

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

on

ARISTOTLE'S

LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP

Ethics—Books VIII-IX

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Aristotle's
Love and Friendship

ETHICS—BOOKS VIII-IX

Translated by
PIERRE CONWAY, O.P.

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VERITATIS DIVINAE

AMICO

OMNIS AMICITIAE FONTIS

ANGELICO DOCTORI

Translator's Note

St. Thomas' magnificent Commentaries on the Works of Aristotle have long remained closed books to the English-reading public. A translation of the Commentary on the *Physics*, Books I-II, by Dr. Raymond Kocourek, St. Thomas College, St. Paul, Minn., has recently appeared. The present translation, of the Commentary on the Nichomachean *Ethics*, Books VIII-IX, is intended as a modest addition to this small store. The choice of subject has been dictated by a desire to appeal to a broad section of readers. Since the Aristotelian concept of friendship also embraces our concept of love, the excerpt has been entitled *LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP*. A translation of the Latin text of Aristotle which St. Thomas employed precedes each chapter in order that the reader may experience for himself the skill with which St. Thomas elucidates and elaborates the terse sentences of Aristotle. The reader may, however, entirely omit the text of Aristotle, as it is fully incorporated into the commentary of St. Thomas. Certain technical divisions of the matter have been somewhat reduced to afford smoother reading. The chapters correspond to the lectures of St. Thomas, which in turn correspond to the chapters in Aristotle except that Book IX, Chapters 8-14 correspond to Book IX, Chapters 8-12 in Aristotle. It is hoped that the reader will be indulgent with the imperfections of the present translation, intended to satisfy in some small way, until such time as more and better translations shall appear, the ever-growing desire for greater knowledge of St. Thomas.

PIERRE CONWAY, O. P.

Introduction

Man's whole pursuit of happiness is in a sense a pursuit of friendship, a pursuit of something more than himself, since he feels and knows that he is not complete alone. In the more specific sense, love and friendship for others are integrally woven into our concept of ultimate well-being, whatever that concept may be. No man would call himself happy if he had all other goods, but lacked friends. Thus any discussion of happiness will involve a discussion of friendship as an integral part of happiness.

In order to situate this discussion of friendship more precisely within the general pattern of happiness a brief outline of the complete subject matter of Aristotle's *Ethics* will be useful. Aristotle justifies his discussion of happiness by saying that if there is some ultimate good of man (happiness) surely one would gain by endeavoring to determine what it is and how one may attain it. "Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?"

This leads him to establish first that happiness is not a thing, but a state of man, comprising all that is good for him. Since the perfection of a thing which can act will consist in activity, happiness will also be an activity. Since it is the happiness of *man*, it will definitely consist in an activity proper to man. It will therefore consist in intellectual activity. This does not mean intellectual activity in the exclusive sense, but rather places the material aspects of happiness in an accessory role. Thus happiness will be the possession of the good of the intellect, which is infinite good and truth, with all the necessary material adjuncts. Although this goal is not attainable in this life, happiness in this life will nevertheless consist in the closest possible approximation to this goal.

The pursuit of happiness thus becomes the work of coordinating man's activity in the service of the highest principle within him. This involves the study of moral acts, those acts proceeding from reason and a deliberate will by which man moves toward his ultimate end. But these acts must not be merely occasional—one swallow does not make a spring—but consistent. Thus the discussion will ultimately be of those habits of moral acts which are the virtues.

Aristotle first treats of those virtues concerned with the passions: fortitude and temperance; then of that concerned with external activities: justice; finally of the intellectual virtues and that virtue in particular which regulates human activity in general: prudence or practical wisdom. The highest virtue of all, however, is that which concentrates on divine things, and that is wisdom in its absolute sense.

Since no man would be considered happy in this life without friends, Aristotle appends, in Books VIII-IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, after the discussion of the virtues, a discussion of friendship. Book X, the final book, discusses pleasure as the necessary concomitant of happiness.

The discussion of friendship itself likewise follows a logical procedure. In friendship, as in everything concerned with happiness, we pursue a good. Thus Aristotle is led to examine the three goods pursued in friendship: useful good, pleasurable good, and the good of virtue. This last is true and absolute good. It is friendship founded upon this last good which is friendship in the perfect sense, since it alone comprises the essential element of being for the sake of another.

Subsequent to the general outline of friendship, Aristotle treats of friendship between unequals. Then he discusses the important point of whether friendship consists more in loving or being loved. Because it is the former, it must be based on giving rather than receiving, on activity rather than passivity, which relates it to the fundamental truth that happiness is activity.

Since friendship is fundamentally an association, Aristotle next shows the similarity between particular associations, such as those of friends or families, and those larger associations which are political communities. He thereby shows that the fundamental characteristics of friendship are equally applicable even in the national and international spheres. On the other hand it is the lack of a common ground, of sharing and of communication, that brings about quarrels and even the dissolution of friendship.

Coming to the intrinsic components of friendship, Aristotle analyzes the three acts which form its progressive structure: benevolence (goodwill), concord (agreement), and beneficence (doing good). This naturally leads to an examination of the

norm for doing good. Is it oneself, and is it really selfish to love oneself best?

The final task is to fit friendship into the pattern of happiness. This brings Aristotle to inquire to what extent the happy man will need friends, how many they should be and of what sort. Summing up, Aristotle shows that the adjunct of happiness, which is friendship, consists in some kind of life together.

That friendship is not a luxury, but a practical necessity for life, may be seen by again recalling that man envisages not only his ultimate end in terms of an association, a companionship, but also relies, whether consciously or not, on his association with other men for the fullest possible leading of his life from day to day. Even in the broad spheres of peoples and nations, where equal justice is the goal aspired to, friendship plays a vital and essential role. "For when men are friends they have no need of justice."

Contents

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE	vii
INTRODUCTION	ix

BOOK VIII

	PAGE
Ch. 1: The foundation of friendship is virtue; and it is the concern of moral philosophy.	1
Ch. 2: The object of friendship is shown to be the good. Two doubts are raised and solved.	5
Ch. 3: The good having been divided up into its different types, namely, the true good, the useful and the pleasing, Aristotle shows that useful and pleasing friendships are not friendship in the strict sense of the word, and are most easily dissolved.	8
Ch. 4: Friendship of the useful and the pleasing sort is shown to be similar to perfect friendship.	14
Ch. 5: Aristotle shows that friendship consists both in act and in habit. Although distance dissolves the acts of friendship, it nevertheless does not dissolve the habit.	18
Ch. 6: The reasons why old people and severe people are not apt for friendship are set forth. It is also impossible for there to be true friendship among a great number.	21
Ch. 7 ¹ : The friendship of unequals is discussed, such as that of father and son, man and wife. The differences between these friendships are shown and how they are preserved.	26

	PAGE
Ch. 8: Loving and being loved: their relation in friendship.	30
Ch. 9: All friendship is based on communication. Friendships are diversified according to the different communications. It is shown how these communications have a similarity to political communication.	34
Ch. 10: The types and number of political bodies are set down and are seen to be three: KINGDOM, ARISTOCRACY, and TIMOCRACY, of which the first is the best, the last the worst (of the three)	38
Ch. 11: Aristotle teaches that to each type of polity there corresponds a type of friendship. This is true both of good and corrupt polities.	42
Ch. 12: Returning to the aforesaid principle of all friendship, which is communication, Aristotle teaches that the distinction of friendship is based upon the distinction of communication.	46
Ch. 13: It is shown in what types of friendship there can be excess and deficiency, also that quarrels and grievances may arise in certain friendships; especially in that friendship which is for utility's sake, not, however, in that which is based on virtue.	53
Ch. 14: Aristotle now shows how complaints come about in friendships involving superiority, and the reason which leads the greater and the lesser, respectively, to quarrel.	59

BOOK IX

Ch. 1: Speaking of the properties of friendship, Aristotle says that proportion must be maintained in them, because thus they endure. Without proportion they are unsettled.	63
--	----

- Ch. 2: Three doubts are brought up: whether one should obey one's parent before others; whether a virtuous man is to be preferred before a friend; whether one should repay a benefactor rather than give to a friend. 68
- Ch. 3: Certain minor doubts are brought up concerning the dissolution of a friendship, both in regard to those who change, and those who remain the same. 72
- Ch. 4: The origin of the acts of friendship is set forth: what the first act is and what the others; also how the virtuous man behaves in regard to such acts, and how the evil man. 76
- Ch. 5: Aristotle begins to treat of goodwill, which appears to be the beginning of friendship, although it is not itself friendship. 83
- Ch. 6: It is now question of concord, which appears to belong to friendship. It is not concerned with speculative matters, but only with practical actions, nor with all of these, but only with important ones. There is not said to be concord among the wicked. 86
- Ch. 7: Beneficence is treated, concerning which a question arises, namely that benefactors seem to love more than those who receive the benefit. 89
- Ch. 8: The love of self is treated; this because those who love themselves most of all are most of all detested. 94
- Ch. 9: It is now shown who may justifiably love himself, namely, the virtuous man. 97
- Ch. 10: The doubt is brought up as to whether the happy man needs friends or not. Arguments for both sides. 102

Ch. 11:	It is shown by a reason closer to nature that a happy and upright man should seek an upright friend, because being and living is worthy of a good man's choice, and the experience of them is pleasing.	106
Ch. 12:	The doubt is raised as to whether one should have many friends. Aristotle solves this by saying that this is not expedient, since a few suffice for pleasure, and one cannot have many friends according to virtue.	110
Ch. 13:	Now Aristotle asks whether a man needs friends in adversity as well as in prosperity. He solves this by saying that in adversity a man needs friends very much, especially useful friends, although in both states of fortune, there is nothing better than friends.	113
Ch. 14:	It is asked whether, just as those in love delight in the sight of each other, so too friends delight in living together.	118
APPENDIX		121

BOOK VIII

Ch. I: The foundation of friendship is virtue, and it is the concern of moral philosophy.

After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow. For it is a virtue or implies virtue.

Besides, it is most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions—"two going together"—for with friends men are more able to think and to act.

Again, parents seem to feel it naturally for their offspring, not only among men, but among birds and most animals. It is felt by members of the same breed, and especially by men. Whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. This is true when one sees a man mistaking his way, as though all men knew each other and were friends.

Friendship seems to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all and expel faction as their worst enemy.

And when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and friendship seems to belong especially to the just.

But it is not only necessary but also good. We praise those who love their friends. It is thought to be a fine thing to have friendship for many. For some consider all good men as friends.

Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence comes the saying "like to like", "birds of a feather flock together", and so on. Others on the contrary say "two of a trade never agree."

On this very question some inquire for deeper and more natural causes. Euripedes says that "parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth", and Heraclitus that "it is what opposes that helps" and "from different tones the fairest tune" and "all things are produced from strife." Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that like is attracted to like.

The physical problems we may leave alone, since they do not belong to the present inquiry. Let us examine those which are human and involve human morals and passions, e.g. whether there can be friendship among all or if it is impossible among evil men, and whether there is one species of friendship or more than one.

Those who think there is only one because it admits of greater or less have relied on an insufficient sign. Even things different in species can be compared in this way. But this is to speak generically.

Aristotle states first of all that after what has preceded (namely, a discussion of the virtues), friendship should now be considered, this from the point of view of moral philosophy, leaving aside that which pertains to natural philosophy.^{1*}

Six reasons are given.

1. The consideration of virtue pertains to the moral philosopher and friendship is a sort of virtue in so far as it is an elective habit,² as will be shown, and is reduced to justice, in that it makes a return. It at least implies virtue, since virtue is the cause of true friendship.

2. The moral philosopher should consider all that is necessary to human life, and friendship is particularly necessary. No man in his right mind would choose to live with all other external goods but without friends. As a matter of fact, friends seem to be especially necessary to those who have the greatest share of the world's goods, namely the rich, rulers, and those in power. This is true first of all as to the use of these goods. The goods of fortune are of no use if one does not do good with them, and beneficence is principally and most laudably exercised toward one's friends. Secondly it is true as to the preservation of these goods, which cannot be preserved without friends, since the more one has, the less secure it is, more being attracted to covet it. Friends are not only useful in good fortune, but also in distress; and in poverty men esteem friends as their only refuge. Thus friends are necessary in all conditions of life. Friendship is necessary to the young so that by friends they may be kept from evil. Youth by its very nature is prone to desiring pleasure, as stated in Book VII. The aged, on the other hand, need friends to help them because of their bodily defects. Since they fail

*See Appendix

in their actions because of weakness, they need friends to sustain them. As for those who are in the prime of life, friends are useful to them in doing good actions. When two unite, they are more powerful. This is true both of the intellectual life, when one is able to perceive what the other cannot, and of external action wherein men can greatly help each other. Thus it is evident that one should consider friendship, since it is something necessary to all.

3. Aristotle says that there is a natural friendship of the parent for its offspring. This is true not only of men, but also of birds, which plainly spend a long time in bringing up their young. The same occurs in other animals also. There is also a natural friendship among those of the same race or nation, since they communicate in their manners and living. That friendship is particularly natural which exists among all men, because of the likeness of their species. Thus we praise philanthropists, that is, lovers of mankind, as fulfilling that which is natural to man. This is plain when one mistakes his way. Any man will stop another from going astray even though he is a stranger, as though all men belonged to the same family and were friends of each other. Those things which are naturally good should be considered by the moralist. Thus we should consider friendship.

4. States appear to be preserved through friendship. Thus legislators strive to preserve friendship among the citizens even more than justice, which they sometimes overlook, as in levying punishments, lest dissension should arise. This is also clear from the fact that concord is likened to friendship. Legislators greatly desire concord, and strive to expel contention among the citizens as though it were inimical to the good of the state. Since the whole of moral philosophy is seen to be ordained to the civic good, as stated in the beginning (Book I),³ it pertains to moral philosophy to treat of friendship.

5. If men are friends, they have no need of justice properly so called, since they have all things, as it were, in common, a friend being another self. One does not have justice toward oneself. On the other hand, even when they are just, they still need friendship. Thus perfect justice seems to preserve and repair friendship. Moral philosophy therefore should treat of friendship even more than of justice.

6. Friendship is not only to be considered because it is something necessary to human life, but also because it is something praiseworthy and morally good. We praise those who love their friends and likewise friendship for many, in that some consider all good men as friends.

Aristotle next shows what is to be treated of in friendship. First he shows that certain doubts exist concerning friendship. That is, there are different opinions about it. Some hold that friendship is a certain likeness, and that like is friend to like. They quote the proverb that "like attracts like" and "birds of a feather flock together." Certain birds *are* gregarious, such as starlings. These and other proverbs are adduced. On the other hand, some hold that "all potters war with each other," inasmuch as one impedes the profit of the other. The truth of the question is that what is like is naturally lovable. Hatred of the like is only accidental, insofar as it is seen as impeding one's own good.

Such contrary opinions exist even among natural philosophers. Thus Euripides says that the dry earth desires rain, as though loving something contrary to it, and that the heavens, venerable for their dignity, when filled with rain, desire to fall upon the earth, which is contrary to their dignity and plenitude. Heraclitus even says that one contrary helps another, as when something cold is pleasing to a man who is suffering from the heat, in such a way that a perfect harmony is established. He says that one contrary helps another since everything is established by conflict, by which that which was previously confused becomes distinct. Others say the opposite, in particular Empedocles, who says that like desires like. This doubt is solved in the same way: what is alike is, of itself, naturally desirable. Accidentally, however, one may desire the contrary in so far as it may be useful and medicinal, as has been said of bodily pleasures.

Aristotle now shows what doubts are to be resolved concerning friendship. Natural questions are to be passed over as not being proper to this discussion. Whatever is human, as pertaining to human morals and passions,⁴ with these we are concerned. For example, there is the question whether there can be friendship among all men, or whether evil men are to be excluded. There is likewise the question of whether there is one type of friendship or several.

Aristotle here excludes a certain error, that of those who believe there is only one type of friendship, since all the types can be compared on the basis of greater and less. Thus we say that friendship based on goodness is greater than friendship based on utility. Aristotle says that they rely on an insufficient sign, since even those things which are specifically different can be compared on the basis of greater or less insofar as they are generically the same, as when we say that white is more colored than black, or analogically as when we say that act is better than potency and substance than accident. Finally he says that in the above what pertains to human affairs concerning friendship is said from a generic point of view.

Ch. 2: The object of friendship is shown to be the good. Two doubts are raised and solved.

The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful. But it would seem that the useful is that by which some good is produced, or some pleasure. So it is the good and the pleasurable which are lovable as ends.

Do men love then, *the* good, or what is good for *them*? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant.

Now it is seen that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without question lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable to him.

But each man does not necessarily love what is good for him, but what *seems* good.

This however will make no difference. We will just have to say (of the good) "that which seems lovable."

Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word 'friendship.' For it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other. For it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself. But to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake.

But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated. Goodwill, when it is reciprocated is friendship.

Or must we add "when it is recognized"?

For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful. One of these might even return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other. But how could one call them friends, when they do not know their mutual feelings?

To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.

After the Philosopher has begun by showing what must be treated of in friendship, he here begins his discussion.

1. He shows what friendship is. (Ch. 2.)
2. He distinguishes its kinds. (Ch. 3-14.)
3. He gives the properties of the different kinds of friendship (beginning with Book IX.)

Concerning the first he does two things. First he investigates the four parts of the definition of friendship. Secondly he gives the definition. Thus he first examines the object of friendship.

He begins then, by saying that possibly something will be made clear on the foregoing questions if we know what that lovable something is which is the object of the love implied in friendship.

Men do not love just anything at all, since evil, for example, is not loved as such. One loves what is lovable, which is either good in itself, as is that which is essentially good, or is pleasing or useful. The last mentioned, the useful, appears to be that by means of which one attains the essentially good and the pleasing, which are both lovable for themselves as ends. The useful, however, is lovable because of its relation to something else, as the means to an end. The essentially good and the pleasing, if they are taken generically, are not distinguished as to subject, but solely by reason.⁵

Good is called that which is in itself perfect and desirable. It is called pleasing in so far as it satisfies the appetite. But the good and the pleasing are not taken in that sense here. The true good of man is here taken as that which is good for him according to reason. The pleasing is defined as that which is good for his senses.

Here Aristotle brings up a doubt as to whether men love that which is good in itself or what is good *for them*. Sometimes these two are at odds. Thus philosophizing is good in itself, but it is not good for a man who is in need of the very necessities of life. The same doubt arises about that which is pleasing to the senses. Thus something may be pleasing in itself, as that which is sweet, and yet not be pleasing in a certain case, as when one is sick.

Aristotle solves this. First he gives the solution. Thus he says that everyone loves that which is good to him, since each and every faculty moves toward that which is proportionate to it, as the sight of each sees that which is visible *to it*. There-

fore, that is lovable in itself which is good in itself, and that is lovable to each which is good to each.

Next he brings up an objection and says that men do not love that which is unconditionally good, but that which appears good to them. The appetite is not drawn to anything except as it is apprehended. Consequently it would appear to be false that that is lovable to each which is good for each (since what is truly good for a man does not always seem lovable to him).

This difficulty is solved by noting that this does not affect the case. When an apparent good is loved, it is loved as good for oneself. Thus one may also say that the lovable is an apparent good.

Secondly he discusses love itself. There are three things which men love, namely the good, that which is pleasing to the senses, and the useful. Love of inanimate things, such as wine or gold, is not friendship. Two reasons show this. First, in such love there can be no return of love, which is required in friendship. Wine does not love a man, as a man loves wine. Secondly, we do not love inanimate things in such a way that we wish their good. It would be ridiculous to say that anyone wishes good to wine: the good which is wine a man wishes for himself. Whence when a man loves wine, he is not wishing good to the wine but to himself.

If anyone should say that a man wishes good to the wine, because he wishes that it may be preserved, one should remember that he wishes the wine to be preserved so that he may have it. Thus he does not wish the good of the wine, in so far as it is good wine, but rather his own good. This is against the notion of friendship. One must wish well to one's friend for his own sake, and not for the sake of oneself.

Thirdly he shows the mutualness involved in love. If men wish well to another for his own sake, they are called benevolent, but not friends, if there is no return: i.e. if the one loved does not also in return wish well to the one loving. Friendship is called mutual benevolence or goodwill, in that the one loving is also loved. Friendship thus implies a certain return of love according to the mode of commutative justice.

The fourth part of the definition is derived from the condition for mutual love. One must add to complete the notion of friendship that it is a mutual benevolence which is recognized. Many wish well to men whom they have never seen, in that by

hearsay they esteem them to be men of virtue, or useful to themselves. It may even be that the one who is the object of this goodwill may also feel the same toward the one who bestows it. Such men appear to be mutually benevolent, but they cannot be called friends, since they are unaware of their esteem for each other.

Aristotle then concludes to his definition of friendship. He says that friendship implies that men wish good to one another, that they be aware of it, and that it is for one of the above reasons, namely, the true good, the pleasing or the useful.⁶

Ch. 3: The good having been divided into its different types, namely the true good, the useful and the pleasing, Aristotle shows that useful and pleasing friendships are not friendship in the strict sense of the word, and are most easily dissolved.

Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so therefore, do the corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable. For with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love. Those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another.

Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure. It is not for their character that men love people with a sense of humor, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore, those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves. And those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved, but as providing some utility or pleasure. Thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the person is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure.

Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves. For if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him.

Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question.

This kind of friendship seems to exist chiefly in old people. For at that age people pursue not the pleasant but the useful. It exists also among the young when utility is the goal. Such people do not live much with each other, either. For sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant, and therefore they do not need such companionship unless they are useful to each other. For they are pleasant to each other only in so far as they rouse in each other hopes of something good to come.

Among such friendships people also class the friendship of travellers.

On the other hand the friendship of young people seems to aim at pleasure. For they live under the guidance of emotion. They pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and immediately before them.

With increasing age, their pleasures become different. This is why they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so. Their friendship changes with the object which is found pleasant. Such pleasure alters quickly.

Young people are amorous too. For love, to a great extent, follows the emotions and is for the sake of pleasure. That is why they fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing often within a single day. But these people do wish to spend their days and lives together. For it is thus that they attain the purpose of their friendship.

Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue.

For they wish well alike to each other as good, and they are good in themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends. For they do this for their friends themselves, and not for some incidental reason.

Therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good and virtue is an enduring thing.

Each is good in himself and to his friend. For the good are such essentially and useful to each other. So too are they pleasant. For the good are without qualification pleasing to each other. To each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable. But the actions of the good are the same or like.

Such a friendship may be expected to endure. For there meets in it all the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure—whether it is truly so, or appears to be to the one loving, in which it has a likeness to that which is really so. To such friendship all these qualities properly belong. Those who are alike according to this friendship also have the other goods, for they are good in themselves and pleasing in themselves.

These are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men.

But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent. For such men are rare.

Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity. As the proverb says, men cannot know each other until they have "eaten salt together;" nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends until each has been found lovable and is trusted by the other.

Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact. For a wish for friendship may arise quickly. But friendship does not.

This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration and in all other respects, and is friendship in every respect, a like return being made to each by the other, which is what ought to happen between friends.

After the Philosopher has shown what friendship is, (in Ch. 2), he now distinguishes the kinds of friendship, (Ch. 3-14).

Thus he first shows the kinds of friendship (Ch. 3-12) and secondly shows in what kinds there are accusations (Ch. 13-14). Concerning the first of these, he first distinguishes the kinds of friendship which exist among equals, (Ch. 3-6), secondly among unequals (Ch. 7-12). As to the first he first shows the kinds, then shows that they consist in equality. More precisely, as to the first of these he first distinguishes the kinds, secondly determines them in relation to their activity, thirdly as to their subject. As to the first he does two things: establishes the distinction and then determines each species.

First he says that since there are three types of lovable thing, namely, the good, i.e. what is good in itself, the pleasing and the useful, these are specifically distinct, not as three species on an equal footing in the same genus, but rather in a relation of greater or less fulfilment of the requisites for friendship. Since acts are differentiated according to their objects,⁷ love according to these three objects will be specified, according to the different objects, i.e. there will be one kind when something is loved because of true good, another kind when love is because of something pleasing to the senses, another kind when love is because of utility. Since the act of friendship is love, there are thus three kinds of friendship according to the three objects of love: (1) friendship because of virtue, which is true and essential good; (2) because of something pleasing to the senses; (3) because of utility.

In each of the three the requisites for friendship previously mentioned are fulfilled, since in each there can be a mutual return of love which is recognized. In each, one can wish good to the other according to the type of their love. If they love one another because of virtue, they wish each other the good of virtue; if because of utility, useful goods; if because of pleasure, pleasurable things.

Now Aristotle determines each kind, since they are not all equal, but more or less perfect. First he determines useful friendship and pleasurable friendship which are friendship in the secondary sense. Then he determines friendship based on true good, which is friendship in the strict sense. Finally he compares the other two to this latter. Thus he first shows that the first two are imperfect friendship, in that they are only accidentally friendship and easily dissolved.

First he says that those who love each other because of utility do not love each other because of themselves, but

because they receive some good from each other. The same is true of those who love each other because of something pleasing to the senses. In this case one does not love the other because he is virtuous in the matter of pleasure, but solely because he is pleasing.

Thus it is evident that those who love because of utility love because of the good which they receive, and those who love because of pleasure, love because of the pleasure they perceive. Thus they do not love their friend for what he is in himself, but according to something accidental to him, i.e. whether he is useful or pleasing. Thus these friendships are not real friendship but only quasi-friendship, because a man is not loved for what he is in himself, but according as he provides utility or sensible pleasure.

Then he shows that such friendships are easily dissolved. They exist because of something passing in the men loved, in which they do not always remain the same, as the same man does not always remain pleasing or useful. When those who are loved cease to be pleasant or useful, their friends cease to love them. The same thing is not always useful to a man, but now one thing, now another, according to the times and places. Thus a doctor is useful in sickness, and a seaman in navigation, and so forth. Since, therefore, friendship is not had toward the man for himself, but for the utility derived from him, it follows that once the cause of the friendship is removed, the friendship also is dissolved. The same occurs with friendship for pleasure.

Next he shows to what sort of people such friendships belong. First, as to useful friendship. This involves three types of men. Principally it occurs among the aged, who do not seek the pleasurable to delight the body or the senses, but the useful, in that they require that failing nature be sustained.

This sort of friendship also belongs to adolescents and young people who seek the useful. They cannot be wholly said to love each other, nor do they live together, because at times they do not afford each other pleasure, nor do they need each other's society except because of utility. Their mutual association is pleasurable to them in so far as it implies the hope of some good, to which end this association is useful.

He also mentions that some reduce to friendship because of utility the friendship of travellers who appear to love each other because of the utility derived from each other in the course of their journey.

Now he shows to whom pleasurable friendship belongs. First he shows that such friendship seems to exist principally among the young. This is because they live as their passions dictate, the judgment of reason, by which the passions are directed, not yet having been strengthened in them. Since all the passions terminate either in pleasure or sorrow, as shown in Book II, it follows that they chiefly pursue that which is pleasurable to them at the moment. The passions belong to the sensitive part of man, which is chiefly concerned with the present. To love that which may produce pleasure in the future already belongs in the domain of the useful.

Such friendships are easily shifted. This is true first of all since, with the passage of time, one's taste in pleasure changes. Children and adolescents and young men are not all delighted by the same things, thus friendships are easily made and easily broken off. As the pleasure changes, so changes the friendship. There is a rapid evolution in the pleasure of youth, since the very nature of youth consists in a certain constant evolution.

This is evident on the part of those who love. Young people are of a loving nature, i.e., they are prompt and intense in their love, since they do not love from considered choice, but by passion and inasmuch as they desire pleasure. Thus they love strongly and intensely. Since passion as quickly passes as it is quickly aroused, it follows that such easily begin to love, and just as easily cease from loving, and many times in the same day begin and break off friendships. But as long as such friendship endures, those involved wish to be together and live together all day long, in that they are mutually pleasing to each other. In this way they are disposed to true friendship.

At this point he determines that principal sort of friendship which is because of the good of virtue. First he shows that it is perfect, and begins by saying that friendship of the good and of those alike according to virtue is perfect friendship.

Secondly he proves what he says by showing the conditions of this friendship. First of all, this friendship is essentially so, and not merely accidentally. Those who are alike according to virtue wish each other good in the respect in which each is good. And they are good in themselves. For virtue is a certain perfection which makes a man good, and his actions. Therefore such men wish each other good in themselves. Thus their friendship is friendship which is truly so.

He also concludes that this friendship is the greatest. That which is essentially so is always greater than that which is merely relatively so. Since this friendship is essentially so, and the others only relatively, it follows that the virtuous, who wish each other good for each other's sake and not because of anything which they receive, are the truest friends.

He further concludes that because such men love each other inasmuch as they are good, it follows that their friendship remains, since they are good by virtue. For virtue is a permanent habit which is not easily lost, as is evident from Book II. Therefore such a friendship is lasting.

Such a friendship lacks nothing which is required to perfect friendship. It comprises all that is in other friendship, since in this friendship both friends are good not only in themselves but towards each other. For the virtuous are essentially good and useful to each other, and essentially pleasing. The reason for this is that each one takes pleasure in his own actions and in those like his own. Actions according to virtue cannot conflict with each other, but all are according to right reason. Thus it is plain that the friendship of the virtuous not only has essential goodness, but also pleasure and utility.

He again stresses that such a friendship is normally long lasting and not easily dissolved, since it involves all that is required for friends. All friendship is either because of good or because of pleasure, and that either essentially or relatively, depending on whether what is loved is essentially good and pleasing, or whether it is good and pleasing in regard to the one loving. This latter is not essentially good and pleasing but according to a certain likeness to that which is truly and properly good and pleasing. In the former friendship, all the above exist not accidentally, but essentially. Those who are alike according to this friendship of virtue also have the other goods because that which is good in itself is also pleasing. Therefore, since such friendships have all that is required for friendship, they are not easily dissolved. For it is usually some deficiency which causes us to set something aside.

He again points out that such friendship is the greatest, since that in which all the reasons for loving is found is most lovable. Such are true goods, because they are good in themselves, and are also pleasing and useful. Therefore love is most truly in such friendships and such friendships are greatest.

Nevertheless such friendships are rare, which is a sign of their perfection, since the perfect is found only rarely in any genus. This is true for two reasons. First, because it is the friendship of the virtuous. There are few such because of the difficulty of attaining the middle course between excess and defect as is said in Book II. Thus it is probable that such friendships will be rare.

A second reason is that such friendships require a long time and mutual knowledge so that both may recognize each other as virtuous and friends; since, as the proverb states, two do not know each other until they have eaten a measure of salt together. It should not be that one should accept another as his friend before he appears lovable to him and is thought to be so, and this rarely happens. Therefore such friendships are rare.

He now excludes the objection concerning those who seem to become friends immediately. He says that those who immediately manifest the deeds of friendship show that they wish to become friends, yet they are not yet so until they know themselves to be lovable. Thus a man may immediately have the desire for friendship but that is not yet friendship.

Aristotle now concludes that such friendship is perfect because it is lasting according to time, and according to the other aspects. It also includes all that is present in other friendships. Each friend gives a like return to his friends, which is required in friendship and they do this because they are alike in virtue.

Ch. 4: Friendship of the useful and the pleasing sort is shown to be similar to perfect friendship.

Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears a resemblance of this kind. For good people are pleasing to each other. Likewise friendship for the sake of utility. For the good are also useful to each other.

Friendships chiefly endure among such people, when the friends get the same from each other: e.g. pleasure. Not only that, but it must be of the same sort, and happens between people with a sense of humor, not as (sometimes) happens between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from the lover. With the passing of beauty, the friendship sometimes passes too. For the one finds no pleasure in the sight of the other, and the other gets no attention from the first.

Many, however, remain in friendship if from habit they like each other's ways, both having the same habits.

But those who do not return pleasure, but utility for pleasure, are less friends and less constant.

Those who are friends for the sake of utility part when the advantage is at an end. For they were not friends of each other but of utility.

For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad of both. But for their own sake clearly only good men can be friends. For bad men do not delight in each other unless some utility is derived from their relationship.

The friendship of the good alone is unchanging. For it is not easy to believe anything (ill) of him who has long been tested by oneself; and it is among good men that trust and the feeling that "he would never wrong me" and all the other things that are demanded in true friendship are found. In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is nothing to prevent these evils from arising. For men apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in which sense states are said to be friendly. For the alliances of states seem to aim at utility. Those who are friends because of pleasure seem to be friends as children are. Perhaps we too ought perhaps to call such people friends.

For there are several kinds of friendship. First of all, and chiefly, there is that of the good, as good. The others are called so because of their similarity. For it is in virtue of something good and something akin to the true good that they are friends. For even the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure. But these two kinds of friendship (the useful and the pleasant) are not always conjoined, nor do the same people become friends for the sake of utility and of pleasure. For things that are only incidentally connected are not always joined together. Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or utility, being alike in one of these. But good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e., in virtue of their goodness. These then are friends without qualification. The others are only incidentally so, and through a resemblance to these.

After the Philosopher determines the three kinds of friendship he now compares them to each other. First he shows in what way other friendships are similar to perfect friendship, then shows in what they differ, and finally concludes. As to the first, he begins by showing their similarity as to the cause of love. Friendship because of pleasure resembles perfect friendship in that virtuous men are pleasing to each other. Friendship based on utility is likewise similar to perfect friendship in that virtuous men are useful to each other.

There is also a similarity as to the permanence of the friend-

ship. This is in two ways. Even those who are friends because of utility or pleasure, often remain friends a long time when they render an equal and same return to each other, i.e., pleasure for pleasure. Since there are different kinds of pleasure, generically and quantitatively different according to the different objects of pleasure, it is required for the permanence of such friendships not only that there be a return of pleasure, but of pleasure of the same sort, as occurs in those with a sense of humor wherein one is pleased at the joke of the other. It should not be as happens in the case of two persons whose love is that of the sexes, when sometimes the two are not always pleased by the same thing.

Here the one who loves is pleased in seeing the beauty of the one loved. The one loved in receiving the attentions of the lover. When this ceases, the friendship is sometimes broken, i.e., when on the one hand there is no longer sight, on the other no longer attention.

Even in useful and pleasing friendships, they often endure if one likes the ways of the other, as one carnal person likes the ways of another, or one covetous person likes the ways of another, not that such ways are lovable in themselves, but rather by habit in that both have the same habits. Similarity is of itself a cause of friendship, unless it accidentally impedes one's own good, as said above. Therefore, since evil ways acquired through habit are enduring, so also is such a friendship.

Those who, in making a return, do not repay pleasure for pleasure but utility for pleasure, are less friends because of a lesser likeness. Therefore their friendship is less enduring.

Those who are friends because of utility, likewise are separated when the utility ceases, because they were not friends of each other but of utility. Pleasure, however, comes more from the one loved himself, than does utility, which is sometimes in virtue of something external.

Men of any type can become friends because of pleasure or utility, the good of the good and the wicked of the wicked, likewise those who are neither virtuous nor wicked, of both the former and of each other. But perfect friendship, whereby men love each other for themselves, can only occur among the good. Among wicked men, there is nothing in themselves which one can love or take pleasure in, except a certain usefulness.

Only the friendship of the good, which is perfect, is of its nature unchangeable. Friendships cease principally for the

reason that one of those concerned finds in the other something which is contrary to the friendship. But this cannot occur in the friendship of the good, since a man does not easily believe anything ill of him whom he has tried over a long period of time and has never found doing anything unjust, and in whom he finds all that is deemed worthy of true friendship. Thus such a friendship is not dissolved, both because it is genuine and not accidental and because it is perfect, containing within itself all that is required for friendship according to the definition above, also because it is not subject to the impediment of friendship which follows.

In other friendships there is nothing to prevent one from believing evil of the other, or one doing something unjust to the other. Therefore, those in such friendships are not really friends. But since men are accustomed to call such people friends, both those whom they love because of utility, as there is said to be friendship among states because of the utility of their alliance against enemies, and those who love each other because of pleasure as in the case of children, we must submit to the common custom of speaking and call them friends.

In conclusion, there are several types of friendship. First and principally there is the friendship of the good, for their goodness. The other types of friendship are called so because of similarity. Men are called friends in such friendships because of a certain resemblance to true friendship. It is plain that pleasure seems a certain good to the lovers of pleasure. Thus this friendship has a certain resemblance to that founded on the true good. The same is true of useful friendship.

These two latter types of friendship do not always go together, i.e., the same being friends both for utility and pleasure, because those things which are accidental are not everywhere conjoined, as in the case of being a musician and being white. The above friendships are accidental,⁸ as said above. Therefore they are not always conjoined. Thus, since friendship is divided into the above categories, wicked men can be friends in that they are alike in one of the above. But only the good are essentially friends. The others are only friends by similitude, in so far as they resemble the good.

Ch. 5: Aristotle shows that friendship consists both in act and in habit. Although distance dissolves the acts of friendship, it nevertheless does not dissolve the habit.

Just as in regard to the virtues, some men are called good because of their activity, so too in friendship. For those who live together delight in each other and confer benefits upon each other; but those who are asleep or separated by distance are not performing but are disposed to perform the activities of friendship. Distance does not break off friendship absolutely, but only its activity.

But if the absence is lasting, it seems to make men forget their friendship. Whence it is said that many friendships are dissolved by not calling one's friends.

Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily, for there is little that is pleasant in them. No one can spend his days with one who is sad, or not pleasant. For nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to seek the pleasant.

Those, however, who approve of each other but do not live together seem to be well disposed rather than actual friends.

For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together. While those in need seek utility, even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together. For solitude suits such people least of all. But people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, as seems to be true of those nourished together.

The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said. For that which is essentially good or pleasant seems to be lovable and to be chosen; and for each person that which is so to him. The good man is such to the good man for both these reasons.

For love may be likened to feeling, but friendship to habit.

Love may be felt toward lifeless things, but mutual love springs from choice, and choice derives from a state of character.

The good which men wish to their friends for their sake comes not from feeling but from a state of character.

In loving a friend, men love what is good to themselves. For the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend.

Each, then, both loves what is good to himself and makes an equal return both as to willing and to the kind of willing. For friendship is said to be equality. These things are found chiefly in the friendship of the good.

After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship, he here determines them according to the proper act of friendship. First he distinguishes friendship according to act and habit, then proves what he has brought forward. He begins by saying that just as in other virtues certain are called good, that is, virtuous by habit, having fortitude or liberality, even when they do not exercise these virtues in act, while certain

others are called virtuous by reason of exercising the acts of virtue, so also in friendship: certain are called friends in act in that they live together with pleasure and do good to one another—which two activities appear to belong to the act of friendship—while certain others do not actually perform the acts of friendship yet are habitually disposed to performing them, as occurs in friends when they are asleep or when they are separated by distance. Friendship itself is not dissolved by distance but only the activity of friendship. Thus it is evident that friendship remains even when the activity ceases.

He shows that nevertheless certain things are lacking to friendship when activity is missing. Thus he says that if the absence of friends from each other is of long duration, it seems to bring about forgetfulness of the previous friendship. So too, other habits are weakened by lack of activity and finally vanish. It is necessary that habits which are acquired by activity be preserved in the same way. For each and every thing is preserved by its cause. Thus it is said proverbially that many friendships are dissolved through the fact that one does not call the other and does not speak to and live with the other.

He also says that neither do old people nor severe people, i.e., men who are austere in speech and life, appear prone to friendship, because they are not apt for the activity of friendship, which is to live together. There is little pleasure in them. Therefore they cannot easily live together since no one can all day long, that is, for a long time, live with a man who sorrows or with one who does not please. It seems to be fundamentally natural to men and other animals to flee sorrow and desire pleasure, which is nothing other than the repose of the appetite in the desired good.

There is also another type of men who are receptive to each other in that the one accepts the manners and ways of the other yet because of some circumstances they never live together. Such men are more benevolent than friends, since friendship requires living with each other at least at times.

Aristotle now proves what he has previously supposed, namely, that living together is required for friendship as its proper act. He states that nothing is so proper to friends as to live together. He has stated above that two things belong to the activity of friendship, namely, to live together and to do good to one another, which is to be useful to one's friends, which

utility not all men seek in their friends but only those in need. But to dwell the day through, that is, for a long time, with one's friends, this even the blessed desire, i.e., those who abound in worldly goods, for whom it is not pleasing to be alone. Men cannot get along together unless they are pleasing to each other and enjoy the same things, both of which factors are found in those who are nourished together. It is therefore evident that the principal act of friendship is to live with one's friend.

Aristotle concludes from the above that that friendship is greatest which is of the good. That appears to be lovable and desirable in itself and essentially so which is good or pleasurable in itself. That is lovable and desirable to each which is such to him. But one virtuous man is lovable and desirable to the other for both these reasons: because both are good and pleasing in themselves, and to each other. Therefore the virtuous above all can live together with pleasure.

Now he proves that friendship exists not only in act but also in habit. First he states that love seems to imply passion. But friendship seems to imply habit and to be like other habits.

Secondly he proves this. The first reason is that love in its fundamental sense may be had even towards inanimate things, as when one is said to love wine or gold. But mutual love, which pertains to the essence of friendship, as was said above, is through choice and can be had only by rational beings toward each other. That which is done through choice, is not done through passion but more by habit. Therefore friendship is a habit.

By friendship men wish good to their friends for themselves. If they wished good to their friends for their own gain, this would be loving oneself rather than one's friends. To love others for their own sake is not according to passion, since passion, which pertains to the sense appetite, does not go beyond the proper good of the one loving.⁹ Friendship therefore depends upon habit, and thus friendship is a habit.

Aristotle now answers a certain tacit objection. It was said above that that is lovable to each which is good to him. That a man should love a friend for his own sake appears to be contrary to this. But Aristotle answers that those who love their friend love that which is good to them. For when a person who is good in himself becomes the friend of someone, he becomes good to his friend. Thus both, when each loves his friend, love what is good

to them. And both make an equal return to each other, both as to will, in that each wishes good to the other, and as to the type of willing in that each wishes good to the other not for his own sake but for the other's sake. For friendship is a certain equality in that it requires a mutual return of love. This appears to add something over and above virtue. For in each and every virtue, the virtuous act suffices. But in friendship the act of one is not enough, but there is required the acts of two who love each other mutually. Therefore the Philosopher does not say that friendship is a virtue absolutely, but adds 'or implies virtue', since it appears to add something over and above virtue.

What has been said here concerning friendship is seen to pertain principally to the good.

Ch. 6: The reasons why old people and severe people are not apt for friendship are set forth. It is also impossible that there be true friendship among a great number.

Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch as they are more hard-tempered and enjoy companionship less. For these are thought to be the greatest marks of friendship and most productive of it. That is why, while young men become friends quickly, old men do not. It is because men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight. Similarly sour people do not quickly make friends either. But such men may bear goodwill to each other. For they wish one another well and aid one another in need. But they are hardly friends, because they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other. These are thought the greatest marks of friendship.

One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of perfect friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once. For love is a sort of excess of feeling. It is of the nature of such only to be felt toward one person.

It is not easy for many people at the same time to please one person. Perhaps this would not be well either.

One must acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with him, and this is very hard.

But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many people should please one. For many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time.

Of these two kinds, that which is for the sake of pleasure is the more like friendship, when both parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the same things, as in the friendships of the young.

For generosity is more found in such friendships. Friendship based on utility is for the commercially minded.

People who are supremely happy, too, have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant friends. For they wish to live with someone. They can put up with something sad for a while. But no one could put up with it continuously. Not even with the Good itself, if it were painful to one.

That is why they look out for friends who are pleasant. Perhaps they should look out for friends who, being pleasant, are also good. They must be good for them, too, and thus they will have what is required for friendship.

People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into distinct classes. Some people are useful to them and others are pleasing. But the same people are rarely both.

For they seek neither those whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue, nor those whose utility is with a view to noble objects. But in their desire for pleasure they seek for those with a sense of humor, for utility they call on those who are industrious in carrying out whatever they command. The two are rarely combined.

Now we have said that the good man is both pleasant and useful. But such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is also surpassed in virtue. Unless this is so, they do not meet on the ground of uniform superiority. But people who surpass him in both respects are not easy to find.

The aforesaid friendships involve equality. For the friends get the same things from each other and wish the same things to each other, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for utility.

We have said, however, that such friendships (for pleasure or utility) are both less truly friendships and less permanent. For it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be friendships. For one of them involves pleasure and the other utility; and these characteristics both belong to the friendship of virtue. It is because the friendship of virtue is unchanging and permanent, while these quickly change, as well as differing in many other respects, that they appear to many not to be friendships—because they are unlike the friendship of virtue.

After the Philosopher has distinguished the different types of friendship, he here determines these friendships in relation to the subject, i.e., the friends themselves. First he treats of the aptitude and inaptitude of certain men for friendship. He begins by saying that there is so much the less friendship among the severe and the aged as they are the more hard-tempered, that is, presuming of themselves, they follow their own way. Therefore they cannot agree with others. They enjoy the conversation of others less, both because they are intent upon themselves and because they are suspicious of others. Yet agreement and speaking with one's friends would seem to be one of the principal activities of friendship and conducive to it.

Consequently, young people, who enjoy talking together and easily assent to others, make friends rapidly. Such is not the case with the aged. They cannot become friends with those whose association and conversation they do not enjoy. The same reason holds for the severe, who are contentious and critical of what is done by others. Such men, i.e., the aged and the severe, can be benevolent, in that they wish good to others, and even come to their assistance in necessity. Yet they do not become really friends, in that they do not live together and do not enjoy the company of friends, both of which appear to be fundamental activities of friendship.

Secondly Aristotle speaks of the number of friends. He begins by showing that in perfect friendship, which is the friendship of the good, one does not have many friends. This is so because, first of all, since such friendship is perfect and the greatest, it is comparable to a certain superabundance of love, regard being had to the quantity of love. In the love itself, however, there will be no excess. It is not possible that virtue and the virtuous man be loved excessively by another virtuous man who orders his affections by reason. Such a quantitatively superabundant love naturally cannot be had for many, but for one; as occurs in love among the sexes wherein it does not occur that a man loves several women superabundantly. Perfect friendship, therefore, cannot be had toward many.

Another reason is that in perfect friendship the friends are most pleasing to each other. But it is not likely that many will please each other at the same time. There are not many to be found who do not have something displeasing to some man because of the many human defects and their conflicting natures. Consequently, whereas one man may be very pleasing, another may not be. Possibly it would not be well if many different men were most pleasing to a man, because while associating with many he could not pay attention to himself. Therefore, there are not many friends in perfect friendship.

A final reason is that in perfect friendship one must get to know one's friend through long association. This is most difficult and therefore cannot occur in many cases. Thus many friends are not implied in perfect friendship.

In the other two types of friendship, however, a man may have many friends to whom he is pleasing. First, because there can be many who are useful and pleasing to the senses. Secondly,

because a long time is not required, but it suffices for such friendships that in a brief interval the friends give pleasure or some utility to each other.

Of these two sorts of friendship, in which one may have many friends, that for pleasure's sake seems to resemble friendship more. If the same is done by both, i.e., if both give pleasure to each other, they both enjoy the same things, which is proper to friendship. It is a sign that their pleasure is one if they enjoy the same things. (But this is not the case when pleasure is given on the one hand, and something useful on the other.) Such pleasurable friendships are those of the young who love each other because of the mutual pleasure they afford.

The reason for this is that in pleasurable friendship the friends love each other more liberally than in useful friendship in which there must be some return of gain. This latter sort of friendship thus appears to resemble a business agreement. Pleasurable friendship is therefore stronger, as approaching closer to perfect friendship, which is most liberal since in it the friends love each other for themselves.

Another reason is that blessed men, i.e., men abounding in goods, do not need useful friends, since such men are self-sufficient, but they do need pleasing friends because they must associate with others, which is impossible if pleasure is not forthcoming. Men can stand sadness for a time. But no man can put up with sadness indefinitely. He could not even stand the true good if it was a source of sadness to him. That is why men who do not take pleasure in good deeds cannot long persevere in them. It is therefore plain that pleasurable friendship is greater than useful friendship as being necessary to more men and better-fated men.

Here Aristotle infers a certain corollary. Since even the true good, if it were something sad, would be intolerable, it follows that those who are friends for virtue's sake must be pleasing to each other. They must not only be good in themselves but in each other's eyes. Thus they will have what is required for friendship.

Finally Aristotle treats of the distinction of friends. First he points out that men who are in power use different sorts of friends, i.e., some are useful friends, others are pleasant friends. It does not easily occur that the same men are their friends in both senses.

This he proves by noting that such men in power do not seek the pleasure of virtue. Such pleasure has a conjoined usefulness. Nor do they seek friends who are useful in the pursuit of true goods. Such utility has a conjoined pleasure. For pleasure they call on men who excel at play, such as actors. For utility they call on other friends who industriously carry out whatever they command, whether good or evil. The two are not found in the same man, i.e., both industry and jocularity, because industrious men do not give themselves to joking but to serious matters. Thus men in power have different sorts of friends.¹⁰

He now answers an objection. Someone might say that a man in power has also friends who are both pleasant and useful, since a virtuous man is both of these. But Aristotle answers that a virtuous man does not become the friend of a man who superabounds in power or wealth, unless the virtuous man finds that the man in power exceeds him in virtue. If this is not the case, the man in power who is excelled in virtue does not recompense the virtuous man proportionately, i.e., just as the virtuous man defers to him as being more powerful, so he should defer to the virtuous man as being better.

Usually, the more men excel in power and wealth, the better they think they are. It is not often that one finds men in power who are such that they either excel in virtue or defer to the virtuous man as being better.¹¹

Now Aristotle shows that the aforesaid friendships reside in equality. Since this is already evident in friendship for goodness' sake, he now proves this for useful and pleasurable friendship. In these cases they either wish and do the same things for each other, repaying pleasure with pleasure, or usefulness with usefulness, or else they exchange one for the other, i.e., usefulness for pleasure or vice versa.

Aristotle concludes that it is evident from the above that those friendships which are less properly friendship are less enduring than perfect friendship which is that of the good, by comparison with which these other friendships are more or less so. Inasmuch as they resemble true friendship, they seem to be so in that one offers pleasure and the other utility. Perfect friendship has both.

But as to the other aspects of friendship they seem to be lacking, in that perfect friendship is unchanging and enduring. The other sorts are quickly changed. They differ in many other

respects also, as is evident from what has gone before. Because of this dissimilarity they do not appear to be friendships in the true sense.

Ch. 7: The friendship of unequals is discussed, such as that of father and son, man and wife. The differences between these friendships are shown, and how they are preserved.

But there is another kind of friendship—that which involves an inequality between the parties, e.g. that of father to son and in general of the elder to the younger, that of man to wife and in general that of ruler to subject.

These friendships differ also from each other. For it is not the same that exists between parents and children and between ruler and subjects, nor is even that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband.

For the virtue and function of each of these is different.

So are the reasons for which they love. The love and friendship are therefore different also.

Each party, then, neither gets the same from the other, nor ought to seek it. But when children render to parents what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent.

In all such friendships the love should be proportional, i.e., the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases. For when the love is in proportion to the dignity of the parties, there arises a certain equality, which is certainly held to be characteristic of friendship.

But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice and in friendship. For in acts of justice, equality according to dignity precedes equality according to quantity. In friendship, however, equality according to quantity precedes equality according to dignity.

This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or of any other kind of abundance. Such men do not remain friends, nor even expect to be so.

This is manifest in the case of the gods. For they surpass us most decisively in all good things. It is also clear in the case of kings. For men do not expect to be their friends who are much inferior to them. Nor do men who are of no account expect to be friends with the best or wisest men.

In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends can remain friends. For much can be taken away and friendship remain. But when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases.

Whence it is that the question arises whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of becoming gods. For, in that

case, they will no longer be friends, nor will they be good for them, for friends are good things in themselves.

The answer is that if we were right in saying that one friend wishes good to another for his sake, he certainly wishes his friend to remain as he is. It is therefore to his friend as a man that he wishes the greatest goods.

But perhaps not all the greatest goods. For it is for himself most of all that each man wishes what is good.

After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship which consist in equality, he here distinguishes the kind of friendship which is among unequal persons. First he determines those things which in general pertain to the distinction of such friendships. Secondly he distinguishes these friendships according to their special properties. Thus he begins by treating of the friendships in which one exceeds the other, secondly of those between contraries, such as a rich man and a poor man.

Besides the friendships already mentioned, which have been said to consist in equality in that they are of those who are alike in virtue or utility or the power to please, there is also another type of friendship which is according to superabundance, in that one person exceeds the other, as in the friendship of father to son, and generally of the older to the younger and of man to wife, and in general of every man who has dominion over anyone to him over whom he has dominion.¹²

He sets down how these friendships differ from each other specifically. They differ first of all according to the different kinds of superabundance. There is one kind of friendship of father toward son and another of the one commanding to those he commands. Another difference lies in the diverse relations of the one exceeding and the one exceeded. The friendship of the father to the son is not the same as that of the son to the father, nor is that the same between husband and wife and wife and husband.

This is true for two reasons. First of all, since friendship exists both in habit and in act, it is necessary that in each friend there must be a certain habitual disposition for fulfilling those things which belong to friendship, and friendship itself. It is obvious that in each of the above, the actual carrying out of friendship is not the same in every case, as of father to son, and man to wife, or of son to father. Consequently it is not one and

the same virtue. Therefore there are different kinds of friendship involved.

The second reason is that in these friendships there are different reasons for loving. The father loves his son for one reason, the son the father for another, likewise a man his wife. But according to the different reasons for love, there are different loves, and consequently different friendships.

Now he shows how the aforesaid friendships are preserved. First of all they are preserved by the fact that each shows toward the other what is right in loving and being loved. Secondly Aristotle shows the relation of love and being loved to friendship, (Ch. 8). Thus, first of all the same things are not done in these friendships on both sides, nor should one require the same things as the other does. Thus a son should not seek from his father the same reverence which he shows him, as in the previous friendships pleasure is demanded for pleasure and utility for utility. But when they show toward their parents what they should show towards the sources of their being, and the parents show towards their children what they should show to those they have engendered, their friendship will be enduring and virtuous.¹³

Aristotle now shows how this should be done. He states that in all friendships according to superabundance of one person towards another, there must be love in proportion, i.e., the better of the two should be loved more than he loves. The same is true of the more useful and the more pleasing or of any other excellence. When both are loved according to their dignity, there is then a certain equality of proportion which appears to belong to friendship.

He now shows how this applies diversely to justice and to friendship. The equality and proportion according to dignity are not the same in justice and in friendship. For, as was said in Book V concerning justice, dignity must be first estimated according to proportion and there is then an equal exchange. But in friendship the opposite is true, since there must first exist a certain equality between persons who love each other, and then there is shown what is fitting to each according to his dignity.

The reason for this difference is that friendship is a certain union or society of friends, which cannot exist among those widely separated, but must approach a certain equality. Consequently it pertains to friendship to use an equality already

constituted with equity, but it pertains to justice to reduce that which is unequal to equality. When equality exists, the work of justice is done. Thus equality is ultimate in justice, but is the beginning in friendship.¹⁴

Aristotle now shows the truth of this by a sign. The equality which is first required by friendship is evident in the fact that if there exists a great gap of virtue or of wickedness or of anything whatever, men do not remain friends, nor is it thought worth while to have friendship between those who differ greatly.

There is the example of those who greatly exceed men in all goods. Consequently they do not have friendship for men, conversing and living with them. These separated substances Aristotle calls gods after the manner of the people.¹⁵ Secondly there is the example of kings who do not think those far lower than themselves worthy of their friendship. The third example is of those men who are the best and the most wise who do not make friends of those who are completely unworthy.

Aristotle now answers a possible question. One might ask how great a distance can exist and friendship still survive. He answers that in such matters one cannot give a certain determination. It is enough to recognize in general that one can lose much which another possesses and friendship still survive. On the other hand if the distance is very great, as between man and God, such a friendship as we are now discussing cannot subsist.¹⁶

There arises from the above a certain doubt, namely, do friends wish for their friends the greatest goods, i.e., that they should be gods or kings or most virtuous? It would seem that they do not, because then they would no longer be friends and thus would lose a great good: their friends.

He solves this objection in a twofold way. First, since one friend wishes good to the other for his own sake, one must presuppose that once these goods attained the friend himself will not change. One friend wishes the greatest goods to the other as he is, not as being set among the gods.

He also says that a friend wishes good to a friend but not more than to all others whatsoever, since each wishes such goods for himself also. Consequently he cannot wish for his friend those goods by which he would lose his friend who is a great good.

Ch. 8: Loving and being loved: their relation in friendship.

Most people seem, owing to love of honor, to wish to be loved rather than to love.

This is why many men love flattery. For the flatterer is a friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be such, and to love more than he is loved.

Being loved seems to be akin to being honored. This latter is what many aim at.

But it seems to be not for its own sake that people choose honor, but incidentally. For many enjoy being honored by those in positions of authority because of their hopes. For they think they will get from them what they need. Therefore they rejoice in honor as a sign of good feeling. Those who seek honor from good men and wise men seek to confirm their own opinion of themselves. They delight in honor, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness on the strength of the judgment of those who speak about them.

In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own sake.

Whence it would seem to be better than being honored, and friendship to be desirable in itself.

But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as indicated by the delight mothers take in loving. For some mothers hand over their children to be brought up, and so long as they know their fate they love them. They do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have both), but seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering. They themselves love their children, even though these, because of their ignorance, give them nothing of a mother's due.

For friendship consists more in loving, and it is those who love their friends who are praised. Thus the virtue of friends seems to be in loving. So those in whom this is found in the proper measure, remain friends, and theirs is friendship that endures. It is in this way more than any other that unequals can be friends. For they are thus equalized. Equality and likeness are friendship.

This is especially true of those who are alike in virtue. For they are steadfast in themselves and hold fast to each other. Neither do they ask nor give base services. But, one may say, they even prevent them. For it is characteristic of good men that they neither go wrong themselves nor allow their friends to do so.

But wicked men have nothing steadfast about them. For they do not remain even like to themselves. They become friends for a short time because they delight in each other's wickedness.

Friends who are useful and pleasant last longer, i.e., as long as they provide each other with pleasure or utility.

Friendship for utility's sake seems to come about principally among contraries, e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant and learned, for what a man lacks he aims at and gives something else in return.

Some place under this head the lover and the beloved, the beautiful and the ugly.

That is why lovers sometimes seem ridiculous when they demand to be loved as they love. If they are lovable, their claim can perhaps be justified. But when they have nothing lovable about them it is ridiculous. Perhaps, however, the contrary is not desired as such but only incidentally, for the

desire is for what is intermediate. For that is what is good, e.g. it is good for the dry not to become wet but to come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the hot and in all other cases. These subjects we may dismiss, for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our inquiry.

After the Philosopher has set down that friendship between unequal persons is maintained by loving and being loved proportionately, he now shows the relationship of loving and being loved to friendship. First he shows that it is more proper to friendship to love than to be loved. Secondly he shows that by love according to dignity, i.e., proportionate love, friendship is preserved. Thus, he first begins by saying that many appear to wish to be loved more than to love, and this because they love honor. For it pertains to those who are superior, to whom honor is owed, that they should be more loved than they themselves love.

This he proves by a sign. From the fact that many wish to be loved more than they love, it follows that many are lovers of adulation, i.e., they get pleasure out of being flattered. One who flatters is either really a friend in an inferior position, since it belongs to the lesser to flatter or by flattering pretends to be so, and to love more than he is loved.

He now explains what he means by saying that because of a love for honor a man wishes to be loved more than he loves. Being loved is close to being honored, which is desired by many. Honor is a certain sign of the goodness of him who is honored; one loves whatever is good or appears to be good.

He now compares being loved and being honored. First of all, men do not desire honor for its own sake but accidentally. Men seek honor especially from two types of men.

Many are pleased if they are honored by the powerful, not because of the honor but because of the hope which they derive from it. They therefore rejoice in honor as in a certain sign of good feeling, i.e., of the affection of those honoring them. There are others however, who seek honor from virtuous men and wise men, because in this way they seek to confirm their own opinion of their goodness. Thus they rejoice really in the fact that they are good, as though believing this on the judgment of upright men, who, by honoring them, seem to call them good.

Secondly, men rejoice in being loved even for itself, and to have friends appears to be the principal exterior sign of honor.

Consequently, since that which is essential to something is greater than that which is accidental, it follows that it is better to be loved than to be honored, since friendship is desirable in itself.

Aristotle now says that friendship consists more in loving than in being loved. Friendship appears as a kind of habit, as was shown above. A habit, however, is destined to action. To love is to act well, being loved is rather receiving an effect. Therefore it is more proper to friendship to love than to be loved.

Aristotle shows this by a certain sign. Mothers, who have a strong friendship for their children, delight more in loving their children than in being loved by them. Some mothers even give their children to others to bring up, and knowing them to be their children, they love them but do not seek to any great extent to be loved by them in return since this cannot be done. It seems to suffice them to see them acting well and faring well. Thus they love their children even though these latter cannot return them a fitting love because of ignorance, i.e., they do not know them to be their mothers.

Aristotle now shows how by love according to dignity, or proportion, friendship is preserved. First he shows how friendship endures if it is proportionate. Since friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, friends are praised for loving, not for being loved. That is the praise of friends.

Since each is praised for his proper virtue, it follows that the virtue of one loving is judged according to his love. Therefore whenever friends love their friends according to the proportion of their dignity, they remain friends and their friendship is persevering. Thus, as long as they love each other according to their dignity, even those who are of unequal condition may be friends, because they are thus equalized. The one who is more lacking in goodness or in some other excellence, loves more, and thus by the abundance of his love makes up for the defect of his condition.

On the basis of this he compares the aforesaid types of friendship. First he shows what friendship is most enduring. Similarity, which brings about and preserves friendship, seems to exist especially among the virtuous. These latter remain alike in themselves, because they are not easily changed from one thing to another, and remain in their friendship for one another. This is because one does not need to have the other do anything wrong for him, which would be against the virtue of the one doing it.

Neither of them aids the other in anything wrong. But if there may be said to be anything wrong among the virtuous, one would rather prevent the other from doing it. For it belongs to the good that neither do they do wrong, nor do they allow their friends to do wrong.¹⁷

He now shows what friendship is least enduring. Evil men do not have anything firm and stable within themselves. The wickedness in which they are is of itself hateful, and thus their affection varies since they can find nothing in which their will can rest, nor do they long remain alike toward each other. But rather they wish contrary things to those they wished at first, and thus they are friends for a while, i.e., as long as they enjoy the wickedness in which they agree.

Finally he notes those friendships which are between the two, and says that useful and pleasurable friendships are more enduring than evil ones. Utility and pleasure have something in themselves whence they are loved. Therefore these friendships last so long as the friends render pleasure or utility to each other. It is otherwise with those who are friends in wickedness, who have nothing lovable in themselves.

Finally he determines concerning that friendship which appears to be between men of disparate condition. First he shows that such friendship seems to be chiefly because of utility, in that one friend seeks from the other something that he lacks and gives something else in return, as the poor man desires to receive riches from the wealthy man, for which he gives him service in return.

Next he shows how this may also apply in pleasurable friendship. He states that one can reduce to this type of friendship love between the sexes, by which the lover loves the one loved. There is sometimes a certain contrariety in such love, as between the beautiful and the ugly. In friendship which is because of virtue, however, there can be no contrariety, since it is chiefly in this type of friendship that similarity exists, as stated above.

Because between the lover and the one loved there is sometimes a contrariety, as between the beautiful and the ugly, it follows that occasionally one sees lovers derided who consider that they should be loved as much as they love. This is fitting if they are both equally lovable. But if they have no such

quality which merits that they be loved to such an extent, it is ridiculous if they seek to be so.

Finally he shows how one contrary may desire the other. He states that this is not so of itself but accidentally. Of itself a middle state is desired which is the good of the subject affected by one of the contraries to excess. For instance, if a man's body is very dried out, moisture is not good and desirable to him in itself but as a means to a middle state which is attained by the moisture. The same is true of heat and other such contraries. Since this question pertains more to natural philosophy he therefore states that it will be passed over.

Ch. 9: All friendship is based on communication. Friendships are diversified according to the different communications. It is shown how these communications have a similarity to political communication.

Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion, to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every communication there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship, too.

Therefore men address as friends their fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers, and those associated with them in any other kind of community. The extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is of the justice which exists between them.

The proverb "what friends have is common property" expresses the truth, for friendship depends on community.

Now brothers and those nourished together have all things in common, others have some things separate. Some have more, some less. According to this some friendships are greater, some less great.

The claims of justice differ, too. For the duties of parents to children and those of brothers to each other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens. So, too, with the other kinds of friendship. For that which is just varies according to each.

Justice and injustice increase as they are shown to those who are more our friends, e.g. it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a fellow citizen, more cruel not to help a brother than a stranger, to strike one's father than anyone else. The demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship, which seems to imply that they apply to the same matters and both belong to a certain equality of communication.

Now all forms of community may be assimilated to aspects of political community. They concur in that they confer some utility and are for the acquisition of those things necessary to life. But political community, too, seems to arise for some gain, for it seems to be in order to seek something

useful and acquire it that citizens first come together and remain united. For this is what legislators aim at, and they call that just which is to the common advantage.

Now other communities aim at some particular advantages, e.g. sailors at what is advantageous on a voyage in view to making money, or some other thing. Fellow-soldiers aim at what is advantageous in war, whether it is money, or victory, or the conquest of a state. Members of the tribes and demes act similarly.

Some communities seem to arise for the sake of pleasure, as those for singing together or playing musical instruments together. But these are for sacrifices and weddings.

But all these are contained under political communication. For the latter aims not at present advantage, but what is advantageous for life as a whole. Those who perform sacrifices and who arrange the meetings and bestow honors upon the gods, also intend to provide pleasant relaxation for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of firstfruits. For it was at these seasons that people had most leisure.

All communities, then, seem to be part of the political community. Thus the particular kinds of friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of political community.

After the Philosopher has touched on the different types of friendship among unequals, he now distinguishes them according to the properties of each. First he shows that these different friendships are distinguished like political communications.¹⁸ Secondly he distinguishes them thus. As to the first he states that all friendship consists in communication. All communication may be reduced to political communication. Therefore all friendships can be distinguished according to political communications. He proves the first statement in two ways.

He does so first of all by reason: showing that such is the nature of friendship. As was said above, justice and friendship are concerned with the same matters. But justice consists in communication. All justice is towards another, as is said in Book V. Therefore friendship consists in communication.

Secondly, he shows the same from customary speech. Men are accustomed to call friends those who communicate with them in some way, e.g. fellow seamen those who sail with them, fellow soldiers those who bear arms with them. The same is true in other communications, since friendship appears to exist among men according to the degree in which they communicate with each other.

Thirdly he adduces a proverb. Among the people it is said that friends have all things in common. Therefore friendship consists in communication.

Now he shows that friendships are diversified according to the different communications. This he does in three ways. First he shows the differences of friendship according to the difference of communication. We see that among brothers and persons so conjoined all things are in common, i.e., house, table, and so forth. Other friends have certain separate possessions. Some have more and some less. According to this, some friendships are greater, namely among those who have more in common, some friendships are less, namely among those who have less in common. From this it is evident that if there were no communication there would be no friendship.

He also shows that justice is diversified according to different communications. That which is just is not the same in every communication, but different, just as it is evident that there is not the same justice between a father and his sons and between the brothers themselves. Likewise justice is different between those who have been brought up together, and among citizens, who mutually render other things to each other as being due. The same is true of other friendships. Thus it is evident that justice varies with each of the above.

He now shows how justice is diversified according to the different friendships. He states that justice and injustice increase as they are exercised towards those who are more our friends. It is more just to do more good for a friend and more unjust to harm him, as for a man to steal or plunder money belonging to someone close to him or brought up with him is more harsh and unjust than if he did the same to another citizen. The same would hold true if he withdrew help from a brother more than if he did the same to a stranger, or if he should strike his father, more than if he struck some other.

The fact that friendship and that which is just grow together proceeds from the fact that they exist in the same matters and both belong to a certain equality of communication. This sign confirms what has been said above.

Now he shows that all communications are reduced to political communication. First he shows that all communications are similar to political communication. We perceive that all communications concur in something useful: to the end, that is, of

procuring some one of those things which are necessary to life. This seems to be likewise true of political communication since citizens appear to have first come together and to persevere together because of common utility. This is evident for two reasons.

The first is that lawmakers appear to tend principally toward procuring the common utility. Secondly men call that just in a state which contributes to the common utility.

He now shows that other communications are contained under political communication. First, communications other than the political, intend some particular good: e.g. those sailing together intend to acquire money if they are merchants, or some such thing. If they are soldiers they agree in that for which the war exists, whether it is money, or purely victory, or dominion over some state. Thus those, too, who belong to one tribe or one people, agree on some particular utility.

Even those communications which seem to be based on pleasure are undertaken for something useful. Certain communications seem to be for this former reason, as that of those who sing together in a choir, or of those who use brass instruments, i.e., the tuba and the cymbals. Such communications are usually made for the sake of sacrifices to the gods that men may be retained there more pleasurably, and for weddings that the man and wife may have greater pleasure since they communicate in such general rejoicing.

From the above Aristotle concludes that all other communications are contained under political communication. All are customarily contained under the political since it is customary that all be ordained through the political.¹⁹ Other communications are ordained to some particular utility. The political however, does not intend any particular and present good, but intends that which is useful throughout life. This he shows in particular concerning the communications of those who convene for pleasure, and principally in the case of sacrifices where it is less evident.

Those who perform sacrifices in such meetings intend to give honor to God and to procure for themselves rest with a certain pleasure, which is ordained to the utility of life. Whence, among the ancients, after the harvesting of the crops, i.e., in the autumn, sacrifices were made and men gathered together, to offer up the first fruits. This was a time apt for

men to relax, both that they might rest from their previous labors, and because they had at hand a sufficiency of foodstuffs. Thus it is evident that all these are subject to political ordination, as pertaining to the utility of life.

He now concludes to his proposition, namely, that all communications are contained under the political as certain parts of it, inasmuch as the others are ordained to certain particular utilities, but the political to the common utility. Since friendships follow such communications, consequently the distinction of friendships is according to the political.

Ch. 10: The types and number of political bodies are set down and are seen to be three: Kingdom, Aristocracy, and Timocracy, of which the first is the best, the last the worst (of the three).

There are three kinds of polity, and an equal number of transgressions, or corruptions, of the same. The polities are kingdom, and aristocracy. The third, which is based on moderate possessions, seems to be fittingly called timocracy. Many simply call it polity.

The best of these is kingdom, the worst timocracy.

The transgression of kingdom is tyranny. Both are monarchies, but there is the greatest difference between them: the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. For a man is not a king unless he is sufficient to himself and excels his subjects in all good things; and such a man needs nothing further. Therefore he will not look to his own interests but to those of his subjects. A man who is not such will be more like a man chosen by lot than a king. Now a tyrant is the very contrary of this; the tyrant pursues his own good. And it is clearer in the case of tyranny that it is the worst transgression, for the worst is the contrary of the best. The depraved form of monarchy is tyranny, and a bad king becomes a tyrant.

Aristocracy turns into oligarchy through the wickedness of the leaders, who distribute the goods of the city without regard to worthiness, and all or most of them to themselves, giving office always to the same people, paying most regard to wealth. Thus the rulers are few, and are bad men instead of the most worthy.

Timocracy turns into democracy, for the two are co-terminous. For timocracy intends to be the rule of the majority, and all to be equal who have places of honor. Democracy is the least evil of the corrupt polities, for it is only a slight deviation from the original polity. Such polities as those enumerated are very greatly subject to change; these are the least and therefore, easiest, transitions.

One may find resemblances to these various polities and, as it were, examples of them, in domestic society.

The relationship between father and sons is like that of a kingdom. For the father cares for the children. That is why Homer calls Jove "father", for a kingdom should be paternal rule.

Among the Persians the rule of the father is tyrannical. They treat their children like slaves. But tyrannical rule is that of master to slave, for it is for the advantage of the master. Now this seems to be correct, but the Persian rule is wrong, because different persons call for different rules.

The association of husband and wife appears to be aristocratic. For the man rules in accordance with his worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule. But the matters that befit a woman, he hands over to her.

When a man rules in everything their relationship changes into oligarchy. For thus he is not acting according to his dignity, nor doing what is better. When women rule because they are heiresses, the rule is not by reason of virtue, but by reason of wealth and power, as in oligarchies.

The association of brothers is like that of a timocracy. For they are equal except for the difference of age. If the difference of age is great, the friendship seems to be no longer fraternal.

Democracy is found chiefly in houses where there is no master, for here all are equal, and he who rules has slight dominion, and each has power.

After showing that the types of friendship are reducible to political communication, he here distinguishes them according to the political communications. First, therefore, he distinguishes friendships according to this distinction; secondly he subdivides them (Ch. 12). He begins by distinguishing the political communications themselves, then the types of friendship according to them (Ch. 11).

He starts by saying therefore that there are three types of political communication, and as many corruptions or transgressions thereof. The proper polities are three: *kingdom* which is the rule of one; *aristocracy* which is the rule of the best, in that such a state is governed by the virtuous. It would seem proper that there be also another type, although they do not mention it, as is evident in Book IV of the *Politics*, which is fittingly called *timocracy* from *timos*. *Timos* means pay, since in this polity pay is given to the poor (to enable them to attend), and penalties inflicted upon the rich if they do not attend political assemblies, as is evident in Book IV of the *Politics*. Some call it by the common name of polity (or constitutional government), in that it is common to the rich and the poor, as is seen in Book IV of the *Politics*.

He now compares these polities with each other and states that the best among them is the *kingdom* in which one man

who is best rules; the worst, i.e., the least good, is the *timocracy* wherein a plurality of mediocre men rule. *Aristocracy* occupies a middle place, in which a few of the best rule, whose power of doing well is nevertheless not so great as that of the one best man acting with the plenitude of power.²⁰

He now discusses the corruption or transgression of the aforesaid politics. The transgression or corruption of a kingdom is called tyranny. He shows this by the fact that they agree generically. Both are monarchies, i.e., the government of one. Just as one man rules in a kingdom, so also in a tyranny.

They differ however in many ways. Contraries are those which differ greatly in the same genus. He manifests this difference by saying that the tyrant intends in his rule that which is useful to himself, the king intends that which is useful to his subjects.

This he proves by saying that a man cannot be called a king who is not sufficient of himself to reign, i.e., excelling in all goods, both of soul and body and exterior things that he may be worthy and capable of ruling. When he is such he needs nothing and therefore does not intend his own utility—which is typical of those in need—but rather is intent upon doing good for his subjects, which is proper to those who superabound. He who is not such, i.e., excelling in all goods, may be better called *clerotes*, that is, one chosen to rule as though by lot, than king. But the tyrant is contrary to the king because he seeks his own good. Consequently it is evident that this corruption is the worst. The worst is contrary to the best. One transgresses from a kingdom, which is the best, as has been said, to tyranny which is none other than the corruption of monarchy and the rule of one. When a king becomes bad he is called a tyrant. Consequently tyranny is the worst.

Next he treats of the corruption of aristocracy. From aristocracy one transgresses to oligarchy which is the rule of a few. This is because of the wickedness of those who rule, who do not distribute the goods of the state according to worth but rather usurp all the goods of the state or a great part of them for themselves and always confer authority upon the same ones, that they may be enriched, and their friends. Thus it comes about that in the place of the most virtuous who preside over an aristocracy, rule is had by a wicked few.

Timocracy corrupts into democracy, which is the power of

the people. Both these polities are co-terminous, i.e. neighboring. They are alike in two respects. The first is that even timocracy, which is the power of rewards, is the rule of the multitude, just as democracy. Secondly, in both polities all those who have places of honor are equal. They differ however, in that a timocracy intends the common good of both the rich and the poor. In a democracy however the good of the poor alone is intended. Consequently democracy is the least perverse. For it recedes only slightly from timocracy which is a correct type of polity.²¹

He concludes that polities greatly vary and thus are easily corrupted, as said above.

He now also distinguishes domestic groups according to the same lines. He therefore begins by saying that a likeness and example of the aforesaid polities may be found in domestic groups.

The communication between a father and his children is similar to a kingdom, because the father has the care of his children as a king has of his subjects. Thus Homer calls Jove, because of his royal power, father. Rule of a father in his house is like a certain kingdom.

As to tyranny, this exists in households first in the case of the Persians where the fathers treat their children like slaves; secondly in the manner in which masters employ slaves intending their own utility. These two ways differ, however, in that one appears correct, whereby masters use slaves for their own utility.²² The other is perverse, whereby fathers use children as slaves. It is fitting that one should rule over different types in a different way. Consequently it is perverse to rule over children and slaves in the same way.

Finally he says that the rule by which man and wife rule in their house is aristocratic, because the man has dominion over and care of those things which pertain to a man by his dignity and relinquishes to his wife those things that belong to her.

He now sets forth two types of household rule that correspond to oligarchy. One is when a husband wishes to dispose of all matters and leaves power over nothing to his wife. This is neither according to his dignity nor what is best. The other is when wives have complete sway by the fact that they possess the wealth, and then rule is not according to virtue but according to riches and power, as occurs in an oligarchy.

Finally as to timocracy. The rule by which brothers rule in a house appears to be timocratic, in that brothers are equals, except for differing in age. If this difference is great, their friendship would seem to be no longer fraternal, but paternal.

A certain likeness to democracy is found in houses which have no master, as when associates dwell in an inn. Here all are equal and if one rules he has slight power, as for example the one deputed to pay the expenses. Each of the associates has power in the house, as in democracies any man of the people has power, as if by equality, and leaders can do little.

Ch. 11: Aristotle teaches that to each type of polity there corresponds a type of friendship. This is true both of good and corrupt polities.

According to each of the polities, there seems to be friendship, in that in each there is some kind of justice.

The friendship of a king for his subjects consists in an excess of benefits conferred, for he confers benefits on his subjects if, being a good man, he cares for them with a view to their well being. Whence Homer called Agamemnon "shepherd of the peoples."

Such too is the friendship of a father.

They differ, however, as to the magnitude of the benefits. For the father is the cause of his children's being, which is thought the greatest good, and of their nurture and instruction. These things are ascribed to ancestors as well.

For by nature a father rules over his children, and ancestors over their descendants, and a king over his subjects.

These friendships imply superiority of one party over the other. For this reason parents are honored. The justice that exists between persons so related is not the same on both sides but is in every case proportioned to merit, which is also true of friendship.

The friendship of man and wife is the same as that found in an aristocracy. For it is in accordance with virtue, and the better gets more of what is good, and each what is fitting, and so too with justice.

The friendship of brothers is like that of those who are comrades. For they are equal and of like age. Such are usually of like instruction and like ways. The friendship of timocracy is similar to this. For citizens wish to be equal and fair, and to rule in part and equally, and so exists the friendship between them.

In the corruptions of the same, as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship.

It exists least in the worst form. For there is little or no friendship in tyranny.

For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is no

friendship either, nor justice. But the relationship is rather that of artisan to tool, soul to body, and master to servant. For these are aided by the latter, which they use for their own advantage. But one does not have friendship toward lifeless things, nor for a horse or an ox, nor for a slave as such, for there is nothing in common. A slave is a living tool, and a tool a lifeless slave.

As slave, therefore, one has not friendship toward him, but as a man. For there appears to be a certain justice between a man and any other with whom he can share in law and agreement, and likewise friendship, but as to a man. There is little friendship and justice in tyrannies.

The most is that which exists in democracies. For those who are equal have many things in common.

Having distinguished the different types of political and domestic communities, Aristotle here distinguishes the types of friendship according to the same. Thus he first states his proposition, saying that according to each civic and political group there is a corresponding friendship, since in every polity there is found some kind of justice. Friendship and justice are in a certain way concerned with the same things, as was said above.

Secondly, he proves his proposition. This he does first concerning correct polities. Thus he begins with friendship corresponding to kingdom. First he shows what kind of friendship exists between the king and his subjects; secondly, he compares paternal friendship to regal friendship. He states therefore first of all that there exists between the king and his subjects a friendship of superabundance in the line of beneficence, as of the one bestowing good toward the one receiving it. It pertains to a king to do good to his subjects. If he is good, he watches over his subjects that they may act well, for he intends to make his subjects virtuous. He is given names denoting that he directs his subjects as a shepherd his sheep. For this reason Homer called King Agamemnon the shepherd of peoples.

He now begins to compare paternal to regal friendship and states first they they are similar.

The two friendships differ however in regards to the magnitude of the beneficence. Although the beneficence of the king is absolutely the greatest insofar as it is directed towards the whole multitude, nevertheless in comparison to the individual person that of the father is greater. For the father is the cause to his child of three supreme goods. First, by engendering him, he is

the cause of his being, which is considered greatest. Secondly, by bringing him up, he is the cause of his being nourished. Thirdly, he is the cause of his instruction. These three are not only attributed to parents in regards to their children, but also to grand-parents and great-grand-parents in regards to their descendants.

He now proves that paternal friendship is similar to regal friendship. For parents are naturally over their children and ancestors over their descendants as a king is over his subjects. Whence children are in the power of their father, and descendants in the power of their ancestor, as subjects are in the power of the king.

He now shows in what all these aforesaid friendships agree. First of all, all these friendships consist in a certain superabundance of one to another. And since in the case of a king and his subjects this is evident he shows how it is true of parents and children. Honor is owed to him who is in a position of excellence as stated in Book I, and this is to be applied to progenitors. Furthermore, in these friendships justice is not the same on both sides as though the king should do the same for his subject as the subject for him, or a father for his son as a son for his father. But rather justice is gauged on each side according to dignity, so that each does to the other what is fitting, since friendship is thus considered among them, i.e., that each should love the other as is befitting.

He now shows what friendship exists similar to aristocracy and states that the friendship which exists between husband and wife is such as that which exists in an aristocracy, in which certain ones are given authority because of virtue and are loved for this reason. Because those who are set at the head are better, they therefore receive greater good, in that they are preferred before others, yet each receives that which is his due. For the virtuous, when they are in power, do not withhold from their subjects that which is their due. In this way justice is preserved in an aristocracy, and the same is true of the friendship of man and wife. The husband, because he is better, is set over the wife, yet the husband does not command in those matters which are the wife's domain.²³

He next shows how friendship may be compared to timocracy, and says that the friendship which exists between brothers is assimilated to the friendship of comrades, i.e., of those of like age.

For brothers are equals and of like age. Such seem to be of one instruction and in general of one code, since one's ethical standards follow one's mode of living, as stated in Book II. Hence it is evident that to such a friendship is assimilated that which exists in a timocracy, in which the citizens who are set in authority are equal and virtuous. Whence it is just that they should rule in part, in such a way, that is, that any one does not have the entire power but partial power, so that even in their power they remain equal. And so exists the friendship between them. This is manifestly seen in the friendship of brothers and those of a same age or brought up together.

He now considers friendship in comparison to corrupt polities, and first shows that in such polities there is little friendship, then that in which there is least and that in which there is most under the circumstances. Thus he states first that in corrupt polities, just as there is little justice, so also there is little friendship, which is in a certain way concerned with the same things as justice.

He now shows in which of the corrupt polities there is the least friendship. He states first that since in corrupt polities there is little friendship, it follows that the least friendship is in the worst of the corrupt polities, i.e., in tyranny, in which there is no or very little friendship.

This he proves. Since friendship consists in communication, as shown above, it is plain that if there is nothing in common between the one commanding and the one commanded, as when the one ruling intends his own good, there can be no friendship between them, just as no justice, in that the one ruling usurps for himself the whole good which is owed to the one ruled. This occurs in a tyranny because the tyrant does not intend the common good but his own; and acts toward his subjects, as the artisan to his tool, the soul to the body, and the master to the slave. The tyrant uses his subjects like slaves.

These three which have been mentioned are aided by those who employ them in that they are moved by them, i.e., the slave by the master, the body by the soul, the tool by the artisan. But there is no friendship of those who use such things towards that which they use, because if they are in any way beneficial to them, they do not intend their good except as it is referred to their own good. This is especially clear of the artisan in relation to an inanimate instrument, towards which there is

neither friendship nor justice because they do not communicate in human life. Likewise there is no friendship towards a horse or a cow even though they are living. Thus there is even no friendship of the master toward the slave as slave, because he does not have anything in common but the whole good of the slave is for the master, as the whole good of the tool is for the artisan. A slave is like an animated tool, just as conversely a tool is like an inanimate slave.

He now shows how this is to be taken, and states that while there is no friendship of the master toward the slave as slave, there is nevertheless friendship toward him as a man. There can be some sort of friendship of any man toward all men, in that they can communicate by some law or in some composition, i.e., in some compact or promise. In this way there can be friendship of the master toward the slave as a man. Thus it is evident that in tyrannies, in which the rulers use their subjects as slaves, there is little friendship and justice.

He now shows in which of the corrupt polities there is most friendship. He states that this exists in democracy since in this polity those who are in power intend to a great extent the common good, in that they wish to equate the people to those who are well off, principally intending the good of the people. Oligarchy, however, is in a middle state, since it neither intends the good of the multitude as does democracy, nor the good of one as does the tyrant, but the good of a few.

Ch. 12: Returning to the aforesaid principle of all friendship, which is communication, Aristotle teaches that the distinction of friendship is based upon the distinction of communication.

All friendship, therefore, consists in communication, as has been said. One might, however, mark off from the rest both the friendship of kindred and that of comrades.

Those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, and the like are more clearly friendships of association. For they seem to rest on a sort of compact. With them we might class the friendship of fellow-travellers.

The friendship of kindred appears to be of many kinds, but to depend in all cases upon paternal friendship.

For parents love their children as being a part of themselves. But the children love their parents as being something originating from them.

Parents know their offspring better than their children know that they are their children.

The progenitor is closer to his offspring than the offspring to his progenitor. For the product belongs to the producer, e.g. a tooth or hair or anything else to him whose it is. But the producer does not belong to the product or belongs in a less degree.

The length of time produces the same result, for the parents love their children as soon as these are born, but children love their parents only after time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding or the power of discrimination by the senses.

From these considerations it is also plain why mothers love more than fathers do.

Parents, then, love their children as themselves, for these are, being from them, like separated other selves. But children love their parents as being from them.

Brothers love each other as being born of the same parents. For their identity with them makes them identical to each other. That is why people talk of the same blood, of the same stock, and so on. They are, therefore, in a sense, the same thing, though in separate individuals.

Two things that contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing and similarity of age. For two of an age take to each other; and those of a common way of life tend to be comrades. Whence the friendship of brothers is assimilated to that of comrades.

Cousins and other kinsmen are bound up together by derivation from brothers, who are from the same parents. They come to be closer together or farther apart by virtue of the nearness or distance to the common ancestor.

The friendship of children to parents, and of men to the gods, is as that to something good and superior. For they have conferred the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and of their nourishment, and their upbringing from birth.

This kind of friendship possesses pleasantness and utility also, more than that of strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived more in common.

The friendship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of comrades, and more so when these are good, and alike in all things in that they are closer together and love each other from birth, and are more of one way, in that they are of the same parents, are nourished together, and brought up together. Likewise the test of time has been applied most fully and convincingly in their case.

The same is proportionately true in the other friendships of relations.

Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature. For man is more conjugal by nature than political, inasmuch as the household is prior and more necessary than the city, and in the procreation of children man has more in common with the animals.

For the other animals communication extends only thus far. But men live together not only for the procreation of children, but also for the various purposes of life. From the start the functions are divided, and those of a man and his wife are different. They are self-sufficient therefore when they contribute their proper functions to the common cause.

For this reason both utility and pleasure seem to be in this friendship. It will even be friendship based on virtue if they are both good; and both have their proper virtue, because of which both will rejoice.

Children seem to be a bond of union. For this reason childless people part more easily. For children are the common good of both, and what is common holds them together.

How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought to live together seems to be nothing other than how they may maintain justice toward one another. For a man does not seem to have the same duties toward a friend, a stranger, a comrade, and a schoolmate.

After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship according to the kinds of political and domestic communications, he here subdivides the various species of friendship. To this end he first shows the common principle of this division and subdivision and secondly treats of certain friendships in particular. Thus he begins by setting forth the common principle for distinguishing friendships, concluding from the above that all friendship consists in communication.

He first distinguishes according to communication those friendships in which it is less evident that this is the principle. Thus he states that according to the diversity of communication one may distinguish among themselves and from others the friendship of relations, i.e., which exists among those of the same blood, and of comrades, which exists among those brought up together. Blood relatives communicate in their origin, comrades communicate in their nourishment.

In this same way he distinguishes friendships wherein this is more evident. Thus he states that political friendships, which exist among fellow citizens, and tribal friendships, among those of a same tribe, and sea-faring friendships, among those who sail together, and others, e.g. among fellow soldiers or students, show a more evident communication than those of relatives or those brought up together since it is plain that in these friendships the reason for friendship is communication. Among these one may also enumerate the friendship of those who are travelling together. But in the friendship of blood relations and comrades there is nothing present and permanent in which they communicate. Hence the fact is less evident.

Then he determines certain friendships in particular: first that of blood relations, secondly that of husband and wife. Among the first he begins with that of father to son. Although the friendship of blood relations appears to be multiple, i.e., divided into many different types because of the different degrees

of consanguinity, nevertheless all these friendships depend upon paternal friendship as their principle, as will be subsequently evident.

He now gives the reason for this friendship and states that parents love their children because they are something of themselves. From the seed of the parents the children are engendered. Whence a child is a certain separated part of his parent. Consequently this friendship most closely approaches the love with which one loves oneself, whence all friendship is derived as will be said in Book IX. Thus it is reasonable to put down paternal friendship as the principle. The children, however, love their parents inasmuch as they have their being from them, as would be if a separated part loved the whole from which it was taken.

He now compares paternal to filial friendship and gives it the preference. It is reasonable to love the more as one knows the cause of love better. As has been said the cause of parents loving their children is that they are something of themselves. The cause of the children's loving is because they are from their parents. Parents are better able to know those who are born from them, than children to know from which parents they are born. Their generation was known to the parents, but not to the children who did not yet exist. Consequently it is reasonable that parents should love their children more, rather than the converse.

The reason for this is as follows. The motive of love in any friendship of blood relations is the propinquity of one to the other. But the one from which, i.e., the one engendering, is closer to the one engendered than that which is made to that which makes, and the engendered to the engendering. The engendered, as has been said, is a certain separated part of that which engenders. Whence it may be compared to the engendering as separable parts are to the whole, such as teeth or hair or some other such. Such parts which are separated from the whole have propinquity to the whole because the whole contains them within itself, but not conversely. Therefore nothing of the parts seems to attain to the whole or, at least, less than the converse. For the part, even though it is something of the whole, nevertheless is not the same as the whole, whereas in the whole the whole part is contained. Hence it is reasonable that parents should love their children more, rather than the converse.

A final reason is that it is plain that friendship is confirmed

by length of time. It is evident that parents love their children over a greater length of time than children do the parents. For parents love their children as soon as they are born. But children love their parents in the course of time when they have reached understanding, or at least the capacity to distinguish their parents from others. For in the beginning they call all men father and all women mother,²⁴ as stated in Book I of the *Physics*. Whence it is again reasonable that the parents should love their children more than the children do them.

He now compares a mother's love to a father's and says that from the above reasons it is clear why mothers love their children even more than fathers. In keeping with the first reason mothers are better able to know who are their children than their fathers. Also, as to length of time, mothers from association earlier conceive an affection of love for their children than do fathers. As to the second reason given, however, this is partially true and partially not. For the father contributes a more important part, namely the form, and the mother the matter, as is said in the book on the *Generation of Animals*.²⁵

He here brings out what he had said in the second reason, namely that children are closer to the parents than the converse. This arises because the parents love their children as themselves. The children who are engendered from the parents are, so to speak, the parents themselves, existing apart from them and in this sense alone separated from them. But children love their parents not as being something of their parents but as having been born from them.

Next Aristotle speaks of fraternal friendship. He states that brothers love each other because they are born from the same. Those things which are the same to one and the same are in a sense the same to each other. Whence, since children are in a sense alike with their parents, as has been said, the identity of the children with their parents makes the children in a sense identical with themselves. Whence it is that we say that brothers are alike in blood and root and so forth. And although the blood of the parents (which is the common root) is absolutely one, this identity also endures in a sense even in the children who are divided from the parents and from each other.

He now shows how such friendship is strengthened when he states that it is most propitious to fraternal friendship that brothers should be brought up together and be near each other

in age, because those of a same age naturally love one another. And comrades, i.e., those nourished together, are usually of a like way of life, which is a cause of mutual love. Thus it is that fraternal friendship is similar to the friendship of comrades, i.e., those nurtured together.

He now determines the friendship of other blood relations and says that grandchildren and others related by blood are drawn together by the proximity of their ancestry and friendship, in that they are from these, i.e., in that they proceed from brothers who are children of the same parents. For this reason those related by blood are thus called consanguineous because they proceed from the same. They are said to be more or less closely related as they are nearer or more remote from the one producing them, i.e., from the first root of consanguinity. That which is first is taken as the measure in all things.

He now shows the properties of the aforesaid friendships. As to paternal friendship, children have friendship toward their parents as to a kind of superior good, since the latter are their greatest benefactors in that they are to their children the cause of being, of nourishment and of upbringing; and such is also the friendship of man to God.

The friendship which exists between children and their parents has pleasure and utility, more than the friendship of outsiders in that they have a more common life. Whence it is that they are especially useful and pleasurable to each other.

In fraternal friendship there is found the same which exists in the friendship of comrades, i.e., of those brought up together. If the brothers are virtuous and completely alike in their way of life, the greater is their friendship from being brought up together the closer they are to each other. This may come about in three ways. First, from length of time, since they love each other from birth. Secondly, according to more perfect likeness. Brothers seem to be more of the same way of life who are from the same parents and thus appear to have the same natural disposition, and are nourished together and brought up together by their parents. Thirdly, by the experience of friendship since over a long period of time they have tried each other and therefore their friendship is greatest and most firm.

Referring to the friendship among other relations he states that what pertains to the friendship of other relations is to be

reckoned according to the proportion of fraternal friendship, since other relationships are derived from brothers.

Now he treats of the friendship of husband and wife. He first states that there is a certain natural friendship between husband and wife. This he proves by recourse to a higher principle. Man is naturally a political animal and much more so is it in the nature of man to be a conjugal animal.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that those things which are prior and necessary seem to pertain more to nature. Domestic society, to which pertains the union of man and wife, is prior to civil society. The part is prior to the whole.²⁶ It is also more necessary, since domestic society is ordained to the necessary acts of life, i.e., generation and nourishment. Whence it is evident that man is more naturally a conjugal animal than a political one. The second reason is that the procreation of children, to which the union of man and wife is ordained, is common to the other animals and therefore follows the nature of the genus animal. Thus for this reason also it is evident that man is more by nature a conjugal animal than a political one.

He now assigns the proper quality of conjugal friendship which is proper only to men, concluding from the above that in the other animals the union of male and female is solely for the procreation of offspring, but among men, male and female communicate not only in the procreation of children but also for the sake of the necessities of life. It is immediately evident that the human operations necessary for life are distinct for men and women, in that certain things are fitting for a man, i.e., what is to be carried on without the household, certain for a wife, such as sewing and other things to be done within the house. Thus they are self-sufficient when both accomplish their proper tasks in common.

Whence it is plain that conjugal friendship among men is not only natural as in the other animals, as being ordained to the work of nature which is generation, but it is also domestic as ordained to the sufficiency of domestic life.

As to the common properties of friendship it appears from the above that conjugal friendship has utility, inasmuch as through it one arrives at a sufficiency of domestic life. It also has pleasure in the act of generation as in the other animals. If the husband and wife are virtuous there can also be a friendship because of virtue. There is a certain type of virtue proper

to both, i.e., to the husband and wife, because of which their friendship is rendered delightful to each. Thus it appears that this friendship can be because of virtue, because of utility and because of pleasure.²⁷

Showing how this friendship may be strengthened he states that the cause of a stable and firm union appears to be children. Whence it is that those who are sterile, i.e., who lack offspring, are sooner separated from one another. Among the ancients matrimonial separation existed for reason of sterility. The reason for this is that children are the common good of both, of the husband and wife, whose union is for the sake of children. That which is common contains and preserves friendship, since it exists, as was said above in communication.

Finally he answers a question as to how a husband and wife should live together. He answers that to seek this is none other than to seek what is just between man and wife. They should so live together that each would maintain for the other that which is just. This varies with the different friendships. It does not seem that the same is just for a friend and a stranger and one with whom one was brought up and a pupil. Therefore the consideration of such belongs to domestic or political science.

Ch. 13: It is shown in what types of friendship there can be excess and deficiency, also that quarrels may arise in certain friendships, and grievances; especially in that friendship which is for utility's sake, not, however, in that which is based on virtue.

There are three kinds of friendship as we said at the outset of our inquiry, and in respect of each some are friends on a basis of equality, others in virtue of some superiority. For not only can equally good men be friends, but a better man may make friends with one who is worse than he; so too in friendships for pleasure and utility, equal benefits may be conferred or they may differ according to more or less. Equals must maintain equality both in loving and in other respects, while unequals must render what is proportionate to the excess and deficiency.

Complaints and quarrels arise solely or at least chiefly in friendship for utility, and with good reason.

For those who are friends on the ground of virtue are anxious to do well by each other. This is true both of virtue and friendship. Between men who rivalize in such things there are neither accusations nor quarrels. For no one wishes to sadden one who loves him and does good to him; if he is

of a grateful nature he will take his revenge by doing good to his friend. The man who excels the other in the service rendered will not complain of his friend, since he gets what he aims at. For both desire what is good.

Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships of pleasure. For both get at the same time what they desire, if they enjoy spending their time together. A man who complained of another for not affording him pleasure would seem ridiculous, since he does not have to spend his days with the other.

But friendship for utility naturally leads to complaints. For in using each other for their own interests they always need more and feel that they get less than is right. They complain because they do not receive as much as they need when they are worthy of it. But the benefactors cannot suffice to provide everything that the beneficiaries need.

Now it seems that, just as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other legal, so too one kind of utilitarian friendship is moral, the other legal. Thus complaints arise most of all when men do not exchange on the same basis, and the friendship is dissolved.

The legal type consists in a stated agreement, and may be completely commercial, requiring a hand to hand exchange. Or it may be more liberal, and allow for a delay in time, but with the stipulation of a definite *quid pro quo*. The debt is clear and not ambiguous. There is a certain friendly deferment. Therefore among some men there is no need of recourse to justice, and they are considered lovable for this reason.

The moral type is not on fixed terms, but is as though a gift to a friend or any other. But the one who gives expects to receive as much or more in return, as having not given but lent. If the return is not made in such a way, there will be complaints over the outcome. This is what happens because all men or the greater part, while they wish for what is noble, choose what is useful. Now it is noble to do well by another without view to payment, but it is useful to receive a return.

Therefore, if we can, we should return the equivalent of what we have received. For we must not make a man our friend against his will, and one is doing wrong from the start in accepting something from one from whom one should not. For if it is not from a friend or for one's own sake, one should settle up for the benefit as though it were a contract. Thus one should agree to repay if one can; if one cannot, even the giver would not expect one to do so. Therefore, if one can, one should return the benefit. At the start, however, one should consider the man who is benefiting one, and on what terms he is doing so, in order that we may accept the benefit on these terms or else decline it.

There is a doubt as to whether a service should be measured by its utility to the receiver, and the return made on this basis, or according to the estimation of the one conferring the benefit.

For those who have received say they have received from their benefactors what meant little to the latter and what they might have got from others—minimizing the gift. The givers, on the contrary, say it was the biggest thing they had, and what could not have been had from others, and that it was given in times of danger or similar need.

Therefore in friendship for the sake of utility, the usefulness to the receiver is the measure. For he is the one in need, and it is enough for him to endeavor to make an equal return. The assistance has been pre-

cisely as great as the advantage the receiver derived by it. Thus he should return as much as he has received; even more, for that is better. But in friendships according to virtue, there are no accusations. Here the intent of the giver is taken as the measure. For the intent is that which is principal in virtue and morals in general.

Having distinguished the different types of friendship, Aristotle here shows in what friendships there are found accusation or grievances. He touches three points: first, what must be done to avoid recriminations; secondly, in what friendships recriminations occur; thirdly, the reason for them. He begins by saying that there are three types of friendship, i.e., friendship because of virtue, because of pleasure and because of utility. In each of them the relationship may be one of equality or one of superiority. This he shows in each.

In friendships which are according to virtue both those who are equally good may be friends, and a better man with a less good man. Likewise in pleasurable friendship, the friends may be equally pleasant to each other, or in the relation of excellence to deficiency. Again in friendship for the sake of utility, friends can be equalized as to the utility of each or differ according to more or less. If friends are equal according to any type of friendship, they must be equated both as to love, so that each loves the other equally, and as to the rest, such as the services of friends. If, however, they are unequal, to each must be assigned what is proportionate to the excess and defect.

He now shows in what friendships quarrels occur. He states that it is reasonable that accusations and quarrels, in which one friend accuses the other or has a grievance against him, should occur either in useful friendship alone or especially in it.

This he proves. First of all he shows that in friendship because of virtue, there is neither accusation nor quarrel, secondly that it is not even prevalent in friendship for pleasure, thirdly that it is principally in friendship for the sake of utility. As to the first, those who are friends because of virtue are prompt to do good to each other. For this is the proper act of virtue and friendship, namely to do good to one's friend. Since the relationship is such that both are intent upon doing good to their friend, it cannot happen that there should arise thence accusations and quarrels.

For no one wishes to sadden one who loves him and does good to him, but rather if the person is grateful who receives the benefit, he will strive to repay his friend in kind. And if it should happen that one is superior to the other, although he does not receive as much as he gives, nevertheless, if he receives what he desires he will not accuse his friend. That which is desired by both is the good, that is, what is fitting and worthy, and this is something which does not exceed the capability of the friend.

Next he shows what is true of pleasurable friendship, and says that not even in friendships which are for the sake of pleasure are there generally accusations and quarrels, even though such occasionally occur. If they rejoice in each other's company, each has what he seeks, namely pleasure. Hence there is no ground for quarreling. If, however, one does not receive from the other pleasure, it is ridiculous that he should accuse the one who does not afford pleasure, since it is in his power not to remain with him.

Finally he comes to useful friendship, and states that that friendship which exists for the sake of utility is especially subject to accusations and quarrels. Those who use each other for the sake of utility always need more than they are given and think that they receive less than they deserve. Therefore they protest that they do not receive so much as they need, especially when they are worthy of such. On the other hand, those who do the good say that they are not up to giving as much as those need who receive their benefits.

He now assigns the reason why quarrels occur in useful friendship. He begins by saying that there is a twofold justice. The first is not written but innate in the mind, which is called above (in Book V) natural justice. The other is justice according to written law, which he has called above in Book V, legal justice.

There is likewise a twofold utility which is to be attained in friendships. One is moral, when, namely one confers utility upon the others as pertains to good morals. And this utility corresponds to unwritten justice. The other is legal utility, by which one bestows utility upon the other according to the statutes of the law. Accusations chiefly arise in useful friendship when the exchange of utility is not made on the same basis, namely, when one bestows utility according to the exigency of

law, whereas the other demands it according to the fittingness of good morals. And thus the friendship is dissolved.

He proves this first as to legal utility, and says that legal utility consists in statements, i.e., in contracts, which are made by the word of both. This may be twofold. One is completely formal, after the manner of buying and selling, and is from hand to hand, as when one immediately receives what is promised to him in return for his service. The other is more liberal and admits of a lapse of time, but nevertheless, what is to be given in return for what, is determined. Thus there is no doubt, but it is clear what is owed. This is a certain friendly deferment of that which is owed. Therefore, among some men of this type, it is not necessary that justice be done through a judge, but rather they keep faith in their exchanges and are considered to be lovable for this reason.

Moral utility, however, does not consist in statements, i.e., in compacts which are made by word of mouth, but after the manner in which one gives freely to a friend. Thus one gives to the other without any outwardly expressed contract. But nevertheless, as to the intention, he who gives considers that he should receive as much in return, or even more, as though he was not freely giving but selling. If the exchange, however, does not take place in this wise, i.e., in such a way that the beneficiary restores and repays in equal or greater amount, he who gave will accuse the one who received and complain about him.

The cause of the above follows. Aristotle states that the reason why he who freely gives seeks a return is that all men, or a good many, desire, i.e., approve, what is virtuous but nevertheless in their acts they choose that which is useful to them. That a man should do good to another not with the intention that he should receive a return of his good deed, is virtuous. Therefore, in order to be acceptable to others, they wish to appear to do good in this manner. But to receive benefits in return is useful. Therefore men choose the useful, no matter how much they pretend otherwise.

He now shows how such complaints are to be avoided. He who receives the benefit, if he is able, should make a return according to the worth of what he had received, and this of his own accord, because no one should make an involuntary friend in the sense of wishing to receive freely from him who does not wish to freely give. But he who has received the benefit has erred

from the start in that he had accepted this from one from whom he should not. For he had not received the benefit from a real friend, nor from a man who confers the benefit for the sake of the beneficiary, but from one who does so for the sake of the utility he hopes to derive therefrom. He therefore, who receives the benefit, should repay the giver, as is done in contracts made by word of mouth. And if he is able to restore the equal of what he has received, he should state as much, declaring that he has restored the whole. If he cannot do so, neither he who gives nor he who receives, can think it fitting to demand it of him.

It is to be observed, however, that one should make a return, if one is able, to such a benefactor, namely, one who is intent upon a return. From the start, when a man receives a benefit, he should give heed to the one from whom he receives it, whether, i.e., it is from a friend freely giving or one who seeks a return. Likewise a man should give heed to his state in receiving the benefit, i.e., whether he can repay it or not, when allowing himself to be benefited or not.²⁸

Aristotle now brings up a doubt and states that the doubt arises as to whether, in making the return, one should base oneself upon the utility acquired by the receiver, or upon the act of the one who gave.

For those who receive the benefits say that what they received from the givers was of little consequence to the latter and that they could have easily received it from others. On the other hand the benefactors, wishing to magnify their gifts, say that they have given of their best, and such things as they could not be repaid for, and that they gave them while in danger and in great need.

Aristotle solves the doubt by saying that the measure of the return should be calculated according to the utility received by the beneficiary. For he is the one who needed the benefit. It is enough for him to endeavor to make an equal return. The measure of the benefactor's aid is the proportion received by the beneficiary. If he returns more, that is even better. In friendships according to virtue, however, there are no such accusations, as said above.

Nevertheless in such friendships one should make a return. In this case the choice or will of the one conferring the benefit is as the measure. For the measure in each genus is that which is principal in it. That which is principal in virtue and morality consists in choice. Therefore in friendship according to virtue

the return should be made according to the intent of the one who confers the benefit, even though one receives little or no help therefrom.²⁹

Ch. 14: Aristotle now shows how complaints come about in friendships involving superiority, and the reason which leads the greater and the lesser, respectively, to quarrel.

Differences also arise in friendships based on superiority. For each expects to get more out of them. But when this does not happen, the friendship is dissolved.

For the better man thinks he should have more, since more should be assigned to a good man. Likewise the more useful man, for it is not required that the less useful man should receive the equal. Otherwise one would have a kind of servitude rather than friendship, if the returns do not correspond to the worth of the benefits given in friendship. For men believe that just as in commercial partnerships those who put more in should get more out, so also should it be in friendship.

But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite claim. Such think it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in need. What, they say, is the use of being the friend of a good man or a powerful man, if one is to get nothing out of it?

It would seem that both are in the right, and that both should get a greater share out of the friendship, but not of the same thing, but the superior more honor, the inferior more gain.

For honor is the reward of virtue and well-doing, while gain is the aid of need.

This seems to be the case in civil affairs. For no one is honored who contributes nothing to the common good. That which belongs to the community is given to him who benefits the community. Honor belongs to the community, but one does not also receive gain at the same time as honor. For no one puts up with the smaller share in everything. To him therefore who loses in wealth, honor is given; to him who expects gifts, money; thus what is fitting to each equalizes the parties and preserves friendship, as has been said. Thus in associations of unequals, he who has been useful by his money or by works of virtue, must receive honor in return, as being the best one can do.

For friendship asks a man to do what he can, not what is proportional to the merits of the case. For that cannot always be done, as in the honors paid to the gods or to parents, since no one could ever return to them what he gets. But one who does the best he can is thought to be a good man.

For this reason, it would not seem open to a man to disown his father, although a father may disown his son.

For one must repay a debt. But nothing one can do is equivalent to what we owe to the causes of our being; therefore a son will always be in

his parents' debt. But creditors can remit a debt, and a father may therefore do so, too.

At the same time it would seem that no father would ever withdraw from his son, except for extraordinary wickedness. For apart from natural friendship, it is human nature not to reject human assistance. But if the son is evil, the father should put him out, or at least be slow to provide for him. For many people wish to get benefits, but shun doing them, as unprofitable. So much for these questions.

After having shown how accusations come about in useful friendship, which is according to equality, he here shows how the same come about in friendships involving superiority. Thus he begins by saying that even in friendships which are according to superiority, there is a certain difference and discord among friends, when both, i.e., the greater and the lesser, think fit that each should have more. And if this is not forthcoming, the friendship is dissolved.

He now assigns the reason for this discord. First, as to the greater, he says that as to the friendship according to virtue, he who is better finds it fitting that he should have more. If good is owed to the good, it is fitting that to the better more good should be apportioned. And likewise in the friendship which is according to utility, he who is more useful feels that he should have more.

It is not necessary, as some say, that he who is less useful should receive the equal of him who is more useful. Friendship would be a kind of servitude, and not friendship, if the goods derived from friendship were not shared according to the dignity of the deeds, and he who acted better did not have more. It is considered that just as in trading those receive more from the common fund who have invested more, so also the same should be done in friendship and that he who contributes more in friendship should receive more.

Next he gives the point of view of those in the inferior position and states that the needful one in useful friendship and the less virtuous one in virtuous friendship argue in the opposite way. For they say that it pertains to a friend who abounds in the good to sufficiently provide for his needy friends. Otherwise there would seem to be no point if an inferior were the friend of some powerful man and were to receive nothing from it.

He now determines the truth and says first that both, i.e., the superior and the inferior, appear to have the right idea because

to both there should be given something more, not however, of the same. But to him who excels there should be given more honor, to him who is in need, more gain.

He proves this, stating that the one who excels should be given more honor because honor is the proper reward for works of virtue and for good works, in which the greater exceed the lesser. But by gain help is given against need, which the inferior suffers.

He also shows this by an example. For we see this occurring in civic affairs. One does not honor him who has conferred no good upon the community. But to him who has conferred some benefit upon the community is given the common good which is honor. It would be difficult for someone to receive both riches and honors alike from the community. For one would not stand the receiving of less as to everything, i.e., both as to riches and as to honors. But to him who has diminished his wealth because of the expenses which he had undergone in the service of the community the state gives honor. To him who because of his services expects gifts, they give money.

For it has been stated above that what is observed and rendered according to dignity brings about equality proportionally in friends, and thus friendship is preserved. Just as states give some honors, others money according to their dignity, so also should one do when friends are unequal. To him who by his services in giving money has been useful or who accomplished works of virtue, honor is given, so that a return is made, even though it is not equivalent, nevertheless it is as good as possible.

He proves that it suffices to render what one does, because friendship seeks what is possible to one's friend, not always, however, what is worthy of one, because sometimes this would be quite impossible. For one cannot always return suitable honor for all benefits, as is evident in the honor shown to God and parents, who can never be fittingly repaid. Nevertheless if anyone serves God and his parents as best he can, he appears to be virtuous.

He infers a certain corollary from this and concludes that it is not permissible for a son to disown his father, but that a father may sometimes disown his son.

This he proves by two reasons. The first is that a son, since he is placed in the debt of his father because of benefits received, should make a return to him though he can do nothing befitting

the benefits that he has received. Whence he always remains a debtor. Therefore he may not disown his father. But those to whom something is owed have the power of dismissing those who owe them. Thus a father has the power of dismissing his son.

He says further that no son can seem to depart from a father disowning him except for the cause of extraordinary wickedness, because in view of the natural friendship which exists between father and son it is human that one should not expel him who has helped one. Thus it is most iniquitous for a son to expel his father. But if the son is evil, the father should put him out, or at least not give great care to providing for him sufficiently, because thus he will grow in wickedness. For there are many who wish to receive good things from others, but flee from doing good themselves as though this were superfluous.

He concludes by saying that this much has been said of the different kinds of friendship. So ends Book VIII.

BOOK IX

Ch. 1: Speaking of the properties of friendship, Aristotle says that proportion should be maintained in them, because it is thus they endure. Without proportion they are unsettled.

In all the kinds of friendship between dissimilar people it is, as has been said, proportion which equalizes and preserves the friendship. For example, in the political form of friendship, the shoemaker gets a return for his shoes in proportion to worth, and the same is true of the weaver and other craftsmen.

Here a common measure has been provided in the form of money. Everything is referred to this and measured by this.

In friendship, however, sometimes the lover complains that his excess of love is not returned (though perhaps there is nothing lovable about him). Often, however, the loved one complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now performs nothing.

Such incidents happen when the lover loves the beloved for the sake of pleasure while the beloved loves the lover for the sake of utility, and they do not both possess the qualities expected of them. Since this was the reason for the friendship, it is dissolved when they do not get the things which were the motive for their love. For each did not love the other person himself but the qualities he had, and these were not enduring. That is why the friendships also are transient. But the friendship based upon one's character, and which exists for itself, endures, as has been said.

Differences also arise when they receive something other than what they desired. It is like getting nothing at all, when we do not get what we aim at. For example, one promises a lyre-player that the better he sings, the more he will get, then the following day, when the other demands the fulfilment of the promise, he is told that he has been given pleasure for pleasure. Now if this had been what each wanted, all would have been well. But if the one wanted enjoyment but the other gain, and the one has what he wants while the other has not, the terms of the association will not have been properly fulfilled. For what each needs, that is what he expects, and it is for the sake of that he will give what he has.

But who is to set the worth of the service? Is it up to him who gives, before he does so, or him who receives, before he renders the return? He who gives seems to concede the judgment of the recompense to the one receiving, as Protagoras is said to have done. For when he had taught someone, he bade the learner recompense him in proportion to what he considered he had learned. That much was what he received. In such matters it is enough for some that a return be made sufficient for the man.

But those who get the money first, and then do none of the things they said they would, owing to the extravagance of their promises, naturally find themselves the object of complaint. For they do not fulfil what they agreed to do. This is perhaps what the sophists are compelled to do, for no one would give them money for what they know. These people, then, if they

do not do what they have been paid for, are rightly made the objects of complaint.

But where there is no contract of service, those who give something for the sake of others cannot (as we have said) be accused. Such is friendship based on virtue, in which the return is to be made according to the intention of the giver. For purpose is proper both to a friend and to virtue. So too, it seems, should one make a return to those with whom one has studied philosophy. For their worth cannot be measured in money. An equal recompense will not be made, but still it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one's parents, to give them enough.

If the giving is not in this manner, but concerned with something else, it would seem quite proper perhaps that the return should be made according to what both think is right. If this cannot be arranged, it not only seems necessary, but also just, that the one who first receives the benefit should set the return.

For to the extent in which one is helped, or has wished for pleasure, so much has one received, and worth accordingly. This is what appears to occur in buying.

In some places there are laws providing that no actions should arise out of voluntary contracts if the debtor settles as he had agreed to do. The law holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit was given should fix the terms than that the person who gave credit should do so. For many things are not equally valued by those who have them, and those who wish to get them. For it appears to each that his own goods are worthy of great price, but the return is made on the terms fixed by the receiver.

But no doubt the receiver should assess a thing not at what it seems worth when he has it, but at what he assessed it at before he had it.

After having shown in Book VIII what friendship is and how many kinds there are, here in Book IX he treats of the properties of friendship. Thus he first sets down the properties (Ch. 1-7) and then solves certain doubts that arise (Ch. 8-14). As to the first he determines what belongs to the preservation and dissolution of friendship (Ch. 1-3) and then of its effects (Ch. 4-7). Thus he begins by discussing that which preserves friendship (Ch. 1-2).

Since in the friendship of equals it is clear that friendship is preserved by the fact of an equal return, Aristotle first shows how the friendship of dissimilar persons may be preserved, since there can be more doubt about this. Thus he says that in all such friendships of dissimilar persons, e.g. of father to son, king to subject, and so forth, friendship is equalized and preserved by the manifestation of what is analgous, i.e., what is proportionate to each. This he shows by an example derived from political

justice, according to what is said in Book V, namely that one makes a return to the shoemaker for the shoes which he gives according to worth, which is according to proportion, and the same is true of the weaver and of the other artisans.

Then he shows how, through the lack of the analogous, friendship is disturbed. First he shows why this perturbation cannot occur in commutative justice. He states that in this, i. e., in commutative justice, there is found a certain common measure, namely the denarius, to which, as to a measure, all exchangeable goods may be referred. Thus their worth is measured in denarii. Therefore, what is to be given for what, may be known with certainty. But those things which are exchanged in friendship, namely, affection and friendly services, cannot be calculated in money.

Next he shows how friendship is disturbed through the defect of the proportionate. This is because, first, there is no return made, secondly, that is not returned what is sought. As to the first it is to be noted that a return in friendship is to be estimated according to two things. First as to the interior affection of love. Concerning this aspect, occasionally it occurs in friendships that the one who loves accuses him who is loved, since while he loves superabundantly, he is not loved in return by him who is loved. This accusation is sometimes unjust, as when it occurs that the accuser has nothing in himself whereby he is worthy of love. Secondly, the return of friendship is made according to external gifts or services. Concerning this he states that in many cases he who is loved accuses the one loving, because after having first promised all, the latter now does nothing.

Aristotle now shows in what sort of friendships this occurs. The aforesaid accusations between the lover and the one loved occur when the one who loves, loves because of pleasure, but his friend loves him because of utility.³⁰ It comes about at times that neither of these exist, as when the one loved does not provide pleasure for the one who loves him, nor does he who loves provide utility for the one loved. Thus the friendship is broken up, since those reasons no longer exist for which alone the friendship existed. For they do not love each other for themselves, but for utility and pleasure, which are not enduring, therefore neither are such friendships enduring. But, as said above, friendship because of virtue is enduring because in it the friends love each other for themselves. Now he shows how friendship is disturbed by the

failure to return what is sought, but something other. Friends often complain of each other, when they are not returned what they desire but something other. When one does not get what one desires, it is as though he received nothing.

He gives the example of a lyre player who has been promised that the better he sings the more he will receive. When, on the following day he asks that the promise be fulfilled, he is told that he has been given pleasure for pleasure, since in some way the one who made the promise has given him pleasure. If indeed the lyre player was looking for pleasure, there has been a sufficient return made. If however the one promising sought pleasure, and the lyre player money, the exchange has not been good, because one has what he sought, the other not. He who needs something, is concerned with his needs, and for this reason gives what he does.

Aristotle now gives the remedy for such disturbances. Thus he first shows to whom it pertains to calculate what is a fitting return in friendships. To this end he states that the estimation of a worthy recompense belongs to him who first receives the benefit. Then he shows how a failure in this sense leads to accusation.

He says first that to calculate the worth of the return belongs to both, i.e. to him who first gives, and him who first receives. Nevertheless he who gives seems to concede the judgment of the recompense to him who receives, as is said of the philosopher Protagoras, who when he taught his students, ordered that the student should pay his honoraries in gifts to the extent to which he considered it to be fitting in return for what he knew by that teaching, and then received that much from each of the students. In such returns of friendship it is enough for some that a return be made to them according to the opinion of those who have received the benefits. They appear thus to receive a sufficient return since the payment is given for the man, not for the thing given. Therefore it seems to be enough that the return suffices the man, even though it does not equal the benefit.

He now shows how friendship is destroyed by the failure of him who first receives the benefit. He says that those who first receive money, before they are of service, and then do nothing of what they promised, possibly because the promises were superficial, are rightly accused because they do not fulfill what they promised. This the Sophists are obliged to do, because nothing would be given them for all they knew if it were left up to the

discretion of the students, because all their knowledge consists in certain appearances and frivolous considerations. Thus, therefore, these latter are rightly accused for not fulfilling that for which they received payment.

Now he shows how a return should be made in friendship, first in those according to virtue, then in the others. Thus he begins by saying that if the benefit is not conferred because of a promise of some service, as it is in the above, it occurs that some men give gifts to others for the sake of those receiving them, and not for any reward. It is plain from what has been said in Book VIII that such cannot be accused. For this pertains to friendship according to virtue, in which return is to be made with an eye on the choice, or affection, of the one who does so. Choice belongs chiefly to friendship and virtue, as has been said.

Just as this is observed in friendship which consists of a communication in virtue, so also it is to be observed in the communication of philosophy, between the master and the student. For the dignity of philosophy which one learns cannot be measured in money, nor can the student return an equal reward to the master, but possibly it is enough if he returns what suffices, as one does to God and one's parents.

Next he shows how return is made in other friendships. Thus he states first that if the giving is not in this manner, i.e., not for the sake of the one receiving, but the intention of the giver is upon receiving something in return, a return must be made which seems worthwhile to both, i.e., to the giver and to him who receives. If this does not occur, he should estimate the right return who first receives the benefit. And this is not only necessary but also just.

This is so first of all by reason. It is fitting that in the measure in which one is helped by the benefit of one's friend in useful friendship or has received pleasure from him in pleasurable friendship, in the same measure one should return. This is so even in buying, where one pays as much for a thing as one thinks it is worth. Just how much one has been helped by a benefit or how much pleasure one has received can best be known by him who has been helped or pleased. Therefore it is necessary and just that the return should be made according to the opinion of the latter.

The same may be shown by the authority of the law. In certain states it is stated by law that no suit shall be made con-

cerning voluntary contracts if afterwards one of the contracting parties considers that he has been deceived. This is because if anyone voluntarily credits someone with a benefit or service, it should be returned according to the judgment of the one who received the credit at the time of the first exchange. For legislators believe that he who received the concession in the beginning more justly judges of the recompense than he who granted it. This is so because there are many things which are not prized equally by those who already have them and those who wish to receive them for the first time. For it appears to each that his own goods which he gives are worthy of great price. But the return should be made according to the judgment of those receiving them.

Finally he answers an implied question, saying that he who receives the benefit should appraise it not according to what it seems to him after he has it, but as he judges it before he has it. For men are accustomed to appraise temporal goods once obtained less than they did before they obtained them, and this is true particularly of those in need.

Ch. 2: Three doubts are brought up: whether one should obey one's parent before others; whether a virtuous man is to be preferred before a friend; whether one should repay a benefactor rather than give to a friend.

Doubt, however, arises about such questions as the following: e.g. whether one should give preference to and obey one's father in all things, or whether when one is ill one should rather obey the doctor, or in warlike matters the leader of the army. Likewise, should one render a service preferably to a friend, or to a good man; and should one show gratitude to a benefactor or oblige a friend, if one cannot do both?

All such questions, therefore, are certainly not easy to settle. For many differences of all kinds are involved, both of magnitude and parvity, and of goodness and necessity. But that we should not give preference in all things to the same person is evident.

We must for the most part return benefits rather than give to friends. This is so just as we should rather repay a loan than give to a friend.

Perhaps this is not always true, as in the case of freeing someone from robbers. Should one free one who has once freed oneself, no matter who he is, or if he has not been captured pay the debt for someone else, if he asks it, or free one's father? It would seem that he should ransom his father even in preference to himself.

As has been said, in general one should always repay a debt. But if a gift is better or is of greater necessity, one should rather incline towards this. For sometimes it is not even fair to return the equivalent of what one has received, when the one man has done a service to one whom he knows to be good, while the other makes a return to one whom he believes to be bad. For that matter, one should sometimes not lend in return to one who has lent to oneself. For the one person lent to a good man, expecting to recover his loan, while the other has no hope of gain from one who is bad. Therefore, if the facts really are so, the worth is not the same; if the man is good, and yet one does not think so, it would still not seem wrong to refuse.

As we have often pointed out, when the matter is concerned with feelings and actions, the discussions have a certitude equivalent to the matter.

Therefore, that one should not bestow the same upon all, nor all upon one's father, just as all sacrifices are not made to Jove, is clear. Since we ought to render different things to parents, brothers, comrades and benefactors, we ought to render to each what is appropriate. To weddings one calls the kinsfolk, for these have a part in the family and therefore in the doings that affect the family. For the same reason it is the kinsfolk primarily who are called to arrange the marriage.

It would appear that in matters of nourishment one should provide first of all for one's parents, as owing this to the causes of one's being, and this is more honorable even than to help oneself. Honor, too, should be given them, as one does to the gods. But not all honor should be given to parents, nor the same honor to a father and a mother, nor the honor due a wise man or a general, but the honor due to a father, and the honor due to a mother. To all older persons, too, one should give honor appropriate to their age, by rising to receive them, inclining before them, and so on. To friends and brothers one should allow freedom of speech and a sharing in all things. To kinsmen and fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens and to every other group one should always try to assign what is appropriate, and give to each what is right according to his state whether by virtue or usage.

It is easy to make a judgment in the case of those who are of one group. But between different groups it is more difficult. Nevertheless one should not give up because of this, but decide the question as best one can.

After the Philosopher has shown that friendship is preserved by a proportionate return, he now brings up certain doubts concerned with the benefactions of friends and their return. Thus he first brings up three doubts. The first is whether in all cases one should confer more benefits upon one's father and obey him, rather than any other persons, or whether in some cases one should not rather obey others, e.g. a sick person the doctor more than his father, and a warrior the command of the leader of the army rather than the command of his father. The second doubt is whether one should minister more to one's

friend or to a virtuous man. The third doubt is whether a man should rather repay his benefactor for a favor received than give to his friend, in the case where it is not possible for him to do both.

He now solves these questions, and first in general, saying that to determine all such questions with certitude is not easy. For, concerning such, the difference can be multiple and varied, i.e., according to great and little, according to whether the one concerned is a friend or virtuous, or a benefactor to great or small extent. Likewise there is sometimes a difference of good and necessity: to minister to a friend or a virtuous man seems to be better, but to minister to a benefactor seems to be more necessary. This, nevertheless, is clear in such matters, namely, that the same is not to be shown to all, but one thing to one, and another to another.

He now solves the aforesaid doubts in particular, beginning with the third. First he teaches what is to be generally observed. Thus he says that in most cases a man should rather repay his benefactor than give gratis to his friend, if he is unable to do both, just as he should rather return a loan than freely give to his friend. For a man is bound in the same way by moral virtue to return a benefit, as he is bound by legal justice to repay a loan.

He gives, however, a case in which this does not apply. Thus he says that perchance that which has been said is not always to be observed, as in the case in which one may be freed from robbers. There may be a doubt as to which of the three following alternatives should be followed. The first is whether a man should ransom from robbers him who once freed him from chains, no matter who he is. The second is, if the benefactor himself has not been captured and asks that the return be made in the person of some other, whether one should do so. The third is whether a man should free his father from robbers; and this third is to be chosen before all. It seems that a man should free his father even before himself.

He shows now how what has been said is to be observed. He says first that what has been said, namely that a debt is to be repaid rather than a gift freely given, is universally to be observed. But if the free gift exceeds in the good of virtue, as in the case of ministering to one who is most virtuous, or if it is of greater necessity, as when a man must free his father, he should rather turn in this direction. Sometimes it happens that one cannot

equate the repayment of previous benefits with the free giving of a gift, as when on the one hand one would be conferring a gift on him whom one knows to be virtuous and on the other hand one would be making a return to one whom one considers wicked.

Nor is it surprising that one should sometimes not make a return to a benefactor, since neither should a man sometimes repay a loan. It happens sometimes that a wicked man loans to a good one, thinking to acquire some profit from him. The virtuous man, however, is not seeking profit if he loans to the wicked man. If, therefore, in truth, the case is such that the man is wicked it is clear that there is not equal reason for repaying him and giving to the good. If, however, the benefactor is not wicked but is thought to be so by the one who receives the benefit, it does not appear unseemly if he gives rather to the virtuous man.

He now infers a certain corollary from what has been said. It is evident from what has just been said that what has been frequently mentioned previously (in Book I) is true, namely, that definitions about human actions and passions cannot be determined with certitude, nor can the matters with which they are concerned.⁸¹

Next he solves the first doubt and shows that not all things should be bestowed upon one's father. Thus he says first that it is not doubtful that the same is not to be shown to all. Consequently neither should one render all things to one's father, just as among the pagans, all things are not sacrificed to Jove but some things to other gods. Since therefore other things are owed to parents and brothers and friends and benefactors, to each is to be attributed that which is proper to each and pertains to each. And the same is true of the virtuous.

This, indeed, men seem to observe, because to weddings, whence comes the propagation of the stock, they invite blood relatives, who have their stock in common. Likewise relatives are invited to gatherings concerned with marriages. For the same reason men consider that relatives should attend the *kedea*, i.e., the meeting at which the wedding is discussed.

He now shows what is to be attributed to whom. He says, therefore, that in those matters which pertain to sustenance which is by nourishment, it appears that children should principally provide a sufficiency for their parents. For they are debtors in this, as to the cause of their being by generation. Whence,

concerning those things which pertain to the preservation of being itself, they should aid their parents even before themselves. For men owe their parents honor as to the causes of their being, just as they do to the gods.

Nevertheless men do not owe all honor to parents for neither do they owe the same honor to father and mother, nor does a man owe his father the honor which is owed to a wise man or to the leader of an army. But a man owes to his father the honor of a father and to his mother the honor of a mother. Likewise in civil affairs honor is owed to an old man because of his age by rising to him and bowing before him and so forth. To friends and brothers, however, a man owes confidence and the sharing of his goods, and likewise to relatives and those who are of the same clan, and to fellow citizens, and other such. One should always endeavor to attribute that which is proper to each and to suit to each that which belongs to each according to his state, whether of age and virtue, whether of wisdom and office, as in the case of the leader of an army.

Finally he shows in which cases this is easy, in which difficult. Thus he says that a judgment concerning such matters is easy among those of the same kind, namely that one should heed more the one with closer ties of blood between two relatives, and the more wise between two wise men. But it is more difficult to judge between men of different kinds, e.g. whether one should pay more heed to one who is wiser or one who is closer related. And although this is difficult to determine, one should not abandon the consideration but determine what has been said to the best of one's ability.

Ch. 3: Certain minor doubts are brought up concerning the dissolution of a friendship, both in regard to those who change and those who remain the same.

The doubt arises as to whether one should dissolve or not one's friendship toward those who do not remain the same.

There seems to be nothing wrong in dissolving a friendship for utility or pleasure when these no longer exist. For one was a friend of those attributes, and when they no longer exist, there is no reason for loving.

But one will complain of another, if, when he loved one for usefulness or pleasure, he pretended to love for virtue's sake. As we have said at the

outset, there are several different kinds of friendship, and friends may not be friends on the basis on which they think they are. When a man has deceived himself and thinks he is being loved for his character, when the other person has done nothing to produce this impression, he has himself to blame. But when he has been deceived by the pretence of the other, he has a right to complain of the deceiver, and this more so than in the case of those who counterfeit money, for this is wickedness in a more honorable matter.

But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him?

Surely it is impossible, because not everything can be loved, but only what is good. One cannot be a lover of what is evil, nor become like what is bad. For it has been said that like is friend to like.

Must the friendship, then be forthwith broken off?

Possibly not in all cases, but in those which are hopeless because of the wickedness of the one involved. If they are capable of direction, one should rather come to the assistance of their character, than of their fortune, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange. For it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend. When his friend has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.

But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend?

It would seem not. This is made clear when the distance between them is very great. For example in the case of childhood friendships, if one friend remained a child in intellect and the other became a very good man, how will they be friends since they neither rejoice in the same things nor sorrow at the same things? For they do not even have any common activity together, and without this they cannot remain friends. For they cannot live together. But we have discussed these matters.

Should he, then, behave no otherwise toward him than he would if he had never been his friend?

Surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness.

After the Philosopher has investigated those things which pertain to the preservation of friendship, he now determines that which pertains to its dissolution. First he inquires as to when a friendship should be dissolved, secondly as to the attitude one should have towards one's former friend. As to the first, he begins by investigating the dissolution of the friendship of those who have changed from their former condition, secondly of those whose condition has not changed. Thus he says that there arises a doubt as to whether one should dissolve or not a friendship

towards those who do not remain in the same condition as when we were first friends towards them.

He solves this doubt first as to useful and pleasurable friendship, saying that it is not unseemly to dissolve a friendship because of utility or pleasure once the utility or pleasure has ceased, because in these friendships men love utility and pleasure, not the persons of their friends for themselves. Whence, once utility or pleasure have ceased to be, it is reasonable that the friendship should also cease to be.

He now shows how just accusations can nevertheless arise, saying that one justly accuses him who, when he loves for the sake of utility or pleasure, pretends to love because of moral virtue. As was said in the beginning of this discussion there are several different kinds of friendship. Whence it can occur that men are not friends according to the type of friendship which they think, as when they are friends for the sake of utility and think they are friends for the sake of virtue. In this case, if he who believes that he is loved because of virtue deceives himself, in that he who loves him contributes nothing to this deception, he who is deceived should accuse himself.

But when he is deceived through the simulation of the other, it is just that he should accuse the deceiver, much more so than one does counterfeiters of money, for the malice of one who pretends virtue consists in an act which is concerned with something more honorable. Virtue is much more honorable than money, whence those who feign virtue are more malicious than those who counterfeit money.

He now solves the doubt for friendship according to virtue. He first shows that friendship should be dissolved toward those who do not remain in virtue. Thus he reiterates the question. If anyone takes as his friend someone whom he considers good and who later on becomes evil, in such a way that his evilness is manifest, the question arises whether one should still love him.

Two considerations enter into the solution. The first is that it is not possible that he whose wickedness is manifest should be loved by a virtuous man, because not just anything at all can be lovable to the virtuous but only true good. The second is that one should not love one who has gone bad, i.e., it is neither useful nor fitting, since a man should not love evil nor be assimilated to a depraved man. This would follow if he maintained his friendship toward him who has become evil. For

it has been said above that like is friend to like, and thus it cannot be that friendship can long be maintained toward a wicked man unless one has some likeness to that wickedness.

Now he shows how this friendship should be dissolved and first proposes the question as to whether a man should immediately dissolve a friendship for him who has gone bad.

He solves this by saying that this is not to be done in all cases, i.e., immediate dissolution of the friendship, but only in those cases which because of the greatness of the wickedness are incurable, i.e., cannot be easily brought back to the state of virtue. If however there are those who will take direction, so that they may be led back to a state of rectitude, one should be more prompt to bring them help in regaining their good ways than in regaining a lost fortune, in that virtue is better and more proper to friendship than money. When, however, one dissolves a friendship towards one who has become evil, he does not seem to be doing anything unfitting, because he was not a friend to such a man but to a virtuous man. Therefore, in that the man's first disposition has altered, a friend who cannot bring him back to health, fittingly abandons his friendship.

He now discusses the dissolution of friendship itself and first brings up a question. For if one of the friends has remained in his former state and the other has become more virtuous so that there is now a great difference between them the question is whether he who has advanced in virtue should treat as a friend him who has not.

He solves this by saying that it is not possible for one who has advanced to preserve his friendship for one who has not. This appears especially when a great distance separates friends, as in those friendships which are made in childhood. For if one remains a child in mind while the other has become a very good man, they cannot remain friends because they are not pleased by the same things, nor do they rejoice and grieve over the same things. Without this, friendship cannot be preserved, since it especially requires that friends should live together. They cannot live together, however, if the same things do not please them, and if they do not rejoice and grieve over the same things. This has been brought out above.

Finally he asks how one should behave toward a friend after the friendship has been dissolved. Thus he asks whether, after the dissolution of a friendship, a man should conduct himself

neither in a more distant way nor in a more friendly way than if they had never been friends.

He solves this by saying that one should remember the past, just as we consider that a man should do more for his friends than for strangers, so also should a man pay more heed to former friends because of the former friendship, except in one case, namely, when the friendship has been dissolved by reason of great wickedness. In that case a man should show himself no longer friendly toward him whose friendship he has dissolved.

Ch. 4: The origin of the acts of friendship is set forth: what the first act is, and what the others; also how the virtuous man behaves in regard to such acts, and how the evil man.

The friendly things one does for one's friends, by which friendship is determined, seem to proceed from a man's relations to himself.

For a friend is said to be one who wishes and does good things, or what appear to him to be good, for the sake of his friend.

Or a friend is one who wishes his friend to be and to live for his own sake, as appears in mothers in regards to their sons, and friends who have come into conflict.

Others define him as one who lives with and has the same tastes as the other, or one who grieves and rejoices with his friend. This, too, is found in mothers most of all. It is by some one of these characteristics that friendship is defined.

Now each of these is true of the good man's relations to himself, and all other men in so far as they think themselves good.

For virtue and the good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of each man.

He is in agreement with himself and wishes the same things with his whole soul. Therefore he wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it. For it is characteristic of the good man to work out the good, and he does so for his own sake, because he does it for the sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man himself.

He wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially as to that by which he thinks. For existence is good to the virtuous man, and each man wishes himself that which is good. No one would choose to have all goods if he had first to become someone else. God here and now possesses the good, but a creature in so far as it exists. And the intellectual part of man would seem to be what each is, or that which is principal in him.

Such a man also wishes to live with himself. For he does so with pleasure, since the memory of his past acts is delightful, and his hopes for the future are good, and therefore pleasant. His mind is well stored too with the subjects of contemplation.

He grieves and rejoices more than any other with himself, for the same thing is sad or pleasant to his whole being, and not one thing to one part of himself, another to another. He has nothing, so to speak, to repent of. Each of these characteristics belongs to the good man in relation to himself.

But one is related to one's friend as to oneself. For a friend is another self, and friendship seems to be one of these attributes (of the good man toward himself) and those who have these attributes to be friends.

Whether there is or is not friendship between a man and himself is a question we may dismiss for the present. There would seem to be friendship in so far as there are two or more of the attributes mentioned. Furthermore when we have great friendship for another it is likened to one's love for oneself.

The attributes named are seen to belong to many, and even to those who are wicked. In so far as they are satisfied with themselves and think themselves good, they participate in the aforesaid acts of friendship. But as to those who are really wicked and impious, none of these things are true, nor appear to be so, and hardly even so of the wicked in general.

For they differ from themselves, desiring one thing and wishing another, as incontinent people do. They choose for themselves, instead of the things which they consider good, things which are pleasant but harmful. The same, because of cowardice or laziness, shrink from doing the things which they consider to be best for themselves.

Those who have done many cruel things and are hated for their wickedness, flee life and destroy themselves.

Therefore the wicked seek others to live with, and flee themselves. For they remember many a grievous deed and anticipate others like them. But when they are with others, they forget themselves. Because there is nothing lovable in them, they do nothing of a friendly nature toward themselves.

They do not rejoice or grieve with themselves, for their soul is rent by faction: one element in it grieves when it abstains while the other part is pleased. Thus one part draws a man in one direction, the other in another, as if they were pulling him to pieces.

Even though it is not possible to be sad and rejoice at the same time the bad man is soon sorrowful because he has indulged himself and wishes that he had not accepted such pleasures. For the wicked are filled with regret. Thus the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even to himself, because there is nothing in him to love.

If to be thus is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wickedness and strive to be virtuous. For thus one will be a friend to oneself and the friend of another.

After the Philosopher has determined concerning the preservation and dissolution of friendship, he here discusses its effects, first the effects themselves, then the effects in relation to the good, then in relation to the wicked. He therefore begins by setting down the origin of the effects or acts of friendship, then enum-

erates these effects or acts. He states first that the amiable things and the works of friendship which a person performs for his friends, and according to which friendship is determined, appear to proceed from the acts which a man has toward himself. Thus a man is seen to be the friend of another if he does the same things for his friend which he does for himself.

He now enumerates the works of friendship. He sets down three, the first of which consists in the voluntary bestowing of benefits. Thus he states that men consider to be a friend one who wishes and does good things to his friend, or what appears to be good, for the sake of his friend. He states both *wishing* and *doing*, because one without the other does not suffice in friendship. For it neither appears to be friendly well-doing if one does good to the other against his will, or if he fails to fulfill his will by action. He also says *good* or *apparent good* because a friend does for another what he considers to be good, even though it may not be so. He says *for his sake* because if a man voluntarily does good to another, not as though intending the good of the latter but his own, as when a man feeds a horse for his own good, he is not the true friend of the latter but of himself.

The second act pertains to benevolence. Thus he states that a friend wishes his friend to be and to live for the sake of his friend and not for himself, as would be if he sought only his own good from him. This mothers feel toward their children, namely they wish them to be and to live; likewise friends, when some offense to friendship has occurred. For even though they do not wish, because of the offense, to live amicably with their friends, nevertheless they at least wish them to be and to live.

The third act or effect pertains to concord, which may be considered in relation to three things. First, as to external association. Secondly, as to choice. Thirdly, as to the passions, which are all followed by either joy or sadness. Whence he states that as to the first some men call friends those who live together, as to the second, those who choose the same things, as to the third, those who sorrow and rejoice together. This also may be seen in mothers in respect to children.

He sums up by saying that through one or the other of these friendship is determined. For men consider that friendship exists between those in which some one of these is found.

Now he shows how a good man conducts himself in regard to these, first as to himself, then as to others. He states therefore

first that each of the above is proper to the virtuous man in regard to himself. To others, however, who are not virtuous, they pertain in the measure only in which they consider themselves virtuous.

He gives the reason for the latter statement in that each does friendly things toward himself accordingly as he considers himself virtuous, because virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the measure of each man. In any category, that is taken for the measure which is perfect in that category, in that all other members are judged to be greater or less as they approach or recede from the most perfect. Whence, since virtue is the proper perfection of man, and a virtuous man is perfect in the human species, it is fitting that the virtuous man should be taken as the measure for the whole human genus.

He now gives the reason for the principal statement and shows first that that which has been said of *benevolence* pertains to the virtuous man in regard to himself.³³ He states therefore that a virtuous man greatly wishes himself goods both true and apparent. For the true and the apparent good are identical for him. In that he wishes for himself the goods of virtue, he wishes the true goods of man. Nor is this will in him vain, but rather he also performs these good works toward himself, because it pertains to a good man to labor to perfect the good.

It was said in Book II that virtue makes its possessor good and his action. The good man wishes and performs good because of himself, i.e., because of his intellectual nature, which is principal in man. (That seems most important which is principal in a being.) Thus the virtuous man always strives to act according to reason. Therefore it is plain that in so doing he also always wishes that which is good for himself.³⁴

Next he shows how what has been said of *benevolence* pertains to the virtuous man, saying that the virtuous man above all wishes himself to live and to be preserved in being, and principally as to that part of his soul in which wisdom resides. If a man is virtuous, he must wish that which is good for himself, because each wishes good for himself. That which is good for the virtuous is his being, namely that he should be virtuous.

If it should occur that a man should be changed into something else, as according to fables a man might be transformed into a stone or an ass, no one would be solicitous that

the transformed being should have all possible goods, therefore each wishes himself to be in the sense of the preservation of what he is. That which is chiefly preserved in its own being is God, who indeed does not wish himself any good, which He does not now have, but here and now possesses perfect good within Himself. And He is always what He is now, because He is unchangeable. We are most like God according to the intellect which is incorruptible and immutable. Therefore the being of every man is principally considered according to the intellect. Whence it is that the virtuous man, who lives wholly according to intellect and reason, wishes most of all to himself to be and to live. He wishes himself to be and to live according to that in him which is permanent. He who wishes himself to be and to live principally according to the body, which is subject to change, does not truly wish himself to be and to live.

Finally he shows how what has been said of *concord* pertains to the virtuous man. First, as to living together. Thus he states that the virtuous man more than any other wishes to live with himself, i.e., returning into his heart and meditating with himself. This he does with pleasure, in one way as to the memory of the past, because the memory of the good that he has done is pleasant to him. In a second way as to the hope of the future, for he has the hope of doing good in the future, which is pleasant to him. Thirdly, as to the knowledge of the present, for he abounds in thoughts which are true and useful considerations.

Secondly the virtuous man has concord with himself as to the passions. He, above all, rejoices and sorrows with himself because the same thing is sorrowful or pleasant according to his whole being, i.e., both as to his senses and his intellect, and not differently to each. This is so because the sensitive part of him is so subject to reason that it follows the motion of reason, or at least does not violently resist, for he is not led by the passions of his sensible nature so that afterwards when the passion ceases he regrets what he has done against reason. But because he always acts according to reason, he does not easily repent, and thus more than others is in concord with himself.

Now he shows how the aforesaid belong to the virtuous man in respect to his friend. He states that the virtuous man behaves toward his friend as toward himself, because his friend, in his affection, is like another self, since a man feels toward his friend

as toward himself. It is seen, therefore, that friendship consists in some one of the above which men perform for themselves and that those are truly friends who act in such a way.

He now brings up the doubt whether a man has friendship for himself, and says that this question is to be left aside for the moment since it is one more of name than of something really existing. For friendship seems to be among men accordingly as two or three of the above are true of them. When we have great friendship for others it is assimilated to the love a man has for himself. Whence, when anyone wishes to commend his friendship for another he is accustomed to say: I love him as myself. Therefore it does not matter much as to the truth of the matter whether the name of friendship is said of oneself, since that which friendship is, abundantly pertains to a man in respect to himself.

Then he shows how evil men are in regards to such acts, first showing that such acts cannot pertain to them. Thus he says that the aforesaid acts appear to pertain to many in regard to themselves even though they are depraved. Nevertheless it is to be considered that they participate in the aforesaid acts of friendship toward themselves only to the extent to which they are pleased with themselves and think themselves virtuous. But the aforesaid neither fit in reality nor appear to fit any one of those who are really depraved and wicked. Nor do the aforesaid appear to belong to any extent to any wicked men. For it is rare to find depraved men who think themselves virtuous, not recognizing their wickedness.

To prove this he shows first that the work of friendship which pertains to beneficence is not proper to the evil man as regards himself. For evil men are at odds with themselves in that they desire one thing according to their sensitive nature and wish another according to reason, as may be seen in incontinent men who, instead of those things which they judge to be good for themselves, desire pleasures which are harmful to them. Others because of timidity or laziness omit doing those things which by reason they judge to be good. Thus they lack beneficence toward themselves in a twofold way: in that they do things harmful to themselves on the one hand, and avoid doing things beneficial to themselves on the other.

Next he shows that neither does benevolence pertain to them as regards themselves. Thus those by whom many and

great deeds of wickedness have been done, so that they are hated by men for themselves, do not wish themselves to be and to live, but rather their life is burdensome to them, knowing themselves to be a burden to other men. And so they flee life, to the extent that sometimes they kill themselves.

Finally he shows that neither does concord belong to them. First, as to living together, for the wicked cannot live with themselves, returning to their hearts, but seek others with whom to live, speaking and acting with them according to external words and acts. This they do because as soon as they think of themselves they remember the many great and wicked things they have committed in the past and presume that they will do the same in the future, which is painful to them. But when they are with other men, pouring themselves out in external things, they forget their evils. Thus, because they have nothing in themselves worthy of love, they do nothing friendly towards themselves.

Nor do they have concord with themselves as regards the passions. Thus Aristotle states that such men neither rejoice nor sorrow with themselves. Their soul is in a certain contention with itself, in that the sensitive part fights against reason. Thus on the one hand, it grieves if they withdraw from pleasures because of the wickedness which predominates in them, for this causes sadness in their sensible nature; on the other hand their soul rejoices as to reason, which judges such evils to be avoided. Thus one part of the soul draws an evil man to one side, while the other part draws him to the contrary side, as though his soul were being cut up in pieces and warred against itself.

He now sets aside a certain objection. For if anyone should say that it is not possible for a wicked man at the same time to sorrow and rejoice about the same thing, this indeed is true of feeling both simultaneously although the cause of both can be present simultaneously according to the different parts of the soul. He says therefore that if it is not possible that a wicked man should sorrow and rejoice simultaneously, nevertheless, shortly after pleasure he sorrows for that which pleased him and wishes that he had not accepted such pleasures. For wicked men are filled with repentance because once the onrush of wickedness or passion ceases, by which they do wrong, they know by reason that they have done wrong, and are sorrowful.

Thus it is clear that wicked men are not amicably disposed toward themselves, because they do not have anything within themselves which is worthy of friendship.

He concludes from what has gone before that if it is most pitiful to be thus without friendship for oneself, we should flee vice, intensely, i.e., vehemently, and strive to be virtuous. In this way one will be a friend to himself, and will become a friend to others.

Ch. 5: Aristotle begins to treat of goodwill, which appears to be the beginning of friendship, although it is not itself friendship.

Goodwill (benevolence) is assimilated to friendship, yet it is not friendship itself.

One may have goodwill toward people one does not know, and without their knowing it; but not friendship. This has been said already.

Nor is it love, for it does not have intensity of soul, nor desire. But these things follow love.

Love comes with familiarity, but goodwill may arise suddenly, as it does towards fighters in a contest. Men are benevolent toward them and share in their wishes, yet do nothing for them to bring this about. For, as we said, men feel goodwill suddenly and love superficially.

Goodwill, then, seems to be a beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. For unless one has been delighted by beauty one does not love. But he who is delighted by beauty does not for all of that love, but only when he longs for the beloved when absent and desires the presence of the beloved. Thus it is not possible for people to be friends unless they first have goodwill for each other, but they are not for all of that friends. For they only wish good things to those toward whom they are benevolent, but they will not do anything for them, nor trouble themselves for them. For this reason somebody has called goodwill, by extension, an inactive friendship. But when good will is of long duration and leads to familiarity, then it becomes friendship.

But it does not turn into the friendship for utility or for pleasure.

For goodwill is not involved in these. This is so because, in that friendship which is for utility's sake, the one who has received the benefit returns goodwill for what he has received by acting justly. He who wishes someone to act well because he has the hope of enrichment through him seems to have goodwill not toward him, but rather toward himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if he is solicitous for him because he expects to use him.

In all cases goodwill arises because of some quality or excellence which is perceived, by which someone appears good to us, or strong, or some other such thing. This we pointed out in the case of fighters.

After the Philosopher has shown what the works of friendship are and to whom they belong, he here discusses each of them in particular. The aforesaid works of friendship are reduced to three, i.e., beneficence, benevolence and concord. Therefore he now determines these three, and first of all benevolence which consists in interior affection for a person himself, secondly concord, which also consists in affection, but with respect to those things which belong to the person, and thirdly beneficence, which consists in the external effect. As to the first he does two things: he shows that benevolence is not friendship, but that it is the beginning of friendship. Thus he first shows that benevolence is not friendship (which is a kind of habit), nor is it love (which is a kind of passion), as shown in Book VIII. Benevolence appears to be something similar to friendship in that all friends must be benevolent. Nevertheless it is not the same as friendship.

This he proves by two means. The first is that benevolence can be had toward men one does not know, experience of whom one has not attained by associating with them as friends. But this cannot be in friendship. The second is that benevolence can be hidden from him toward whom one is benevolent, which also cannot be in friendship; and this is stated in the beginning of Book VIII.

He now shows that benevolence is not love, for two reasons. The first is that benevolence does not have intensity of soul, nor desire, i.e., feeling in the sensitive appetite, which distends the soul by its onrush as though moving it toward something with a kind of violence. This occurs in the feeling of love, but not in benevolence, which consists in a simple motion of the will.

The second reason is that love comes from familiarity. For love implies a certain vehement onrush of the soul. It is not customary, however, for the soul immediately to move vehemently toward something, but it is led to do so little by little.²⁵ Therefore love grows by a certain familiarity, but since benevolence implies a simple motion of the will, it can occur suddenly, as happens to men watching the struggles of fighters. They become benevolent toward one or the other of the fighters, and it would please them that this one or that one should win. Nevertheless they do nothing to bring this about, because as has just been said, men become benevolent suddenly and love superficially, i.e., according to a solitary and weak motion of the will, which does not burst out into action.

He now shows that benevolence is the beginning of friendship, and secondly of what sort of friendship. First of all, benevolence is said to be the beginning of friendship as delighting in the sight of some woman is the beginning of love for her. For no one begins to love a woman unless he has first been delighted by her beauty. Nevertheless one does not immediately love a woman when one is pleased by her beauty, but it is a sign of complete love when, if she is absent, one desires her, as though begrudging her absence and desiring her presence. The same is true of friendship and benevolence. For it is not possible for men to be friends, unless they have first become benevolent.

Nevertheless it is not because they are benevolent that they can be called friends, since all that pertains to the benevolent is that they should wish good to the objects of their benevolence, in such a way, nevertheless, that they would not do anything for them, nor are they perturbed at their misfortunes. Whence one may say that benevolence is a certain idle friendship, since it does not have any friendly act connected with it. But when a man remains benevolent over a period of time, and becomes accustomed to wishing well to someone, his soul becomes firm in wishing good to the other, so that his will will not be idle but efficacious, and thus friendship comes about.

He now shows of what sort of friendship benevolence is the beginning. He first shows, however, of what friendship it is not the beginning. Thus he says that benevolence over a long period of time, combined with familiarity, does not lead to that type of friendship which is for the sake of something useful or pleasurable.

For benevolence does not change into that friendship which does not comprise benevolence. For benevolence has no place in such friendships. This indeed appears plainly in pleasurable friendship, in which both friends wish pleasure from the other, which is sometimes with harm of the friend, and thus benevolence is removed. But in useful friendship there can be benevolence as to him who has already received benefits. If he acts justly he returns at least benevolence for the benefits that he has received.

But if anyone should wish that a person be well off and should act well because of the hope which he has that through him he will abound in goods, he does not seem to be benevolent

toward him through whom he hopes to abound, but more to himself. Likewise, one does not appear to be the friend of another, who is solicitous of the good of the other because of some utility deriving to himself, i.e., in order to use him for something.

Finally he shows of what friendship benevolence is the beginning. In all cases benevolence seems to be had toward someone because of some quality which he has, as when one appears to be, to him who is benevolent, good or strong or some such thing for which men are usually praised, as it is said of fighters, towards whom we become benevolent because of the strength which appears in them or some other such thing.

Ch. 6: It is now question of concord, which appears to belong to friendship. It is not concerned with speculative matters, but only with practical actions, nor with all of these, but only with important ones. There is not said to be concord among the wicked.

Concord also seems to belong to friendship, which is why it is not the same thing as unity of opinion. For the latter can exist even with people who do not know each other.

Nor do we say that people who have the same views on any subject at all, have concord, as, for instance, concerning the heavenly bodies. For there is nothing friendly in agreeing about these things.

But cities are said to be in accord when they agree as to what is to their advantage, and choose to do the same things, and perform those things which they have resolved in common. Thus concord is about things to be done.

It is concerned also with matters of a certain magnitude, and involving both parties, or a whole group, as, for instance, in cities when it seems to all that the leaders should be elected, or that an alliance should be formed with Sparta, or that Pindar should rule, at a time when he himself was willing to rule. But when each of two people wishes himself to have the thing in question, as in the *Phoenissae*, then there is contention. For concord does not exist when both wish something to themselves, but rather when they agree on the same thing, as when both the people and men of virtue agree that the best men should rule. Thus do all get what they aim at.

Political friendship appears to be the same thing as concord, as is commonly said. For it is concerned with things that are to our interest and are good for living.

Such is the concord which exists among good men, for these have concord with themselves and with each other, and remain stable, so to speak. For

the wishes of such men are constant, and do not flow back and forth like Euripus. They wish just things and fitting things. And these things they desire in common.

But bad men cannot have concord, unless to a small extent, just as they cannot be friends, desiring more than their share in useful things, while in labor and service they fall short of their share. Each man wishing advantages for himself criticizes his neighbor and stands in his way. The common good of those who do not watch over it is lost. Therefore contention arises among them while they force others to do just things and themselves do not wish to do them.

After determining what benevolence is, the Philosopher here determines concord, first showing what it is, secondly how it is related to political friendship. Thus he states first that concord seems to belong to friendship. It has been said above that it pertains to friends to choose the same things, in which consists the essence of concord. From this it is evident that concord is not the same thing as *homodoxia*, i.e., unity of opinion. For it can occur that even those who do not know each other may be of the same opinion, among whom, however, there is not concord, just as there is not friendship.

He now inquires of the matter of concord and first shows with what concord is not concerned. Thus he states that men are not said to be in concord who agree about anything at all, as those who consent with each other in speculative matters, as for example things pertaining to the heavenly bodies. To consent with one another in such things does not pertain to the notion of friendship, since friendship is from choice. Judgment in speculative matters, however, does not depend upon the necessity of choice. Therefore nothing prevents friends from having different ideas about such things, while enemies may agree on them. Thus it is evident that concord, which pertains to friendship, is not about such things.

Now he shows what concord is concerned with, and first in general that it is concerned with things to be done. Thus he says that states are said to have concord when they agree on what is useful, so that they choose the same things and do in general those things which they consider to be useful. Thus it is clear that concord is concerned with things to be done.

Now he shows in particular with what operations concord is concerned. First, concord is to be considered in matters of a certain magnitude. For the concord of several is not dissipated

by a disagreement on minor things. Secondly, the things with which concord is concerned are such that they may be fitting to all, whether men or citizens of a state. For if anyone should consent that another should have what none can have, this does not seem to matter much for concord.

He here introduces an example from states, in which there is said to be concord when all the citizens see the same way, as when the leaders are chosen by election, not by lot or succession; or when it seems to the Athenians that they should enter into partnership with the Lacedemonians in order to fight together against enemies; or when it seems to all the citizens that some man, say Pindarus, should lead, provided he wants to lead. Then those who wish this are in concord with him.

But when each wants to lead, contention arises in consequence, as is related in the *Phoenissae*, which are certain poems. For concord does not consist in each wishing the good for himself (although there is a likeness of will according to proportion since each does wish good for himself). Otherwise this will be the cause of contention. But it is necessary for concord that all should agree on the same identical thing, as when in some state both the people and virtuous men concur in this, that the best should rule. In this way, all have what they desire, when they all agree on the same thing.

Now he shows how concord is related to political friendship, saying that political friendship, whether it exists between the citizens of a same state, or between states themselves, seems to be the same thing as concord. Thus men are accustomed to say that states or citizens who are in concord have friendship for each other. For political friendship is concerned with useful things, and that which is good for human life, about which we say concord exists.

Now he shows to whom concord properly belongs, and first shows that it is found in the good, secondly that it is not found in the wicked. First, therefore, concord, such as it has been defined, is found in those who are virtuous. Such men agree with themselves, and also agree with others, in that they remain permanently in the same state both as to their choice and as to their actions, because, as has been said above the good are not accustomed to repent of their decisions. But he adds "so to speak" because it is not possible that men in this life have complete immutability.

He adds to this exposition that they are therefore said to remain in the same because their wills remain fixed on the good, and they do not flow from one thing to another, as *Euripus*, i.e., a certain place on the sea in Greece, in which the water flows both ways. Such virtuous men wish what is just and useful, and desire such things in common.

Now he shows that concord does not exist in the wicked, saying that the wicked cannot agree, except to a slight degree, just as they can be friends only to a slight degree. They cannot agree because they wish to have a superabundant share of all that is useful, but wish to be deficient, i.e., have less, of the labors which are done in common and are to be undergone, i.e., whatever taxes or services are necessary. Since each of them wishes this, i.e., to superabound in good things and have a lesser share of the hard things, they question their neighbor and impede him lest he should have what he desires. Thus, since they do not preserve that common good which is justice, the community of concord is destroyed among them. So contention comes about among them, when one forces the other to do for him what is just, but himself does not wish to do justice to the other, but wishes to abound in good things and lack hard things, which is against the equality of justice.

Ch. 7: Beneficence is treated, concerning which a question arises, namely that benefactors seem to love more than those who receive the benefit.

Benefactors seem to love those whom they have benefited more than the latter love them.

The question arises because this seems contrary to reason.

To a good many people this seems to be because the latter owe something whereas the former have something owed to them. Just as in loans, the debtors wish their creditors not to be, while those who loan watch over the security of their debtors, so also benefactors would seem to wish the recipients to be, that they might receive thanks, but the latter to take no interest in the return. Epicharmus would perhaps say that this is said looking at the bad side of men. But it is quite like human nature. For many are forgetful of benefits, and desire more to receive good things than to do them.

But there is an answer closer to nature, which is not like the one brought up in the case of those who loan. For love does not enter into such matters,

but the will that the other should remain in being is for the sake of the gain to be derived. But benefactors like and love those whom they do good to, even if these are of no use to them, nor will be so in the future.

This happens with craftsmen. For every man loves his own work better than he would be liked by his work if it were perchance to come alive. This seems to happen particularly with poets: for they greatly love their poems, loving them like their own sons. The case of benefactors is like this. For the one that they have done good to is their work. They love their work more than their work loves them. The reason for this is that being is something worthy of choice by all, and lovable. We exist when we act. For living and acting is a certain work. We love a work, then, because we love being. This is natural, and the reason for this is that whatever a thing is potentially is revealed by action.

Likewise, to the benefactor, that is good which is according to act, whence he rejoices in the object of his action. But to the recipient there is no good in the one acting, unless it be some advantage, but this is less delightful and lovable.

The present activity is delightful, the future the object of hope, and the past of memory. That is most delightful which is according to act, and likewise lovable. For him who does the work, the work remains, for the good is lasting. But for the recipient the utility passes away.

The memory of good things is pleasing, but that of useful things either entirely not so, or less. Expectancy of the future, however, seems to be the opposite.

Loving is assimilated to making. To be loved, however, to being acted upon. Love and friendly actions belong to those who are more active.

Further, those things which require labor are always more loved, e.g. those who have made their money love it more than those who have inherited it. Now receiving good things would seem to be without labor, but doing them to be laborious. For this reason, too, mothers love their children more. The generation of the children is more laborious for them, and they know better that they are theirs. This too, would seem to be proper to benefactors.

Having determined benevolence and concord, the Philosopher now treats of beneficence. He begins by stating a question which arises concerning it. For benefactors appear to love more those they benefit, than do those who receive the benefit love those who do good to them.

He then states that this is a question because it seems to be contrary to reason. For beneficiaries are obliged in justice to love their benefactors but not conversely.

Next he solves this question by assigning the reason of that which occurs. First he gives the apparent reason, then the true reason. As to the first he states that to many the reason for this occurrence is that beneficiaries owe something to their benefactors,

after the manner of owing to those who loan. We perceive in loans, that they who owe, wish those to whom they owe, not to be, in order that they may be immune from the debt. But those who loan, to whom something is owed, take care of the welfare of those who owe to them, lest they should lose the debt. Thus do benefactors wish those whom they have done good to to be and to live so that they may receive thanks from them. But those who have received the benefactions are not concerned with giving thanks but wish rather to be absolved of this debt. Therefore they do not much love their benefactors.

Approving this reason, *Epicharmus*, a certain philosopher or poet, would say that such a reason is given considering the malice of men. For that is attributed to human custom which is found among many, and many are those who are forgetful of benefits and seek more to receive good things from others than to do good themselves.

Now he assigns the four real reasons. First he begins by setting this explanation before the previous reason, saying that the present explanation appears closer to nature than the previous one because it is taken from the nature of the benefaction, nor is it similar to the reason assigned above taken from those who make loans. Those who make loans do not love those to whom they loan but wish them to remain in being not out of love but because of gain. But benefactors love according to the sensitive appetite and by choice those whom they do good to, even though they are of no use to them in the present and they do not expect any utility from them in the future.

Now he gives the first true reason, saying that the same occurs with benefactors in relation to their beneficiaries, as occurs with artisans in relation to their works. Every artisan loves his own work more than he is loved by it, even though it were possible for such a work to come alive. This appears to happen especially with poets who love their own poems superabundantly, as parents love their children. For poems belong more to that by which man is a man than do other (mechanical) works. To this one may compare what happens in benefactors loving those to whom they do good. For he who receives some good from another is, in a certain sense, his work. Therefore benefactors love their work more, i.e., the beneficiaries, than conversely.

Having given these examples he adds the common reason, saying that the cause of the above is that all men love and choose

their own being. Everything, inasmuch as it is, is good. The good is worthy of choice and lovable. Our being consists in a certain activity. For our being is to live and consequently to act. For life cannot be without any of the operations of life. Hence it is lovable to each to do the works of life. The product of the maker is in a certain sense the maker in act. For the act of the one moving and acting is in that which is moved and receives the action. Therefore, for this reason do artisans and poets and benefactors love their product, because they love their being. This indeed is natural, namely that each should love his being.

The reason for this consequence, namely that they love their product because they love their being, is manifested when he adds: "That which is in potency, the product announces in act." A man is a man because he has a rational soul: the soul is the first act of a physical body which has the power of life, i.e., which is in potency to the activity of life. Thus the fundamental being of man consists in his having the power of the activity of life. The reduction of this potency to act is manifested by that which man does in exercising the activities of life.

As to the second reason, he begins by saying that each loves his own good. The good of the benefactor consists in his act, by which he gives benefits. It is also an act of virtue. Therefore the benefactor delights in the beneficiary as in that in which his good is found. But the one who receives does not have any true good in the one acting, i.e., the benefactor. For it is not an act of virtue to receive benefits from another. If he has any good at all in the benefactor it is a useful good, which is less delightful and lovable than moral good. Thus it is evident that the benefactor is less lovable to the beneficiary than conversely.

He now proves what he has just supposed, first in general. That which is delightful in the present is the act itself or the operation; in the future it is hope; as to what has been done, or the past, it is memory. Of these three the most delightful is act, and it is likewise more lovable than hope or memory. But there remains to the benefactor the goodness of his act, for a moral good does not pass immediately but is enduring, and thus he delights in him to whom he has done good, as in his present good. But the utility which the one receiving has, soon passes. Thus the beneficiary delights in the benefactor according to the memory of that which is past. The moral good, therefore, which

the benefactor has is more delightful and lovable than the useful good which the beneficiary has in his benefactor.

He proves this by saying that the memory of the good, i.e., the moral good, which one has done in the past, is delightful. But the memory of the useful goods which one once had, is either wholly not delightful, as when one is saddened by their loss, or is less delightful than the memory of moral good, because something of the latter remains. But as to the hope of the future the contrary seems to hold true, i.e., that it is more delightful to look forward to useful things than moral goods.

The reason for this divergence is that an unknown good does not please but only a known one. No one knows a moral good, however, unless he had it. Hence they are known if they are past, not if they are only future. Useful goods are known both past and future, but the aid of those past has already gone. The hope they expect to receive from them in the future delights as a kind of remedy against future needs. Whence it is that a man delights more in the hope of useful things than in the memory of the same, or in the hope of moral goods. But in the memory of moral goods a man delights more than in the memory of useful goods.³⁶ The benefactor has the memory of a moral good, the beneficiary of a useful good. Therefore the beneficiary is more delightful and lovable to the benefactor than conversely. He gives the third reason when he says that loving is assimilated to making. For it pertains to one who loves to wish and do good to the one he loves. But to be loved is assimilated to undergoing. The one who does is more excellent than the one who undergoes. Therefore it is reasonable that those who excel by activity, i.e., benefactors, artisans and poets, should love and possess those things which follow love.

The fourth reason is given when he states that those things which are done with labor are always more loved. Thus those who by their own effort and labor possess riches love them more than those who have inherited them from their parents or by the free gift of somebody, whence it is also, that the latter are more liberal, as is said in Book IV. For someone to receive a benefit from another is without any labor on his part. But to do good to another is laborious, i.e., it requires action and labor. Hence it is reasonable that benefactors should love their beneficiaries more than conversely.

He confirms this reason by the example of mothers, who love

their children more than the fathers do. This is so both because they labor more over their birth, carrying them and bearing them, than do the fathers, and because they are better able to know that they are their children than the fathers. And this seems to be proper to benefactors, that they love their beneficiaries to the extent that they have labored over them.

Ch. 8: The love of self is treated; this because those who love themselves most of all are most of all detested.

The question arises as to whether one should love oneself the most or some other.

People reproach those who love themselves most of all, and they are called lovers of self as a term of disgrace.

Indeed a bad man appears to do everything he does for his own sake. The worse he is, the more he seems to act this way. They accuse him as doing nothing outside of himself. But good men act for the good, and the more so the better they are, and for the sake of a friend. Such a man sacrifices his own interest.

But in reality actions do not agree with these reasons, and this is not surprising. For men say that a man should love most him who is most his friend. But one's friend is he who most of all wishes one good for one's own sake, even though none should know. This situation is verified most of all in a man's relations to himself.

So are all the other attributes by which a friend is known. For, as has been said, it is from one's relations to oneself that all other friendly relations to others are derived.

Likewise, in this all the proverbs agree, e.g. that friends have but one soul, that what friends have is in common, that friendship is equality, and that the knee is neighbor to the tibia. But all these characteristics are found above all in a man's relations to himself. For a man is his own best friend, and therefore ought to love himself most.

There is therefore good reason to ask which of the two opinions one should follow, since there is something to be said for both of them.

Possibly, then, one should distinguish between these two viewpoints and determine what is true of each and how this is so. If we take the term 'lover of self' in each of the two senses and see what is true of each, we may attain a clear idea.

Those who use the term as one of reproach, call "lovers of self" those who attribute to themselves the greater share in money, honors and bodily pleasures. For many men desire these things and strive for them as the best, for which reason they are the occasion of competition. Those who have an abundance of such goods indulge their desires, and their passions in general; the irrational part of their soul. Many men are of this sort, which is why the appellation is derived from this sort of self-love. It is right that a man who loves himself in this sense should be an object of reproach.

That it is men of this sort, who allot such things to themselves, that are usually called 'lovers of self' is obvious. For if a man always strove to do just things more than anyone else, or temperate things, or any other things according to virtue, and took all this good for himself, no one would ever call him a lover of self or reproach him for it.

After the Philosopher has determined concerning the preservation and dissolution of friendship, as well as of the acts of friendship, he now brings up certain doubts involved in friendship. This he does first in respect to the one loving, secondly in respect to those loved. Therefore he begins by saying that a doubt arises whether one should love oneself most or some other more than oneself.

He shows that this doubt is reasonable. Men reproach those who love themselves especially. The fact of being a lover of one self is considered as something wrong.

Furthermore, a wicked man does everything for his own good, and the more so the worse he is. The more he does this, the more he is accused by men, as one who does nothing outside himself, i.e., for the good of others, but only for his own good. But virtuous men do not act for themselves alone, but rather do what is morally good, both because of themselves and because of their friends. For which reason they often sacrifice their own interest.

On the other hand, however, the actions by which men are shown to love themselves particularly, differ from the above reasons. Nor is this unreasonable. First since men generally say that a man should most love him who is most his friend. He is the greatest friend of someone who most wishes him good for his own sake, even though no other should know it. This exists above all in the relations of a man to himself. For each wishes good things to himself above all. Thus it is plain that a man should love himself above all.

Secondly, all the other things by which it is determined and defined what a friend is, exist above all between a man and himself, as said above, because all friendly actions which we do toward others are derived from the friendly actions which we do toward ourselves.

To the same end he introduces certain proverbs, saying that all proverbs which are commonly in use, agree on this point, that

a man loves himself above all. Thus it is said that two friends have but one soul, or that the possessions of friends are in common, and that friendship is a certain equality, also that friendship is like the knee to the tibia, which are most close together. All these give one to understand that friendship consists in a certain unity, which principally is that of one to oneself. Thus all the aforesaid proverbs can be verified in regard to a man in respect to himself. This, because a man is above all a friend to himself, and thus a man should principally love himself.

He concludes the doubt by saying that it is fitting to doubt which of the two viewpoints one should follow, since there is something to be said for both of them.

He now solves the doubt and begins by determining the mode of the solution. Thus he says first that those questions which can be solved in two different senses, should be distinguished as to what is true in both senses, and where it is so. If we consider how a person is said to be a lover of himself according to both senses of the objection, we shall find the truth we are seeking.

Thus he solves the doubt by distinguishing it, first showing what is meant by a lover of self in the sense in which it is decried, secondly in which it is praised. As to the first he states that those who consider it wrong to be a lover of oneself, mean by that those who allot to themselves the greater share in corporeal goods, i.e., money, honors, and corporeal pleasures, such as those of food and sex. Such goods are sought by a great many men. Men look at them as though they were the best.

Since many seek a superabundance in such goods, which all cannot have at once, it follows that quarrels and contentions come about in connection with such goods. Those who abound more in such goods, transform their abundance into the satisfaction of their concupiscence and in general of all their desires, and consequently of the irrational part of their soul to which the feelings belong. Thus those who seek such goods, love themselves according to the irrational part of their soul, i.e., the sensitive part. The majority of men is such that they follow their senses rather than their intelligence. Therefore this use of the term lover of self is taken from that which is evil, which is proper to many. Thus a lover of self in this sense may be found in most cases and is justly condemned.

He proves what he has said, saying that it is clear that many are called lovers of self because they confer upon themselves a greater share of the aforesaid goods which belong to the irrational part of man, because if anyone wished to superabound in the goods of reason, which are the works of virtue, as though wishing to perform more than any other the works of justice, or temperance, or any other virtue whatsoever, in such a way that he always wished to acquire moral good for himself, none of the aforesaid multitude would call him a lover of himself, or if some wise man called him this, it would not be to his shame.³⁷

Ch. 9: It is now shown who may justifiably love himself, namely, the virtuous man.

It will be seen that such a man (the virtuous man) is indeed more truly a lover of himself.

For he attributes to himself the best and greatest goods.

He gratifies the most principal element in himself and obeys it in all things.

Just as a state appears to be that which is most principal in it, and likewise any other group, so also with man. Thus a man seems to be most a lover of himself when he loves that which is principal in himself and gratifies it.

A man is called continent or incontinent in the measure in which he is able to keep a hold on his reason or not, on the assumption that this is the man himself.

Men are thought to have acted of themselves and voluntarily, above all when they acted by reason.

That each man is what his reason is, or at least is that most of all, is obvious, as it is that the virtuous man loves his reason most of all. Therefore such a man, more than any other, will be a lover of himself.

This is love of self according to a different mode than that which is reprobated, differing from it to the degree in which living according to reason differs from living according to the passions, and desiring the true good from seeking what appears to be useful.

Those who strive to do good actions more than others, are approved and praised by all.

If all men competed for the good, and sought to do the best things, they would all have in common what they needed, and the greatest of goods would be proper to each, for such is virtue.

Therefore a good man should love himself, for by doing good things he will help himself and will help others. But a bad man should not. For he will harm both himself and his neighbors by following his wicked passions.

For the bad man, there is a clash between what he should do and what he actually does. The intellect always chooses what is good for it, and the virtuous man obeys his intellect.

It is true what is said of the virtuous man, namely that he does and suffers many things for the sake of his friend, and if necessary dies for him. For he will throw away money and honors, and in general all those things that men compete after, procuring the true good for himself.

For he chooses rather to have great joy for a short while, than a long period of mild enjoyment, to live well for one year rather to have many years of a humdrum existence, to perform one great and good action rather than many small ones. This seems to be what happens to those who die for others. But they are choosing a great good for themselves.

They will throw away money, too, if thereby their friends will receive more. Their friend receives money but they receive good. But they are giving the greater good to themselves.

They act in the same way about honors and rule. For all these the good man will sacrifice for his friend's sake. For this is good and praiseworthy for himself. Thus the virtuous man acts wisely, choosing the true good before all things.

It happens that he will even sacrifice his good actions. It is better for him to be the cause of his friend doing them. In all praiseworthy things, the virtuous man is seen to give himself the greater share of the good. In this way a man should be a "lover of self" as we have said, but as many men are, he should not be.

After the Philosopher has shown how a person may be said to be a lover of self in a way which is reprehensible, he now shows how one may be a lover of self in a way which is praiseworthy. Thus he first shows that there is a way in which one may love oneself other than that already mentioned. Secondly he shows that this second way is praiseworthy. As to the first he shows that a person is a lover of self who attributes an abundance of the goods of reason to himself. Thus he says that one who strives to excel in the works of virtue appears to be more a lover of himself than he who attributes to himself a superabundance of sensible goods.

He proves this by two reasons. The first is that a person loves himself more in the measure in which he attributes to himself greater goods. But he who strives to surpass in the works of virtue, attributes to himself the best, i.e., those which are the greatest goods, namely moral goods. Therefore such a man loves himself more than any other.

The second reason is that such a man gives good to that which is most important in himself, namely the intellect. He

brings it about that all the parts of his soul obey the intellect.²⁸ The more a person loves something, the more he loves that which is most important in it. Therefore it is evident that he who wishes to excel in the works of virtue loves himself above all.

He now proves what he has supposed, namely that he who loves that which is most important in himself, i.e., the intellect or reason, loves himself above all. This he shows by three reasons. The first is that a state appears to be that which is chief in it. Thus that which the rulers of a city do, the whole city is said to do. The same is true of every other thing which is constituted on several elements. Whence man is above all that which is principal in him, namely reason or intellect. Thus he who loves intellect or reason and gives them goods, seems above all to be a lover of himself.

The second reason is that a person is called continent who holds on to himself, and incontinent who does not. This is said inasmuch as a man holds on to his intellect by following its judgment, or does not hold to it by reason of incontinence, because each man is what his intellect is. Thus it appears that such a man truly loves himself who loves his reason.

The third reason is that what men do by reason they seem to do themselves to the greatest degree and such deeds to have been done voluntarily. What a man does through concupiscence or anger, does not seem to be done by his own will, but as led by an extraneous motion. Thus it is evident that a man is principally that which he is according to intellect and reason. Whence he loves himself most when he loves intellect and reason.

Now he shows to whom it belongs to love himself in this way. Thus he says that it is clear from the above that each is what he is by reason of intellect or reason. Or if other factors concur in the being of man, one may say that a man is principally such, i.e., intellect or reason, because this is what is formal and complete in the human species. It is clear also that the virtuous man principally loves this, i.e., the intellect and reason, because he keeps it in its totality and obeys it. Whence it is evident that the virtuous man above all is a lover of himself.

He now shows that this manner of loving oneself is specifically different from the previous one, saying that the virtuous man is a lover of himself according to another type of love than that which is reprehensible, as said above. He assigns two differences, the first of which is on the part of act. For the virtuous man loves himself because he lives according to reason. But he who

is reprehended lives according to passion. For he follows the passions of the irrational soul, as said above. The other difference is on the part of the end. For the virtuous man loves himself in that he desires that which is essentially good. But he who is reprehensible loves himself in that he desires for himself that which appears as a useful good, when nevertheless it is harmful.

He shows that to love oneself as the virtuous man does is praiseworthy. Such a man strives to excel in the works of virtue. It is plain that all receive and praise those who strive for good actions differently than others, i.e., more abundantly than others; thus it is evident that he who loves himself according to virtue is praiseworthy.

He shows that such a man is also useful to himself and others. For it has been said that he who loves himself according to virtue, strives to act well in a superlative way. If all men competed for the good, i.e., if each tried to excel the other in goodness by acting best it would follow that all would have together what they needed, because one would help the other, and that which was proper to each would be the best of goods, namely virtue.

He now infers two corollaries from what has preceded. The first is that it is the best possible thing for a good man to love himself, because by doing good he helps both himself and others. But a bad man should not love himself because by pursuing his evil passions he both hurts himself by depriving himself of virtue, and his neighbors by depriving them of sensible goods.

The second corollary is that in an evil man the things he does are contrary to the things he should do. For he acts against intellect and reason. Every intellect chooses that which is best for itself. Thus an evil man does not do what he should do. But this fits the virtuous man because he obeys the intellect in all things.

He now excludes from him who loves himself according to virtue that which was said above in accusation of one who loves himself, namely that he does nothing for the sake of others. First he says that it is true what is said of the virtuous man, namely that he will do many things for his friends and his country, more than any other. Even though he should be required to die, he will not desert his friend. Money, however, and honors and all other external things for which men fight, he, as it were, casts aside and despises for his friend. By all these things he

procures good for himself, namely moral good, which is more eminent. Whence even in this he loves himself more and procures for himself the greater good.

He manifests what he has said. First as to the death which the virtuous man will undergo for his friend. For a man who dies for his friend procures good for himself because he chooses rather to delight for a short time in a great work of virtue than to delight for a long time in a slight way in mediocre works of virtue.

He prefers to live in an excellent way for one year than for many years in a mediocre way. Likewise he chooses a great and good action rather than many good and slight actions. This occurs in those who die for virtue's sake, because although they live less, nevertheless in one action alone, in which they expose themselves for a friend, they do more good, than in many other actions. Thus, by exposing themselves to death for their friends by reason of virtue, they choose a great good for themselves. In this it is manifest that they love themselves to the greatest degree.

He manifests the same as to the contempt for external goods. First as to money, saying that the virtuous, for the sake of their friends, despise or disperse their money, so that their friends receive more from the point of view of money than they do. In this also they in truth love themselves more. For when one concedes money to his friend and acquires for himself moral good, it is clear that he gives the greater good to himself and thus loves himself more.

He shows the same about honors, saying that he acts in the same way about honors and positions of authority, for a virtuous man easily relinquishes all of these for his friend's sake, because to do so is a certain good work of virtue and praiseworthy. Thus it is evident that the virtuous man acts wisely, in place of all external goods choosing the good of virtue, which is great, and thus he will love himself more than any other.

Finally he shows the same as to acts of virtue, saying that it even happens sometimes that a virtuous man will concede the acts of virtue to his friend, as when, in the case where some work of virtue is to be done by himself or by another, he allows his friend to do it, so that he may advance and be praised. Nevertheless even in this he is choosing for himself that which is better. For it is better and more virtuous to be the cause of

his friend's doing such things than if he did them himself, especially when the opportunity remains for him to do other such or greater acts. Thus it is evident that the virtuous man attributes more to himself of all praiseworthy things and thus he, above all, loves himself.

He concludes by saying that one must be a lover of self as the virtuous man is, not as many men, who are not virtuous, love themselves.³⁹

Ch. 10: The doubt is brought up as to whether the happy man needs friends or not. Arguments for both sides.

Does the happy man need friends or not?

Some say that the blessed and those who are self-sufficient have no need of friends. For they have the things that are good: those who are self-sufficient are in need of nothing. But a friend, they say, provides another self, giving a man what he cannot accomplish by himself.

Therefore, if the spirit has given well, what need is there of friends?

But it would seem not to make sense, to assign all good things to the happy man, yet not friends. For a friend seems to be the greatest of external goods.

If it is more the part of a friend to do good things than to receive them, and it is proper to the good and to virtue to do good, and it is better to do good to one's friends than to strangers, the virtuous man will need friends.

For this reason it is asked whether friends are needed more in good fortune or in misfortune, that they may receive the needs of the unfortunate man, or be the objects of the beneficence of the fortunate man.

Another drawback to the initial attitude is that it would make the blessed man solitary. But no one would choose to have all goods alone, for man is a political creature and born to live with others. Now a happy man will have all that is good by nature. It is clear that it is better to dwell with friends and those who are virtuous than with strangers, and any sort of men whatever. Therefore the happy man needs friends.

What then do those first cited mean and what truth is there in what they say? Is it because many consider friends those who are useful and the blessed man will not need such, because he has the good things, nor will he need friends for pleasure's sake, or at least not many? For if life itself is delightful, it needs no accessory pleasure. Thus a man who does not need such friends seems not to need friends at all.

But perchance this is not true. It has been said in the beginning that happiness is a certain operation and it is obvious that an operation is something that is done: it does not exist like a kind of possession. If happiness lies in living and acting, and the good man's activity is virtuous and delightful in itself, as has also been said in the beginning, and it is also

true that it is proper of delightful things that we can consider them better in others than in ourselves, and actions of others better than ours, and that actions of virtuous men who are their friends are delightful to good men, both will have those things which are by nature delightful. Thus the blessed man will need such friends. If he needs to contemplate good actions and actions that are his own, such will be the actions of a friend who is good.

It is thought that the happy man must live delightfully. But life is difficult for the man who lives alone, for he cannot easily act by himself continuously, but he can easily do so with others and toward others. Thus there will be a more continuous operation, and one that is delightful in itself, as it must be in the case of the blessed man. For the virtuous man, inasmuch as he is such, rejoices in actions that are in keeping with virtue and is pained by those which proceed from wickedness, just as a musician is delighted by good melodies, and saddened by bad ones.

Thus there comes about a certain training in virtue from the dwelling together of good men as Theognis says.

After the Philosopher has brought up and solved the question of the love of self, he here solves a question which arises concerning the love of others.

First he shows that the doubt is a reasonable one, by arguing for both sides. First, as to the negative side, he argues by reason. Thus certain men say that the happy man, since he is self-sufficient, does not need friends. Since all good things are had by those who have a complete sufficiency of goods, they would seem to need no other. A friend appears to be necessary, because since he is another self, he gives what a man cannot have by himself. Thus it would seem that the happy man does not need friends.

He adduces a proverb in support of this which was current among the pagans, that he to whom the spirit gives good does not need friends. For the pagans, and the Platonists in particular, held that the order of providence was such that human things were governed by divine providence through the intermediary of spirits. Some were said to be good, some evil. There exists therefore the proverb that, since men receive good things through divine providence, as appears to occur with happy men, that they do not need the help of friends.

Now he argues for the other side and gives three reasons. Thus he says that it does not seem right that all external goods should be given to the happy man, but not friends, since a friend is, so to speak, the greatest of external goods.

Secondly, as said above, it pertains to a friend rather to do

good than to receive good. For it is proper to virtue to do good. Happiness, however, consists in the work of virtue, as is said in Book I. Thus it is necessary for the happy man to be virtuous and consequently that he do good. It is better, however, for a man to do good to his friends than to those who are not, all other things being equal, because a man does this with greater pleasure and more promptly. Therefore, the happy man, since he is virtuous, needs friends to whom he may do good.

A certain doubt arises from the above, namely, whether a man needs friends more in good fortune than in misfortune, for in both situations a man seems to need friends. The unfortunate man needs friends who may do good for him, but the fortunate man needs friends to whom to do good. This doubt will be pursued further on.

Thirdly it does not seem right for the happy man to be alone. For this is against the choice of all. For no man would choose always to live with himself, i.e., alone, even after he had all goods, because man is naturally a political animal and is born apt to live with others. Since a happy man has those things which are naturally good, it follows that he would have a life with others. It is clear, however, that it is better to live with friends and virtuous men than with strangers and any sort of men at all. Thus, therefore, it is clear that the happy man needs friends.

He now solves this problem and first shows how it is true that the happy man does not need friends. Thus he says first that since it has been shown that the happy man needs friends one must consider what the former say, denying that the happy man needs friends, and what truth there is in their statement.

To this end one must consider that many consider those to be their friends who are useful to them, in the giving of external goods, which ordinary men alone know. A happy man does not need such friends, since he has a sufficiency of goods. Likewise he does not need friends for the sake of pleasure, unless in a small degree, inasmuch as in human life one must have a certain amount of recreation for the sake of repose, as is said in Book IV. For the life of the happy man, since it is itself pleasurable, as said in Book I, does not need any further pleasure which would absolutely require friends. Since he does not need such friends, namely useful and pleasurable ones, he seems not to need friends.

He now shows that this is not absolutely true, and adduces

first certain moral reasons. The first is that it is not true what has been said, namely, that if the happy man does not need useful and pleasurable friends, he does not need friends at all. For a man needs friends for the sake of virtue. The prime reason for which is, as said in Book I, because happiness is a certain operation.

It is plain however that an operation exists as something that is being done and not like permanent things, as if there might be some possession which, once had, would make a man happy, in such a way that he would not have to do anything. But happiness consists rather in a continuous living and acting.⁴⁰ It is necessary however, that the activity of the good man be good and pleasurable in itself because it is good in itself, as is said in Book I. Good activity is, among pleasurable goods, the proper pleasure of the virtuous man. For a man would not be virtuous who did not delight in the activity of virtue, as is said in Book I. It is required therefore for happiness that the happy man should delight in the activity of virtue.

We cannot be pleased except by what we know. We can, however, consider our neighbors more than ourselves, and their actions better than ours, because the judgment of each is inclined to err in one's own affairs because of the private affection one has toward oneself. Thus it is evident that the actions of those who are good and are friends, are pleasing to good men, in which actions are found both those elements which are pleasing by nature, namely the good and that which is loved. Thus, too, the happy man needs such virtuous friends in that he seeks to consider the good actions of a good man who is his friend. Since a man's friend is as though another self, his friend's actions are, so to speak, his own.

He now shows the second reason saying that it is commonly accepted that a happy man must live pleasantly. For pleasure is one of the things which is required for happiness, as stated in Book I. But he who lives a solitary life undergoes a difficult, i.e., a burdensome life. For the pleasure which he gets from his activity must be interrupted. For it is not easy for a man by himself, i.e., living alone, to act continuously. But this is easy, if he lives with another. For there comes about a certain alternation of activity, since they do good to each other. And thus the pleasure is continuous.

If, therefore, a man dwells with friends, his activity, which

is pleasing in itself, will be more continuous. This must be taken into consideration when speaking of the happy man, namely that he should delight continuously in the works of virtue. The virtuous man, as such, enjoys virtuous actions whether performed by himself or by another. He is saddened by contrary actions which proceed from malice, as a musician is pleased by good melodies and offended by bad ones.

The third reason is that because the virtuous man lives amicably with good men, there arises an *ascesis*, i.e. an association in virtue, as *Theognis*, a certain poet, says. Such a society is beneficial to any virtuous man, just as other human activities are perfected in society.

Ch. 11: It is shown by a reason closer to nature that a happy and upright man should seek an upright friend, because being and living are worthy of a good man's choice, and the experience of them is pleasing.

To those who look for reasons closer to nature, it appears that a virtuous man will naturally incline to choose a virtuous friend.

What is naturally good, as we have said, is good and pleasing to the virtuous man.

Life is determined for the animals by the power of the senses, for men by the senses and the intellect. A power, however, is ordained to action, and consists principally in action. Thus life appears to be principally the activity of the senses or of the intellect.

Living is among those things which are good and delightful in themselves. For it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good. What is naturally good is also good for the virtuous man, for which reason it is seen to be pleasing to all.

But this cannot be applied to a wicked and corrupt life, nor to a life of sadness. For such a life is indeterminate, as are its constituent parts. This will become clearer when we get to sadness.

If life itself is good and delightful, as it seems to be from the fact that all men desire it, it is especially so to the virtuous and the blessed. For they have more reason to choose life, and their life is the most blessed.

One who sees, feels that he sees, and one who hears, that he hears, and one who walks, that he walks, and in other activities, likewise, we feel ourselves acting. For indeed we sense that we sense, and we know that we are knowing. This is so because we sense or intellectually know that we exist. For being was defined as sensing or knowing. To sense that one is living is among those things which are delightful in themselves. For by nature life is good, and to perceive something good existing in oneself is pleasing.

Living as an object of choice is especially so to the good, because their existence is good to them and likewise delightful. Feeling that which is good in itself, they are delighted.

Now the virtuous man is to his friend as to himself. For his friend is another self. Just as his own being is worthy of choice to each, so also is his friend, or nearly so. It has been said that being was worthy of choice, because of feeling the existence of something good. Such feeling is delightful in itself. He needs to be conscious therefore, also of his friend, and this is done by living together and communicating in words and thought. For this seems to be how men should be said to live together, and not like animals who only eat together. If therefore existence is something that a blessed man opts for as something good in itself, since existence is good by nature and delightful, that of his friend is very nearly so, and a friend is among those things which a man would choose to have.

Now whatever is desirable for a man to have, must be, otherwise he will be deficient in this respect. Thus the happy man will need virtuous friends.

After assigning certain moral reasons why a happy man needs friends, the Philosopher now shows the same by a more natural reason. First he shows that a happy man would choose to have a friend, secondly he concludes further that a happy man needs friends. Thus he says that if anyone should wish to consider the question from a more natural point of view, it will be clear that a man who is virtuous and happy will naturally choose a virtuous friend, even more than other external goods.

This he proves by showing, first, what is naturally worth choosing and pleasing to a virtuous man in respect to himself, secondly in respect to a friend. As to the first he begins by showing that it is natural for a good man to choose to be and to live, secondly that it is pleasing for him to feel this. Thus he begins by saying that whatever is naturally good, is good and pleasing to a virtuous man as such, as appears from Book VII. But being and living is good and pleasing to the virtuous man.

As to the proof of this he first shows in what life consists. Thus he says that in all animals, life is generically determined according to the power of sense. In men however, it is determined according to the senses as to that which man has in common with the other animals, and according to the power of the intellect, as to that which is proper to him. Every power is reduced to operation as to its proper perfection. Therefore, that which is principal consists in activity, and not in mere power, as is proved in Book IX of the *Metaphysics*. From this it is evident

that life for animals or man consists principally in feeling or intellectual knowledge. When one sleeps, because one is not actually feeling or knowing, one is not perfectly alive but has a half life, as is said in Book I.

Now he shows that life is naturally good and pleasing, saying that life is among those things which are good and pleasing in themselves. He proves this by the fact that life is determined. That which is determined pertains to the nature of good.

In evidence of this, it is to be considered that a power as such is indetermined because it can be ordered to many things; it is determined by act, as is evident in matter and form. A power or potency without act is a power with a privation, which is in the order of evil, just as the perfection which comes through act is in the order of good. Therefore just as anything, in so far as it is indetermined is evil, in so far as it is determined, it is good.

Life is determined, in that it consists principally in activity, as has been said. Whence it is evident that life is naturally good. That which is naturally good is also good to the virtuous man, since the virtuous man is the measure in the human species, as has been said. Therefore, since living is naturally good, we see that it is pleasing to all.

He sets aside a doubt, saying that the statement that life is naturally good and delightful, is not to be applied to a bad life, i.e., a vicious and corrupt life which recedes from the true order, nor even a life of sorrow. Such a life is not naturally good, because it is indetermined, i.e., lacking the desired perfection as to the things concerned with it. Because each thing is determined by that which is in it, if that is indetermined then the thing itself will be indetermined, just as if sickness is indetermined the sick body will be indetermined and bad, just as are evil itself and corruption or sadness. This will be more evident when one treats of sadness (in Book X).

He now infers a conclusion to the aforesaid reason, saying that if life is naturally good and pleasing, which not only appears from the above but also from the fact that all desire it, it follows that especially for the virtuous and the blessed is it good and pleasing to live. For their life is most perfect and most blessed, and therefore is more desirable to them.

He now shows that to feel oneself living is something a virtuous man will choose and enjoy. He who sees himself seeing

feels his sight, and likewise he who hears himself hearing, and so forth in other activities in which one feels oneself acting. In that we feel ourselves feeling, and know ourselves knowing, we feel and know ourselves to be. For it has been stated above that to be and to live for a man is principally to feel or to know.⁴¹ For a person to feel himself living is among those things which are pleasing in themselves, because, as proved above, life is naturally good. For a person to feel good within himself is pleasing. Thus it is evident that, since life is something worth choosing, and especially for the good whose being is good and pleasing, also for them to perceive their feeling and their knowing is pleasing to them, for along with this they feel that which is good in itself, namely being and living, and this they enjoy.

Now he shows what is worth choosing for a virtuous and happy man in regard to a friend. Thus he says that a virtuous man is toward his friend as toward himself, since his friend is, in a way, another self. Therefore, just as it is desirable and pleasing for the virtuous man that he should be, so also it is desirable and pleasing for him that his friend should be. If not equally as much, at least nearly so. For the natural unity which one has to oneself is greater than the unity of affection which one has with one's friend. It has been stated above that for the virtuous man his being and living is something desirable since he feels that his being and living are good. Such feeling is pleasing in itself, in that one feels good within oneself. Therefore, just as one delights in one's being and living by feeling it, so also in order to enjoy this in one's friend, one must feel him to be.

This occurs when they live together according to the communication of words and the consideration of the mind. For in this way are men properly said to live together, i.e., according to the life which is proper to man, not because they happen to eat together, as occurs in cattle.

Thus, from all that has gone before, he concludes what he had first proposed, saying that if his life is naturally desirable to the blessed man, in that it is naturally good and pleasing, since the being and life of his friend are, as to his affection, close to his own life, it follows that a friend is desirable for the virtuous and happy man.

He shows further that friends are necessary for the happy man. What is desirable for the happy man, he must have, otherwise there will remain something lacking, which is against the nature of happiness, which requires sufficiency. It is required therefore that he who is in the state of happiness should have friends. Aristotle is speaking however, of happiness such as it can be had in this life, as is said in Book I.⁴²

Ch. 12: The doubt is raised as to whether one should have many friends. Aristotle solves this by saying that this is not expedient, since a few suffice for pleasure, and one cannot have many friends according to virtue.

Should one make as many friends as possible, or should one apply what is prudently said of travelling in the proverb "Let me neither be called a great traveller nor one who does not travel at all" likewise to friendship and neither to be no friend at all, nor, by excess, the friend of many.

As to friends for utility's sake, what has been said seems to apply completely. For it is a laborious task to minister to many, and a whole life would not suffice to accomplish this. A greater number, therefore, than are necessary for one's own life, are a distraction and an impediment to living well, so we have no need of them.

As for those who suffice for pleasure, we need only a few, like condiments in food.

But as for virtuous friends, should we have as many as possible, or is there a certain measure of what makes a friendly group, as there is of a city? For neither is a city composed of ten men, nor of ten myriads (100,000) of men. Just exactly how many is perhaps no one single number, but one may determine a mean between two extremes.

So for friends also there is a certain determined number, and that it is probably the number with whom one can live and share himself, is obvious. For this seems to be true friendship. That one cannot live with many and parcel oneself out to them, is obvious.

Furthermore, they must be friends of each other, if they are all to dwell together. But it is difficult for such a situation to exist among many.

It is likewise difficult to rejoice and grieve intimately with many. It could arise that one might have to rejoice with one and sorrow with another simultaneously.

Thus it is perhaps right that one should not seek to be very friendly with many, but only so many as suffice for living together. Nor does it seem to happen that a man can be a close friend of many, because one cannot love many. For love is a kind of excess of friendship. But this can only be felt for one, or at most for a few.

This is what seems to happen in actuality, for one does not have many friends in a comradely way. It is two who are said to sing together. Those

who have many friends and mix intimately with all seem the friends of none; in a political sense they are called complacent.

In the way proper to fellow-citizens, it is indeed possible to be the friend of many without being obsequious, but a genuinely good man. But friendship for virtue and for another's sake is not toward many. It is a lovable thing if we can find a few such.

If, therefore, one has more useful friends than are necessary for one's life, one will be too much distracted and impeded from the goods of life which consist in the work of virtue, because when a man superfluously engages in the affairs of others, it follows that he cannot give due care to himself. Thus it is evident that it is not necessary for a man to have a number of useful friends.

He now shows that even for pleasant living a few friends suffice. For the external pleasure which is afforded by such friends is sought in human life like seasoning in food, which although it be slight, is enough. Whence it is that a few friends suffice a man for pleasure that he may recreate with them for a time.

He now solves the question as to friends according to virtue, first by reason, then by experience. He begins by summing up the question, saying that it remains to be considered whether one should make oneself virtuous friends in numbers, so that the more one had the better it would be, or whether one should have a certain measure as to the number of one's friends, as appears in states, which are not composed of ten men only, but neither are they composed of ten myriads, i.e., a hundred thousand (for a *myrias* is the same as ten thousand), for by reason of the numbers it will then not be a city but rather a kingdom. But how great a number is necessary for a city is not determined by any set rule, because there can be both a large and a small city. But one can establish two extremes, between which a middle state can be determined as a fitting number for a city.

He now solves the doubt, saying that there should not be an immense multitude of friends, but rather a certain determined number of them. This he proves by three reasons. The first is that a man can live with a certain number of friends: for this among others seems to be more in the nature of friendship, i.e., befitting friendship which is according to virtue. It is plain,

however, that a man cannot live with an immoderate number of men, and parcel himself out, so to speak, among many. Thus it is evident that there cannot be many friends according to virtue.

The second reason is as follows. It is plain that friends should live with one another. Likewise, if one has many friends, they must all be friends of each other. Otherwise they could not live together, nor consequently with their friend. This, however, is difficult to bring about where many are concerned. Thus it does not seem possible for one man to have many friends.

The third reason is that, as was said above, a friend rejoices with his friend. It is difficult, however, for anyone to intimately rejoice and grieve with many. It might well happen that one might be called upon simultaneously to rejoice with one and sorrow with the other, which is impossible. For this reason also it is not possible to have many friends.

He concludes from the above that it is not well for a man to seek to be a close friend of many but only so many as may suffice for living together, because it does not seem to happen, anyway, that a man is a close friend of many. Whence it is that according to passionate love, one man does not love several women with intense love, because perfect friendship consists in a certain superabundance of love, which cannot be fulfilled except toward one person, or, at most, toward a very few.⁴⁴ For always that which is abundant belongs to a few, because it cannot occur in many cases that a thing be brought to its highest perfection, because of the multiple deficiencies and obstacles, which intervene.

He now shows this by experience. For we see that in reality a man has friendship toward a few. For a man is not found to have many friends according to the friendship of those who are associated or conjoined. This is also proved by a certain proverb which states that it is two who sing together.

Indeed it is customary for young people to come along singing in pairs. But those who are the friends of many, who act in a familiar way toward all, do not seem to be the true friends of any, because they do not stay long with any, but passing on they act amicably toward all. Nevertheless such men are called political friends, according to the custom in cities, in which friendship is judged by such plaudits and familiarities. Those who are the friends of many are called placid men, which implies the vice of excess in delighting with others, as is said above in Book IV.

He now shows according to what kind of friendship men may truly be said to be the friends of many. Thus he says that this can occur in political friendship, not only in the sense in which a placid man is the friend of many, but also in a way befitting a truly virtuous man. For it has been stated above that political friendship appears to be the same thing as concord. The virtuous man, however, concurs with many in those things which pertain to political life. It does not happen, however, that a virtuous man has friendship toward many for the sake of virtue, loving them for themselves and not only for utility's or pleasure's sake. Rather it should be exceedingly lovable and dear to a man if he can find a few such friends, i.e., for virtue's sake and for themselves.⁴⁵

Ch. 13: Now Aristotle asks whether a man needs friends in adversity as well as in prosperity. He solves this by saying that in adversity a man needs friends very much, especially useful friends, although in both states of fortune, there is nothing better than friends.

Are friends needed more in good fortune than in misfortune? They are needed in both, for those in misfortune need help, and fortunate men need friends to live with and to whom to do good, since they wish to act well.

They are more necessary, indeed, in misfortune, and therefore in this case one needs useful friends. But it is *better* to have friends in good fortune, and therefore virtuous men seek them. For it is more worthy to do good to such and to converse with them.

The very presence of friends is delightful, whether in good fortune or in misfortune.

For those who sorrow are relieved by friends who sorrow with them.

One might ask whether it is as though they take upon themselves a share of the burden, or some other reason. For the presence itself of friends is delightful, and the thought of their grieving for us diminishes our sadness. Whether it is because of this or some other cause does not matter here, but things appear to happen in the way we have said.

However, the presence of friends is a certain mixed pleasure. To see one's friends is a pleasure and especially to the infortunate man, and is a certain help against his sadness. For a friend consoles us both by his sight and by his words if he is skilled. For he knows our ways and what pleases us, and saddens us. But it is sad to feel one's friend sorrowed at our misfortunes. For everyone avoids being a cause of sadness to his friends.

Therefore, those of a manly nature fear having their friends grieve for them. If the sadness caused his friend is not greater than his own, he will

allow him to bear a part of it. Nor do such men rejoice in having others weep with them, for they do not weep themselves. It is womanly and for men of like nature to be happy when others share their anguish, and they love such as friends and companions in sorrow. But in all things we should imitate the better man.

In good fortune, however, the presence of friends and their conversation is delightful as is the knowledge that they are enjoying one's good things.

For this reason, it certainly seems that we should promptly summon our friends to our good fortune. For the good should be used in doing good. But one should be slow to call one's friends to one's troubles. For a man should share his misfortune as little as possible. Whence the proverb: "It is enough that I should be unfortunate." We should summon friends, then, most of all when with little trouble on their part we may be greatly aided.

On the other hand, it is probably right that one should go to friends in misfortune without being called, and this promptly. For it is the part of a friend to do good and especially to those in need and who do not ask for it. This is better and more pleasant to both. We should also be prompt in cooperating in the good fortune of our friends. For friends are needed in this, too; but we should not be over-eager. It is not good to be swift to accept help. One should avoid a reputation displeasing to one's friends because of hanging about for benefits, as sometimes happens. Thus the presence of friends in all circumstances seems to be something which the good man will choose.

After having solved the difficulty concerning the number of one's friends, the Philosopher now brings up the question of their necessity. Thus he says first that one might ask whether a man needs friends more in good fortune or in misfortune. It is clear that a man needs friends in both conditions. In misfortune a man needs friends who will bring him aid against the misfortune. In good fortune a man needs friends with whom to live and to whom to do good. For if they are virtuous they wish to act well.

He solves the question concluding from what has been said that for a man to have friends is *more necessary* in misfortune, in which he needs the help which is given by friends, as has been said. Whence it is that in such a state a man needs useful friends who will bring him help. But in good fortune it is *better*, i.e., more morally good, to have friends. Therefore, in this state men seek friends who are virtuous. This they do because it is better to choose to do good to such men and to live with them.

This he now proves, namely that friends are needed in both states. First he proposes what he is going to prove, saying that the

presence of friends is agreeable both in good fortune and in evil fortune.

He proves this, therefore, first as to misfortune, stating that men who are in sadness, feel a certain relief in the presence of friends who sorrow with them.

Next he asks what the causes of this may be, and gives two, with the doubt as to which predominates. The first is taken from the example of those who carry on some heavy burden, wherein one is relieved by the help of another who assumes the load with him. It seems to be likewise that the burden of sadness is more easily borne by one friend if another friend bears the same burden with him.

But this likeness does not seem to prevail as to the sadness itself. For one does not assume a part of the same sadness which one's friend has in order to diminish his sadness. This can apply, however, as to the cause of the sadness, as when one is saddened by some loss that one has undergone and a friend assumes part of the loss, which in diminishing the loss, thereby also diminishes the sadness.

The second cause is better and applies to the sadness itself. It is clear that any supervening pleasure diminishes sadness and a friend who is present and sympathizes brings pleasure in two ways. In one way, because the presence of a friend is agreeable. In another way, because when one knows him to grieve with one, one has pleasure in his friendship and thus the sadness is diminished.

Since this is outside the principal question, he adds that at present one will not examine whether it is because of what has been said, or for some other reason that men who are sad are relieved by the presence of sympathetic friends. It is manifest, nevertheless, that what has been said does occur.

He now shows that the presence of a friend has a certain sadness mixed with it. Thus he says first that the presence of sympathetic friends appears to comprise a certain mixture of pleasure and sadness. For the sight of one's friends is agreeable, both in general, and in particular for a man in misfortune who is helped by his friend not to sorrow, in that his friend consoles him, both by his sight, and also by his words, if he is competent in consoling. For one friend knows the mind of the other, and what pleases and sorrows his friend, and thus he can bring the suitable remedy against his sadness. In this way the presence of

a sympathetic friend is agreeable. But on the other hand it is sad, in that a man feels his friend grieving with him in his misfortunes. For any man who is well disposed avoids as much as he can being a cause of sadness to his friends.

He concludes from the above that men who have virile souls are naturally apprehensive lest their friends should be saddened on their account. For it is in the nature of friendship that a friend should wish to do good to his friend, not be the cause of some harm to him. Virile men cannot bear in any way that their friends be saddened on their account unless the help brought by the friends exceeds the sadness they may be caused. For they accept that their friends be slightly saddened if thereby their own sadness is relieved. In general it is not pleasing for virile men to have those who weep with them, because virile men are not inclined to weep.

There are however certain men with more feminine dispositions who are cheered in having others who share their anguish, and they love those who grieve with them as friends. But in this divergence among men, one should imitate in all things those who are better, namely virile men.

He now shows the second part of the question, namely that the presence of friends in good fortune is praiseworthy. He states that in good fortune the presence of friends gives pleasure in two ways. First, as to conversing with them, for it is agreeable to converse with one's friends. Secondly, because one sees one's friends enjoying one's goods. For every man seeks to be a cause of pleasure to his friends.

He infers a certain corollary from the above which contains some moral teaching. This applies first to those who summon their friends. Thus he concludes from the above, first, that because it is pleasant for a man to know that his friends enjoy his goods, a man should promptly summon his friends to his good fortune, in order to share it with his friends. For a good man must do good to his friend.

Secondly a man should be slow and somewhat lax about calling his friend in his misfortune. For a man should share his harm with his friend as little as possible. To this end he adduces the proverb of a certain sayer: "It is enough for me to be infortunate," as though saying: It is enough that I should suffer misfortune, it is not fitting that my friends should also suffer it.

Thirdly friends are to be called in misfortune especially when with slight inconvenience on their part they can be of great help to their friend.

He now gives three teachings concerned with going spontaneously to one's friends. The first is that when one's friends suffer misfortune one should on occasion go to them promptly, even when not asked, because it is proper to friendship to do good to one's friends and especially those who are in need, and who do not consider that they should ask this of their friend. For thus, when help is given to him who does not ask it, it is more virtuous on the part of both, i.e., both he who gives and he who receives. This is so because he who gives is seen to give more spontaneously and he who receives to act virtuously in that he has not wished to burden his friend. It is also more pleasing to both, since the one receiving does not suffer shame as he would in asking something of his friend, and he who gives has more pleasure as giving of himself and not being prompted to do so.

The second teaching in this line is that in a man's good fortune, a friend should be prompt in offering to cooperate with him, for a man needs friends to act with him.

The third is that for a man to be well received by a friend in good fortune he should present himself quietly, i.e., not over-eagerly, nor too easily. For it is not good for a man to be prompt in receiving help from a friend. But rather a man should fear and avoid a reputation for pleasure, i.e., lest he should gain the reputation of not being pleasing to his friend, because he renders himself onerous to him. It is clear that this sometimes happens. For when some men rush forward too much to receive benefits, they render themselves burdensome and unpleasing to their friends. Or in another sense, a man should fear, i.e., avoid a reputation for pleasure by staying around, lest his friend should think of him that he enjoys remaining with him because of his benefits.

Finally he concludes from all the above that the presence of friends in all situations is seen to be desirable.

Ch. 14: It is asked whether, just as those in love delight in the sight of each other, so too friends delight in living together.

Just as among lovers it is most delightful for them to see each other, and they prefer more to have this sense than the others, since on it love depends most for its being, and its beginning, is it also true that that which is most preferred in love is to live together?

For friendship is communication.

As a man is to himself, so is he to his friends. Just as it is desirable for him to be conscious of himself, so too of his friend. The activity which brings this about is living together, and therefore they rightly desire it.

Whatever existence means to each man, or whatever he thinks life worth living for, in this he wishes to converse with his friend. Therefore some drink together, others play at dice together. Others still exercise or hunt together or philosophize together, each associating with others in that which they love best in life. They do this wishing to live with their friends and this communication they consider living together.

Thus the friendship of wicked men becomes bad, for they communicate in wicked things, being unstable. They grow in wickedness by becoming like each other.

But the friendship of good men is augmented by their conversing together. For they are seen to become better by acting and living together. For they consider each other and take pleasure in each other, whence the proverb: "Good things from the good." So much, then, has been said for friendship. Next we must pass on to pleasure.

Having finished the question of the number and necessity of friends, Aristotle here treats of their living together. He proposes the question, stating that living together is based upon a certain likeness of friendship to love between a man and a woman, in which we see that those who love desire above all to see the women they love. They choose this sense before all other external senses because, as said above, the passion of love begins by sight especially and through this sense is preserved. For such love is provoked principally by beauty, which sight perceives.

What therefore is proportionate to sight in friendship? Is it for friends to live together? Just as lovers are delighted above all by the sight of each other, are friends delighted by living together? According to another text, this is not brought up as a question but as a conclusion. One could arrive at such a conclusion from what has been proved above, namely that the presence of friends is at all times delightful.

He shows the truth of the aforesaid, whether as a question or a conclusion, by three reasons. The first is that friendship consists in communication, as is evident from what has been said

in Book VIII. But friends communicate especially in living together. Whence living together appears especially to be proper and delightful in friendship.

Secondly, just as a man is to himself, so he is to his friend, as is evident from what has been said above. As regards himself, it is desirable and pleasing for a man to be aware of himself. Therefore, this is also pleasing to him in regard to his friend. But this is done by living together, because by their mutual activities which they see, they perceive themselves to be. It is fitting therefore that friends should wish to live together.

The third reason is taken from experience. For we see that men wish to converse with their friends according to that activity which principally delights them, which they consider to be their being, and for the sake of which they choose to live, as though ordering their whole life to this end.

Whence it is that some wish to drink with their friends. Others to play dice with them. Others still to exercise with them, for example in tournaments, combats, and so forth. Yet others to hunt together or philosophize together. Each wishes to live with his friends in those actions which he loves above all others in this life. Their wishing to live with their friends consists in performing with them those actions in which they most delight and in which they consider their whole life exists. They communicate in such actions with their friends and consider this communication to be living together. Thus it is evident that living together is chosen before all else in friendship.

He now concludes from the above concerning the friendship of the good and the wicked. First as to the wicked, whose friendship is evil. They delight principally in evil deeds, and communicate with each other in these. Since they are unstable, they always go from bad to worse, because one is made wicked by accepting the likeness of the other.

He concludes concerning the good that the friendship of virtuous men is good, and constantly increases in virtue by good conversations. These friends are made better by virtue of acting together and loving each other. For one receives from the other the example of virtuous activity in which he delights. Whence it is stated proverbially that a man receives good things from the good.

Finally he concludes saying that so much has been said of friendship, and that next pleasure is to be treated. Thus ends the teaching of Book IX.

APPENDIX

¹ Aristotle's *Ethics* is a study of human happiness: what it is and how it may be attained. In Book I he arrives at a definition of happiness as an activity of the soul according to perfect virtue. The remaining Books are therefore devoted to a study of the moral and intellectual virtues and finally, in Books VIII and IX to a study of friendship since the truly happy man will need friends. Book X, the last book, is a study of pleasure, which is a necessary concomitant to happiness.

Because friendship is a virtue, or at least implies virtue, it is treated as a part of *moral philosophy*. The senses can know individual things, but it is only reason which can perceive the *order* of one thing to another. The order of one thing to another, however, in any group, ultimately depends upon the order of those things to the end or principle of the group. Thus, in an army, the order of one soldier to another ultimately depends upon the order of the whole army to its chief. *Philosophy* is nothing other than a consideration of the order existing between things, principally in reference to the order of the whole group to its ultimate end, since this is the final reason and explanation of whatever order exists.

Thus the consideration of the order existing in nature is *natural philosophy*; the consideration of the order which the mind sets in its own activity is *rational philosophy* (or logic); the consideration of the order which man sets in his voluntary acts is *moral philosophy* (or ethics). The order which the mind sets in external things contrived by human reason is *art*.

² Friendship is referred to as a sort of virtue, in so far as it is an *elective habit*. A habit is any more or less permanent disposition existing in a faculty. An elective habit is one which is a result of man's deliberate choice, one which he *elects* to have, one, therefore, which implies the use of intellect and will.

It is such permanent and deliberate habits which a man forms, rather than his transitory feelings, which constitute a man's character. It is this note of purpose, intent, and deliberate choice, which constitute such acts as truly human and coming from the man himself, as against those acts which are the result of sudden impulse or feeling, and do not necessarily represent the man himself.

The word *elective* or its synonyms will recur frequently as a characteristic of a permanent state of character (virtue) or as something worthy of being made the object of virtue. Thus it will recur specifically in distinguishing the permanent habit of friendship from a spontaneous and possibly passing feeling of love in the senses, which though it may be a beginning of friendship, is not yet friendship itself. It is because this element of deliberate choice, implying really human activity, is so essential to virtue in general and friendship in particular, that we consider primarily the intent of the giver in friendship, rather than his gift, whereas in the ordinary exchanges of business we are concerned with the worth of the object alone (Ch. 13).

³ This is not said in the sense that the end of the individual is to be subordinated to another end which is that of the state, as is the case in

totalitarian regimes. Rather, it is meant in the sense in which a particular science is a part of the science which governs the whole field, as the science of making munitions would be a part of the general science of making war. Thus, in human life, that science which is devoted to making the individual man good and happy (*Ethics*) is a part of the general science devoted to making all of human society good and happy (*Politics*). To quote St. Thomas: "If the same is the good of one man and of a whole state, it appears to be much greater and more perfect to undertake, i.e., procure and preserve, the good of a whole state than the good of a single man. It pertains to the love which should exist among men, that a man should preserve the good of even a single man. But it is much better and more divine, that this should be towards a whole people and entire states." (Book I, Ch. 2).

However, this science which treats of human things, is not the highest of all as science. "For the ultimate end of the whole universe is considered by divine science (*Metaphysics*), which is the most principal of all." (*ibid.*)

From St. Thomas' assumption of Aristotle's statement that it is *more divine* to care for the multitude than for a single one alone, one may also infer that God's relationship to us is primarily as to members of an order, than as to strictly isolated individuals.

* Passion has a specific sense for Aristotle and St. Thomas. In treating of living beings, it is the word used to denote the *motions of the sense appetite*, such as sensible love, desire, pleasure, hate, revulsion, sadness, hope, despair, daring, fear and anger. Man being composed of soul and body has both intellectual appetites (of the will following intellectual knowledge) and sense appetites (following purely sense knowledge). His problem is not to eliminate his passions, but rather to organize them in the service of the guiding principle of reason to live a complete and unified life *as a man*, a creature who is both spiritual and material.

The virtues are nothing other than the permanent dispositions resulting from a perfect organization of the intellect and passions towards a complete and human life, moving toward an end perceived by the intellect, under the motive force of the will.

It is because of the difficulty in mastering and utilizing the passions that some schools, such as the Stoics, and, to a certain extent, the Platonists, strive to suppress them entirely. It is possibly because of Luther's notion of the innate evilness of man based experimentally on the rebelliousness and perverse tendencies of the passions, that in Protestant cultures the word has come to assume a pejorative sense.

⁵ Aristotle's problem in Book X, the last Book of the *Ethics*, is precisely to determine what is ultimate in happiness. Is it the good which one has, or is it the pleasure which one has in possessing it? He leaves this problem unsolved since, in any case, the two are necessarily co-existent. The ultimate notion of the good implies the concomitance of pleasure, otherwise it would not be considered as the ultimate good. Thus the ultimate good implies the ultimate in pleasure, and the ultimate in pleasure the possession of the ultimate good. Thus St. Thomas states that the two are identified in the subject, although reason can distinguish between them. Elsewhere (*S.T.* I-II, q. 4, a. 2) he positively gives the primacy to the good possessed, since this is the reason for the pleasure and not conversely.

However, in this discussion of the different bases for friendship, the *good* is taken as that which is good according to reason, the *pleasing* is that

which is good according to the senses. The two are not exclusive, but rather represent a difference of degree. The true good will include the good of the senses, but the pleasing will involve sense good alone.

⁶It is to be noted that Aristotle does not restrict friendship to the friendship of virtue alone. The other two types, that for pleasure and that for utility, are also friendships—though of an imperfect type—in that each knowingly wishes the good of the other, even though this is done for selfish motives. It is because these three types really exist that misunderstandings can arise when people who think they are friends of the first type, are really friends of the second or third types (Book IX, Ch. 3). It is also for this reason that even though another's friendship toward one is on a utilitarian basis, one is nevertheless morally bound, if one accepts the benefit, to make a return (Book IX, Ch. 13).

⁷This is a cardinal principle which extends through the whole realm of Aristotelian philosophy. Whereas existing things may be differentiated by their forms, how are acts to be differentiated? By their objects. Thus knowing is differentiated from willing because the object of the former is some truth, the object of the latter some good. Seeing is differentiated from hearing by the fact that the object of one is color, of the other, sound. In morals, one act of, say, almsgiving, will be differentiated from the other according to whether the object in view is a sincere desire to help the poor man or to attain a reputation for generosity. Thus, too, friendships which may externally appear alike are differentiated by the object which the friends have in view: the good, pleasure or utility.

⁸Friendship for pleasure or utility is said to be accidental (or incidental) in that it lacks the indispensable characteristic of perfect friendship which is to wish the good of the other *for his sake*.

⁹This is one of Aristotle's penetrating perceptions, further amplified by St. Thomas. Although one's feelings are given a primordial role in love, it is not by them that one really loves another in the true sense of wishing his good *for his own sake*, since our passions vary accordingly as the object is pleasing or displeasing *to us*.

¹⁰The correctness of this observation may be verified in the tendency of our Presidents to gather certain men around them as "trouble-shooters" or "hatchet-men" and others as "court jesters."

¹¹This is a parenthetical remark of St. Thomas of a realism paralleling that of Aristotle.

¹²The possible implication that one might draw here of the relationship of husband to wife as one of dominion of man over woman is dissipated further on when Aristotle compares their relationship not to that of a king towards a subject, but rather to that of an aristocracy wherein several, outstanding by virtue, exercise joint rule each in his own sphere (Ch. 10, 11), and when he speaks of their friendship for each other (Ch. 12).

¹³In keeping with the observation that the friendship of father to son does not involve the rendering of the same thing from both parties, it is hardly to be expected that Aristotle and St. Thomas would approve of the proposal to settle family difficulties by having parents and children sit down at table together and talk things over "man to man."

¹⁴This as an indication of the important position of friendship in human relations, since friendship will automatically bring about an equality, which a one-sided struggle for justice may be incapable of attaining. The

ultimate goal of justice is to attain for each his due, but when a man becomes the friend of another he has already implicitly recognized the right of the other to his fair share and intends to give it to him. Thus friendship contains justice, while justice alone is not yet friendship. Consequently the doctrine of love of one's fellow man as the solution to international understanding is more than a vague general panacea, since friendship, whether of man to man, or nation to nation, is the most effective and direct means of producing justice.

¹⁵ This statement is not part of a process which those prone to the uncritical repetition of old saws might term the "christianization of Aristotle." Aristotle *does* speak of separated substances in no uncertain terms. (Cf. *Metaphysics*, Book XII, 1071b and 1074b where Aristotle treats of separated substances and the custom of calling them "gods.")

¹⁶ St. Thomas in his commentaries on Aristotle remains on a strictly philosophic plane, going no farther than the conclusions of reason will allow. Thus, naturally speaking, there is no possibility of friendship between man and God, because of the great distance between them. It is only when man is raised by grace to a certain participation in the divine life that friendship is possible, which friendship is called charity.

¹⁷ This point in friendship is often overlooked, namely that it not only implies doing good to one's friend, but also preventing him from doing wrong, rather than allowing him to harm himself by condoning and overlooking the wrong.

¹⁸ *Communicatio* is the Latin word thus rendered. It would appear that the word *communication* in the sense of an *active unity based upon some common ground* better renders the meaning of the word than *community* which appears to denote more a purely passive state. In this former sense the word *communication* rejoins its common English sense of an actual interchange of words and thoughts. It is also in this sense that friends will be said to communicate most specifically. In the course of Aristotle's discussion, however, the word will be used in its more general sense of any kind of active unity maintained by those involved on the basis of some common ground. It is in this sense that all friendship is said to depend upon communication.

¹⁹ Aristotle's statement that all other communications are ordained through the political is more than a corollary of his statement that the science of Ethics is ranged under the general science of Politics. Adhering to a realistic view Aristotle notes that not only are men naturally drawn into families by the common instinct of the preservation of the race and the need to obtain the necessities of life, but families also, whether by the multiplication of a single family or by the association of several families, naturally tend to grow into communities, originating for the sake of the bare needs of life and continuing for the sake of a better and more full life.

"Therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the end of a thing is its nature. For what each thing is when it is fully developed we call its nature . . . Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature and that man is by nature a political animal." (*Politics*, Book I, 1252b)

Thus a state or community represents the natural whole to which a man belongs. The family, although it must exist prior to the state, does not stand as the ultimate natural unity, since man, in order to lead a complete life, naturally resorts to a community. Thus the state is not a supplementary

artificial creation, but in the order of nature stands to the family as the whole to the part. In the words of St. Thomas, "just as the hand or foot cannot exist without the man, neither is one man sufficient to live himself without the state."

With the introduction of subjectivism into philosophy and society, the realistic concept of man as a social animal was supposedly to be supplanted by the pseudo-scientific phantasies of such men as Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Their theories of government are erected on the completely unverified, if not impossible, supposition of an original "state of nature" in which man lived happy and alone. Only to protect his property did he reluctantly agree to enter into a purely contractual society. (This probably afforded Jean-Jacques with a convenient motive for his practice of depositing his children at the Foundling Hospital of Paris.) Our supposedly enlightened age eagerly swallows such airy and ultimately vicious theories, with their consequent exaltation of the absolute rights of the individual and the purely opportunistic notion of law and morality, while recoiling from the realism of Aristotle and St. Thomas. How could a man possibly exist in a solitary "state of nature" when he must have parents to be born, must have constant care for years, and constantly yearns for the companionship and help which others give him?

To sum up in the words of Aristotle: "The state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. . . . (it) is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life." (*Politics*, Book III, 1280b)

²⁰ Here Aristotle is speaking theoretically. The kingdom is best in that it implies that one man is so vastly superior by his virtue and wisdom that the people naturally wish him to rule over them. If no such man exists, the next best thing would be to have several good men govern—since several will always have more combined wisdom than one—and this is aristocracy. They will also rule by law, since law is an unimpassioned ruler, "reason unaffected by desire." However, since even this sort of government seems impossible because many of the citizens will resent being excluded from the government, and also because it is possible that the whole group of citizens may combine even more virtue and wisdom than the few good men, Aristotle concludes (in *Politics*, Book IV) that probably the best sort of government, from a practical point of view, is that of majority rule.

Such a constitutional government would be timocracy, inasmuch as it implies a certain mean of wealth. Since governments are endangered either by the domination of the very rich or by the rebellious despair of the very poor, the aim would be constantly to broaden the majority middle class by taxing the rich and giving subsidies to the poor.

²¹ Aristotle is not condemning democracy as we conceive it. The reader will note that the type of government which he calls timocracy, and which, in the *Politics*, he recommends as probably the only workable form of government for free men, is that which corresponds to our notion of democracy. That form of government which he defines as a perversion of timocracy, or constitutional government, corresponds to the Soviet notion of democracy: a "dictatorship of the people" to the exclusion of the middle class and the rich. Constitutional government, however, which he recommends, implies a government in which no class is excluded and all are equal under law.

Jefferson pays Aristotle his due in recognizing him as an exponent of

democracy, but reserves to his own age the concept of representative government as a substitute for having the whole people meet to deliberate. However, as a reader of the *Politics* will observe, Aristotle also envisioned representative government. "When the class of husbandmen and of those who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the government is administered according to law. For the citizens being compelled to live by their labor have no leisure; and so they set up the authority of the law and attend assemblies only when necessary. They all obtain a share in the government when they have acquired the qualification which is fixed by law—the absolute exclusion of any class would be a step towards oligarchy; hence all who have acquired the property qualification are admitted to a share in the constitution." (*Politics*, Book IV, 1292b). Jefferson even followed Aristotle as to the desirability of the citizen having a certain property qualification, as may be seen by his efforts to prevent large massing of industries with their consequent propertyless workers.

²² Here Aristotle unequivocally admits slavery as a legitimate institution. But what was his concept of slavery? It was that of voluntary submission rather than compulsory servitude. Thus, while admitting of natural slavery, he condemns legal slavery.

To understand Aristotle's point of view, it is necessary to return to a cardinal point of his philosophy and that of St. Thomas. *Whenever several things are gathered together to form a whole there must be a governing principle, and that which is governed.* This applies to the whole universe and every particular order within the universe. The reason for it is plain: if any group is to act as a whole, there must be within it some unifying and directing principle and, conversely, that which is unified and directed. The universe as a whole maintains its harmony and balance because of some directing principle which coordinates its various parts. Man as a composite of body and soul maintains his equilibrium by coordinating the two elements within himself. This coordination is not attained by letting body and soul fight it out on an equal footing, but rather by reason directing the activity of the body in order to produce the fullest possible life for the whole man. Thus harmony is achieved by direction on the one hand and conformity on the other. In all associations, one part naturally rules and the other is naturally ruled, and it is for the good of all.

Since man cannot attain a full and perfect life alone, he naturally moves into society. That is why man is called naturally a political animal, since his full natural perfection as an individual is attained, not alone, but in society. That is why friendship is not something that a man can take or leave alone but something he naturally needs for his full perfection.

Consequently the state appears, not as something which restricts the free development of the individual, but as the indispensable means of bringing the individual to his full perfection. Since the state exists for the perfection of the individual, its end will be to further the accomplishment of that which man cannot attain alone, namely the coordinating of material resources under the direction of reason to bring about the fullest possible life for all concerned. Since some are more highly endowed mentally, while others physically, the most complete life for all will be achieved when those who have the greatest intelligence obtain the cooperation of those who have the greatest physical vigor in working together to achieve a perfect life. Thus those excelling in reason will be able to achieve a material prosperity for

all of society which they could not bring about alone, and those excelling in physical work will achieve a more full and happy existence than they could devise through their own efforts.

The former is Aristotle's concept of a master, a man who by his mental endowments is naturally suited to direct others less gifted for the general welfare of the community. The latter is his concept of a slave, a man physically able, who recognizes that he can best attain to a prosperous and complete existence by following the direction of another. This is our own concept of the division of labor, whereby some will specialize in mental labor, others in physical labor to produce the best possible life for all.

Actually, Aristotle's notion is humane and for the good of all, both masters and servants, whereas our society, whether it admits it or not, inclines in practice towards the forced slavery which Aristotle condemns, (*Politics*, Bk. I, 1255b) in that controlling positions in society are guaranteed to those who have no qualifications, while others, regardless of their endowments are forced through lack of opportunity to remain in a state of legal slavery. Natural slavery would mean not only that those who recognized that they did not have ability to direct the common welfare would put their resources at the disposal of those better able to do so, but also that any man who showed intellectual superiority and a capacity for directing would be given an opportunity to do so, regardless of his status. Thus the common interest of all would be best served.

²³ Although in theory we may argue that anything less than absolute equality between man and wife and all men in general is rank injustice, nevertheless in practice we do not follow this. We do not because we cannot. Aristotle was both rational and a realist. By reason he recognized that no association could ever function as a united whole without some acknowledged leadership. Likewise his objective view of reality did not allow theory to obscure to him the fact that both in the family and society men naturally and willingly fell into the relationship of ruler and ruled, and this for the better accomplishment of the common end. Thus in our society, no matter what we may hold up as the theoretical ideal, in practice we would not for a moment tolerate the catastrophic consequences of allowing all men, whether old or young, learned or unlearned, to have an equal say in all matters. We recognize, at least implicitly, that although all men are created equal as far as human nature is concerned, nevertheless the very perfection of society for all concerned, consists in a certain coordination, which in turn implies direction voluntarily recognized.

St. Thomas points out in the *Summa Theologica* that it would be undesirable for all men to be created equal in the absolute sense, since this would exclude the existence of even better men by whom the whole group would be benefited. It is because of the perversity of human nature, whereby authority is so often used as an instrument of selfish interest, that we resent it. But in the true sense, the better man in society is he who, being better endowed, is able by his efforts to raise the level of the group as a whole.

Specifically, in the family no wife would wish to assume equal responsibility in all matters with her husband. That is why Aristotle compares the relationship of husband and wife, in the *Ethics*, to an aristocracy, which is an association of good men, each in his own sphere supreme, and in the *Politics*, to a constitutional government which is an association of equals with an elective form of government. As in society one elects leaders who

rule for the common good within the law, so also in the family, which is the component part of society, of two equals the husband is by nature elected to be the leader *within the law*, since it is he who is endowed by nature to taking the lead in the securing of the needs of life which is the fundamental reason for society. Within this framework, however, and following the aristocratic principle, the wife will have full authority in her own sphere.

In their marital relations, however, which are primarily an office of nature, and not specifically of society, husband and wife are absolutely equal, with an equal obligation on the part of each of rendering to the other the conjugal debt whenever it is (*reasonably*) asked (S.T., III, q.64,a.5).

²⁴ Most fathers and mothers would deny this. However, what is meant, as is clear from the context of the original allusion in the *Physics*, is that in the beginning children know their parents only confusedly, as sources of their physical well-being. In infancy it is just as easy for them to love a nurse as a mother, if the former is more continuously in contact with them. It is only with the lapse of time that a child becomes specifically aware of his parents as parents and pays them the special respect that is due to them.

²⁵ This is not meant absolutely, in the physical sense, since as St. Albert the Great points out, both the elements in generation have both matter and form. Likewise the corresponding activity and passivity in generation which Aristotle and St. Thomas allude to, and which is at least true in a general sense, does not imply inferiority on the part of the female since generation involves the fusion of equally indispensable elements (S.T., III, q.64,a.5,ad1).

²⁶ Although the family exists before society, the ultimate unity which nature is seen to intend—since only thus can man live the full life he naturally aspires to—is not the family any more than it is the individual. It is society, not as a thing in itself, but as the state in which the individual man finds his natural fulfilment as an individual. The family is prior to society in the sense that the bricks are prior to the house, but it is the house which is the reason for the bricks being there.

²⁷ Since man is not only a conjugal animal but also a political animal, the relationship of husband and wife will achieve its perfection when their friendship is not only that of utility and pleasure, common to all conjugal animals, but also that of virtue, which is proper to man. This last friendship is not only the best and truest of all, but in its perfection also brings about concomitantly the perfect fulfilment of useful and pleasant friendship.

²⁸ Useful friendship is not a merely selfish procedure. It is a real and legitimate type of friendship, more liberal than a formally contractual relationship and therefore more pleasing, but in which the motive, whether expressed or not, is mutual utility. This should be at least tacitly recognized by both parties and a return made.

As Aristotle shows, quarrels and disillusionment arise when we do not trouble to discern, beneath the surface similarity, the distinct type of friendship we are involved in, and offend our friend whom we think is giving to us for our own sake (friendship of virtue) when in reality he expects a return (friendship of utility). This misunderstanding comes about, as Aristotle mentions, from the trait common to ourselves as well as others, of unconsciously disguising as virtuous an act we intend for utility.

²⁹ This is the rational explanation of a phenomenon we all recognize: our intent upon the *value* of the service rendered in friendships for utility's sake, and our intent upon the *intention* of the giver in friendships we

treasure. It is because that which is primary in true friendship is not some common utility but the love of and association with the character and virtue of our friend.

³⁰ This situation exists in the so-called "marriages for money."

³¹ Whereas the one thing one is looking for in a study of social relationships is a precise and detailed key, whereby one will have an infallible guide to producing the optimum result in each particular case, this is the one thing that such a study cannot supply. The very nature of the matter precludes this, since in human relationships a rule which applies to one set of circumstances, will not apply exactly to another—and the variety of circumstances can be infinitely multiplied. The best one can do is to become aware of the make-up of human beings and of the essential pattern of their behavior. Success in actually dealing with oneself and with others in practical cases, which is the ultimate goal of ethical study, depends upon the acquisition of that virtue which Aristotle places before all others: prudence or practical wisdom. This virtue is compounded from experience, understanding, quickness to learn, alertness, reasoning power, foresight and circumspection, and depends for its perfect functioning on the possession of a sense of justice, self-control and courage. Thus the man who wishes to become the *good man* of the *Ethics* will have to do more than read a book. He will have to bring all his faculties, physical and spiritual, to bear in translating the perceptions of his reason into the particular, concrete, constantly varying acts which constitute his life.

³² How many of the pangs of love could be assuaged if one were frank enough to recognize that what one would like to believe is the friendship of virtue is really friendship for pleasure or utility.

³³ Aristotle here begins to show that the good man has first of all *toward himself* the three principle acts of friendship: beneficence, benevolence (goodwill) and concord. Each of the three will be treated in detail in the ensuing chapters (Ch.5,6,7).

³⁴ It should be noted here, as the key to the whole discussion on the love of self, that the good man's love of himself is not the motive of his actions but rather the *result* of them. Thus the good man's primary aim is to conform his life to reason, which is the highest thing in him, and which he conceives of not as the ultimate expression of his own wishes, but as the expression of the essential order of the universe established by the ultimate truth and goodness, God. His position in this order is not a mere external factor of his existence, it is his very nature. Just as every being, by the very compulsion of its nature, strives to be to the fullest extent what it is supposed to be, so the good man, by the very compulsion of his nature strives to live according to reason, i.e., to conform himself to the order of which he perceives himself to be a part. It is in doing this, not for himself, but because he perceives that that is the very *raison d'être* of his being, that he also attains closer and closer to the perfection of his being. Thus, by living according to reason, he concomitantly and as though unconsciously, does good to himself. Because in the process of living according to reason he inevitably does good to himself he must be truly said to love himself. Thus in working not for himself but for God, he also, as it were automatically, brings about his own greatest perfection.

This is equally true in the religious sense. Often people are reproached with loving God as though this were some sort of a long-range calculation

for one's own best interest. But the love of God which is demanded in religion is specifically a love of God more than oneself and before oneself. It is a love of God not of oneself. But just as in the case of the good man, by conforming oneself blindly, as it were, to the divine reason, one also necessarily does what is best for oneself. *He who loves his life shall lose it, but he who shall lose his life for My sake shall find it.* (Matth. 10:39)

³⁵ Thus it would seem more true to fact to speak of "goodwill at first sight" rather than "love at first sight."

³⁶ The foregoing is a good example of St. Thomas' skill in evolving a few terse words of Aristotle.

³⁷ Aristotle's treatment of the meaning of a "lover of self" may be summed up as follows:

A "lover of self" may be either one who seeks a greater share of moral goods for himself, or one who seeks a greater share of material goods.

But most men are "lovers of self" in this second sense.

Therefore the term has usually a pejorative meaning.

³⁸ The thoughtful reader cannot fail to notice the consistent emphasis of both Aristotle and St. Thomas upon *reason* as the arbiter of truth and goodness. For them it is not the didactic conviction, not the ingenious charm of the teacher which constitute the validity of the statement, as in the case with much which passes for modern philosophy. Such "rationalism" demands a renunciation of reason on the part of the student and the blind acceptance on faith of a universe which is the personal creation of a solitary human being, the professor.

Aristotle and St. Thomas do not ask their students to accept their statement because they said so, but rather lay down that that statement and any other statement, has validity only if it is independently verified in reality.

³⁹ By now it should be clear that love in its best sense is not a mere complacent feeling, but a clear-sighted willing and doing of good to another. Thus it is not in the sense of a self-satisfied introspection that the good man is said to love himself, but rather in the sense that in seeking to live according to reason he does good to himself.

⁴⁰ Happiness, which all seek, is nevertheless something few are able to define. Successive disillusionings with objects one thought would make one happy prove that one is none too sure wherein it lies. It is clear that it is not a passive state as one's repugnance to a notion of eternal happiness which implies sitting around on clouds with nothing to do, clearly shows. Nor is it an object. Man does not enjoy a steak as an object, he enjoys eating it. Clearly, thus it is an activity. Just as eating a steak gives a person a certain partial pleasure, a certain partial well-being, happiness will be an activity that will give man the sum total of all possible pleasure, perfect and complete well-being.

Just as partial pleasure and well-being comes from the optimum functioning of any one faculty, complete happiness will come from the optimum functioning of the whole man, when a man is living to the fullest possible extent. In other words just as there is a kind of minor happiness when any part of man is functioning perfectly and satisfyingly, complete happiness will come when the whole man is acting fully and satisfyingly.

But how does man act as a man; what is full life for a man? Is it in growing and reproducing? That he has in common with the animals. What is distinctive of man? It is his reason. Therefore happiness will be for him

the fullest and most active possible life according to reason; but not reason alone, since man also has his body. Therefore happiness will ultimately consist in the active and continuous enjoyment of infinite good by his reason, accompanied by an equally perfect well-being of his body through the possession of the same infinite good.

⁴¹ The current problem of the Existentialists, which is to distill the sense of existence itself which lurks at the base of our vital acts, is in reality a pseudo-problem. It is not as though sensing or knowing are products of some basic force which is our existence. Sensing and knowing, as being formal and principal in us, *are* our existence. Just as the existence of a plant is identified with the vegetative life of the plant, the existence of an animal with the purely sensory life of the animal, so also is the existence of a man identified with that form of life which is proper to him: sensing and knowing. For him, to be, to exist, is to sense and to know. If he does not do these things, he does not exist. If he were to perform merely the vegetative functions of life, then, as a man, he would not exist. For a man to exist at all, he must exist as a man, i.e., must be sensing and knowing, for that *is* his existence. Thus the procedure of turning a subtle, introspective ear to detect the throb of existence deep down underneath our activities is pure imagination. We do not have to know our existence reflectively, we do not even need to seek an intuition of it, we are our existence. Our sensing and knowing is our existence, fully present to us. To abstract the sensing and knowing from our acts with the idea that the residue will be pure existence is impossible, since in removing sensing and knowing, even mentally, one removes existence itself.

This pseudo-problem is similar to that of Kant who suddenly made the horrifying discovery that in his sensing and knowing he couldn't get rid of himself. It is not as though there is a certain something called the "I" which has certain separable functions such as sensing and thinking. The sensing and thinking *is* the "I". Just as Kant calls all our knowledge subjective because the "I" is always lurking somewhere in it, so also he would have to call a tree subjective and not real because in its life the tree could never get quite away from the tormenting fact that at bottom the tree was always there.

Fundamentally this effort to get at something, itself formless, which is presumed to be at the base of all forms, is either an unconscious effort to identify oneself with primordial matter, or for more intellectual beings, with that sole being, unlimited by any form which is God.

⁴² St. Thomas qualifies thus the conclusion of Aristotle because in supernatural beatitude, which consists in the possession of God, the sum total of all goods, friends are not essentially necessary. In this life they are necessary for the perfection of virtue, but in supernatural beatitude one finds complete perfection in God. Yet one will have friends in eternal beatitude because of the number of the elect. That this is fitting may be drawn from the principle that grace does not destroy but perfects nature. Thus if it is natural for man, a necessarily social animal, to have friends in this life, it is also in keeping for him to have them in the life of glory. Likewise in heaven man will lose none of the goods he had on this earth, but will rather have infinitely greater ones added to them. Thus the loves and friendships which man had on this earth, which are the greatest of his

external goods, will remain with him in heaven. (Cf. *S.T.* I-II, q.4, a.8; II-II, q.26, a. 13)

⁴³ Here again Aristotle stresses the fact that since useful friendship is a real type of friendship one is morally bound to make the return appropriate to that type of friendship.

⁴⁴ Although in the usual mode of thinking passionate love is probably rated over the friendship of virtue, as material goods are usually more cherished than spiritual ones, it is clear from Aristotle's analysis that the former, which is gauged by one's feelings alone, cannot of itself go beyond one's own person, while the latter is that love which reaches out to do good to the other for his own sake, and is thus true love and true friendship. Needless to say the two are not mutually exclusive since both can very well exist toward the same person, but it remains that friendship for the good of another predominates over friendship for pleasure. On the other hand, passionate love alone is not only not yet perfect friendship, but may even involve, for the greater gratification of the passions, pleasure which is actually harmful to the good of one's friend.

⁴⁵ St. Thomas' final words on the value of friendship are even more emphatic than Aristotle's. A glimpse of St. Thomas' own esteem for friendship may be seen in the opening lines of a letter to a Dominican professor in Venice:

"Having read your letter, I found in it a great number of questions which your charity asked that I answer for you within four days. Although I was very occupied with other things, lest I should be found wanting to the request of your friendship, I have put aside the other things I was supposed to take care of, and have undertaken to answer each of the questions you proposed to me." There follows a complete and detailed answer to each of 36 questions, terminating with the lines: "These are, dear friend, the answers I give to your questions, more at length than you asked . . . May your charity be long-lived and please repay this work with your prayers."

⁴⁶ Aristotle here shows the nobility of perfect friendship whose very unselfishness contributes to the deeper happiness of the friends. For while one friend will hide his pain from the other lest he also grieve, the other will come unasked and thereby give him greater happiness.

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