of water hollowing out a rock.

p 70

12. Avicenna's intention is to define natural virtue, which follows the form of man or his essential principle. Hence his definition does not apply here to our matter.

p 70

13. Virtues are engendered from acts which are in one sense virtuous and in another sense not virtuous. For acts preceding virtue are virtuous as regards the effect they produce, so that a man does brave and just things. But they are not virtuous as regards their mode of action, because, before acquiring a virtuous habit, a man does not perform virtuous works in the same way as a virtuous man does, namely: promptly, without hesitation or difficulty, and with pleasure.

p 71

14. Reason is nobler than a virtue formed in the appetitive part, since such a virtue is no more than a certain participation in reason. Therefore, an act which precedes virtue can cause virtue inasmuch as it is from reason, from which it derives whatever of perfection there is in it. Its imperfection is in the appetitive power, which has not as yet been informed by a habit whereby a man may follow the command of reason with pleasure and promptness.

p 71

15. Virtue is said to be the limit of a power, not because it is always of the essence of a power; but because it inclines a power to the limit of its extent (*ad id quod ultimo potentia potest*).

p 71

16. By his nature man is good to some extent, but not absolutely. That a thing be simply good, it must be completely perfect, just as, that something be simply beautiful, there must be no deformity or ugliness in any part of it. Now a man is said to be simply and wholly good from his having a good will, because by his will man controls all his other powers. Therefore, a good will makes a man good absolutely; and for this reason, a virtue of the appetitive part, whereby the will is made good, is that which makes its possessor good absolutely.

p 71

17. Acts which precede virtue can indeed be called natural insofar as they proceed from natural reason, †29 and as what is natural is distinguished from what is acquired; however, they cannot be called natural in the sense in which what is natural is opposed to what is from reason. Thus we say that we neither acquire by habit nor lose by neglect natural properties, in the sense in which nature is distinguished from reason.

p 71

18. Grace is said to be the form of infused virtue, not in the sense that it gives virtue its specific being, but inasmuch as by grace the act of virtue is somehow informed. Hence it is not necessary that civic virtue result from the infusion of grace.

p 71

19. Virtue †30 is made perfect in infirmity, not because infirmity causes virtues, but because it provides the occasion for a certain virtue, namely, humility. It is also the matter of other virtues, such as patience and charity, as when one aids one's neighbor in his weakness. Furthermore, it is naturally a sign of virtue, because the soul is shown to be more virtuous (or stronger) the more difficulty it has in moving the body to an act of virtue.

p 72

20. Properly speaking, a thing is not said to be altered when it acquires its proper perfection. Wherefore, since virtue is the proper perfection of man, a man is not said to be altered in acquiring it, unless perhaps accidentally, when a change in the sensible part of the soul, in which the passions are located, pertains to virtue. †31

p 72

21. A man may be said to be such as he is either according to a certain quality of the intellective part: in which case he is not said to be such from the natural complexion of his body, or by the impression of a heavenly body, since the intellective part is independent of every body; or he may be said to be such as he is from a disposition in the sensitive part: which can indeed be from the natural constitution of his body, or from the impression of a heavenly body. However, because this latter part obeys reason, what a man is can by habit be diminished or completely erased. †32

p 72

This last also provides the response to the twenty-second objection; for by this disposition in the sensitive part some men are said to have a natural inclination to vice or virtue, etc.

Article 10

p 73
ARTICLE 10

In this article the question is: **Whether there are any infused virtues in man**. †1

It would seem that there are not.

p 73
OBJECTIONS:

1. In the *Physics* †2 we read: "Each thing is perfect when it attains the virtue (strength) proper to it." But the proper virtue of each thing is its natural perfection. Therefore, a man's connatural virtue suffices for his perfection, and this virtue can be caused by natural principles. Hence man's perfection does not require that he have any infused virtue.

p 73
2. It might be objected that man must be made perfect by virtue not only with regard to a connatural end but also to a supernatural end, namely, the happiness of eternal life, to which man is ordered by infused virtues.—On the contrary, nature does not fall short in necessaries. But what a man needs to reach his final end is necessary for him. Therefore, he can acquire it by his natural powers, and so does not need infused virtue for it.

p 73
3. The seed germinates by the power received from its germinator. Otherwise, since an animal seed is imperfect, it could not by its own action attain the perfection of the species. †3 But the seeds of the virtues are planted in us by God, as we read in a Gloss (on Heb. 1:3: "who, being the brightness of His Glory."): "God has sown in every soul the beginnings of understanding and of reason." Hence these seeds act by the power of God. Now since acquired virtue is caused from seeds of this kind, it would seem that acquired virtue could bring us to the enjoyment of God, in which the happiness of eternal life †4 consists.

p 73
4. Further, virtue orders man to the happiness of eternal life, inasmuch as virtue is a meritorious act. Now the act of an acquired virtue can be meritorious of eternal life if it be informed by grace. Therefore, it is not necessary for eternal life to have infused virtues.

p 74
5. Further, the principle or root of merit is charity. Hence if it were necessary to have infused virtues to merit eternal life, it would seem that for this charity alone would suffice. And so it is not imperative to have any other infused virtues.

p 74
6. Further, moral virtues are necessary in order that the lower powers be subjected to reason. But these

powers are sufficiently subjected to reason by the acquired virtues. Therefore, it is not necessary that there be any infused moral virtues for the purpose of ordering reason to this specific end or any other; rather it is enough that man's reason be directed to his supernatural end. Now this is adequately accomplished by faith. Therefore, we need have no other infused virtues.

p 74

7. Further, what is done by Divine power is not specifically different from what is wrought by the working of nature. For example, the health which a man recovers by a miracle is of the same nature as that which nature procures. Therefore, if there is any infused virtue, which would be in us from God; besides virtue acquired by our own acts, e.g. should there be acquired temperance and infused temperance, they would not on this account differ. Now two forms identical in species cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject. Therefore, it is impossible that one who has acquired temperance should have an infused temperance.

p 74

8. Further, the nature of a virtue is known from its acts. But acts of infused and of acquired temperance are specifically the same. Therefore, so are the virtues themselves. Proof of the minor: Whatever things agree both in matter and in form are of one species. But acts of infused and of acquired temperance are concerned with the same matter †5 both are concerned with the pleasures of touch. They agree also in form, for both consist in a mean. Therefore, the acts of infused temperance and the acts of acquired temperance are identical in species.

p 74

9. But it might be objected that they differ in species from the fact that they are ordered to different ends, and in morals species are determined by the end.—On the contrary, things can be specifically different according to that which determines the nature of a thing. Now in morals, species are not determined from the ultimate end but by the proximate end. Otherwise, all virtues would be of one species, since all are ordered to happiness as to their ultimate end. Therefore, things cannot be said to agree or to differ in species from their ordination to the ultimate end. And so infused temperance is not specifically different from acquired temperance from the fact that the former orders man to a higher type of beatitude.

p 75

10. Further, no moral habit takes its species from its being moved by another habit. For one moral habit may happen to be moved or imperated by habits which are specifically diverse; as the habit †6 of intemperance is moved by that of avarice, when one commits adultery in order to steal; and by that of cruelty, when one commits adultery in order to murder someone. On the other hand, habits specifically diverse may be imperated by one and the same habit; for example, when one man commits adultery in order to steal, while another commits murder in order to steal. But temperance or fortitude or any of the other moral virtues have no act ordered to the happiness of eternal life, save insofar as it be imperated by the virtue which has the ultimate end for its object. †7 Therefore, they do not take their species from this, or, in other words, an infused moral virtue does not differ in species from an acquired virtue by the fact that it is ordered to eternal life as to its end.

p 75

11. Further, the subject of infused virtue is the mind: thus Augustine says, in *Contra Julianum*, †8 that virtue is a good quality of the mind which God works in us without us. But the moral virtues do not have the mind as their subject: for temperance and fortitude are in the irrational parts, as the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*. †9 Therefore, the moral virtues are not infused.

p 75

12. Further, contraries are of the same ratio. †10 But vice, which is the contrary of virtue, is not infused, but is brought about by our acts. Neither, therefore, are the virtues infused, but rather they are caused solely by our acts.

p 76

13. Further, before the acquisition of virtue man is in potency to virtue. But potency and act are of the same genus: every genus is divided by potency and act, as is clear from the *Physics*. †11 Therefore, since the potency to virtue is not infused, it would seem that virtue is not infused either.

p 76

14. Further, if the virtues are infused, they must be infused together. Now when grace is infused into a man who has been in the state of sin, the habits of the moral virtues are not at that time infused into him; for even after contrition he suffers the onslaughts of the passions. But this is not the condition of a virtuous, but perhaps of a continent man: a continent man differs from a temperate man in this, that the former suffers but is not overcome, whereas the latter does not suffer, as we read in the *Ethics*. †12 Therefore, it would seem that the virtues are not in us from the infusion of grace.

p 76

15. Further, the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, †13 that we may consider it as a sign of the formation of a habit when delight accompanies an operation. But one does not perform with pleasure acts of the moral virtues immediately after contrition. Therefore, he has not as yet a virtuous habit; and consequently, the moral virtues are not caused in us from the infusion of grace.

p 76

16. Further, we hold that from many bad acts a vicious habit is formed in a man. Yet it is manifest that a man's sins are forgiven and grace is infused from one act of contrition. But an acquired habit is not destroyed by one, single act, just as it is not formed by one only. Therefore, if the moral virtues are infused together with grace, it must follow that the habit of a (infused) moral virtue could exist along with the habit of an opposed vice: †14 which is impossible.

p 76

17. Further, virtue is both engendered and destroyed from the same cause, as it says in the *Ethics*. †15 Therefore, if virtue is not caused in us by our own acts, it would seem to follow that neither is it corrupted because of our acts. From this it would also follow that a man does not lose virtue by sinning mortally: which is false.

p 77

18. Further custom (Lat.: *mos, moris*) and habit would seem to have the same meaning. Therefore moral (*moralis*) and habitual virtue are the same. But habitual virtue is so called from habit, because it is caused by frequent or habitual good acts. Therefore, all moral virtue is caused by acts, and not by the infusion of grace.

p 77

19. Further, if certain virtues are infused, their acts will of necessity be more efficacious than those of a man who has no virtue. But from our acts, even before we have any virtue, virtuous habits are caused in us. †16 Therefore, habits will also be formed from acts of infused virtues, if there be any such virtues. But we know, from the *Ethics*, †17 that as acts are, so are the habits which they cause. Therefore, habits caused by acts of infused virtues are of the same nature as the infused virtues themselves. It must then follow that two forms identical in species are in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore, it would seem

impossible that there be any infused virtues in us.

p 77

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Luke 24:49: "But stay you in the city till you be endued with power from on high."

p 77

2. Further, in Wisd. 8:7, it is written of Divine wisdom that "she teaches temperance and prudence, etc." Now the spirit teaches virtue by causing it. Therefore, it would seem that there are moral virtues infused into us by God.

p 77

3. The acts of all the virtues should be meritorious, in that by them we are able to attain beatitude. But there can be no merit save from grace. Therefore, it would seem that virtues are caused in us from the infusion of grace.

p 77

I reply: Besides the virtues acquired from our acts, as has been said, we must admit other virtues infused into us by God.

p 77

The reason for this may be seen in the fact that virtue, as the Philosopher says, †18 makes both its possessor and his action good. Therefore, virtue will be diversified according as good is diversified in man, for the good of man insofar as he is man is evidently other than his good as a citizen. Moreover, certain operations can be agreeable to man as man, which would not be appropriate to him insofar as he is a citizen. †19 On this point the Philosopher remarks, in the *Politics*, †20 that there is one virtue which makes a good man, and another which makes a good citizen.

p 78

Now it must be observed that man's good is two-fold: one is proportionate to his nature, the other exceeds the powers of his nature.

p 78

The point is that a passive subject must acquire perfections from an agent in various ways, according to the diversity of the agent's powers. Thus we see that the perfections and forms which are caused by the action of a natural agent do not exceed the natural capacity of the receiver; for the natural active power is proportionate to the natural passive power. But the perfections and forms which derive from a supernatural agent of infinite power, which is God, exceed the powers of the nature which receives these perfections. Thus the rational soul, which is immediately created by God, exceeds the capacity of its material receiver in such wise that corporeal matter cannot completely confine and enclose it; there remains to it some power and operation in which corporeal matter does not share. †21 This does not happen in any of the forms which are all caused by natural agents.

p 78

Just as man acquires his first perfection, namely, his soul, from God, so he also receives his ultimate perfection, which is perfect happiness, immediately from God, and therein he rests. This is evident, indeed, from the fact that man's desire can be satisfied in nothing outside of God alone. It has been given man by nature, that from effects he should be moved to a desire to seek after causes; nor does this desire cease until

he beholds the First Cause, which is God.

p 78

Hence it must be that, just as man's first perfection, which is his rational soul, exceeds the power of corporeal matter, so the ultimate perfection which man can attain, which is the blessedness of eternal life, exceeds the powers of the whole of human nature. And since each thing is ordered to reach its end by some operation, and since the means must be in some manner proportionate to the end, of necessity there must be in man certain perfections whereby he may be ordered to his supernatural end, and these perfections must surpass the power of man's natural principles. Now this cannot be, unless certain supernatural principles of operation be infused into man by God, over and above man's natural powers of action.

p 79

The natural principles of man's operations are the soul and its faculties, namely, the intellect and the will, which are the principles of his actions precisely insofar as he is human. This could not be, unless the intellect were endowed with a knowledge of principles to serve as a guide in the knowledge of other things; or unless the will had a natural inclination to the good proportionate to its nature, as was said in the preceding Articles, 8 and 9.

p 79

There is infused into man by God, to enable him to perform acts ordered to eternal life as their end: first, grace, which gives the soul a certain spiritual or Divine being; and then, faith, hope and charity. By faith the mind is enlightened concerning supernatural truths, which in their order stand as do principles naturally known in the order of natural actions. By hope and charity the will acquires an inclination to that supernatural good to which the human will, by its own natural operations, is not adequately ordered.

p 79

Besides the natural principles which a man has, for his perfection in the order natural to him, a man needs virtuous habits, as was indicated above (in the preceding Art.). So also, besides the aforesaid supernatural principles, †22 man is endowed by God with certain infused virtues which perfect him in the ordering of his actions to their end, which is eternal life. †23

p 79

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. By his first perfection man is perfected in two ways: first, in his nutritive and sensitive part, wherein the perfection does not surpass the capacity of corporeal matter, and secondly, in his intellective part, which does exceed corporeal nature: and in this part man is absolutely perfect, whereas in the lower part he is only so to some extent. So also, with regard to his final perfection, man can be perfected in two ways: first, according to the capacity of his nature, and secondly, according to a supernatural perfection. In the second way a man is said to be absolutely perfect, but in the first way, only in some respect. Hence two types of virtue may be present in man: one which corresponds to natural perfection, and this is not perfect virtue; and another, which corresponds to man's ultimate perfection, and this is man's true and perfect virtue.

p 80

2. Nature provides for man in necessaries according to his (natural) powers; hence with respect to those things which do not exceed the capacities of nature, man has from nature, not only receptive (i.e. passive), but also active principles. But as regards those things which exceed nature, man has from nature only the aptitude †24 for receiving them.

p 80

3. The seed of a man acts with the full power of the man himself. But the seeds of the virtues naturally planted in the human soul do not act with the full power of God. Hence it does not follow that they can do whatever God can do.

p 80

4. Since there is no merit without charity, the act of an acquired virtue cannot be meritorious without charity. Now the other virtues are infused together with charity; hence an act of acquired virtue cannot be meritorious save by means of the (corresponding) infused virtue. For a virtue ordered to an inferior end produces no act ordered to a superior end, save by means of superior virtue; as the fortitude which is man's as an individual does not order its act to the common good save by means of that fortitude which is a virtue of man in his capacity as a citizen.

p 80

5. When an action proceeds from many agents mutually ordered to one another, its perfection and goodness can be hindered by an impediment from one of the agents, even if the other agents are perfect. Thus, no matter how skilled an artisan may be, he will not produce a perfect work if his instrument is defective.

p 80

Now in the operations of man, which must be made good by virtue, we must consider that the action of a superior power does not depend on an inferior power, but that the latter depends on the former. Therefore, that the acts of the lower powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible appetites, may be perfect, not only must the intellect be ordered to the ultimate end by faith and the will by charity, but the inferior powers themselves, irascible and concupiscible, must also have their own proper operations made good and ordered to the ultimate end.

p 80

Thus the sixth objection is also answered.

p 81

7. Of every form which nature produces, God can also produce specifically the same form, by Himself and without the action of any natural agent. In this respect, the health which is miraculously bestowed by God is of the same species as that health which nature procures. But it does not follow that every form which God is able to produce, nature can also produce. Consequently, infused virtue, which is immediately from God, need not be of the same nature as acquired virtue.

p 81

8. Infused and acquired temperance both agree in their matter or object, for both are concerned with the pleasures of touch; but they do not agree in the nature or form of their acts. For although both seek a mean, nevertheless, infused temperance seeks a mean under another formality than does acquired temperance. Infused temperance seeks the mean which accords with the precepts of Divine law †25 and which is ordered to the ultimate end; whereas acquired temperance takes its mean according to inferior reasons, as ordered to the good of the present life. †26

p 81

9. The ultimate end does not determine the nature of things in morals, save insofar as in the proximate end there is a due ordination towards the ultimate end; for means must be proportionate to the end. The good of counsel also requires that one seek the end with the appropriate means, as is clear from the *Topics* †27 of

Aristotle.

p 81

10. The act of one habit, as it is imperated by another habit, takes its moral character, formally speaking, from the end to which the act is ordered. Hence, when a man commits fornication in order to steal, although the act may be materially one of intemperance, yet formally it is an act of avarice. But although an act of intemperance may in a certain sense receive its nature from its being imperated by avarice; nevertheless, it does not follow from this that intemperance itself takes its nature from the fact that an act is imperated by avarice.

p 81

Therefore, when acts of temperance or of fortitude are imperated by charity, which orders them to the ultimate end; the very acts take their species formally from charity, for formally they are acts of charity. However, this does not mean that (the habits of) temperance or fortitude are so constituted. Infused temperance and fortitude do not differ specifically from acquired temperance and fortitude from the fact that their acts are imperated by charity, but because their acts consist in a mean which orders them to the ultimate end, which is the object of charity.

p 82

11. Infused temperance is in the concupiscible's appetite. Now the irascible and concupiscible powers are said to belong to reason or to be reasonable insofar as they participate to some extent in reason, by obeying it. By the same token, they are called 'mind' when they obey mind; so that what Augustine says (*loc. cit. in obj.* 11) is true, namely, that virtue is a good quality of the mind. †28

p 82

12. Man's vice consists in his going after lower things; but his virtue lies in this, that he be elevated to higher things. Hence vice cannot be infused (from above), but only virtue.

p 82

13. When a passive subject is by nature constituted to receive various perfections from diversely ordered agents, the diversity and order of the passive powers in the patient will correspond to the diversity and order of the active powers in the agents, for an active power will correspond to each passive potency. For example, water or earth have some potency whereby they are naturally apt to be changed by fire and another potency whereby they are naturally apt to be changed by a heavenly body; and still another, whereby they are naturally apt to be moved or changed by God. Just as from water or from earth something can be made by the power of a heavenly body which cannot be made by the power of fire; so, from the same elements something can be formed by the power of a supernatural agent which no natural agent can produce. For this reason we say that in the whole of creation there is a certain obediential potency whereby every creature obeys God by receiving into itself whatsoever God wills.

p 82

In a similar manner, there is in the soul something potential which is by nature constituted to be actualized by a natural agent. In this way the acquired virtues exist potentially in the soul. In another way, there is something potential in the soul which is not naturally ordered to be reduced to act except by Divine power; and in this way the infused virtues exist potentially in the soul.

p 83

14. The passions which incline us towards evil are not completely suppressed by either acquired or infused virtue, †29 unless it be in an extraordinary and miraculous manner. For the struggle of the flesh against the spirit always remains, even after moral virtue is had. Of this the Apostle speaks, in Gal. 5:17: "For the

spirit always remains, even after moral virtue is had. Of this the Apostle speaks, in Gal. 5:17: "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh." However, these passions are subdued by both acquired and infused temperance, to the extent that a man is not violently disturbed by them.

p 83

Acquired and infused virtues accomplish different effects in this subduing of the passions. Acquired virtue effects that the attacks of concupiscence be felt less. This effect results from the causality of acquired virtue; by the frequent acts whereby a man grows accustomed to virtue, he gradually grows unaccustomed to obey his passions and begins to resist them. From this there ensues that he senses their attacks the less. Infused virtue is of value in that, even though the passions be felt, still they in no way gain control. For infused virtue effects that a man in no way obey the concupiscences of sin; and while this virtue remains, it does this infallibly. Acquired virtue falls short in this respect, although in only a few instances, as other natural †30 inclinations fail in only a minor part. Hence the Apostle declares, Rom. 7:5 and 6: "For when we were in the flesh, the passions of our sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit and death. But now we are loosed from the law of death wherein we were detained; so that we should serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter."

p 83

15. Because infused virtue does not at once always remove the stings of the passions, as acquired virtue does, for this reason it does not in the beginning operate with much delight. This does not destroy the nature of virtue, because at times it is sufficient for virtue that it work without sadness, nor is it required that it work with pleasure, because of the severe attacks which are experienced. Thus, in the *Ethics*, †31 the Philosopher says that it is enough that the courageous man act without sadness.

p 84

16. Although an acquired habit is not destroyed by a single (natural) act, nevertheless, by the power of grace an act of contrition has the effect of destroying a vicious habit which has been formed or acquired. Therefore, when the habit of intemperance is broken, it no longer remains as a habit in one who had it, along with the infused virtue of temperance, but it remains only as a form on its way to corruption, as a sort of disposition. Now a disposition does not exclude a contrary habit.

p 84

17. Although infused virtue is not caused by our acts, still our acts can dispose for it; †32 hence it is not impossible that it be destroyed by these same acts. Form is removed through the indisposition of matter, as the soul is separated from the body on account of the latter's indisposition.

p 84

18. Moral virtue does not derive its name from custom (*more*) insofar as custom signifies a habit of the appetitive power, for on this count the infused virtues could be called moral, even though they are not formed by frequent acts.

p 84

19. Acts †33 of infused virtue do not cause any habit, but by them a pre-existing habit is strengthened. In fact, neither is a habit formed by each act of acquired virtue; otherwise, there would be an infinite number of habits. †34

Article 11

p 85

ARTICLE 11

In this article the question is: **Whether infused virtues may be increased**. †1

It would seem that they may not.

OBJECTIONS:

p 85

1. Nothing save quantity is increased. But virtue is not a quantity but a quality. Therefore, it is not increased.

p 85

2. Further, virtue is an accidental form. But form is most simple and essentially invariable. Therefore, virtue does not vary essentially, nor can it be essentially increased.

p 85

3. Further, what is increased undergoes a change, and what is essentially increased is changed essentially. Now what is changed in its essence is either corrupted or generated. But generation and corruption are changes in substance. Therefore, charity is not essentially increased, save when it is destroyed or first formed.

p 85

4. Further, essentials are neither increased nor diminished. Now it is evident that the essence of virtue is essential to it. Therefore, virtue is not increased according to its essence.

p 85

5. Moreover, increase and decrease are contraries, and so are by nature concerned with the same subject. Now infused virtue is not diminished, for it is diminished by neither a virtuous act, which rather strengthens it, nor by an act of venial sin, for then many venial sins would entirely destroy charity and the other infused virtues, which is impossible. †2 For if it were possible, many venial sins would be equivalent to one mortal sin. Nor is infused virtue diminished by mortal sin, because mortal sin rather destroys completely charity and the other infused virtues. Therefore, infused virtue is not increased.

p 85

6. Further, like is increased by like, as it says in *De Anima*. †3 Therefore, if infused virtue be increased, it must be increased by the addition of virtue. But this cannot be, because virtue is simple, and something simple added to what is already simple does not enlarge it, e.g. a point added to a point does not make a greater line. Therefore, infused virtue cannot be increased.

p 86

7. Further in *De Generatione* †4 we learn that augmentation is an addition made to a pre-existing magnitude. Therefore, if virtue is increased, something must be added to it, and so it will be more composite and recede further from the Divine likeness, and be less excellent as a result. But all of this is

most inappropriate. It remains then that virtue is not increased.

p 86

8. Further, everything which is increased is changed. But whatever undergoes change †5 is a body. Now virtue is not a body. Therefore, it is not increased.

p 86

9. Further, that which has an unchanging cause is itself invariable. But the cause of infused virtue, which is God, is unchangeable. Therefore, infused virtue itself is immutable: it does not admit of a more or less; and so is not increased.

p 86

10. Further, virtue is in the genus of habit, as science is. †6 Hence, if virtue is increased, it must be in the way in which science is increased. Now science is increased by the multiplication of objects, so that it extends to more of them. But virtue is not increased in this way, as is evident in the case of charity: for the least degree of charity extends to all the objects which are capable of being loved. Therefore, virtue is in no way increased.

p 86

11. Further, if infused virtue is increased, its increase must be reduced to some species of change (*motus*). But it can only be reduced to alteration, which is the change of a quality. †7 Now there is alteration, according to the Philosopher, †8 only in the sensitive part of the soul: wherein there is neither charity nor many of the other infused virtues. Therefore, not every infused virtue is increased.

p 86

12. Further, if infused virtue is increased, it must be increased by God, Who is its cause; and if God does increase it this must be by some action of His. But there can be no new action unless there be a new infused virtue. Therefore, infused virtue cannot be increased, save by the addition of a new virtue. Now it cannot be increased in this manner, as was shown above. Therefore, infused virtue can in no way be increased.

p 87

13. Further, habits are increased especially by acts. Since virtue is a habit, if it is increased, it is especially increased by its act. But it seems that this cannot be, for act proceeds from habit. Now nothing is increased by the fact that something goes out from it, but by the fact that something is received in it. Therefore, virtue is in no way increased.

p 87

14. Further, all virtues have a common generic ratio. Therefore, if any virtue is increased by its own act, it may be increased by any act whatsoever; which experience seems to deny. For we do not experience that virtue grows with every act.

p 87

15. Further, that which is the best in its kind cannot be increased: for there is nothing better than the best, nor anything whiter than the whitest. But the very nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is the ultimate term of a power (*ultimum de potentia*). †9 Therefore, virtue cannot be increased.

p 87

16. Further, whatever has an indivisible ratio lacks intenseness and remissness, e.g. substantial form

16. Further, whatever has an indivisible ratio lacks intenseness and remissness, e.g. substantial form, number and figure. But the ratio of virtue consists in something indivisible, for it is in a mean. Therefore, virtue is neither intensified nor slackened.

p 87

17. Further, what is infinite cannot be increased, because outside the infinite there is nothing. But infused virtue is infinite, since by it man merits an infinite good, namely, God. Therefore, virtue cannot be increased.

p 87

18. Further, nothing extends beyond its own perfection, because perfection is the term of a thing. But virtue is the perfection of its possessor, for according to the *Physics* †10 virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing for its best. Therefore, virtue can not be increased.

p 87

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. We read in Peter 2:2: "As newborn babes, desire the rational milk without guile, that thereby you may grow unto salvation." Now a man does not grow unto salvation, except by an increase in virtue, by which he is ordered to salvation. Therefore, virtue is increased.

p 88

2. Further, in his Commentary on John, †11 Augustine states that charity is increased so that, being increased, it may merit to be brought to perfection.

p 88

I reply: Many have erred concerning forms because they considered them in the way substances are to be considered. It seems that they were led to do this because, in the abstract, forms are given substantive names; we speak, for example, of virtue or whiteness and the like. As a result, some, deceived by this mode of expression, treat of forms as though they were substances.

p 88

From this have arisen the errors both of those who held for the latent pre-existence of forms, †12 as well as of those who claimed that all forms were immediately created. For these men reason that it is proper to forms to be produced in the same manner as are substances. Since they were unable to discover any source whence forms were educed, they taught either that they were (immediately) created or else that they pre-existed †13 in matter. In this they failed to remember that existence does not belong to the form but to the (composite) subject through the form, so that becoming (*fieri*), which terminates in being, is not a process of movement of the form but of the complete subject. †14 For just as form is termed being, not because it is itself a being, if we want to speak properly, but because by it something is; so form is said to become, not because it itself becomes, but because by it something becomes, when a subject is reduced from potency to act.

p 88

Such is the case as regards the increase of qualities. Of this increase some speak as though qualities and forms were substances. Now substance is said to be increased insofar as it is the subject of a change whereby it acquires greater quantity; and this change is called augmentation.

p 89

Because increase in substance may be affected by the addition of substance to substance, some have

Because increase in substance may be effected by the addition of substance to substance, some have thought that this is the way in which charity or any other infused virtue is increased, namely, by the addition of charity to charity, or virtue to virtue, or whiteness to whiteness: which is certainly not the case. †15

p 89

There can be no addition of one thing to another unless two things be pre-supposed. But there can be no duality of forms unless there be a distinction of subjects, because specifically identical forms are not numerically distinguished except by reason of their subjects. Consequently, if quality is added to quality, it must be in one of two ways: either that subject is added to subject, e.g. when one white thing is added to another; or that something in a subject, which was not previously white, becomes white—as some have held with regard to corporeal qualities, and which the Philosopher disproves in the *Physics*. †16 For when something becomes more curved, nothing is curved which was not curved before, but the whole being becomes more curved. However, not even this can possibly apply to spiritual qualities, the subject of which is the soul or a part of the soul.

p 89

Hence certain others have said that charity and the other infused virtues are not essentially increased; but that they are said to be increased, either insofar as they are more firmly rooted in their subject, or in the sense that they operate more fervently and intensely. Now this opinion would indeed have reasonable grounds to it, if charity were a substance of some sort, existing by itself without a subject of inherence. †17 In fact, the Master of the *Sentences* (*Peter Lombard*), in I *Sent*. D. 17, †18 considering charity to be a substance, namely, the Holy Spirit Himself, seems to have held, not unreasonably, for this manner of increase. But others of this opinion, who do admit that charity is a quality of some kind, have maintained this position most unreasonably.

p 89

For a quality to be increased means nothing other than that a subject participate more of the quality; indeed, a quality has no being save what it has in a subject. From its partaking more of the quality, the subject operates more forcefully; for everything operates to the extent that it is in act, so that what has been reduced to greater act, acts more perfectly. Therefore, to state that a quality is not increased in its essence, but may be increased according to its radication in a subject, or according to the intensity of its act, is a contradiction.

p 90

It remains then to consider how certain qualities and forms are said to be increased, and which of them can be increased.

p 90

Since terms are the signs of concepts, as it says in *De Interpretatione*, †19 it is evident that, just as we know the less known from the more known, so we also name the less known from the more known. Therefore, because local motion is the most known of all the types of movement or change, †20 we extend the term 'distance' from meaning contrariety of place to all contraries between which there can be movement, as we learn from the *Metaphysics*. †21 Likewise, because change of substance according to quantity (i.e. augmentation or increase) is more sensible than change by way of alteration (i.e.: change of quality), it has come about that the terms proper to quantitative change have been carried over to denote change of alteration. Thus, just as a body which is changed so as to acquire its perfect quantity, is said to be increased, and as the perfect quantity itself is said to be great in relation to imperfect quantity; so also, whatever is changed from imperfect to perfect quality is said to be increased with respect to quality, and perfect quality itself is called great as compared to imperfect quality. Since the perfections of each thing is its goodness, Augustine says that in things which are not of very large size, to be greater in size is the same

thing as to be better. †22

p 90

To change from imperfect to perfect form is nothing other than for the subject to be more fully reduced to actuality, for form is act. Hence a subject has greater possession of a form when it is more perfectly actualized by that form. Just as something is reduced by an agent from pure potency to the actuality of a form, so also it is reduced by the agent's action from imperfect to perfect act.

p 90

But this is not the case in all forms, for two reasons.

p 91

First, from the very nature of form, for what has the ratio of form perfectly is something indivisible, for example, number. In numbers an added unit constitutes a new species, so that numbers, such as three or four, allow of no more or less. †23 Consequently, more or less are not found either in quantities designated by numbers, e.g. two cubits or three cubits, or in figures, e.g. triangle, quadrangle, or in proportions, e.g. double or triple.

p 91

Secondly, from the relation of form to subject; because form inheres in its subject in an indivisible mode. For this reason, substantial form is not subject to any intensification or remissness, because it gives substantial being, which is only one in each substance: †24 where there is another substantial being (*esse*), there is another thing (*res*). Hence the Philosopher likens definitions to numbers, in the *Metaphysics*. †25 Hence also, nothing which is substantially predicated of another thing, †26 even if it be in the class of accidents, is predicated according to more or less: thus whiteness is not said to be more or less of a color. For this reason, too, qualities expressed in abstract terms, because they are expressed as substance is, are neither intensified nor diminished; for we do not speak of more or less whiteness, but of a more or less white thing.

p 91

However, neither of the above reasons explains why charity or the other infused virtues cannot be intensified or slackened, because the ratio of these virtues is not something indivisible, as is the concept of number; †27 nor do they give substantial being to a subject, as do substantial forms. Therefore, to the extent that a subject is more or less perfectly actualized by these virtues, as a result of the agent causing them, they are, in fact, intensified or slackened. Just as the acquired virtues are increased by the acts which cause them, so the infused virtues are increased by the action of God, by Whom they are caused.

p 92

Our acts are as dispositions for the increase of charity and of the infused virtues, just as they dispose for the reception of these virtues in the first place (or: from their source). For a man who does what lies in his power prepares himself to receive charity from God. Even further, our acts can be meritorious of an increase of charity, because they presuppose charity, which is the principle of merit. †28 But no one can merit to obtain the first infusion of charity, because there can be no merit at all without charity itself. In conclusion then we say that charity is increased by being made more intense.

p 92

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Just as in charity and in other qualities increase is spoken of through a similitude, so also in quantity, as

is clear from what has been said in the body of the article.

p 92

2. Form is invariable insofar as it is not the subject of variation; however, it can be said to vary insofar as a subject, varied in its regard, participates in it more or less.

p 92

3. Essential change in anything can be understood in two ways. First, as regards what is proper to the thing, namely, its essential being or non-being. In this sense, essential change is nothing other than change according to being and not-being, which is generation and corruption. †29 Secondly, essential change can be understood where there is change of anything at all which is connected with the essence. In this sense, we say that a body is essentially changed when it is moved locally, because the subject of change is transferred from place to place; and also that a quality is essentially changed in the mode proper to it when it varies according to perfect or imperfect, or rather that the subject is thus changed in respect of quality, as is evident from what was said in the body of the Art.

p 92

4. What is predicated essentially of charity, is not predicated of it according to more or less, for we do not speak of anything as more or less a virtue. Greater charity is said to be "more a virtue" (*magis virtus*) rather by a mode of signifying, expressing it in terms of a substance. But because charity itself is not predicated essentially of its subject, the subject may be said to enjoy it more or less: thus we speak of a man's having more or less charity, and we say that one who has more charity is more virtuous. †30

p 93

5. Charity suffers no diminution, because there is nothing to cause its decrease, as Ambrose proves. †31 However, it does have a cause of its increase, namely God.

p 93

6. Increase by addition is increase in a quantified substance. But charity is not increased in this way, as was said in the body of the Art. †32

p 93

This also answers the seventh objection.

p 93

8. Charity is said to be increased or changed, not because it is itself the subject of change, but insofar as its subject is changed and increased with regard to it.

p 93

9. Although God is immutable, yet He changes things while remaining Himself unvarying; for it is not necessary that every mover be moved, as is proved in the book of the *Physics*. †33 And this is especially true of God, because He does not act from any necessity in His nature, but of His own free will.

p 93

10. All qualities and forms share in common the notion of magnitude insofar as this represents their perfection in a subject. Some qualities, besides this magnitude or quantity which they have per se, have another magnitude or quality, which pertains to them accidentally and this in two ways.

p 93

First, by reason of their subject, as whiteness is said to be quantitative accidentally because its subject has quantity; so that, when the subject is increased, the whiteness is also increased accidentally. Now by this increase we do not say that a thing is whiter but that there is more whiteness there, just as we would say that there is a larger white thing. In no other sense do we predicate those things which pertain to increase of whiteness and of the subject by reason of which the whiteness is said to be accidentally increased. But this quantitative change and increase is not found in the qualities of the soul, namely, the sciences and virtues.

p 93

Secondly, quantity and increase are attributed to a quality accidentally, by reason of the object which the quality affects (*ex parte obiecti in quod agit*). We call this the quantity or amount of power (*virtutis*), which is said to be more according to the extent and perfection of the object. Thus a man is said to have great strength (*magnae virtutis*) who can lift a heavy weight or perform any sort of good-sized task, one which is larger either dimensively or by reason of its perfection or according to discrete quantity. In this sense we attribute great power to a man who can do many things. †34

p 94

However, as regards science and virtue there is this to note: that it is not of the nature of a science to extend actually to all possible objects, for it is not necessary that one who has science know all things knowable. But it is of the essence of virtue that the virtuous man act virtuously in all things. Hence science can be increased both in the number of known objects and by reason of its intensity in a subject; whereas virtue can only be increased in the latter way. †35

p 94

But we must observe that a quality is both great in itself and has great potentiality for the same reason, as was made clear above. Wherefore, greatness of perfection can also be called greatness of power.

p 94

11. In charity, change in quantity or increase may be reduced to change in quality or alteration; not in the sense in which alteration is a change between contraries, which occurs only in sensible subjects and in the sensitive part of the soul; but insofar as alteration and passion bespeak reception and perfection. Thus, to have sense and intellectual knowledge is to be passive and to undergo alteration. In this way the Philosopher distinguishes alteration and passion, in *De Anima*. †36

p 94

12. God increases charity, not by infusing new charity, but by perfecting that which already exists.

p 94

13. Just as an agent's act can cause acquired virtue by reason of the impression of active or passive powers, as was remarked above (in the body of the Article); so it can also increase this virtue.

p 95

14. Charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by our acts, but only dispositively and meritoriously, as we have said (*ibid*). Nor indeed is it absolutely necessary that every perfect act correspond to the amount of one's virtue: for one who has charity need not always act with all the charity of which he is capable; for the use of habits is subject to the *will*. †37

p 95

15. The ratio of virtue does not consist in a maximum in itself (*quantum ad se*), but only as regards its object; because by virtue a man is ordered to the limit of his power, which is to act well. †38 Thus the

Philosopher says, in the *Physics*, †39 that virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing for its best. Now one can be more or less disposed for what is his best; and according to this disposition virtue can allow of more or less. Or it might be said that here it is not a question of the absolute ultimate, but of a specific ultimate: as fire is the subtlest element among bodies, and man is the noblest of creatures (on earth)—and yet one man is worthier than another.

p 95

16. The concept of virtue is not something indivisible in itself, but is so by reason of its subject, insofar as it seeks a mean for the subject. A man may be variously disposed, for better or worse, for seeking this mean. Yet even the mean itself is not altogether indivisible, for it admits of a certain latitude. It is sufficient for virtue that it approach the mean, as is stated in the *Ethics*. †40 It is in this very respect that one act is said to be more virtuous than another.

p 95

17. The virtue of charity is infinite on the part of its end, which is God; but charity itself is finitely disposed towards this infinite end. Hence it can admit of more or less. †41

p 95

18. Not everything perfect is most perfect, but only what is in complete and ultimate actuality. Therefore, nothing prevents what is perfect in virtue from being perfected yet further. †42

Article 12

p 96

ARTICLE 12

In this article the question is: **Whether the virtues are distinct from one another**. †1

This question concerns the distinction of virtues. It would seem that they are not correctly distinguished.

p 96

OBJECTIONS:

1. Moral entities are specified by the end, so that, if the virtues are to be distinguished according to species, this must be from the part of their end. But it cannot be from the part of their proximate end; for there would then be an infinite number of specifically distinct virtues. Hence it must be on the part of the ultimate end. But there is only one ultimate end for all the virtues, namely, God or beatitude. Therefore, there is only one virtue.

p 96

2. Further, by one operation one end is attained. Now one operation proceeds from one form. Therefore, by one form man is ordered to one end. But the end of man is one, namely happiness. Therefore, virtue, which is the form whereby man is ordered to happiness, is also one.

p 96

3. Further, forms and accidents are numerically distinguished by their matter or subject. †2 Now the subject of virtue is the soul or one of its powers. Therefore, it would seem that there is only one virtue, because in each man there is only one soul; or at least that the virtues do not exceed in number the powers of the soul.

p 96

4. Further, habits are distinguished by their objects, as powers are. Therefore, since virtues are habits, it would seem that we should distinguish the virtues on the same basis as we distinguish the powers of the soul. Thus the virtues do not exceed in number the powers of the soul.

p 96

5. But it might be objected that habits are distinguished by their acts and not by their powers.—On the contrary, things which derive from principles (*principiata*) are distinguished according to their principles, and not vice versa; because things have both being and unity from the same source. But habits are the principles of acts. Therefore, acts are distinguished according to habits, rather than the other way around.

p 97

6. Further, virtue is necessary that a man be inclined, as it were naturally, to what is of virtue; for as Cicero remarks, †3 virtue is a habit formed in the reason, like a second nature. Hence man needs no virtue for that to which one of his powers is naturally inclined. Now man's will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end. Therefore, with regard to the ultimate end man does not need any virtuous habit, for which reason the Philosopher did not assign any virtues having beatitude, as their object. †4 Consequently, neither should we admit any theological virtues, the object of which would be God, Who is the Ultimate End.

p 97

7. Further, virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to what is best. But faith and hope connote a certain imperfection: for faith is of things not seen and hope is of things not possessed, so that "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away," as we are told in 1 Cor. 13:10. Therefore, faith and hope should not be regarded as virtues.

p 97

8. Further, a man cannot be ordered to God save by his intellect and will. †5 But faith adequately orders man's intellect to God, while charity does the same for the will. Therefore, hope should not be included along with faith and charity as a theological virtue.

p 97

9. Further, what is common to every virtue ought not be assigned as a special virtue. But charity seems to be common to every virtue, because virtue is no less than the order of love, as Augustine observes, in his book *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, †6 while charity itself is said to be the form of all the virtues. Therefore, it should not be given a special place among the theological virtues.

p 97

10. Further, in God there is not only Truth, with which faith is concerned, and the Divine bounty (*sublimitas*), †7 which hope regards, and Goodness, to which charity looks; but there are many other Divine attributes, as wisdom, power, and others. It would seem, therefore, that there is either only one theological virtue, because all these attributes are one in God; or else there are as many theological virtues as there are Divine attributes.

p 98

11. Further, a theological virtue is one whose act is immediately ordered to God. But there are many virtues of this nature: wisdom, which contemplates God, fear, which reverences Him, religion, which worships Him. Therefore, there are more than three theological virtues.

p 98

12. Further, the end is the reason for everything in the means (*finis est ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem*). Therefore, when one has the theological virtues, whereby a man is rightly ordered to God, it would seem superfluous to look for any other virtues.

p 98

13. Further, virtue is ordered to good; for it is defined as that which makes its possessor good and his action good. But goodness is only in the will and in the sensitive appetite. And so it seems that there are no intellectual virtues.

p 98

14. Further, prudence is one of the intellectual virtues, and yet it is reckoned among the moral virtues. Therefore, it would seem that the moral virtues are not distinguished from the intellectual.

p 98

15. Further, moral science treats only of moral matters. Now this science does consider the intellectual virtues. Therefore, there is no difference between the moral and the intellectual virtues.

p 98

16. Further, whatever is included in a thing's definition is not distinct from that thing. But prudence is placed in the definition of moral virtue; for the latter is defined as a habit of choice, consisting in a mean determined by right reason, as it says in the *Ethics*. †8 Indeed, prudence is the right way of doing things, as it says later on. †9 Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from prudence.

p 98

17. Further, both prudence and art pertain to practical knowledge. But besides art, †10 there are no habits in the appetitive part ordered to the production of artifacts. By the same token, neither should there be any virtues besides prudence †11 in the appetite, for directing one's actions. Therefore, it would seem that there are no moral virtues distinct from prudence.

p 99

18. But it might be objected that there is no virtue in the appetite corresponding to art, because the appetite is concerned with singulars, whereas art is of universals.—On the contrary, Aristotle says in the *Ethics* †12 that anger is always concerned with singulars; but hatred may also be of universals, for we hate every type of thief. Now hatred pertains to the appetite. Therefore, the appetite does regard universals.

p 99

19. Further, every power naturally tends to its proper object. Now the object of the appetite naturally tends to the good from which it has been apprehended. Therefore, the appetite tends naturally to the good from which it was apprehended. But in apprehending the good we are sufficiently perfected by prudence. Therefore, we do not need any other moral virtue in the appetite, besides prudence, but a natural inclination suffices for the appetitive part.

p 99

20. Further, knowledge and action suffice for virtue. But prudence guarantees both of these. Therefore, we need not assign any moral virtue besides prudence.

p 99

21. Further, cognitive habits are distinguished according to their acts, the same as appetitive habits. But as far as all moral actions are concerned, there is only one cognitive habit involved; and this is either moral science, with respect to moral actions in general, or prudence (as regards individual acts, here and now.) †13 Therefore, in the appetite as well there should be only one moral virtue.

p 99

22. Further, things which agree in form and differ only in matter are specifically one. †14 But all the moral virtues agree in form, since in all there is a mean determined by right reason—and this is formal (the formal element) in moral virtue; †15 whereas they differ as regards their matter or objects. Therefore, virtues differ, not specifically, but only numerically.

p 100

23. Further, things which differ in species are not predicated or denominated of each other. But the moral virtues mutually denominate each other; thus, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, †16 justice must be brave and temperate, temperance must be just and courageous, and the same for the others. Therefore, the virtues are not distinct from one another.

p 100

24. Further, the theological and the cardinal virtues are more excellent than the other moral virtues. But the intellectual virtues are called neither cardinal nor theological. Therefore, neither should the moral virtues be called cardinal, as though they were the principal virtues. †17

p 100

25. Further, there are three parts assigned to the soul, namely, the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible. Therefore, if there are any principal virtues, it would seem that they are only three in number.

p 100

26. Further, some virtues seem to be more eminent than those which are (commonly) called cardinal. For example: magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues (*quae operatur magnum in omnibus virtutibus*), †18 and meekness, which is opposed to anger (*ira*), from which the irascible appetite takes its name. These seem to be more excellent than fortitude. Likewise, liberality and magnificence, which give of themselves, seem to be more outstanding than justice, which renders to another (only) what is due him. Therefore, the virtues which are commonly called cardinal are not really such, but rather others are so.

p 101

27. Further, a part is not distinct from the whole. But Cicero, in his book *De Inventione Rhetorica*, †19 lists certain virtues as parts of these four, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Therefore, these certain virtues, at least, are not distinct from the four cardinal virtues. Thus it would seem that the virtues are not correctly distinguished.

p 101

ON THE CONTRARY:

In 1 Cor. 13:13; we read: "And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three;" and in Wisd. 8:7;

In 1 Cor. 13:13: we read: "And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three," and in Wisd. 8:7: "for she teacheth temperance and prudence and justice, and fortitude."

p 101

I reply: A thing is distinguished in its species by what is formal to it. Now in each thing the formal element is what completes its definition. For it is the ultimate difference which constitutes the species as such, so that by this *differentia* a thing differs specifically from other things. Hence, if the difference be formally multiple (*si ipsa sit multiplicabilis formaliter*) by reason of diverse elements, the thing defined will be divided into various species, according to the diverse elements found in its difference.

p 101

Now goodness is the formal element which ultimately completes the definition of virtue: †20 for virtue is commonly defined as "that which makes both its possessor and its acts good," as is clear from the *Ethics*. †21 Therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking, will be specifically diversified according as the concept of good is diversified.

p 101

Since man is human precisely because he is rational, human good ought to be in some sense (*aliqualiter*) a rational good or the good of reason. Now the rational or intellective part comprises both the cognitive and the appetitive powers. Further, not only does the appetite which is in the rational part, which follows the apprehension of the intellect and is called the will, pertain to the rational part; but also the appetite which is the sensitive part of man, and is divided into the irascible and concupiscible powers. For the sensitive appetite in man follows the apprehension of the intellect insofar as it obeys the command of reason; whence also it is said to participate to some extent in reason. †22 Therefore, the good of man is the good of both his cognitive and his appetitive powers.

p 102

However, good is not attributed to both these parts according to the same formality or ratio. For good is attributed formally to the appetitive part, since good itself is the object of the appetite. On the other hand, good is attributed to the intellect, not formally but only materially. Knowledge of the truth is the good for the cognitive part; although this good is not grasped as such by the cognitive part, but rather by the appetitive part, for the very knowledge of the truth is something desirable. †23

p 102

Hence, the virtue which perfects the cognitive part in its knowledge of the truth will be of another nature (*alterius rationis*) than the virtue which perfects the appetitive part in its apprehension of the good. For this reason, the Philosopher, in his book of *Ethics*, †24 distinguishes intellectual from moral virtue. He calls intellectual that virtue which perfects the intellective power in its knowledge of the truth, while moral virtue is that which perfects the appetite in its desire of the good.

p 102

Because good pertains more properly to the appetitive than to the intellective part, the name "virtue" applies more properly and precisely to the virtues of the appetitive than to those of the intellective part; even though the intellectual virtues may be nobler as perfections than the moral virtues, as is proved in the Ethics. †25

p 102

Moreover, knowledge of the truth is not specifically one as regards all things. For necessary truth is known with a different formality than contingent truth is known. Again, necessary truth is known differently according as it is known either per se, as the intellect knows first principles, or as it is known from something else, as conclusions are made known by science and wisdom concerning the highest

truths; and in the knowledge of these lofty truths there is yet another formality, in that by it (wisdom) a man is directed to know other truths. In a similar way, as regards contingent actions, there is one mode of knowing those things in us which we must do, i.e. our actions, wherein error frequently occurs, on account of passion; and with these actions prudence is concerned. There is another and different mode of knowledge as regards those things which are outside of us and are to be made by us: in these matters we are directed by art, the correct judgment of which is not corrupted by the passions of the soul. †26

p 103

Thus, as enumerated by the Philosopher in the *Ethics*, †27 the intellectual virtues are: wisdom, science, understanding, prudence, and art.

p 103

In a similar manner, the good of the appetitive part is not the same in all human matters. This good may be sought in three objects; namely: in the passions of the irascible and those of the concupiscible appetite, and in our operations, which are concerned with things we use, e.g. in buying and selling leasing and borrowing, and others such as these.

p 103

Now the good for man, as far as his passions are concerned, is that he conduct himself so as not to swerve from the judgment of reason under their impetus. Hence, if there be any passions which by nature impede the good of reason by inciting man to perform acts contrary to or to seek other goods opposed to reason, then the virtuous good will consist especially in a certain bridling and restraining; as is evident in temperance, which represses and beats down the concupiscences. However, if there is a passion which is apt to impede the good of reason particularly by holding men back, as fear does, then the good of virtue in regard to this type of passion will be to give a man courage, which fortitude does.

p 103

The good of reason as regards external things consists in their being duly proportioned according to the share which men have of them in daily life. To effect this good there is justice, whose office it is to direct and to insure equity in these matters.

p 103

The good of both the intellective and the appetitive part is two-fold: first, there is the good which is the ultimate end, and secondly, the good which is a means to the end. Therefore, besides all the virtues mentioned above, by which a man attains good in those things which are means to the end, other virtues must be assigned, which will dispose one rightly towards the ultimate end, which is God. Consequently, these virtues are called theological, because they have God, not only as their end, but also as their object. †28

p 104

That we may be rightly moved toward our end, this end must be both known and loved. Now desire of the end requires two things: namely, confidence that we will attain the end, for no wise man is moved to what he cannot attain; and love of the end, for only what is loved is desired. And so there are three theological virtues, as follows: faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we trust we will one day possess Him; and charity, by which we love Him. From all that has been said, we conclude that there are three classes of virtue: theological, intellectual, and moral; and each general class has many specific types under it.

p 104

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Moral entities take their species from their proximate ends. †29

p 104

However, these ends are not infinite in number, if in them only the formal difference be considered. For the proximate end of each virtue is the good which it effects, which differs specifically from the goods of the rest of the virtues, as was shown in the body of the Article.

p 104

2. This objection is valid with respect to those agents which act by a necessity of their nature, because they attain their end by one act and one form; whereas man has reason, because he is meant to attain his end by many and various acts. Therefore, many virtues are necessary for him.

p 104

3. Accidents are not multiplied in a single subject numerically but only specifically; hence we need not consider the unity or multiplicity of virtues according to their subject, which is the soul or its powers, save where a diversity of powers demands a diverse type of good; for the virtues are distinguished by the various types of good which they effect, †30 as has been said.

p 104

4. A thing is not the object of a power in the same way as it is the object of a habit. For a power is that whereby we are simply capable of something, for example, of becoming angry or of being trustful; whereas a habit is that whereby we enjoy the capability of acting well or badly, as explained in the Ethics. †31 And so, where there are different kinds of good there will be but one kind of object with respect to a habit, but not as regards a power; so that in one power there may be many habits.

p 105

5. Nothing prevents one thing from being the efficient cause of another, which other is at the same time the final cause of the first thing; as medicine is the efficient cause of health, which is the end of medicine, as the Philosopher says in the *Ethics*. †32 Thus, habits are efficient causes of acts, while acts are the final causes of habits; and so habits are formally distinguished by their acts.

p 105

6. A mutual inclination is sufficient for a man, that he be well disposed with respect to an end which is proportionate to human nature. And so the philosopher enumerated certain virtues, the object of which was to be the happiness of which they themselves had treated. But the end for which we †33 hope, namely God, exceeds the proportion of our nature. Therefore, over and above any natural inclination, we need the virtues whereby we may be elevated to our ultimate end. †34

p 105

7. To attain God in some manner, even imperfectly, is a greater perfection than to attain other things perfectly. Whence the Philosopher remarks, in *De Proprietatibus Animalium*, †35"What we perceive of the more sublime things is more excellent than the great deal which we may know about other things." Consequently, nothing prevents faith and hope from being virtues, even though by them we attain God only imperfectly. †36

p 105

8. Our will is ordered to God, both by hope, whereby we trust in God, and by charity, whereby we love Him.

p 105

9. Love is the principle and the root of all affections: for we rejoice in the presence of a good only insofar as the good is loved; and the same is true of all the other affections. Hence every virtue which orders a passion is also directive of love. Nor does it follow that charity, which is love, is not a special virtue; rather, it must in a certain sense be the principle of all the virtues, insofar as it moves them all to their end. †37

p 106

10. We need not assign theological virtues to correspond to all of the Divine attributes, but only for those attributes which move our appetite as an end. Now in this capacity there are the three theological virtues which were mentioned in Article 10 of this Question.

p 106

11. Religion has God for its end, but not for its object. The object of the virtue of religion is those things which it offers to God in Divine worship. Therefore, religion is not a theological virtue. †38 Likewise, wisdom, whereby we contemplate God, does not immediately regard God Himself, but the effects from which we are led to contemplate Him in the present life. Fear too has for its object something other than God, namely, either punishments or one's own meanness, from the consideration of which a man is moved to subject himself reverently to God.

p 106

12. Just as in speculative matters there are principles and conclusions, so in actions there are ends and means. Just as for perfect and clear knowledge it is not enough that a man have a good grasp of the principles, which is obtained by understanding, but there is further required science, for conclusions; so also in actions, besides the theological virtues, whereby we are well-disposed for the ultimate end, other virtues are necessary, whereby we may be well-ordered to those things which are for the end. †39

p 106

13. Although good as such is the object of an appetitive and not of an intellective power; nevertheless, the good can also be found in an intellectual virtue. For to know the truth is a good; and so a habit which perfects the intellect in its knowledge of the truth has the nature of a virtue. †40

p 106

14. Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue, but its matter or object is moral. Hence it is sometimes numbered with the moral virtues, as a sort of mean between the intellectual and the moral. †41

p 107

15. Although the intellectual virtues are distinct from the moral, still they pertain to moral science insofar as their acts are subject to the will. For we make use of science and the other intellectual virtues when we have a will to do so. Now when something is in some way related to the will, it is called moral. †42

p 107

16. The right reason of prudence is not included in the definition of moral virtue as part of the latter's essence, but as, in a certain sense, its efficient cause; or else it is put there by participation. For moral virtue is nothing other than a certain participation of the appetitive part in right reason, as was said above. †43

p 107

17. The matter with which art deals is exterior things which are to be made, while the matter of prudence is the things which we are to do. Just as art requires a right disposition in the exterior things which it will

the things which we are to do. Just as art requires a right disposition in the exterior things which it will fashion according to some form; so prudence requires a right disposition in our passions and affections. For this disposition prudence presupposes moral virtues in the appetitive part, which art does not require.

p 107

18. We concede the objection. The intellective appetite, which is the will, can have as its object the universal good which the intellect can apprehend. But the sensitive appetite cannot have this universal good as its object, because sense cannot grasp the universal.

p 107

19. The appetite is naturally moved by an apprehended good; yet, that it be easily inclined towards a good which reason determines with perfect prudence, a virtuous habit is required in the appetitive power. Man especially needs right reason freely to determine and to point out a good, towards the opposite of which the appetite may by nature be absolutely †44 drawn: as the concupiscible appetite is naturally moved to sense pleasure, and the irascible power to vengeance, which reason at times forbids by its deliberation. Similarly, the will also naturally desires for the needs of life whatever may come to a man's use; but the deliberation of reason may sometimes command that these goods be shared with another. Therefore, we must assign virtuous habits to the appetitive part, whereby it may easily obey reason.

p 108

20. Knowledge pertains immediately to prudence, but actions pertain to prudence through the medium of the appetitive powers. Therefore, there should be certain habits in the appetitive part also, and these are called the moral virtues.

p 108

21. In all moral matters truth is of one kind: it is the contingent truth of actions which must be performed. However, in these actions there is more than one kind of good, which is the object of virtue. Therefore, with respect to all moral actions there is but one cognitive habit, but not merely one moral virtue.

p 108

22. There are various means for diverse subject-matters. Hence diversity of matter is the basis for the formal diversity whereby the moral virtues differ specifically from one another.

p 108

23. Certain moral virtues, which are concerned with special matter, appropriate to themselves what is common to every virtue, and by this they are denominated. Moreover, what is common to all the virtues is particularly difficult and deserving of praise in certain special matters or objects.

p 108

Thus, for every virtue it is clearly required that its act be modified to fit the proper circumstances by which it is constituted in the mean; and that it be directed to the end or to some other exterior object, and further, that it have a certain firmness.

p 108

For to act with firmness is one of the conditions of virtue, as we learn from the *Ethics*; †45 and to persevere unflinchingly in the face of death is especially praiseworthy and difficult. And so the virtue which is concerned with effecting this courage appropriates to itself the name of fortitude (*fortitudo* = courage).

p 108

Again, to be continent in the pleasures of touch is especially difficult and praiseworthy; hence the virtue

Again, to be continent in the pleasures of touch is especially difficult and praiseworthy, hence the virtue which regulates this matter is called temperance (*temperantia* = moderation).

p 108

Further, in the use of exterior things, rectitude is above all required and to be commended, because it is in these goods that men communicate with each other. Therefore, in these things the good of virtue is that a man maintain in their regard a certain equality towards others. From this function the virtue of justice (*ius* = right) is named.

p 108

Sometimes, then, when speaking of the virtues, men use the terms fortitude, temperance, and justice, not according as these are special virtues, having a definite, determined object, but in reference to the general conditions from which they derive their names. It is in this sense that we say that temperance should be courageous, i.e. firm, and that fortitude should be temperate, i.e. observe moderation, and the same for the other virtues.

p 109

Now concerning prudence, it is clear that in a certain sense it is general, to the extent that it has for its object all the moral virtues (i.e. all moral matters), and inasmuch as all the moral virtues in some way participate in it, as was shown in this article, in reply to the sixteenth objection. For this reason we say that every moral virtue ought to be prudent.

p 109

24. A virtue is called cardinal, meaning principal, because the other virtues are based on it much as a door swings on its hinges (*cardine*). †46

p 109

Inasmuch as it is through a door that one enters a house, the ratio of cardinal virtue is not found in the theological virtues, which are concerned with the ultimate end, from which there is no entrance or passing on to anything beyond. Indeed, it is proper to the theological virtues that on them the other virtues are established as on an immovable foundation. †47 Thus faith is called the foundation, 1 Cor. 3:11: "For other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid;" hope is called an anchor, Heb. 6:19: "which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm;" and charity is called the root, Ephes. 3:17: "being rooted and founded in charity."

p 109

Similarly, the intellectual virtues are not given the name of cardinal because some of them, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding, perfect one in the contemplative life: now the contemplative life is an end; therefore, it does not partake of the notion of a door. But the active life, in which the moral virtues are practiced, is a doorway to the contemplative life. †48

p 110

Lastly, art has no virtues connected with it by which it might possibly be called cardinal. But prudence, which directs us in the active life, is counted among the cardinal virtues.

p 110

25. In the rational part there are two powers, namely, the appetitive, called the will, and the cognitive, called the reason. Therefore, in the rational part there are two cardinal virtues: prudence, which is in the reason, and justice, which is in the will. In the concupiscible appetite there is temperance, and in the irascible appetite, fortitude.

appetite, fortitude.

p 110

26. There is a cardinal virtue concerned with what is outstanding in every object of the virtues. The virtues which regard other things pertaining to the object are called secondary or connected.

p 110

For example, in the passions of the concupiscible appetite, the elements of chief concern are the concupiscences and pleasures of touch, which are the object of temperance. And so, in this matter the cardinal virtue is temperance; whereas eutrapelia, which has to do with pleasure found in games, may be assigned as a secondary or connected virtue.

p 110

Likewise, among the passions of the irascible appetite, the principal element is what pertains to fear and daring in the face of death, which is the object of fortitude. Hence fortitude is assigned as the cardinal virtue for the irascible appetite; and not meekness, which has to do with anger, even though the irascible appetite is denominated from anger (*ira*), because anger is the greatest of the passions of this power. Nor do we count magnanimity or humility, which are concerned in some way with hope or confidence in something great, as the cardinal virtues of the irascible power; for anger and hope do not move men as does fear of death.

p 110

In actions which regard the external goods meant to be used in daily life, the first and foremost requirement is that each man be given what is due him: and this justice insures. For apart from justice neither liberality nor magnificence have any place. Therefore, justice is the cardinal virtue, and the others are connected with it.

p 110

Furthermore, in the acts of reason, the principal act is command or choice, which prudence regulates: for to this act both ebulia, which directs counsel, and synesis, which directs judgment, are ordered. †49

p 111

27. The connected or secondary virtues are considered as parts of the cardinal virtues, not integral or subjective parts, since they have their own determined matter and proper act; but as potential parts, inasmuch as they participate in a partial and imperfect way in the mean which belongs principally and in a more perfect manner to the cardinal virtues. †50

Article 13

p 112

ARTICLE 13

In this article the question is: **Whether virtue is in the mean** †1

In this article the question is: **Whether virtue is in the mean.** †1

It would seem that it is not.

p 112

OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue is the limit of power, as stated in *De Caelo*. †2 But the limit is not a mean, but rather an extreme. Therefore, virtue is not in the mean but in the extreme.

p 112

2. Further, virtue has the nature of good; for it is a good quality, as Augustine says. Now goodness has the nature of end, which is something ultimate, and so an extreme. Therefore, virtue is in the extreme rather than in the mean.

p 112

3. Further, good is the contrary of evil. But between these two contraries there is no mean, which would be neither good nor bad, as we read in the *Postpredicaments*. Hence, the good is of the nature of an extreme; and also virtue, which makes its possessor and his action good, according to the *Ethics*, †3 is not in the mean, but in the extreme.

p 112

4. Further, virtue is the good of reason; for that is virtuous which is according to right reason. Now in man reason is not a mean or something mean, but is supreme. †4 Therefore, the notion of mean does not apply to virtue.

p 112

5. Further, every virtue is either theological, intellectual, or moral, as is evident from the preceding Articles (6 to 10 of this Question).

p 112

But theological virtue is not in the mean; for Bernard says, in his book *On the Love of God*, †5 that the measure of charity is to love without measure. Now charity is the foremost of the theological virtues and their root.

p 112

It would seem, likewise that the mean is not observed in the intellectual virtues: because a mean is something between contraries, whereas things as they are in the intellect are not contraries; nor is the intellect damaged by any eminently intelligible object, as we read in *De Anima*. †6

p 113

Similarly, neither do the moral virtues seem to be in the mean: for some of these virtues consist in the maximum. Thus fortitude concerns the gravest dangers, namely, those of death; magnanimity regards exalted honors; magnificence is concerned with large expenditure; piety, with the greatest reverence due to parents, whom we can never adequately repay; religion, likewise, in that it strives for the most perfect carrying out of Divine worship, in order to honor God, Whom we cannot serve adequately.

p 113

Therefore, virtue is not in the mean.

p 113

6. Further, if the perfection of virtue consists in the mean, it must be that the more perfect virtues adhere more closely to the mean. But virginity and poverty are among the more perfect virtues, since they fall under counsel, which is concerned with the *better* things. Hence virginity and poverty would be in the mean: which is manifestly false, because, as regards sexual pleasures, virginity abstains from every one of them, and so consists in an extreme position. Similarly, as regards possessions, poverty renounces them all. Therefore, it does not seem that the notion of virtue is to consist in the mean.

p 113

7. Further, in *Arithmetica*, †7 Boethius distinguishes three types of mean, namely: arithmetical, as six is between four and eight, because six is equally distant in numbers from both extremes; geometrical, as six is between nine and four, because six is equally distant from both extremes, not in numbers, but by the same proportion, namely, by one-half of the first extreme and one-half of the mean; lastly, a harmonic or musical mean, as three is the mean between six and two, because the proportion of one extreme to the other, i.e. of six to two, is the same proportion as that of three, which is the difference between six and three, to one, which is the difference between three and two. †8 Now none of these means may be applied to virtue; for the virtuous mean need not be equally related to extremes, either in number (arithmetical mean), or in proportion either of terms (geometrical) or of differences (hamonic). Therefore, virtue is not in the mean.

p 114

8. But it might be objected that virtue consists in the mean of reason and not that of things, whereas Boethius is speaking of the latter.—On the contrary, according to Augustine, in *De Libero Arbitrio*, †9 virtue is counted among the greatest goods, of which no one can make a bad use. Now if virtuous good consists in the mean, the virtuous mean must be the most perfect mean of all. Therefore, the virtuous mean is a mean of things rather than a mean of reason.

p 114

9. Further, moral virtue has to do with the passions and actions of the soul, which are indivisible. Now in the indivisible there are neither mean nor extremes. Therefore, virtue does not consist in the mean.

p 114

10. Further, the Philosopher says, in his book, the *Topica*, †10 that in pleasures present activity is better than past and present enjoyment better than past (*melius est facere quam fecisse, vel fieri quam factum esse*). But there is a certain virtue which regards pleasures, and that is temperance. Therefore, since virtue always seeks what is better, temperance always seeks present pleasures to moderate, which is to hold to the extreme, and not the mean. Therefore, moral virtue does not consist in the mean.

p 114

11. Further, where degrees of more and less are to be found, there is a mean to be found as well. But we can discern more and less in vices: for a man may be more or less lustful or gluttonous. Therefore, in gluttony, in lust, and in the other vices, there is a mean. Consequently, if the nature of virtue is to be in the mean, it would seem that where there is vice, virtue may also be found.

p 114

12. Further, if virtue consists in the mean, it is only in the mean between two vices. But this is not the case with every moral virtue, for justice is not a mean between two vices, but has only one vice opposed to it, since to take more than what is one's own is vicious, but there is no vice in one who suffers the loss of what is his own. Therefore, it is not the nature of moral virtue to consist in the mean.

p 115

p 115

13. Further, a mean is equally distant from two extremes. But virtue is not equally distant from two extremes; for the courageous man is closer to audacity than to timidity; and the liberal man is nearer to prodigality than to close-fistedness; and the like is true of the other virtues. †11 Therefore, moral virtue does not consist in the mean.

p 115

14. Further, there is no going from one extreme to another, save by passing through the mean. But if virtue be in the mean, there will be no passing from one vice to its opposite vice, save through virtue: which is patently false.

p 115

15. Further, mean and extremes are in the same genus. But fortitude, timidity and daring are not in the same genus: for fortitude is a virtue, whereas fear and daring are in the class of vice. Therefore, fortitude is not the mean between the other two. And the same objection may be raised concerning the other virtues.

p 115

16. Further, in quantities just as extremes are indivisible, so is the mean; for the point is both the mean and the term of a line. If, then, virtue consists in the mean, the latter is something indivisible. This is clear also from what the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, †12 namely, that it is difficult to be virtuous, just as it is difficult to hit the center of a target or to find the center of a circle. Therefore, if virtue consists in an indivisible, it would seem that virtue is neither increased nor diminished, which is obviously false. †13

p 115

17. Further, there is no room for diversity in what is indivisible. Hence, if virtue is in the mean as in something indivisible, it would seem that there is no diversity in virtue, so that whatever is virtuous for one man will be virtuous for another. But this is certainly false, for what may be praised as a virtue in one man will be condemned in another.

p 115

18. Further, what is separated even a short distance from something indivisible, for example, from the center of a circle, is outside that indivisible thing, outside the center. Hence, if virtue is in the mean as in something indivisible, it would seem that whatever deviates ever so slightly from what ought to be done is outside the pale of virtue, so that man rarely acts according to virtue. Therefore, virtue is not in the mean.

p 116

ON THE CONTRARY:

Virtues are either moral, intellectual, or theological. Now moral virtue is in the mean; for moral virtue, according to the Philosopher †14 is a habit of choosing the mean. Intellectual virtue seems also to be in the mean, from what the Apostle says, in Rom. 12:3. "For I say . . . not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Likewise, theological virtue seems to be in the mean, for faith holds the mean between two heresies, as Boethius says, in his book *De Duabus Naturis*; †15 hope also is the mean between presumption and despair. †16 Therefore, all virtue is in the mean.

p 116

I reply: Moral and intellectual virtues are in the mean, although each in its own manner, but theological virtues are not in the mean, except accidentally.

p 116

In confirmation, it must be observed that the good of one having a rule and measure consists in its adequating the rule or measure. Thus we call good a thing which has neither more nor less than what it should have.

p 116

Now it must be noted that the matter or object of the moral virtues are human passions and actions, just as the object of art are artefacts. Just as the good of those things which are fashioned by art consists in their conforming to the measure demanded by art, which is their rule; so the good of man's passions and actions is that the mean of reason be observed, which mean is the measure and rule of all human passions and actions. For since man is human because he has reason, the good for man must be according to reason. †17

p 117

It is bad for a man to go beyond or to swerve from the measure which reason imposes on his passions and actions. Since human virtue is the good of man, it follows that moral virtue consists in the mean between excess and defect: excess, defect, and mean being taken as they are measured by the rule of reason. †18

p 117

Of the intellectual virtues, which reside in reason itself, some are practical, e.g. prudence and art; and some are speculative, as wisdom, science, and understanding. The matter of the practical virtues are the human passions and actions, or artefacts made by man. The matter of the speculative virtues are necessary things (or truths).

p 117

Reason orders each type of intellectual virtue differently.

p 117

As regards those things on which reason works effectively, †19 reason acts as a measure and rule, as has already been said. But as regards speculations, reason itself is the thing measured and regulated by the measure and rule of reality: for the good of the intellect is truth, which our intellect attains when it adequates reality. †20

p 117

Moreover, just as the moral virtues consist in the mean determined by reason (*medium rationis*); so this same mean belongs to prudence, the practical intellectual virtue which directs moral actions and passions in man. This is evident from the very definition of moral virtue given in the *Ethics*, †21 where it is said to be a habit of choosing the mean which the man of practical wisdom would determine. Therefore, the mean of prudence and of moral virtue are the same; †22 but it belongs to prudence as to the virtue which determines it, and to moral virtue as to the subject on which it is impressed, just as the canons (*rectitudo*) of art, as the habit which imposes, are the same as those of artefacts, which are determined by this habit.

p 118

In the speculative intellectual virtues, the mean will be truth itself, or rather the true thing (*verum*), and this mean will be determined according as the true thing attains its measure. Now this is not a mean between two contraries on the part of things (between two contrary things), for the contraries between which the virtuous mean are found are not on the part of the measure but on the part of what is measured. †23 This is clear from what has been said about the moral virtues. Therefore, we must look to the intellect itself for the contraries between which the mean in the intellectual virtues is to be found.

p 118

The contraries of the intellect are opposites by affirmation and negation, as we read in *Perihermeneias*. †24 Between affirmations, then, and their opposite negations, we find the mean in the speculative intellectual virtues. This mean is truth. As an example, it is true to say that what is is, and that what is not is not, but it is false by excess to say that what is not is, and by defect to say that what is is not.

p 118

Therefore, if there were not in the intellect its own proper contrariety, †25 over and above the contrariety found in things, there would be no mean or extremes in the intellectual virtues. There is evidently no contrariety in the will as proper to it, but only by an ordination to contrary willed objects. The reason is that whereas the intellect knows things as they are within it (*in esse intentionali*), the will is moved to things as they are in themselves. Hence, if there is in the will any virtue which is measured and regulated by the will, such virtue will not consist in the mean: for we find no extremes on the part of the measure, but only on the part of the thing measured, as it exceeds or falls short of its measure.

p 119

The theological virtues are ordered to their object, which is God, by means of the will. This is evident in the case of charity and of hope, and may be said also of faith; for, although faith is in the intellect, still it is there inasmuch as it is commanded by the will, for no one believes unless he wills to do so. †26 Since God is the rule and measure of the human will, it is clear that the theological virtues are not in the mean, strictly (*per se*) speaking; although one of them may be in the mean by accident, as we shall explain later. †27

p 119

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. The limit of a power is the farthest point of its extension, or the thing which is most difficult for it: for it is most difficult to find the mean, whereas it is easy to miss it. For this reason, virtue is the limit of a power, and this limit is in the mean. †28

p 119

2. The good is as the end in relation to the movement of an appetite, but not as regards the object in which the good may be found. The good is the mean in this matter or object, whereby it neither exceeds nor falls short of the due rule and measure. †29

p 119

3. As to the form which it takes from its measure, virtue has the nature of an extreme; thus it is opposed to evil as the formed to the unformed, the commensurate to the incommensurate. But as regards the matter on which the measure is imposed, virtue is in the mean.

p 120

4. This objection considers the supreme (extreme) and the mean according to the order of the soul's powers, and not in relation to the matter on which the measure of virtue is imposed as a mean.

p 120

5. In the theological virtues there is no mean, as has been said; but in the intellectual virtues there is a mean, not between contrary things, as they are in the intellect, but between the contrariety of affirmation and negation, as has also been said.

p 120

Now in all the moral virtues it is commonly found that they are in the mean. The fact that some attain the

Now in all the moral virtues it is commonly found that they are in the mean. The fact that some attain the maximum pertains to them as their mean, inasmuch as they attain the maximum according to the rule of reason. Thus, the courageous man faces the gravest dangers reasonably, i.e. when, as, and for the reason that he ought to face them.

p 120

On the other hand, excess and defect are considered, not in relation to the quantity of things, but according to the rule of reason; so that it would be excessive if, for example, one should put himself in danger when he ought not to do so, or for the wrong motive; and it would be a defect if he should fail to face danger when and as he ought. †30

p 120

6. Although virginity and poverty are in the extreme with regard to things, nevertheless, they are in the mean with regard to reason. A virgin abstains from all sexual pleasures because and as he should, namely, for the love of God and with joy. But if he were to abstain for the wrong reason, for instance, if it were odious to him by its very nature either to generate sons or to have a wife, this would be the vice of insensibility. But to abstain entirely from sexual pleasures for a proper end is virtuous: Thus even those who so abstain that they may go to war for the good of their country are praised as having political or civic virtue.

p 120

7. The means which Boethius mentions are means of things (*media rei*); and so they do not apply to the mean of virtue, which is according to reason (*medium rationis*): except perhaps in the case of justice, in which there is at the same time the mean of things and the mean of reason. To this virtue we may apply the arithmetic mean of reason in commutative justice (*in commutationibus*) and the geometric mean in distributive justice (*in distributionibus*), as is clear from the *Ethics*. †31

p 121

8. The concept of mean applies to virtue, not just as mean, but insofar as it is a mean of reason; for virtue is the good of man, which is to be according to reason. Hence, what partakes more of the nature of mean does not necessarily pertain more to virtue, but what has more of the mean of reason.

p 121

9. The passions and actions of the soul are indivisible per se but divisible *per accidens*, to the extent that they are found to be greater or less according to diverse circumstances. And so in these passions and actions virtue holds to the mean.

p 121

10. In pleasures it is better to enjoy them here and now than to have already enjoyed them, in that "better" signifies, not the performance of a virtuous good, which pertains to virtue, but of delectable good, which pertains to pleasure: for pleasure consists in actual or present enjoyment. Now those things whose being consists in becoming, once they have become, are no longer; hence the good of pleasure consists in becoming †32 more than in having become.

p 121

11. Not any mean at all applies to virtue, but the mean of reason; which mean, indeed, is not found in vices, because according to its proper nature it is not possible that in vice there be virtue.

p 121

12. Justice does not attain the mean in exterior things when a man takes more for himself because of an

inordinate will. Hence this is vicious. But it does not impair a man's own goodness when something he owns is taken away from him. Therefore, this does not imply any deordination in him. But the passions of the soul with which other virtues are concerned are within us; and so excess or defect in their regard is chargeable to man's viciousness. Consequently, other virtues are a mean between two vices; but justice is not. Nevertheless, justice observes the mean in its own proper matter, and this is what pertains per se to virtue. †33

p 122

13. The mean of virtue is a mean of reason and not of things; and so it is not necessary that the virtuous man be equally distant from two extremes, but he must act as reason demands. Hence in those things wherein the good of reason consists principally in restraining the passions, virtue is nearer to defect than to excess; as is evident in temperance and meekness. But in things wherein the good is to lead one on to what passion urges, virtue is more like to excess, as is evident in the virtue of fortitude. †34

p 122

14. As the Philosopher says, in the *Physics*, †35 the mean is that into which a thing continuously changing first changes, and in which it finally rests. Hence, only in continuous movement must one pass from extreme to extreme through the mean. Now the movement from one vice to its opposite is not a continuous movement, nor is the movement of the will or of the intellect in considering diverse objects. Therefore, one need not pass from vice to vice through virtue.

p 122

15. Although virtue is a mean as regards the matter in which it finds a mean, yet, according to its proper nature, inasmuch as it is in the class of goods, it is an extreme, as the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*. †36

p 123

16. Although the mean in which virtue consists is something indivisible, still, virtue can be intensified or slackened, according as a man is more or less disposed for attaining that indivisible mean, as an archer comes more or less close to hitting the indivisible center of a target.

p 123

17. The mean of virtue is not a mean of things but of reason, as has been said. This mean consists in the due proportion or measure of things to man. Now this proportion is diversified in different men; for what is much for one man is little for another. And so virtue is not determined for all men in one and the same manner. †37

p 123

18. Since the mean of virtue is a mean of reason, the indivisibility of this mean must be determined by reason. Reason determines as indivisible that which maintains an imperceptible distance, †38 and which does not err. Thus, the earth as a whole is to be taken as an indivisible point in comparison with the rest of the heavens. Consequently, the mean of virtue allows of a certain latitude. †39

p 123

The objection on the contrary may be conceded both as regards moral and as regards intellectual virtue, but not as regards theological virtue. For faith is a mean between two heresies, but this does not pertain to it per se, precisely as it is a virtue. The same is to be said of hope, which is a mean between two extremes, not in relation to its object, but according to the disposition of the subject towards hoping for heavenly things. †40

Appendix 1

p 124

Outline Synopsis of the Articles

ARTICLE 1

Whether virtues are habits.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that they are not:
a. Virtues are acts. obj. 1 to 6, 8, 15.
b. Virtues are dispositions obj. 9.
c. Virtues are anything but habits obj. 7, 10 to 14.
2. *On the contrary*
a. The authority of St. Augustine and Aristotle 1 and *2*.
b. Dialectical argument from experience 3.
3. *Body*
a. Dialectical inquiry
(1) Nominal definition and common usage assign virtues to the powers of the soul.
(2) How virtues perfect these powers.
(3) Conclusion: Virtue defined, tentatively, as that which makes both its possessor and his operation good.
b. Determination of the type of power which can receive virtue:
(1) There are three kinds of powers.
(2) Two kinds are eliminated as subjects of virtue.
(3) Only man's active-passive powers, in some way possessed of reason, can be perfected by virtues.
(a) These powers are of themselves objectively indeterminate.
(b) Virtues determine and reside in them, not as passions, but as habits.
(c) Conclusion: Virtues are habits, differing from the other species of quality.
c. We need virtuous habits.
(1) for uniformity in our virtuous acts.
(2) for readiness in our virtuous acts.
(3) for pleasure in our virtuous acts.

p 125

ARTICLE 2

Whether St. Augustine's definition of virtue is a good one.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that it is not:

a. Against "good" in the definition obj. 1 to 10.
b. Against "mind" in the definition obj. 11 to 13.
c. Against "righteously" in the definition obj. 14.
d. Against "live" in the definition obj. 15.
e. Against "of which no one can make a
bad use" in the definition obj. 16 and 17.
f. Against "which God works in us, etc."

1. Against "which God works in us, etc."
in the definition obj. 18 to 21.
2. *On the contrary*: None in this Article.
3. *Body*
a. Having shown in Art. 1 that virtue is a habit, he proposes to determine what sort of habit it is, by examining its four causes.
b. The elements of the definition include the four causes of virtue.
(1) Final cause: virtue orders its subject to good operation: "by which we live righteously" and "of which no one makes a bad use."
(2) Material cause: only powers in some way possessed of reason can be the subject of virtue: "the mind."
(3) Formal cause: virtue makes its subject good: "a good quality."
(4) Efficient cause: God is the cause of the infused virtues: "which God works in us without us."
Note: This definition applies to all virtue, except for the last phrase, which is applicable only to infused virtue.

p 126

ARTICLE 3

Whether a power of the soul can be the subject of virtue.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that it cannot.

a. The subject of virtue is not the powers
but the essence of the soul obj. 1 and 2.
b. A power of the soul cannot be the subject
of virtue because:
(1) it is an accident, not a substance obj. 3, 6, 7.
(2) not every power is beset by the
attacks of vice. obj. 4.
(3) it is an active principle obj. 5.
2. *On the contrary*
a. Virtuous acts proceed from the powers of
the soul. 1.
b. Authority of Aristotle 2.
3. *Body*
a. The subject of an accident may be considered under three aspects:
(1) as sustaining the accident by its subsistence.
(2) as in potency to be actualized by the accident.
(3) as the cause of the accident.
b. One accident:
(1) cannot sustain another accident, since no accident subsists per se.
(2) can be in potency to another.
(3) can be the cause of another.
c. The powers of the soul are subjects of virtue as being in potency to and causing them.
(1) These powers are determined and actualized to good acts by virtuous habits.
(2) The acquired virtues are caused, i.e., elicited, by the powers.
Conclusion: Virtues are in the soul through the powers in which they reside.

p 127

ARTICLE 4

Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that they cannot.
a. Virtues cannot be in the sense appetites
because these powers
(1) cannot be the subject of vice obj. 1.
(2) are corruptible, while virtue is
incorruptible. obj. 3.
(3) use a corporeal organ obj. 4.
(4) are not active principles obj. 11.
(5) lack the perfection of doing good
—at least the irascible part obj. 9 and 13.
b. There can be no virtue in the sense
cognitive powers obj. 6.
c. Virtue must be in reason obj. 2, 5, 10, 12.
d. The rebellion of the flesh can never
be entirely put down obj. 7 and 8.
2. *On the contrary*
a. Fortitude and temperance are in the
sense appetites 1 and 3.
b. The sinful movements of sensuality are
in the sense appetites; hence virtue
must also be there. 2.
3. *Body*
a. All agree that there are virtues in the sense appetites, whether the latter are of two types, as some hold, or not.
b. Human virtue will reside in powers which can elicit human acts, i.e., acts directed by reason. Man's powers are of three kinds:
(1) First movers: †1 the intellect and will.
(2) Moved movers: the sense appetites, which have their own natural inclinations, and so do not obey reason slavishly, although they do have a natural aptitude for obeying reason.
(3) Powers which are only moved: the external bodily members, which obey reason unfailingly, because they are so determined, hence they do not need and cannot have habits.
c. The lower appetites must be perfected by habits proper to them, else the perfection of man's higher faculties is of no avail as regards acts of these lower powers.

p 128

ARTICLE 5

Whether the will is the subject of virtue.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that it is:
a. There are virtues in other powers, so
a fortiori, in the will obj. 1, 3, 4, 11.
b. Friendship and charity are virtues in
the will obj. 5 and 6.
c. Happiness, which is the supreme good for
the will, is attained by virtue obj. 2, 7, 8.
d. Sin is in the will, hence its contrary,
virtue, is there also obj. 9 and 10.
2. *On the contrary*
a. It would seem that there is no virtue in

the will, because the will is rational
neither essentially nor by participation 1.
b. There is no need for virtue in the will
to rectify the lower powers, since these
powers have their own virtue 2.
3. *Body*
a. The will needs no virtue to order it to the good which is proportionate to it, because the object of the will, by its very nature as a power, is the good.
b. However, the will does need virtue to tend to a good which exceeds
(1) the good of the human species: this good is supernatural, to which the will is elevated by the virtues of faith, hope, charity, etc.
(2) the good of an individual: i.e., another's good, which man seeks by the virtues of liberality, justice, etc.
c. That certain virtues, e.g., justice and charity, although in the appetitive part, are not in the lower appetites, is clear from the fact that they act without passion.

p 129

ARTICLE 6
Whether there is virtue in the practical intellect.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that there is not:
a. Knowledge is of little or no consequence
for the perfection of virtue obj. 1 to 3.
b. Virtue is a second nature, whereas
reason and nature differ as principles
of action obj. 4.
c. The object of the intellect is truth,
whereas virtue is concerned with the good obj. 5.
d. Virtue is a voluntary habit obj. 6.
2. *On the contrary*
a. Prudence is a virtue of the practical
intellect 1.
b. The practical intellect is more a human
power than are the affective powers 2 and 3.
3. *Body*
a. Where there is a uniform good, a natural inclination suffices.
b. But man is capable of many and diverse perfections, and so his appetite for good must be more specifically determined and perfected.
c. Reason must determine the good to be sought here and now, by the virtue of prudence, which resides in the practical intellect and perfects all the moral virtues by finding their mean.

p 130

ARTICLE 7
Whether there is virtue in the speculative intellect.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that there is not:
a. The speculative intellect is not ordered
to action or to happiness obj. 1 and 4.
b. Knowledge does not make us good and is

b. Knowledge does not make us good and is
not meritorious obj. 2 and 5.
c. Science is distinct from virtue obj. 3.
2. *On the contrary*
a. Faith is in the speculative intellect 1.
b. Truth and goodness are equally noble;
hence, since there is virtue in the will,
there is also virtue in the intellect 2.
3. *Body*
a. Virtue is always ordered to the good, either:
(1) formally: when it is ordered to the good as such, as it is the object of an appetite. Hence the virtues of the appetitive powers are formally and most properly virtues.
(2) materially: when it is ordered to the good under the aspect of truth, as it is the object and the good of the intellect.
b. Habits may perfect the intellect either:
(1) in itself, as it precedes the will, in which case they are not properly or perfectly virtues, for they give only the ability of using the mind well and do not assure the actual good use. Of this type are wisdom, science, art, etc.
(2) as it follows the will, which determines their end and moves them to exercise, as faith and prudence, which have their own proper object, but are imperated by the will.
c. Thus intellectual habits may depend on the will:
(1) only as to their use, i.e., accidentally, e.g., science, wisdom, art.
(2) both for their exercise and for their principle, namely, the *end* or the *good*, which the will determines; e.g., prudence.
(3) for their exercise, their principle, and their object; e.g., all the moral virtues.

p 131

ARTICLE 8
Whether virtues are in us by nature.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that they are:
a. The authority of Scripture, theologians
and philosophers. obj. 1 to 5.
b. The beginnings of virtue are natural obj. 6, 9, 13, 20.
c. Nature is sufficient for virtue obj. 7-8, 14-15, 18-19.
d. Virtue, like nature, is determined
to one obj. 10 and 11.
e. Malice is natural; therefore, virtue is
also natural obj. 12 and 16.
f. It is natural that the lower powers be
subject to reason, and this is the work
of virtue obj. 17.
2. *On the contrary*
a. We both acquire and lose virtues 1 and 2.
b. Virtues are not found in all men 3.
c. By virtue we acquire merit 4.
3. *Body*
a. Three opinions on the presence of virtue in man:
(1) in us by nature—Plato.
(2) in us from an extrinsic agent intellect—others.

(3) there is an aptitude in us by nature, but not the perfection of virtue—Aristotle.
b. This aptitude is in man both by an active and a passive principle, according to both the
(1) specific nature of man:
(a) in the intellect, both possible and agent, there are first principles, both speculative and practical.
(b) in the will
1. active principle: to the last end.
2. passive principle: in potency to this or that particular good.
(c) in the sense appetites: naturally inclined to obey reason.
(2) and the nature of an individual: in whom there will be a natural inclination to this or that virtue, which aptitude will be perfected by the rule of reason.
c. Reason will find the *mean* for all the virtues, subject the inferior in man to the superior, and from a natural inclination to the ultimate end, order all means and proximate ends.

p 132

ARTICLE 9
Whether virtues are acquired by acts.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that they are not.
a. All virtue and grace is from God obj. 1 to 7, 18.
b. Virtue, of its very nature, cannot be
from our acts. obj. 8, 10, 12, 20 to 22
c. Virtue is caused by an extrinsic agent obj. 9 and 21.
d. Virtuous acts cannot cause virtuous
habits obj. 11, 13, 14, 17.
e. Virtue is from nature obj. 15 and 16.
2. *On the contrary*
a. Virtue is destroyed by bad acts, and so
can be caused by good acts 1 and 3.
b. Virtue is caused by our acts 2.
3. *Body*
a. The *good* for man,
(1) as man: is that he know the truth and subject his lower appetites to his higher.
(2) as a citizen,
(a) of a natural society: is that he be duly ordered to the other citizens.
(b) of a supernatural society: is that he be in the state of grace.
b. The virtues of man's supernatural state cannot be acquired by our acts, but are infused by God. But man can, by his acts, acquire those virtues which do not exceed his nature.
c. Virtues are acquired in the
(1) intellect: by receiving intelligible species. Because our rational powers are objectively indetermined, they can acquire a habit to a determined object or mode of operation.
(2) appetites: by an inclination towards a determined object, i.e., a disposition impressed on them by reason.

p 133

ARTICLE 10
Whether there are any infused virtues in man.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that there are not

1. *Objections*: It would seem that there are not.
a. Natural virtue suffices obj. 1 to 3, 13.
b. Acquired virtue suffices obj. 4, 7 to 10, 18.
c. Not all virtues are infused obj. 5, 6, 11.
d. Since vices cannot be infused, neither
can virtues. obj. 12 and 17.
e. The virtues, by their very nature,
cannot be infused obj. 14 to 16, 19.
2. *On the contrary*
a. The authority of Scripture 1 and 2.
b. Virtuous acts are meritorious, and
merit is only from grace 3.
3. *Body*
a. In man there are two types of good:
(1) proportionate to his nature.
(2) exceeding his nature: supernatural good.
b. Just as man's *first* perfection, viz., his soul and its powers (which exceed matter) is received from God, so also his *final* perfection, viz., eternal happiness, is the immediate gift of God.
c. In order to attain this supernatural end, man must have supernatural principles of operation, infused by God:
(1) grace: which gives the soul a certain spiritual being.
(2) the theological virtues: which order man's acts directly to God, man's supernatural *end*.
(3) the other infused virtues: which perfect man's acts concerning the *means* to his end.

p 134

ARTICLE 11
Whether infused virtue may be increased.

1. *Objections*: It would seem not.
a. Virtue is a quality, but only matter or
quantity is increased obj. 1 and 8.

b. Virtue is a simple, indivisible form obj. 2, 6, 7, 17.
c. Virtue cannot be essentially increased obj. 3 and 4, 12.
d. Since virtue cannot be diminished,
neither can it be increased obj. 5 and 16.
e. Virtue is invariable because its cause,
God, is so obj. 9.
f. Virtue is a maximum or extreme, and so
cannot be increased obj. 10, 15, 17-18.
g. Not all virtues can be increased obj. 11.
h. Virtue cannot be increased by acts obj. 13 and 14.
2. *On the contrary*
The authority of Scripture and of St. Augustine 1 and 2.
3. *Body*
a. The error of those who consider all forms as substances, which do not increase.
b. Virtues are not increased:
(1) by the addition of one to another, since virtue is not an *indivisible* form.
(2) essentially in themselves, since virtue is not a *substantial* form.
c. Rather their subject is more or less actualized by them (the infused virtues; through the action of God;

c. Rather their subject is more or less actualized by them (the infused virtues: through the action of God; the acquired virtues: through our acts).
Note: Our acts are merely dispositions for and, once charity has been infused, merit to receive the infused virtues; they do not cause these virtues.

p 135

ARTICLE 12
Whether the virtues are correctly distinguished.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that they are not:
a. There is only one virtue, because
(1) there is only one end to which
virtue is ordered obj. 1 and 2.
(2) there is only one soul or subject
of virtue obj. 3.
b. The number of virtues does not exceed
the number of the soul's powers obj. 4 and 5.
c. The theological virtues are superfluous
or are incorrectly distinguished obj. 6 to 12.
d. The moral and intellectual virtues are
not correctly distinguished obj. 13 to 15, 18.
e. The moral virtues are not distinct from
prudence. obj. 16-17, 19-21.
f. The virtues are unnecessarily
distinguished from each other obj. 22 and 23.
g. The cardinal virtues are not correctly
distinguished obj. 24 to 27.
2. *On the contrary*
The authority of Scripture, where both the theological and the moral virtues are clearly distinguished.
3. *Body*
a. The virtues will be distinguished according to the diverse kinds of human or rational *good*.
b. This good will be of both the:
(1) appetitive powers: formally, for good is the object of the appetite. This good will be found in three types of matter or objects:
(a) the passions of the concupiscible appetite, in which this good is restraint, and the chief virtue is *temperance*.
(b) the passions of the irascible appetite, in which this good is to fortify and the chief virtue is *fortitude*.
(c) exterior goods: the good of reason here is due proportion in the sharing of these goods, and the chief virtue is *justice*.
(2) intellect: the good of which is knowledge of the truth. Hence the intellectual virtues will be distinguished according to the various types of knowledge:
(a) of *necessary* truths:
1. known per se, i.e., first principles: the virtue of *understanding*.
2. conclusions from principles: the virtue of *science*.
3. highest truths: the virtue of *wisdom*.
(b) of *contingent* truths, i.e., of truths ordered to
1. moral acts: the virtue of *prudence*.
2. things to be made: the virtue of *art*.
These virtues have to do with goods which are means to the ultimate end.
c. Virtues which have for their object the ultimate end, viz., God, are the theological virtues of

(1) faith: knowledge of God.
(2) hope: confidence in God.
(3) charity: love of God.
Under all of these chief virtues are subordinate virtues.

p 137

ARTICLE 13

Whether virtue is in the mean.

1. *Objections*: It would seem that it is not:
a. Virtue is an extreme, not a mean obj. 1 to 4, 6, 10.
b. None of the types of virtue is in
the mean obj. 5 and 15.
c. Virtue is in no type of mean obj. 7, 13, 14.
d. Virtue is in the mean of things, not
that of reason. obj. 8.
e. Virtue is an indivisible, without mean
or extreme. obj. 9.
f. Since vice is not in the mean, neither
is virtue. obj. 11.
g. Virtue is not an indivisible obj. 16 to 18.
h. At least justice is not in the mean obj. 12.
2. *On the contrary*
The authority of Aristotle, Scripture, and Boëthius, for the moral, intellectual, and theological virtues, respectively.
3. *Body*
a. A thing which has a rule or measure is good when it adequates its rule or measure.

b. The good of
(1) human passions and actions, which are the object of the moral virtues, consists in their adhering to the measure or mean of reason.
(2) the intellectual virtues differs according as these are
(a) practical, i.e., with regard to things to be done or made by us: in which our reason is the rule and measure.
(b) speculative: which regard the truth of things in themselves in which reality will be the measure and rule of our reason. This mean will not be between contrary things but between contraries of the mind, namely, affirmation and negation.
(3) the theological virtues lies in their being ordered to their object, viz., God, by the will. In the will there is no mean, since the will tends to things in themselves, to reality, in which there is no contrariety. Hence per se there is no mean in the theological virtues, although there may be one *per accidens*.

Appendix 2

Detached Notes

ARTICLE 1

(1) In St. Thomas' moral synthesis, the consideration of virtue precedes that of vice: "Although in the order of execution vices should be uprooted before virtues may be sown, according to Ps. 33/15: 'Turn away from evil and do good,' and Is. 1/16-17: 'Cease to do perversely; learn to do well;' nevertheless, in the order of knowledge virtue precedes vice." (I-II, 100, 6 ad 2) Virtue as such bespeaks good, which is something positive and formed in its own right; whereas vice is intrinsically a lack of goodness, something privative and hence intelligible only in relation to the good of which it deprives its subject.

p 138

Note also that in the way of invention, things are known first, as real beings, before their real definition, precisely as such, is grasped by the mind. Thus in this Article St. Thomas seeks to place virtue in a real genus, that of habit; while in Article 2 he is concerned with the process of formulating the definition of virtue.

p 138

The word virtue is used variously for a habit, an act, and an object. In the present context it is taken exclusively as a habit. Cf. I-II, 55 1 obj. and ad 1.

p 138

(2) The title of this Article: In I-II, 55, the title of Art. 1 reads: "Whether human virtue is a habit." St. Thomas uses the word "human," not as restrictive to those virtues only which can be acquired by human powers in any way; but as pertaining to man precisely as such, i.e., insofar as he is rational. What proceeds in man from reason is to be distinguished from what is *natural* in him. Reason integrates, while dominating, the whole of human personality and capacity. Hence man's powers are brought to dynamic perfection by habits formed under the direction of reason. It remains true, nevertheless, that our reason is a thing measured rather than measuring: we possess the truth of things only by submitting our intellects to the demands of reality. Moreover, when it is a question of supernatural virtue, human reason plays a role which is no way decisive or arbitrative. Cf. Art. 3, obj. 4, note 9, et al. in the text above.

p 138

(3) "Since an effect must be proportionate to its cause, the act of a rational power must be proportionate to the power itself. Now in a virtuous act we consider not only the substance of the act itself, but also the manner of acting; for not anyone who performs chaste acts in some way or other is chaste, but one who does so easily and with delight, as we are told in I *Ethics*, c. 13. Delight, however, is the result of agreeableness, as is evident in sensible matters, where the conjunction of agreeable elements causes delectation. A virtuous act, therefore, must proceed from a power adapted and assimilated to this act. But a rational power does not have this (adaptation) of itself, since it is objectively indifferent. Consequently, something must be added to the power so that, by this perfection, it might readily elicit such an act: and this perfection we call a virtuous habit . . . Hence also a power perfected by a virtuous habit tends to similar acts, as it were, by nature. For this reason, in the prologue to *De Invent. Rhet.*, Bk. II, Tully says that virtue is a habit in agreement with reason, after the manner of nature; for just as heavy bodies tend downward, so chastity performs chaste acts. This is also the reason why, in a completed nature, whose power cannot be deflected to evil, no habit is required with which to act, because the power is of itself proportioned to a perfect act, as is clearly the case with God."—In II *Sent.* d. 27, q. 1, a. 1.

p 139

(4) "Some say that virtues have certain acts which are continuous, suffering no interruption, although they

are not perceived by us; for these people do not allow that virtues can be inactive. But act is two-fold: first act, as existence, is the act of form: and by this act virtue is continuous, for as long as chastity remains firm, its subject remains chaste; and second act, which is operation, and this act is not continuous, for it is the act not merely of a virtue but also of the power which the latter perfects. Just as no form which is not per se subsistent has an operation in which its subject does not communicate, neither is there any act or operation of free choice, and especially one with election—without which there can be no virtuous act—without our perceiving it. It must be said therefore, in opposition to the above opinion, that the nature of a power is not destroyed by a habit; and since it is the nature of a rational power that it cannot be coerced to one object of choice, it will retain the liberty, even when perfected by virtue, of acting or not acting, and of choosing this or that. It need not continuously follow the inclination of virtue: for from the power a virtuous act derives that it be unnecessitated, and from the habit that it be performed with ease."—Ibid, ad 3.

p 139

(5) Aristotle arrived at habit as the genus of virtue by considering those accidents of the soul which are principles of acts. By a process of elimination, powers and passions are excluded and virtue is shown to be a habit. "In investigating the nature of virtue, we must agree that in the soul there are three things, namely: passions, powers, and habits. One of these must be virtue, for (the Philosopher) said above that virtue is the principle of certain operations of the soul. Now nothing in the soul, besides these three things, is a principle of operation. A man is seen to act, at one time from passion, as from anger; at another time, from sheer power (*potentia nuda*), as when an action is first begun; and yet again from habit, as the man who exercises an art. Whence it is clear that under this division not everything which is in the soul is contained: for the essence of the soul is none of these things, nor is intellectual operation. Here are mentioned only those things which are principles of operation."—In II *Ethics*, lect. 5.

p 139

(6) Father Brennan summarizes, from this Article, the properties of an act which springs from habit: "Once habit has been made part of man's permanent equipment, it displays other definite characteristics which Aquinas has summarized under three headings:

p 140

"First, every established habit manifests a typical *uniformity* in the way that it functions and in the acts that it produces. So smooth and regular are its operations, in fact, as to suggest the automatism of a machine. This trait appears all the more striking when we contrast the initial stumbling performance of a habit in formation with the stabilized products of a habit that is fixed.

p 140

"Second, every established habit exhibits a *propensity* to act at the slightest provocation. As soon as an object is presented, it, at once, and without effort, and often without consciousness of what is involved, begins to operate. So emphatic is this habitual impulse that it may require a special act of will to prevent our doing what we are accustomed to doing. For this reason habit has rightly been called *second nature*. Like nature at work, it is full of grace and ease and masterful action. There is artistry in the craftsman's skilled labor, in the painter's manipulation of colors, in the sculptor's handling of chisel and hammer, in the singer's exercise of vocal chords, in the thinker's clean-cut incision through the body of error to the soul of truth, in the saint's splendid mortification of sense and appetite. The task of habit, accordingly, is analagous to the task of the perfect servant: to make the work of the power wherein it dwells more lightsome and unobtrusive, more readily undertaken, more effectively accomplished.

p 140

"Third, every mature habit is a *pleasure* to its possessor since its operations are so assured and well

rounded and satisfying to the power thus accustomed to act. Without such pleasure as a reward for our efforts, the work of forming habits would be grievous and burdensome."—R. E. Brennan, O.P. *Thomistic Psychology*, Macmillan, N. Y. 1941, pp. 264-65.

ARTICLE 2

p 141

(7) St. Thomas adopts the ethics and psychology of Aristotle in the same sense and for the same reason that he adopts the Aristotelian physics and metaphysics from which they proceed, and this because they are the most rational expression of objective truth. Nevertheless, it is instructive to notice that he accepts the classical Augustinian definition of virtue as perfectly expressive of the whole notion of virtue . . . Undoubtedly this definition can be interpreted (as St. Thomas interprets it) in an Aristotelian sense as regards its philosophical implications, but it is equally certain that it was formulated without any regard at all for philosophical implications. Its author was concerned solely with the moral content of virtue and not with the psychological concomitants."—Carpenter, *op. cit.* p. 109.

p 141

It is interesting to note, as Father Carpenter remarks, that this definition was, in fact, not formulated by St. Augustine himself, but is a reconstruction from Augustine's words in *De Lib. Arb.* II, 19, by the Master of the *Sentences*, Peter Lombard, II, d. 17. The context of the passage cited in *De Lib. Arb.* is on liberty, and Augustine is intent on showing the great goodness of this noble faculty. He says that virtues are among these great goods, for by them one lives righteously, nor can anyone use them badly. In c. 20 (*PL* 32, col. 1270), Augustine notes that, while sin, or aversion from the Immutable Good, is not from God, still, every good thing, including virtue, is from God: "omne autem bonum ex Deo; nulla ergo natura est quae non sit ex Deo."

p 141

(8) "Augustine does not intend here to define every sort of virtue, but infused virtue; and this he defines most completely, stating its formal elements: genus and difference, when he says: 'a good quality;' its subject or matter 'in which' when he says: 'of the mind;' its act, which is also virtue's end, when he says: 'by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use;' and its efficient cause, when he says: 'which God works in us, without us.'" In II *Sent.* d. 21, q. 1, a. 2.

p 141

(9) "If it be a question of a definition of something which embraces the thing's entire being, insofar as it is constituted by all its causes, then of a single thing there can be only one definition, and this is the perfect definition. Now Augustine's definition of virtue comprises all its causes, as was said; however, there may be other definitions which express some of these causes, as that given by the Philosopher, II *Ethics*, c. 6: 'A habit of choice, consisting in a mean, etc.' which expresses the formal constituent of virtue and its act; and in VII *Physics*, text 17: 'The disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best,' expressing the ordination of virtue to the end. There are, besides these, various descriptive definitions, indicative of diverse conditions realized in virtue. Therefore, it is not inappropriate that there be many definitions of virtue."—*Ibid.* ad 9.

p 141

(10) "Although goodness is convertible with being, nevertheless it is found in a special manner in things which have a soul and the power of election, as it says in V *Metaph.* text 19. The reason for this is that

goodness bespeaks the nature of end. Hence, although it may be found in all things which have an end, it is found more especially in those beings which choose an end for themselves and know the meaning of end as such. This is why habits of choice take their species from their end, and why 'good' and 'bad' are the constitutive differentiae of these habits, not indeed as they (good and bad) are commonly taken (ontologically), but in the sense we have explained"—*Ibid*. ad 2.

p 142

(11) Thomas prefers *mens*, mind, to *anima*, soul, because the former is more specifically human, without being any the less spiritual: "Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in the reason (I *Ethics*, c. 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue" I-II, 55, 4 ad 3. The *rational part* is the preeminent seat of our virtues, whether acquired or infused. Hence human virtue, the proper good of our soul, consists in living according to reason, and thereby causing the "spiritual man" to triumph in us.

p 142

(12) "Living righteously is pertinent to two things, namely, to virtue and free choice. But free choice can be used badly; and hence to complete it by way of differentia is added: 'which no one uses badly' For although one who lives righteously does not make a bad use, still, not every thing by which one lives righteously is such that no one can use it badly."—In *Sent., loc. cit*. ad 6.

p 142

(13) Note that "by which we live righteously" applies, in meaning, both to the proximate rule of reason, namely, human virtue, and to the Divine movement which the infused gifts bring: "This definition (Augustine's) applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, 'whereby we lead a good life' as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God, ordered to His motion; that is, something which makes a man follow well the promptings of God."—I-II, 68, 1 ad 3.

p 142

(14) "As regards those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature"—I-II, 55, 4 ad 6. The entire, immense reality of the Divine concursus is evoked in these simple, unequivocal words, as something inescapably true and truly inescapable. St. Thomas combines, in due subordination and with perfect tranquility, two beautiful doctrines in a magnificent antithesis: nothing we do is done without God; He does nothing in us without our consent—but our consent is from Him.

p 142

(15) It is worthwhile to note that, while St. Thomas' study of the nature of virtue is basically directed by Aristotelian psychology and ethics, its chief inspiration, so to speak, remains Christian throughout. Augustine, the great Doctor of Grace, is enlisted and his definition accepted as perfect and ultimate in this inquiry. In this respect, Thomas is but true to his age, in which the definition and classification of virtue as handed down by St. Augustine was universally received. The Angelic Doctor's fidelity to the *best* of tradition never falters.

p 143

ARTICLE 3

(16) This article, together with the following four, find a parallel in I-II, 56, where the order is somewhat different. The treatment in both places is practically identical. Thomas' determination of the subject of virtue is one of his major contributions to the doctrine of the virtues in general. Indeed neither his predecessors nor his contemporaries approached this intricate question with the precision, coherence, or perspicuity evidenced in the *Summa* and in the articles of this Disputed Question. †1

p 143

Thomas has already proved that the virtues are immediately operative habits. From this it should be obvious that they do not reside in the essence of the soul, which operates only through its powers. In this regard, it is necessary to recall the distinction of the essence of the soul from its faculties: cf. I, 77, 1. Moreover, powers or faculties which are not indifferent as to good or bad operation, but completely determined to a single good, have no difficulty in performing their proper operations. Of this type are the external bodily members, the vegative powers, and the external senses: hence these cannot be the subject of virtue. Cf. Art. 1, Body, in the text, above. It remains, then, to consider but four powers of the soul, namely, the internal senses, the sense appetites, the will, and the intellect. This is the order followed by St. Thomas in Articles 3-7.

p 143

(17) Sacred Scripture locates virtues in various powers, e.g.: "God hath abolished the memory of the proud, and hath preserved the memory of them that are humble in mind." (Ecclus. 10/21): "My son, if thy mind be wise, my heart shall rejoice with thee" (Prov. 23/15); "Give me constancy in my mind, that I may despise him; and fortitude, that I may overthrow him." (Judith 9/14); "I am meek and humble of heart" (Matt. 11/29). In tradition, St. Augustine is concerned with proving that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, because the former is ruled by the latter. With St. Thomas clear and exact distinction is made of the subjects of all the virtues, and this distinction affords another penetration into the essence and grandeur of virtue. Virtue is seen as the power or faculty carried to its highest point of perfection. It is in the power an aptitude for or facility in action, a disposition for the best, i.e., for the full and complete realization of itself in action or in what is attained by means of action. Virtue, then is the great *resource* of life's activity.

p 144

(18) This question pertains largely to psychology, wherein its solution is found. Thus Father Brennan:

p 144

"As Aquinas points out, not all our powers are in need of habit, since some of them are disposed by their nature to operate well and successfully. Being determined to a single course of action or a single kind of stimulus, they are not in potentiality to many things. The eye, for example, sees light and nothing else. Its action is confined to the visual field, and the mode of its operation is fixed beforehand. This sort of determination is found in all our psychosomatic powers, where activity is impossible except through a material organ. Obviously, then, it is in the intellectual dimension that habit is properly lodged For here our powers are not determined to one. Light and sound, odor and tangibility, accident and substance are all so many objects of human understanding, just as any conceivable kind of good may attract the human will. And so, because our rational powers can act in indefinite ways, they have need of habit in order to act well in definite ways. Sense, for example, is directed to concrete and singular entities. Intellect, on the other hand, is directed to abstract and universal entities. Similarly, sensitive appetite is ordained to particular goods. Will, on the other hand, is ordained to good in general. While sense and sensitive appetite, therefore, do not require habits for their perfection, intellect and will can reach the operational excellence that is possible to them only through the acquisition of habits." *Op. cit.*, pp. 265-66.

p 144

(19) "Substance, which is the subject of all accidents, receives *some* accidents through the medium of others, while others are caused by substantial principles by means of other accidents. Thus color is received through the medium of surface, while taste is caused from the principles of a mixed body by means of heat and cold. Hence the subject of an accident can be considered from two aspects. In one sense, it is the substance, which is the primary foundation for accidents; and under this aspect virtuous habits are not in powers as in their subject, but rather in the soul itself or in what is conjoined to it.

p 144

"In another sense, an accident through the medium of which another accident inheres in a substance is said to be the subject of the other accident, as surface is of color. And under this aspect, virtuous habits are said to be in the powers as in their subject; because habits are ordered to acts, and acts proceed from the essence of the soul by means of its powers." In III *Sent*. d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol 1 resp. ad 1.

ARTICLE 4

p 145

(20) Virtue is all the more necessary in the lower appetites because of the defects suffered by these powers as a result of original sin. The acquiring of natural virtues and the exercise of supernatural virtues, as regulative and perfective of the sensitive appetites, occupy a prominent role in Christian asceticism. St. Thomas treats the matter of mortification when he discusses the morality of the passions, the seven capital sins and their results, and, in particular, when he speaks of the virtues which have for their subject the inferior appetites. Spiritual writers have developed this doctrine at length, with particular emphasis on the difference between the condition of redeemed human nature and that of nature in the state of original justice. Thus, Father Leen: "In the state of original justice the subordination of sense to reason and reason to God could be maintained without any internal conflict. The maintenance of this right order in redeemed man even when his efforts are aided by grace, involves a severe struggle. The internal conflict remains even after original sin has been taken away. It is because of this that mortification is rigidly necessary. Without it then this internal conflict cannot issue in success for reason and faith." †2

p 145

However, in the present context, St. Thomas is concerned solely with establishing the fact that the sense appetites are subjects of virtue, and in presenting the psychological and moral bases for this fact. The conflict between sense and spirit, and the consequent need of virtues in the sense appetites, is indicated in the *Summa*: "Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, to the extent that, being moved by reason, 'we yield our members to serve justice.' (Rom. 6/19); so also the irascible and concupiscible powers have not, of themselves, the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the 'fomes.' But insofar as they are made to conform to reason, the good of virtue is engendered in them."—I-II, 56, 4 ad 2.

p 145

(21) "Every power in which something of reason, which makes man to be man, is found, is a principle of human action. Wherefore, since in the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are parts of the same appetite, there is something of reason participatively, inasmuch as they can obey reason—which is not true of the powers of the nutritive part—there must be in the irascible and concupiscible powers certain virtues, as in a subject, whereby these powers are given a facility in obeying reason. This facility consists in

repressing the passions, so that they do not disturb reason.

p 145

"Thus, in the man who suffers more vehement passions, but is not carried away by them, there is indeed a habit in his reason which restrains him from being led away; but there is no habit in those powers in which the passions reside. This is the case with the continent man. Hence the continent or abstinent man is not perfectly virtuous, but the temperate or meek man, in whom not only is the superior part so perfect that it cannot be enticed, but the inferior is also moderated, so that vehement passions do not even arise.

p 146

"And so, in whatever power there is a passion with which a virtue is concerned, that power is the subject of virtue; as temperance is in the concupiscible, and fortitude and meekness in the irascible powers."—In III *Sent*. d. 33, q. 2, a. 4 Sol 2 ad qu 2.

p 146

(22) "The inferior appetites, namely, the irascible and concupiscible, require habits, and hence they are perfected by moral virtues. For it does not exceed human nature that their acts be moderated, but it does exceed the force (*vim*) of the aforesaid powers. Hence something of a superior power, namely, reason, must be impressed upon them; and this seal of reason on the inferior powers formally constitutes the moral virtues."—*De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 4 ad 9.

ARTICLE 5

p 147

(23) The will is more than the seat of certain virtues; being inclined to the universal good, it commands all the other powers, whose objects are several particular goods. Whereas the other faculties are each inclined to its own proper good, the will seeks the good of the entire man. This is the reason why, if a man has a *good will*, he is absolutely good: for he stands in due order to the Ultimate End or Supreme Good.

p 147

"Here we reach the most fundamental and essential point in the analysis of virtue under its psychological aspect, and discover the binding link or principle of unification between the psychology and ethics of virtue, namely, the controlling force of the will in relation to habit.

p 147

"This relation of the will to habits, and more particularly of operative habits, is one of causality. †3 But since causality is fourfold, namely, efficient, material, formal and final, it is necessary to be more precise. Firstly, then, the will is the efficient cause of a habit insofar as it is the cause of the repeated action from which the habit results. Secondly, the will is obviously not the material cause of habit; this comprises the potency of the faculty in which the habit inheres, the bodily modification it connotes and the diverse external objects with which the faculty is concerned. Thirdly, the will is the formal cause of the habit to the extent that it is the desire of the will that moves a faculty to the repetition of this kind of act rather than that. Thus it is the desire to be abstemious that influences a man's actions and so produces a habit of temperance. Finally, the will is the final cause of habit in the sense that it belongs to the will to decide upon the end to be aimed at and to choose the means best calculated to obtain that end. It should perhaps be noted here that if a habit is not acquired by repeated acts, but infused immediately by God, the will would not be the efficient cause of the habit. But it would still play the part of formal and final cause, and moreover would

be the efficient cause of the use of that infused habit." †4

p 147

"Further, moral virtues are concerned with means to the end and not directly with the end itself. The particular action of the will in relation to these virtues is, therefore, that of choice. Hence we find St. Thomas saying that the principal act of any virtue is choice ., . and St. Augustine defines virtue as 'the good use of free choice' . . . Right reason gives the norm of morality but of itself, as Aristotle says (VI *Ethics*, c. 2), reason moves nothing, and consequently reason cannot be the constituent of virtue. That which constitutes virtue, and is itself essentially virtuous, is moral choice proceeding from a will rightly orientated in respect of the true ultimate end. This rectitude of the will alone gives the virtuous character to human habits.

p 148

"Finally, the pre-eminence of the will is seen in the inter-connection of the virtues. St. Gregory says: 'That is not true prudence which is not also just and temperate and strong; nor perfect temperance that is not strong and prudent and just; nor complete fortitude that is not prudent, temperate and just; nor true justice that is not prudent, strong and temperate.' (*Moral*. XXII, 1). This inter-relation follows precisely from the fact that virtue connotes the moral good of the man as a whole which is rooted in the rectitude of the will. If a man has this fundamental moral perfection, it follows necessarily that he must have not just this virtue or that, but all the virtues, because in desiring the true ultimate end he must direct by his will all his faculties to the use of means calculated to bring him to that end. Though there may be, of course, degrees of moral excellence or moral deficiency, nevertheless, just as a man is either moral or not moral, so he has either all the virtues or none. The deciding factor is the rectitude or otherwise of his will." †5

p 148

St. Thomas treats the connection of the virtues in I-II, q. 65. He insists also that the will's very strength, in orientating both its own acts as well as those of all the other powers, derives from its docility to God, from the conformity to the Divine will. For this, of course, Divine aid is necessary.

p 148

(24) "As we said above, virtues are necessary for us in order that our natural powers may be determined to good. Hence in those natural powers which are by their very nature determined to good, no virtues are required.

p 148

"Now the will has for its object the good as end. Therefore, it is by its own nature intrinsically determined to the good which is an end proportionate to human nature. For this same reason, the *Philosophers* assigned no virtue to the will with respect to the ultimate end.

p 148

"However, some acquired virtue must be placed in the will as regards the means to the end, and this is justice, as will be shown later (d. 33, q. 2, a. 4 Sol. 3), which regards the goods which sustain human life and is counted among the moral virtues. The reason is that the will, although by its very nature essentially in the rational part, nevertheless, from a likeness of operation agrees with the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are called rational by participation. For the will itself participates to some extent in reason, inasmuch as it is directed by reason apprehending (good).

p 148

"Moreover, the doctrine of faith reveals an Ultimate End which exceeds natural inclination. Hence, according to the *Theologians*, a virtue must be assigned to the will, to elevate it to this (supernatural) end;

according to the *Theologians*, a virtue must be assigned to the will, to elevate it to this (supernatural) end, and this virtue we call charity."—In III *Sent*. d. 27, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5.

p 148

(25) "Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the very nature of this power is sufficient for the purpose, as has been said. A need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good."—I-II, 56, 6 ad 3.

ARTICLE 6

p 149

(26) "The phrase of Augustine's ('virtue is the order of love') is to be understood of virtue simply so called, not that every such virtue is love simply, but that it depends in some way on love, insofar as it depends on the will, whose first movement is one of love, as we have said above, (q. 25, aa. 1, 2, 3; q. 27, a. 4; I, q. 20, a. I)".—I-II, 56, 3 ad 1. This beautiful and profound reflection is thoroughly and typically Augustinian. For Augustine, at the root of virtue there is always, in effect, *love*! The basis for this truth is the fact that complete virtue exists only in the measure that *the will enters into play*. This action of the will in the intellectual virtues of faith and prudence (which reside in the speculative and practical intellects, respectively) is admirably delineated in this and the following Article. Enlightened by this doctrine, we perceive how even the love of a science or of an art can make it a point of honor for us not to prostitute one's art or science to bad uses. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas insists, the influence of willing and loving does not extend to the very heart of these intellectual habits. The latter can be formed, exercised, and developed independently of the will: in their regard love is not absolutely indispensable. Cf. Article 7 in the text, above.

p 149

(27) "The intellect is moved by the will just as the other powers are: for a man actually considers something because he wills to do so. And so the intellect, according as it is ordered to the will, can be the subject of a virtue absolutely so-called. In this manner the speculative intellect or reason is the subject of faith. Thus the intellect is moved to assent to what is of faith by the command of the will; for 'no one believes unless he is willing.' The practical intellect, on the other hand, is the subject of prudence. Since prudence is the right reason of things to be done (*recta ratio agibilium*), it requires that a man be well-disposed towards the principles of this reason of things to be done, which principles are ends, and to which a man is well ordered through rectitude of will, as he is to speculative principles by the natural light of the agent intellect. And therefore, as the subject of science, which is right reason in speculative truths, is the speculative intellect, as ordered to the agent intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its ordination to a rectified will."—I-II, 56, 3.

p 149

(28) "The truth of the speculative intellect consists in knowing; but that of the practical intellect in directing. And so the truth of the speculative intellect consists in this, that the knowledge adequate the thing known: while the truth of the practical intellect consists in this, that the direction adequate the directive principles. Now the determinative, and hence directive principle of art in its operation is the appetite, as we are told in IX *Metaphys*. (1048 a 10 ff; S. Thos. lect. 4). Therefore, since each thing stands to truth as it does to being, the act of direction, proper to the practical intellect, depends on the appetite both as to being and as to truth."—Cajetan, in I-II, 57, 5, no. II.

ARTICLE 7

p 150

(29) "The subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical but also the speculative intellect, without any reference to the will. Thus the Philosopher holds, in VI *Ethics*, c. 3, that science, wisdom, and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. The reason for this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as was said above (q. 9, a. 1; q. 17, aa. 1, 5; I, 82, 4). Therefore, if a man actually do well, this is because he has a good will; and so the virtue which makes a man actually do well, and not merely be able to do so, must be either in the will itself or in some power moved by the will."—I-II, 56, 3.

p 150

(30) "No habit has the ratio of virtue except one whose act is always good; for otherwise it would not be the perfection of a power. Therefore, since the act of the intellect is good in that it considers the truth, it follows that a habit residing in the intellect cannot be a virtue unless it be such that by it the truth is infallibly perceived. For this reason, opinion is not an intellectual virtue, but science and understanding are, as we read in VI *Ethics* (c. 3, 6 and 7)."—*De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 8.

p 150

"Now the good of the intellect is knowledge of the truth; and therefore, those habits whereby the intellect is perfected in knowing the truth, are called virtues, as it says in VI *Ethics* (c. 5 and 6), as rendering the act of the intellect good.

p 150

"But falsity is not only a lack of truth, but also the corruption thereof. For one who completely lacks knowledge of the truth, in whom there is a lack of truth, although he does not hold as an opinion the contrary of truth, is not in the same state as regards truth, as one who holds a false opinion, whose judgment is corrupted by falsehood. Wherefore, just as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsity is its evil, for which reason the habit of opinion is not an intellectual virtue, because it can happen that by it falsehood is approved, as we learn from VI *Ethics*, c. 3. Now no virtuous act can be evil, as though false opinion itself could be a kind of bad intellectual act."—*Ibid*., q. 18, a. 6.

p 150

(31) As we pointed out above, note (2), the good of virtue is measured by its convenience to reason. St. Thomas repeats and employs this truth throughout his tracts on the virtues, in general and in particular, thus emphasizing the eminently significant role of the intellect in the acquisition and exercise of all the virtues. Thus, he argues that one virtue cannot be opposed to another, because the good of virtue depends on due relation to a single rule, namely, that of reason (I-II, 31, 8 ad 1). The gravity of sin is measured, in one instance, according as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason; because the good of virtue, which is effaced by sin, consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of right reason (I-II, 73, 3). So too, any kind of desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue lies (II-II, 148, 1). Temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue lies in its accord with reason, which rules more completely in the temperate than in the continent man. Further, the good of reason, on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as in the case of the temperate man, is shown to be greater than if it reached only to the will, as in the case of the continent man

(II-II, 155, 4, c. and ad 3). Since the cause and root of human good is reason (cf. I-II, 18, 5; 61, 2), prudence, which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive powers, insofar as these participate in reason. Even among the moral virtues, one is better than another according as it approaches nearer to reason (I-II, 66, 1). The good in human acts is proportionate to their regulation by reason. Hence those acts which proceed more immediately from the rational part, are, precisely as such, more excellent than those of inferior powers (*Contra Gentiles*, III, 139). It remains, however, that to be more properly and perfectly a virtue, is not to be nobler in an absolute sense, but to have a more intrinsic and necessary ordination to an *appetite*, which alone moves one effectively to *do good*.

p 151

(32) "Virtue is a habit perfecting a human power for a good act. Now an act may be called good in two ways: first, formally and per se, and secondly, materially and accidentally.

p 151

"Since an act takes its form from its proper object, an act is said to be good *formally* whose object is a good under the aspect of good. And since good is the object of the will, it follows that no act can be called good in this sense except an act of the will or of the appetitive part.

p 151

"However, an act is said to be good *materially* when it is convenient with an operating power, even though its object is not the good under the aspect of good: as when a man understands right or the eye sees clearly . . .

p 151

". . . Therefore, we may speak of virtue in two senses. In the first sense, virtue is a habit perfective of a good act of a human power, whether the act be good materially or formally; and thus intellectual and speculative habits can be called virtues, for by them the intellect and reason are determined to the truth, the consideration of which constitutes their good act. This is the sense in which the Philosopher speaks of virtue in the *Ethics*.

p 151

"In another sense, we may speak of virtue more strictly, according to the common usage of this word, as a habit perfective of an act which is good not only materially but formally: and in this sense only those habits which pertain to the appetitive part can be called virtues, and not the intellectual habits, especially not those which reside in the speculative intellect." In III *Sent*. d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, qla. 3 sol. 1.

ARTICLE 8

p 152

(33) "Speaking of moral virtues, Aristotle says: 'The virtues come to be in us neither by nature nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them, and are perfected in them through custom (or habit)' (*Nich. Ethics* II, 1). This capacity includes both the faculties of the soul and the bodily dispositions. We say of a certain man that he is naturally mild or naturally abstemious, or of another that he is naturally choleric or naturally intemperate. Or again, we say that so-and-so is a natural linguist or a born musician. Such statements mean that a man has a natural predisposition to art or virtue which will make one line of action easier to him than another line. or easier to him than to another man. It is

possible that this predisposition may be reducible in each case to the physical structure of the body. But is that bodily disposition to be taken as a principle of action. If so, the resulting habits of virtue, of vice, of learning and so on, will in no sense be under the control of the man in question; there is no place for his reason or his will. Granting such a hypothesis, we should have to conclude that a man's character and attainments must necessarily develop entirely and only upon lines dictated by corporal infirmities or excellences over which he has no control. If he has a physical tendency which inclines him to excessive consumption of alcoholic liquor, he will necessarily become a confirmed drunkard. Or if he has physical predispositions which lend themselves to musical ability, he will necessarily become an accomplished musician. Such a position is, of course, utterly untenable and preposterous. It is true that these conditions, in so far as they are purely corporeal, cannot be directly controlled by the will; it is equally true that the passions, incited and aided by these conditions, may conceivably prove strong enough on occasion to overwhelm reason. But in spite of this it is certain that a man can control his passions and can act in accordance with or diametrically opposite to his bodily predisposition. If a man follows the corporeal or purely sensitive bent of his nature, he does so of his own choice, and he is himself responsible for the actions thus performed and for the habits which are thus generated in the faculties immediately productive of those actions. Again, habitual action in a specified direction will produce a corresponding modification of the bodily organ or member concerned. But that aptitude and prompt obedience in the bodily member, though undoubtedly an important concomitant, is not the habit nor even necessarily conjoined to the habit."—Carpenter, *op. cit.* p. 115-16.

p 152

It is important to remember that true human habits are formed only by one who knows what they are and voluntarily chooses to acquire them (we are speaking of natural habits; supernatural habits "God works in us without us"). Thus Aristotle's commentators have defined habit as "that which a man may use when he so wishes." The promptness, facility, and stability of operation which ensue upon the formation of perfect habit in no way diminish its voluntary character. (cf. I-II, q. 49, a. 3) Hence language such as "second nature," and, more especially, "the automatism of a machine," employed in description of the characteristic properties of habitual operation, is to be referred to the *mode* of action. The action itself, if it be truly human and springing from a distinctively human habit, is always elicited by reason and will. Otherwise human habit is indistinguishable from the natural traits of brute animals, such as the mildness of the lamb and the fierceness of the lion, or from innate racial and national hereditary characteristics.

p 153

(34) "Since God remains equally the same in His action on all creatures, the diversity of gifts received from Him must be attributed to the diverse conditions of the recipients. Now the diversity of the recipients follows from their being more or less disposed and prepared to receive. Just as we observe in regard to natural forms, that by accidental dispositions, such as heat and cold and the like, matter is rendered more or less disposed to receiving a form; so also, in the perfections of the soul, the soul is rendered more or less apt at attaining its own perfection. However, the operations of the soul are related differently to infused and to acquired perfections. For acquired perfections are in the nature of the soul itself, †6 in a potency which is not purely material (passive) but active as well, as a thing exists in its seminal causes. Thus every acquired science evidently exists in the knowledge of first principles, which are naturally known, as in the active principles from which the science may be deduced. Likewise the moral virtues pre-exist in the very rectitude and order of reason, as in a kind of seminal principle. Hence in VII *Ethics*, c. 5, the Philosopher says that there are certain natural virtues, which are like seeds of the moral virtues. And so the operations of the soul stand in relation to acquired perfections, not merely as dispositions but as active principles.

p 153

"But infused perfections are in the nature of the soul itself †7 as in a potency which is material (i.e., purely passive) and in no way active, since they elevate the soul above all its natural activity. Hence the soul's

operations are related to infused perfections only as dispositions. It must be noted, also, that the measure by which charity is given is the capacity of the soul itself, which is simultaneously from nature and from the disposition which results from acts which the soul has attempted. Because nature is more and better disposed according to this very striving, it happens that one who has better natural dispositions, but who struggles but little, will receive less of infused perfections; while one whose natural gifts are inferior, if he makes a greater effort, will sometimes receive more."—In I *Sent*. d 17, q. 1, a. 2.

p 153

(35) "That is said to be natural to a thing which is agreeable to it according to its form, whereby the thing is constituted of such a nature, as fire naturally tends upward. The form which makes man to be man is his reason or intellect. Hence man naturally tends to what is agreeable to him according to reason and intellect. Now the good of any virtue is proper to man according to his reason: for this goodness arises from a certain commensuration of an act with its circumstances and end, and this commensuration is brought about by reason. Therefore, certain inclinations to or aptitudes for virtue pre-exist itself, and are called natural virtues, as we read in VI *Ethics*, c. 9. And by these a man tends naturally to good. But a natural movement proceeds from a form according to the condition of the form. Now the will and reason are of such a nature that they are not determined to one, so as to be unable to turn to another. Consequently, although it is natural for a man to will good, still, he can will evil, not in so far as it is evil, but in so far as it is judged to be good.—In II *Sent*. d. 39, q. 2, a. 1.

p 154

It is clear, then, that natural inclinations do not destroy man's freedom; and further, that these inclinations, by their very indeterminateness—generality would be better—demand further perfection. This demand is satisfied by acquired virtue (there is no question here of infused virtue, since the latter is not demanded by nature, nor does man have any natural inclinations to it).

p 154

(36) Maintaining the correct distinction between the inchoative or "seminal" stages of virtue and its consummate, stable, perfect state, Aristotle is able to show, in one part of his *Ethics*, how virtue is in us by nature, and, in another part, how it is *not* in us in this manner. St. Thomas comments on both of these passages:

p 154

"That there is such a thing as *natural virtue*, which is presupposed to moral, is patent from the fact that singular traits of virtues or of vices are seen to exist naturally in certain men; for some men seem, immediately from birth, to be just or temperate or courageous on account of a natural disposition which inclines them to acts of these virtues. This same natural disposition can be perceived in three parts of the soul.

p 154

"First, on the part of the reason, since the first principles of human actions are naturally inserted, for example, that harm is to be done to no one, and similar principles. Secondly, on the part of the will, which is naturally moved of itself by a good understood, as by its proper object. Thirdly, on the part of the sensitive appetite, wherein, from a natural complexion, some men are disposed to anger, some to the concupiscences, or to other passions, either to a greater or a lesser degree, or moderately, in which moral virtue consists. But the first two dispositions (in reason and in will) are common to all men.

p 154

"Hence according to this the Philosopher says that some men are naturally brave or just: and yet in those who are naturally such, something which is eminently good is required, in order that the aforesaid virtues

reside in us in a more perfect manner. These same natural habits or inclinations do exist in children and in beasts, as the lion is naturally brave and greathearted; but nevertheless, natural habits such as these can be harmful, unless the discretion of reason be present."—In VI *Ethics*, lect. II.

p 154

Having agreed that virtue is caused in us by repeated operation, Aristotle proceeds to show that it is impossible for virtue to be in us from nature. Commenting on the Philosopher, St. Thomas writes:

p 154

"He proves from what he has said above that moral virtue is not in us from nature, for two reasons. The first reason is this: In things which are from nature, there is no variation, because of their set ("accustomed") condition. He illustrates this statement by an example: Since a stone is naturally borne earthward, no matter how often it may be thrown in the air, it will in no way become accustomed to being tossed upwards in this manner. The reason for this is that in their natural actions things are either active only or are both active and passive. If the former, the principle of action in them undergoes no mutation; and while the cause remains the same, the inclination to the same effect always remains. But if these things so act that they also suffer (action), unless the passion be such that it removes the principle of action, the natural inclination which is in them is not taken away. If, however, it be a passion such as removes the principle of action in them, then the nature will also be changed, †8 and what was natural to them before will no longer be so. Therefore, by the fact that a thing acts naturally, it undergoes no immutation by reason of its action. Similarly, even if it be moved against its nature, unless it happens that the motion be such as to corrupt the nature. But if the natural principle of action remains, the action will remain always the same. Thus it is that in acts which are according to nature, and in those which are contrary to nature, habituation (*consuetudo*) exercises no influence.

p 155

"The reason is that moral virtue pertains to the appetite, which operates according as it is moved by an apprehended good. And so, as often as it must operate, it must at the same time, and just as often, be moved by its object. From this there arises a certain inclination, after the manner of a nature, just as many drops of falling water will hollow out a rock. Thus it is evident that the moral virtues are not in us *by nature*, nor are they in us *contrary to nature*. Rather there is in us a natural aptitude to receive them, inasmuch as the appetitive power in us is ordered by nature to obey reason. However, they are made perfect in us by repeated acts (*per assuetudinem*), for from performing acts according to reason a number of times, a form is impressed by the power of reason on the appetitive part, which impression is nothing other than moral virtue.

p 155

". . . The second reason is this. Of all those things which are in us from nature, the potency is in us before the act. This is apparent in the senses. For we do not acquire the sense of sight or of hearing by having seen or heard a number of times. On the contrary, from the fact that we have these senses, we begin to use them; we do not have them from the fact that we have used them. But we possess the acquired virtues by acting according to virtue, as is the case also in the manual arts, wherein men learn by doing those things which, after they have learnt, they will have to do. Thus men become builders by building and harpists by playing the harp. And similarly, by performing just or temperate or courageous acts, men become just, or temperate, or brave. Consequently, these virtues are not in us from nature."—In II *Ethics*, lect. 1.

ARTICLE 9

p 156

(37) "Naturally speaking, the habit grows up and becomes more rooted in the faculty as the result of repeated individual acts of the same kind. These individual acts are performed as the result of rational deliberation and free choice, though the need of conscious deliberation or actual choice grows less in proportion as the passive indetermination of the faculty diminishes with the repetition of the act. The passive indetermination of the faculty becomes more and more an actual indetermination as it receives more and more deeply, and retains more and more firmly, the impress of the deliberate free-will which moves it."—Carpenter, *op. cit.* p. 117.

p 156

(38) The question of whether a habit can be caused by a single act, which St. Thomas touches on here in the reply to obj. 11, is answered at length in the *Summa*: "Habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved (changed) by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Hence we see that fire does not kindle at once, because it cannot immediately overcome the combustible object; rather it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming the combustible element completely, it may impress its likeness on the object. Now it is manifest that the active principle which is reason cannot completely overcome the appetitive power in one act; because the appetitive power is inclined in various ways and to many things; while reason judges in a single act what should be willed as regards various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby overcome, so as to be inclined, as by nature, to the same thing in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore, a virtuous habit cannot be caused by a single act, but only by many acts.

p 156

"In the apprehensive powers, however, it must be observed that there are two passive principles: one is the possible intellect itself, while the other is what Aristotle (*De Anima* III, text, 20) calls the passive intellect, which is the particular reason, or the cogitative power, together with the memory and the imagination (cf. I, 79, 2 c. and ad 2). With respect to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to overcome completely, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus a single self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives firm assent to the conclusion, whereas a probable proposition cannot do this. Hence a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason—even on the part of the possible intellect; whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, as far as the possible intellect is concerned. But as regards the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts must be repeated many times for anything to be impressed firmly on the memory. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (*De Memor. et Remin.* 1) that 'meditation strengthens memory.' Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle be of great strength: for instance a strong dose of medicine will sometimes restore health at once."—I-II, 51, 3.

p 157

(39) St. Thomas' position with regard to the possibility and existence of virtues acquired by our acts is commonly received among theologians, although Catholic doctors in general make it a point to emphasize the inferiority of these acquired virtues, as compared with those infused by God, and their absolute insufficiency for attaining a supernatural reward. That God can and sometimes does infuse virtues which, strictly speaking, we could attain to by our own actions (moved and sustained, of course, by God), is also maintained in the Thomistic doctrine on virtue:

p 157

"Man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Since the notion of good consists in 'mode, species, and order,' as Augustine declares (*De Natura Boni*, iii), or in 'number, weight, and measure,' as we are told in Wisd. 11/21, man's good must be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as we said

Wisd. 11/21, man's good must be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as we said above (q. 19, aa. 3, 4), namely, human reason and Divine law. And since the Divine law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason is ruled by the Divine law as well; but the converse is not true.

p 157

"It follows that human virtue ordered to a good which is laid down according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts; inasmuch as these acts proceed from reason, by whose power the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which orders man to a good defined by Divine law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, whose principle is reason, but is caused in us by the Divine action alone. Hence Augustine, in defining this latter type of virtue, inserts the phrase: 'which God works in us, without us' (Super Ps. CXVIII; Serm. xxvi)."—I-II, 63, 2.

p 157

(40) "Certain philosophers, whom Avicenna follows, held that all forms are from a giver of forms, and that a natural agent does nothing except dispose for these forms.

p 157

"Avicenna said, likewise, that science and virtue are from a giver, and that the soul is disposed by study and exercise for receiving the influx of these habits.

p 157

"However, this position eliminates natural virtue, †9 which is in every natural principle for the purpose of making something like to itself, according as the matter on which it acts is receptive of its likeness. This is necessarily true from the fact that every agent acts in so far as it is in act. Hence everything which is actually something must be capable of being in some way the active principle of what it actually is.†10 And so every natural principle is naturally apt to induce its own likeness through its action.

p 158

"Therefore, since the principles of the sciences and the virtues are naturally sown in us, as has been said, it necessarily follows that, by actions proceeding from these principles, the habits of the virtues and sciences are brought to perfection. Indeed, experience testifies to this; for by habitual (accustomed) action, what was previously difficult is made easy and delightful, and delight in an operation is a sign of an acquired habit."—In III *Sent*. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, Sol. 2.

p 158

(41) At first sight it may seem odd, yet the principles or "seeds" of the acquirable virtues, which pre-exist in us by nature, before any operation on our part, are really more important and more excellent than the virtues themselves, which are firmly established and brought to perfection by our repeated efforts. St. Thomas explains why this is so: "These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them. Thus, the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which is the result of the participation by the appetite in reason, which is brought about by moral virtue." I-II, 63, 2 ad 3. Thomas adds that it is thanks to the inherent possession of these "seeds of virtue" that man is at all able to acquire further perfections. A little reflection recalls to mind the further truth that the innate inclinations to virtue are the immediate and exclusive handiwork of God, while the virtues which we acquire must be attributed to ourselves, as secondary causes, as well as to the First Cause and First Mover of all creatures. In this light, it is recognized as inevitable that the works of Almighty God should excel immeasurably those of His creatures.

ARTICLE 10

p 159

(42) In his tract on the habits in general, before taking up the consideration of good habits or virtues, St. Thomas establishes the fact that the habits can be and, in fact, are infused into man by God:

p 159

"Certain habits are infused by God into man, and this for two reasons:

p 159

"The first reason is that there are some habits whereby man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, and this end is man's ultimate and perfect beatitude, as stated above (q. 5, a. 5). Since habits must be proportionate to that to which man is disposed by them, it follows of necessity that those habits which dispose to this end must exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore, such habits can never be in man, except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all the virtues which are freely given.

p 159

"The second reason is, that God can produce the effects of secondary causes without these secondary causes, as we noted in the First Part (q. 105, a. 6). Hence, just as, in order to manifest His power, He sometimes causes health without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also for the manifestation of His Power, He sometimes infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by man's natural power. Thus to the Apostles He gave the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by habit, but not so perfectly." I-II, 51, 4.

p 159

In the first place St. Thomas argues to the infusion of essentially supernatural virtues; and in the second, to those which are of their very nature proportionate to man's powers, but which derive their supernatural character from the mode in which they are received, viz., by Divine infusion.

p 159

(43) Before giving any further notes on the theological doctrine of infused virtue, the declarations of the Church's magisterium must be carefully considered.

p 159

As early as 1201, theological opinions concerning the infusion of grace and the virtues were officially recognized by the Church. In that year the great Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) enumerated three opinions in this regard: (1) Faith, Charity and the other virtues are not infused into infants at Baptism, because the babes do not exercise any consent (recall St. Thomas' own statement: "Infused virtue is caused in us by God, without any action on our part, not, however, without our consent."—Art. 2, ad 20, in the text, above); (2) Through baptism, sin is forgiven them, but no grace is conferred on the infants; (3) Both sin is forgiven and virtues are infused, so that the infants possess the latter as habits, but do not enjoy their use until they reach the age of discretion." †11 Innocent does no more than state the three opinions which in his day enjoyed varying favor; he does not go on to declare his own mind in this particular matter.

p 160

Pope Clement V (1305-1314), together with the Fifteenth Oecumenical Council of Vienne (1311-1312),

took up this question and declared on it unequivocally. Condemning the errors of Peter John Olivi, concerning the effects of baptism in infants, Clement stated that, in virtue of the universal efficacy of the Death of Christ, which is applied equally to all who are baptized, the opinion which holds that in baptism informing grace and the virtues are conferred on both infants and adults is the more probable opinion, as being more in harmony with the teachings of the saints and of contemporary theologians. Clement adds that the Council also approves of this stand. †12 Although this statement appears in a solemn declaration, it must be noted that it defends the doctrine of infused virtues only as "more probable."

p 160

The Council of Trent, explaining the doctrine of justification and its cause, declares that by the merits of Christ's Passion "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us" (Rom. 5/5), and that this charity inheres in the just. Whence, in the actual justification, along with the remission of sins, faith, hope, and charity are all simultaneously infused into man through the merits of Jesus Christ. The Council goes on to explain why these virtues must accompany one another, in their perfect state. †13

p 160

In the canons on justification, of the same Session, anathema is pronounced on anyone who denies that grace and charity are diffused in the hearts of the just by the Holy Spirit, and inhere therein. †14

p 160

Pronouncing on the nature and cause of merit, the Tridentine Fathers declare that Jesus Christ Himself, as the head of the members (Eph. 4/15) and the vine in the branches (Jn. 15/5), continuously infuses virtue into those who are justified, which virtue always antecedes their good works, and accompanies and follows upon them as well, and without which these same works can in no manner whatever be rendered meritorious and pleasing to God. †15

p 161

The statements given here are all those which have been formally pronounced concerning the *existence* of infused virtues in general. Declarations on the three theological virtues in particular are numerous, and may be traced in Denzinger, Index system, XIb, XIc, and XId. †16

p 161

(44) Along with, and ever under the direction and authority of, the magisterium of the Church, all Catholic theologians, ancient, medieval, and modern, unanimously teach that there are infused theological virtues. †17 The conclusion of the majority of theologians is that (1) it is proximate to the faith that the theological virtues are infused with grace, †18 and that (2) it is the truer and more common opinion that all the moral virtues and the gifts are also infused with grace. The latter conclusion is denied by no theologian today: †19 There are as many infused moral virtues as there are acquired moral virtues. Indeed, the many definitions of the Church, interpreted and dutifully explained by Catholic theologians, demand the affirmation or supposition, in the supernatural organism of the soul, of the existence of certain well-determined aptitudes, dependent on the grace of Christ and unacquirable by us, and dwelling in the soul as permanent faculties, by way of habit. The *positive* function of Sacred Doctrine will be to inquire into and establish, by theological reasoning, the existence of these infused virtues; while Theology will exercise its *speculative* and *scientific* office, to acquire some idea of their nature and mode of operation. Saint Thomas is concerned chiefly with the latter function—which is an indication that the existence of the infused virtues was a commonly accepted doctrine in his day. Moreover, we may presume that these supernatural habits are not without some relation or analogy to our natural habits: and it is on this score that St. Thomas broaches the question: "Natural reason cannot argue to a state of grace in man, for in origin, in essence, and in consequences, it is supernatural. But this, at any rate, we can know demonstratively, namely, that if grace is

given to man it will be given to him as a perfection compatible with and based upon His God-given nature. Any other conclusion would militate against the wisdom of the Creator. It is this alone that makes possible an analysis of the virtuous operation of man constituted in grace; it is this that justifies our . . . approach to supernatural virtues through the medium of the natural. It may be, indeed must be, taken for granted therefore that the various human faculties and their respective functions are essentially the same in the supernatural as in the natural order. There is the same co-ordination of these faculties in view of the ultimate end and object of existence. It follows that there is the same need for a perfecting of these faculties by means of virtue, for there must be the same habitual orientation of the whole man towards his ultimate end." †20

p 162

The argument, then, for the existence of infused, supernatural virtues will look to the dynamic needs of man, constituted in grace or justified, and ordered to a supernatural end. It is the universal Providence of God, which extends to all things "sweetly and strongly," which persuades the theologian, grounded on his Catholic faith, of the existence of the infused virtues: "It is unfitting that God should provide less for those whom His love has destined to the attainment of a supernatural good, than for those creatures for whom His love has prepared a natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that He not only moves them to their natural operations, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are principles of acts, so that they might be inclined of themselves to this movement. And so the motion whereby they are moved by God is made connatural to and easy for creatures, according to Wisd. 8/1: 'she . . . ordereth all things sweetly.' Much more, therefore, does He infuse into those whom He moves to the attainment of an eternal, supernatural good, certain forms of supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly, to the attainment of an eternal good."—I-II, 110, 2.

p 162

(45) The difference between the infused and the acquired moral virtues is a special problem in itself, and is taken up by St. Thomas in I-II, 63, 4. For a more lengthy and detailed account of this question, cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life*, Vol. I, pp. 58-66. Father Garrigou-Lagrange exposes the doctrine clearly and simply, and offers admirable comments on its ramifications on the spiritual life.—It may be noted that theologians distinguish between virtues which are infused *per se* and those which are infused *per accidens*. They classify under the former title those virtues which of their proper nature can be effectively produced in us only by God, namely, the theological virtues. *Per accidens* infused virtues are those which, by their nature, can be acquired by our acts, but which, by Divine dispensation, are actually infused. Thus, all those virtues which of themselves are acquirable were infused into our First Parent, and also into Our Lord. Cf. 1, 95, 3 and III, 7, 1 and 2.

p 163

(46) St. Thomas treats briefly and pointedly the difference between acquired and infused virtue in his Commentary on the *Sentences*:

p 163

"Acquired and infused virtues differ specifically, fortitude from fortitude and temperance from temperance, and so for the rest; because, as we have said, in actions, ends are as principles.

p 163

"If there were a science which could not be reduced to those principles which are naturally known, it would not be of the same species as the other sciences, nor would science be understood univocally of all.

p 163

"Wherefore, since the ends of the infused virtues do not pre-exist in the natural 'seed-beds' of virtues, but

exceed human nature; it follows that the infused virtues must be specifically different from the acquired virtues which spring from those seeds. Hence also the former perfect man in another sort of life: the acquired virtues, in civic life, the infused, in the spiritual life which derives from grace and by which the virtuous man is a member of the Church."—In III *Sent*. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2 Sol. 4.

p 163

"Although the acts of the acquired and of the infused virtues may be materially the same, nevertheless, they are not the same acts formally. For by acquired virtue circumstances are ordered according to their proportion to the civil good; whereas by infused virtue they are ordered according to their proportion to the good of eternal glory. Hence also, what is excessive according to the norms of civic virtue may be truly moderate, according to infused virtue; for example, that a man fast or offer himself voluntarily to die in defense of the faith."—*Ibid*., ad 2.

p 163

(47) The necessity of infused virtues for salvation is expressed in the three following propositions: (1) Infused virtues are absolutely necessary, that a man be formally just and holy. "But without faith it is impossible to please God." (Heb. 11/6); "And you, employing all care, minister in your faith, virtue" (2 Pet. 1/5). (2) Infused habits are absolutely necessary, that supernatural acts may be performed with due proportion and connaturality, i.e., that they may be elicited according to the conditions which their nature postulates, by a principle which is duly proportioned to them. (3) Infused habits are not absolutely necessary for performing supernatural acts, if it be a question of acts which, although good and salutary, nevertheless are not connaturally and duly proportioned to the nature of such habits; e.g., in unreconciled penitents, there may be true acts of faith and of hope, etc.

p 163

(48) "The ultimate good which the philosopher considers is other than that considered by the theologian.

p 163

"For the *philosopher* considers as the ultimate good what is proportionate to human powers, and consists in an act of man himself; hence he says that beatitude is a certain operation. And so, according to the philosopher, a good act, whose principles is called a virtue, is said to be such absolutely in so far as it is convenient to a power, as perfecting the latter. Wherefore, whatever habit the philosopher finds eliciting such an act, he calls a virtue; whether it be in the intellective part, as science and the intellectual virtues of this sort, whose act is the good of the power itself, which is the consideration of truth; or in the affective part, such as temperance and fortitude and the other moral virtues.

p 164

"But the *theologian* considers as the ultimate good what exceeds the faculty of nature, namely, eternal life, as we said above. Hence he does not consider that good is to be found absolutely in human acts, because he does not place the end in these, but he considers the good of human acts as ordered to that good which he holds to be the end: asserting that an act is completely good only when it is proximately ordered to the ultimate good, that is, when it is meritorious of eternal life; every such act he calls a virtuous act; and whatever habit elicits such an act, is called by him a virtue.

p 164

"However, an act cannot be said to be meritorious, except as it is constituted in the power of the agent: because one who merits must exhibit something; nor can he exhibit anything, save what is in some way his own, that is, from himself. Now an act is truly in our power when it is subject to our will; whether it belong to the will as elicited by it, as to love and to will; or whether it be imperated by the will, as walking and talking. Hence, with respect to any such act, a virtue can be assigned, eliciting the aforesaid acts in the

class of acts mentioned above."—*De Veritate*, q. 3, a. 14.

ARTICLE 11

p 165

(49) St. Thomas' doctrine on the increase of infused virtue, in I-II, 66, 1, is an application, with due considerations and reservations, of his teaching on the increase of habits in general, to which he devotes an extraordinarily long and difficult article, q. 52, a. 1. The matter itself is intricate enough on the natural level, and becomes positively mysterious and elusive when it is a question of supernatural virtue. Two more articles in q. 52 discuss the mode in which habits may be increased; and the same doctrine is treated, more concisely, in Thomas' Comment. in X *Ethics*, lect. 3. The holy Doctor broaches the problem in q. 52, a. 1, by a consideration of the signification of the terms "increase" and "perfection," wherein he indicates the analogous usages of these concepts. This is followed by an account of four opinions among philosophers concerning the intensity and remissness of habits. The general positions of these four schools are alluded to in the present Article of *The Virtues in General*. They were as follows: (1) Habits themselves are susceptible of more and less, because they are material qualities: Plotinus and other (neo-) Platonists. (2) Habits are not of themselves susceptible of more and less, but their subjects are so affected, in respect of the degree to which they possess the habits: an opinion alluded to by Aristotle in the *Categories*, c. 6. (3) Some habits, such as the arts, are of themselves susceptible of more and less, and some, such as the virtues, are not: the Stoics. (4) Qualities are immaterial forms, and so are not susceptible of more and less, but material forms are. Having stated the positions maintained by his predecessors, St. Thomas examines the matter himself:

p 165

"In order that the truth of this matter be made manifest, we must observe that that whereby a thing receives its species must be something fixed and stable and, as it were, indivisible: for whatever attains to these conditions are contained under a species, and whatever falls short of them, more or less, pertains to another species, more or less perfect. Hence in VIII *Metaphys*. (S. Thos. lect. 3), the Philosopher says that the species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction varies the species. If, therefore, a form or any other thing, either in respect of itself or in respect of something of itself, takes on the ratio of a species, it follows of necessity that, considered in itself, it must have a determined nature, which can neither further increase nor further diminish. Of this nature are heat and whiteness and other similar qualities, which are not denominated by a relation to something else: and, *a fortiori*, substance, which is being per se.—However, those things which receive their species from something to which they are ordered, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less, and nevertheless remain specifically the same, because of the unity of that to which they are ordered and from which they receive their species. Thus motion is more intense or more remiss in itself, and yet remains specifically the same, on account of the unity of the term, by which it is specified. The same may be observed of health: for a body attains the perfection of health according as its dispositions are agreeable to animal nature, to which diverse conditions can be convenient Hence the body's disposition can vary more or less, and yet the form of health will remain throughout. The Philosopher, therefore, says in X *Ethics*, c. 3, that 'health itself is susceptible of more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one and the same person; but it can decrease to a certain point, and yet remain health.' However, these diverse measures or dispositions of health are spoken of by way of excess and a point exceeded (*excedens et excessum*): wherefore, if the name of health were attributed only to the most perfect measure, then health itself would not be spoken of as greater or less.—Thus it is clear how a quality or form can, in itself, be increased or diminished, and how it cannot.

p 166

"But if we were to consider quality or form according to the participation of their subject, then we should also find that certain qualities and forms are susceptible of more and less, while others are not. Simplicius assigns as the cause of this diversity the fact that substance cannot in itself be susceptible of more or less, because it is being per se. And so every form which is participated substantially by its subject lacks intenseness and remissness: hence in the genus of substance, nothing is predicated according to more or less. Because quantity is close to substance, and because figure likewise follows quantity, therefore, neither in these is anything spoken of as more or less. Hence the Philosopher says, in VII *Physics*, c. 3, that when anything receives form or figure, it is not said to be altered but rather to become (*fieri*).—But other qualities, which are further removed from substance, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more and less, as regards the participation of their subject.

p 166

"However, the reason for this diversity can be even more fully explained. For, as we have said, that from which a thing has its species, must remain fixed, stationary, and indivisible. Therefore, it can happen in two ways that a form is not participated according to more and less. In one way, because the participant has its species according to that form. And thus no substantial form is participated according to more and less; for which reason the Philosopher says, in VIII *Metaphys*. (S. Thos. lect. 3) that: 'just as number cannot be more nor less, so neither can a substance (substantial form) which determines a species,' that is, as regards the participation of a specific form; 'but as regards its matter,' that is, according to material dispositions, more and less is found in substance.—It may happen in another way, from the fact that indivisibility itself is of the ratio of form: hence it must be that, if anything participates this form, it will participate of it according to the nature of indivisibility. Hence it is that the species of numbers are not spoken of according to more and less; because each species thereof is by an indivisible unit. The same may be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two cubits long, three cubits long; of (quantitative) relations, as double and triple; and of figures, as triagonal and tetragonal. Aristotle gives this explanation in the *Predicaments*, c. 6, where assigning the reason why figures are not susceptible of more and less, he says: 'Things which receive the nature of triangle and of circle, are all similarly triagonal or circular;' because indivisibility is of their very ratio, whence whatever participates in their ratio must participate in it indivisibily.

p 167

"Thus it is clear that, since habits and dispositions are predicated according to their relation or order to something, as it says in VII *Physics*, c. 3, intenseness and remissness in habits and dispositions can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves: as we speak of greater or lesser health; or greater or lesser science, which embraces more or fewer truths.—Secondly, according to the participation of a subject: as the same (*aequalis*) science or health is received by one subject more than by another, according to the diverse aptitude resulting either from nature or from habit (custom). For habit and disposition do not give the subject its species: nor again do they include indivisibility in their concepts."—I-II, 52, 1. St. Thomas adds in closing: "We shall say later how this applies to the virtues." Note that in the *Sed Contra* of this article, St. Thomas cites the words spoken by the disciples to Our Lord: "Lord, increase our faith." (Luke 17/5) In q. 66, a. 1 S.c.: "Unless your justice abound more than the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven." (Matt. 5/20); and "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." (Vulg: *virtus*) (Prov. 15/5).

p 167

St. Thomas treats profusely of the increase of the virtue of charity, an important theological question, especially for the spiritual life. Cf. II-II, q. 24, aa. 4-10, *In Ep. ad Hebr*. 10/25. Father Garrigou-Lagrange presents a concise and beautiful exposition of St. Thomas' doctrine in *The Three Ages*, I, c. 7, pp. 129-140.

p 167

(50) St. Thomas' teaching on the increase of virtue may be summed up in the following outline:

A virtue may be increased

(1) Intensively: by a firmer radication in its subject, which it actuates more with respect to its perfection (thus: charity, cf. II-II, 24, 4 ad 3).

(2) Extensively:
(a) intrinsically: the virtue is perfected in itself by attaining the force to extend to new material objects, which it could not attain before (the *intellectual* virtues).
(b) extrinsically: the virtue is extended merely by way of application to a new material object, without being perfected any further in itself (the *moral* virtues.)

Note that extensive increase can be found along with intensive increase in virtue. For the basis of this schema, cf. I-II, 52, 2.

ARTICLE 12

p 168

(51) This is an especially rich and decisive Article. It is concerned in large measure with introducing and emphasizing the pre-eminence of the theological virtues, and in showing the ordination and subordination of all the other virtues to these three.

p 168

Keeping in mind what is laid down at the beginning of the *Prima Pars* concerning the two-fold order of truths knowable about God, it will be seen that the order of naturally known truths is subordinate to the order of those which exceed natural reason. Consequently, God Himself, as the End of the supernatural order, is truly the complete and unique ultimate End of the whole created order; and for this reason, in I-II, 62, 2, St. Thomas tells us that God *as He exceeds our natural knowledge*, is the Ultimate End of all things. It becomes evident from this that the entire universe, including everything in it of the natural and the supernatural order, is a kind of unit, of which God, as the End of the latter order, is the End, absolutely and completely, and thus He is the object of our beatitude, for we have been raised to the supernatural order through grace, by the merits of Christ.

p 168

We believe by Divine faith that we are ordered to supernatural happiness. However, as Cajetan points out, †21 it is then a matter of rational deduction that there must be supernatural principles in us, that we might elicit proportionately supernatural acts towards the attainment of this end. That this capability perdure throughout life, these principles should likewise endure, that is to say, should reside in us as *habits*. Thus the theological virtues regard God as their proper and immediate object, and by them man is duly ordered to his ultimate end, which is supernatural beatitude.

p 168

Theologians, following St. Thomas, remark that God is the *object* of the theological virtues, which are ordered to Him as to their end and object; whereas the other virtues are ordered to God only as their end—they each have their own proper and immediate objects. The virtue of religion is ordered to God as object, in a certain sense, but not *properly* and *immediately*, as Aquinas observes in II-II, 81, 5. Also, acquired faith and hope are excluded as true theological virtues, because they do not duly order man to supernatural beatitude. Hence theological virtue in general may be defined as that which, by its own interior act, immediately attains God as He is supernaturally known formally and explicitly. St. Thomas distinguishes the three theological virtues in several places: I-II, 62, 3, II-II, 17, 6; III *Sent*. d. 23, q. 1, a. 5; d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, qla. 1; In I Cor. c. 13, lect. 2 and 4. The text in I-II is precise and its doctrine complete:

p 168

"The theological virtues direct man to supernatural beatitude in the same way as man is directed to an end connatural to him by a natural inclination. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are the principle of rational operation, both in speculative as well as in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will, which tends naturally to the good of reason.

p 169

"But both of these are defective as regards the order of supernatural beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 2/9: 'The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God had prepared for them that love Him.' Hence in respect of both the above things, man needed to receive in addition something supernatural, to order him to a supernatural end. First, as regards his intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are grasped by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, with which faith is concerned.—Secondly, the will is ordered to this end, both as to the movement of intention, which tends to that end as something attainable, and this pertains to hope; and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is in some way transformed into that end, and this pertains to charity. For the appetite of each thing is moved and tends naturally to an end connatural to it; and this movement arises from a certain conformity of the thing with its end."—I-II, 62, 3.

p 169

(52) Father Carpenter explains why, in the supernatural order, virtue is necessary not only to bring about an habitual orientation of both intellect and will towards God, but even to make contact with God in this order at all possible: "Hence we find a peculiar necessity for certain new virtues, having no counterparts in the natural order of virtue, which will make that contact both possible and constant. They are three: *Faith*, which gives certitude to the intellect about the reality of the supernatural ultimate end, and makes it possible for the intellect to accept, though not to comprehend, ultimate truths which it could not otherwise even make contact with, *Hope*, which gives to the will confidence in the ultimate attainment of a beatitude far above natural needs and capacities; *Charity*, which effects through the will a direct contact of desire and love between man in a state of grace and God, his ultimate end and beatitude, and maintains a constant orientation of the will towards that ultimate end. They are called 'theological' virtues because they bring man into direct contact with God, and further because, unlike the other supernatural virtues, they have no counterparts in the order of natural morality." Carpenter, *op. cit*. pp. 136-137.

p 169

(53) "In all things which act for an end, there must be an inclination to the end, and as it were a beginning of the end (already had—*inchoationem finis*): otherwise they would never (begin to) act for the end.

p 169

"Now the end to which the Divine Bounty has ordered or predestined man, namely, the fruition of Himself, is completely elevated above the faculties of created nature: for 'eye hath not seen, nor ear heard

Himself, is completely elevated above the faculties of created nature, for 'eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him,' as we read in I Cor. 2/9.

p 169

"Hence man does not have, by his natural powers, a sufficient inclination to this end; and so something must be added to man, whereby he might have an inclination to this end, just as by his natural faculties he has an inclination to an end connatural to himself: and these superadded qualities are called *theological* virtues, on three counts.

p 170

"First, as to their *object*; because, since the end to which we are ordered is God himself, the inclination which is required beforehand consists in an operation which is concerned with God Himself.

p 170

"Secondly, as to their *cause*; because, just as this end is ordered to (be attained by) us by God, not through our natural power, so God alone produces in us the inclination to this end, and thus these are called theological virtues, since they are formed in us by God alone.

p 170

"Thirdly, as to the *knowledge* of their nature; for since the end is above our natural knowledge, the inclination to the end cannot be known by natural reason, but only by Divine revelation; and thus they are called theological virtues, because they have been revealed to us by the Divine word. And hence the Philosophers knew nothing about them." In III *Sent*. d. 23; q. 1, a. 4, gla. 3, Sol. 3.

p 170

"Habits are distinguished, not only by their subjects but also by their objects. Therefore, the moral and intellectual virtues are distinguished from each other from the part of their subject, as we have said. But the theological virtues are distinguished from both of these from the part of their object, which is above the natural power of both the intellectual and the moral virtues. Hence, of the theological virtues, one has to do with knowledge, and this is faith, which communicates in this respect with the intellectual virtues; while the others regard the affective part, as does charity, and so it has something in common with the moral virtues."—*Ibid*., ad 4.

p 170

(54) St. Thomas insists frequently on the pre-eminence of the *end* in all moral matters—theological as well as philosophical. Thus: "A due end is the chief consideration in virtue (*Id quod potissimum est in virtute, est debitus finis*): for it is from the end that the notion of the good principally derives. If, therefore, the end were more excellent, even if one should in a given case act quite remissly, his act would still be more virtuous . . . by reason of the greater good aimed at or intended, even though another man might seem more fervent in actual execution."—III C. G. 138.

p 170

"It is apparent that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of the moral virtues.

p 170

"For human happiness is not ordainable to a further end, if it be truly ultimate. But all moral actions are ordered to something else, as is evident from those which are outstanding among them. For acts of fortitude, which are concerned with affairs of war, are ordered to victory and to peace: indeed it would be stupid to go to war merely for its own sake (X *Ethics*, c. 6, 1177 b)! Similarly, acts of justice are ordered to

preserving peace among men, by seeing to it that each man possess his own property in tranquility. And the same is clearly true of all the others. Therefore, the ultimate happiness of man does not consist in moral operations.

p 170

"Further, the moral virtues aim at conserving the mean in interior passions and exterior affairs. But it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of human life: since these passions and external things are themselves ordained to something else. Hence it cannot be that man's final happiness consists in acts of the moral virtues . . ."—*Ibid*., ch. 34.

p 171

Now the ends which are proximate and proper to each of the virtues are all ordered and subordinated to beatitude as to their one, universal, ultimate end: "The proper ends of the virtues are ordained to happiness as to their last end."—I-II, 13, 3, ad 1; and: "Even virtue itself, which consists essentially in noble good (*bonum honestum*) is ordered to something else as its end, namely, to happiness."—II-II, 145, 3. The superiority of the theological virtues is thereby further manifested, because of their close proximity to the end.

p 171

(55) It is important to remember that the division of the virtues is analogous: "When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic concept; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But when an analogous term is divided, which may be applied to several things, but to no one before another, there is nothing to prevent one from ranking before another, even as regards the point of the generic concept. Thus the notion of being is applied to substance more principally, in relation to accident. And such is the division of virtue into the various kinds of virtue: since the good of reason is not found in the same way in all things."—I-II, 61, 1 ad 1. In his *Comment in I Sent*. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1, St. Thomas indicates that the analogy here is *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*, or what is called "analogy of inequality," a most powerful analogy, persistent throughout the whole of created being; although it cannot exist between God and creatures, because there is no such agreement between them *secundum intentionem*: cf. In I *Sent*. d. 23, q. 1, a. 4 c. Nevertheless, the scale of the virtues, explained by St. Thomas in I-II, 61, 5, is based to some extent on a sort of exemplarism which agrees in some part with this type of analogy, although formally and properly it pertains to what is called "analogy of attribution." This point was not fully developed in the doctrine of St. Thomas; but the principles for its solution are contained in Thomistic metaphysics and theology. It is a difficult, technical problem which need not distract the student or beginner.

p 171

(56) The intimate and immediate relation between sanctifying grace and the theological virtues is at once apparent. "So close is it, indeed, that the great Master of the Sentences, Peter the Lombard, would admit no difference between them. It was in view of this that he formulated his famous Augustinian definition of virtue previously referred to, which might almost equally well serve as a definition of grace in that grace implies, fundamentally, a power of supernatural operation as do all initiative habits. This close relation is especially marked in the case of Charity, for grace must almost inevitably be expressed in terms of love. It presupposes God's love for man; it causes a man to be pleasing, i.e., lovable in the sight of God; and it implies an active recognition of the gift by way of a return love. But this quality of lovableness implied in grace must belong primarily and directly to the essence of the soul and only indirectly to the faculties, for one is loved for oneself primarily, not for one's faculties. It is not immediately productive of operation, but is related to operation through the medium of faculties (Cf. Comm. *Sent*. II, 26, 1, 4). At the same time this close alliance of grace and charity indicates the fundamental importance of Charity itself, for if grace

connotes a supernatural ultimate end and can only be expressed in terms of love, it is clear that charity is the essential means of attaining that end which grace makes, so to speak, connatural to man. Therefore all virtues even Faith and Hope somehow depend for their efficacy on Charity." Carpenter, *op. cit.* pp. 137-38 The primacy of charity and its role in the formation and ordering of all the virtues is treated at length in the second Disputed Question of the series on the virtues, entitled *On Charity*. Cf. briefly, I-II, 62, 2 ad 3.

p 172

(57) Note that there are two kinds of infused habits: (1) for all men: sanctifying grace and the virtues; (2) for certain men, according to their state of life, for the edification of others, or for a particular task: the gratuitously given graces, such as prophecy, the gift of tongues, etc. This division is in large part the basis of St. Thomas' division of the II-II.

p 172

(58) The *order* among the theological virtues is discussed in I-II, 62, 4; and stated briefly in III *Sent.* d. 23, q. 2, a. 5: "A thing can be said to precede another thing in time and in nature.—In time all the virtues are simultaneous, because they are divinely infused at the same time;—but in nature, the order of the virtues must be established from their acts, as is the order of the powers of the soul, which are simultaneously concreated with it.

p 172

"Now an act of faith consists in knowledge of the truth, which the love of God, which is demanded in all the other virtues, presupposes. And so *faith*, as regards what is proper to it as such, is prior to all the other virtues according to nature."

p 172

"Just as the end is prior in intention and posterior in being; so, by as much as a thing is closer to the end, it is prior in intention, although it may be posterior in being, whether in time or in nature. And so *hope*, according as it approaches closer to the attainment of the end than faith, precedes faith in intention (*in proposito*), but not in being. And in this respect hope is said to lead to faith, not that which already is, but that which is proposed in the future; as when eternal goods are proposed to someone, first, he wills them; secondly he wills to cling to them through love; thirdly, he wills to hope for them; fourthly, he wills to believe them, so that believing he might already hope, love, and possess. Hence in being faith is prior."—*Ibid.*, ad 4.

p 172

"Although faith presupposes (the act of) will, still, it does not presuppose a will already loving, but intent on loving, and this in so far as it is faith; because the affection cannot be fixed through love on something on which the intellect has not fixed through assent: just as it cannot tend by desire to something which the intellect does not previously apprehend.

p 172

"Hence the natural order of these acts is that God is first apprehended—which pertains to the knowledge preceding faith—then one wills to attain to Him, then one wills to love Him, and so on, as we said above."—*Ibid*, ad 5.

p 172

(59) There are a great number of questions concerning the theological virtues which have not been touched in these notes, chiefly because they are not raised or alluded to in the text of our Disputed Question. However, it is interesting to consider the reasons given by Cajetan that theology is not a theological virtue: "Our theology falls short in two respects of the nature of a theological virtue. First, since theology differs

"Our theology falls short in two respects of the nature of a theological virtue. First, since theology differs from faith in this, that faith perfects the intellect with respect to the act of assent; while theology does so with respect to the act of knowing (*sciendi*), which imports assent and evidence. However, the act of assent is made perfect by faith, whereas the act of science is not made perfect by the science of theology: from which it follows that theology is not a virtue, but faith is: for a virtue should make its work good. Secondly, because of the, difference between them in the fact that the assent of faith terminates immediately in God, whereas the knowledge of theology is terminated in God mediately. For we *believe* God revealing not by believing in another: but, on the other hand, we *know* God by knowing vestiges of Him or Him in His vestiges. And so, although theology and faith agree in object, still they differ in their manner of attaining it, one mediately and the other immediately, according to the nature of each one's act."—In II-II, 17, 5 n. 2.

p 173

(60) Aristotle enumerates, classifies, and describes a host of virtues in his *Nichomachean Ethics*. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that, after considering the end or goal of human life, the Aristotelian critique of the means to attain this end consists almost entirely in an inquiry into the existence, nature, and distinction of virtues. The Philosopher distinguishes virtues according to *object* and *subject*, thus:

A. Concerning operations
(only one virtue) in the will justice
B. Concerning passions
1. fear and daring in the irascible appetite fortitude
2. anger in the irascible appetite meekness
3. pleasures of
touch in the concupiscible appetite temperance
4. honors
(a) fair in the concupiscible appetite modesty
(b) great in the irascible appetite magnanimity
5. wealth
(a) moderate in the concupiscible appetite liberality
(b) great in the irascible appetite magnificence
6. affability in the concupiscible appetite friendship
7. manifestation of
one's thoughts in the concupiscible appetite veracity
8. games in the concupiscible appetite eutropelia

p 173

There are many others for which, Aristotle says, no name has been found (cf. II *Ethics* c. 7). The British scholar, Prof. W. D. Ross, gives a complete tabulation of the moral virtues treated by Aristotle in his survey of the Peripatetic's thought, *Aristotle*, Methuen, London, 1930, p. 203. This table is reproduced in *A History of Philosophy*, Copleston, S. J., Vol. 1, Newman Press, Westminster, Md. 1948, p. 341, note 3.

p 173

(61) Again, the cardinal virtues demand a specific study by themselves; hence Aquinas has devoted an entire question in the *Summa* to them, I-II, q. 61, and considers them as well as III *Sent*. d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, and in a profound and splendidly ordered Disputed Question which bears the title *On the Cardinal Virtues*. We may note here that these virtues are called cardinal, not in respect to the theological, but as regards other human virtues, as St. Thomas indicates in the present Article, ad 24, in the text above.

ARTICLE 13

p 174

(62) An entire question is also dedicated to the mean of virtue, I-II, q. 64, in which there are four articles: (1) Whether moral virtue is in the mean; (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is of things or of reason; (3) Whether the intellectual virtues are in the mean; (4) Whether the theological virtues are in the mean. Aristotle considered the mean in virtue so important that he included it in one of his definitions of virtue: "Virtue, then, is a habit concerned with choice, consisting in a mean (II *Ethics*, c. 6, 1107 a 1), and devoted several chapters of his general account of moral virtue to establish and illustrate this definition. It is difficult, therefore, to see why so many modern authors pass over this point with but scant notice. The principle, if not exclusive, concern in recent studies on the virtues has been with the mean of the virtue of justice, and this subject has suffered not a little from the confused notion and misapplication of true Aristotelico—Thomistic doctrine on the nature and distinction of the virtuous mean.

p 174

(63) Note particularly that the mean of virtue includes in its consideration *all* the circumstances of a human act. "The mean of virtue is preserved by its adequation of all the circumstances together, with reason. Now it happens in some virtues that, all other circumstances being adequated, there can be no extreme in another; because there can be nothing excessive in this other save in comparison with the other circumstances, as is clear in the virtue of truth: for a man cannot tell too much truth (i.e., something which is too true), as long as he says the truth which he should say, and when, where, and to whom he should speak it, and similarly as regards the other circumstances. But excess in this circumstance is taken from excess in others. For one who speaks the truth when he ought not to do so, also says too much of the truth. The same holds true of magnanimity: by reason of the amount; and in chastity, for a man cannot abstain too much, as long as the other circumstances are preserved."—In III *Sent*. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2 Sol. 1 ad 4. This point, complicated perhaps by the involved language of the *Sentences*, is clearly stated in the *Summa*:

p 174

"In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing prevents something from being an extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, by its conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we consider the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, there will be an extreme and a maximum; but if we consider the quantity in respect to other circumstances, then it takes on the character of a mean: since in this regard these virtues tend to a maximum, in accordance with the rule of right reason, i.e., where, when, and for the reason that it ought. There will be excess if one tends to this maximum when, where, or for an end that is not right, and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend to this maximum where and when one should do so. And this is what the Philosopher says, in IV *Ethics*, c. 3: "the magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity; but the mean as regards his mode of action, as he should."—I-II, 64, 1 ad 2.

p 175

(64) There are two types of mean in the intellectual virtues: one in simple apprehension, the other in judgment.

p 175

"Since equality is a mean between more and less, the good of the intellectual virtues must consist in the mean of knowing a thing just as it is. If this mean is missed, by excess or by defect, there will be falsity, which is to the intellectual virtues what vice is to the moral. This concerns the intellect's consideration of a

thing absolutely (i.e., simple apprehension). But in discoursing from one truth to another (judgment and reasoning), the mean consists not only in commensuration with reality, but also in the commensuration of conclusions with principles or of means with the end, in operations."—In III *Sent*., *loc. cit*. Sol. 3.

p 175

Note also the difference between the mean of the speculative and that of the practical intellect. In the former, virtue consists in absolute conformity with reality, and therein lies its mean. Just as virtue in general perfects man for *good*, so intellectual virtue perfects him for the particular good which is *truth*—and this is the good of the intellect. But truth itself is defined as the adequation of the mind with reality, and this conformity regards the object of knowledge absolutely, as it is in itself. Our minds do not create or fashion reality in speculation: They become what they know, simply and completely, according to their own mode of being, of course. However, virtue of the practical intellect consists in conformity to a thing or reality which has been measured by or rectified according to a well-disposed appetite. Truth which is ordered to operation bespeaks a further ordination to a right appetite: for appetite or will, in this case, is the principle of action. The appetite must be "rectified," else the true good—or we might say the *good* truth—will not be chosen. Thus, prudence selects or rather identifies the virtuous mean only when the will is well and virtuously disposed. Such as each man is, so does an end or a good appeal to him!

p 175

(65) The mean can be distinguished according to the essence or according to the effect of virtue. Mean is found on the part of the virtue itself when it is by its very essence a mean between two extreme vices. Virtue lies in the mean of its effect when it stands between excess and defect in its own proper matter. In the present Article, and in the *Summa*, St. Thomas is concerned with the latter kind of mean, which is found in every virtue. The virtue of justice knows no mean of the first type, as we are told in this Article, ad 12, in the text, above.

p 175

As regards the moral virtues, which reside in the *appetitive* part of the soul, the rule or measure, and hence the mean, is present in *reason*. Aristotle perceived a two-fold mean of reason: The first is determined without any regard to the things which constitute its material object as such, but absolutely by reason. The second has regard for the exigencies of things, and so is determined by these as well as by reason. It should be noted that great attention must be paid to the *circumstances* which essentially modify an act, because the act derives its moral color from these as well as from its object. This is true in matters of justice, which demands a *medium rei*, and not merely in the case of the other virtues, as is evident.

p 176

(66) As regards the means of theological virtue, St. Thomas remarks: "In all virtues which have a mean, the latter is taken from the virtue's attaining in its proper matter what is an equal and fitting measure. Hence if there were some virtue which had the measure itself for its matter, there would be for that virtue neither extreme nor mean; rather its good would consist in attaining the measure absolutely: for example, if the matter of a virtue were 'truth.'

p 176

"Now the First Measure of all things is God, as the Philosopher himself lays down in X *Metaphys*. (1053 a 31 ff). Wherefore, the theological virtues, which have God for their object, Who is the ultimate end by which all things are measured, cannot have the ratio of mean. The reason is that in this matter (God) there are no extremes to be found: as also in things which are attached to an evil end, there can be no mean."—In III *Sent*., *loc. cit*. Sol. 4.

p 176

(67) The implications of the virtuous mean in the spiritual life are indicated by Father Garrigou-Lagrange:

p 176

"These moral virtues consist in a happy mean between two extremes, shown by excess on the one hand and deficiency on the other. Thus the virtue of fortitude inclines us to keep a happy mean between fear, which flees danger without a reasonable motive, and temerity, which would lead us into the danger of getting our head broken without sufficient reason. However, this happy mean may be misunderstood. Epicureans and the tepid intend to keep a happy mean not for love of virtue but for convenience' sake in order to flee from the discomfort of the contrary vices. They confuse the happy mean with mediocrity which is found not precisely between two contrary evils, but halfway between good and evil. Mediocrity or tepidity flees the higher good as an extreme to be avoided. It hides its laziness under this principle: 'The best is sometimes the enemy of good;' and it ends by saying: 'The best is often, if not always, the enemy of the good.' It thus ends by confusing the good with the mediocre.

p 176

"The right happy medium of true virtue is not only a mean between two contrary vices: it is also a summit. It rises like a culminating point between these contrary deviations; thus fortitude is superior to fear and temerity; true prudence to imprudence and cunning; magnanimity to pusillanimity and vain and ambitious presumption; liberality to avarice or stinginess and prodigality; true religion to impiety and superstition.

p 176

"Moreover, this happy medium, which is at the same time a summit, tends to rise without deviating to the right or the left in proportion as virtue grows. In this sense the means of the infused virtue is superior to that of the corresponding acquired virtue, for it depends on a higher rule and has in view a more elevated object."—*The Three Ages*, I p. 64-5.

p 176

St. Thomas cites Augustine, who observed that "every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike to it, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence."—*Contra Julian*, IV, 3. Aristotle held the same position when he said that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of its contrary vices than the other; as temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity (II *Ethics*, c. 8). Yet none of the vicious contraries of virtue really stands in the mean defined by reason. Cf. II-II, 21, 3.

Appendix 3 - Bibliography

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8: 7 Art. 10, S.c. 2; Art. 12 S.c.
8:21 Art. 9, obj, 4
12:10 Art. 8, obj. 16

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APPENDIX IV

p 180
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Footnotes

p ix

†1 Much of the material in this section has been adapted from the General Introduction to the *Quaestiones*

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p x

†2 *Handbuch des Katholischen Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1874, p. 433.

p x

†3 P. Synave, following P. Mandonnet, assigns the Disputed Questions *De Veritate* to a period covering the years 1256-1259. *Revue Thomiste*, 1926, p. 156.

p xi

†4 Cf. Mandonnet, *Chronologie des Questions Disputées de S. Thomas* in Revue Thomiste, 1918, p. 266 ff. For additional and slightly divergent details of the origin, nature, and use of the disputation as a pedagogical device in medieval universities, cf. *On Spiritual Creatures*, Fitzpatrick and Wellmuth, Marquette Univ. Press, Milwaukee, 1949, pp. 3-4.

p xi

†5 Cf. Prologue to the *Prima Pars*.

p xii

†6 *Revue Thomiste*, 1893, p. 11.

p xiii

†7 Cited by De Rubeis, Dissert. XI, c. 1 n. 2, *Omnia Opera Leonine Edit. tom. I*, Introd. p. cxxv.

p xv

†8 Chap. 172, translated by Cyril Vollert, S.J. Herder, St. Louis, 1948, pp. 186-87.

p xv

†9 Ibid. p. 187.

p xvi

†10 The *Quodlibeta*, or extraordinary disputations, were held semi-annually, at Christmas and Paschal time. They are distinguished from the *Disputed Questions*, or ordinary disputations, which were held more frequently.

p xvi

†11 The author of the General Introduction to Marietti's edition of the *Quaestiones Disputatae*, p. XV, cites P. Angelus Walz, O.P. as agreeing on these years for all five questions, cf. n. 30; and on p. XVI, in a table proposed as Walz's, this period, from 1269 to 1272 (a typographical error in the Marietti text actually reads: 1282), is listed as the date of composition. An examination of Walz's book, *San Tommaso D'Aquino*, Rome, 1945, p. 207, reveals a somewhat different chronology, thus: *De virtutibus in communi*, 1266-69 (while St. Thomas was in Italy, at the Papal Court and elsewhere); *De virtutibus cardinalibus*, 1269-72; *De caritate*, 1266-69 (Walz gives also Mandonnet's date: 1269-72). *De correctione fraterna*, 1269-72; and *De spe*, 126972. Cf. p. 106, 112, 141, and the Table, Appendix (p. 238).

p xvi

†12 *Le probleme Chronologique des Questions Disputées de S. Thomas d'Aquin, in Revue Thomiste*, 1926, p. 158.

p xvi

†13 *Storia della Teologia cattolica*, transl. by di Fabio, Milano, 1937, p. 108. Cf. also *Die Werke Des Hl. Thomas von Aquin*, Münster, 1949, p. 307, where Dr. Grabmann limits the period to the years 1269-1270.

p xvi

†14 *Chronologie des Questions disputées de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, in *Revue Thomiste*, 1918, p. 16.

p xvi

†15 *Siger dans l'histoire d'Aristotélisme* (Louvain, 1942), II, c. 3, p. 541 ff.

p xix

†16 In *Awake in Heaven*, Gerald Vann, O.P., New York, 1948, ch. 6, pp. 49-50.

p xix

†17 *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

p xix

†18 Cf. Art. 6 ad 1, in the text, below.

p xx

†19 "The proper effect of law is to lead its subject to their proper virtue; and since virtue is 'that which makes its subject good,' it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either absolutely or in some particular respect."—S. Th. I-II, q. 92, a. 1.

p xxiii

†20 *Compendium of Theology*, ch. 227, p. 273.

p xxiii

†21 Proem. in Opusc. VI: *Contra Errores Graecorum* ad Urbanum IV, P.M. Opera omnia, Vivès, Vol. XXIX, p. 345. "Unde ad officium boni translatoris pertinet ut ea quae sunt catholicae fidei transferens, servet sententiam, mutet autem modum loquendi secundum proprietatem linguae in quam transfert . . . quando ea quae in una lingua dicuntur, transferuntur in aliam, ita quod verbum sumatur ex verbo, non est mirum si aliqua dubietas relinquatur."

p xxiv

†22 *De Virtutibus in Communi* will be found in the following editions of St. Thomas' works, one or more of which should be available to the reader:
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4. *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. P. Mandonnet, 5 vols.; Paris: Lethielleux, 1927, Vol. IV.
5. *Quaestiones Disputatae*, 2 vols.; Marietti, Turin, 1949, Vol. 2, pp. 707-751.

p xxvi

†23 *The Supernatural Virtues*, by Rev. Hilary Carpenter, O.P., ch. VII in *Moral Principles and Practice*, ed. by Rev, G. J. MacGillivray, Sheed & Ward, London, 1933, pp. 127-28.

p 1
†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 55, a. 1; II *Sent.* D. 27, a. 1; 2 *Ethics*, lect. 5.

p 1
†2 I, 9 (*PL* 32, 598); cf. *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 19.

p 1
†3 II, 18 and 19 (*PL* 32, 1267).

p 1
†4 St. Thomas calls Aristotle "the Philosopher".

p 1
†5 I, II (281 a 15).

p 1
†6 The much-used term *potentia* may mean either power, as in this case, or potency, as in the next phrase.

p 2
†7 VII, 3 (246 b 2).

p 2
†8 C. 15 (*PL* 32, 1322).

p 2
†9 XV, 22 (*PL* 41, 640).

p 2
†10 That is, a brute animal, or the sensitive powers.

p 2
†11 *Mens* is used both for mind and soul. Cf. Art. 2, note 4, below.

p 3
†12 Both election, i.e. choice, and volition are acts elicited directly by the will, and so are immediately and essentially subject to this faculty. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 13, a. 1, and q. 9, a. 1.

p 3
†13 Cf. Art. 13, obj. 15, below.

p 3
†14 *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 19 (*PL* 32, 1268).

p 3
†15 II, 6 (1107 a 1).

p 3

†16 The Latin *vis* and *virtus* mean power or strength, also force.

p 3

†17 *Loc. cit.*

p 3

†18 I, 3 (286 a 8).

p 4

†19 II, 6 (1106 a 15).

p 4

†20 VII, 3 (246 b 2) Here a thing is called perfect which is well disposed and completely ready for action or operation. The latter is its end, and is said to be what is best in it. Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 5.

p 4

†21 In a general sense, the Latin *virtus* means strength, force, ability. Cf. note 16 above.

p 4

†22 III, 5 (1139 a 20).

p 5

†23 The root of freedom is reason. "For as much as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free will"—*S. Th.* I, q. 83 a. 1.

p 5

†24 III, Comm. 18. St. Thomas refers to the Arabian philosopher, Averroes, as "the Commentator," because of his renowned commentaries on Aristotle.

p 5

†25 C. 21 (*PL* 40, 390).

p 5

†26 The reference to Bk. V, ch. 3 is wrong. This statement does not appear anywhere in any edition of the *Ethics* consulted for this translation.

p 6

†27 II, 3 (1104 b 4).

p 6

†28 I, 8 (1098 b 30 and 1099 a 24).

p 7

†29 The rational powers as such are objectively indetermined, i.e. free, as was pointed out in the Body of the Article, above.

p 7

†30 *Motus* should be translated here as change; although the word movement may better suggest the idea of transition from one term to another.

p 7

†31 Heat itself is an accidental form.

p 9

†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 55 a. 4; II *Sent.* D 27, a. 2.

p 9

†2 *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 19 (*PL* 32, 1268).

p 10

†3 V *Metaphys.* 6. Cf. *S. Th.* I, q. 84, a. 3; C.G. II, 42; *De Substantiis Separatis.*

p 10

†4 St. Thomas takes *mens* in the definition to mean mind, more precisely than soul. Cf. the next objection and resp.; also *S. Th.* I, q. 79, aa. 8 and 9.

p 10

†5 XII *De Trinitate*, 3 (*PL* 42, 1000). Cf. *S. Th.* I, q. 79, a. 9.

p 10

†6 I *De Spiritu et Anima* (*PL* 40, 779-832). The author of this work is not St. Augustine but a Cistercian, Alcher of Clairvaux. Cf. Bibliography, p. 177.

p 11

†7 II, 18 (*PL* 32, 1257). Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 57, a. 3 obj. 1.

p 11

†8 This is the work of virtue.

p 11

†9 *Tract LXXII in Ioan.* (PL 35, 1823).

p 12

†10 VI, 3 (1139 b 18).

p 12

†11 I.e. the intellective or rational part. Cf. Art. 6 and 7 below.

p 12

†12 This phrase is explained in the replies to objections 18, 19, and 20, below.

p 13

†13 Add: are acts of hot and cold agents, respectively.

p 13

†14 In all the editions of the Disputed Question *The Virtues in General* published since the year 1503, after the reply to the 8th obj. of Art. 2, this notation is inscribed: "The following is an addition made by Father Vincent de Castronovo, O.P., venerable professor of Sacred Theology." The remaining responses, 9th to 21st, are the work of this theologian. The interpolation concludes with the statement: "End of the addition of Vincent of Castronovo."

p 13

Father Aloysius Galea wrote a brief monograph on this addition in *Divus Thomas*, Piacenza, Vol. II, Jan. 1884, pp. 173-178. Father Galea noted that De Rubeis, in his *De Gestis et scriptis ac doctrina sancti Thomae Aquinatis dissertationes criticae et apologeticae* (Leonine ed. Omnia opera, tom. 1), makes no specific mention of this particular addition. In Dissert. 1, cap. 3, on the Disputed Questions, De Rubeis informs us that the Venice edition of the Disputed Questions, which first appeared in 1503, as revised and edited by Father Vincent Bandelli de Castronovo, who had been elected Master General of the Dominicans two years earlier. In a previous edition of these questions, that of Martin Flach at Argentin, in 1500, after the 8th resp. this statement was printed, as part of the text: "The solutions to the other objections are evident from what has been said." The addition, then, is certainly the work of a hand other than that of St. Thomas'. The addition is thence included in the Acchi edition of St. Thomas' works, Venice, 1781, tom. XV and, much earlier, in that of Rovilli at Lyons, 1595. All subsequent editions of the Disputed Questions have the addition.

p 13

In his monograph Father Galea observes that the author of the addition drew his matter from several of the works of St. Thomas. Among these were the *Summa Theologiae*, I Pars and I-IIae, the commentary on II *Sentences*, *De Veritate*, and other articles in the same Disputed Question, *The Virtues in General*. Some of the objections are transferred verbatim from passages of these works to the present article. On the other hand, as Fr. Galea remarked, Vincent de Castronovo's style is somewhat different from St. Thomas'. The same words are often needlessly repeated, a practice which the Angelic Doctor scrupulously avoided. Further, Bandelli's responses are uniformly more prolix and evolved than those of St. Thomas. However, it is most important to note that the doctrine contained in the addition is authentically Thomistic. The entire article by Fr. Galea, in *Divus Thomas*, can be profitably consulted.

p 15

†15 VII, 3 (246 b 2).

p 15

†16 III, 14 (*PL* 32, 1291). Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 71, a. 1.

p 16

†17 I.e. moral good is not a type of virtue, since the former is more generic and includes the latter.

p 16

†18 Cf. Art. 6 and 7, below.

p 16

†19 The reference is to the theological virtues.

p 16

†20 Cf. Art. 4 to 7 below. Vincent de Castronovo has obviously included much in these responses which

pertain strictly to succeeding articles.

p 17

†21 The human intellect and will are not the first principles absolutely: God alone is the First Unmoved Mover. St. Thomas means that these superior faculties are the first of man's powers in the process of engendering acts which are truly human. Cf. *S. Th.* I, 83 1 ad 3.

p 17

†22 Cf. Art. 4, below.

p 17

†23 This must be understood strictly of the virtues, even of the theological virtues, and not of grace. Divine grace truly resides in the very essence of the soul. Cf. ad 21 below, and *S. Th.* I-II, q. 110, a. 4.

p 17

†24 Cf. *S. Th.* I, q. 79, a. 6, S. c.

p 18

†25 II, 4 (415 b 14). For further explanation of this two-fold signification of life, cf. *In Metaphys.* I lect. 1, and *In De Anima*, I, lect. 14.

p 18

†26 I, 1 (980 b 26).

p 18

†27 Cf. ad 11 and note 18, above.

p 19

†28 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 61, art. 2 and 3, and Art. 9 and 10, below.

p 19

†29 The importance and strikingness of this response, as well as of the next response, are evident.

p 20

†30 Nothing could be clearer or simpler than this statement of the absolute priority and infallible, intrinsic efficacy of Divine grace. The author, Vincent de Castronovo, has faithfully reproduced the authentic doctrine of his Master, Thomas Aquinas, and this a full century before the innovations, denials, and purported discoveries of the then-current new Theology.

p 20

†31 St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure also cite St. John Chrysostom in this statement. The reference is to the *Homil.* 24 *in Epist. ad Ephes*, which is in *PG* 62. However, this statement occurs nowhere in this Homily, certainly, at least, not in these words. The thought expressed may be drawn from a number of the passages in Chrysostom's works. Cf. Galea, art. cit. above, note 11, p. 175, note (1).

p 21

†32 The Divine nature is the very essence of God; men and angels share in it only by participation.

p 22
†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 56, a. 1; III *Sent.* D 33, q. 2, a. 4; q. 1, a. 1.

p 22
†2 *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 19 (*PL* 32, 1268).

p 22
†3 I.e. the nature of man.

p 22
†4 I.e. which operates through the virtues.

p 22
†5 Art. 4-7, below.

p 23
†6 I, 22 (83 a 36).

p 23
†7 I, 13 (1103 a 4).

p 23
†8 The *diaphane* is a term designating a transparent body, through which rays of light can be transmitted. Cf. *S. Th.*, I, q. 79, a. 3 ad 2, where, following Averroes, St. Thomas compares the agent intellect to this sort of *medium*.

p 24
†9 As distinct from natural forces (*virtutes*), such as heat, cold, hardness, heaviness, etc.

p 24
†10 E.g. lust, gluttony, sloth.

p 24
†11 Cf. Art. 1, above.

p 25
†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 56, a. 4 and a. 5 ad 1; III *Sent.*, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 4, q. 1a 2; *De Verit.* q. 24, a. 4, ad 9; Art. 10 ad 5, below.

p 25
†2 VI, 2 (1139 a 23); also VIII, 13 (1163 a 23).

p 25
†3 *De Quantitate Animae*, c. 5 (*PL* 32, 1040).

p 26
†4 I, 4 (187 b 25).

p 26

†5 *Rational* is the specific difference in the definition of man, determining; the genus, *animal*.

p 27

†6 *Loc. cit.*

p 27

†7 II, 6 (1139 a 2).

p 27

†8 The *Glossa ordinaria*, which here cites the words of St. Augustine, commenting on v. 7: "I had not known concupiscence."

p 27

†9 In virtue of the axiom: "Contraries are found in the same genus, from which they mutually exclude each other.— Cf. Art. 1, obj. 5, above.

p 27

†10 III, *Ethics 9* (1117 b 22).

p 27

†11 III, 9 (432 b 7).

p 28

†12 At least the moral virtues. Cf. Art. 13, below.

p 28

†13 *Loc. cit.*

p 29

†14 I, 3 (1253 b 19).

p 30

†15 An example may be drawn, by analogy, from instrumental causality: If the saw is bent, dull, and rusted, it will not cut well, no matter how skilled the carpenter may be.

p 31

†16 Cf. note 2, above; also: *S. Th.* I-II, q. 56, a. 4 ad 4.

p 31

†17 Cf. Art. 8, below and Art. 2 ad 12, above.

p 31

†18 *Imperium* is an act of reason: cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 17, a. 1.

p 32

†19 Cf. *S. Th.* III, q. 13, a. 3, Sed c.

†19 Cf. *S. Th.* III, q. 19, a. 3, sed. c.

p 32

†20 Either in a state of pure nature, without original justice, or after original sin. Cf. *S. Th.* I, q. 95, a. 2 ad 1; I-II, q. 82, a. 3.

p 33

†21 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 25, a. 1.

p 33

†22 I, 5 (1254 b 4).

p 33

†23 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 22, a. 2; q. 72, a. 2, ad 1.

p 34

†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 56, a. 6; III *Sent.* D. 23, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1a 1; D. 27, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5; *De Verit.* q. 24, a. 4 and 9.

p 34

†2 III, 5 (1114 b 1).

p 35

†3 VIII, 5 (1157 b 29).

p 35

†4 This love is called intellectual or rational love, in the natural order; in the supernatural order it is charity. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 26, a. 1; II-II, q. 24, a. 1.

p 35

†5 *Retractations*, I, 9 (*PL* 32, 596).

p 35

†6 IV, 3 (*PL* 44, 743).

p 36

†7 C. 13 (1103 a 5).

p 36

†8 The will can command these acts.

p 36

†9 Cf. Art. 1 and 2, above.

p 37

†10 V, 1 (1130 a 4). Cf. Plato's *Republic*, 343 c. This is Plato's definition.

p 37

†11 VII, 6 (248 a 7).

p 38

†12 C. 19 (100 a 10).

p 39

†13 X, 4 (1174 b 32). For further treatment of St. Thomas' doctrine on these points, cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 3, a. 4, 5, and 8; q. 4, a. 1 and 4; q. 5, a. 7, etc.

p 39

†14 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 74, a. 2.

p 40

†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 56, a. 3.

p 40

†2 II *Ethics*, 2 (1103 b 27).

p 40

†3 *De Inventione Rhetorica*, II, 53.

p 40

†4 II, 1 (193 a 32).

p 41

†5 II *Ethics*, 6 (1106 b 32).

p 41

†6 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 57, a. 2.

p 41

†7 *Virtutes* here signifies forces, virtues, strength, perfections ordered to operation. Cf. Art. 1, note 16, above.

p 43

†8 II, 6 (1107 a 1).

p 43

†9 XXII, 1 (*PL* 76, 212). Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 58, a. 4 S.c.; q. 61, a. 4, obj. 1, etc. St. Thomas uses this statement many times in his tract on the virtues in the *Summa Theologiae*.

p 43

†10 This is the science of morals or Ethics. For the difference between the science of Ethics and the virtue of prudence, cf. also St. Thomas *In Ethics*, VI, lect. 4.

p 43

†11 Thus, a man can be taught the science of Ethics by another man.

p 44
†12 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 76.

p 44
†13 *Ibid*, q. 76, a. 4.

p 44
†14 VI, 13 (1144 b 10).

p 44
†15 Cf. S. *Th. I*, q. 82, a. 4 ad 1.

p 44
†16 II, 6.

p 45
†17 (1140 b 20 and 1141 b 23).

p 46
†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 56, a. 3; III *Sent.* D. 23, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1a 1.

p 46
†2 This is one of Aristotle's definitions of virtue. Cf. Art. 1, above.

p 46
†3 III, 7 (431 b 10).

p 46
†4 II, 6 (1106 a 6).

p 46
†5 Cf. IV *Topics*, c. 2 (121 b 26); *S. Th.* I-II, q. 57, a. 1 obj. 3.

p 46
†6 I, 2 (982 a 15). Cf. *S. Th.* loc. cit. obj. 2.

p 47
†7 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 4, a. 2.

p 47
†8 Cf. Art. 5, above.

p 47
†9 *Loc. cit.*

p 48

†10 Cf. Art. 6 ad 5, above.

p 48

†11 *Tract XXVI in Ioan*. (*PL* 35, 1607). Cf. *S. Th*. II-II, q. 1, a. 6 obj. 3; q. 2, a. 1; q. 4, a. 2, obj. 1.

p 49

†12 That prudence is the most excellent of the cardinal virtues, cf. *S. Th*. I-II, q. 61, a. 2, obj. 1 and ad 1. That faith is nobler than any of the intellectual virtues is evident, since faith is a theological virtue. Cf. q. 62, a. 1.

p 50

†13 Prudence is concerned with what must be done (*agibilia*); art is concerned with what must be made (*factibila*). These are the two virtues of the practical intellect.

p 50

†14 Cf. S. *Th*. *I*, q. 79, a. 11.

p 50

†15 Cf. S. *Th*. *I*, q. 5, a. 4 ad 3: q. 48, a. 6; I-II, q. 56, a. 3; II-II, q. 122, a. 2.

p 50

†16 Cf. S. *Th*. *I*-II, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2 and ad 3.

p 50

†17 Cf. S. *Th*. *I*-II, q. 3, a. 5.

p 51

†18 VI, 5 (1140 b 24).

p 52

†1 Cf. *S. Th*. I-II, q. 63, a. 1; I *Sent*. D. 17, q. 2, a. 1; II D 39, q. 2, a. 1; III D 33, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1a 1; *De Verit*. q. 1, a. 1; II *Ethic*. II 1.

p 52

†2 III, 14 (*PL* 94, 1046). Cf. *S. Th*. I-II, q. 63, a. 1 obj. 1.

p 52

†3 Cf. Anthony's Discourse to his Monks, in St. Athanasius' *Life of St. Anthony*.

p 52

†4 *De Inventione Rhetorica*, II, 53.

p 52

†5 II, 6 (*PL* 32, 1248).

p 53

†6 *Loc. cit*.

p 53

†7 I.e. according to its inception or in an inchoative state, as is claimed in obj. 6, above.

p 53

†8 Cf. Art. 6, above.

p 53

†9 *De Inventione Rhetorica*, II, 53. St. Thomas often quotes this definition; cf. e.g. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 58, a. 1, obj. 3.

p 53

†10 Cf. St. Augustine, *De Natura Boni*, c. 4; also *S. Th.* I-II, q. 63, a. 2; q. 85, a. 4.

p 54

†11 Cf *S. Th.* I, q. 5, a. 5.

p 54

†12 Cf. S. Jerome, *Comment. in Galat.* 1:15-16. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 63, a. 3, obj. 3.

p 54

†13 III, 11 (434 a 14). Cf. I *Ethics*, c. 13 (1102 b 22); *S. Th.* I-II, q. 95, a. 5.

p 54

†14 According to Aristotelian astronomical physics, the higher heavenly bodies move the lower.

p 54

†15 St. Thomas teaches that the higher spheres are moved locally by angels. Cf. *S. Th.* I, q. 110, a. 3.

p 55

†16 II, 1 (1103 a 24).

p 55

†17 VI, 13 (1144 b 5).

p 55

†18 C. 4 (PG 3, 726). Cf. S. Thomas, *Comment.*, 1. 9; *S. Th.* I-II, q. 63, a. 1 S. c.

p 56

†19 Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 4. St. Thomas discusses this opinion in lect. 9 of his Commentary; also *S. Th.* I, q. 45, a. 8; q. 65, a. 4; I-II, q. 63, a. 1.

p 56

†20 *Meno*, c. 15 ff. In I *Metaphys.* c. 9. Aristotle criticizes the Platonic doctrine of the separate existence of forms. Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 14-17.

p 56

†21 *De Anima*, V, 5. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 63, a. 1

†21 *De Anima*, V, 3. Cf. S. *Th*. I-II, q. 63, a. 1.

p 56

†22 II, 3 (736 b 15). Aristotle is speaking of the three types of soul, vegetative, sensitive, and rational, all of which, he says, pre-exist potentially in matter.

p 56

†23 *Loc. cit.*

p 56

†24 Avicenna, Averroes, and their followers. Cf. *De Unitate Intellectus*, c. 5.

p 56

†25 This is the teaching of Aristotle, in II *Ethics*, c. 1. Cf. S. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 1.

p 57

†26 The Latin here is: *sicut circa formas naturales nihil derogat virtus naturalium agentium*; which is rather difficult to translate. The meaning is clear from the comparison with science and virtue.

p 57

†27 Art. 4-7.

p 57

†28 Cf. *S. Th*. I, q. 78, a. 2.

p 57

†29 *Ibid*. art. 3.

p 57

†30 Cf. *S. Th*. I-II, q. 4, a. 2.

p 58

†31 This is a fundamental principle of Aristotelian-Thomistic Ethics, and is used throughout the *Ethics* of Aristotle and the moral part of the *Summa Theologiae*. Cf. VII *Ethics*, c. 8.

p 58

†32 St. Thomas, following Aristotle, teaches that the heavenly bodies exercise a certain causality on bodies here below. Cf. *S. Th*. I, q. 115, a. 3.

p 58

†33 Cf. Art. 6, note 8, above.

p 59

†34 II, 8: here Aristotle clearly distinguishes reason and nature as each acts for an end.

p 59

†35 Cf. Art. 1, above.

p 60

†36 The Angels.

p 60

†37 In brutes, of course, these are not acts of true virtues, such as exist in rational creatures; but are said to be "virtues" by metaphorical analogy.

p 60

†38 II, 6 (1107 a 1). Cf. Art 13, below.

p 61

†39 *Loc. cit.*

p 61

†40 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 82, a. 1.

p 62

†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 51, a. 2; q. 63, a. 2; II *Sent.* D. 44, q. 1, a. 1 ad 6; III D. 33, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1a 2; II Ethics lect. 1.

p 62

†2 IV, c. 3 (*PL* 44, 793). Cf. Art. 2, above.

p 62

†3 Glossa Ordin. gives no name; the statement is taken from the *Sententiae* of Prosper of Acquitaine, sent. 106. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 63, a. 2, obj. 1.

p 62

†4 VII, 1 (1145 a 35). Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 58, a. 3 ad 2.

p 63

†5 Following St. Paul, St. Augustine says this many times. St. Thomas makes use of the statement throughout the first question in the tract on grace in the *Summa Theologiae*. The citations in this question are drawn from several of the works of St. Augustine, e.g. *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, c. 21; *De Natura et Gratia*, c. 26; *De Perseverantia*, c. 2. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 109 'passim.'

p 63

†6 I, 9 (1099 b 15).

p 63

†7 II, 18 (*PL* 32, 1267). Cf. Art. 2, obj. 17, above.

p 63

†8 II, 7 (*PL* 32, 1265).

p 64

†9 This statement does not appear explicitly in the *Ethics*, but cf. I, 6 (1099 a 20).

p 64
†10 I, II (281 a 15). Cf. Art. 1, note 6, above.

p 64
†11 II, 6 (1106 a 15).

p 65
†12 VII, 3 (245 b 24).

p 65
†13 Cf. obj. 1, above.

p 65
†14 VI, 13 (1145 a 5).

p 65
†15 III, 5 (1114 a 35).

p 65
†16 C. 4 (PG 3, 718-19).

p 65
†17 Cf. note 9, above.

p 66
†18 III, 11 (1276 b 34). Cf. *Ethics*, V, 2 (1130 b 28).

p 67
†19 Cf. Art. 1, above; also *S. Th.* I-II, q. 51, a. 1 and 2.

p 68
†20 The substantial or essential form in each supposit is one.

p 68
†21 Cf. *Ethics*, II, 1 (1103 a 22).

p 68
†22 The reference is to beings which enjoy free will, or are "objectively indeterminate." Cf. Art. 1, note 29, above.

p 68
†23 Cf. S. Thomas, *In III Ethic.* lect. 15; also Aristotle, *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, c. 2 (452 a 30), and St. Thomas' Comment., lect. 6.

p 68
†24 I.e. the rational appetite or will, not the sensitive appetites.

p 69
†25 II, 6 (1107 b 1).

p 69
†26 IX, 8 (1050 b 1).

p 69
†27 VIII, 4 (254 b 30-33, cf. 255 a 14 and 257 b ff). Cf. *S. Th.* I, q. 2, a. 3; I-II, q. 51, a. 2 ad 2.

p 70
†28 Cf. Art. 1, above.

p 71
†29 And not from reason enlightened by faith and supernatural virtues.

p 71
†30 Vulgate: *virtus*=strength.

p 72
†31 E.g. to virtues of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, such as temperance, fortitude, and their parts.

p 72
†32 St. Thomas is speaking of a man's accidental qualities, his temperament and characteristic traits and tendencies.

p 73
†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 51, a. 4; q. 63, a. 3; III *Sent.* D 33, q. 1, a. 2; q. 1a. 3.

p 73
†2 VII, 3 (246 a 14).

p 73
†3 Cf. St. Thomas, *In de Anima*, II, lect. 12.

p 73
†4 This is St. Thomas' phrase for supernatural beatitude.

p 74
†5 I.e. they have the same object or *materia circa quam*.

p 75
†6 The example St. Thomas uses is that of a vice, which, nonetheless, is a moral habit, viz., a bad one.

p 75
†7 This virtue is charity. Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 23, a. 4 ad 1; a. 6.

p 75
†8 VI, 6 (*PL* 44, 743). Cf. Art. 9 obj. 1, above.

p 75
†9 III, 10 (1118 a 25): Aristotle mentions only temperance explicitly.

p 75
†10 Contraries agree in subject, in genus, and in power. Cf. St. Thomas, *In Metaphys*. V, lect. 12.

p 76
†11 III, 1 (201 a 8). Cf. *Metaphys*. X, 1 (1045 b 34).

p 76
†12 VII, 9 (1152 a 2).

p 76
†13 II, 3 (1104 b 5). Cf. Art. 1, above.

p 76
†14 I.e.: of a vice opposed to an acquired virtue.

p 76
†15 II, 1 (1103 b 8).

p 77
†16 Cf. Art. 9, above.

p 77
†17 II, 1, 2 and 4 (1103 a 16, 1103 b 21; 1103 b 30; 1105 a 18). Aristotle insists that the habits are *known* from their acts, while the latter are determined in nature by the habits from which they spring.

p 77
†18 *Ethics*, II, 6 (1106 a 15).

p 78
†19 The notion here is not of opposition but of diversity.

p 78
†20 III, 11 (1276 b 34). Cf. Art. 9, note 18, above.

p 78
†21 These are the intellectual and volitional faculties and their acts. Cf. S. Thomas *In De Anima*, III, lect. 7.

p 79
†22 Grace and the theological virtues.

p 79

†23 These other infused virtues are the infused moral virtues and all their parts.

p 80

†24 This aptitude is called the "obediential potency."

p 81

†25 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 91, a. 4 and ad 1.

p 81

†26 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 63 a. 4 ad 2.

p 81

†27 Cf. *Ethics*, III, 3 (1112 b 15-20).

p 82

†28 Cf. Art. 2 ad 12 and Art. 4, above.

p 83

†29 Cf. Art. 4 ad 7 and 8, above.

p 83

†30 As opposed to supernatural.

p 83

†31 III, 9 (1119 a 32). Cf. II, 3 (1104 68) and S. Thomas *In Ethics* III, lect. 21.

p 84

†32 Cf. Art. 2 ad 18, above.

p 84

†33 I.e. acts taken singly.

p 84

†34 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 51, a. 4 ad 3.

p 85

†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 52, a. 1; q. 66, a. 1; q. 92, a. 1 ad 1; II-II, q. 24, a. 4.

p 85

†2 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 88, a. 4 and a. 5 and S.c.

p 85

†3 II, 4 (415 a 30).

p 86

†4 I, 5 (320 b 30).

p 86

†5 *Movetur* is taken here in the strictest sense of motion as it pertains to mobile beings, and more precisely, to the material or corporeal element in them as such. St. Thomas says, *In De Anima*, I, lect. 11, that only quantified beings are moved or changed.

p 86

†6 Here again, as in Art. 6 and 7 above, science and virtue are distinguished under certain aspects, although science is itself numbered among the intellectual virtues. Cf. Art. 7 ad 3 and ad 5 above.

p 86

†7 Virtue is a habit, the first species of quality. Cf. Art. 1, above.

p 86

†8 *Physics* VII, 3 (245 b 2-4). Cf. Art. 9, obj. 20, above.

p 87

†9 Cf. Art. 1 obj. 3, above.

p 87

†10 VII, 3 (246 b 2). Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, a. 52, a. 1 obj. 2.

p 88

†11 The reference to tract V is wrong. Cf. *Tract LXXIV* (*PL* 35, 1827) and *S. Th.* II-II, q. 24, a. 4 s.c.

p 88

†12 Cf. Art. 8, above.

p 88

†13 Plotinus and other neo-Platonists taught that qualities and habits are material beings, and that they pre-exist latently, although actually, in matter. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 52, a. 1.

p 88

†14 This statement contains the basis for the thesis maintained in the present Article. St. Thomas at the very outset locates the 'increase' of virtue in the subject—in its hold on the form—rather than in the form of virtue itself.

p 89

†15 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 24, a. 5.

p 89

†16 VII, 3. Cf. St. Thomas Comment. lect. 5 and 6.

p 89

†17 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 24, a. 4 ad 3.

p 89

†18 Cf. S. Thomas' *Comment.*, q. 2, a. 1; also a. 2-4.

p 90

†19 I, 1 (16 a 3). St. Thomas usually refers to this work of Aristotle's by its Greek name, *Perihermeneias*.

p 90

†20 *Motus*: cf. Art. 1, note 30, above.

p 90

†21 X, 1 (1052 a 27). Cf. S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 1, also *Physics*, VIII, 7 (260 a 27).

p 90

†22 VI *De Trinitate*, c. 8, quoted in *S. Th.* I-II, q. 52, a. 1.

p 91

†23 Cf. S. Thomas *In Metaphys.* IX, lect. 3.

p 91

†24 *Ibid.*

p 91

†25 VIII, 3 (1044 a 10). Cf. S. Thomas' Comment. *loc. cit.*

p 91

†26 "Substantially" here means "essentially."

p 91

†27 In *S. Th.* I-II, q. 66, a. 1, S. Thomas says: "The nature (*ratio*) of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean." Cf. Art. 13, c. and ad 13, ad 16, ad 17, and ad 18, below.

p 92

†28 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 24, a. 6 ad 3.

p 92

†29 This is substantial change.

p 93

†30 Recall what was said in note 14, above.

p 93

†31 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 24, a. 10 (St. Ambrose is not cited in this article).

p 93

†32 Cf. *S. Th. ibid.*, a. 5.

p 93

†33 VIII, 5 (256 b 20). Cf. I Sent. D 8, q. 3, a. 1 S. c. and ad 3.

p 94

†34 Three uses of quantity in an accidental or transferred sense are given and illustrated: dimensive quantity: lifting a heavy object; quantity of "perfection:" performing a task of considerable "size" or which demands a good deal of ability; and discrete quantity: performing a large number of tasks.

p 94

†35 Cf. *Physics* VII, 3; also *S. Th.* I-II, q. 52. a. 1, and q. 66, a. 1.

p 94

†36 II, 5 (417 b 8). Cf. S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 11.

p 95

†37 This is St. Thomas' teaching on the increase of charity in remiss acts. Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 24, a. 6. The question has been widely disputed, but St. Thomas' doctrine is clear and certain. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 52, a. 3; q. 114, a. 8, ad 3; I *Sent.* D17, q. 2, a. 3; II, D27, a. 5 ad 2. For a presentation of the authentic Thomistic position, cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *The Three Ages of the Interior Life* (St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1949), Vol. 1, pp. 133-138.

p 95

†38 Cf. Art. 1 ad 3, above.

p 95

†39 VII, 3 (246 b 2).

p 95

†40 II, 6 (1106 b 28). Cf. Art. 13 c. and ad 9, 16, 17, and 18, below.

p 95

†41 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 24, a. 7.

p 95

†42 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 52, a. 1 ad 2.

p 96

†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 62, a. 2; III *Sent.* D 23, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1a 3, ad 4; *De Verit.* q. 14, a. 3, ad 9.

p 96

†2 The subject of accident is called *materia in qua*—matter in which. Cf. *S. Th.* I, q. 29, a. 1, and q. 39, a. 3.

p 97

†3 *De Inventione Rhetorica*, 1. II, c. 53, cf. Art. 6, obj. 4, above.

p 97

†4 Cf. St. Thomas *In Ethic.* I, lect. 12.

p 97

†5 Cf. S. Th. I, q. 93, a. 2.

p 97

†6 C. 15 (*PL* 32, 1322).

p 97

†7 St. Thomas never uses this word in the tract on Hope in the *Summa Theologiae*. He does use the word *largitas* in III *Sent*. D 26, q. 2, a. 1 ad 4; which may be rendered "largesse" or "bounty".

p 98

†8 II, 6 (1107 a 1).

p 98

†9 VI, 5 (1140 b 20).

p 98

†10 Which is in the intellective part. Cf. *S. Th*. I-II, q. 57, a. 3.

p 99

†11 Which is also in the intellective part. *Ibid*. a. 4.

p 99

†12 Cf. *Rhetorica*, II 4 (1382 a 4).

p 99

†13 Cf. Art. 6 ad 1 and note 11, above.

p 99

†14 St. Thomas, following Aristotle, teaches that matter (designated by certain quantity) is the principle of individuation in beings which include matter in their constitution. This doctrine is extended to apply to all beings (except, of course, God), so that the material element in a thing is what distinguishes it numerically from all other things. In the case of the virtues, the "matter" is the material object of the virtues. Cf. *S. Th*. I-II, q. 57, a. 2,

p 100

†15 Cf. Art. 13, below; also *S. Th*. I-II, q. 64, a. 1.

p 100

†16 VI, 4 (*PL* 42, 927).

p 100

†17 In Art. 7, at the end of the Response or Body, St. Thomas noted that, although the moral virtues are more properly given the name of virtue, still, they are not nobler or more perfect habits. This objection is raised in *S. Th*. I-II, q. 61, a. 1, obj. 3: "That which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3). Therefore, the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues."

p 100

†18 Cf. *Ethics* IV, 3 (1123 b 30); *S. Th.* I-II, q. 61, a. 3 obj. 1.

p 101

†19 II, 53 and 54.

p 101

†20 Cf. Art. 7, beginning of Response, above; also Art. 1 and especially 2, above. The rest of the doctrine in this Article (12) contains the basis and foundation of St. Thomas' treatment of the nature of virtue.

p 101

†21 II, 6 (1106 a 15).

p 102

†22 Cf. Art. 4, above.

p 102

†23 Cf. Art. 7, above.

p 102

†24 I, 13 (1103 a 5).

p 102

†25 In Books VII and VIII Aristotle shows how the contemplative life, represented by the intellectual virtues (especially wisdom), is superior to the active life, in which the moral virtues are especially exercised. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 68, a. 7 and 8; II-II, q. 23, a. 6 ad 1; also, note 17, above

p 103

†26 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 57, a. 4.

p 103

†27 VI, 3 (1139 b 17).

p 104

†28 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 62, a. 1 and 2.

p 104

†29 Cf. S. Thomas' *In Ethic.* IV, lect. 2 and 8.

p 104

†30 Cf. Art. 2 c. and ad 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, above.

p 105

†31 II, 5 (1105 b 25). The point here is that a power is indifferent in itself to good or bad objects or acts; whereas a habit is precisely ordered to either good or bad, according as it is virtuous or vicious.

p 105

†32 I, 7 (1097 a 20) and S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 9.

p 105

†33 Christians, who hope for the supernatural end of the Beatific Vision.

p 105

†34 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 62, a. 1 ad 3.

p 105

†35 I, 5 (644 b 33).

p 105

†36 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 62, a. 3 ad 2.

p 106

†37 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 58, a. 6; q. 85, a. 2 ad 1. "Charity is the root of all the virtues." (I-II, q. 62, a. 4.)

p 106

†38 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 81, a. 5.

p 106

†39 Cf. *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 3 ad 2: "The object of the theological virtues is the ultimate end; while the object of the other virtues (moral and intellectual) is the means to the end."

p 106

†40 Cf. Art. 7, above, also *S. Th.* I-II, q. 57, a. 1.

p 107

†41 Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 47, a. 4.

p 107

†42 Cf. *De Veritate*, q. 25, a. 5.

p 107

†43 Art. 6. Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 47, a. 4 and 5.

p 107

†44 I.e. unless a superior, directing force, viz., prudence, intervenes.

p 108

†45 II, 4 (1105 a 35).

p 109

†46 Cf. Cajetan's Comment. in I-II, q. 61. According to Cajetan, S. Ambrose was the first to use this name in designating the four principle virtues.

p 109

†47 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 61, a. 1 ad 2: "The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3 ad 3). Hence they should properly be called, not human, but super-human or divine virtues. The moral virtues as such are what S. Thomas would call "human" virtues.

p 109

†48 In *S. Th.* I-II, q. 61, a. 1 ad 3, St. Thomas gives another reason: "Although the intellectual virtues . . . rank before the moral virtues, by reason of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.

p 111

†49 For the role of these virtues attached to prudence, cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 57, a. 6.

p 111

†50 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 61, a. 2 ad 3: "'All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to subject and as to their formal ratios."

p 112

†1 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, aa. 1 to 4; III *Sent.* D. 33, q. 1, a. 3, q. 1. a. 1; II *Ethic.* lect. 6 and 7.

p 112

†2 I, 11 (281 a 15).

p 112

†3 II, 6 (1106 a 15).

p 112

†4 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 3 obj. 1.

p 112

†5 *De Diligendo Deo*, c. 1 (*PL* 182, 974).

p 113

†6 III, 4 (429 b 3). In S. Thomas' Comment. in X *Metaphys.* lect. 9, how a mean is properly between contraries is explained. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 3, obj. 3.

p 113

†7 II, 42 ff. (*PL* 63, 1147-1152).

p 113

†8 The mathematical formulae for these three examples of means would be: Arithmetical —8:6 :: 6:4
Geometrical —9:6 :: 6:4
Harmonic —6:2 :: 3:1.

p 114

†9 II, 18 (*PL* 32, 1267). Cf. Art. 1, obj. 3, above.

p 114

†10 VI, 8 (146 b 17).

†10 VI, 6 (1140 b 17).

p 115

†11 Cf. *Ethics*, II, 8 and S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 10.

p 115

†12 II, 6 (1106 b 24). Throughout c. 3 of this Book, Aristotle speaks of the difficulties attached to the various virtues, and of their consequent laudability. In c. 6 he says explicitly that the mean, which is characteristic of virtue, is as difficult to hit as the center of a target.

p 115

†13 Cf. Art. 11, above.

p 116

†14 VII *Ethics*, c. 6 (1106 b 15). Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 1.

p 116

†15 C. 7. (*PL* 64, 1352). Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 4, obj. 4.

p 116

†16 St. Thomas treats of the mean which charity observes only very briefly, below. Charity is the subject of the next Disputed Question in this series on the virtues.

p 116

†17 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 1: "Moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determined matter. Now the measure or rule of the movements of the appetite towards appetible objects is reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in conformity with its rule: thus the good of things fashioned by art is that they conform to the rule of art . . . . Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason." In the text, "passions" refer to the objects of fortitude and temperance, while "actions" designate the object of justice. Both actions and passions are regulated by prudence, which is "right reason."

p 117

†18 The mean of moral virtue is the mean of reason. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 2.

p 117

†19 I.e. practical matters.

p 117

†20 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 3: "Truth apprehended by our intellect if we consider it absolutely is measured by things, since things are the measure of our intellect, as we read in the *Metaphysics* (X, 1). We speak the truth according as what we say is so or not in reality. Accordingly, the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean in conformity with things as they are in reality, insofar as the intellect recognizes them for what they are or for what they are not."

p 117

†21 II, 6 (1107 a 1).

p 118

†22 I.e. the mean of reason *(medium rationis)*. Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 47, a. 6: "To the rule of prudence it belongs to determine in what manner and by what means man shall observe in his actions the mean of reason."

p 118

†23 The measure is reality, the thing, *res*; the intellect is measured by reality. Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 3 ad 3: "Things that are themselves contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one may be the reason for knowing the other."

p 118

†24 C. 14. Aristotle poses this principle as a question, and resolves it by dialectical inquiry. Cf. *S. Th. ibid.*

p 118

†25 I.e. between affirmation and negation.

p 119

†26 Cf. Art. 7, above. Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 2, a. 1; q. 4, a. 2 ad 1.

p 119

†27 Cf. Reply to the objection on the contrary, below; also *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 4.

p 119

†28 This objection is answered in *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 1 ad 1: "Moral virtue derives its goodness from the rule of reason, while its object is the passions and operations of man. If, therefore, we compare moral virtue to reason, we find that what there is in it of reason places it as an extreme, viz., its (complete) conformity; while excess and defect hold the position of the other extreme, viz., complete deformity. But if we consider moral virtue with respect to its object, then it holds the position of a mean, insofar as it conforms passions to the rule of reason."

p 119

†29 Cf. *S. Th. ibid.*: "Hence the Philosopher says, in the *Ethics*, II, 6, that 'virtue is a mean in its essence,' inasmuch as the rule of virtue is applied to its proper object, 'but it is an extreme with regard to what is best and excellent,' viz., in its conformity with reason."

p 120

†30 In *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 1 ad 2 St. Thomas says: "In actions and passions the mean and extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing prevents something from being an extreme in a certain virtue with regard to one circumstance, while it is a mean with regard to other circumstances, namely, by its conformity with reason . . . There will be excess if one tends to the maximum when or where one should not do so, or for an inordinate end; there will be defect if one fails to tend where and when one ought."

p 121

†31 V, 3 and 4. In 3, 1131 b 27-1132 a 2: "The justice which distributes common possessions is always in accordance with the sort of proportion mentioned above (1131 b 12: "Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical") . . . But the justice in transactions between individual men is a sort of equality . . . not according to geometrical proportion, but according to arithmetical proportion." Cf. *S. Th.* II-II, q. 61, a. 2. "In distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to an equality of things, but according to a proportion between things and persons . . . Hence the mean in the case follows geometrical proportion . . . On the other hand, in commutations . . . it is necessary to equalize things with each other . . . The result of

On the other hand, in commutations . . . it is necessary to equalize things with each other . . . The result of this will be equality according to arithmetical mean."

p 121

†32 I.e. in present enjoyment.

p 122

†33 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 2. "Justice concerns operations, which deal with external things, in which the right is established simply and absolutely . . . wherefore the mean of reason in justice is the same as the mean of things, insofar as justice gives each one his due, no more and no less. But the other moral virtues concern our inner passions, in which what is right cannot be established in the same way . . . hence the rectitude of reason must be established in the passions with reference to ourselves."

p 122

†34 Cf. *Ethics*. II, 8 (1109 a 1-19): "Since rashness is considered to be more like and nearer to courage, and cowardice to be more unlike it, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things which are further from the mean are considered more contrary to it . . . we consider as contrary to the mean the directions in which we more often take the greatest pains, thus self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance."

p 122

†35 V, 3 (226 b 27-27).

p 123

†36 II, 6 (1107 a 6-7).

p 123

†37 Cf. *Ethics*, II, 6 (1106 a 32) and S. Thomas' Comment. lect. 6.

p 123

†38 I.e. an equal distance, proportionately speaking.

p 123

†39 St. Thomas insists on this, following Aristotle, throughout his tract on the mean of the virtues, in general, and in each specific instance—except, of course, in the case of justice. Cf. St. Thomas' *In Ethic*. II, lect. 6.

p 123

†40 Cf. *S. Th.* I-II, q. 64, a. 4.

p 127

†1 Cf. Art. 2, note 21 in the text, above.

p 143

†1 "Quodsi doctrinae Aquinatis cum sententiis doctorum anteriorum et aequalium, . . . comparantur, Doctori Angelico sine ullo periculo falsae elationis principatus tribuendus est. Neque Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, neque Philippus Cancellarius neque S. Albertus Magnus neque S. Bonaventura, ut de minoribus sileamus, hac re cum Aquinate certare possunt. Nemo eorum tanta praecisione solutionis, tanta cohaesione doctrinali, tanta perspicuitate argumentorum, tam ampla consideratione omnium quaestionum

huc pertinentium de subiecto psychico virtutum egit." Graf, *De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum, secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saec XIV*, t. II, p. 114.

p 145

†2 Edw. Leen, C.S.Sp. *Progress Through Mental Prayer*, Sheed & Ward, N.Y. 1937, p. 237 (4).

p 147

†3 It is a question, obviously, of acquired habits, as Father Carpenter points out (my note).

p 147

†4 Carpenter, *op. cit.* p. 117-18.

p 148

†5 *Ibid.*, p. 124-25.

p 153

†6 That is, within the scope of its natural capacities (tr.).

p 153

†7 St. Thomas can mean here, only that these infused perfections are *in some way* according to the soul's nature (tr.).

p 155

†8 That is, the subject or supposit will undergo a *substantial* change (tr.).

p 157

†9 Again, the Latin *virtus* is used in the English equivalent of force or strength or 'power.' Cf. Art. 1, notes 16 and 21, in the text, above (tr.).

p 157

†10 The Latin here is hardly less difficult than the English: "Unde oportet quod omne quod est in actu aliquid, aliquo modo possit esse activum illius." The reasoning is close and precise: Operation follows being. But being consists primarily and essentially in act or form. Hence operation follows on act or form. Now every agent, since it acts by and through its own form, impresses something of this form, which is its own being, on its effect. Applied to the sphere of human actions, as Thomas applies it shortly, this basic truth indicates that human acts will impress something of their own character on their effects—one of which is the disposition or determination gradually induced into the power of the soul from which each given action immediately proceeds (tr.).

p 159

†11 "Quod opponentes inducunt, fidem aut caritatem aliasque virtutes parvulis, utpote non consentientibus, non infundi, a plerisque non conceditur absolute . . ., aliis asserentibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; nonnullis vero dicentibus, et dimitti peccatum, et virtutes infundi, habentibus illas quoad habitum, non quoad usum, donec perveniant ad aetatem adultam."—Denzinger, E. S. 410.

p 160

†12 "Nos autem attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter

omnibus baptizatis, opinionem secundam, quae dicit, tam parvulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam et virtutes, tamquam probabiliorem, et dictis Sanctorum et doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante Concilio duximus eligendam."—ES 483.

p 160

†13 "Quamquam enim nemo possit esse iustus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur, id tamen in hac impii iustificatione fit, dum eiusdem sanctissimae passionis merito 'per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus' eorum, qui iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret (can. II). Unde in ipsa iustificatione cum remissione peccatorum haec omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur: fidem, spem et caritatem. Nam fides, nisi ad eam spes accedat et caritas etc."—ES 800 (Trent, Sess. VI (Jan. 13, 1547), cap. 7).

p 160

†14 "Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari vel sola imputatione iustitiae Christi, vel sola peccatorum remissione, exclusa gratia et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur, atque illis inhaereat . . .: A.S."

p 161

†15 "Ille ipse Christus Jesus tanquam caput in membra et tanquam vitis in palmites in ipsos iustificatos iugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit, comitatur et subsequitur, et sine qua nullo pacto Deo gratia et meritoria esse possent . . ."—ES 809.

p 161

†16 The *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, which was expressly intended to state the doctrine of the universal Church, especially in keeping with the decrees of Trent, declares: "This grace (the grace of regeneration in Baptism) is accompanied by a most splendid train of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul along with grace. Hence, when writing to Titus, the Apostle says: 'He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour (Tit. 3/5, 6).' St. Augustine, in explanation of the words, 'poured forth abundantly,' says: 'that is, for the remission of sins and for abundance of virtues.'"—*Catechism of the Council of Trent*, transl. by McHugh and Callan, New York, Jos. Wagner, 11th Printing, 1949, p. 188. The translators note that the statement attributed to St. Augustine is taken from St. Ambrose on Luke 1/15, and is found in the Gloss. interlin. Cf. *S. Th.* III, q. 69, aa. 4-6.

p 161

†17 Peter Lombard, a sole exception, held that charity is not a virtue but the Holy Ghost Himself, Who moves us to acts of charity directly and without any medium of habit. Cf. I Sent. d. 17; St. Thomas refutes this position, in his *Comment.* in *Sent.* h. 1, and in II-II, q. 23, a. 2.

p 161

†18 A number of theologians held at one time that this is *de fide*, e.g.: Vega, Suarez, Ripalda, Benedict XIV (as a private theologian). Cf. Prümmer, *Manuale Theol. Moral.* t. I, p. 324.

p 161

†19 Cf. Prümmer, *ibid.* We exclude the possible aberrations of the "new theology."

p 162

†20 Carpenter, *op. cit.* p. 126-27.

†21 In I-II, 62, 1 and 2.