Unknown

Contents

The First Book

i. in what consists the office of a wise man

ii. the author’s intention in this work

iii. in what way it is possible to make known the divine truth

iv. that the truth about divine things which is attainable by reason is fittingly proposed to man as an object of belief

v. that those things which cannot be investigated by reason are fittingly proposed to man as an object of faith

vi. that it is not a mark of levity to assent to the things that are of faith, although they are above reason

vii. that the truth of reason is not in opposition to the truth of the christian faith

viii. in what relation human reason stands to the truth of faith

ix. of the order and mode of procedure in this work

x. of the opinion of those who aver that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a god, since this is self-evident

xi. refutation of the foregoing opinion and solution of the aforesaid arguments

xii. of the opinion of those who say that the existence of god cannot be proved, and that it is held by faith alone

xiii. arguments in proof of god’s existence

xiv. that in order to acquire knowledge of god it is necessary to proceed by the way of remotion

xv. that god is eternal

xvi. that in god there is no passive potentiality

xvii. that in god there is no matter

xviii. that in god there is no composition

xix. that in god there is nothing violent or beside nature

xx. that god is not a body

xxi. that god is his own essence

xxii. that in god existence and essence are the same

xxiii. that there is no accident in god

xxiv. that the divine being cannot be specified by the addition of any substantial difference

xxv. that god is not in any genus

xxvi. that god is not the formal being of all things

xxvii. that god is not the form of a body

xxviii. of the divine perfection

xxix. of the likeness of creatures

xxx. what terms can be predicated of god

xxxi. that the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not inconsistent with the divine simplicity

xxxii. that nothing is predicated univocally of god and other things

xxxiii. that not all terms applied to god and creatures are purely equivocal

xxxiv. that terms applied to god and creatures are employed analogically

xxxv. that the several names predicated of god are not synonymous

xxxvi. how our intellect forms a proposition about god

xxxvii. that god is good

xxxviii. that god is goodness itself

xxxix. that no evil can be in god

xl. that god is the good of every good

xli. that god is the sovereign good

xlii. that god is one

xliii. that god is infinite

xliv. that god is an intelligent being

xlv. that god’s act of intelligence is his essence

xlvi. that god understands by nothing else than his essence

xlvii. that god understands himself perfectly

xlviii. that god knows only himself first and per se

xlix. that god knows things other than himself

l. that god has proper knowledge of all things

li. and lii. reasons for inquiring how there is a multitude of things understood in the divine intellect

liii. solution of the foregoing doubt

liv. how the divine essence, though one and simple, is a proper likeness of all things intelligible

lv. that god understands all things at the same instant

lvi. that god’s knowledge is not a habit

lvii. that god’s knowledge is not discursive

lviii. that god does not understand by composition and division

lix. that god is not ignorant of the truth of enunciations

lx. that god is truth

lxi. that god is the most pure truth

lxii. that the divine truth is the first and supreme truth

lxiii. the arguments of those who would deny to god the knowledge of singulars

lxiv. order of the things to be said about the divine knowledge

lxv. that god knows singulars

lxvi. that god knows the things that are not

lxvii. that god knows future contingent singulars

lxviii. that god knows the movements of the will

lxix. that god knows infinite things

lxx. that god knows trivial things

lxxi. that god knows evil things

lxxii. that in god there is will

lxxiii. that god’s will is his essence

lxxiv. that the principal object of god’s will is the divine essence

lxxv. that god in willing himself wills also other things

lxxvi. that god, by the one act of his will, wills himself and other things

lxxvii. that the multitude of things willed is not inconsistent with the divine simplicity

lxxviii. that the divine will extends to particular goods

lxxix. that god wills even the things that are not yet

lxxx. that god necessarily wills his being and his goodness

lxxxi. that god does not necessarily will other things than himself

lxxxii. objections against the statement that god wills not of necessity things other than himself, in that it involves impossibilities

lxxxiii. that god wills something other than himself by a necessity of supposition

lxxxiv. that god’s will is not of things impossible in themselves

lxxxv. that the divine will does not remove contingency from things, nor impose absolute necessity on them

lxxxvi. that a reason of the divine will can be assigned

lxxxvii. that nothing can be the cause of the divine will

lxxxviii. that in god there is free-will

lxxxix. that the passions of the appetite are not in god

xc. that in god are delight and joy; nor are they incompatible with the divine perfection

xci. that in god there is love

xcii. how virtues are to be ascribed to god

xciii. that in god there are the moral virtues which are about actions

xciv. that the contemplative virtues are in god

xcv. that god cannot will evil

xcvi. that god hates nothing, nor can the hatred of anything be ascribed to him

xcvii. that god is a living being

xcviii. that god is his own life

xcix. that god’s life is eternal

c. that god is happy

ci. that god is his own happiness

cii. that god’s happiness is perfect and singular, surpassing all other happiness

The Second Book

i. connection of the foregoing with the sequel

ii. that the consideration of creatures is useful for building up our faith

iii. that the knowledge of the nature of creatures avails for refuting errors against god

iv. that the philosopher and the theologian treat of creatures in different ways

v. order of the things to be said

vi. that it becomes god to be the source of being to other things

vii. that in god there is active power

viii. that god’s power is his substance

ix. that god’s power is his action

x. in what way power is ascribed to god

xi. that something is said of god in relation to creatures

xii. that relations said of god in reference to creatures are not really in god

xiii. and xiv. how the aforesaid relations are predicated of god

xv. that god is to all things the cause of being

xvi. that god brought things into being out of nothing

xvii. that creation is neither movement nor change

xviii. how to solve the objections against creation

xix. that in creation there is no succession

xx. that no body can create

xxi. that it belongs to god alone to create

xxii. that god can do all things

xxiii. that god does not act of natural necessity

xxiv. that god works according to his wisdom

xxv. how the almighty is said to be unable to do certain things

xxvi. that the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects

xxvii. that the divine will is not confined to certain effects

xxviii. and xxix. how there is anything due in the production of things

xxx. how there can be absolute necessity in created things

xxxi. that it is not necessary for creatures to have been always

xxxii. arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from god’s side of the question

xxxiii. arguments of those who would prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of creatures

xxxiv. arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making

xxxv. solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those that were taken from the standpoint of god

xxxvi. solution of the arguments produced on the part of the things made

xxxvii. solution of the arguments taken from the making of things

xxxviii. arguments by which some endeavour to prove that the world is not eternal

xxxix. that the distinction of things is not from chance

xl. that matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things

xli. that the distinction of things is not on account of a contrariety of agents

xlii. that the first cause of the distinction of things is not the order of secondary agents

xliii. that the distinction among things does not result from some secondary agent introducing various forms into matter

xliv. that distinction among things did not result from the diversity of merits or demerits

xlv. what is in truth the first cause of the distinction of things

xlvi. that for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there should be some intellectual creatures

xlvii. that intellectual substances are capable of willing

xlviii. that intellectual substances are of free-will in acting

xlix. that the intellectual substance is not a body

l. that intellectual substances are immaterial

li. that the intellectual substance is not a material form

lii. that in created intellectual substances there is a difference between being and what is

liii. that in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality

liv. that composition of substance and being is not the same as composition of matter and form

lv. that intellectual substances are incorruptible

lvi. in what way it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body

lvii. the opinion of plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body

lviii. that the nutritive, sensitive, and intellective faculties in man are not three souls

lix. that man’s possible intellect is not a separate substance

lx. that man derives his species not from the passive, but from the possible intellect

lxi. that the aforesaid opinion is contrary to that of aristotle

lxii. against the opinion of alexander about the possible intellect

lxiii. that the soul is not a temperament, as galen asserted

lxiv. that the soul is not a harmony

lxv. that the soul is not a body

lxvi. against those who say that intellect and sense are the same

lxvii. against those who say that the possible intellect is the imagination

lxviii. how an intellectual substance can be the form of the body

lxix. solution of the arguments by which it was proved above that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form

lxx. that according to the words of aristotle we must say that the intellect is united to the body as its form

lxxi. that the soul is united to the body immediately

lxxii. that the whole soul is in the whole body and in each part thereof

lxxiii. that there is not one possible intellect in all men

lxxiv. of the opinion of avicenna, who asserted that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect

lxxv. solution of the arguments which would seem to prove the unity of the possible intellect

lxxvi. that the active intellect is not a separate substance but part of the soul

lxxvii. that it is not impossible for the possible and active intellect to concur in the one substance of the soul

lxxviii. that aristotle’s opinion concerning the active intellect was not that it is a separate substance, but rather that it is part of the soul

lxxix. that the human soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted

lxxx. and lxxxi. arguments to prove that the soul is corrupted when the body is corrupted

lxxxii. that the souls of dumb animals are not immortal

lxxxiii. that the human soul begins to exist with the body

lxxxiv. solution of the foregoing arguments

lxxxv. that the soul is not made of god’s substance

lxxxvi. that the human soul is not transmitted with the semen

lxxxvii. that the human soul is brought into being through creation by god

lxxxviii. arguments for proving that the human soul is formed from the semen

lxxxix. solution of the foregoing arguments

xc. that an intellectual substance is united as a form to no other than the human body

xci. that there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies

xcii. of the great number of separate substances

xciii. that there are not several separate substances of one species

xciv. that the separate substance and the soul are not of one species

xcv. how we are to understand genus and species in separate substances

xcvi. that separate substances do not gather their knowledge from sensibles

xcvii. that the intellect of a separate substance always understands actually

xcviii. how one separate substance understands another

xcix. that separate substances know material things

c. that separate substances know singulars

ci. whether separate substances know all things at the same time by their natural knowledge

The Third Book

i. foreword

ii. that every agent acts for an end

iii. that every agent acts for a good

iv. that evil is unintentional in things

v. and vi. arguments that would seem to prove that evil is not beside the intention

vii. that evil is not an essence

viii. and ix. arguments whereby seemingly it is proved that evil is a nature or a thing

x. that the cause of evil is a good

xi. that the subject of evil is a good

xii. that evil does not entirely destroy good

xiii. that evil has a cause of some kind

xiv. that evil is an accidental cause

xv. that there is no sovereign evil

xvi. that the end of everything is a good

xvii. that all things are directed to one end, which is god

xviii. how god is the end of things

xix. that all things tend to be like unto god

xx. how things imitate the divine goodness

xxi. that things have a natural tendency to be like god forasmuch as he is a cause

xxii. how things are directed in various ways to their respective ends

xxiii. that the movement of the heaven is from an intellective principle

xxiv. how even things devoid of knowledge seek the good

xxv. that to know god is the end of every intelligent substance

xxvi. does happiness consist in an act of the will?

xxvii. that human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures

xxviii. that happiness does not consist in honours

xxix. that man’s happiness consists not in glory

xxx. that man’s happiness does not consist in wealth

xxxi. that happiness consists not in worldly power

xxxii. that happiness consists not in goods of the body

xxxiii. that human happiness is not seated in the senses

xxxiv. that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of moral virtue

xxxv. that ultimate happiness does not consist in the act of prudence

xxxvi. that happiness does not consist in the practice of art

xxxvii. that man’s ultimate happiness consists in contemplating god

xxxviii. that human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of god which is possessed generally by the majority

xxxix. that man’s happiness does not consist in the knowledge of god acquired by demonstration

xl. that man’s happiness does not consist in the knowledge of god by faith

xli. is it possible for man, in this life, to understand separate substances by the study and inquiry of speculative sciences?

xlii. that in this life we are unable to know separate substances in the manner proposed by alexander

xliii. that we cannot understand separate substances in this life, in the manner suggested by averroes

xliv. that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of separate substances as pretended by the aforesaid opinions

xlv. that it is impossible in this life to understand separate substances

xlvi. that in this life the soul does not understand itself by itself

xlvii. that in this life we are unable to see god in his essence

xlviii. that man’s ultimate happiness is not in this life

xlix. that separate substances do not see god in his essence through knowing him by their own essences

l. that the natural desire of the separate substances is not set at rest in the natural knowledge they have of god

li. how god may be seen in his essence

lii. that no created substance can by its natural power arrive at seeing god in his essence

liii. that the created intellect needs a ray of the divine light in-order to see god in his essence.

liv. arguments that would seem to prove that god cannot be seen in his essence; and the solution thereof

lv. that the created intellect does not comprehend the divine substance

lvi. that no created intellect, in seeing god, sees all that can be seen in him

lvii. that every intellect of any degree can participate in the divine vision

lviii. that it is possible for one to see god more perfectly than another

lix. how those who see the divine substance see all things

lx. that those who see god see all in him at once

lxi. that by seeing god a man is made a partaker of eternal life

lxii. that those who see god will see him for ever

lxiii. how in that ultimate happiness man’s every desire is fulfilled

lxiv. that god governs things by his providence

lxv. that god preserves things in existence

lxvi. that nothing gives existence except in so far as it acts by god’s power

lxvii. that in all things that operate god is the cause oe their operating

lxviii. that god is everywhere

lxix. concerning the opinion of those who withdraw from natural things their proper actions

lxx. how the same effect is from god and from the natural agent

lxxi. that divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things

lxxii. that divine providence does not exclude contingency from things

lxxiii. that divine providence does not exclude free will

lxxiv. that divine providence does not exclude chance or luck

lxxv. that divine providence is concerned with singular contingencies

lxxvi. that god’s providence cares for all individuals immediately

lxxvii. that the execution of divine providence is carried out by secondary causes

lxxviii. that by means of intellectual creatures other creatures are ruled by god

lxxix. that the lower intellectual substances are ruled by the higher

lxxx. of the order between one angel and another

lxxxi. of the ordering of men among themselves and to other things

lxxxii. that the inferior bodies are ruled by god by means of the heavenly bodies

lxxxiii. conclusion of the foregoing

lxxxiv. that the heavenly bodies do not impress on our intellect

lxxxv. that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing

lxxxvi. that corporeal effects in this lower world do not result of necessity from the action of the heavenly bodies

lxxxvii. that the movement of a heavenly body is not the cause of our choosing by virtue of its soul moving us, as some say

lxxxviii. that created substances cannot be the direct causes of our acts of choosing and willing, but god alone

lxxxix. that the movement of the will, and not only the power of the will, is caused by god

xc. that human choice and will are subject to divine providence

xci. how human affairs may be referred to higher causes

xcii. how a man may be said to be fortunate, and how he is assisted by higher causes

xciii. is there such a thing as fate, and what is it?

xciv. of the certainty of divine providence

xcv. and xcvi. that the unchangeableness of divine providence does not exclude the usefulness of prayer

xcvii. how there is a reason for divine providence

xcviii. how it is possible, and how it is impossible, for god to do something outside the order of his providence

xcix. that god can work outside the order imposed on things, by producing effects without their proximate causes

c. that what god does beside the order of nature is not contrary to nature

ci. of miracles

cii. that god alone works miracles

ciii. that spiritual substances do wonders which, however, are not miracles properly speaking

civ. that the works of magicians result not only from the influence of heavenly bodies

cv. whence the works of magicians derive their efficacy

cvi. that the intellectual substance which gives efficacy to the practices of magic is not good according to virtue

cvii. that the intellectual substance whose assistance is employed in the magic arts is not evil in its nature

cviii. arguments that would seem to prove that there can be no sin in the demons

cix. that sin is possible in the demons, and how

cx. solution of the aforesaid arguments

cxi. that rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a special manner

cxii. that rational creatures are governed for their own sake, and other creatures, as directed to them

cxiii. that the rational creature is directed to its action by god not only in its relation to the species, but also in its relation to the individual

cxiv. that laws are given by god to man

cxv. that the divine law directs man chiefly to god

cxvi. that the end of god’s law is the love of god

cxvii. that we are directed by the divine law to the love of our neighbour

cxviii. that the divine law binds men to the true faith

cxix. that our mind is directed to god by certain sensible things

cxx. that the worship of latria is due to god alone

cxxi. that the divine law directs man according to reason as regards things corporeal and sensible

cxxii. how, according to the divine law, simple fornication is a sin: and that matrimony is natural

cxxiii. that matrimony should be indissoluble

cxxiv. that matrimony should be the union of one man with one woman

cxxv. that marriage should not be contracted between relatives

cxxvi. that not all carnal intercourse is sinful

cxxvii. that no food is in itself sinful for one to take

cxxviii. how by the divine law man is directed to his neighbour

cxxix. that some human acts are right by nature, and not because they are prescribed by law

cxxx. of the counsels given in the divine law

cxxxi. concerning the error of those who condemn voluntary poverty

cxxxii. of the ways of life followed by those who embrace voluntary poverty

cxxxiii. how poverty is good

cxxxiv. solution of the arguments given above against poverty

cxxxv. solution of the objections urged against the various ways of life followed by those who embrace voluntary poverty

cxxxvi. and cxxxvii. concerning the error of those who condemn perpetual continence

cxxxviii. against those who condemn vows

cxxxix. that neither merits nor sins are equal

cxl. that man’s actions are punished or rewarded by god

cxli. of the difference and order of punishments

cxlii. that punishments and rewards are not all equal

cxliii. of the punishment due to mortal and venial sin in relation to the last end

cxliv. that by mortal sin man forfeits his last end for eternity

cxlv. that sins are punished also by the sinner being subjected to some kind of pain

cxlvi. that it is lawful for judges to inflict punishments

cxlvii. that man needs the divine assistance in order to obtain beatitude

cxlviii. that the assistance of divine grace does not compel man to virtue

cxlix. that man is unable to merit the divine assistance

cl. that this same assistance is called grace; and what is meant by sanctifying grace

cli. that sanctifying grace causes in us the love of god

clii. that grace causes faith in us

cliii. that divine grace causes hope in us

cliv. of the gifts of gratuitous grace: wherein it is treated of the divinations of demons

clv. that man needs the divine aid in order to persevere in good

clvi. that he who falls away from grace by sin, can recover again by means of grace

clvii. that man cannot be freed from sin save by grace

clviii. how man is freed from sin

clix. that, although man cannot be converted to god without god’s grace, yet it is reasonably imputed to him, if he be not converted

clx. that a man who is in sin cannot avoid sin without grace

clxi. that god delivers some from sin, and leaves some in sin

clxii. that god is not the cause of any man sinning

clxiii. of predestination, reprobation, and the divine election

The Fourth Book

i. foreword

ii. that in god there are generation, paternity, and filiation

iii. that the son of god is god

iv. the opinion of photinus concerning the son of god: and its refutation

v. the opinion of sabellius concerning the son of god: and its refutation

vi. concerning the opinion of arius about the son of god

vii. refutation of the opinion of arius

viii. solution of the arguments adduced by arius in support of his view

ix. explanation of the texts quoted by photinus and sabellius

x. arguments against the divine generation and procession

xi. the meaning of generation in god, and of the scriptural references to the son of god

xii. how the son of god is called the wisdom of god

xiii. that there is only one son in god

xiv. solution of the foregoing objections against the divine generation

xv. of the holy ghost: that he is in god

xvi. reasons for which certain men have deemed the holy ghost to be a creature

xvii. that the holy ghost is true god

xviii. that the holy ghost is a subsistent person

xix. the meaning of statements that are made about the holy ghost

xx. of the effects ascribed by scripture to the holy ghost in respect of all creatures

xxi. of the effects ascribed to the holy ghost, as regards the gifts bestowed by god on the rational creature

xxii. of the effects ascribed to the holy ghost, according as he moves the creature to god

xxiii. solution of the arguments given above, against the divinity of the holy ghost

xxiv. that the holy ghost proceeds from the son

xxv. arguments of those who would prove that the holy ghost proceeds not from the son: and their solution

xxvi. that there are no more than three persons in god: namely, the father, the son, and the holy ghost

xxvii. of the incarnation of the word, as handed down in holy scripture

xxviii. the error of photinus about the incarnation

xxix. the error of the manicheans concerning the incarnation

xxx. the error of valentine about the incarnation

xxxi. the error of apollinaris concerning christ’s body

xxxii. the error of arius and apollinaris concerning christ’s soul

xxxiii. the errors of apollinaris, who said that christ had not a rational soul; and of origen, who said that christ’s soul was created before the world

xxxiv. the error of theodore of mopsuestia concerning the union of the word with man

xxxv. against the error of eutyches

xxxvi. the error of macarius of antioch, who said that there was only one will in christ

xxxvii. refutation of those who maintained that christ’s body and soul were not united together

xxxviii. refutation of those who hold that in the person of christ there are two hypostases or supposits

xxxix. the teaching of the catholic church on the incarnation of christ

xl. objections against faith in the incarnation

xli. how we are to understand that the son of god was incarnate

xlii. that it was most becoming to the word of god that he should take human nature

xliii. that the human nature assumed by the word did not exist before it was assumed, but was assumed by the word at the moment of its conception

xliv. that the human nature assumed by the word was perfect in body and soul at the moment of conception

xlv. that it was fitting that christ should be born of a virgin

xlvi. the christ was conceived by the holy ghost

xlvii. that christ was not the son of the holy ghost according to the flesh

xlviii. that we must not say that christ is a creature

xlix. reply to the objections given above against the incarnation

l. that original sin is transmitted by our first parent to his posterity

li. arguments against original sin

lii. reply to the above arguments

liii. arguments that would seem to show that it was not fitting that god should be incarnate

liv. that it was fitting for god to be incarnate

lv. reply to the arguments given above against the fittingness of the incarnation

lvi. of the necessity of the sacraments

lvii. of the difference between the sacraments of the old and of the new law

lviii. the number of the sacraments of the new law

lix. baptism

lx. confirmation

lxi. the eucharist

lxii. the error of unbelievers concerning the sacrament of the eucharist

lxiii. solution of the foregoing difficulties: and first with regard to the changing of the bread into christ’s body

lxiv. solution of the difficulties as regards place

lxv. solution of the objections on the part of the accidents

lxvi. solution of the objections on the part of action and passion

lxvii. solution of the objections in regard to breaking of the host

lxviii. explanation of the passage quoted above

lxix. what kind of bread and wine should be used in this sacrament

lxx. the sacrament of penance: and first that it is possible for a man to sin after receiving sacramental grace

lxxi. that a man who has sinned after receiving the grace of the sacrament can return to grace

lxxii. the necessity of penance and of its parts

lxxiii. the sacrament of extreme unction

lxxiv. the sacrament of order

lxxv. the different kinds of order

lxxvi. of the episcopal dignity: and that one bishop is over all

lxxvii. that the sacraments can be dispensed by wicked ministers

lxxviii. the sacrament of matrimony

lxxix. that our bodies will rise again through christ

lxxx. objections against the resurrection

lxxxi. solution of the foregoing objections

lxxxii. that man will rise again immortal

lxxxiii. that after the resurrection there will be no use of food or venery

lxxxiv. that the bodies of those who rise again will have the same nature as before

lxxxv. that the bodies of those who rise again will have a different disposition from that which they had before

lxxxvi. the quality of glorified bodies

lxxxvii. the place of the glorified bodies

lxxxviii. the sex and age of those who will rise again

lxxxix. the quality of the bodies in the resurrection as regards the damned

xc. how incorporeal substances can suffer from a material fire

xci. that the soul will receive its punishment or reward, as soon as it departs from the body

xcii. that immediately after death the souls of the just have their will fixed unchangeably on the good

xciii. that the souls of the wicked after death have their will fixed unchangeably on evil

xciv. the unchangeableness of will of the souls in purgatory

xcv. the common cause of this unchangeableness in all souls after their departure from the body

xcvi. the last judgement

xcvii. the state of the world after the judgement

Chapter I

in what consists the office of a wise man

My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate wickedness.—Prov. 8:7.

The general use which, in the Philosopher’s1 opinion, should be followed in naming things, has resulted in those men being called wise who direct things themselves and govern them well. Wherefore among other things which men conceive of the wise man, the Philosopher reckons that it belongs to the wise man to direct things.2 Now the rule of all things directed to the end of government and order must needs be taken from their end: for then is a thing best disposed when it is fittingly directed to its end, since the end of everything is its good. Wherefore in the arts we observe that the art which governs and rules another is the one to which the latter’s end belongs: thus the medical art rules and directs the art of the druggist, because health which is the object of medicine is the end of all drugs which are made up by the druggist’s art. The same may be observed in the art of sailing in relation to the art of ship-building, and in the military art in relation to the equestrian art and all warlike appliances. These arts which govern others are called master-arts (architectonicæ), that is principal arts, for which reason their craftsmen, who are called master-craftsmen (architectores), are awarded the name of wise men. Since, however, these same craftsmen, through being occupied with the ends of certain singular things, do not attain to the universal end of all things, they are called wise about this or that, in which sense it is said (1 Cor. 3:10): As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation; whereas the name of being wise simply is reserved to him alone whose consideration is about the end of the universe, which end is also the beginning of the universe: wherefore, according to the Philosopher,1 it belongs to the wise man to consider the highest causes.

Now the last end of each thing is that which is intended by the first author or mover of that thing: and the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect, as we shall prove further on.2 Consequently the last end of the universe must be the good of the intellect: and this is truth. Therefore truth must be the last end of the whole universe; and the consideration thereof must be the chief occupation of wisdom. And for this reason divine Wisdom, clothed in flesh, declares that He came into the world to make known the truth, saying (Jo. 18:37): For this was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth. Moreover the Philosopher defines the First Philosophy as being the knowledge of truth,3 not of any truth, but of that truth which is the source of all truth, of that, namely, which relates to the first principle of being of all things; wherefore its truth is the principle of all truth, since the disposition of things is the same in truth as in being.

Now it belongs to the same thing to pursue one contrary and to remove the other: thus medicine which effects health, removes sickness. Hence, just as it belongs to a wise man to meditate and disseminate truth, especially about the first principle, so does it belong to him to refute contrary falsehood.

Wherefore the twofold office of the wise man is fittingly declared from the mouth of Wisdom, in the words above quoted; namely, to meditate and publish the divine truth, which antonomastically is the truth, as signified by the words, My mouth shall meditate truth; and to refute the error contrary to truth, as signified by the words, and my lips shall hate wickedness, by which is denoted falsehood opposed to divine truth, which falsehood is contrary to religion that is also called godliness, wherefore the falsehood that is contrary thereto receives the name of ungodliness.

Chapter II

the author’s intention in this work

Now of all human pursuits, that of wisdom is the most perfect, the most sublime, the most profitable, the most delightful. It is the most perfect, since in proportion as a man devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom, so much does he already share in true happiness: wherefore the wise man says (Ecclus. 14:22): Blessed is the man that shall continue in wisdom. It is the most sublime because thereby especially does man approach to a likeness to God, Who made all things in wisdom:1 wherefore since likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom especially unites man to God by friendship: hence it is said (Wis. 7:14) that wisdom is an infinite treasure to men: which they that use, become the friends of God. It is the most profitable, because by wisdom itself man is brought to the kingdom of immortality, for the desire of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom (Wis. 6:21). And it is the most delightful because her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness (Wis. 8:16).

Wherefore, taking heart from God’s lovingkindness to assume the office of a wise man, although it surpasses our own powers, the purpose we have in view is, in our own weak way, to declare the truth which the Catholic faith professes, while weeding out contrary errors; for, in the words of Hilary,2 I acknowledge that I owe my life’s chief occupation to God, so that every word and every thought of mine may speak of Him. But it is difficult to refute the errors of each individual, for two reasons. First, because the sacrilegious assertions of each erring individual are not so well known to us, that we are able from what they say to find arguments to refute their errors. For the Doctors of old used this method in order to confute the errors of the heathens, whose opinions they were able to know, since either they had been heathens themselves, or had lived among heathens and were conversant with their teachings. Secondly, because some of them, like the Mohammedans and pagans, do not agree with us as to the authority of any Scripture whereby they may be convinced, in the same way as we are able to dispute with the Jews by means of the Old Testament, and with heretics by means of the New: whereas the former accept neither. Wherefore it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to assent. And yet this is deficient in the things of God.

And while we are occupied in the inquiry about a particular truth, we shall show what errors are excluded thereby, and how demonstrable truth is in agreement with the faith of the Christian religion.

Chapter III

in what way it is possible to make known the divine truth

Since, however, not every truth is to be made known in the same way, and it is the part of an educated man to seek for conviction in each subject, only so far as the nature of the subject allows,1 as the Philosopher most rightly observes as quoted by Boethius,2 it is necessary to show first of all in what way it is possible to make known the aforesaid truth.

Now in those things which we hold about God there is truth in two ways. For certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason, for instance that God is three and one: while there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers proved demonstratively of God, being guided by the light of natural reason.

That certain divine truths wholly surpass the capability of human reason, is most clearly evident. For since the principle of all the knowledge which the reason acquires about a thing, is the understanding of that thing’s essence, because according to the Philosopher’s teaching1 the principle of a demonstration is what a thing is, it follows that our knowledge about a thing will be in proportion to our understanding of its essence. Wherefore, if the human intellect comprehends the essence of a particular thing, for instance a stone or a triangle, no truth about that thing will surpass the capability of human reason. But this does not happen to us in relation to God, because the human intellect is incapable by its natural power of attaining to the comprehension of His essence: since our intellect’s knowledge, according to the mode of the present life, originates from the senses: so that things which are not objects of sense cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, except in so far as knowledge of them is gathered from sensibles. Now sensibles cannot lead our intellect to see in them what God is, because they are effects unequal to the power of their cause. And yet our intellect is led by sensibles to the divine knowledge so as to know about God that He is, and other such truths, which need to be ascribed to the first principle. Accordingly some divine truths are attainable by human reason, while others altogether surpass the power of human reason.

Again. The same is easy to see from the degrees of intellects. For if one of two men perceives a thing with his intellect with greater subtlety, the one whose intellect is of a higher degree understands many things which the other is altogether unable to grasp; as instanced in a yokel who is utterly incapable of grasping the subtleties of philosophy. Now the angelic intellect surpasses the human intellect more than the intellect of the cleverest philosopher surpasses that of the most uncultured. For an angel knows God through a more excellent effect than does man, for as much as the angel’s essence, through which he is led to know God by natural knowledge, is more excellent than sensible things, even than the soul itself, by which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. And the divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect by its capacity equals the divine essence, wherefore God perfectly understands of Himself what He is, and He knows all things that can be understood about Him: whereas the angel knows not what God is by his natural knowledge, because the angel’s essence, by which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect unequal to the power of its cause. Consequently an angel is unable by his natural knowledge to grasp all that God understands about Himself: nor again is human reason capable of grasping all that an angel understands by his natural power. Accordingly just as a man would show himself to be a most insane fool if he declared the assertions of a philosopher to be false because he was unable to understand them, so, and much more, a man would be exceedingly foolish, were he to suspect of falsehood the things revealed by God through the ministry of His angels, because they cannot be the object of reason’s investigations.

Furthermore. The same is made abundantly clear by the deficiency which every day we experience in our knowledge of things. For we are ignorant of many of the properties of sensible things, and in many cases we are unable to discover the nature of those properties which we perceive by our senses. Much less therefore is human reason capable of investigating all the truths about that most sublime essence.

With this the saying of the Philosopher is in accord (2 Metaph.)1 where he says that our intellect in relation to those primary things which are most evident in nature is like the eye of a bat in relation to the sun.

To this truth Holy Writ also bears witness. For it is written (Job 11:7): Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? and (36:26): Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge, and (1 Cor. 13:9): We know in part.

Therefore all that is said about God, though it cannot be investigated by reason, must not be forthwith rejected as false, as the Manicheans and many unbelievers have thought.2

Chapter IV

that the truth about divine things which is attainable by reason is fittingly proposed to man as an object of belief

While then the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to man as an object of belief. We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appears to some, that since it can be attained by reason, it was useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural inspiration. Now three disadvantages would result if this truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason. One is that few men would have knowledge of God: because very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, for three reasons. Some indeed on account of an indisposition of temperament, by reason of which many are naturally indisposed to knowledge: so that no efforts of theirs would enable them to reach to the attainment of the highest degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God. Some are hindered by the needs of household affairs. For there must needs be among men some that devote themselves to the conduct of temporal affairs, who would be unable to devote so much time to the leisure of contemplative research as to reach the summit of human inquiry, namely the knowledge of God. And some are hindered by laziness. For in order to acquire the knowledge of God in those things which reason is able to investigate, it is necessary to have a previous knowledge of many things: since almost the entire consideration of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God: for which reason metaphysics, which is about divine things, is the last of the parts of philosophy to be studied. Wherefore it is not possible to arrive at the inquiry about the aforesaid truth except after a most laborious study: and few are willing to take upon themselves this labour for the love of a knowledge, the natural desire for which has nevertheless been instilled into the mind of man by God.

The second disadvantage is that those who would arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely succeed in doing so after a long time. First, because this truth is so profound, that it is only after long practice that the human intellect is enabled to grasp it by means of reason. Secondly, because many things are required beforehand, as stated above. Thirdly, because at the time of youth, the mind, when tossed about by the various movements of the passions, is not fit for the knowledge of so sublime a truth, whereas calm gives prudence and knowledge, as stated in 7 Phys.1 Hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance, if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God: because the knowledge of God which especially makes men perfect and good, would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time.

The third disadvantage is that much falsehood is mingled with the investigations of human reason, on account of the weakness of our intellect in forming its judgments, and by reason of the admixture of phantasms. Consequently many would remain in doubt about those things even which are most truly demonstrated, through ignoring the force of the demonstration: especially when they perceive that different things are taught by the various men who are called wise. Moreover among the many demonstrated truths, there is sometimes a mixture of falsehood that is not demonstrated, but assumed for some probable or sophistical reason which at times is mistaken for a demonstration. Therefore it was necessary that definite certainty and pure truth about divine things should be offered to man by the way of faith.

Accordingly the divine clemency has made this salutary commandment, that even some things which reason is able to investigate must be held by faith: so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error.

Hence it is written (Eph. 4:17, 18): That henceforward you walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened: and (Isa. 54:13): All thy children shall be taught of the Lord.

Chapter V

that those things which cannot be investigated by reason are fittingly proposed to man as an object of faith

It may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith: because divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary also for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith.

For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavour unless it be previously known to him. Wherefore since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel,1 it was necessary for his mind to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire, and by his endeavours to tend to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially competent to the Christian religion, which alone promises goods spiritual and eternal: for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man: whereas the old law which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things that are above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, in order to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues.

Again it is necessary for this truth to be proposed to man as an object of faith in order that he may have truer knowledge of God. For then alone do we know God truly, when we believe that He is far above all that man can possibly think of God, because the divine essence surpasses man’s natural knowledge, as stated above.2 Hence by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man, which surpass his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think.

There results also another advantage from this, namely, the checking of presumption which is the mother of error. For some there are who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole nature of things by their intellect, in that they esteem all things true which they see, and false which they see not. Accordingly, in order that man’s mind might be freed from this presumption, and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that certain things far surpassing his intellect should be proposed to man by God.

Yet another advantage is made apparent by the words of the Philosopher (10 Ethic.).1 For when a certain Simonides maintained that man should neglect the knowledge of God, and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things: the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can. Hence he says (11 De Animal.)2 that though it is but little that we perceive of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He says also (2 De Cœlo et Mundo)3 that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be answered by a short and probable solution, it happens that the hearer is very much rejoiced. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul: and consequently, although human reason is unable to grasp fully things that are above reason, it nevertheless acquires much perfection, if at least it hold things, in any way whatever, by faith.

Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): Many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men, and (1 Cor. 2:10, 11): The things … that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.

Chapter VI

that it is not a mark of levity to assent to the things that are of faith, although they are above reason

Now those who believe this truth, of which reason affords a proof,4 believe not lightly, as though following foolish5 fables (2 Pet. 1:16). For divine Wisdom Himself, Who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to man the secrets of God’s wisdom:6 and by suitable arguments proves His presence, and the truth of His doctrine and inspiration, by performing works surpassing the capability of the whole of nature, namely, the wondrous healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a marvellous control over the heavenly bodies, and what excites yet more wonder, the inspiration of human minds, so that unlettered and simple persons are filled with the Holy Ghost, and in one instant are endowed with the most sublime wisdom and eloquence. And after considering these arguments, convinced by the strength of the proof, and not by the force of arms, nor by the promise of delights, but—and this is the greatest marvel of all—amidst the tyranny of persecutions, a countless crowd of not only simple but also of the wisest men, embraced the Christian faith, which inculcates things surpassing all human understanding, curbs the pleasures of the flesh, and teaches contempt of all worldly things. That the minds of mortal beings should assent to such things, is both the greatest of miracles, and the evident work of divine inspiration, seeing that they despise visible things and desire only those that are invisible. And that this happened not suddenly nor by chance, but by the disposition of God, is shown by the fact that God foretold that He would do so by the manifold oracles of the prophets, whose books we hold in veneration as bearing witness to our faith. This particular kind of proof is alluded to in the words of Heb. 2:3, 4: Which, namely the salvation of mankind, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed with us by them that heard Him, God also bearing witness by signs and wonders, and divers1 … distributions of the Holy Ghost.

Now such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them, seeing that there is evidence of them in their result. For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if without any wondrous signs the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime. Although God ceases not even in our time to work miracles through His saints in confirmation of the faith.

On the other hand those who introduced the errors of the sects proceeded in contrary fashion, as instanced by Mohammed, who enticed peoples with the promise of carnal pleasures, to the desire of which the concupiscence of the flesh instigates. He also delivered commandments in keeping with his promises, by giving the reins to carnal pleasure, wherein it is easy for carnal men to obey: and the lessons of truth which he inculcated were only such as can be easily known to any man of average wisdom by his natural powers: yea rather the truths which he taught were mingled by him with many fables and most false doctrines. Nor did he add any signs of supernatural agency, which alone are a fitting witness to divine inspiration, since a visible work that can be from God alone, proves the teacher of truth to be invisibly inspired: but he asserted that he was sent in the power of arms, a sign that is not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. Again, those who believed in him from the outset were not wise men practised in things divine and human, but beastlike men who dwelt in the wilds, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching; and it was by a multitude of such men and the force of arms that he compelled others to submit to his law.

Lastly, no divine oracles of prophets in a previous age bore witness to him; rather did he corrupt almost all the teaching of the Old and New Testaments by a narrative replete with fables, as one may see by a perusal of his law. Hence by a cunning device, he did not commit the reading of the Old and New Testament Books to his followers, lest he should thereby be convicted of falsehood. Thus it is evident that those who believe his words believe lightly.

Chapter VII

that the truth of reason is not in opposition to the truth of the christian faith

Now though the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. For it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature, are most true, so much so that it is impossible to think them to be false Nor is it lawful to deem false that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. Seeing then that the false alone is opposed to the true, as evidently appears if we examine their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally.

Again. The same thing which the disciple’s mind receives from its teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless he teach insincerely, which it were wicked to say of God. Now the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore the divine Wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently whatever is contrary to these principles, is contrary to the divine Wisdom; wherefore it cannot be from God. Therefore those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.

Moreover. Our intellect is stayed by contrary arguments, so that it cannot advance to the knowledge of truth. Wherefore if conflicting knowledges were instilled into us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered from knowing the truth. And this cannot be ascribed to God.

Furthermore. Things that are natural are unchangeable so long as nature remains. Now contrary opinions cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore God does not instil into man any opinion or belief contrary to natural knowledge.

Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 10:8): The word is nigh thee even in thy heart and in thy mouth. This is the word of faith which we preach. Yet because it surpasses reason some look upon it as though it were contrary thereto; which is impossible.

This is confirmed also by the authority of Augustine who says (Gen. ad lit. ii):1 That which truth shall make known can nowise be in opposition to the holy books whether of the Old or of the New Testament.

From this we may evidently conclude that whatever arguments are alleged against the teachings of faith, they do not rightly proceed from the first self-evident principles instilled by nature. Wherefore they lack the force of demonstration, and are either probable or sophistical arguments, and consequently it is possible to solve them.

Chapter VIII

in what relation human reason stands to the truth of faith

It would also seem well to observe that sensible things from which human reason derives the source of its knowledge, retain a certain trace of likeness to God, but so imperfect that it proves altogether inadequate to manifest the substance itself of God. For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent. Accordingly human reason is adapted to the knowledge of the truth of faith, which can be known in the highest degree only by those who see the divine substance, in so far as it is able to put together certain probable arguments in support thereof, which nevertheless are insufficient to enable us to understand the aforesaid truth as though it were demonstrated to us or understood by us in itself. And yet however weak these arguments may be, it is useful for the human mind to be practised therein, so long as it does not pride itself on having comprehended or demonstrated: since although our view of the sublimest things is limited and weak, it is most pleasant to be able to catch but a glimpse of them, as appears from what has been said.1

The authority of Hilary is in agreement with this statement: for he says (De Trin.)2 while speaking of this same truth: Begin by believing these things, advance and persevere; and though I know thou wilt not arrive, I shall rejoice at thy advance. For he who devoutly follows in pursuit of the infinite, though he never come up with it, will always advance by setting forth. Yet pry not into that secret, and meddle not in the mystery of the birth of the infinite,3 nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding: but understand that there are things thou canst not grasp.

Chapter IX

of the order and mode of procedure in this work

Accordingly, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to the refutation of contrary errors: and that the research of reason is able to reach to one of these, while the other surpasses every effort of reason. And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things, not on the part of God Himself Who is Truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, the relation of which to the knowledge of divine things varies.

Wherefore in order to deduce the first kind of truth we must proceed by demonstrative arguments whereby we can convince our adversaries. But since such arguments are not available in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth, because, as shown above,1 natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith. In a special way may the opponent of this kind of truth be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles: since we believe not what is above human reason save because God has revealed it. In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error, if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.

With the intention then of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first of all endeavour to declare that truth which is the object of faith’s confession and of reason’s researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and of holy men, so as thereby to confirm the truth and convince our opponents. After this, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall with God’s help proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason, by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority.2

Seeing then that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in Himself; the second3 will be the procession of creatures from Him; and the third4 the relation of creatures to Him as their end. Of those things which we need to consider about God in Himself, we must give the first place (this being the necessary foundation of the whole of this work), to the question of demonstrating that there is a God: for unless this be established, all questions about divine things are out of court.

Chapter X

of the opinion of those who aver that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a god, since this is self-evident

Possibly it will seem to some that it is useless to endeavour to show that there is a God: they say that it is self-evident that God is, so that it is impossible to think the contrary, and thus it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God. The reasons for this view are as follow. Those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known: thus as soon as it is known what is a whole, and what is a part, it is known that the whole is greater than its part. Now such is the statement God is. For by this word God we understand a thing a greater than which cannot be thought of: this is what a man conceives in his mind when he hears and understands this word God: so that God must already be at least in his mind. Nor can He be in the mind alone, for that which is both in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only. And the very signification of the word shows that nothing is greater than God. Wherefore it follows that it is self-evident that God is, since it is made clear from the very signification of the word.

Again. It is possible to think that there is a thing which cannot be thought not to exist: and such a thing is evidently greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore if God can be thought not to exist, it follows that something can be thought greater than God: and this is contrary to the signification of the term. Therefore it remains that it is self-evident that God is.

Further. Those propositions are most evident in which the selfsame thing is predicated of itself, for instance: Man is man; or wherein the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, for instance: Man is an animal. Now, as we shall show further on,1 in God alone do we find that His being is His essence, as though the same were the answer to the question, What is He? as to the question, Is He? Accordingly when we say, God is, the predicate is either identified with the subject, or at least is included in the definition of the subject. And thus it will be self-evident that God is.

Moreover. Things that are known naturally are self-evident, for it is not by a process of research that they become evident. Now it is naturally known that God is, since man’s desire tends naturally to God as his last end, as we shall show further on.1 Therefore it is self-evident that God is.

Again. That whereby all things are known must needs be self-evident. Now such is God. For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual knowledge, because it is therein that first and foremost intellectual light is to be found. Therefore it must needs be self-evident that God is.

On account of these and like arguments some are of opinion that it is so self-evident that God is, that it is impossible for the mind to think the contrary.

Chapter XI

refutation of the foregoing opinion and solution of the aforesaid arguments

The foregoing opinion arose from their being accustomed from the beginning to hear and call upon the name of God. Now custom, especially if it date from our childhood, acquires the force of nature, the result being that the mind holds those things with which it was imbued from childhood as firmly as though they were self-evident. It is also a result of failing to distinguish between what is self-evident simply, and that which is self-evident to us. For it is simply self-evident that God is, because the selfsame thing which God is, is His existence. But since we are unable to conceive mentally the selfsame thing which is God, that thing remains unknown in regard to us. Thus it is self-evident simply that every whole is greater than its part, but to one who fails to conceive mentally the meaning of a whole, it must needs be unknown. Hence it is that those things which are most evident of all are to the intellect what the sun is to the eye of an owl, as stated in Metaph. ii.1

Nor does it follow, as the first argument alleged, that as soon as the meaning of the word God is understood, it is known that God is. First, because it is not known to all, even to those who grant that there is a God, that God is that thing than which no greater can be thought of, since many of the ancients asserted that this world is God. Nor can any such conclusion be gathered from the significations which Damascene2 assigns to this word God. Secondly because, granted that everyone understands this word God to signify something than which a greater cannot be thought of, it does not follow that something than which a greater cannot be thought of exists in reality. For we must needs allege a thing in the same way as we allege the signification of its name. Now from the fact that we conceive mentally that which the word God is intended to convey, it does not follow that God is otherwise than in the mind. Wherefore neither will it follow that the thing than which a greater cannot be thought of is otherwise than in the mind. And thence it does not follow that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Hence this is no argument against those who assert that there is no God, since whatever be granted to exist, whether in reality or in the mind, there is nothing to prevent a person from thinking of something greater, unless he grants that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of.

Again it does not follow, as the second argument pretended, that if it is possible to think that God is not, it is possible to think of something greater than God. For that it be possible to think that He is not, is not on account of the imperfection of His being or the uncertainty thereof, since in itself His being is supremely manifest, but is the result of the weakness of our mind which is able to see Him, not in Himself but in His effects, so that it is led by reasoning to know that He is.

Wherefore the third argument also is solved. For just as it is self-evident to us that a whole is greater than its part, so is it most evident to those who see the very essence of God that God exists, since His essence is His existence. But because we are unable to see His essence, we come to know His existence not in Himself but in His effects.

The solution to the fourth argument is also clear. For man knows God naturally in the same way as he desires Him naturally. Now man desires Him naturally in so far as he naturally desires happiness, which is a likeness of the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that God considered in Himself is naturally known to man, but that His likeness is. Wherefore man must needs come by reasoning to know God in the likenesses to Him which he discovers in God’s effects.

It is also easy to reply to the fifth argument. For God is that in which all things are known, not so that other things be unknown except He be known, as happens in self-evident principles, but because all knowledge is caused in us by His outpouring.

Chapter XII

of the opinion of those who say that the existence of god cannot be proved, and that it is held by faith alone

The position that we have taken is also assailed by the opinion of certain others, whereby the efforts of those who endeavour to prove that there is a God would again be rendered futile. For they say that it is impossible by means of the reason to discover that God exists, and that this knowledge is acquired solely by means of faith and revelation.

In making this assertion some were moved by the weakness of the arguments which certain people employed to prove the existence of God.

Possibly, however, this error might falsely seek support from the statements of certain philosophers, who show that in God essence and existence are the same, namely that which answers to the question, What is He? and that which answers to the question, Is He? Now it is impossible by the process of reason to acquire the knowledge of what God is. Wherefore seemingly neither is it possible to prove by reason whether God is.

Again. If, as required by the system of the Philosopher,1 in order to prove whether a thing is we must take as principle the signification of its name, and since according to the Philosopher (4 Metaph.)2 the signification of a name is its definition: there will remain no means of proving the existence of God, seeing that we lack knowledge of the divine essence or quiddity.

Again. If the principles of demonstration become known to us originally through the senses, as is proved in the Posterior Analytics,3 those things which transcend all sense and sensible objects are seemingly indemonstrable. Now such is the existence of God. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated.

The falseness of this opinion is shown to us first by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to conclude causes from effects. Secondly, by the order itself of sciences: for if no substance above sensible substance can be an object of science, there will be no science above Physics, as stated in 4 Metaph.4 Thirdly, by the efforts of the philosophers who have endeavoured to prove the existence of God. Fourthly, by the apostolic truth which asserts (Rom. 1:20) that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.

Nor should we be moved by the consideration that in God essence and existence are the same, as the first argument contended. For this is to be understood of the existence by which God subsists in Himself, of which we are ignorant as to what kind of a thing it is, even as we are ignorant of His essence. But it is not to be understood of that existence which is signified by the composition of the mind. For in this way it is possible to prove the existence of God, when our mind is led by demonstrative arguments to form a proposition stating that God is.

Moreover. In those arguments whereby we prove the existence of God, it is not necessary that the divine essence or quiddity be employed as the middle term, as the second argument supposed: but instead of the quiddity we take His effects as middle term, as is the case in a posteriori reasoning: and from these effects we take the signification of this word God. For all the divine names are taken either from the remoteness of God’s effects from Himself, or from some relationship between God and His effects.

It is also evident from the fact that, although God transcends all sensibles and senses, His effects from which we take the proof that God exists, are sensible objects. Hence our knowledge, even of things which transcend the senses, originates from the senses.

Chapter XIII

arguments in proof of god’s existence

Having shown then that it is not futile to endeavour to prove the existence of God, we may proceed to set forth the reasons whereby both philosophers and Catholic doctors have proved that there is a God. In the first place we shall give the arguments by which Aristotle sets out to prove God’s existence: and he aims at proving this from the point of view of movement, in two ways.

The first way is as follows.1 Whatever is in motion is moved by another: and it is clear to the sense that something, the sun for instance, is in motion. Therefore it is set in motion by something else moving it. Now that which moves it is itself either moved or not. If it be not moved, then the point is proved that we must needs postulate an immovable mover: and this we call God. If, however, it be moved, it is moved by another mover. Either, therefore, we must proceed to infinity, or we must come to an immovable mover. But it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Therefore it is necessary to postulate an immovable mover.

This argument contains two propositions that need to be proved: namely that whatever is in motion is moved by another, and that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved.

The first of these is proved by the Philosopher in three ways. First, thus. If a thing moves itself, it must needs have the principle of its movement in itself, else it would clearly be moved by another. Again it must be moved primarily, that is, it must be moved by reason of itself and not by reason of its part, as an animal is moved by the movement of its foot, for in the latter way not the whole but the part would be moved by itself, and one part by another. Again it must be divisible and have parts, since whatever is moved is divisible, as is proved in 6 Phys.1

These things being supposed, he argues as follows. That which is stated to be moved by itself is moved primarily. Therefore if one of its parts is at rest, it follows that the whole is at rest. For if, while one part is at rest, another of its parts were in motion, the whole itself would not be moved primarily, but its part which is in motion while another is at rest. Now nothing that is at rest while another is at rest, is moved by itself: for that which is at rest as a result of another thing being at rest must needs be in motion as a result of the other’s motion, and hence it is not moved by itself. Hence that which was stated to be moved by itself, is not moved by itself. Therefore whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another.

Nor is this argument traversed by the statement that might be made, that supposing a thing moves itself, it is impossible for a part thereof to be at rest, or again by the statement that to be at rest or in motion does not belong to a part except accidentally, as Avicenna quibbles.1 Because the force of the argument lies in this, that if a thing moves itself primarily and of itself, not by reason of its parts, it follows that its being moved does not depend on some thing; whereas with a divisible thing, being moved, like being, depends on its parts, so that it cannot move itself primarily and of itself. Therefore the truth of the conclusion drawn does not require that we suppose as an absolute truth that a part of that which moves itself is at rest, but that this conditional statement be true that if a part were at rest, the whole would be at rest. Which statement can be true even if the antecedent be false, even as this conditional proposition is true: If a man is an ass he is irrational.

Secondly,2 he proves it by induction, thus. A thing is not moved by itself if it is moved accidentally, since its motion is occasioned by the motion of something else. Nor again if it is moved by force, as is manifest. Nor if it is moved by its nature like those things whose movement proceeds from themselves, such as animals, which clearly are moved by their souls. Nor if it is moved by nature, as heavy and light things are, since these are moved by their generating cause and by that which removes the obstacle to their movement. Now whatsoever things are in motion are moved either per se or accidentally; and if per se, either by force or by nature: and if the latter, either by something in them, as in the case of animals, or not by something in them, as in the case of heavy and light bodies. Therefore whatever is in motion is moved by another.

Thirdly,3 he proves his point thus. Nothing is at the same time in act and in potentiality in respect of the same thing. Now whatever is in motion, as such, is in potentiality, because motion is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such.1 Whereas whatever moves, as such, is in act, for nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Therefore nothing is both mover and moved in respect of the same movement. Hence nothing moves itself.

We must observe, however, that Plato,2 who asserted that every mover is moved, employed the term movement in a more general sense than Aristotle. For Aristotle took movement in its strict sense, for the act of a thing that is in potentiality as such, in which sense it applies only to divisible things and bodies, as is proved in 6 Phys.3 Whereas according to Plato that which moves itself is not a body; for he took movement for any operation, so that to understand or to think is a kind of movement, to which manner of speaking Aristotle alludes in 3 De Anima.4 In this sense, then, he said that the first mover moves itself, in as much as it understands, desires and loves itself. This, in a certain respect, is not in contradiction with the arguments of Aristotle; for it makes no difference whether with Plato we come to a first mover that moves itself, or with Aristotle to something first which is altogether immovable.

He proves the other proposition, namely that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, by three arguments.

The first5 of these is as follows. If one were to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, all this infinite number of things would necessarily be bodies, since whatever is moved is divisible and corporeal, as is proved in 6 Phys.6 Now every body that moves through being moved is moved at the same time as it moves. Therefore all this infinite number of things are moved at the same time as one of them is moved. But one of them, since it is finite, is moved in a finite time. Therefore all this infinite number of things are moved in a finite time. But this is impossible. Therefore it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved.

That it is impossible for the aforesaid infinite number of things to be moved in a finite time, he proves thus.1 Mover and moved must needs be simultaneous; and he proves this by induction from each species of movement. But bodies cannot be simultaneous except by continuity or contact. Wherefore since all the aforesaid movers and things moved are bodies, as proved, they must needs be as one movable thing through their continuity or contact. And thus one infinite thing would be moved in a finite time, which is shown to be impossible in 6 Phys.2

The second argument3 in proof of the same statement is as follows. In an ordinate series of movers and things moved, where namely throughout the series one is moved by the other, we must needs find that if the first mover be taken away or cease to move, none of the others will move or be moved: because the first is the cause of movement in all the others. Now if an ordinate series of movers and things moved proceed to infinity, there will be no first mover, but all will be intermediate movers as it were. Therefore it will be impossible for any of them to be moved: and thus nothing in the world will be moved.

The third argument4 amounts to the same, except that it proceeds in the reverse order, namely by beginning from above: and it is as follows. That which moves instrumentally, cannot move unless there be something that moves principally. But if we proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, they will all be like instrumental movers, because they will be alleged to be moved movers, and there will be nothing by way of principal mover. Therefore nothing will be moved.

We have thus clearly proved both statements which were supposed in the first process of demonstration whereby Aristotle proved the existence of a first immovable mover.

The second5 way is as follows. If every mover is moved, this statement is true either in itself or accidentally. If accidentally, it follows that it is not necessary: for that which is accidentally true is not necessary. Therefore it is a contingent proposition that no mover is moved. But if a mover be not moved, it does not move, as the opponent asserts. Therefore it is contingent that nothing is moved, since, if nothing moves, nothing is moved. Now Aristotle holds this to be impossible,1 namely, that at any time there be no movement. Therefore the first proposition was not contingent, because a false impossibility does not follow from a false contingency. And therefore this proposition, Every mover is moved by another, was not accidentally true.

Again, if any two things are found accidentally united in a certain subject, and one of them is to be found without the other, it is probable that the latter can be found without the former: thus if white and musical are found in Socrates, and musical without white is found in Plato, it is probable that it is possible to find white without musical in some subject. Accordingly if mover and moved be united together in some subject accidentally, and it be found that a certain thing is moved without its being a mover, it is probable that a mover is to be found that is not moved. Nor can one urge against this the case of two things one of which depends on the other; because those in question are united not per se but accidentally. If, however, the aforesaid proposition is true in itself, again there follows something impossible or unfitting. For the mover must needs be moved either by the same kind of movement or by another kind. If by the same kind, it follows that whatever causes alteration must itself be altered, and furthermore that the healer must be healed, that the teacher must be taught, and in respect of the same science. But this is impossible: for the teacher must needs have science, while the learner must needs not have it, and thus the same will be both possessed and not possessed by the same, which is impossible. And if it be moved by another kind of movement, so that, to wit, that which causes alteration be moved in respect of place, and that which moves in respect of place be increased, and so on, it will follow that we cannot go on indefinitely, since the genera and species of movement are finite in number. And thus there will be some first mover that is not moved by another. Unless, perchance, someone say that a recurrence takes place, in this way, that when all the genera and species of movement have been exhausted, a return must be made to the first; for instance, if that which moves in respect of place be altered, and that which causes alteration be increased, then again that which is increased be moved in respect of place. But the consequence of this will be the same as before; namely, that which moves by one kind of movement is itself moved by the same kind, not immediately indeed but mediately. It remains therefore that we must needs postulate some first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself.

Since however, given that there is a first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself, it does not follow that it is absolutely immovable, Aristotle proceeds further, saying that this may happen in two ways. First, so that this first mover is absolutely immovable. And if this be granted, our point is established, namely that there is a first immovable mover. Secondly, that this first mover is moved by itself. And this seems probable: because what is of itself is always prior to what is of another: wherefore also in things moved, it is logical that what is moved first is moved by itself and not by another.

But, if this be granted, the same consequence follows.1 For it cannot be said that the whole of that which moves itself is moved by its whole self, because then the absurd consequences mentioned above would follow, namely that a person might teach and be taught at the same time, and in like manner as to other kinds of movement; and again that a thing would be at the same time in act and in potentiality, since a mover, as such, is in act, while that which is moved is in potentiality. It remains, therefore, that one part thereof is mover only, and the other part moved. And thus we have the same conclusion as before, namely that there is something that moves and is itself immovable.

And it cannot be said that both parts are moved, so that one is moved by the other; nor that one part moves both itself and the other; nor that the whole moves a part; nor that part moves the whole, since the above absurdities would follow, namely that something would both move and be moved by the same kind of movement, and that it would be at the same time in potentiality and in act, and moreover that the whole would move itself not primarily but by reason of its part. It remains, therefore, that in that which moves itself, one part must be immovable, and must move the other part.

Since, however, in those things among us which move themselves, namely animals, the part which moves, namely the soul, though immovable of itself, is nevertheless moved accidentally, he goes on to show that in the first mover, the part which moves is not moved neither of itself nor accidentally.1

For in those things which among us move themselves, namely animals, since they are corruptible, the part which moves is moved accidentally. Now those corruptible things which move themselves must needs be reducible to some first self-mover that is everlasting. Therefore that which moves itself must have a mover, which is moved neither of itself nor accidentally.

It is clear that, in accordance with his hypothesis, some self-mover must be everlasting. For if, as he supposes, movement is everlasting, the production of these self-movers that are subject to generation and corruption must be everlasting. But no one of these self-movers, since it does not always exist, can be the cause of this everlastingness. Nor can all of them together, both because they would be infinite, and because they do not exist all together. It follows therefore that there must be an everlasting self-mover, that causes the everlastingness of generation in these lower self-movers. And thus its mover is not moved, neither of itself nor accidentally. Again, we observe that in self-movers some begin to be moved anew on account of some movement whereby the animal is not moved by itself, for instance by the digestion of food or a change in the atmosphere: by which movement the mover that moves itself is moved accidentally. Whence we may gather that no self-mover, whose mover is moved per se or accidentally, is always moved. But the first self-mover is always in motion, else movement could not be everlasting, since every other movement is caused by the movement of the first self-mover. It follows therefore that the first self-mover is moved by a mover who is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally.

Nor is this argument rebutted by the fact that the movers of the lower spheres cause an everlasting movement, and yet are said to be moved accidentally. For they are said to be moved accidentally not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the things subject to their motion, which follow the motion of the higher sphere.

Since, however, God is not part of a self-mover, Aristotle goes on in his Metaphysics1 to trace from this motor that is part of a self-mover, another mover altogether separate, which is God. For since every self-mover is moved through its appetite, it follows that the motor that is part of a self-mover, moves on account of the appetite for some appetible object. And this object is above the motor in moving, because the appetent is a moved mover, whereas the appetible is a mover altogether unmoved. Therefore there must needs be a first mover separate and altogether immovable, and this is God.

Now two things would seem to weaken the above arguments. The first of these is that they proceed from the supposition of the eternity of movement, and among Catholics this is supposed to be false. To this we reply that the most effective way to prove God’s existence is from the supposition of the eternity of the world, which being supposed, it seems less manifest that God exists. For if the world and movement had a beginning, it is clear that we must suppose some cause to have produced the world and movement, because whatever becomes anew must take its origin from some cause of its becoming, since nothing evolves itself from potentiality to act, or from non-being to being.

The second is that the aforesaid arguments suppose that the first moved thing, namely the heavenly body, has its motive principle in itself, whence it follows that it is animated: and by many this is not granted.

To this we reply that if the first mover is not supposed to have its motive principle in itself, it follows that it is immediately moved by something altogether immovable. Hence also Aristotle draws this conclusion with an alternative, namely that either we must come at once to a first mover immovable and separate, or to a self-mover from which again we come to a first mover immovable and separate.1

The Philosopher proceeds in a different way in 2 Metaph. to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes, and that we must come to one first cause, and this we call God. This is how he proceeds. In all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate, whether the intermediate be one or several. Now if the cause be removed, that which it causes is removed. Therefore if we remove the first the intermediate cannot be a cause. But if we go on to infinity in efficient causes, no cause will be first. Therefore all the others which are intermediate will be removed. Now this is clearly false. Therefore we must suppose the existence of a first efficient cause: and this is God.

Another reason can be drawn from the words of Aristotle. For in 2 Metaph.2 he shows that those things which excel as true excel as beings: and in 4 Metaph.3 he shows that there is something supremely true, from the fact that we see that of two false things one is falser than the other, wherefore it follows that one also is truer than the other. Now this is by reason of approximation to that which is simply and supremely true. Wherefore we may further conclude that there is something that is supremely being. And this we call God.

Another argument in support of this conclusion is adduced by Damascene1 from the government of things: and the same reasoning is indicated by the Commentator in 2 Phys.2 It runs as follows. It is impossible for contrary and discordant things to accord in one order always or frequently except by someone’s governance, whereby each and all are made to tend to a definite end. Now we see that in the world things of different natures accord in one order, not seldom and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore it follows that there is someone by whose providence the world is governed. And this we call God.

Chapter XIV

that in order to acquire knowledge of god it is necessary to proceed by the way of remotion

Accordingly having proved that there is a first being which we call God, it behoves us to inquire into His nature.

Now in treating of the divine essence the principal method to be followed is that of remotion. For the divine essence by its immensity surpasses every form to which our intellect reaches; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we have some knowledge thereof by knowing what it is not: and we shall approach all the nearer to the knowledge thereof according as we shall be enabled to remove by our intellect a greater number of things therefrom. For the more completely we see how a thing differs from others, the more perfectly we know it: since each thing has in itself its own being distinct from all other things. Wherefore when we know the definition of a thing, first we place it in a genus, whereby we know in general what it is, and afterwards we add differences, so as to mark its distinction from other things: and thus we arrive at the complete knowledge of a thing’s essence.

Since, however, we are unable in treating of the divine essence to take what as a genus, nor can we express its distinction from other things by affirmative differences, we must needs express it by negative differences. Now just as in affirmative differences one restricts another, and brings us the nearer to a complete description of the thing, according as it makes it to differ from more things, so one negative difference is restricted by another that marks a distinction from more things. Thus, if we say that God is not an accident, we thereby distinguish Him from all accidents; then if we add that He is not a body, we shall distinguish Him also from certain substances, and thus in gradation He will be differentiated by suchlike negations from all beside Himself: and then when He is known as distinct from all things, we shall arrive at a proper consideration of Him. It will not, however, be perfect, because we shall not know what He is in Himself.

Wherefore in order to proceed about the knowledge of God by the way of remotion, let us take as principle that which is already made manifest by what we have said above,1 namely that God is altogether unchangeable. This is also confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ. For it is said (Malach. 3:6): I am God (Vulg., the Lord) and I change not; (James 1:17): With Whom there is no change; and (Num. 23:19): God is not as a man … that He should be changed.

Chapter XV

that god is eternal

From the foregoing it is also clear that God is eternal.

For whatever begins or ceases to be, suffers this through movement or change. Now it has been shown2 that God is altogether unchangeable. Therefore He is eternal, having neither beginning nor end.

Again. Only things which are moved are measured by time: because time is the measure of movement, as stated in 4 Phys.1 Now God is absolutely without movement, as we have already proved.2 Therefore we cannot mark before and after in Him. Therefore in Him there is not being after non-being, nor can He have non-being after being, nor is it possible to find any succession in His being, because these things cannot be understood apart from time. Therefore He is without beginning and end, and has all His being simultaneously: and in this consists the notion of eternity.3

Moreover. If anywhen He was not and afterwards was, He was brought by someone out of non-being into being. Not by Himself; because what is not cannot do anything. And if by another, this other is prior to Him. Now it has been shown4 that God is the first cause. Therefore He did not begin to be. Therefore neither will He cease to be: because that which always was, has the power to be always. Therefore He is eternal.

Furthermore. We observe that in the world there are certain things which can be and not be, namely those that are subject to generation and corruption. Now whatsoever is possible to be has a cause, because, as in itself it is equally related to two things, namely being and not being, it follows that if it acquires being this is the result of some cause. But, as proved above5 by Aristotle’s argument, we cannot go on to infinity in causes. Therefore we must suppose some thing, which it is necessary to be. Now every necessary thing either has a cause of its necessity from without, or has no such cause, but is necessary of itself. But we cannot go on to infinity in necessary things that have causes of their necessity from without. Therefore we must suppose some first necessary thing which is necessary of itself: and this is God, since He is the first cause, as proved above.6 Therefore God is eternal, since whatever is necessary of itself is eternal.

Again. Aristotle7 proves the everlastingness of movement from the everlastingness of time: and thence he goes on to prove the everlastingness of the substance that is the cause of movement.1 Now the first moving substance is God. Therefore He is everlasting. And supposing the everlastingness of time and movement to be denied, there still remains the argument in proof of the everlastingness of substance. For if movement had a beginning, it must have had its beginning from some mover. And if this mover had a beginning, it had its beginning from some agent. And thus either we shall go on to infinity, or we shall come to something without a beginning.

Divine authority bears witness to this truth: wherefore the Psalm2 reads: But Thou, O Lord, endurest for ever, and again:3 But Thou art always the self-same, and Thy years shall not fail.

Chapter XVI

that in god there is no passive potentiality

Now if God is eternal, it follows of necessity that He is not in potentiality.

For everything in whose substance there is an admixture of potentiality, is possibly non-existent as regards whatever it has of potentiality, for that which may possibly be may possibly not be. Now God in Himself cannot not be, since He is eternal. Therefore in God there is no potentiality to be.

Again. Although that which is sometimes potential and sometimes actual, is in point of time potential before being actual, nevertheless actuality is simply before potentiality: because potentiality does not bring itself into actuality, but needs to be brought into actuality by something actual. Therefore whatever is in any way potential has something previous to it. Now God is the first being and the first cause, as stated above.4 Therefore in Him there is no admixture of potentiality.

Again. That which of itself must necessarily be, can nowise be possibly, since what of itself must be necessarily, has no cause, whereas whatever can be possibly, has a cause, as proved above.1 Now God, in Himself, must necessarily be. Therefore nowise can He be possibly. Therefore no potentiality is to be found in His essence.

Again. Everything acts according as it is actual. Wherefore that which is not wholly actual acts, not by its whole self, but by part of itself. Now that which does not act by its whole self is not the first agent, since it acts by participation of something and not by its essence. Therefore the first agent, which is God, has no admixture of potentiality, but is pure act.

Moreover. Just as it is natural that a thing should act in so far as it is actual, so is it natural for it to be passive in so far as it is in potentiality, for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality.2 Now God is altogether impassible and immovable, as stated above.3 Therefore in Him there is no potentiality, namely that which is passive.

Further. We notice in the world something that passes from potentiality to actuality. Now it does not reduce itself from potentiality to actuality, because that which is potential is not yet, wherefore neither can it act. Therefore it must be preceded by something else whereby it can be brought from potentiality to actuality. And if this again passes from potentiality to actuality, it must be preceded by something else, whereby it can be brought from potentiality to actuality. But we cannot go on thus to infinity. Therefore we must come to something that is wholly actual and nowise potential. And this we call God.

Chapter XVII

that in god there is no matter

From this it follows that God is not matter.

For matter, such as it is, is in potentiality.

Again. Matter is not a principle of activity: wherefore, as the Philosopher puts it,1 efficient and material causes do not coincide. Now, as stated above,2 it belongs to God to be the first efficient cause of things. Therefore He is not matter.

Moreover. For those who referred all things to matter as their first cause, it followed that natural things exist by chance: and against these it is argued in 2 Phys.3 Therefore if God, Who is the first cause, is the material cause of things, it follows that all things exist by chance.

Further. Matter does not become the cause of an actual thing, except by being altered and changed. Therefore if God is immovable, as proved above,4 He can nowise be a cause of things as their matter.

The Catholic faith professes this truth, asserting that God created all things not out of His substance, but out of nothing.

The ravings of David of Dinant are hereby confounded, who dared to assert that God is the same as primary matter, because if they were not the same, they would needs differ by certain differences, and thus they would not be simple: since in that which differs from another thing by a difference, the very difference argues composition. Now this proceeded from his ignorance of the distinction between difference and diversity. For as laid down in 10 Metaph.5 a thing is said to be different in relation to something, because whatever is different, differs by something, whereas things are said to be diverse absolutely from the fact that they are not the same thing.6 Accordingly we must seek for a difference in things which have something in common, for we have to point to something in them whereby they differ: thus two species have a common genus, wherefore they must needs be distinguished by differences. But in those things which have nothing in common, we have not to seek in what they differ, for they are diverse by themselves. For thus are opposite differences distinguished from one another, because they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence: and consequently we must not ask in what they differ, for they are diversified by their very selves. Thus too, God and primary matter are distinguished, since, the one being pure act and the other pure potentiality, they have nothing in common.

Chapter XVIII

that in god there is no composition

From the foregoing we are able to conclude that there is no composition in God. For in every composite thing there must needs be act and potentiality: since several things cannot become one simply, unless there be something actual there and something else potential. Because those things that are actually, are not united except as an assemblage or group, which are not one simply. In these moreover the very parts that are gathered together are as a potentiality in relation to the union: for they are actually united after being potentially unitable. But in God there is no potentiality.1 Therefore in Him there is no composition.

Again. Every composite is subsequent to its components. Therefore the first being, namely God,2 has no component parts.

Further. Every composite is potentially dissoluble, so far as its composite nature is concerned, although in some there is something else incompatible with dissolution. Now that which is dissoluble is in potentiality to not-being. But this cannot be said of God, since of His very essence He is necessarily. Therefore there is no composition in Him.

Moreover. Every composition requires a compounder: for if there be composition, it results from several things: and things that are several in themselves would not combine together unless they were united by a compounder. If then God were composite, He would have a compounder: for He could not compound Himself, since no thing is its own cause, for it would precede itself, which is impossible. Now the compounder is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore God would have an efficient cause: and thus He would not be the first cause, which was proved above.1

Again. In any genus the more simple a thing is the more excellent it is; such, in the genus hot, is fire which has no admixture of cold. Therefore that which obtains the summit of nobility among beings, must be in the summit of simplicity. Now that which obtains the summit of nobility in things is what we call God, since He is the first cause, because the cause is more excellent than its effect. Therefore there can be no composition in Him.

Moreover. In every composite thing the good does not belong to this or that part but to the whole, and I speak of good in reference to that goodness which is proper to, and is the perfection of, the whole: thus the parts are imperfect in relation to the whole: thus the parts of a man are not a man, nor have the parts of the number six the perfection of six, nor do the parts of a line attain to the perfection of the measure found in the whole line. Therefore if God is composite, His proper perfection and goodness are found in the whole of God but not in any of His parts. And thus the good that is proper to Him will not be purely in Him; and consequently He will not be the first and supreme good.

Further. Before every multitude it is necessary to find unity. Now in every composite there is multitude. Therefore that which is before all things, namely God, must needs be devoid of all composition.

Chapter XIX

that in god there is nothing violent or beside nature

Hence the Philosopher1 concludes that in God there cannot be anything violent or outside nature. For whatever has in itself anything violent or beside nature, has something added to itself: since that which belongs to a thing’s essence cannot be violent or beside nature. Now no simple thing has in itself anything that is added, for this would argue its being composite. Since then God is simple, as shown above,2 there can be nothing in Him that is violent or beside nature.

Further. The necessity resulting from compulsion is a necessity imposed by another. Now in God there is no necessity imposed by another, for He is necessary of Himself, and the cause of necessity in other things.3 Therefore nothing is compulsory in Him.

Moreover. Wherever there is violence, there can be something besides what belongs to a thing by its very nature: since violence is contrary to that which is according to nature. But it is not possible for anything to be in God that does not belong to Him according to His nature, since by His very nature He is necessary being, as shown above.4 Therefore there can be nothing violent in Him.

Again. Everything that is compelled or unnatural has a natural aptitude to be moved by another: because that which is done by compulsion has an external principle, without any concurrence on the part of the patient.5 Now God is altogether immovable, as shown above.6 Therefore nothing in Him can be violent or unnatural.

Chapter XX

that god is not a body

From the foregoing we are also able to prove that God is not a body.

For since every body is a continuous substance, it is composite and has parts. Now God is not composite, as we have shown.1 Therefore He is not a body.

Further. Every quantitative substance is somehow in potentiality: for that which is continuous is potentially divisible to infinity; and number can be infinitely augmented. Now every body is a quantitative substance. Therefore every body is in potentiality. But God is not in potentiality, but is pure act, as shown above.2 Therefore God is not a body.

Again. If God were a body, He would needs be a physical body, for a mathematical body does not exist by itself, as the Philosopher proves,3 since dimensions are accidents. Now He is not a physical body; for He is immovable, as we have proved,4 and every physical body is movable. Therefore God is not a body.

Moreover. Every body is finite, which is proved in regard both to spherical and to rectilinear bodies in 1 Cœli et Mundi.5 Now we are able by our intellect and imagination to soar above any finite body. Wherefore, if God were a body, our intellect and imagination would be able to think of something greater than God: and thus God would not exceed our intellect: which is inadmissible. Therefore He is not a body.

Furthermore. Intellective knowledge is more certain than sensitive. Now among natural things we find some that are objects of sense: therefore there are also some that are objects of intellect. But the order of powers is according to the order of objects, in the same way as their distinction. Therefore above all sensible objects there is an intelligible object existing in natural things. But every body that exists among things is sensible. Therefore above all bodies it is possible to find something more excellent. Wherefore if God were a body, He would not be the first and supreme being.

Again. A living thing is more excellent than any body devoid of life. Now the life of a living body is more excellent than that body, since thereby it excels all other bodies. Therefore that which is excelled by nothing, is not a body. But such is God. Therefore He is not a body.

Moreover. We find the philosophers proving the same conclusion by arguments1 based on the eternity of movement, as follows. In all everlasting movement the first mover must needs not be moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we have proved above.2 Now the body of the heavens is moved in a circle with an everlasting movement. Therefore its first mover is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally. Now no body causes local movement unless itself be moved, because moved and mover must be simultaneous; and thus the body that causes movement must be itself moved, in order to be simultaneous with the body that is moved. Moreover no power in a body causes movement except it be moved accidentally; since, when the body is moved, the power of that body is moved accidentally. Therefore the first mover of the heavens is neither a body nor a power residing in a body. Now that to which the movement of the heavens is ultimately reduced as to the first immovable mover, is God. Therefore God is not a body.

Again. No infinite power is a power residing in a magnitude. But the power of the first mover is an infinite power. Therefore it does not reside in a magnitude. And thus God, Who is the first mover, is neither a body nor a power residing in a body.

The first proposition is proved as follows. If a power residing in a magnitude be infinite, this magnitude is either finite or infinite. But there is no infinite magnitude, as proved in 3 Phys.1 and 1 Cœli et Mundi.2 And it is not possible for a finite magnitude to have an infinite power. Therefore in no magnitude can there be an infinite power.

That there cannot be an infinite power in a finite magnitude is proved thus. A great power produces in less time an equal effect, which a lesser power produces in more time: of whatever kind this effect may be, whether it be one of alteration, of local movement, or of any other kind of movement. Now an infinite power surpasses every finite power. It follows therefore that it produces its effect more rapidly, by causing a more rapid movement than any finite power. Nor can this greater rapidity be one of time. Therefore it follows that the effect is produced in an indivisible point of time. And thus moving, being moved, and movement will be instantaneous: the contrary of which has been proved in 6 Phys.3

That an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in time, is proved thus. Let A be an infinite power; and AB a part thereof. This part therefore will cause movement in more time. And yet there must be proportion between this time and the time in which the whole power causes movement, since both times are finite. Suppose then these two times to be in proportion as 1 to 10, for it does not affect this argument whether we take this or any other ratio. Now if we increase the aforesaid finite power, we must decrease the time in proportion to the increase of the power, since a greater power causes movement in less time. If therefore we increase it tenfold, that power will cause movement in a time which will be one-tenth of the time occupied by the first part that we took of the infinite power, namely AB. And yet this power which is ten times the aforesaid power is a finite power, since it has a fixed proportion to a finite power. It follows therefore that a finite power and an infinite power cause movement in an equal time: which is impossible. Therefore an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in any time.

That the power of the first mover is infinite is proved thus. No finite power can cause movement in an infinite time. Now the power of the first mover causes movement in an infinite time, since the first movement is eternal. Therefore the power of the first mover is infinite. The first proposition is proved thus. If any finite power of a body causes movement in infinite time, a part of that body having a part of that power, will cause movement during less time, since the greater power a thing has, for so much the longer time will it be able to continue a movement, and thus the aforesaid part will cause movement in finite time, and a greater part will be able to cause movement during more time. And thus always according as we increase the power of the mover, we increase the time in the same proportion. But if this increase be made a certain number of times we shall come to the quantity of the whole or even go beyond it. Therefore the increase also on the part of the time will reach the quantity of time wherein the whole causes movement. And yet the time wherein the whole causes movement was supposed to be infinite. Consequently a finite time will measure an infinite time: which is impossible.

However, there are several objections to this chain of reasoning. One of these is that it might be held that the body which moves the first thing moved is not divisible, as is the case of a heavenly body: whereas the argument given above supposes it to be divided.

To this we reply that a conditional clause may be true though its antecedent be impossible. And if there be anything to disprove such a conditional, the antecedent is impossible. Thus if anyone disprove this conditional, If a man flies, he has wings, the antecedent would be impossible. It is in this way that we are to understand the process of the aforesaid reasoning. For this conditional is true, If a heavenly body be divided, its part will have less power than the whole. But this conditional is disproved if we suppose that the first mover is a body, on account of the impossibilities that follow. Wherefore it is clear that this is impossible. We can reply in the same way if objection be made to the increase of finite powers. Because it is impossible in natural things to find powers according to any proportion that there is between one time and any other time. And yet the conditional required in the aforesaid argument is true.

The second objection is that, although a body be divided, it is possible for a power of a body not to be divided when the body is divided, thus the rational soul is not divided when the body is divided.

To this we reply that by the above argument it is not proved that God is not united to the body as the rational soul is united to the human body, but that He is not a power residing in a body, as a material power which is divided when the body is divided. Wherefore it is also said of the human intellect that it is neither a body nor a power in a body.1 That God is not united to the body as its soul, is another question.2

The third objection is that if the power of every body is finite, as is proved in the above process; and if a finite power cannot make its effect to endure an infinite time; it will follow that no body can endure an infinite time: and consequently that a heavenly body will be necessarily corrupted. Some reply to this that a heavenly body in respect of its own power is defectible, but acquires everlastingness from another that has infinite power. Apparently Plato approves of this solution, for he represents God as speaking of the heavenly bodies as follows: By your nature ye are corruptible, but by My will incorruptible, because My will is greater than your necessity.3

But the Commentator refutes this solution in 11 Metaph. For it is impossible, according to him, that what in itself may possibly not be, should acquire everlastingness of being from another: since it would follow that the corruptible is changed into incorruptibility; and this, in his opinion, is impossible. Wherefore he replies after this fashion: that in a heavenly body whatever power there is, is finite, and yet it does not follow that it has all power; for, according to Aristotle (8 Metaph.)1 the potentiality to (be) somewhere is in a heavenly body, but not the potentiality to be. And thus it does not follow that it has a potentiality to not-be. It must be observed, however, that this reply of the Commentator is insufficient. Because, although it be granted that in a heavenly body there is no quasi-potentiality to be, which potentiality is that of matter, there is nevertheless in it a quasi-active potentiality, which is the power of being: since Aristotle says explicitly in 1 Cœli et Mundi,2 that the heaven has the power to be always. Hence it is better to reply that since power implies relation to act, we should judge of power according to the mode of the act. Now movement by its very nature has quantity and extension, wherefore its infinite duration requires that the moving power should be infinite. On the other hand being has no quantitative extension, especially in a thing whose being is invariable, such as the heaven. Hence it does not follow that the power of being a finite body is infinite though its duration be infinite: because it matters not whether that power make a thing to last for an instant or for an infinite time, since that invariable being is not affected by time except accidentally.

The fourth objection is that the statement that what causes movement in infinite time must have an infinite power, does not necessarily apply to those movers which are not altered by moving. Because such a movement consumes nothing of their power; wherefore they can cause movement for no less time after they have moved for a certain time, than before. Thus the power of the sun is finite, and, because its power is not diminished on account of its action, it can act on this lower world for an infinite time, according to nature.

To this we reply that a body moves not unless it be moved, as we have shown. Therefore, supposing a body not to be moved, it follows that it does not move. Now in anything that is moved there is potentiality to opposites, since the terms of movement are opposite to one another. Consequently, considered in itself, every body that is moved is possibly not moved. And that which is possibly not moved, is not apt of itself to be moved for an everlasting time: and consequently neither is it apt to move for a perpetual time.

Accordingly the demonstration given above is based on the finite power of a finite body; which power cannot of itself move in an infinite time. But a body which of itself is possibly moved and not moved, and possibly moves and does not move, can acquire perpetual movement from some cause; and this cause must needs be incorporeal. Wherefore the first mover must needs be incorporeal. Hence according to nature nothing hinders a finite body, which acquires from another cause perpetuity in being moved, from having also perpetuity in moving: since also the first heavenly body, according to nature, can cause a perpetual circular movement in the lower bodies, according as one sphere moves another. Nor is it impossible, as the Commentator maintains,1 for that which is, of itself, in potentiality to being moved and not moved, to acquire perpetual movement from something else, as he supposed it impossible as regards perpetuity of being. For movement is a kind of outflow from the mover to the thing movable, and consequently a movable thing can acquire perpetual movement from something else, without having it by nature. On the other hand to be is something fixed and quiescent in a being, and consequently that which is, of itself, in potentiality to not-be, cannot, as he says, in the course of nature, acquire from something else perpetuity of being.

The fifth objection is that according to the above reasoning there does not appear to be more reason why there should not be an infinite power in a magnitude than outside a magnitude: for in either case it would follow that it moves in not-time.

To this it may be replied that finite and infinite are found in a magnitude, in time and in movement in a univocal sense, as proved in 3 and 6 Phys.,1 wherefore the infinite in one of them removes a finite proportion in the others: whereas in things devoid of magnitude there is neither finite nor infinite unless equivocally. Hence the above course of reasoning has ho place in suchlike powers.

But another and better answer is that the heaven has two movers.2 One is its proximate mover, which is of finite power, and thence it is that its movement is of finite velocity. The other is its remote mover, which is of infinite power, whence it is that its movement can be of infinite duration. Thus it is clear that an infinite power which is not in a magnitude, can move a body not immediately in time: whereas a power which is in a magnitude must needs move immediately, since no body moves without itself being moved. Wherefore, if it moved, it would follow that it moves in not-time.

Better still it may be replied that a power which is not in a magnitude is an intellect, and moves by its will. Wherefore it moves according to the requirement of the movable and not according to the proportion of its strength. On the other hand a power that is in a magnitude cannot move save by natural necessity, for it has been proved that the intellect is not a bodily force.3 Wherefore it causes movement necessarily according to the proportion of its quantity. Hence it follows that if it moves anything it moves it instantaneously. In this sense then, the foregoing objections being refuted, proceeds the reasoning of Aristotle.

Moreover. No movement that proceeds from a bodily mover can be continuous and regular: because a bodily mover, in local movement, moves by attraction or repulsion, and that which is attracted or repelled is not disposed in the same way towards its mover from the beginning to the end of the movement, since at one time it is nearer to it and at another time further from it: and thus no body can cause a continuous and regular movement. On the other hand the first movement is continuous and regular, as is proved in 8 Phys.1 Therefore the mover of the first movement is not a body.

Again. No movement that tends towards an end which passes from potentiality to actuality, can be perpetual: since, when it arrives at actuality, the movement ceases. If therefore the first movement is perpetual, it must be towards an end which is always and in every way actual. Now such is neither a body nor a power residing in a body; because these are all movable either per se or accidentally. Therefore the end of the first movement is not a body nor a power residing in a body. Now the end of the first movement is the first mover, which moves as the object of desire:2 and that is God. Therefore God is neither a body nor a power residing in a body.

Now though, according to our faith, it is false that the movement of the heavens is everlasting, as we shall show further on;3 it is nevertheless true that that movement will not cease, either on account of lack of power in the mover, or on account of the substance of the movable being corrupted, since we do not find that the movement of the heavens slackens in the course of time. Wherefore the aforesaid proofs lose nothing of their efficacy.

The truth thus demonstrated is in accordance with divine authority. For it is said (Jo. 4:24): God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth; and again (1 Tim. 1:17): To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God; and (Rom. 1:20): The invisible things of God … are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, for things that are clearly seen not by the eye but by the mind, are incorporeal.

Hereby is refuted the error of the early natural philosophers,4 who admitted none but material causes, such as fire, water and the like, and consequently asserted that the first principles of things were bodies, and called them gods. Among these also there were some who held that the causes of movement were sympathy and antipathy: and these again are refuted by the above arguments. For since according to them sympathy and antipathy are in bodies, it would follow that the first principles of movement are forces residing in a body. They also asserted that God was composed of the four elements and sympathy: from which we gather that they held God to be a heavenly body. Among the ancients Anaxagoras alone came near to the truth, since he affirmed that all things are moved by an intellect.

By this truth, moreover, those heathens are refuted who maintained that the very elements of the world, and the forces residing in them, are gods; for instance the sun, moon, earth, water and so forth, being led astray by the errors of the philosophers mentioned above.

Again, the above arguments confound the extravagances of the unlettered Jews, of Tertullian, of the Vadiani or Anthropomorphite heretics, who depicted God with human features; and again of the Manichees who affirmed God to be an infinite substance composed of light and spread abroad throughout boundless space. The occasion of all these errors was that in their thoughts about divine things they had recourse to their imagination, which can reflect none but corporeal likenesses. Wherefore it behoves us to put the imagination aside when we meditate on things incorporeal.

Chapter XXI

that god is his own essence

From what has been laid down we are able to conclude that God is His own essence, quiddity or nature.

In everything that is not its own essence or quiddity there must needs be some kind of composition: for since each thing contains its own essence, if a thing contained nothing besides its own essence, all that a thing is would be its essence. Therefore if a thing were not its own essence, there must be something in it besides its essence: and consequently there must be composition therein. For which reason the essence in composite things has the signification of a part, as humanity in a man. Now it has been shown1 that in God there is no composition. Therefore God is His own essence.

Again. Seemingly that alone which does not enter into the definition of a thing is beside the essence of that thing: for a definition signifies what a thing is.2 Now only the accidents of a thing do not enter into its definition: and consequently only accidents are in a thing besides its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as we shall show further on.3 Accordingly, there is nothing in Him besides His essence. Therefore He is His own essence.

Moreover. Forms that are not predicated of subsistent things, whether the latter be taken universally or singly, are not single per se subsistent forms individualized in themselves. For we do not say that Socrates, or man, or an animal is whiteness, because whiteness is not singly per se subsistent, but is individualized by its subsistent subject. Likewise natural forms do not per se subsist singly, but are individualized in their respective matters: wherefore we do not say that this individual fire, or that fire in general is its own form. Moreover the essences or quiddities of genera or species are individualized by the signate matter of this or that individual, although indeed the quiddity of a genus or species includes form and matter in general: wherefore we do not say that Socrates, or man, is humanity. Now the divine essence exists per se singly and is individualized in itself, since it is not in any matter, as shown above.4 Hence the divine essence is predicated of God, so that we say: God is His own essence.

Further. The essence of a thing is either the thing itself, or is related to it in some way as cause: since a thing derives its species from its essence. But nothing can in any way be a cause of God: for He is the first being, as shown above.5 Therefore God is His own essence.

Again. That which is not its own essence, is related in respect of some part of itself to that essence, as potentiality to act: wherefore the essence is signified by way of form, for instance humanity. But there is no potentiality in God, as shown above,1 therefore it follows that He is His own essence.

Chapter XXII

that in god existence and essence are the same

From what has been shown above, we may go on to prove that in God essence or quiddity is not distinct from His existence.

For it has been shown above2 that there is a thing which exists of itself necessarily, and this is God. Now necessary existence, if it belong to a quiddity which is not that existence itself, is either inconsistent with or repugnant to that quiddity, as per se existence is to the quiddity of whiteness, or else is consistent or akin thereto, for instance that whiteness exist in some other thing. In the former supposition it will not belong to that quiddity to exist per se necessarily, for instance it becomes not whiteness to exist per se. In the second hypothesis, either this existence must be dependent on the essence, or both of them on some other cause, or the essence on the existence. The first two are in contradiction with the very notion of necessary per se existence: for if it depend on something else, it no longer exists necessarily. From the third supposition it follows that this quiddity is added accidentally to the thing which exists per se necessarily: because whatever follows on the essence of a thing is accidental thereto. Therefore God has not an essence distinct from His existence.

Against this, however, it might be urged that this existence does not depend absolutely on this essence, and in such a way that it would not be at all unless the essence were: but that it depends as regards the conjunction whereby they are united together. And thus this existence is per se necessary, while the conjunction is not per se necessary.

But this answer does not avoid the above impossibility. For if this existence can be understood without this essence, it will follow that this essence is related accidentally to this existence. Now this existence is that which exists per se necessarily. Therefore this essence is related accidentally to that which exists per se necessarily. Therefore it is not its quiddity. But God is that which exists per se necessarily. Therefore this existence is not God’s essence, but something subsequent thereto. On the other hand if this existence cannot be understood apart from this essence, then this existence depends absolutely on that on which depends its conjunction with this essence: and thus the same conclusion follows.

Further. Each thing exists by its own existence. Wherefore that which is not its own existence does not exist per se necessarily. But God exists per se necessarily. Therefore God is His own existence.

Moreover. If God’s existence is not His essence; and it cannot be a part of Him, since the divine essence is simple, as shown above;1 it follows that this existence is something besides His essence. Now whatever is becoming to a thing besides its essence, is becoming to it through some cause: for those things which are not one per se, if they be united together, must needs be united through some cause. Therefore existence is becoming to that quiddity through some cause. Either, then, this cause is something essential to that thing, or the essence itself, or else it is some other thing. If the former; and the essence exists according to that existence; it follows that a thing is a cause of its own existence. But this is impossible, because according to the understanding the cause exists before the effect; and consequently if a thing is the cause of its own existence, it would be understood to exist before having existence, which is impossible:—unless it be understood that a thing is the cause of its own accidental existence, which is a relative existence. For this is not impossible: for we find an accidental being caused by the principles of its subject, before the substantial being of the subject is understood to exist. Now, however, we are speaking, not of accidental, but of substantial existence. If, on the other hand, existence be becoming to the essence, by reason of some other cause; then whatever acquires existence from another cause, is caused and is not the first cause: whereas God is the first cause, having no cause, as shown above.1 Wherefore this quiddity that acquires existence elsewhere is not the quiddity of God. Therefore it is necessary that God’s existence be His own quiddity.

Moreover. Existence denotes a kind of actuality: since a thing is said to exist, not through being in potentiality, but through being in act. Now everything to which an act is becoming, and which is distinct from that act, is related thereto as potentiality to act: since act and potentiality are reciprocal terms. Accordingly, if the divine essence is distinct from its existence, it follows that His essence and existence are mutually related as potentiality and act. Now it has been proved that in God there is nothing of potentiality, and that He is pure act.2 Therefore God’s essence is not distinct from His existence.

Again. Whatsoever cannot exist unless several things concur, is composite. Now no thing in which essence and existence are distinct from one another can exist except several things concur, to wit its essence and existence. Therefore every thing, in which essence and existence are distinct, is composite. But God is not composite, as proved above.3 Therefore God’s existence is His essence.

Further. Everything exists through having existence. Therefore nothing the essence of which is not its existence, exists by its essence, but by participation of something, namely existence. Now that which exists by participation of something cannot be the first being, because that in which a thing participates in order to exist, is previous to that thing. But God is the first being, to which nothing is previous.1 Therefore God’s essence is His existence.

This sublime truth Moses was taught by the Lord: for when he asked the Lord (Exod. 3:13, 14): If the children of Israel should say to me: What is His name? what shall I say to them? the Lord answered: i am who am.… Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: he who is hath sent me to you; thus declaring His own name to be: he who is. Now every name is appointed to signify the nature or essence of a thing. Wherefore it follows that God’s very existence itself is His essence or nature.

Moreover. The Catholic doctors have professed this truth. For Hilary says (De Trin.)2: Existence is not an accident in God, but the subsisting truth, the abiding cause, and the natural property of His essence. And Boethius says (De Trin.)3 that the divine substance is existence itself, and all other existence proceeds therefrom.

Chapter XXIII

that there is no accident in god

From this truth it follows of necessity that nothing can accrue to God besides His essence, nor anything be accidentally in Him.

For existence itself cannot participate in something that is not of its essence; although that which exists can participate in something else. Because nothing is more formal or more simple than existence. Hence existence itself can participate in nothing. Now the divine substance is existence itself.4 Therefore He has nothing that is not of His substance. Therefore no accident can be in Him.

Moreover. Whatever is in a thing accidentally, has a cause of being there: since it is added to the essence of that in which it is. Therefore if anything is in God accidentally, this must be through some cause. Consequently the cause of the accident is either the divine substance itself, or something else. If it is something else, this other thing must act on the divine substance; since nothing introduces a form whether substantial or accidental, into some recipient, unless in some way it act upon that recipient: because to act is nothing but to make something to be actual, and it is this by a form. Wherefore God will be passive and movable to some agent: which is against what has been decided above.1 If, on the other hand, the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident that is in it, then it is impossible for it to be its cause as receiving it, since then the same thing in the same respect would make itself to be in act. Therefore, if there is an accident in God, it follows that He receives that accident in one respect, and causes it in another, even as bodies receive their proper accidents through the nature of their matter, and cause them through their form: so that God, therefore, will be composite, the contrary of which has been proved above.2

Again. Every subject of an accident is compared thereto as potentiality to act: because an accident is a kind of form making a thing to exist actually according to accidental existence. But there is no potentiality in God, as shown above.3 Therefore there can be no accident in Him.

Moreover. Everything in which something is accidentally is in some way changeable as to its nature: since an accident, by its very nature, may be in a thing or not in it. Therefore if God has something that becomes Him accidentally, it follows that He is changeable: the contrary of which has been proved above.4

Further. Everything that has an accident in itself, is not whatever it has in itself, because an accident is not of the essence of its subject. But God is whatever He has in Himself. Therefore no accident is in God. The middle proposition is proved as follows. A thing is always to be found more excellently in the cause than in the effect. But God is the cause of all things. Therefore whatever is in Him, is found in Him in the most perfect way. Now that which is most perfectly becoming to a thing, is that thing itself: because it is more perfectly one than when one thing is united to another substantially as form is united to matter: which union again is more perfect than when one thing is in another accidentally. It follows therefore that God is whatever He has.

Again. Substance is not dependent upon accident, although accident depends on substance. Now that which is not dependent upon another, can sometimes be found without it.1 Therefore some substance can be found without an accident: and this seemingly is most becoming to a supremely simple substance, such as the divine substance.2 Therefore the divine substance is altogether without accidents.

The Catholic tractarians also are in agreement with this statement. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin.)3 that there is no accident in God.

Having established this truth we are able to refute certain erroneous statements in the law of the Saracens to the effect that the divine essence has certain forms added thereto.

Chapter XXIV

that the divine being cannot be specified by the addition of any substantial difference

Again. From what we have said above, it can be shown that we cannot add anything to the divine being so as to specify it by an essential specification, as a genus is specified by differences. For it is impossible that a thing be in act unless there be also all those things whereby its substantial being is specified: for an animal cannot be in act unless it be either a rational or an irrational animal. Wherefore also the Platonists who postulated ideas, did not postulate per se existing ideas of genera, which derive specification from essential differences, but they postulated per se existing ideas of the species alone, which need not to be specified by essential differences. If, then, the divine being can receive an essential specification from something added to it, that being will not be in act without something added to it. But God’s very being is His substance as shown above.1 Therefore the divine substance cannot be in act without some addition: the contrary of which has been shown above.2

Again. Whatever needs something added to it, in order to exist, is in potentiality to that thing. But the divine substance is not in potentiality in any way, as proved above:3 and God’s substance is His being. Therefore His being cannot receive essential specification from something added to it.

Moreover. Whatever makes a thing to be in act, and is intrinsic to that thing, is either the whole essence thereof or part of its essence. Now that which specifies a thing by an essential specification, makes a thing to be in act, and is intrinsic to the thing specified: otherwise the latter could not be specified essentially thereby. Therefore it must be either the very essence or part of the essence of that thing. But if something be added to the divine being, it cannot be the whole essence of God, for it has already been proved4 that God’s existence is not distinct from His essence. Therefore it follows that it is a part of the divine essence: and thus God would be composed of essential parts, the contrary of which was proved above.5

Again. That which is added to a thing by way of essential specification, does not constitute the notion of that thing, but only makes it to be in act: for rational added to animal makes animal to be in act, but does not constitute the notion of an animal as such: because the difference does not enter into the definition of the genus. Now if something be added to God to specify Him with an essential specification, it must give that to which it is added the notion of its proper quiddity or nature: since what is added thus, gives the thing actual being. Now this, namely actual being, is the divine essence itself, as shown above.1 It follows, therefore, that nothing can be added to the divine being to give it an essential specification, as a difference specifies a genus.

Chapter XXV

that god is not in any genus

Hence it follows of necessity that God is not in any genus.

For whatever is in a genus, has in itself something whereby its generic nature is specified: for nothing is in a genus without being in some one of its species. But in God this is impossible, as shown above.2 Therefore it is impossible that God be in any genus.

Moreover. If God be in a genus, He is either in the genus of accident, or in that of substance. He is not in the genus of accident: for an accident cannot be the first being and first cause. Nor can He be in the genus of substance: for substance that is a genus is not being itself, otherwise every substance would be its own being, and thus would not be caused by something else, which is impossible, as is clear from what we have said above.3 Now God is being itself.4 Therefore He is not in any genus.

Again. Whatever is in a genus differs as to being from the other things contained in the same genus: otherwise a genus would not be predicated of several things. Now all things that are contained in one same genus, must agree in the whatness of the genus, because the genus is predicated of all in respect of what a thing is. Therefore the being of anything contained in a genus is beside the whatness of the genus. But this is impossible in God.5 Therefore God is not in a genus.

Further. A thing is placed in a genus by the nature of its whatness, for genus is predicated of what a thing is. But the whatness of God is His very being.1 Now a thing is not placed in a genus according to its being, because then being would be a genus signifying being itself. It remains therefore that God is not in a genus.

That being cannot be a genus is proved by the Philosopher as follows.2 If being were a genus, it would be necessary to find a difference in order to contract it to a species. Now no difference participates in the genus, so that, to wit, the genus be contained in the notion of the difference, for thus the genus would be placed twice in the definition of the species: but the difference must be something besides that which is contained in the notion of the genus. Now there can be nothing besides that which is understood by being, if being belong to the notion of those things of which it is predicated. And thus by no difference can being be contracted. It remains, therefore, that being is not a genus: wherefore it follows of necessity that God is not in a genus.

Wherefore it is likewise evident that God cannot be defined: since every definition is composed of genus and difference.

It is also clear that no demonstration is possible in regard to Him: because the principle of a demonstration is the definition of that about which the demonstration is made.

Someone, however, might think that, although the name of substance cannot properly be applied to God, because God does not subsist under (substat) accidents: yet the thing signified by that term is applicable to Him, and consequently He is in the genus substance. For substance is a per se being, and it is clear that this can be applied to God, from the fact that it has been proved3 that He is not an accident. But to this we reply, according to what has been said, that per se being is not in the definition of substance. For from the fact that it is described as a being it cannot be a genus, since it has been already proved that being has not the conditions of a genus: and again from the fact that it is described as being per se, for this would seem to denote nothing else than a negation, since it is said to be a per se being, through not being in another, which is a pure negation. And this cannot satisfy the conditions of a genus, for then a genus would not express what a thing is, but what it is not. Therefore we must understand the definition of substance in this way, that a substance is a thing to which it is fitting not to be in a subject: the word thing being taken from its quiddity, just as being is from existence: so that the meaning of substance is that it has a quiddity to which it is fitting to exist not in another. Now this does not apply to God, for He has no quiddity besides His existence.1 Hence it follows that He is nowise in the genus of substance: and consequently that He is in no genus, since it has been proved2 that He is not in the genus of accident.

Chapter XXVI

that god is not the formal being of all things

From the foregoing we are able to refute the error of some who have asserted that God is nothing else than the formal being of everything.3

For this being is divided into substantial and accidental being. Now the divine being is neither the being of a substance nor the being of an accident, as shown above.4 Therefore it is impossible for God to be the being whereby everything is formally.

Again. Things are not distinct from one another in that they have being, since in this they all agree. If, then, things differ from one another, it follows that either being itself is specified by certain differences added thereto, so that different things have a specifically different being, or that things differ in that being itself is attached to specifically different natures. But the former of these is impossible, because an addition cannot be attached to being in the same way as a difference is added to a genus, as already stated.1 It remains, therefore, that things differ because they have different natures, to which being is attached in different ways. Now the divine being is not attached to another nature, but is the nature itself, as shown above.2 If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, it would follow that all things are simply one.

Moreover. The principle is naturally prior to that which flows from it. Now in certain things being has something by way of principle: since the form is said to be the principle of being; and in like manner the agent which gives certain things actual being. Therefore if the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has a cause, and thus is not per se necessary being. The contrary of which has been shown above.3

Further. That which is common to many is not something besides those many except only logically: thus animal is not something besides Socrates and Plato and other animals except as considered by the mind, which apprehends the form of animal as divested of all that specifies, and individualizes it: for man is that which is truly an animal, else it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely animal in general, man in general, and Plato himself. Much less therefore being itself in general is something apart from all things that have being; except only as apprehended by the mind. If therefore God is being in general, He will not be an individual thing except only as apprehended in the mind. Now it has been shown above4 that God is something not merely in the intellect, but in reality. Therefore God is not the common being of all.

Again. Generation is essentially the way to being, and corruption the way to not-being. For the term of generation is the form, and that of corruption privation, for no other reason than because the form makes a thing to be, and corruption makes a thing not to be, for supposing a certain form not to give being, that which received that form would not be said to be generated. If, then, God were the formal being of all things it would follow that He is the term of generation. Which is false, since He is eternal, as we have shown above.1

Moreover. It would follow that the being of every thing has been from eternity: wherefore there would be neither generation nor corruption. For if there were, it would follow that a thing acquires anew a being already pre-existing. Either then it is acquired by something already existing, or else by something nowise pre-existing. In the first case, since according to the above supposition all existing things have the same being, it would follow that the thing which is said to be generated, receives not a new being but a new mode of being, and therefore is not generated but altered. If on the other hand the thing nowise existed before, it would follow that it is made out of nothing, and this is contrary to the essence of generation. Consequently this supposition would wholly do away with generation and corruption: and therefore it is clear that it is impossible.

Moreover. The Sacred Doctrine refutes this error, by confessing that God is high and elevated (Isa. 6:1), and that He is over all things (Rom. 9:5). For if He were the being of all, He would be something in all, and not above all.

Those who erred thus are condemned by the same sentence as idolaters who gave the incommunicable name,2 i.e. of God, to wood and stones (Wis. 14:21). For if God is the being of all it would be no truer to say a stone is a being than to say a stone is God.

Now there are four things which apparently fostered this error. The first was a wrong understanding of certain authorities. For, they found Dionysius saying (Cœl. Hier. iv.): The being of all is the super-essential Godhead: and from this they wished to conclude that God is the formal being of all things, not perceiving that this meaning is irreconcilable with the words. For if the Godhead were the formal being of all, it would not be above all, but in the midst of all, in fact something of all. Wherefore when he said that the Godhead is above all, he declares It to be by Its nature distinct from all and placed above all. And by saying that the Godhead is the being of all, he declares that all things derive from God a likeness to the divine being. Moreover he elsewhere expressly proscribes their wrong interpretation (Div. Nom. ii.) where he declares that there can be no contact with God nor mingling of Him with other things, as of point with line, or of the shape of the seal on wax.

The second cause of this error was defective reason. For since that which is common is specified or individualized by addition, they deemed the divine being, to which nothing is added, not to be some proper being, but the common being of all, not perceiving that the common or universal cannot be without some addition, though it be considered apart from any addition: for animal cannot be apart from the difference of rational or irrational, although we think of it apart from these differences. Moreover although we think of the universal without an addition, we do not think of it apart from its receptivity of addition: for if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus; and the same applies to all other names of things. Now the divine being is without addition, not only in thought but also in reality; and not only is it without addition, but also without receptivity of addition. Wherefore from the very fact that it neither receives nor can receive addition, we should conclude rather that God is not common but proper being; since His being is distinct from all others for the very reason that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says (De causis)1 that the first cause, by reason of the very purity of its goodness, is distinct from others and, so to speak, individualized.

The third cause of this error is the consideration of the divine simplicity. For since God is the extreme of simplicity, they thought that if we make an analysis of all that is in us, the last thing, being the most simple, must be God; for we cannot proceed indefinitely in the composition of the things that are in us. In this again their reason was lacking, that they failed to observe that what is most simple in us, is not so much a complete thing as some part of a thing: whereas simplicity is ascribed to God as to a perfect subsistent being.

The fourth thing that might lead them into this error, is the expression whereby we say that God is in all things: for they failed to perceive that He is in things, not as part thereof, but as the cause of things, which is nowise wanting to its effect. For we do not say that the form is in the body in the same sense as we say that the sailor is in the boat.

Chapter XXVII

that god is not the form of a body

Accordingly, having shown that God is not the being of all, it can be proved in like manner that God is not the form of any thing.

For the divine being cannot be the being of a quiddity that is not its own being, as shown above.1 Now that which is the divine being itself is no other than God. Therefore it is impossible for God to be the form of any other thing.

Further. The form of a body is not its very being but the principle of its being. But God is being itself. Therefore God is not the form of a body.

Again. The union of form and matter results in a composite, and this is a whole in respect of form and matter. Now the parts are in potentiality with respect to the whole: but in God there is no potentiality.2 Therefore it is impossible for God to be the form united to any thing.

Again. That which has being per se, is more excellent than what has being in another. Now every form of a body has being in another. Since then God is the most excellent being, as the first cause of being,1 He cannot be the form of any thing.

Moreover, this can also be proved from the eternity of movement, as follows.2 If God were the form of a movable thing, since He is the first mover, the composite will be its own mover. But that which moves itself can be moved and not moved. Therefore it is in it to be either. Now a thing of this kind has not of itself indefectibility of movement. Therefore above that which moves itself we must place something else as first mover, which confers on it perpetuity of movement. And thus God Who is the first mover is not the form of a body that moves itself.

This argument avails for those who hold the eternity of movement. Yet if this be not granted the same conclusion may be drawn from the regularity of the heavenly movement. For just as that which moves itself can both be at rest and be moved, so can it be moved with greater or less velocity. Wherefore the necessity of uniformity in the heavenly movement depends on some higher principle that is altogether immovable, and that is not the part, through being the form, of a body which moves itself.

The authority of Scripture is in agreement with this truth. For it is written in the psalm:3 Thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens; and (Job 11:8, 9): He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do?… the measure of Him is longer than the earth, and deeper4 than the sea.

Hence we are able to refute the error of the pagans who asserted that God was the soul of the heaven or even the soul of the whole world:5 which led them to defend the idolatrous doctrine whereby they said that the whole world was God, not in reference to the body but to the soul, even as man is said to be wise in reference not to his body but to his soul: which being supposed they deemed it to follow that divine worship is not unduly shown to the world and its parts. The Commentator also says (Metaph. xi.) that this occasioned the error of the Zabian people, i.e. of idolaters, because, to wit, they asserted that God was the soul of the heaven.

Chapter XXVIII

of the divine perfection

Now although things that exist and live are more perfect than those which only exist, yet God Who is not distinct from His own existence, is universally perfect being.1 And by universally perfect I mean that He lacks not the excellence of any genus.

For every excellence of any being whatsoever is ascribed to a thing in respect of its being, since no excellence would accrue to man from his wisdom, unless thereby he were wise, and so on. Wherefore, according as a thing has being, so is its mode of excellence: since a thing, according as its being is contracted to some special mode of excellence more or less great, is said to be more or less excellent. Hence if there be a thing to which the whole possibility of being belongs, no excellence that belongs to any thing can be lacking thereto. Now to a thing which is its own being, being belongs according to the whole possibility of being: thus if there were a separate whiteness, nothing of the whole possibility of whiteness could be wanting to it: because something of the possibility of whiteness is lacking to a particular white thing through a defect in the recipient of whiteness, which receives it according to its mode and, maybe, not according to the whole possibility of whiteness. Therefore God, Who is His own being, as shown above,2 has being according to the whole possibility of being itself: and consequently He cannot lack any excellence that belongs to any thing.

And just as every excellence and perfection is in a thing according as that thing is, so every defect is in a thing according as that thing in some sense is not. Now just as God has being wholly, so is not-being wholly absent from Him, since according as a thing has being it fails in not-being. Therefore all defect is removed from God, and consequently He is universally perfect.

But those things which only exist are imperfect, not on account of an imperfection in absolute being itself, for they have not being according to its whole possibility, but because they participate being in a particular and most imperfect way.

Again. Every imperfect thing must needs be preceded by some perfect thing: for seed is from some animal or plant. Wherefore the first being must be supremely perfect. Now it has been shown1 that God is the first being. Therefore He is supremely perfect.

Moreover. A thing is perfect in so far as it is in act, and imperfect in so far as it is in potentiality and void of act. Wherefore that which is nowise in potentiality but is pure act, must needs be most perfect. Now such is God.2 Therefore He is most perfect.

Further. Nothing acts except according as it is in act: wherefore action follows upon the mode of actuality in the agent; and consequently it is impossible for the effect that results from an action to have a more excellent actuality than that of the agent, although it is possible for the actuality of the effect to be more imperfect than that of the active cause, since action may be weakened on the part of that in which it terminates. Now in the genus of efficient cause we come at length to the one cause which is called God, as explained above,3 from Whom all things proceed, as we shall show in the sequel.4 Wherefore it follows that whatever is actual in any other thing, is found in God much more eminently than in that thing, and not conversely. Therefore God is most perfect.

Again. In every genus there is some thing most perfect relatively to that genus, by which every thing in that genus is measured: since every thing is shown to be more or less perfect according as it approaches more or less to the measure of that genus: thus white is said to be the measure in all colours, and the virtuous among all men.1 Now the measure of all beings can be none other than God Who is His own being. Therefore no perfection that belongs to any thing is lacking to Him, otherwise He would not be the universal measure of all.

Hence it is that when Moses sought to see the face of God, the Lord answered him: I will show thee all good (Exod. 33:18, 19), giving thus to understand that the fulness of all good is in Him. And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.): God exists not in any single mode, but embraces and prepossesses all being within Himself, absolutely and without limit.

It must however be observed that perfection cannot fittingly be ascribed to God if we consider the meaning of the word in respect of its derivation: since what is not made, cannot seemingly be described as perfect. Yet since whatever is made has been brought from potentiality to act, and from not-being to being, when it was made; it is rightly described as perfect, i.e., completely made, when its potentiality is completely reduced to act, so that it retains nothing of not-being, and has complete being. Accordingly by a kind of extension of the term, perfect is applied not only to that which has arrived at complete act through being made, but also to that which is in complete act without being made at all. It is thus that we say that God is perfect, according to Matt. 5:48: Be ye perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect.

Chapter XXIX

of the likeness of creatures

In sequence to the above we may consider in what way it is possible to find in things a likeness to God, and in what way it is impossible.1

For effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them in name and ratio, and yet there must needs be some likeness between them, because it is of the nature of action that a like agent should produce a like action, since every thing acts according as it is in act. Wherefore the form of the effect is found in its transcendent cause somewhat, but in another way and another ratio, for which reason that cause is called equivocal. For the sun causes heat in lower bodies by acting according as it is in act; wherefore the heat generated by the sun must needs bear some likeness to the sun’s active power by which heat is caused in those lower bodies and by reason of which the sun is said to be hot, albeit in a different ratio. And thus it is said to be somewhat like all those things on which it efficaciously produces its effects, and yet again it is unlike them all in so far as these effects do not possess heat and so forth in the same way as they are found in the sun. Thus also God bestows all perfections on things, and in consequence He is both like and unlike all.

Hence it is that Holy Writ sometimes recalls the likeness between Him and His creatures, as when it is said (Gen. 1:26): Let Us make man to Our image and likeness: while sometimes this likeness is denied, according to the words of Isa. 40:18: To whom then have you likened God; or what image will you make for Him? and of the psalm:2 O God, who shall be like to Thee?

Dionysius is in agreement with this argument, for he says (Div. Nom. ix.): The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as they can, Who is not perfectly imitable; unlike, according as effects fall short of their causes.

However,1 according to this likeness, it is more fitting to say that the creature is like God than vice versa. For one thing is like another when it possesses a quality or form thereof. Since then what is in God perfectly is found in other things by way of an imperfect participation, that in which likeness is observed is God’s simply but not the creature’s. And thus the creature has what is God’s, and therefore is rightly said to be like God. But it cannot be said in this way that God has what belongs to His creature: wherefore neither is it fitting to say that God is like His creature; as neither do we say that a man is like his portrait, although we declare that his portrait is like him.

And much less properly can it be said that God is assimilated to the creature. For assimilation denotes movement towards similarity, and consequently applies to one that receives its similarity from another. But the creature receives from God its similarity to Him, and not vice versa. Therefore God is not assimilated to His creature, but rather vice versa.

Chapter XXX

what terms can be predicated of god

Again in sequel to the above we may consider what can and what cannot be said of God; also what is said of Him alone, and what is said of Him together with other beings.

For since every perfection of creatures is to be found in God, albeit in another and more eminent way, whatever terms denote perfection absolutely and without any defect whatever, are predicated of God and of other things; for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth. But any term that denotes suchlike perfections together with a mode proper to creatures, cannot be said of God except by similitude and metaphor, whereby that which belongs to one thing is applied to another, as when a man is said to be a stone on account of the denseness of his intelligence. Such are all those terms employed to denote the species of a created thing, as man and stone: for its proper mode of perfection and being is due to each species: likewise whatever terms signify those properties of things that are caused by the proper principles of the species, therefore they cannot be said of God otherwise than metaphorically. But those which express these perfections together with the mode of supereminence in which they belong to God, are said of God alone, for instance the sovereign good, the first being, and the like.

Now, I say that some of the aforesaid terms denote perfection without defect, as regards that which the term is employed to signify: for as regards the mode of signification every term is defective. For we express things by a term as we conceive them by the intellect: and our intellect, since its knowledge originates from the senses, does not surpass the mode which we find in sensible objects, wherein the form is distinct from the subject of the form, on account of the composition of form and matter. Now in those things the form is found to be simple indeed, but imperfect, as being non-subsistent: whereas the subject of the form is found to be subsistent, but not simple, nay more, with concretion. Wherefore whatever our intellect signifies as subsistent, it signifies it with concretion, and whatever it signifies as simple, it signifies it not as subsisting but as qualifying. Accordingly in every term employed by us, there is imperfection as regards the mode of signification, and imperfection is unbecoming to God, although the thing signified is becoming to God in some eminent way: as instanced in the term goodness or the good: for goodness signifies by way of non-subsistence, and the good signifies by way of concretion. In this respect no term is becomingly applied to God, but only in respect of that which the term is employed to signify. Wherefore, as Dionysius teaches,1 such terms can be either affirmed or denied of God: affirmed, on account of the signification of the term; denied, on account of the mode of signification. Now the mode of supereminence in which the aforesaid perfections are found in God, cannot be expressed in terms employed by us, except either by negation, as when we say God is eternal or infinite, or by referring Him to other things, as when we say that He is the first cause or the sovereign good. For we are able to grasp, not what God is, but what He is not, and the relations of other things to Him, as explained above.1

Chapter XXXI

that the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not inconsistent with the divine simplicity

From what has been said we are also able to see that the divine perfection and the various names applied to God are not inconsistent with His simplicity.

For we asserted that all the perfections to be found in other things are to be ascribed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes:2 which causes are in their effects virtually, as heat is in the sun. Now this virtue unless it were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun acting thereby would not generate its like. Wherefore by reason of this virtue the sun is said to be hot, not only because it causes heat, but because the virtue whereby it does this, is something in conformity with heat. Now by this same virtue by which the sun causes heat, it causes also many other effects in lower bodies, such as dryness. And so heat and dryness, which are distinct qualities in fire, are ascribed to the sun in respect of the one virtue. And so too, the perfections of all things, which are becoming to other things in respect of various forms, must needs be ascribed to God in respect of His one virtue. And this virtue is not distinct from His essence, since nothing can be accidental to Him, as we have proved.1 Accordingly God is said to be wise not only because He causes wisdom, but because in so far as we are wise, we imitate somewhat the virtue whereby He makes us wise. He is not however called a stone, although He made the stones, because by the term stone we understand a definite mode of being, in respect of which a stone differs from God.2 But a stone imitates God as its cause, in respect of being, goodness and so forth, even as other creatures do.

The like of this may be found in human cognitive powers and operative virtues. For the intellect by its one virtue knows all that the sensitive faculty apprehends by various powers, and many other things besides. Again, the intellect, the higher it is, the more things is it able to know by means of one, while an inferior intellect can arrive at the knowledge of those things only by means of many. Again the royal power extends to all those things to which the various subordinate powers are directed. And so too, God by His one simple being possesses all manner of perfections, which in a much lower degree other things attain by certain various means. Whence it is clear how it is necessary to give several names to God. For since we cannot know Him naturally except by reaching Him from His effects,3 it follows that the terms by which we denote His perfection must be diverse, as also are the perfections which we find in things. If however we were able to understand His very essence as it is, and to give Him a proper name, we should express Him by one name only: and this is promised in the last chapter of Zacharias4 to those who will see Him in His essence: In that day there shall be one Lord, and His name shall be one.

Chapter XXXII

that nothing is predicated univocally of god and other things

From the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that whereby the agent acts, cannot receive in a univocal sense the name derived from that form: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things whereof God is cause do not attain to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally.1 It is evident therefore that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.

Further. If an effect attain to the species of its cause, the name of the latter will not be predicated of it univocally unless it receive the same specific form according to the same mode of being: for house in art is not univocally the same as house in matter, since the form of house has an unlike being in the one case and in the other. Now other things, even though they should receive entirely the same form, do not receive it according to the same mode of being: because there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, as shown above,2 which does not apply to other things. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Moreover. Whatever is predicated of several things univocally is either genus, or species, or difference, or proper accident. Now nothing is predicated of God as genus or as difference, as we have proved above,3 and consequently neither as definition nor as species, which consists of genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to Him, as was shown above,4 and consequently nothing is predicated of God, either as accidental or as proper, for the proper is a kind of accident. It follows therefore that nothing is predicated of God and other things univocally.

Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is more simple than either of them, at least in our way of understanding. Now nothing can be more simple than God, either in reality or in our way of understanding. Therefore nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Further. Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate the genus, and the individual the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially and not according to every mode of perfection. It follows therefore that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Again. That which is predicated of several things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated of them univocally, since that which comes first is included in the definition of what follows, for instance substance in the definition of accident considered as a being. If therefore we were to say being univocally of substance and accident, it would follow that substance also should enter into the definition of being as predicated of substance: which is clearly impossible. Now nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but according to priority and posteriority: since all predicates of God are essential, for He is called being because He is very essence, and good because He is goodness itself: whereas predicates are applied to others by participation; thus Socrates is said to be a man, not as though he were humanity itself, but as a subject of humanity. Therefore it is impossible for any thing to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Chapter XXXIII

that not all terms applied to god and creatures are purely equivocal

It is also clear from what has been said that things predicated of God and other things are not all pure equivocations, as are the effects of an equivocal cause. For in the effects of an equivocal cause we find no mutual order or relationship, and it is altogether accidental that the same name is applied to various things; since the name applied to one does not signify that thing to have any relationship to another. Whereas it is not so with the terms applied to God and creatures: for in employing these common terms we consider the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said.1 Therefore certain things predicated of God and other things are not pure equivocations.

Moreover. Where there is pure equivocation, we observe no likeness of things, but merely sameness of name. Now there is some kind of likeness of things to God, as shown above.2 Therefore it follows that they are not said of God by pure equivocation.

Again. When one thing is predicated of several by pure equivocation, we cannot be led from one to the knowledge of the other, for the knowledge of things depends not on words but on the meaning of names. Now we come to the knowledge of things divine from our observation of other things, as shown above.3 Therefore the like are not pure equivocations when said of God and other things.

Further. The use of equivocal terms breaks the continuity of an argument. Therefore if nothing were said of God and creatures except by pure equivocation, no argument could be made by proceeding to God from creatures, whereas the contrary is evidenced by all who speak of divine things.

Moreover. It is useless to predicate a name of a thing unless by that name we understand something about that thing. Now if names are predicated altogether equivocally of God and creatures, we understand nothing of God by those names: since the meanings of those names are known to us only as applied to creatures. It would therefore be to no purpose to prove about God that God is being, good, or any thing else of the kind.

If, however, it be asserted that by suchlike terms we only know of God what He is not, so that, to wit, He be called living because He is not in the genus of inanimate beings, and so forth, it follows at least that living when said of God and creatures agrees in the negation of inanimate being: and thus it will not be a pure equivocation.

Chapter XXXIV

that terms applied to god and creatures are employed analogically

It follows, then, from what has been said1 that those things which are said of God and other things are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, that is according to an order or relation to some one thing.

This happens in two ways. First, according as many things have a relation to some one thing: thus in relation to the one health, an animal is said to be healthy as its subject, medicine as effective thereof, food as preserving it, and urine as its sign. Secondly, according as order or relation of two things may be observed, not to some other thing, but to one of them: thus being is said of substance and accident, in so far as accident bears a relation to substance, and not as though substance and accident were referred to a third thing.

Accordingly such names are not said of God and other things analogically in the first way, for it would be necessary to suppose something previous to God; but in the second way.

Now in this analogical predication the relationship is sometimes found to be the same both as to the name and as to the thing, and sometimes it is not the same. For the relationship of the name is consequent upon the relationship of knowledge, since the name is the sign of intellectual conception. Accordingly when that which comes first in reality is found to be first also in knowledge, the same thing is found to be first both as to the meaning of the name and as to the nature of the thing: thus substance is prior to accident both in nature, in as much as substance is the cause of accident, and in knowledge, in as much as substance is placed in the definition of accident. Wherefore being is said of substance previously to being said of accident, both in reality and according to the meaning of the word. On the other hand, when that which comes first according to nature, comes afterwards according to knowledge, then, in analogical terms, there is not the same order according to the reality and according to the meaning of the name: thus the healing power in health-giving (medicines) is naturally prior to health in the animal, as cause is prior to effect; yet as we know this power through its effect, we name it from that effect. Hence it is that health-giving is first in the order of reality, and yet healthy is predicated of animal first according to the meaning of the term.

Accordingly, since we arrive at the knowledge of God from other things, the reality of the names predicated of God and other things is first in God according to His mode, but the meaning of the name is in Him afterwards. Wherefore He is said to be named from His effects.

Chapter XXXV

that the several names predicated of god are not synonymous

From what we have said it is also proved that, although names predicated of God signify the same thing, they are not synonymous, because they do not convey the same meaning.

For just as various things are by their various forms like one simple thing which is God, so our intellect, by its various conceptions, is somewhat like Him, in so far as it is led to know Him by the various perfections of creatures. Wherefore our understanding is neither false nor vain in conceiving many things of one; because that simple divine being is such that certain things can be likened to Him according to their manifold forms, as we have proved above.1 And according to its various conceptions our intellect devises various names which it applies to God. Wherefore, since they are not applied with the same meaning, it is clear that they are not synonymous, although they signify a thing absolutely one: for the name has not the same meaning, since it denotes the concept of the intellect previously to the thing understood.

Chapter XXXVI

how our intellect forms a proposition about god

From this it is moreover clear that our intellect does not vainly form propositions about a simple God by composition and division, although God is altogether simple.

For although our intellect arrives at the knowledge of God by various conceptions, as stated above,2 it understands that what corresponds to them all is absolutely one: because our intellect does not ascribe its mode of understanding to the things which it understands, even as neither does it ascribe immateriality to a stone, although it knows it immaterially. Consequently it enunciates the unity of the thing by a verbal composition implying identity, when it says: God is good or is goodness: so that if there be any diversity in the composition it is referred to the understanding, and unity to the thing understood. Similarly sometimes our intellect forms a proposition about God with an implication of diversity by inserting a preposition, as when we say: Goodness is in God: because here we imply both a certain diversity that is befitting the understanding, and a certain unity which must be referred to the thing.

Chapter XXXVII

that god is good

The goodness of God may be concluded from His perfection which we have proved.1

For that by reason of which a thing is said to be good is its own virtue, since the virtue of any thing is that which makes its subject good and renders its work good.2 Now virtue is a perfection: since we say that a thing is perfect when it attains its proper virtue, as stated in 7 Phys.3 Wherefore a thing is good from the fact of its being perfect: and consequently every thing desires its own perfection as its proper good. Now it has been proved4 that God is perfect. Therefore He is good.

Again. It has been proved above5 that there is an immovable first mover which is God. Now He moves as a mover absolutely immovable: and this moves as the object of desire.6 Wherefore God, since He is the first immovable mover, is the first object of desire. Now a thing is desired in two ways, either because it is good, or because it seems good. The former is that which is good, for the seeming good does not move per se, but according as it has some appearance of good; whereas the good moves per se. Therefore the first object of desire, which is God, is good.

Further. The good is that which all things desire, which the Philosopher quotes as very well said.7 Now all things desire to be in act according to their mode: which is evident from the fact that every thing, by its nature, shrinks from corruption. Wherefore the essential notion of the good is to be in act, and consequently evil which is opposed to good results from the privation of act by potentiality, as the Philosopher declares (9 Metaph.).1 Now God is a being in act and not in potentiality, as we have proved above.2 Therefore He is truly good.

Moreover. The bestowal of being and goodness proceeds from goodness. This is proved from the very nature of the good, and from the notion it conveys. For the good of a thing is naturally its act and perfection. Now a thing acts through being in act: and by acting it bestows being and goodness on other things. Wherefore it is a sign of a thing’s perfection that it is able to produce its like, as the Philosopher declares (4 Meteor.).3 Again, the notion of the good is that it is something appetible: and this is an end. And the end moves the agent to act. Hence good is said to be diffusive of self and being.4 Now, this diffusion is becoming to God: for it has been shown above5 that He is the cause of being in other things, since He is the per se necessary being. Therefore He is truly good.

Wherefore it is said in the psalm:6 How good is God to Israel, to them that are of a right heart; and (Lam. 3:25): The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him.

Chapter XXXVIII

that god is goodness itself

From the above we are able to conclude that God is His own goodness.

For to be in act is for every thing its own good. Now, God is not only being in act, but is His own being, as proved above.7 Therefore He is goodness itself and not merely good.

Further. The perfection of a thing is its goodness, as we have shown above.8 Now the perfection of the divine being does not consist in something added thereto, but in its being perfect in itself, as proved above.9 Therefore God’s goodness is not something added to His essence, but His essence is His goodness.

Again. Any good that is not its own goodness is good by participation. Now that which is by participation presupposes something antecedent to itself, from which it derives the nature of goodness. But it is not possible to continue thus to infinity: since in final causes there is no proceeding to infinity, for the infinite is inconsistent with finality: and the good has the nature of an end. We must therefore come to some first good, that is good not by participation in relation to something else, but by its essence. Now this is God. Therefore God is His own goodness.

Again. That which is can participate something, but being itself can participate nothing: because that which participates is potentiality, whereas being is act. Now, God is being itself, as we have proved.1 Therefore He is good not by participation, but essentially.

Moreover. In every simple thing, being and that which is are one: for if they be distinct, there is no longer simplicity.2 Now, God is absolutely simple, as we have proved. Therefore that He is good is not distinct from Himself. Therefore He is His own goodness.

These same arguments show that nothing else is its own goodness: hence it is said (Matth. 19:17): None is good but God alone.3

Chapter XXXIX

that no evil can be in god

Hence it is manifestly apparent that evil cannot be in God.

For being and goodness and all essential predicates have nothing besides themselves added to them, although that which is or the good may have something besides being or goodness: since nothing hinders the subject of one perfection being the subject of another besides; thus that which is a body may be white and sweet: while every nature is confined within the bounds of its essence, so that it admits of nothing extraneous within itself. Now God is goodness and not merely good, as we have proved above.1 Therefore nothing that is not goodness can be in Him: and consequently evil can nowise be in Him.

Moreover. As long as a thing remains, that which is contrary to its essence is altogether incompatible with that thing: thus irrationality or insensibility is incompatible with man unless he cease to be man. Now the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have proved.2 Therefore evil which is contrary to good can have no place in God unless He cease to be God: which is impossible, since He is eternal, as was proved above.3

Again. Since God is His own being, nothing can be said of Him by participation, as is clear from the argument given above.4 If, then, evil were predicated of Him, it would be a predicate not by participation, but by essence. But evil cannot be predicated of any thing in such a way as to be the essence of that thing: for it would lack being, which is a good, as we have shown above:5 and in evil there can be no extraneous admixture, as neither can there be in goodness. Therefore evil cannot be predicated of God.

Again. Evil is opposed to good. Now the notion of good consists in perfection:6 and therefore the notion of evil consists in imperfection. Now defect or imperfection cannot be in God, since He is universally perfect, as shown above.7 Therefore evil cannot be in God.

Further. A thing is perfect according as it is in act.8 Therefore it will be imperfect according as it is deficient in act. Therefore evil is either privation or includes privation. Now the subject of privation is a potentiality: and this cannot be in God,9 and consequently neither can evil.

Moreover. If good is what is desired by all,10 it follows that evil as such is shunned by every nature. Now that which is in a thing against the mode of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Therefore evil in a thing is violent and unnatural in so far as it is an evil to that thing, although in composite things it may be natural thereto in respect of some part. But God is not composite, nor can anything be violent or unnatural in Him, as shown above.1 Therefore evil cannot be in God.

This is moreover confirmed by Holy Writ. For it is written in the canonical epistle of John:2 God is light, and in Him there is no darkness; and (Job 34:10): Far from God be wickedness, and iniquity from the Almighty.

Chapter XL

that god is the good of every good3

It is also proved from the foregoing that God is the good of every good.4

For the goodness of a thing is its perfection, as we have stated.5 Now, since God is simply perfect, He contains in His perfection the perfections of all things, as we have shown.6 Therefore His goodness contains all goodnesses; and consequently He is the good of every good.

Again. A thing is not said to have a quality by participation, except in so far as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially: thus iron is said to be fiery in so far as it partakes of a resemblance to fire. Now, God is good essentially, while all else is good by participation, as we have proved.7 Therefore nothing is said to be good except in so far as it bears some resemblance to the divine goodness. Therefore He is the good of every good.

Further. Since a thing is desirable for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its being desirable;8 it follows that a thing is said to be good, either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Therefore the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of good. Now this is God, as we shall prove further on.1 Therefore God is the good of every good.

Hence the Lord in promising Moses that he should see Him, said (Exod. 33:19): I will show thee all good. And it is said of divine wisdom (Wis. 8):2 All good things came to me together with her.

Chapter XLI

that god is the sovereign good

From this it is proved that God is the sovereign good. For the universal good stands far above any particular good, even as the good of the nation is greater than the good of an individual:3 since the goodness and perfection of the whole stand above the goodness and perfection of the part. Now the divine goodness of God is compared to all other things as the universal good to the particular, for He is the good of every good, as we have proved.4 Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Moreover. That which is predicated essentially is said more truly than that which is predicated by participation. Now God is good by His essence; and other things, by participation, as shown above.5 Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Again. The greatest in any genus is the cause of others in that genus:6 since the cause is greater than its effect. Now all things derive their ratio of goodness from God, as we have shown.7 Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Moreover. Just as that is more white which has less admixture of black, so that is better which has less admixture of evil. Now God is most of all unmixed with evil, since in Him there can be no evil, neither in act nor in potentiality, and this becomes Him by His very nature, as we have proved.8 Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Hence it is said (1 Kings 2:2): There is none holy as the Lord is.

Chapter XLII

that god is one

Having proved the foregoing, it is manifest that there is only one God.

For it is impossible that there be two sovereign goods: since that which is ascribed to a thing by way of superabundance is to be found in one alone. Now God is the sovereign good, as we have shown.1 Therefore God is one.

Further. We have shown that God is absolutely perfect,2 and that He lacks no perfection. If, then, there be several gods, it follows that there are several suchlike perfect things. But that is impossible: for if none of them lacks any perfection, nor has any admixture of imperfection, which is required for anything to be simply perfect, there will be nothing by which they can be distinguished. Therefore it is impossible that there be several gods.

Again. That which is sufficiently done if it be supposed to be done by one, is better done by one than by many.3 Now the order of things is the best possible: since the potency of the first agent does not fail the potentiality of things for perfection. And all things are sufficiently perfected by referring them to one first principle. Therefore a plurality of principles is inadmissible.

Moreover. It is impossible for one continual and regular movement to proceed from several movers. For if they move together, none of them is a perfect mover, but all together take the place of one perfect mover: which does not apply to the first mover, since the perfect precedes the imperfect. If, however, they move not together, each of them is at one time moving, and at another time not; whence it follows that the movement is neither continuous nor regular: because movement that is continuous and one is from one mover. Moreover a mover that is not always moving is found to move irregularly: as evidenced by movers of lower degree, wherein violent movement is intense at first and slackens at the end, while natural movement is the reverse. On the other hand, the first movement is one and continuous, as was proved by the philosophers.1 Therefore its first mover must needs be one.

Again. Corporeal substance is directed to spiritual substance as its good: for there is in the latter a fuller goodness to which corporeal substance seeks to be likened, since whatever exists desires to attain the greatest good as far as possible. Now all movements of the corporeal creature are found to be reduced to one first movement, beside which there is no other first movement not reducible to it. Therefore beside the spiritual substance which is the end of the first movement, there is no other that cannot be reduced to it. Now under this name we understand God. Therefore there is only one God.

Moreover. The mutual order of all diverse things that are directed to each other is on account of their order towards some one thing: even as the mutual order of the parts of an army is on account of the order of the whole army to the commander-in-chief. For that certain diverse things be united together in some relationship, cannot result from their own natures as distinct from one another, because from this there would rather result distinction among them. Nor can it result from different causes of order: because these could not possibly of themselves as differing from one another have one order in view. Accordingly either the mutual order of many is accidental, or it must be reduced to one first cause of that order, who sets all in order towards the end which he intends. Now, all the parts of this world are observed to be ordered to one another, in so far as certain things are aided by certain others: thus the lower bodies are moved by the higher, and the latter by incorporeal substances, as shown above.2 Nor is this accidental, since it happens always or for the most part. Wherefore this world has but one director and governor. But there is no other world besides this. Therefore there is but one governor of the universe, and Him we call God.

Again. If there be two things both of which are of necessity, they must needs agree in the intention of the necessity of being. It follows, therefore, that they must be differentiated by something added either to one or to both of them; and consequently that either one is composite, or both. Now no composite thing exists necessarily per se, as we have proved above.1 Therefore there cannot possibly be several things each of which exists necessarily: and consequently neither can there be several gods.

Moreover. That in which they differ, on the supposition that they agree in the necessity of being, is either required as a complement in some way to this necessity of being, or is not required. If not, it follows that it is accidental: because whatever is added to a thing, that has nothing to do with its being, is an accident. Therefore this accident has a cause. And this cause is either the essence of that which exists of necessity, or something else. If it is its essence, since the very necessity of being is its essence, as shown above,2 the necessity of being will be the cause of that accident. But necessity of being is found in both. Therefore both have that accident: and consequently are not differentiated thereby. If, however, the cause of this accident be something else, it follows that unless this something else exist, this accident would not exist. And without this accident there would not be the aforesaid distinction. Therefore without that something else, these two things that are supposed to exist of necessity would be not two, but one. Therefore the proper being of both is dependent on a third: and consequently neither of them exists necessarily per se.

If, on the other hand, that in which they differ be necessary as a complement to their necessity of being, this will be either because it is included in the notion of the necessity of being, as animate is included in the definition of animal, or because necessity of being is specified thereby as animal is completed by rational. In the first case, it follows that wherever there is necessity of being, there is that which is included in its notion; thus to whatever we can apply animal we can apply animate. And thus, since we ascribe necessity of being to both the aforesaid, they cannot be differentiated thereby. In the second case, this is again impossible. For the difference that specifies a genus does not complete the generic idea, but the genus acquires thereby being in act: because the notion of animal is complete before the addition of rational, although animal cannot be in act except it be either rational or irrational. Now, this is impossible for two reasons. First, because the quiddity of that which has being of necessity, is its being, as we have proved above.1 Secondly, because thus necessary being would acquire being from something else: which is impossible. Therefore it is impossible to have several things each of which has necessary being per se.

Further. If there be two gods, this word god is predicated of both either univocally or equivocally. If equivocally, this is beside the present question: for nothing prevents any thing receiving an equivocal name, if the usual mode of speech allow. If, however, it be predicated univocally, it must be said of both in the same sense: and thus it follows that in both there is the same nature in common. Either, therefore, this nature is in both according to the same being, or else it is according to different beings. If according to one being, it follows that they are not two but only one: for two things have not one being if they differ substantially. If, however, there is a different being in both, the quiddity of neither will be its own being. But we must admit this to be the case in God, as we have proved.2 Therefore neither of them is what we understand by the name of God, and consequently it is impossible to admit the existence of two gods.

Again. None of the things that belong to a particular signate thing as such, can possibly belong to another: because the singularity of a particular thing belongs to no other but the singular thing itself. Now, its necessity of being belongs to that which is of necessity in as much as it is this signate thing. Therefore it cannot possibly belong to any other thing: and thus it is impossible that there be several things each of which exists of necessity. Therefore it is impossible that there be several gods.

Proof of the middle proposition: If that which is of necessity is not this signate thing as being of necessity, it follows that the designation of its being is not necessary in itself, but depends on something else. Now a thing according as it is in act is distinct from all else, and this is to be this signate thing. Therefore that which is of necessity depends on something else for being in act: and this is contrary to the notion of that which is of necessity. Therefore that which is of necessity must be of necessity according as it is this signate thing.

Again. The nature signified by this word God is individualized either by itself in this God or by something else. If by something else there must be composition therein. If by itself, it follows that it cannot be applied to another: for that which is the principle of individualization cannot be common to several. Therefore it is impossible that there be several gods.

Moreover. If there be several gods, it follows that the divine nature is not identically the same in each. Therefore there must be something to distinguish the divine nature is this one and that one. But this is impossible: since the divine nature receives no addition whether of essential or of accidental differences, as proved above:1 nor is the divine nature the form of any matter,2 so as to be divided as the matter is divided. Therefore there cannot possibly be several gods.

Again. The being proper to each thing is but one. Now God is Himself His very being, as shown above.3 Therefore there can be but one God.

Further. A thing has being according as it has unity: wherefore every thing shuns division so far as it can, lest it thus tend to not-being. But the divine nature surpasses all in having being. Therefore there is supreme unity therein. Therefore it is nowise divided into several.

Moreover. We observe that in every genus multitude proceeds from some kind of unity: wherefore in every genus we find one first thing, which is the measure of all things found in that genus. Hence whatever things we find agreeing in one point, must proceed from some one principle. Now all things agree in the point of being. Therefore that which is the principle of all things must needs be one only: and this is God.

Again. In every government he who presides desires unity, wherefore the chief form of government is a monarchy or kingdom. And of our many members there is one head: and this is an evident sign that unity is due to whom headship is becoming. Wherefore we must confess that God, Who is the cause of all, is simply one.

We can moreover infer this confession of the divine unity from the sacred oracles. For it is said (Deut. 6:4): Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy1 God is one; and (Exod. 20:3): Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me; and (Eph. 4:5): One Lord, one faith, etc.

By this truth the heathens who believe in many gods are refuted. And yet several of them affirmed the existence of one supreme god, by whom they asserted that the others whom they called gods were caused, for they ascribed the godhead to all eternal substances, especially by reason of wisdom, felicity and governance of the universe. This mode of expression is found even in Holy Writ, where holy angels or men or judges are called gods, as in the words of the psalm:2 There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord, and again:3 I have said: You are gods: and many like passages are found throughout Scripture.

Wherefore the Manichees would seem yet more opposed to this truth, since they assert two first principles, the one of which is not the cause of the other.

The Arians too impugned this truth by their errors, since they asserted that the Father and the Son are not one but distinct gods, and yet were compelled by the authority of Scripture to confess that the Son is true God.

Chapter XLIII

that god is infinite

Now while the infinite is a sequel of quantity, as philosophers teach,1 infinity cannot be ascribed to God in respect of multitude, seeing that it has been proved that there is but one God,2 and that there is no composition either of parts or of accidents in Him.3 Nor may we say that He is infinite in respect of continuous quantity, since we have shown that He is incorporeal.4 It remains therefore to inquire whether infinity is becoming to Him in respect of spiritual magnitude.

This spiritual magnitude is referable to two things: namely to power, and to the goodness or perfection of a thing’s very nature. For a thing is said to be more or less white according to the degree of perfection in its whiteness. And the magnitude of power is gauged from the magnitude of deeds or of things made. Now in these things the magnitude of one follows the magnitude of the other, because from the very fact that a thing is in act it is active, and consequently according to the degree in which it is perfected in its act, is the degree of magnitude in its power. Wherefore spiritual things are said to be great according to their degree of perfection: for Augustine says that in things which are great not by bulk, to be great is to be good.5

Accordingly we have to show that God is infinite according to this kind of magnitude. Not, however, so that infinite be understood privatively, as in dimensive or numeral quantity, for a quantity of this kind is naturally finite, so that we speak of infinity by subtraction of that which it has by nature, and for this reason infinity in those quantities denotes imperfection. But in God the infinite is understood only negatively, because there is no bound or end to His perfection, and He is the supremely perfect being: and it is thus that the infinite should be ascribed to God.

For whatever is finite by its nature is confined to some generic notion. Now God is in no genus, and His perfection contains the perfections of all genera, as we have shown above.1 Therefore He is infinite.

Moreover. Every act inherent to something else receives its limitation from that in which it is: since that which is in another is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore an act that exists in no subject has no limitations: for instance, if whiteness were per se existent, the perfection of whiteness therein would not be limited from having whatever it is possible to have of the perfection of whiteness. Now God is an act nowise existing in another: because neither is He form in matter, as we have proved,2 nor is His being inherent to any form or nature, since He is His own being, as we have shown above.3 Therefore it follows that He is infinite.

Again. In things we find something that is pure potentiality; as primary matter; something that is pure act, namely God, as we have shown above;4 and something that is act and potentiality, namely other things. Now as potentiality, since it bears relation to an act, cannot exceed that act in any particular thing, so neither can it simply. Therefore, since primary matter is infinite in its potentiality, it follows that God, Who is pure act, is infinite in His actuality.

Again. An act is the more perfect, according as it is less mingled with potentiality. Wherefore every act that has an admixture of potentiality has a limit to its perfection: while the act which has no admixture of potentiality has no limit to its perfection. Now God is pure act without any potentiality, as we have proved above.1 Therefore He is infinite.

Again. Being itself, considered absolutely, is infinite; for it can be participated by an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways. Hence if we take a thing with finite being, this being must be limited by some other thing which is in some way the cause of that being. Now there can be no cause of God’s being, since He is necessary of Himself.2 Therefore He has infinite being, and Himself is infinite.

Moreover. Whatever has a particular perfection is the more perfect according as it more fully participates that perfection. Now there cannot be, nor even be imagined, a way in which a perfection is possessed more fully, than by that which is perfect by its essence, and whose being is its goodness: and such is God. Therefore in no way can anything be imagined better or more perfect than God. Therefore He is perfect in goodness.

Further. Our intellect reaches the infinite in understanding: a sign of which is that given any finite quantity, our intellect can imagine a greater. Now it would be to no purpose for the intellect to be thus directed to the infinite unless there were infinite intelligible being. Therefore there must be some infinite intelligible thing, which must needs be the greatest of all beings: and this we call God. Therefore God is infinite.

Again. An effect cannot extend beyond its cause. Now our intellect cannot be but from God, Who is the first cause of all things. Therefore our intellect cannot think of anything greater than God. If then it is possible to think of something greater than every finite thing, it follows that God is not finite.

Moreover. Infinite power cannot be in a finite essence: because everything acts by its form, which is either its essence or part thereof: and power denotes a principle of action. But God has not a finite active power: for He moves in infinite time, and this cannot be save from an infinite power, as we have shown above.1 Therefore it follows that God’s essence is infinite. This argument, however, avails for those who hold to the eternity of the world: and if this be not supposed, our opinion about the infinity of the divine power is confirmed yet more. For every agent is the more powerful to act according as it reduces to act a potentiality the further removed from act: thus a greater power is needed to heat water than air. Now that which is not at all, is infinitely distant from act, nor is it in any way in potentiality. Wherefore, if the world was made after previously not being at all, the maker’s power must needs be infinite.

This argument, even for those who hold to the eternity of the world, avails to prove the infinity of the divine power. For they confess that God is the cause of the substance of the world, although they aver that it is eternal, since they say that the eternal God is the cause of an eternal world in the same way as a foot would have been from eternity the cause of a footprint, if it had trod on the dust from eternity.2 Now this opinion being presupposed, it follows none the less from the argument stated above, that the power of God is infinite. For whether He fashioned things from time, as we hold, or from eternity, as they maintain, there cannot be in things anything that He has not produced, since He is the universal sourse of being: and so He produced them without any pre-existing matter or potentiality. Now active power must needs be in proportion to passive potentiality; because the greater the passive potentiality that is pre-existent or presupposed, the greater the active power which completes its actuality. Hence it follows, since a finite power produces an effect if we presuppose the potentiality of matter, that God’s power, which presupposes no potentiality, is not finite but infinite: and that consequently His essence is infinite.

Moreover. A thing lasts so much the longer as its cause is more efficacious. Consequently, a thing which is of infinite duration must have being through a cause of infinite efficacy. Now God is of infinite duration, for it has been shown above1 that He is eternal. Since then He has no cause of His being besides Himself, it follows that He is infinite.

The authority of Holy Writ bears witness to this truth; for the psalmist says:2 Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised: and of His greatness there is no end.

The same truth is attested by the statements of the oldest philosophers, since all of them, compelled as it were by truth itself, asserted that the first principle of things is infinite.3 For they knew not what they said, believing the infinity of the first principle to be after the manner of a discrete quantity, as Democritus maintained, asserting an infinite number of atoms to be the principles of things, and as Anaxagoras held, stating that the principles of things are an infinite number of similar parts; or after the manner of continuous quantity, as those who held that some element, or some undefined infinite body, is the first principle of all. But since it was proved by the researches of subsequent philosophers that there is no infinite body, and if to this we add that the first principle must needs be infinite in some way, it follows that the infinite which is the first principle is neither a body nor a power residing in a body.4

Chapter XLIV

that god is an intelligent being

It may be shown from the above that God is an intelligent being.

For it was proved5 that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, and that all things moved must be reduced, as is probable, to one self-moving principle. Now a self-mover moves itself by appetite and apprehension: for suchlike things alone are found to move themselves, since it is in them to be moved and not to be moved. Wherefore the moving part in the first self-mover must needs be appetitive and apprehensive. Now in that movement which is by appetite and apprehension, the appetent and apprehender is a moved mover, while appetible and apprehended is a mover not moved. Since then that which is the first mover of all, which we call God, is a mover altogether unmoved, it follows that it is compared to the motor which is a part of the self-mover as the appetible to the appetent. Not, however, as the appetible to the sensitive appetite, because the sensitive appetite is not of the good simply, but of this particular good, since also sensitive apprehension is only of the particular; and that which is good and appetible simply, is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. Therefore the first mover must be the appetible as an object of the understanding: and consequently the mover that desires itself must be an intelligent being. Much more therefore is the very first appetible an intelligent being; because that which desires it becomes actually understanding through being united to it as an intelligible object. Therefore it follows that God is intelligent, if it be supposed that the first mover moves itself, as the early philosophers maintained.

Again. The same conclusion follows necessarily, if movable things be reduced not to some first self-mover, but to a mover that is utterly immovable. For the first mover is the universal principle of movement. Wherefore, since every mover moves by some form which it intends in moving, it follows that the form by which the first mover moves must be universal form and universal good. Now a form is not found under conditions of universality save in the intellect. Therefore the first mover, which is God, must be intelligent.

Moreover. In no order of movers do we find that a mover by the intellect is the instrument of that which moves without intellect; but rather the opposite. Now all movers that are in the world, are compared to the first mover which is God, as instruments to the principal agent. Since then we find in the world many movers by intellect, it is impossible that the first mover move without intellect. Therefore God must of necessity be intelligent.

Again. A thing is intelligent from the fact of its being without matter: in sign of which forms become understood by being abstracted from matter. Hence also understanding is of universals and not of singulars, because matter is the principle of individualization. Now forms actually understood become one with the intellect actually understanding. Wherefore, if forms are actually understood from the very fact that they are without matter, it follows that a thing is actually intelligent from the fact that it is without matter. Now it was shown above1 that God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore He is intelligent.

Again. God lacks no perfection that is to be found in any genus of things, as we have proved above:2 nor does it follow from this that there is any composition in Him, as was also shown above.3 Now the greatest among the perfections of things is that a thing is intellectual, because thereby it is, after a fashion, all things, having in itself the perfection of all.4 Therefore God is intelligent.

Moreover. Whatever tends definitely to an end, either prescribes that end to itself, or that end is prescribed to it by another: else it would not tend to this end rather than to that. Now natural things tend to definite ends, for they do not pursue their natural purposes by chance, since in that case those purposes would not be realized always or for the most part, but seldom, for of such is chance. Since then they do not prescribe the end to themselves, for they do not apprehend the notion of end, it follows that the end is prescribed to them by another, Who is the author of nature. This is He Who gives being to all, and Who necessarily exists of Himself, Whom we call God, as shown above.5 Now He would be unable to prescribe nature its end unless He were intelligent. Therefore God is intelligent.

Moreover. Whatever is imperfect originates from something perfect: because the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect, as act precedes potentiality. Now the forms that exist in particular things are imperfect, since their existence is limited and does not extend to the full universality of their nature. Wherefore they must needs originate from certain perfect and not limited forms. Now such forms are impossible except as an object of the understanding, since no form is found in a state of universality except in the intellect. Consequently those forms must be intelligent if they are subsistent, for in no other way can they be operative. Therefore it follows that God Who is the first subsistent act, from which all others derive, is intelligent.

The Catholic faith confesses this truth. For it is said of God (Job 9:4): He is wise in heart and mighty in strength; and (12:16): With Him is strength and wisdom; and in the psalm:1 Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me; and (Rom. 11:33): O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God!

The truth of this belief took such hold on men that they named God from understanding: for Θεὸς, which is the Greek for God, is derived from θεᾶσθαι, which means to consider or to see.

Chapter XLV

that god’s act of intelligence is his essence

From the fact that God is intelligent it follows that His act of intelligence is His essence.

For intelligence is the act of an intelligent being, existing within that being and not passing on to something outside of it, as heating passes into the thing heated: for the intelligible suffers nothing through being understood, but the one who understands is perfected. Now whatever is in God is the divine essence.2 Therefore God’s act of intelligence is the divine essence, the divine existence, and God Himself: since God is His essence and His existence.3

Further. The act of intelligence is compared to the intellect as existence to essence. But God’s existence is His essence, as proved above.1 Therefore God’s act of intelligence is His intellect. Now the divine intellect is God’s essence, otherwise it would be accidental to God.2 Therefore the divine act of intelligence must needs be His essence.

Moreover. Second act is more perfect than first act, even as consideration is more perfect than knowledge. Now God’s knowledge or intellect is His very essence, if He is intelligent as shown above:3 since no perfection belongs to Him by participation, but by essence, as already proved.4 If, therefore, His act of consideration be not His essence, something will be more noble and perfect than His essence. And thus He will not be in the summit of perfection and goodness:5 and consequently He will not be first.

Again. Intelligence is the act of the intelligent. If then God being intelligent is not His act of intelligence, He must be compared to it as potentiality to act: and so there will be potentiality and act in God; which is impossible, as we have proved above.6

Again. Every substance is for the sake of its operation. If therefore God’s operation is other than the divine substance, His end will be other than Himself. And thus God will not be His own goodness, since the good of a thing is its end.7

If, however, God’s act of intelligence is His existence, His act of intelligence must be simple, eternal, unchangeable, existing only in act, and all those things Which have been proved about the divine existence. Wherefore God is not in potentiality to intelligence, nor does He begin to understand a thing anew, nor is His act of intelligence subject to any change or composition whatsoever.

Chapter XLVI

that god understands by nothing else than his essence

From what has been proved above it is made evident that the divine intellect understands by no other intelligible species but the divine essence.

For the intelligible species is the formal principle of the intellectual operation; even as the form of every agent is the principle of that agent’s proper operation. Now the intellectual operation of God is His essence, as we have shown.1 Wherefore something else would be the principle and cause of the divine essence, if the divine intellect understood by some intelligible species other than His essence: and this is in contradiction with what has been shown above.2

Again. The intellect is made actually intelligent by the intelligible species: just as sense is made actually sentient by the sensible species. Hence the intelligible species is compared to the intellect as act to potentiality. And consequently if the divine intellect were to understand by a species other than itself, it would be in potentiality with respect to something: and this is impossible, as we have proved above.3

Moreover. An intelligible species that is accessory to the essence of the intellect in which it is, has an accidental being: for which reason our knowledge is reckoned among the accidents. Now in God there can be no accident, as proved above.4 Therefore there is no species in His intellect besides the divine essence.

Further. An intelligible species is the image of something understood. Wherefore if in the divine intellect there be an intelligible species besides its essence, it will be the image of something understood. Either, therefore, it will be the image of the divine essence or of some other thing. But it cannot be the image of the divine essence: for then the divine essence would not be intelligible by itself, and this species would make it intelligible. Nor again can there be in the divine intellect a species distinct from its essence and representative of some other thing. For this image would be imprinted thereon by something. Not however by the divine intellect itself, because then the same thing would be agent and patient: and there would be an agent which imprints not its own but another’s image on the patient, and thus not every agent would produce its like. Nor again by another: for then there would be an agent previous to the divine intellect. Therefore there cannot possibly be in it an intelligible species besides its essence.

Moreover. God’s act of intelligence is His essence, as we have proved.1 Therefore if He understood by a species that is not His essence, it would be by something other than His essence. But this is impossible.2 Therefore He does not understand by a species that is not His essence.

Chapter XLVII

that god understands himself perfectly

It is furthermore clear from the above that God understands Himself perfectly.

For since the intellect is directed by the intelligible species to the thing understood, the perfection of intellectual operation depends on two things. One is that the intelligible species be perfectly conformed to the thing understood. The other is that it be perfectly united to the intellect; and this is all the more so, according as the intellect is endowed with greater efficacy in understanding. Now the divine essence which is the intelligible species whereby the divine intellect understands, is absolutely the same as God Himself, and is altogether identified with His intellect. Therefore God understands Himself most perfectly.

Further. A material thing is made intelligible by being abstracted from matter and from material conditions. Wherefore that which by its nature is severed from matter and from material conditions, is by its very nature intelligible. Now every intelligible is understood according as it is actually one with the intelligent: and God is Himself intelligent, as we have proved.1 Therefore since He is altogether immaterial, and is absolutely one with Himself, He understands Himself most perfectly.

Again. A thing is actually understood through the unification of the intellect in act and the intelligible in act. Now the divine intellect is always intellect in act: since nothing is in potentiality and imperfect in God. And God’s essence is by itself perfectly intelligible, as shown above. Since, then, the divine intellect and the divine essence are one, as stated above,2 it is evident that God understands Himself perfectly: for God is both His own intellect and His own essence.

Moreover. Whatever is in anyone in an intelligible manner, is understood by him. Now the divine essence is in God in an intelligible manner: for God’s natural being and His intelligible being are one and the same, since His being is His act of intelligence.3 Therefore God understands His essence. Therefore He understands Himself, since He is His very essence.

Further. The acts of the intellect, as of the other powers of the soul, are distinguished according to their objects. Hence the more perfect the intelligible, the more perfect will the operation of the intellect be. Now the most perfect intelligible is the divine essence, since it is the most perfect act and the first truth. And the operation of the divine intellect is also the most excellent, since it is the divine being itself, as we have shown.4 Therefore God understands Himself.

Again. All the perfections of things are found eminently in God.5 Now among other perfections found in created things is that of understanding God: since the intellectual nature whose perfection it is to understand stands above others: and God is the most excellent intelligible. Therefore God, most of all, understands Himself.

This is confirmed by divine authority. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10) that the Spirit of God searcheth … the deep things of God.

Chapter XLVIII

that god knows only himself first and per se

From the foregoing it follows that God first and per se knows Himself alone.

For that thing alone is known first and per se by whose species the intellect understands, because the operation is proportionate to the form which is the principle of the operation. Now that by which God understands is nothing else than His essence, as we have proved.1 Therefore that which is understood by Him first and per se is nothing else than Himself.

Again. It is impossible to understand simultaneously several things first and per se: since one operation cannot terminate simultaneously in several things. Now God understands Himself sometimes, as we have proved.2 Therefore if He understands something else by way of an object understood first and per se, it follows that His intellect is changed from consideration to consideration of that thing. But this thing is less excellent than He. Therefore the divine intellect would be changed for the worse: which is impossible.

Moreover. The operations of the intellect are distinguished in relation to their objects. If, therefore, God understands Himself and something other than Himself as principal object, He will have several intellectual operations. Therefore either His essence will be divided into several parts, or He will have an intellectual operation that is not His substance: both of which have been proved to be impossible.1 Therefore it follows that nothing is known by God as understood first and per se, except His essence.

Again. The intellect, in so far as it is distinct from the object of its intelligence, is in potentiality in its regard. If then something else is understood by God first and per se, it will follow that He is in potentiality in respect of something else: and this is impossible as we have shown above.2

Further. The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands: because the intellect is perfect in so far as it actually understands; and this is through its being one with the thing understood. Therefore if something other than God be first understood by Him, something else will be His perfection and more excellent than He. But this is impossible.

Moreover. The knowledge of one who understands is the product of many things understood. Accordingly if many things are known by God as known principally and per se, it follows that God’s knowledge is composed of many: and thus either God’s essence will be composite, or knowledge will be accidental to God. But either of these is clearly impossible from what has been said.3 It remains, therefore, that that which is understood by God first and per se is nothing else than His substance.

Further. The intellectual operation takes its species and excellence from that which is understood first and per se; since this is its object. If therefore God understood a thing other than Himself, as though it were understood first and per se, His intellectual operation would derive its species and excellence from that which is other than Himself. But this is impossible: since His operation is His essence, as we have shown.4 It is accordingly impossible for that which God understands first and per se to be other than Himself.

Chapter XLIX

that god knows things other than himself

From the fact that God knows Himself first and per se, we must conclude that He knows things other than Himself in Himself.

For the knowledge of an effect is sufficiently obtained from knowledge of the cause: wherefore we are said to know a thing when we know its cause.1 Now God by His essence is the cause of being in other things. Since therefore He knows His own essence most fully, we must conclude that He knows other things also.

Further. The likeness of every effect pre-exists somewhat in its cause: since every agent produces its like. Now whatever is in something else, is therein according to the mode of the thing in which it is. If, therefore, God is the cause of certain things, since by His nature He is intellectual, the likeness of His effect will be in Him intelligibly. Now that which is in a subject intelligibly, is understood thereby. Therefore God understands things other than Himself in Himself.

Moreover. Whoever knows a thing perfectly, knows whatever can be said truly of that thing, and whatever is becoming thereto by its nature. Now it is becoming to God by His nature to be the cause of other things. Since then He knows Himself perfectly, He knows that He is a cause: and this is impossible unless He knows His effect somewhat. Now this is something other than Himself, for nothing is cause of itself. Therefore God knows things other than Himself.

Accordingly taking these two conclusions together,2 it is evident that God knows Himself as the first and per se object of His knowledge, and other things as seen in His essence.

This truth is explicitly declared by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii.) as follows: He looks upon singulars not by casting His eye on each one, but He knows all things as one, contained in their cause; and further on: Divine wisdom knows other things by knowing itself.

Moreover the authority of Holy Writ apparently bears witness to the same statement. For in the psalm1 it is said of God: He hath looked forth from His high sanctuary, as though He saw other things from His exalted self.

Chapter L

that god has proper knowledge of all things

Since however some2 have said that God has none but a universal knowledge of other things, in the sense that He knows them as beings, through knowing the nature of being from His knowledge of Himself; it remains to be shown that God knows all other things, as distinct from one another and from God. This is to know things by their proper ideas.

In evidence of this let us suppose that God is the cause of every being, which is clear to a certain extent from what has been said above,3 and will be more fully proved further on.4 Accordingly then there can be nothing in a thing without its being caused by Him indirectly or directly. Now if the cause be known its effect is Known. Wherefore all that is in anything whatsoever can be known if God be known as well as all the causes intervening between God and that thing. Now God knows Himself and all the causes that intervene between Him and any thing whatever. For it has been shown already that He knows Himself perfectly.5 And through knowing Himself He knows whatever proceeds from Him immediately: and again through knowing this, He knows whatever proceeds therefrom immediately, and so on as regards every intervening cause until the ultimate effect. Therefore God knows whatever is in a thing. Now this is to have proper and complete Knowledge of a thing, namely, to know whatever is in a thing, whether common or proper. Therefore God has proper knowledge of things, according as they are distinct from one another.

Further. Whatever acts by intellect, has knowledge of what it does, as regards the proper idea of the thing done: because the knowledge of the doer appoints the form to the thing done. Now God is cause of things by His intellect: since His being is His act of intelligence, and every thing acts in so far as it is actual. Therefore He knows His effect properly, according as it is distinct from others.

Moreover. The distinction of things cannot arise from chance, for it has a fixed order. Hence it follows that the distinction among things proceeds from the intention of some cause. But it cannot proceed from the intention of a cause that acts from natural necessity: because nature is determined to one thing, so that nothing that acts from natural necessity can have an intention in relation to several things considered as distinct from one another. It remains therefore that the distinction among things arises from the intention of a cause endowed with Knowledge. Now it would seem proper to an intellect to consider the distinction among things: wherefore Anaxagoras1 declared that an intellect was the principle of distinction. But taken as a whole the distinction of things cannot proceed from the intention of any second cause, since all such causes are included in the universality of distinct effects. Wherefore it belongs to the first cause, which is of itself distinct from all others, to intend the distinction among all things. Therefore God knows things as distinct.

Again. Whatsoever God knows, He knows most perfectly: for in Him are all perfections as in that which is simply perfect, as shown above.2 Now that which is known only in general is not known perfectly: since the chief things belonging thereto are ignored, namely its ultimate perfections whereby its own being is perfected; wherefore by such knowledge as this a thing is known potentially rather than actually. Accordingly if God, by knowing His essence, knows all things in general, it follows that He has also proper knowledge of things.

Further. Whoever knows a nature knows the per se accidents of that nature. Now the per se accidents of being as such are one and many, as is proved in 4 Metaph.1 Wherefore if God, by knowing His essence, knows the nature of being in general, it follows that He knows multitude. Now multitude is inconceivable without distinction. Therefore He understands things as distinct from one another.

Moreover. Whoever knows perfectly a universal nature knows the mode in which that nature can be had: thus he who knows whiteness knows that it is susceptive of increase and decrease. Now the various degrees of being result from various modes of being. Therefore if God by knowing Himself knows the universal nature of being—and this not imperfectly, since all imperfection is far removed from Him, as we have proved above2—it follows that He knows all the degrees of being: and so He has proper knowledge of things other than Himself.

Further. Whoever knows a thing perfectly, knows all that is in that thing. Now God knows Himself perfectly. Therefore He knows all that is in Him in relation to His active power. But all things according to their proper forms are in Him in relation to His active power: since He is the principle of all being. Therefore He has proper knowledge of all things.

Again. Whoever knows a nature, knows whether that nature is communicable: for one would not know the nature of an animal perfectly unless one knew that it is communicable to several. Now the divine nature is communicable according to likeness. Therefore God knows in how many ways a thing can be like His essence. But the diversity of forms arises from the different ways in which things reflect the divine essence: wherefore the Philosopher3 calls a natural form a godlike thing. Therefore God has knowledge of things in reference to their proper forms.

Moreover. Men and other beings endowed with knowledge know things as many and distinct from one another. Accordingly if God knows not things as distinct from one another, it follows that He is most foolish, as in the opinion of those who asserted that God is ignorant of discord, which all know, an opinion that the Philosopher considers inadmissible1 (1 De Anima v. 10; 3 Metaph.).2

We are also taught this by the authority of canonical Scripture: for it is stated (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made and they were very good: and (Heb. 4:13): Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight: … all things are naked and open to His eyes.

Chapters LI and LII

reasons for inquiring how there is a multitude of things understood in the divine intellect

Lest, however, from the fact that God understands many things we be led to conclude that there is composition in the divine intellect, we must examine in what way the things He understands are many.

Now they cannot be understood to be many, as though the many things God understands had a distinct being in Him. For these understood things would either be the same as the divine essence, and thus we should have multitude in the essence of God, which has been disproved above3 in many ways, or else they would be added to the divine essence, and thus there would be something accidental in God, and this again we have proved above to be impossible.4

Nor again can it be admitted that these intelligible forms exist per se: as Plato, in order to avoid the above impossibilities, seems to have maintained by holding the existence of ideas.1 Because the forms of natural things cannot exist apart from matter, since neither are they understood without matter.

And even if the above supposition were admissible, it would not suffice to explain how God understands many things. For since the aforesaid forms are outside the essence of God, if God were unable without them to understand the multitude of things, as is requisite for the perfection of His intellect, it would follow that the perfection of His understanding depends on something else: and consequently the perfection also of His being, since His being is His act of intelligence: the contrary of which has been shown above.2

Again. Since all that is beside His essence is caused by Him, as we shall prove further on,3 it must needs be that if the aforesaid forms are outside God, they are caused by Him. Now He is the cause of things by His intellect, as we shall show further on.4 Therefore in order that these intelligible forms may exist, it is required that previously in the order of nature God should understand them. And consequently God does not understand multitude through the fact that many intelligible things exist per se outside Him.

Again. The intelligible in act is the intellect in act, even as the sensible in act is the sense in act.5 But so far as the intelligible is distinct from the intellect, both are in potentiality, as appears in the senses: for neither is the sight actually seeing, nor the visible actually seen, except when the sight is informed by the species of the visible object, so that one thing results from sight and visible. Accordingly if the intelligible objects of God are outside His intellect, it will follow that His intellect is in potentiality, and likewise His intelligible objects: and thus He will need something to reduce Him to actuality. But this is impossible, since this thing would be previous to Him.

Further. The object understood must be in the intellect. Therefore in order to explain how God understands the multitude of things it is not enough to suppose that the forms of things exist per se outside the divine intellect; but it is necessary that they be in the divine intellect itself.

1From these very same reasons it appears that it cannot be admitted that the multitude of the aforesaid intelligibles is in some other beside the divine intellect, either that of the soul, or that of an angel or intelligence. For in that case the divine intellect, in respect of one of its operations, would depend on some secondary intellect: which also is impossible.

Even as things that subsist in themselves are from God, so are those that exist in a subject. Wherefore the existence of the aforesaid intelligibles in some secondary intellect presupposes God’s act of intelligence whereby He is their cause. It would also follow that God’s intellect is in potentiality: since His intelligibles would not be united to Him. Even as each thing has its proper being so has it its proper operation. Wherefore it is impossible that because one intellect is disposed to operate, therefore another exercises intellectual operation, but only that same intellect where we find the disposition: even as a thing is by its own essence and not by another’s. Hence it does not become possible for the first intellect to understand multitude, through the fact that many intelligibles are in some second intellect.

Chapter LIII

solution of the foregoing doubt

The foregoing doubt1 may be easily solved if we examine carefully how things understood are in the understanding.

And in order that, as far as possible, we may proceed from our intellect to the knowledge of the divine intellect, it must be observed that the external objects which we understand do not exist in our intellect according to their own nature, but it is necessary that our intellect contain their species whereby it becomes intellect in act. And being in act by this species as by its proper form, it understands the object itself. And yet the act of understanding is not an act passing into the intellect, as heating passes into the object heated, but it remains in the one who understands: although it bears a relation to the object understood, for the very reason that the aforesaid species, which is the formal principle of intellectual operation, is the image of that object.

It must furthermore be observed that the intellect informed by the species of the object, by understanding produces in itself a kind of intention of the object understood, which intention reflects the nature of that object and is expressed in the definition thereof. This indeed is necessary: since the intellect understands indifferently a thing absent or present, and in this point agrees with the imagination: yet the intellect has this besides, that it understands a thing as separate from material conditions, without which it does not exist in reality; and this is impossible unless the intellect forms for itself the aforesaid intention.

Now this understood intention, since it is the term, so to speak, of the intellectual operation, is distinct from the intelligible species which makes the intellect in act, and which we must look upon as the principle of the intellectual operation; albeit each is an image of the object understood: since it is because the intelligible species, which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding, is the image of the external object, that the intellect in consequence forms an intention like that object: for such as a thing is, such is the effect of its operation. And since the understood intention is like a particular thing, it follows that the intellect by forming this intention understands that thing. On the other hand the divine intellect understands by no species other than His essence, as we have proved.1 And yet His essence is the likeness of all things.2 Wherefore it follows from this that the concept of the divine intellect, according as He understands Himself, which concept is His Word, is the likeness not only of God Himself understood, but also of all things of which the divine essence is the likeness. Accordingly many things can be understood by God, by one intelligible species which is the divine essence, and by one understood intention which is the divine Word.

Chapter LIV

how the divine essence, though one and simple, is a proper likeness of all things intelligible

And yet it may seem to someone difficult or impossible that the one and same simple thing, such as God’s essence, be the proper type or likeness of diverse things. For, since the distinction of diverse things arises from their proper forms, that which by reason of its proper form is like one of them must needs be unlike another. Whereas, so far as diverse things have something in common, nothing hinders them from having one likeness, for instance a man and an ass, in as much as they are animals. Hence it would follow that God has not proper but common knowledge of things: because the operation of knowledge follows according to the mode by which the thing known is in the knower, even as heating follows the mode of heat: for the likeness of the thing known in the knower is as the form by which a thing acts. Therefore if God has proper knowledge of many things it follows that He is Himself the proper type of each. How this may be, we must investigate.

As the Philosopher says (8 Metaph.)1 forms of things, and their definitions which signify them, are like numbers. For in numbers, if one unit be added or subtracted the species of the number is changed; as appears in the numbers 3 and 4. Now it is the same with definitions: for the addition or subtraction of one difference changes the species: thus a sensible substance minus rational and plus rational differs specifically.

Now in things which include many, it is not the same with the intellect as with nature. For the nature of a thing does not allow of the separation of those things that are required essentially for that thing: thus the nature of an animal will not remain if the soul be taken away from the body. On the other hand the intellect is sometimes able to take separately those things which are essentially united, when one is not included in the notion of the other. Wherefore in the number 3 it can consider the number 2 alone, and in a rational animal it can consider that which is only sensible. Hence the intellect is able to consider that which includes several things as the proper notion of several, by apprehending one of them without the others. For it can consider 10 as the proper notion of 9, by subtracting one unit, and in like manner as the proper notion of each lesser number included therein. Again, in man, it can consider the proper type of an irrational animal as such, and of each of its species, unless they imply the addition of a positive difference. For this reason a certain philosopher, Clement by name, said that the things of higher rank are the types of those of lesser rank.1

Now the divine essence contains the excellences of all beings, not indeed by way of composition, but by way of perfection, as we have shown above.2 And every form, whether proper or common, so far as it is something positive, is a perfection: nor does it include imperfection except in so far as it falls short of true being. Wherefore God’s intellect can include within His essence that which is proper to each thing, by understanding wherein each thing imitates His essence, and wherein it falls short of His essence: for instance, by understanding His essence as imitable in respect of life and not of knowledge, it understands the proper form of a plant: or again as imitable in respect of knowledge but not of intellect, it understands the proper form of an animal, and so on. Hence it is clear that the divine essence, in as much as it is absolutely perfect, may be taken as the proper type of such thing. Wherefore God can have proper knowledge of all things thereby.

Since, however, the proper notion of one thing is distinct from the proper notion of another, and since distinction is the principle of plurality; we must consider a certain distinction and plurality of understood notions in the divine intellect, in so far as that which is in the divine intellect is the proper notion of diverse things. Wherefore, since this is according as God understands the proper relation of similarity which each creature bears to Him, it follows that the types of things in the divine intellect are not many nor different, except in so far as God knows that things can be like Him in many and divers ways. In this sense Augustine1 says that God makes man after one type and a horse after another, and that the types of things are manifold in the divine mind. Wherein also the opinion of Plato holds good, in that he held the existence of ideas according to which all that exists in material things would be formed.2

Chapter LV

that god understands all things at the same instant

From the foregoing it is also made evident that God understands all things at the same instant.

For our intellect is unable actually to understand several things simultaneously, because since the intellect in act is the thing understood in act,3 if it were to understand actually several things at the same time, it would follow that the intellect is simultaneously several things according to one genus; which is impossible. And I say according to one genus, because nothing hinders the same subject receiving different forms of different genera, even as the one body receives shape and colour. Now the intelligible species by which the intellect is informed with the result that the things themselves are actually understood are all of one genus: for they have one essential nature although the things whereof they are the species do not agree in one essential nature: wherefore neither are they contrary to one another as are the things outside the mind. Hence it is that, when we consider a certain number of things in any way united together, we understand them at the same time: for we understand a continuous whole simultaneously, and not part by part: and in like manner we understand a proposition, and not the subject first and the predicate afterwards; because we know all the parts by one species of the whole. From this we may gather that whatever number of things are known by one species, they can be understood simultaneously. Now all that God knows, He knows by one species which is His essence.1 Therefore He can understand all things simultaneously.

Again. The cognitive power does not know a thing except the intention be there, wherefore at times we do not actually imagine the phantasms preserved in the organ, because the intention is not directed thereto: for the appetite moves the other powers to act, in voluntary agents. Hence we do not consider simultaneously a number of things if the intention be not directed to them simultaneously: and those things that must needs come under one intention must be understood simultaneously: since he who considers the comparison between two things, directs his intention simultaneously to both, and considers both at the same time. Now all those things that are in the divine knowledge must come under one intention. For God intends to see His essence perfectly: and this is to see it according to its whole power under which all things are comprised. Therefore God, in seeing His essence, sees all things simultaneously.

Moreover. The intellect of one who considers many things in succession cannot possibly have only one operation: for since operations differ according to their objects, the operation whereby the intellect considers the first thing must needs be distinct from that whereby it considers the second. But the divine intellect has only one operation, which is its essence, as proved above.1 Therefore it considers all that it knows, not simultaneously but successively.

Further. Succession is inconceivable apart from time, and time apart from movement: since time is the measure of movement according to before or after.2 Now no movement is possible in God, as may be gathered from what has been said above.3 Therefore in God’s thought there is no succession: and consequently whatever He knows He considers simultaneously.

Again. God’s act of understanding is His very being, as shown above.4 Now there is no before and after in the divine being, but it is all simultaneously, as proved above.5 Therefore neither is there before and after in God’s thought, but He understands all things simultaneously.

Moreover. Every intellect that understands one thing after another is at one time understanding potentially, and at another time actually: for while it understands the first thing actually, it understands the second potentially. But the divine intellect is never in potentiality, but is always understanding actually.6 Therefore it understands things, not successively, but altogether simultaneously.

Holy Writ bears witness to this truth: for it is said (James 1:17) that with God there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.

Chapter LVI

that god’s knowledge is not a habit

From the foregoing it follows that God’s knowledge is not a habit.

For wheresoever knowledge is habitual, all things are not known simultaneously, but some actually and others habitually. Now God knows all things actually in the same instant, as we have proved.7 Therefore in Him knowledge is not a habit.

Further. He who has a habit, while not using it, is somewhat in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning.1 Now it has been shown that the divine intellect is nowise in potentiality.2 Therefore nowise is there habitual knowledge in Him.

Again. The essence of any intellect that knows something habitually is distinct from its intellectual operation which is actual consideration: because the intellect that knows something by a habit lacks its operation: whereas it cannot lack its essence. Now in God His essence is His operation, as we have proved.3 Therefore there is no habitual knowledge in His intellect.

Again. The intellect that knows something only habitually is not in its ultimate perfection: wherefore happiness which is the best thing of all is held to be not a habit but an act.4 Therefore if God has habitual knowledge through His substance, He will not be universally perfect considered in regard to His substance. And the contrary of this was proved above.5

Moreover. We have shown6 that He is intelligent by His essence, and not by any intelligible species added to His essence. Now every intellect with a habit understands by species: for habit is either ability of the intellect to receive intelligible species whereby it becomes actually understanding, or else it is the orderly collection of the species themselves residing in the intellect without complete actuality, and after a manner that lies between potentiality and act. Therefore in Him there is no habitual knowledge.

Further. Habit is a quality. Now neither quality nor any accident can be ascribed to God, as was proved above.7 Therefore habitual knowledge is not becoming to God. Since, however, the disposition by which one is only habitually considering or willing or acting, is like the disposition of one who sleeps,8 hence David in order to remove habitual knowledge from God, says:1 Behold He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel. For the same reason it is said (Ecclus. 23:28): The eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun, for the sun shines always actually.

Chapter LVII

that god’s knowledge is not discursive

Furthermore we gather from the foregoing that God’s thoughts are not argumentative or discursive.

Our thoughts are argumentative when we pass from one thought to another, as when we reason from principles to conclusions. For a person does not argue or discourse from the fact that he sees how a conclusion follows from its premisses, and considers both together: since this happens not by arguing but by judging of an argument: even so neither does material knowledge consist in judging of material things. Now, it was shown2 that God does not consider one thing after another successively as it were, but all things simultaneously. Therefore His knowledge is not argumentative or discursive: although He is cognizant of all discourse and argument.

Again. Whosoever argues views the premisses by one consideration and the conclusion by another: for there would be no need after considering the premisses to proceed to the conclusion, if by the very fact of considering the premisses one were to consider the conclusion also. Now God knows all things by one operation which is His essence, as we have proved above.3 Therefore His knowledge is not argumentative.

Further. All argumentative knowledge has something of potentiality and something of actuality: since conclusions are potentially in their premisses. But potentiality has no place in the divine intellect, as we have shown above.4 Therefore His intellect is not discursive.

Moreover. In all discursive knowledge something must needs be caused; since the premisses are, so to speak, the cause of the conclusion: wherefore a demonstration is described as a syllogism that produces knowledge.1 But nothing can be caused in the divine knowledge, since it is God Himself, as shown above.2 Therefore God’s knowledge cannot be discursive.

Again. Those things which we know naturally, are known to us without our discoursing about them, as in the case of first principles. Now knowledge in God cannot be otherwise than natural, nor in fact otherwise than essential; since His knowledge is His essence, as we proved above.3 Therefore God’s knowledge is not argumentative.

Further. Whatever is moved must be reduced to a first mover that is mover only and not moved.4 Wherefore that whence comes the first source of movement, must be absolutely a mover unmoved. Now this is the divine intellect, as we have shown above.5 Therefore the divine intellect must be an absolutely unmoved mover. But argument is a movement of the intellect in passing from one thing to another. Therefore the divine intellect is not argumentative.

Again. That which is highest in us is inferior to that which is in God: for the inferior does not touch the superior except in its summit. Now the summit in our knowledge is not reason, but understanding, which is the source of reason. Therefore God’s knowledge is not argumentative, but purely intellectual.

Moreover. All defect is far removed from God, because He is simply perfect, as proved above.6 But argumentative knowledge results from an imperfection of the intellectual nature: since what is known through another thing is less known than what is known in itself: nor does the nature of the knower suffice to reach what is known through something else, without this thing through which the other is made known. Now in argumentative knowledge, one thing is made known through another: whereas what is known intellectually is known in itself, and the nature of the knower suffices for the knowledge thereof without any means from without. Hence it is clear that reason is a defective intellect: and consequently the divine knowledge is not argumentative.

Again. Without any discourse of reason those things are understood whose species are in the knower: for the sight does not discourse in order to know a stone the image of which is in the sight. Now the divine essence is the likeness of all things, as we have proved above.1 Therefore it does not proceed to know a thing by a discourse of reason.

It is also clear how to solve the arguments that would seem to prove the presence of discourse in the divine knowledge. First, because He knows other things through His essence. For it has been proved that this does not involve discoursing: since His essence is related to other things not as the premisses to a conclusion, but as species to things known. Secondly, because some might think it unfitting that God should be unable to argue. For He has the knowledge of arguing as judging, and not as discoursing by arguing.

Holy Writ bears witness to this truth which we have proved by reason. For it is said (Heb. 4:13): All things are naked and open to His eyes. Because the things that we know by reasoning are not in themselves naked and open to us, but are opened out and laid bare by reason.

Chapter LVIII

that god does not understand by composition and division

It may also be shown from the same principles that the divine intellect does not understand after the manner of a composing and dividing intellect. For He knows all things by knowing His essence.1 Now He does not know His essence by composition and division; since He knows Himself as He is, and in Him there is no composition.2 Therefore He does not understand by way of a composing and dividing intellect.

Again. Things composed and divided by the intellect are by nature such as to be considered by the intellect apart from one another: for there would be no need of composition and division, if from the very fact that one understood what a particular thing is, one knew what is or is not in that thing. Therefore if God understands by way of a composing and dividing intellect, it follows that He sees all things, not at one glance, but each one separately: and yet we have proved the contrary above.3

Further. In God there cannot be before and after. Now composition and division come after the consideration of what a thing is, for this consideration is their foundation. Therefore composition and division are impossible in the divine intellect.

Again. The proper object of the intellect is what a thing is: wherefore about this the intellect is not deceived except accidentally; whereas it is deceived about composition and division; even as the senses are always true about their proper objects, but may be deceived about others. Now, in the divine intellect there is nothing accidental, and only what is essential.4 Wherefore in the divine intellect there is no composition and division, but only simple apprehension of a thing.

Moreover. The composition of a proposition formed by a composing and dividing intellect exists in the intellect itself, not in the thing that is outside the mind. Wherefore, if the divine intellect were to judge after the manner of a composing and dividing intellect, His intellect would be composite. But this is impossible as shown above.5

Again. A composing and dividing intellect judges of various things by various compositions: because the composition of the intellect does not go beyond the limits of composition: wherefore the intellect does not judge that a triangle is a figure by the same composition whereby it judges that man is an animal. Hence, if God considers things by composing and dividing, it follows that His act of understanding is not one only but manifold. And thus again His essence will not be one only, since His intellectual operation is His essence, as we proved above.1

Yet we must not therefore say that He is ignorant of enunciations. For His essence, since it is one and simple, is the type of all things multiple and composite: so that thereby God knows every multitude and composition both of nature and of reason.

Holy Writ is in agreement with this. For it is said (Isa. 55:8): For My thoughts are not your thoughts. And yet it is said in the psalm:2 The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men, which manifestly proceed from composition and division of the intellect.

Moreover. Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.): Wherefore divine Wisdom, by knowing itself knows all things, the material immaterially, divisible things indivisibly, multitude unitedly.

Chapter LIX

that god is not ignorant of the truth of enunciations

It follows from the foregoing that, although the knowledge of the divine intellect is not like that of a composing and dividing intellect, it is not ignorant of the truth which, according to the Philosopher,3 is solely about composition and division of the intellect.

For since the truth of the intellect is the equation of thought and thing,4 in so far as the intellect asserts that to be which is, and that not to be which is not,5 truth in the intellect belongs to that which the intellect asserts, not to the operation whereby it asserts. Because the truth of the intellect does not require that the act itself of understanding be equated to the thing, since sometimes the thing is material, whereas the act of understanding is immaterial. But that which the intellect in understanding asserts and knows, needs to be equated to the thing, namely to be in reality as the intellect asserts it to be. Now God, by His simple act of intelligence wherein is neither composition nor division, knows not only the essence of things, but also that which is enunciated about them, as proved above.1 Wherefore that which the divine intellect asserts in understanding is composition or division. Therefore truth is not excluded from the divine intellect by reason of the latter’s simplicity.

Moreover. When something non-complex is said or understood, the non-complex in itself is neither equal nor unequal to the reality, since equality and inequality imply a comparison, and the non-complex in itself contains no comparison or application to a reality. Wherefore in itself it cannot be said to be either true or false: but only the complex which contains a comparison between the non-complex and the reality, expressed by composition or division. But the non-complex intellect by understanding what a thing is, apprehends the quiddity of a thing in a kind of comparison with the thing, since it apprehends it as the quiddity of this particular thing. Hence, although the non-complex itself, or even a definition, is not in itself true or false, nevertheless the intellect that apprehends what a thing is is said to be always true in itself, as stated in 3 De Anima,2 although it may be accidentally false, in so far as the definition includes complexion either of the parts of the definition with one another, or of the whole definition with the thing defined.3 Wherefore a definition, according as it is taken to be the definition of this or that thing, as understood by the intellect, will be said to be false either simply, if the parts of the definition do not hold together, as if we were to say an insensible animal, or false in its application to this particular thing, as if one were to apply the definition of a circle to a triangle. Hence, though it be granted, by an impossibility, that the divine intellect knows only non-complex things, it would still be true in knowing its quiddity as its own.

Again. The divine simplicity does not exclude perfection: because in its simple essence it has all the perfections to be found in other things by the aggregation of perfections or forms; as was proved above.1 Now, our intellect, by apprehending the incomplex, does not as yet reach to its ultimate perfection, since it is still in potentiality as regards composition and division: even as in natural things simple things are in potentiality in respect of mixed things, and parts in respect of the whole. Accordingly God, in respect of His simple act of intelligence, has that perfection of knowledge which our intellect has by both kinds of knowledge, whether of the complex or of the non-complex. Now truth is acquired by our intellect in its perfect knowledge thereof, when it arrives at composition. Therefore there is truth in God’s mere act of simple intelligence.

Again. Since God is the good of every good, through having in Himself all manner of goodness, as we have shown above,2 the goodness of the intellect cannot be lacking to Him. Now truth is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares (6 Ethic.).3 Therefore truth is in God.

And this is what is stated in the psalm:4 But God is true.

Chapter LX

that god is truth

It follows from what has been said that God Himself is truth.

For truth is a perfection of the intelligence or intellectual operation, as stated above.1 Now God’s act of intelligence is His substance:2 and since this very act of intelligence is God’s being, as we have shown,3 it is not made perfect by some additional perfection, but is perfect in itself, just as we have said about the divine being.4 It remains therefore that the divine substance is truth itself.

Again. Truth is a good of the intellect, according to the Philosopher.5 Now God is His own goodness, as we have shown.6 Therefore He is also His own truth.

Further. Nothing can be said participatively of God: since He is His own being which participates nothing. Now truth is in God, as was shown above.7 If, then, it be not said of Him participatively, it follows that it is said essentially. Therefore God is His own truth.

Moreover. Although properly speaking the true is not in things but in the mind, according to the Philosopher,8 nevertheless sometimes a thing is said to be true, in so far as it attains to the act of its own nature. Hence, Avicenna says in his Metaphysics9 that the truth of a thing is a property of the nature immutably attached to it, in so far as that thing is naturally inclined to cause a true estimate of itself, and reflects the type of itself that is in the divine mind. Now God is His own essence. Therefore, whether we speak of the truth of the mind, or of the truth of the thing, God is His own truth.

This is confirmed by the authority of our Lord, Who says of Himself (Jo. 14:6): I am the way, the truth, and the life.

Chapter LXI

that god is the most pure truth

The foregoing being established it is evident that in God there is pure truth, in which there can be no alloy of falsehood or deception.

For falsehood is incompatible with truth, even as black with white. Now God is not merely true, but is truth itself.1 Therefore there can be no falsehood in Him.

Moreover. The intellect is not deceived in knowing what a thing is, as neither is the sense about its proper sensible.2 Now all knowledge of the divine intellect is as the knowledge of one who knows what a thing is, as was proved above.3 Therefore it is impossible that there be error, deception or falsehood in the divine knowledge.

Further. The intellect does not err about first principles, whereas it does sometimes about conclusions, to which it proceeds by arguing from first principles. Now the divine intellect is not argumentative or discursive, as we proved above.4 Therefore there can be no falsehood or deception therein.

Again. The higher a cognitive power is, the more universal and the more comprehensive is its proper object: wherefore that which the sight knows accidentally, the common sense or the imagination apprehends as included in its proper object. Now the power of the divine intellect is absolutely supreme in knowledge. Therefore all things knowable are compared thereto as knowable properly and per se and not accidentally. But the cognitive power errs not about such things. Therefore it is impossible for the divine intellect to err about any knowable object.

Moreover. An intellectual virtue is a perfection of the intellect in knowing things. Now the intellect cannot, according to an intellectual virtue, speak false, but always speaks true: because to speak true is the good act of the intellect, and it belongs to virtue to perform a good act.5 Now the divine intellect is more perfect by its nature than the human intellect is by a habit of virtue, for it is in the summit of perfection.6 It remains, therefore, that falsehood cannot be in the divine intellect.

Further. The knowledge of the human intellect is somewhat caused by things; the result being that man’s knowledge is measured by its objects: since the judgment of the intellect is true through being in accordance with things, and not vice versa. Now the divine intellect is the cause of things by its Knowledge.1 Wherefore His knowledge must needs be the measure of things: even as art is the measure of the products of art, each of which is so far perfect as it accords with art. Hence the divine intellect is compared to things as things to the human intellect. Now falsehood resulting from inequality between man’s mind and things is not in things but in the mind. Wherefore if there were not perfect equality between the divine mind and things, falsehood would be in things but not in the divine mind. And yet there is no falsehood in things, because as much as a thing has of being, so much has it of truth. Therefore there is no inequality between the divine intellect and things: nor is any falsehood possible in the divine mind.

Again. As the true is the good of the intellect, so is falsehood its evil:2 for we naturally desire to know the true and shun to be deceived by the false. Now evil cannot be in God, as was proved above.3 Therefore falsehood cannot be in Him.

Hence it is said (Rom. 3:4): But God is true: and (Num. 33:19): God is not as a man, that He should lie: and (1 Jo. 1:5): God is light, and in Him there is no darkness.

Chapter LXII

that the divine truth is the first and supreme truth

From what has been proved it clearly follows that the divine truth is the first and supreme truth.

For the disposition of things in truth is as their disposition in being, according to the Philosopher (2 Metaph.),4 and this because truth and being are mutually consequent upon one another; since the true is when that is said to be which is, and that not to be, which is not.5 Now God’s being is first and most perfect. Therefore His truth is also first and supreme.

Again. That which belongs to a thing essentially belongs thereto most perfectly. Now truth is ascribed to God essentially, as we have proved.1 Therefore His truth is the supreme and first truth.

Further. Truth is in our intellect through the latter being equated to the thing understood. Now the cause of equality is unity, as stated in 5 Metaph.2 Since then in the divine intellect, intellect and thing understood are absolutely the same, His truth must be the first and supreme truth.

Moreover. That which is the measure in any genus must be the most perfect in that genus, wherefore all colours are measured by white. Now the divine truth is the measure of all truth. For the truth of our intellect is measured by the thing that is outside the mind, since our intellect is said to be true from the very fact that it accords with the thing. And the truth of a thing is measured according to the divine intellect which is the cause of things, as we shall prove further on:3 even as the truth of art-products is measured by the art of the craftsman: for then is a casket true when it accords with art. Also, since God is the first intellect and the first intelligible, it follows that the truth of every intellect must be measured by His truth: if each thing is measured by the first in its genus, as the Philosopher teaches in 10 Metaph.4 Hence the divine truth is the first, supreme and most perfect truth.

Chapter LXIII

the arguments of those who would deny to god the knowledge of singulars

Now there are some who endeavour to withhold knowledge of singulars from the perfection of God’s knowledge: and in support of their contention they proceed by seven ways. The first is from the very nature of singularity.1 For since the principle of singularity is signate matter, it seems impossible for singulars to be known by an immaterial power, if all knowledge result from some kind of assimilation. Wherefore in us those powers alone which use material organs apprehend singulars, for instance the imagination, the senses and so on: while our intellect, since it is immaterial, knows not singulars. Much less, therefore, is the divine intellect cognizant of singulars, since it is furthest removed from matter. Hence by no means does it seem possible that God should know singulars.

The second argument2 is that singulars are not always. Either therefore they are always known by God, or they are known at one time and unknown at another. The first is impossible, since about what is not there can be no knowledge, which is always about true things, and things which are not cannot be true. The second is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine intellect is altogether unchangeable, as we have proved.3

The third argument4 proceeds from the fact that singulars do not all happen of necessity, but some contingently. Wherefore there can be no certain knowledge about them except when they are. For certain knowledge is that which cannot be deceived, and every knowledge of contingencies, since these are future, can be deceived: because the event may prove the opposite of that to which the mind holds, since if the opposite could not happen, they would be necessary. Wherefore we can have no knowledge of future contingencies, but only a kind of conjectural estimate. Now we must suppose that all God’s knowledge is most certain and infallible, as we have proved above.5 Moreover it is impossible that God begin anew to know something, on account of His unchangeableness, as stated.6 Hence it would seem to follow that He knows not contingent singulars.

The fourth7 is based on the fact that the will is the cause of certain singulars. Now an effect, until it actually is, cannot be known save in its cause, for only thus can it be before it begins to be in itself. But the movements of the will cannot be known for certain by anyone except the willer in whose power they are. Wherefore it seems impossible for God to have eternal knowledge of such singulars as have their cause in the will.

The fifth1 proceeds from the infinity of singulars. For the infinite as such is unknown:2 because whatever is known is, in a way, measured by the comprehension of the knower, since measurement is nothing else than a kind of certification of the thing measured. Wherefore every act discards the infinite. Now singulars are infinite, at least in potentiality. Therefore it seems impossible for God to know singulars.

The sixth3 proceeds from the pettiness of singulars. For as the excellence of knowledge is gauged by the excellence of its object, so apparently the pettiness of the object conduces to pettiness of knowledge. Now the divine intellect is supremely excellent. Therefore it is incompatible with its excellence that God should know the most trivial of singulars.

The seventh4 argues from the presence of evil in certain singulars. For since the thing known is, in a manner, in the knower; and since evil cannot be in God, as proved above,5 it would seem to follow that evil and privation are entirely unknown to God, and known only by an intellect that is in potentiality, since privation can only be in that which is potential. Hence it follows that God has no knowledge of singulars wherein evil and privation are to be found.

Chapter LXIV

order of the things to be said about the divine knowledge

In order to refute this error, and moreover to show the perfection of the divine knowledge, we must carefully seek the truth about each of the aforesaid arguments, so as to disprove whatever is contrary to the truth. In the first place, then, we shall show that the divine intellect knows singulars; secondly, that it knows things that actually are not; thirdly, that it knows future contingencies with an unerring knowledge; fourthly, that it knows the movements of the will; fifthly that it knows infinite things; sixthly, that it knows all the most trivial and petty things; seventhly, that it knows all evils and privations or defects.

Chapter LXV

that god knows singulars

Accordingly, we shall prove first that God cannot be lacking in the knowledge of singulars.

For it has been shown1 that God knows other things in as much as He is their cause. Now God’s effects are singular things: because God causes things in the same way as He makes them to be actual; and universals are not subsistent, but have their being only in singulars, as is proved in 7 Metaph.2 Therefore God knows things other than Himself not only in the universal but also in the singular.

Again. As soon as one knows the constituent principles of a thing’s essence, one must needs know that thing: thus knowledge of the rational soul and of such a body implies knowledge of man. Now the essence of a singular is made up of signate matter and an individual form: thus the essence of Socrates is made up of this particular body and this particular soul, even as the essence of man in general is made up of soul and body, as stated in 7 Metaph.1 Wherefore, since the latter are included in the definition of man in general, so would the former be included in the definition of Socrates, if he could be defined. Hence whoever has knowledge of matter, and of those things whereby matter is designated, and of the form individualized by matter, cannot be lacking in knowledge of the singular. Now God’s knowledge reaches to matter, individualizing accidents, and forms. For, since His act of understanding is His essence,2 it follows that He understands all that is in any way whatever in His essence: wherein are virtually, as in their first origin, all that have being in any way whatever, forasmuch as He is the first and universal principle of being;3 and among these we must include matter and accident, since matter is being in potentiality, and accident, being in another. Therefore God lacks not knowledge of singulars.

Moreover. The nature of a genus cannot be known perfectly unless its first differences and proper passions be known: thus the nature of number would not be perfectly known if odd and even were unknown. Now universal and singular are differences or proper passions of being. Therefore if God, in knowing His essence, knows perfectly the common nature of being, it follows that He knows perfectly the universal and the singular. But, just as He would not know the universal perfectly, if He knew the intention of universality without knowing the thing in the universal, such as man or animal, so too He would not know the singular perfectly if He knew the nature of singularity without knowing this or that singular thing. Therefore God must needs know singulars.

Again. Just as God is His very being, so is He His own act of knowledge, as we have proved.4 Now from the fact that He is His own being it follows that in Him are all the perfections of being as in the first source of being, as we have shown above.5 Therefore it follows that every perfection of knowledge is found in His knowledge, as in the first fount of knowledge. But this would not be if He were lacking in the knowledge of singulars: since the perfection of some knowers consists in this. Therefore it is impossible for Him not to have knowledge of singulars.

Further. In every order of powers it is universally found that the higher power extends to more things and yet is but one, whereas the lower power extends to fewer things, and yet is multiple in relation to them. This appears in the imaginative power and sense; for the one power of imagination extends to all the things of which the five senses take cognizance, and to more besides. Now the cognitive power in God is higher than in man. Therefore whatever man knows by various powers, his intellect namely, imagination, and sense, God considers it by His one simple intellect. Therefore He knows singulars, which we apprehend by sense and imagination.

Moreover. God’s intellect does not derive its knowledge from things as ours does, rather is He the cause of things by His knowledge, as we shall prove further on:1 wherefore His knowledge of other things is after the manner of practical knowledge. Now practical knowledge is not perfect unless it extend to singulars: because the end of practical knowledge is operation, which is about singulars. Therefore the divine knowledge of other things extends to singulars.

Again. The first movable is moved by a motor that moves by intellect and appetite, as was shown above.2 Now a motor by intellect cannot cause movement unless it knows the movable as naturally inclined to local movement, and that is as existing here and now, and consequently as a singular. Wherefore the intellect that is the motor of the first movable knows the first movable as a singular. But this motor is either supposed to be God, and thus our point is proved, or else it is something beneath God. And if the intellect of this motor is able by its own power to know a singular which our intellect is unable to know, much more will the divine intellect be able to do so.

Again. The agent is more excellent than the patient and the thing done,1 as act is more excellent than potentiality. Wherefore a form of lower degree cannot by its action transmit its likeness to a higher degree, whereas a higher form is able by its action to transmit its likeness to a lower degree: thus corruptible forms are produced in this lower world by the incorruptible agency of the stars, while a corruptible agency cannot produce an incorruptible form. Now all knowledge is the result of assimilation between knower and known: yet there is this difference, that in human knowledge assimilation is brought about by the action of sensible things on the human cognitive powers, whereas contrariwise in God’s knowledge it arises from the action of the form of the divine intellect on things known. Accordingly the form of a sensible object, being individualized by its materiality, is unable to transmit the likeness of its singularity to that which is altogether immaterial, and it can only reach those powers which use material organs; but it is transmitted to the intellect by virtue of the active intellect, in so far as it is wholly stripped of material conditions: and so the likeness of the singularity of a sensible form cannot reach as far as the human intellect. On the other hand the likeness of the form in the divine intellect, since it extends to the smallest details to which His causality extends, reaches to the singularity of a sensible and material form. Therefore the divine intellect can know singulars, whereas the human intellect cannot.

Further. If God knows not singulars which even men know, this would involve the absurdity which the Philosopher urges against Empedocles, namely that God is most foolish.2

The truth which we have established is confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ. For it is written (Heb. 4:13): Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight. The contrary error is rejected (Ecclus. 16:16): Say not: I shall be hidden from God, and who shall remember me from on high?

From what we have said it is also clear how the objection1 raised in the contrary sense does not conclude aright. For that which the divine intellect understands, although immaterial, is nevertheless the likeness of both the matter and the form, as the first productive principle of both.

Chapter LXVI

that god knows the things that are not

In the next place we must show that God lacks not the knowledge of things that are not.

For as stated above2 the divine knowledge stands in the same relation to the things known, as things knowable to our knowledge. Now the comparison of the thing knowable to our knowledge is that the knowable thing may exist without our having knowledge of it, whereof the Philosopher3 in the Predicaments gives the example of squaring the circle; but not conversely. Wherefore the relation of the divine knowledge to things must be such that it can also relate to non-existent things.

Again. The knowledge of God’s intellect stands in the same relation to other things as the knowledge of a craftsman to the works of his craft: since He is cause of things by His knowledge.4 Now the craftsman by the knowledge of his art knows even those things which are not yet produced by his art: since the forms of his art pass from his knowledge into external matter so as to produce the works of his art: and consequently nothing prevents forms which have not yet materialized outwardly from being in the craftsman’s knowledge. Therefore nothing prevents God from having knowledge of things that are not.

Further. God knows things other than Himself by His essence, in as much as He is the likeness of the things that proceed from Him, as shown above.1 But, since God’s essence is infinitely perfect, as proved above,2 while all things else have limited being and perfection, it is impossible for all other things together to equal the perfection of the divine essence. Wherefore it is capable of representing many things besides those that exist. Hence if God knows the whole power and perfection of His essence,3 His knowledge extends not only to those things that are, but also to those that are not.

Moreover. Our intellect, in respect of the operation by which it knows what a thing is, can have knowledge of those things also that are not actually: since it is able to comprehend the essence of a lion or horse, even if all such animals were slain. Now the divine intellect knows, as one who knows what a thing is, not only definitions but also enunciations, as shown above.4 Therefore it can have knowledge of those things also that are not.

Again. An effect can be foreknown in its cause even before it exist: even so an astronomer foreknows a future eclipse by observing the order of the heavenly movements. Now God’s knowledge is of all things through their cause: for by knowing Himself, Who is the cause of all, He knows other things as His effects, as we proved above.5 Nothing, therefore, prevents Him from knowing those things also that are not yet.

Moreover. There is no succession in God’s act of understanding, any more than there is in His existence.6 Hence it is all at once everlasting, which belongs to the essence of eternity,7 whereas the duration of time is drawn out by the succession of before and after. Wherefore the proportion of eternity to the whole duration of time is as the proportion of the indivisible to the continuous, not indeed of the indivisible that is the term of the continuous, and is not present to each part of the continuous—for such is likened to an instant of time—but of the indivisible that is outside the continuous, and yet synchronizes with each part of the continuous, or with each point of a signate continuous: because, since time does not exceed movement, eternity, being utterly outside movement, is altogether outside time. Again, since the being of the eternal never fails, eternity synchronizes with every time or instant of time. Somewhat of an example of this may be seen in the circle: for a given point in the circumference, although indivisible, does not coincide in its position with any other point, since the order of position results in the continuity of the circumference; while the centre which is outside the circumference is directly opposite any given point in the circumference. Accordingly whatever exists in any part of time, is coexistent with the eternal as though present thereto, although in relation to another part of time it is present or future. Now a thing cannot be present to, and coexistent with, the eternal, except with the whole eternal, since this has no successive duration. Therefore whatever happens throughout the whole course of time is seen as present by the divine intellect in its eternity. And yet that which is done in some part of time was not always in existence. It remains therefore that God has knowledge of those things which are not as yet in relation to the course of time.

By these arguments it is made clear that God has knowledge of not-beings. Nevertheless not-beings have not all the same relation to His knowledge. For those things which neither are, nor shall be, nor have been, are known by God as possible to His power. Wherefore He knows them, not as existing in themselves in any way, but as merely existing in the divine power. Such things are said by some to be known to God according to His knowledge of simple intelligence.

On the other hand things which to us are present, past, or future, are known to God as being not only in His power, but also in their respective causes, and in themselves. Of such things God is said to have knowledge of vision, because God sees the existence of things which, in relation to us, are not as yet, not only in their causes but also in themselves, in as much as His eternity is by its indivisibility present to all time.

Yet God knows every manner of a thing’s being by His essence. For His essence is capable of being represented by many things that neither are, nor shall be, nor have been. Moreover it is the likeness of every cause’s power, in respect of which effects pre-exist in their causes. And the being that every single thing has in itself is drawn as a copy from Him.

Wherefore God knows not-beings in so far as they have being after a fashion, either in the divine power, or in their causes, or in themselves. And this is not contrary to the essential conditions of knowledge.

The authority of Holy Writ also bears witness to the foregoing. For it is written (Ecclus. 23:29): All things were known to the Lord God, before they were created; so also after they were perfected He knoweth1 all things: and (Jer. 1:5): Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee.

It is clear from what has been said, that we are not compelled to say, as some have said, that God knows all singulars universally, because He knows them in their universal causes only, even as one who knows a particular eclipse, not as this particular one, but as resulting from opposition: since it has been proved2 that the divine knowledge extends to singulars as existing in themselves.

Chapter LXVII

that god knows future contingent singulars

From the foregoing it is already somewhat evident that from eternity God has had unerring knowledge of singular contingencies, and that nevertheless they cease not to be contingent.3

For contingency is not incompatible with certainty of knowledge except in so far as it is future, and not as it is present. Because a contingency, while future, may not be; so that the knowledge of one who thinks it will be, may be wrong, and it will be wrong if what he thinks will be, will not be. From the moment however that it is, for the time being it cannot not-be: although it may not be in the future, but this affects the contingency, not as present but as future. Hence sense loses nothing of its certainty when it sees that a man is running, although this statement is contingent. Accordingly all knowledge that bears on a contingency as present, can be certain. Now the vision of the divine intellect from eternity sees each thing that happens in time as though it were present, as we have shown above.1 Therefore it follows that nothing prevents God having unerring knowledge of contingencies from eternity.

Again. The contingent differs from the necessary, according as each is in its cause: for the contingent is in its cause in such a way that it may not result, or may result therefrom: whereas the necessary cannot but result from its cause. But according as each of them is in itself, they differ not as to being, on which the true is founded: because there is not in the contingent, considered as it is in itself, being and not-being, but only being, although it is possible for the contingent not to be in the future. Now the divine intellect knows things from eternity, not only as to the being which they have in their causes, but also as to the being which they have in themselves.2 Therefore nothing prevents it having eternal and unerring knowledge of contingencies.

Moreover. Even as the effect follows certainly from a necessary cause, so does it from a complete contingent cause unless it be hindered. Now, since God knows all things, as was proved above,3 He knows not only the causes of contingencies, but also that which may possibly hinder them. Therefore He knows certainly whether contingencies be or not.

Again. An effect does not happen to exceed its cause; but sometimes it falls short of it. Hence, since in us knowledge is caused from things, it happens at times that we know necessary things, by way not of necessity but of probability. Now, just as with us things are the cause of knowledge, so the divine knowledge is the cause of the things known.1 Nothing therefore prevents things whereof God has necessary knowledge being contingent in themselves.

Further. An effect cannot be necessary if its cause be contingent, for it would follow that an effect exists after its cause has been removed. Now the ultimate effect has both a proximate and a remote cause. Hence if the proximate cause be contingent, its effect must needs be contingent, even though the remote cause be necessary: thus plants do not necessarily bear fruit—although the motion of the sun is necessary—on account of the contingent intermediate causes. But God’s knowledge, although it is the cause of the things it knows, is nevertheless their remote cause. Wherefore the contingency of the things it knows does not militate with its necessity: since it happens that the intermediate causes are contingent.

Again. God’s knowledge would not be true and perfect, if things happened not in the same way as God knows them to happen. Now God, since He is cognizant of all being, whereof He is the source, knows each effect not only in itself, but also in its relation to every one of its causes. But the relation of contingencies to their proximate causes, is, that they result from them contingently. Therefore God knows that certain things happen and that they happen contingently. Wherefore the certainty and truth of the divine knowledge do not take away the contingency of things.

It is therefore clear from what has been said how we are to refute the objection2 gainsaying God’s knowledge of contingencies. For change in that which is subsequent does not argue changeableness in that which precedes: since it happens that contingent ultimate effects result from necessary first causes. Now the things known to God do not precede His knowledge, as is the case with us, but are subsequent thereto. Therefore it does not follow that, if what is known to God be changeable, His knowledge can err or in any way be changeable. It will therefore be a fallacy of consequence if, because our knowledge of changeable things is changeable, we think that this happens in all knowledge.

Again, when we say God knows or knew this future thing, we imply a kind of middle term between the divine knowledge and the thing known, namely the time at which the statement is made, in relation to which that which God is said to know is future. But it is not future in relation to the divine knowledge, which existing in the moment of eternity, is related to all things as though they were present. In relation to that knowledge, if we set aside the time at which the statement is made, there is no saying that the thing is known as non-existent, so as to allow of the question being raised as to whether it is possible for the thing not to be: but it will be said to be known by God as already seen in its existence. This being supposed, there is no room for the aforesaid question: since what is already, cannot, as regards that instant, not be. The fallacy arises then from the fact that the time at which we speak is coexistent with eternity, as also does past time (which is designated when we say God knew): wherefore the relation of past or present to future time is ascribed to eternity, which is altogether inapplicable thereto. The result is a fallacy of accident.

Further, if every single thing is known to God as seen present to Him, that which God knows will be so far necessary as it is necessary that Socrates is sitting from the fact that he is seen to be sitting. Now this is necessary, not absolutely or as some say by necessity of consequent, but conditionally, or by necessity of consequence. For this conditional statement is necessary: If he is seen to sit, he sits. Wherefore if the conditional be rendered categorically, so as to run, That which is seen to sit, necessarily sits, it is clear that if it be referred to the statement, and in a composite sense, it is true, and if referred to the thing and in a divided sense, it is false. And so in these and in all like arguments employed by those who gainsay God’s knowledge of contingencies, there is a fallacy of composition and division.

That God knows future contingencies is also proved by the authority of Holy Writ. For it is said (Wis. 8:8) about the divine Wisdom: She knoweth signs and wonders before they be done, and the events of time and ages: and (Ecclus. 39:24, 25): There is nothing hid from His eyes, He seeth from eternity to eternity: and (Isa. 48:5): I foretold thee of old; before they came to pass I told thee.

Chapter LXVIII

that god knows the movements of the will

In the next place we must show that God knows our mind’s thoughts and our secret wills.

For everything, in whatever way it exists, is known by God, in as much as He knows His essence, as we have shown above.1 Now some things are in the soul, and some in things outside the soul. Wherefore God knows all these differences of things and whatever is contained under them. Now the things in the soul are those that are in our will or our thought. It remains, therefore, that God knows what we have in our thoughts and wills.

Moreover. God so knows other things in knowing His essence, as effects are known through their cause being known.2 Accordingly by knowing His essence God knows all the things to which His causality extends. Now this extends to the works of the intellect and will: for, since every thing acts by its form which gives the thing some kind of being, it follows that the highest source of all being, from which also every form is derived, must be the source of all operation; because the effects of second causes are to be referred in a still higher degree to first causes. Therefore God knows both the thoughts and the affections of the mind.

Again. Even as His being is first and consequently the cause of all being, so His act of intelligence is first, and consequently the cause of all intellectual operation. Wherefore just as God by knowing His being knows the being of everything, so by knowing His act of intelligence and will He knows every thought and will.

Further. God knows things not only as existing in themselves, but also as existing in their causes, as proved above:1 for He knows the relation between cause and effect. Now the products of art are in the craftsman through the intellect and will of the craftsman, even as natural things are in their causes through the powers of the causes: for, just as natural things liken their effects to themselves by their active powers, so the craftsman by his intellect gives his handiwork the form whereby it is likened to his art. It is the same with all things done of set purpose. Therefore God knows both our thoughts and our wills.

Again. Intelligible substances are no less known to God than sensible substances are known to Him or to us: since intelligible substances are more knowable, for as much as they are more actual. Now the informations and inclinations of sensible substances are known both to God and to us. Consequently, since the soul’s thought results from its being informed, and since its affection is its inclination towards something—for even the inclination of a natural thing is called its natural appetite—it follows that God knows our secret thoughts and affections.

This is confirmed by the testimony of Holy Writ. For it is said in the psalm:2 The searcher of hearts and reins is God: and (Prov. 15:11): Hell and destruction are before the Lord: how much more the hearts of the children of men; and (Jo. 2:25): He knew what was in man.

The dominion which the will exercises over its own acts, and by which it is in its power to will and not to will, removes the determination of the power to one thing, and the violence of a cause acting from without: but it does not exclude the influence of a higher cause from which it has being and action. Thus causality remains in the first cause which is God, in respect of the movements of the will; so that God is able to know them by knowing Himself.

Chapter LXIX

that god knows infinite things

We must next prove that God knows infinite things. For in knowing that He is the cause of things He knows things other than Himself, as was shown above.1 Now He is the cause of infinite things, if there be infinite things, since He is the cause of whatever is. Therefore He knows infinite things.

Again. God knows His own power perfectly, as was proved above.2 Now a power cannot be known perfectly unless all the things to which it extends be known, since its quantity is gauged in a manner according to them. But His power, being infinite as we have shown,3 extends to infinite things. Therefore God knows infinite things.

Moreover. If God’s knowledge extends to all things that exist, in whatever way they exist, as we have shown,4 it follows that He knows not only actual being but also potential being. Now in natural things there is the infinite potentially although not actually, as the Philosopher proves in 3 Phys.5 Therefore God knows infinite things: even as unity, which is the principle of number, would know infinite species of numbers, if it knew whatever is potentially in it; for unity is every number potentially.

Again. God knows other things in His essence as in a prototypical medium.6 Now since He is infinitely perfect, as was shown above,1 it is possible for an infinite number of things with finite perfections to be copied from Him; since it is impossible for any single one, or any number of copies, to equal the example of their prototype, and thus there always remains some new way in which some copy can imitate it. Nothing therefore prevents Him from knowing infinite things by His essence.

Further. God’s being is His act of understanding.2 Therefore even as His being is infinite, as shown above,3 so His act of understanding is infinite. Now as finite is to finite so is infinite to infinite. If therefore by our act of understanding which is finite we are able to understand finite things, God also by His act of understanding is able to understand infinite things.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (3 De Anima4) an intellect which knows the supremely intelligible knows the less intelligible not less but more: and the reason for this is that the intellect is not corrupted by the excellence of the intelligible, as the sense is, but is the more perfected. Now if we take an infinite number of beings, whether they be of the same species—as an infinite number of men—or of an infinite number of species, even though some or all of them be infinite in quantity, if this were possible; all of them together would be of less infinity than God: since each one and all together would have being confined and limited to a certain species or genus, and thus would be in some way finite: wherefore it would fall short from the infinity of God Who is infinite simply, as we proved above.5 Since, therefore, God knows Himself perfectly,6 nothing prevents Him from also knowing that infinite number of things.

Further. The more efficacious and clear an intellect is in knowing, the greater the number of things is it able to know from one: even as every power, the stronger it is, the more united it is. Now the divine intellect is infinite in effiacy or perfection, as was shown above.7 Therefore it can know an infinite number of things by one which is His essence.

Further. The divine intellect like the divine essence is perfect simply.1 Wherefore no intellectual perfection is lacking thereto. Now that to which our intellect is in potentiality is its intellectual perfection: and it is in potentiality to all intelligible species. But these species are infinite in number: since the species of numbers and figures are infinite. It follows therefore that God knows all like infinite things.

Again. Since our intellect is cognizant of the infinite in potentiality, for as much as it is able to multiply the species of numbers indefinitely; if the divine intellect knew not also the infinite in act, it would follow either that our intellect knows more things than the divine intellect knows, or that the divine intellect knows not actually all the things that it knows potentially: and each of these is impossible, as proved above.2

Further. The infinite is repugnant to knowledge in so far as it is incompatible with being counted: for it is in itself impossible, as implying a contradiction, for the parts of the infinite to be numbered. Now the knowledge of a thing by counting its parts belongs to an intellect that knows one part after another in succession, and not to one that understands the various parts together. Since then the divine intellect knows things together without succession, it is no more hindered from knowing the infinite than from knowing the finite.

Moreover. All quantity consists in a certain plurality of parts, for which reason number is the first of quantities. Accordingly where plurality involves no difference, neither does it cause any difference consequent upon quantity. Now in God’s knowledge many things are known in the same way as one, since they are known, not by various species, but by one which is God’s essence.3 Wherefore many things are known by God simultaneously: and consequently plurality makes no difference in God’s knowledge. Neither therefore does the infinite which is consequent upon quantity.1 Therefore knowledge, whether of infinite or of finite things, differs not to the divine intellect. And consequently, since it knows finite things, nothing prevents it from knowing also infinite things.

The words of the psalm2 are in agreement with this: And of His wisdom there is no number.

From the foregoing it is clear why our intellect knows not the infinite, as the divine intellect does. For our intellect differs from the divine intellect in four respects, which constitute this difference. In the first place, our intellect is simply finite, whereas the divine intellect is infinite. Secondly our intellect knows different things by different species: wherefore it cannot grasp infinite things by one knowledge, as the divine intellect can. The third difference results from the fact that our intellect, since it knows different things by different species, cannot know many things at the same time, so that it cannot know an infinite number of things except by taking them one after the other. Whereas it is not so in the divine intellect, which considers many things simultaneously, as seen by one species. Fourthly, because the divine intellect is about things that are and things that are not, as we proved above.3

It is also clear how the saying of the Philosopher that the infinite as such is unknown, is not in contradiction with this statement.4 For since, as he says,5 the notion of infinity is becoming to quantity, the infinite would be known as such, if it were known by the measuring of its parts: because this is proper knowledge of quantity.6 But God does not know thus. Wherefore, so to say, He knows the infinite, not as such, but in as much as in comparison with His knowledge it is finite, as we have shown.

It must be observed, however, that God does not know infinite things by His knowledge of vision,7 to use the expression employed by others, because the infinite neither is, nor was, nor will be actual; since, according to the Catholic faith, generation is not infinite on either part. Yet He knows the infinite by His knowledge of simple intelligence. For God knows the infinite number of things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, and nevertheless are in the power of a creature. He knows also the infinite things that are in His power, that neither are, nor have been, nor shall be.

Wherefore as regards the question about the knowledge of singulars, we might reply by denying the major premiss: since singulars are not infinite. If, however, they were, God would know them none the less.

Chapter LXX

that god knows trivial things

This being established, we must show that God knows trivial things and that this is not inconsistent with the nobility of His knowledge.

For the stronger an active power is, the further does its action extend, as appears even in the action of sensible things. Now the force of the divine intellect in knowing things is likened to an active power: since the divine intellect knows, not by receiving from things, but rather by pouring itself into them. Since, then, it is of infinite power in understanding, as shown above,1 it follows that its knowledge extends to the most remote things. Now the degrees of nobility and meanness in all beings depend on nearness to and distance from God, Who is in the summit of nobility. Therefore God, on account of the exceeding power of His intellect, knows things even though they be in the last degree trivial.

Further. Whatever is, for as much as it exists, or is such, is actual, and a likeness of the first act, and for this reason has nobility. Again whatever is in potentiality, has a share of nobility through its being ordained to actuality: for so is it said to be. It follows, therefore, that everything, considered in itself, is noble; but is said to be mean in comparison with that which is more noble. Now the noblest of things other than God are no less distant from Him than the lowest creatures are from the highest. If, therefore, this latter distance hindered God’s knowledge, much more would the former: and thus it would follow that God knows nothing other than Himself; which has been disproved above.1 If, therefore, He knows something other than Himself, however most noble it may be, for the same reason He knows everything, no matter how mean we call it.

Moreover. The good of the order in the universe is more noble than any part of the universe, because each part is directed to the good of the order in the whole, as to its end, as the Philosopher states in 11 Metaph.2 If then God knows some other noble nature, most of all must He know the order, of the universe. But this cannot be known unless both noble and mean things be known, because the order of the universe consists in their mutual distances and relationships. It follows therefore that God knows not only noble things, but also those that are deemed trivial.

Further. The meanness of things known does not of itself reflect on the knower: for it belongs to the nature of knowledge that the knower contains the species of the things he knows, according to his mode. And yet the meanness of things known may reflect accidentally on the knower: either because while considering mean things he is withdrawn from the thought of noble things, or because through considering mean things he is inclined to certain undue affections. But this cannot take place in God, as appears from what has been said.3 Therefore the knowledge of trivial things is not derogatory to the nobility of God; rather does it belong to His perfection, for as much as He prepossesses all things in Himself, as we have shown above.4

Again. A power is accounted little, not through being capable of little things, but through being confined to little results: since a power that is capable of great things is also capable of little ones. Accordingly knowledge that comprises both noble and trivial things is not to be accounted trivial, but only that which comprises none but trivial things, as happens with us: for our thoughts of divine things are distinct from our thoughts of human things, and of each we have a distinct knowledge; wherefore in comparison with the more noble, the less noble is accounted mean. But it is not thus in God: because He considers all things with the same thought and knowledge.1 Therefore no meanness is to be ascribed to His knowledge, on account of His knowing any mean things whatever.

In accord with this is the saying of Wis. 7:24, 25 about divine Wisdom, that She reacheth everywhere by reason of Her purity … and no defiled thing cometh into Her.

It is clear from what has been said that the argument put forward in opposition2 is not subversive of the truth we have demonstrated. For the nobility of a science depends on the principal object of that science and not on whatever may come under that science: because with us not only the highest but also the lowest beings come under the most noble of sciences: for the treatise of Metaphysics extends from the first being to potential being, which is the lowest of all beings. Thus then the divine knowledge comprises the lowest beings as being known at the same time with the object known principally, for the divine essence is the principal object of God’s knowledge, and in it He knows all things, as we have shown above.3

It is also evident that this truth is not in contradiction with the statements of the Philosopher in 11 Metaph.4 For there he intends to prove that the divine intellect knows not something other than Himself, that is a perfection of His intellect as the principal object of its knowledge. And in this sense he states that it is better not to know mean things than to know them: when, that is, knowledge of trivial things is distinct from the knowledge of noble things, and the thought of mean things is an obstacle to the thought of noble things.

Chapter LXXI

that god knows evil things

It remains now to be proved that God knows evil things.

For if a good be known the opposite evil is known. Now God knows all the particular goods to which evils are opposed. Therefore God knows evil things.

Further. The notions of contraries in the mind are not opposed to one another, else they would not be together in the mind, nor would they be known at the same time. Therefore the aspect under which we know evil is not repugnant to good, rather is it connected with the idea of good. Accordingly if, as we have proved above,1 all the aspects of goodness are to be found in God, by reason of His absolute perfection, it follows that in Him is the notion by which evil is known. Therefore He knows evils also.

Again. The true is the good of the intellect:2 for an intellect is said to be good for as much as it knows the true. Now it is not only true that good is good, but also that evil is evil: for just as it is true that what is, is, so is it true that what is not, is not. Hence the good of the intellect consists even in the knowledge of evil. But, since the divine intellect is perfect in goodness,3 it cannot possibly lack any intellectual perfection. Therefore it has the knowledge of evils.

Moreover. God knows the distinction between things, as shown above.4 Now the notion of distinction includes negation, for when things are distinct, the one is not the other. Hence primaries which are distinguished by themselves, include mutual negation of one another, and for this reason negative propositions about them are self-evident, for instance, No quantity is a substance. Therefore God knows negation. Now privation is negation in a definite subject, as is proved in 4 Metaph.1 Therefore He knows privation, and consequently evil, which is nothing else than the privation of due perfection.

Further. If God knows all the species of things, as was proved above,2 and as granted and proved even by some philosophers, it follows that He knows contraries; both because the species of certain genera are contrary, and because the differences of genera are contrary, as stated in 10 Metaph.3 Now contraries include opposition of form and of privation, according to the same authority.4 Therefore it follows that God knows privation and, consequently, evil.

Again. God knows not only form but also matter, as was proved above.5 Now matter, since it is being in potentiality, cannot be known perfectly, unless it be known to what its potentiality extends, and this applies to all kinds of power. But the potentiality of matter extends to both form and privation: for that which can be, can also not be. Therefore God knows privation: and consequently He knows evil.

Again. If God knows anything besides Himself, most of all He knows that which is best: and this is the order of the universe, to which as their end all particular goods are directed.6 Now in the order of the universe there are certain things intended for the removal of harms that might result from certain other things, as evidenced by the means of defence with which animals are provided. Therefore God knows these harms: and thus He knows evils.

Further. We are never blamed for knowing evils, as regards that which belongs essentially to knowledge, that is, as regards judgment about evil, but only accidentally, for as much as sometimes one is inclined to evil through thinking about it. But it is not so in God, for He is unchangeable, as was proved above.7 Nothing therefore hinders God from knowing evils.

In agreement with this it is written (Wis. 8) that no evil can overcome God’s wisdom;1 and (Prov. 15:11) that Hell and destruction are before the Lord. Also in the psalm2 it is said: My offences are not hidden from Thee; and (Job 11:11): For He knoweth the vanity of men, and when He seeth iniquity, doth He not consider it?

It must however be observed that with regard to the knowledge of evil and privation there is a difference between the divine intellect and ours.3 For seeing that our intellect knows each thing by its respective proper and distinct species, it knows that which is in act by an intelligible species, whereby the intellect is made actual. Hence it is able to know potentiality, in as much as it is sometimes in potentiality to such a species: and thus just as it knows act by means of an act, so it knows potentiality by means of potentiality. And since potentiality belongs to the notion of privation, for privation is a negation the subject whereof is a being in potentiality, it follows that it is becoming to our intellect to know privation, in some way, in as much as it is naturally fitted to be in potentiality; although we may also say that the mere knowledge of actuality leads to the knowledge of potentiality and privation.

On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is nowise in potentiality, knows neither privation nor anything else in the above manner.4 For if He knew anything by a species other than Himself, it would follow of necessity that He is compared to that species as potentiality to act. It follows therefore that He understands only by a species that is His essence: and consequently that He understands Himself as the first object of His understanding: and yet in understanding Himself He understands other things, as shown above,5 and not only acts but potentialities and privations.

This is what the Philosopher means when he says (3 De Anima6): How does it know evil, or black? For it knows contraries1 somewhat. And it must know them by a potentiality that is in itself. But if anything there be in which the contrary is not (namely in potentiality), it knows itself, and is in act and separable. Nor is it necessary to admit the explanation of Averroës who maintains that it follows from the above that the intellect which is pure act knows a privation not at all. But the sense is that it knows privation, not through being in potentiality to something else, but through knowing itself and being always in act.

Again, it must be observed that if God knew Himself in such a way that by knowing Himself He knew not other beings which are particular goods, He would have no knowledge whatever of privation or evil. Because there is no privation contrary to the good that is Himself: since a privation and its contrary are naturally adapted to be in relation to the same thing, and so no privation, and therefore no evil, is opposed to that which is pure act. Wherefore, supposing God to know Himself alone, He would not know evil through knowing the good which is Himself. But, since by knowing Himself He knows things in which there is a natural aptness for privations, it follows of necessity that He knows the opposite privation, and the evils contrary to particular goods.

It must also be observed that, just as God by knowing Himself knows other things without any discursion of His intellect, as shown above,2 so too there is no need for His knowledge to be discursive, if He knows evil through good. For good is the ratio as it were of the knowledge of evil, so that evil is known through good, as a thing through its definition, and not as conclusions through their premisses. Nor does it argue imperfection in the divine knowledge if God knows evil through the privation of good: because evil does not indicate being except in so far as it is a privation of good. Wherefore in this way alone is it knowable: since a thing is so far knowable as it has being.

Chapter LXXII

that in god there is will

After discussing the matters concerning the knowledge of the divine intellect it remains for us to consider the divine will.

For from the fact that there is intelligence in God it follows that in Him there is will. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now understood indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows therefore of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good: for since He is perfectly intelligent, as shown above,1 He understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore in Him there is will.

Again. Whatever has a form, is thereby related to things actually existing: thus white timber by its whiteness is like some things and unlike others. Now in intelligent and sentient subjects there is the form of the thing understood and sensed, because all knowledge is through some likeness. Therefore there must be a relation in the intelligent or sentient subject to the things understood or sensed according as the latter actually exist. Now this is not due to the fact that they understand or sense, because in this respect rather is there a relation in things to the intelligent or sentient subject, since intelligence and sensation depend on things being in the intellect and sense, according to the respective modes of each. But the sentient and the intelligent subject have by the will and appetite a relation to things outside the mind. Wherefore every sentient and intelligent subject has an appetite and will, although properly speaking, will is in an intellect. Since then God is intelligent, it follows that He has a will.

Moreover. That which is consequent upon every being, belongs to being as such: and a thing of this kind must needs be found especially in that which is the first being. Now it is competent to every being to desire its own perfection and the preservation of its being: and to each one this is competent according to its mode, to intelligent beings by will, to animals by sensitive appetite, to those that are devoid of sense by natural appetite: to those however who have it otherwise than to those who have it not: for those who have it not, by the appetitive power of their genus tend with desire to acquire what is lacking to them, whereas those who have it are at rest therein. Wherefore this cannot be lacking to the first being, which is God. Since, then, He is intelligent, there is will in Him, whereby His being and His goodness are pleasing to Him.

Again. The more perfect the act of understanding is, the more delightful is it to the one who understands. Now God understands, and His act of understanding is most perfect, as was proved above.1 Therefore to understand is to Him most delightful. But intellectual delight is by the will, even as sensitive delight is by the appetite of concupiscence. Therefore there is will in God.

Further. A form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the medium of the will, whose object is an end and a good by which one is moved to act. Wherefore the speculative intellect does not move; nor does the sole imagination without the estimative power. Now the form of the divine intellect is the cause of being and movement in other things, for God moves things by His intellect, as we shall prove further on.2 Therefore it follows that He has a will.

Again. The first of motive powers in intelligent beings is the will: because the will applies every power to its act: for we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so forth. And the will has this because its object is the end—although the intellect, not by way of efficient and moving cause, but by way of final cause, moves the will, by putting its object before it, which object is the end. Therefore it is especially fitting that the first mover should have a will.

Further. The free is that which is its own cause:1 and so the free has the aspect of that which is of itself. Now liberty of action is seated primarily in the will, for in so far as one acts voluntarily, one is said to perform any action whatever freely. Therefore it is especially fitting that the first agent should act by will, since to Him it is most competent to act of Himself.

Moreover. The end and the agent intending the end are always of the same order in things: wherefore the proximate end which is proportionate to the agent, is of the same species as the agent, in works both of nature and of art: for the form of the art whereby the craftsman works is the species of the form that is in matter, and is the end of the craftsman; and the form of the generating fire, whereby the fire acts, is of the same species as the form of the fire generated, which form is the end of the generation.2 Now nothing is co-ordinate with God as though it were of the same order, except God Himself, otherwise there would be several first beings, and we have shown the contrary to be the case.3 He is therefore the first agent intending an end which is Himself. Therefore He not only is a desirable end, but also desires Himself, so to speak, as an end; and, since He is intelligent, He desires Himself by intellectual appetite; and this is will. Therefore in God there is will.

Holy Writ bears witness to this will of God. For it is said in the psalm:4 Whatsoever the Lord willed, He hath done: and (Rom. 9:19): Who resisteth His will?

Chapter LXXIII

that god’s will is his essence

It is evident from the foregoing that His will is not distinct from His essence.

For it belongs to God to have a will in as much as He has an intellect, as proved above.1 Now He is intelligent by His essence, as we have already shown:2 and consequently will also is in Him by His essence. Therefore God’s will is His very essence.

Again. Even as to understand is the perfection of one who is intelligent, so to will is the perfection of one who wills, for each is an action abiding in the agent, and not passing into something passive, as heating. Now God’s act of intelligence is His being, as we proved above;3 because, since God’s being is by itself supremely perfect, it admits of no additional perfection, as we have shown above.4 Therefore the divine willing is also His being: and consequently God’s will is His essence.

Moreover. Since every agent acts in so far as it is actual, it follows that God, Who is pure act, acts by His essence. Now willing is an operation of God. Therefore it follows that God wills by His essence. Therefore His will is His essence.

Again. If will were something added to the divine substance, since the divine substance is complete in being, it would follow that will would be adventitious to Him like an accident to its subject; that the divine substance would be compared thereto as potentiality to act; and that there is composition in God. All of which have been disproved above.5 It is therefore impossible for the divine will to be something in addition to the divine essence.

Chapter LXXIV

that the principal object of god’s will is the divine essence

It is also evident from the foregoing that the principal object of God’s will is His essence.

For the good understood is the object of the will, as proved above.1 Now the principal object of God’s intellect is the divine essence, as we have already proved.2 Therefore the divine essence is the principal object of the divine will.

Again. The appetible object is compared to the appetite as mover to the thing moved, as we have stated above.3 It is the same with the thing willed in relation to the will, since the will belongs to the genus of appetitive powers. Wherefore if something besides God’s essence were the principal object of God’s will, it would follow that something else is superior to, and moves the divine will: and the contrary of this was proved above.4

Further. The principal thing willed is to every willer the cause of his willing: for when we say: I wish to walk that I may be healed, we consider that we are stating the reason, and if it be asked, Why do you wish to be healed? we shall continue to give reasons until we come to the last end which is the principal thing willed, and is of itself the cause of willing. Accordingly if God wills principally something other than Himself, it follows that something other than Himself is the cause of His willing. But His willing is His being, as we have shown.5 Therefore something else will be the cause of His being: and this is contrary to the notion of the first being.

Again. To every willer the thing willed principally is his last end: because the end is willed by reason of itself, and other things come to be willed by reason of it. Now God is the last end, because He is the sovereign good, as was proved.1 Therefore He is the principal object of His will.

Moreover. Every power is proportionate to its principal object according to equality: for the power of a thing is measured according to its object, as the Philosopher says (1 Cœli et Mundi ). Therefore the will is proportionate according to equality to its principal object, as well as the intellect and the senses. Now nothing is proportionate according to equality to God’s will, except His essence. Therefore the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence. And since the divine essence is God’s act of understanding and whatsoever else is said to be in God, it is also clear that in the same way God wills principally, to will, to understand, to be one and so forth.

Chapter LXXV

that god in willing himself wills also other things

Hence it may be proved that in willing Himself He wills other things also.

For He who wills the end principally, wills the means to the end for the sake of that end. Now God Himself is the last end of things, as appears sufficiently from what we have said.3 From the fact therefore that He wills Himself to be, He wills also other things, that are directed to Himself as their end.

Again. Every thing desires the perfection of that which it wills and loves for its own sake: because whatever we love for its own sake, we wish to be best, and ever to be bettered and multiplied as much as possible. Now God wills and loves His essence for its own sake: and it cannot be increased or multiplied in itself, as appears from what has been said:4 and can only be multiplied in respect of its likeness which is shared by many.5 Therefore God wishes things to be multiplied, because He wills and loves His essence and perfection.

Moreover. Whosoever loves a thing in itself and for its own sake, loves in consequence all the things wherein it is found: thus he who loves sweetness for its own sake, must needs love all sweet things. Now God wills and loves His own being, in itself and for its own sake, as we have proved above.1 And all other being is a participation, by likeness, of His being, as was made sufficiently clear by what we have said above.2 Therefore, from the very fact that God wills and loves Himself, it follows that He wills and loves other things.

Again. God, in willing Himself, wills all things that are in Him. Now all things pre-exist in Him somewhat by their proper types, as we have proved.3 Therefore in willing Himself, God wills other things.

Again. As stated above,4 the greater a thing’s power, to so many more things, and to the greater distance does its causality extend. Now the causality of an end consists in other things being desired for its sake. Wherefore the more perfect and the more willed an end is, to so many more things does the will of him who wills that end extend by reason of that end. But the divine essence is most perfect considered under the aspect of goodness and end. Therefore it will extend its causality most of all to many things, so that many be willed for its sake, especially by God, Who wills it perfectly with all His might.

Further. Will is consequent upon intellect. Now God by His intellect understands Himself principally, and other things in Himself.5 Therefore in like manner He wills Himself principally, and in willing Himself, He wills all else.

This is confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ: for it is written (Wis. 11:25): For Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.

Chapter LXXVI

that god, by the one act of his will, wills himself and other things

This being proved, it follows that God, by one act of His will, wills Himself and other things.

For every power tends by one operation or act to its object and the formal aspect of that object: even as by the one sight, we see light and colour made visible by light. Now when we will something solely for the sake of an end, that which is desired for the sake of the end takes its aspect of thing willed from the end; and thus the end is compared to it as the formal aspect to an object, as light to colour. Since, then, God wills all things for His own sake as for the sake of an end, as we have proved,1 He wills Himself and other things by one act of His will.

Moreover. That which is perfectly known and desired is known and desired with respect to its whole virtue. Now the virtue of an end consists not only in its being desired for its own sake, but also in other things being made desirable for its sake. Wherefore he that desires an end perfectly, desires it in both these ways. But it cannot be admitted that God has an act whereby He wills Himself without willing Himself perfectly, since in Him there is nothing imperfect.2 Hence by every act in which God wills Himself, He wills Himself absolutely, and other things for His own sake. And He wills not things other than Himself, except because He wills Himself, as was proved above.3 It follows therefore that not by distinct acts but by one and the same act He wills Himself and other things.

Again. As appears from what has been said,4 discursion in the act of the cognitive faculty occurs when we know the premisses apart from the conclusions, and draw the conclusions from them: for if we were to see the conclusions in the premisses themselves, simply through knowing the premisses, there would be no discursion, as neither is there when we see something reflected in a mirror. Now just as the premisses are related to the conclusions in speculative matters, so are the ends to the means in practical and appetitive matters: because even as we know conclusions through their premisses, so does the end lead us to the appetite and practice of the means.1 Accordingly if a person will the end and the means separately, there will be discursion in his will. But there can be no such thing in God, since He is outside all movement.2 Therefore it follows that God wills Himself and other things simultaneously by the one same act of His will.

Again. Since God always wills Himself, if He will Himself by one, and other things by another act, it follows that there are two acts of will in Him at the same time. But this is impossible: since of one simple power there are not at the one time two operations.

Further. In every act of the will the thing willed is compared to the will as mover to moved. Wherefore if there be an act of the divine will, by which He wills things other than Himself, and which is distinct from the act whereby He wills Himself, there will be in Him something else that moves the divine will: and this is impossible.

Moreover. God’s willing is His being as we have proved.3 But in God there is only one being. Therefore in Him there is but one act of the will.

Again. It is becoming to God to will in as much as He is intelligent.4 Wherefore just as by one act He understands Himself and other things, in as much as His essence is the exemplar of all things,5 so by one act He wills Himself and other things, in as much as His goodness is the type of all goodness.6

Chapter LXXVII

that the multitude of things willed is not inconsistent with the divine simplicity

Hence it follows that the multitude of things willed is not inconsistent with the oneness and simplicity of the divine substance.

For acts are distinguished according to their objects. If, then, the plurality of things willed by God indicated any kind of multitude in Him, it would follow that there is not only one operation of the will in Him: and this is contrary to what has been proved.1

Again. It has been shown2 that God wills other things in as much as He wills His goodness. Wherefore things stand in relation to His will for as much as they are comprised in His goodness. Now all things are one in His goodness: because other things are in Him according to His mode, to wit material things immaterially and multitude unitedly, as we have shown above.3 Hence it follows that the plurality of things willed does not argue plurality in the divine substance.

Further. The divine intellect and will are of equal simplicity, since each is the divine substance, as we have proved.4 Now the multitude of things understood does not involve multiplicity in the divine essence, nor composition in His intellect.5 Neither therefore does the multitude of things willed prove either diversity in the divine essence or composition in His will.

Moreover. The difference between knowledge and appetite is, that knowledge results from the thing known being somehow in the knower, whereas appetite does not, but on the contrary, results from the appetite being referred to the appetible thing, which the appetent seeks and wherein it rests. For this reason good and evil which regard the appetite are in things, whereas true and false which regard knowledge are in the mind, as the Philosopher states in 6 Metaph.1 Now it is not inconsistent with the simplicity of a thing that it be referred to many, since even unity is the principle of the multitude of numbers. Therefore the multitude of things willed by God is not inconsistent with His simplicity.

Chapter LXXVIII

that the divine will extends to particular goods

It is also evident from the foregoing that in order to safeguard the divine simplicity it is not necessary for us to say that God wills other goods in a kind of universal way, in so far as He wills Himself to be the source of the goods which can flow from Him, and that He does not will them in particular.

For the act of willing is according to a comparison of the willer to the thing willed. Now the divine simplicity does not forbid God’s being compared to many things, even to particulars: for He is said to be best or first even in comparison with singulars. Therefore His simplicity is not inconsistent with His willing things other than Himself even in special or particular.

Again. God’s will is compared to other things in as much as they partake of His goodness through being ordered to the divine goodness which is to God the reason of His willing.2 Now not only the universe of good things, but also each one of them derives its goodness as also its being from the goodness of God. Therefore God’s will extends to each single good.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (11 Metaph.)3 there is a twofold good of order in the universe: one consisting in the whole universe being directed to that which is outside the universe, just as the army is directed to the commander-in-chief: while the other consists in the parts of the universe being directed to each other, as the parts of an army: and the second order is for the sake of the first. Now God, through willing Himself as end, wills other things that are directed to Him as their end, as we have proved.1 Therefore He wills the good of the order of the whole universe in relation to Himself, and the order of the universe as regards the mutual relation of its parts. Now the good of order arises from each single good. Therefore He wills also singular goods.

Further. If God wills not the singular goods of which the universe consists, it follows that the good of order is in the universe by chance: for it is not possible that some one part of the universe arranges all the particular goods so as to produce the order of the universe; and only the universal cause of the whole universe can do this, which cause is God Who acts by His will, as we shall prove further on.2 But it is impossible for the order of the universe to result from chance: since it would follow a fortiori that other things which come afterwards are the result of chance. Therefore it follows that God wills even each particular good.

Again. The good understood as such is the object of the will.3 But God understands also particular goods, as we have proved.4 Therefore He also wills particular goods.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture which sets forth (Gen. 1) the pleasure of the divine will in each work, in the words: God saw the light that it was good, and in like manner as to each work, and afterwards in reference to all the works: God saw all that He had made, and they were very good.

Chapter LXXIX

that god wills even the things that are not yet

Now if the act of willing is by comparison of the willer to the thing willed, someone might think that God wills only the things that are: since relatives must needs be simultaneous, and if one cease the other ceases, as the Philosopher teaches.1 Wherefore if the act of willing is by comparison of the willer to the thing willed, no one can will other things than those which are.

Moreover. Will relates to things willed, even as cause and creator. Now not even God can be called Creator, or Lord, or Father, except of the things that are. Neither therefore can He be said to will other things than those which are.

One might conclude further, if God’s willing is unchangeable, just as the divine being, and if He wills nothing but what actually is, that He wills nothing but what always is.

To these arguments some answer that things which are not in themselves are in God and in His intellect. Wherefore nothing prevents God willing things even which are not in themselves, in so far as they are in Him.

This reply, however, is seemingly insufficient. For every willer is said to will a thing in so far as his will is referred to the thing willed. Wherefore, if the divine will is not referred to a thing willed that is not except in so far as it is in God or in His intellect, it would follow that God wills it merely because He wills it to be in Himself or in His intellect. Yet those who make the above statements do not mean this, but that God wills things which as yet are not to be also in themselves.

Again, if the will be referred to the thing willed through its object which is a good understood; the intellect understands that the good is not only in (the intellect) itself, but also in its own nature: and the will must be referred to the thing willed not only as it is in the knower, but also as it is in itself.

Accordingly we must say that, since the apprehended good moves the will, the act of willing must needs follow the condition of the apprehender, even as the movements of other movables follow the condition of the mover which is the cause of the movement. Now the relation of the apprehender to the thing apprehended is consequent upon the apprehension, because the apprehender is referred to the thing apprehended through its apprehension thereof. Now the apprehender apprehends the thing not only as it is in the apprehender, but also as it is in its proper nature: for we not only know that a thing is understood by us, which is the same as the thing being in our intellect, but also that it is, or has been, or will be in its proper nature. Wherefore although the thing is then only in the knower, yet the relation consequent upon the apprehension is referred thereto not as it is in the knower, but as it is in its proper nature which the apprehender apprehends.

Accordingly the relation of the divine will is to a non-existent thing, as it is in its proper nature in reference to a certain time, and not only as in God knowing it. Therefore God wills the thing that is not now to be in reference to a certain time, and He does not will merely to understand it. Nor does the comparison hold with the relation of willer to thing willed, nor of creator to creature, nor of maker to thing made, nor of Lord to the creature subject to Him. For to will is an act abiding in the willer, wherefore it does not necessarily imply anything existing outside. But to make, to create, and to govern denote an action terminating in an external effect, without the existence of which such an action is inconceivable.

Chapter LXXX

that god necessarily wills his being and his goodness

From what has been proved above it follows that God wills necessarily His being and His goodness, and that He cannot will the contrary.

For it has been shown1 that God wills His being and goodness as principal object, which is the reason of His willing other things. Wherefore in everything willed by Him He wills His being and goodness, just as the sight sees light in every colour. Now it is impossible for God not to will a thing actually, for He would be only potentially willing; which is impossible, since His willing is His being.2 Therefore it is necessary for Him to will His being and His goodness.

Again. Whoever wills, of necessity wills his last end: thus man of necessity wills his own happiness, nor can he will unhappiness. Now God wills Himself as last end, as stated above.3 Therefore He necessarily wills Himself to be, nor can He will Himself not to be.

Moreover. The end in matters of appetite and action is as an undemonstrable principle in speculative matters:4 for just as in speculative matters conclusions are drawn from principles, so in active and appetitive matters the reason of all things to be done or desired is taken from the end. Now, in speculative matters, the intellect necessarily assents to the first undemonstrable principles, to the contraries of which it can nowise assent. Therefore the will necessarily adheres to the last end, so as to be unable to will the contrary. And thus, if the will of God has no other end than Himself,5 He necessarily wills Himself to be.

Again. All things, in as much as they are, are like to God, Who is being first and foremost.6 Now all things, in as much as they are, love their own being naturally in their own way. Much more therefore does God love His own being naturally. Now His nature is per se necessary being, as was proved.1 Therefore God necessarily wills Himself to be.

Further. Every perfection and goodness which is in creatures, belongs to God essentially, as we have proved above.2 But to love God is the highest perfection of the rational creature: since by so doing man is, in a way, united to God. Therefore this is in God essentially. Therefore He loves Himself necessarily, and so He wills Himself to be.

Chapter LXXXI

that god does not necessarily will other things than himself

Now if God wills the divine goodness and being necessarily, someone might think that He wills other things necessarily also: since He wills all else by willing His own goodness, as we have already proved.3 Yet to those who look at it aright it is clear that He wills other things not of necessity. For He wills other things as ordered to the end which is His goodness.4 Now the will is not necessarily directed to the means, if the end is possible without them: for the physician, supposing him to have the will to heal, has no need to prescribe to the patient those remedies without which He can heal the patient. Since, then, God’s goodness can be without other things, nay more, since nothing accrues thereto from other things, He is under no necessity to will other things through willing His own goodness.

Again. Since the good understood is the proper object of the will, any concept of the intellect, provided it retains an aspect of goodness, can be an object of the will. Wherefore, although the being of a thing as such is good, and its not-being an evil, the not-being of a thing can be an object of the will by reason of some connected good which is retained, albeit not of necessity: because it is good for a thing to be, even though another be non-existent. Hence that good alone is the will, according to its nature, unable to will not to be, without the existence of which, the aspect of good is wholly done away. Now such a good is God alone. Wherefore the will, according to its nature, is able to will the not-being of anything whatever except God. Now will is in God according to its full capacity, since all things in Him are in every way perfect.1 Hence God can will the not-being of anything Whatever except Himself. Therefore He does not necessarily will things other than Himself.

Moreover. God, by willing His own goodness, wills other things to be, in as much as they partake of His goodness.2 Now, since God’s goodness is infinite, it can be participated in an infinite number of ways, and in other ways besides those in which it is participated by those creatures which now are. If, then, through willing His own goodness, He willed of necessity the things which participate it, it would follow that He wills an infinite number of creatures partaking of His goodness in an infinite number of ways. But this is clearly false: for if He willed it, they would exist, since His will is the source of being to things, as we shall prove further on.3 Therefore He does not necessarily will those things also that are not.

Again. A wise man, through willing the cause, wills the effect which follows necessarily from the cause: for it would be foolish to will that the sun exist above the earth, and that there be no brightness of day. On the contrary, it is not necessary for one through willing the cause to will an effect which does not follow of necessity from the cause. Now other things proceed from God not necessarily, as we shall show further on.4 Therefore it is not necessary that God will other things through willing Himself.

Moreover. Things proceed from God as products of art from a craftsman, as we shall show further on.1 Now the craftsman, though he will himself to have his art, does not necessarily will to produce his work. Therefore neither does God necessarily will things other than Himself.

We must accordingly consider why it is that God knows of necessity other things than Himself, whereas He wills them not of necessity; and yet through understanding and willing Himself, He understands and wills other things.2 The reason is this. Because that the person who understands, understands something, is due to the understanding person being conditioned in a certain way, in so far as a thing is actually understood through its likeness being in the person who understands it. Whereas that the willer wills something, is due to the thing willed being conditioned in some way: since we will a thing either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Now the divine perfection necessarily requires that all things should be in God, in order that they may be understood in Him:3 whereas the divine goodness does not necessarily demand that the other things which are directed to it as their end should exist. For this reason it is necessary that God should know, but not will, other things. Wherefore neither does He will all things that can possibly be directed to His goodness: although He knows all that can in any way be directed to His essence, whereby He understands.

Chapter LXXXII

objections against the statement that god wills not of necessity things other than himself, in that it involves impossibilities

Nevertheless it would seem to lead to impossibilities if God does not necessarily will the things that He wills.

For if God’s will is not determined in respect of certain things that He wills, it would seem that He is indifferent. Now every power that is indifferent is somewhat in potentiality: since the indifferent is a species of possible contingency. Therefore God’s will would be in potentiality: and consequently it would not be God’s substance, wherein there is no potentiality, as we have shown above.1

Again. If a potential being as such is naturally changeable, since what is possible to be, is possible to not-be, it follows also that the divine will is changeable.

Further. If it is natural for God to will something concerning His effects, it is necessary. Now nothing can be in Him that is not natural to Him, for nothing accidental or violent can be in Him, as we have proved above.2

Again. If that which is indifferent to either of two alternatives does not tend to the one rather than to the other unless it be determined by something else, it follows that either God wills none of the things to which He is indifferent—the contrary of which has been proved above3—or else He is determined to one alternative by something else. And thus something will be before Him that determines Him to one thing.

Now none of these consequences follow of necessity. For indifference may befit a power in two ways: first, on the part of the power itself; secondly, in respect of that to which it is said to be indifferent. On the part of the power itself, when it has not yet reached its perfection whereby it is determined to one thing. Wherefore this argues imperfection in the power, and potentiality is proved to be in it: as may be seen in the intellect of one who doubts, for it has not yet acquired the principles by which it may be determined to one alternative. On the part of the thing to which it is said to be indifferent, a power is found to be indifferent to either alternative, when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, and yet either is possible: even as an art which can use various instruments that are equally adapted to perfect its work. Now this does not argue imperfection in the power, rather does it pertain to its perfection: in as much as it transcends both alternatives, and for this reason is determined to neither, being indifferent to both. It is thus with God’s will in regard to other things than Himself: since its end depends on none of these other things, whereas it is most perfectly united to its end. Therefore it does not follow that there must be potentiality in the divine will.

Likewise neither does it follow that there is changeableness. For if there is no potentiality in God’s will, the reason why, in His effects, He does not of necessity give preference to the one alternative, is not because He is considered to be indifferent to either alternative, so as to be at first potentially willing either, and afterwards willing actually (whereas He is always actually willing whatsoever He wills, with regard not only to Himself but also His effects); but it is because the thing willed is not necessarily related to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will; in the same way in which we say that an enunciation is not necessary but possible where the predicate is not necessarily related to the subject. Hence when we say: God wills this effect, this statement is clearly not necessary but possible, in the same way as a thing is said to be possible, not in reference to a potentiality, but because it is neither necessary nor impossible for it to be, as the Philosopher teaches (6 Metaph.).1 Thus the statement that a triangle has two equal sides is possible, yet not in reference to a potentiality, since in mathematics there is neither potentiality nor movement. Therefore the exclusion of the aforesaid necessity does not remove the unchangeableness of the divine will, to Which Holy Writ bears witness (1 Kings 15:29): The Triumpher in Israel … will not be moved to repentance.

Yet although God’s will is not determined to its effects, it does not follow that He wills none of them, or that He is determined by something outside to will them. For, since the apprehended good determines the will as the latter’s proper object, while God’s intellect is not outside His will, because each is His essence; if God’s will is determined by the will of His intellect to will something, the determination of the divine will is not effected by something outside. For the divine intellect apprehends not only the divine being which is His goodness, but also other goods, as we proved above.1 And it apprehends these as likenesses of the divine goodness, not as principles thereof. Wherefore the divine will tends to them as according with His goodness, not as necessary thereto. It is the same with our will, because when it tends to something as simply necessary to an end, it is moved by a kind of necessity towards it: whereas when it tends to something merely on account of some fittingness, it does not tend thereto of necessity. Therefore neither does the divine will tend necessarily to its effects.

Nor does it follow on account of what has been said, that we must admit the existence in God of something not natural. For His will, by the one and same act, wills Himself and other things. Now His relation to Himself is necessary and natural; whereas His relation to other things is by way of a kind of fittingness, not necessary and natural, nor violent and unnatural, but voluntary: since what is voluntary, must needs be neither natural nor violent.

Chapter LXXXIII

that god wills something other than himself by a necessity of supposition

We may conclude from the foregoing that, although God wills none of His effects of absolute necessity, He wills something necessarily by supposition.

For it has been proved2 that the divine will is unchangeable. Now that which is once in an unchangeable thing cannot afterwards not be therein: since we say that a thing is changed when its condition is different now to what it was before. Therefore, if God’s will is unchangeable, supposing that He will something, it is necessary by supposition that He will it.

Again. Everything eternal is necessary. Now that God will some particular effect to exist is eternal: for His willing, like His being, is measured by eternity.1 Therefore it is necessary. Not however if we consider it absolutely: because God’s will has not a necessary relation to this particular thing willed. Therefore it is necessary by supposition.2

Further. Whatsoever God could do, He can do, for His power is not diminished, as neither is His essence. But He cannot now not will what He is supposed to have willed, since His will is unchangeable. Therefore He never could not will whatever He has willed. Therefore it is necessary by supposition that He willed, as also that He will, whatever He willed: neither however is necessary absolutely, but possible in the aforesaid manner.3

Moreover. Whosoever wills a thing, necessarily wills those things which are necessarily requisite to that thing, unless there be a defect on his part, either through ignorance, or because he is led astray from the right choice of means to the end in view, by some passion. But these things cannot be said of God. Wherefore if God, in willing Himself, wills something other than Himself, it is necessary for Him to will all that is necessarily required for What is willed by Him: even so is it necessary for God to will that there be a rational soul, supposing that He wills a man to be.

Chapter LXXXIV

that god’s will is not of things impossible in themselves

Hence it is clear that God’s will cannot be of things that are impossible in themselves.

For the like are those which imply a contradiction in themselves: for instance that a man be an ass, which implies that rational is irrational. Now that which is incompatible with a thing excludes some of those things which are required for that thing: for instance, to be an ass excludes man’s reason. If, then, He wills necessarily the things that are required for those He is supposed to will, it is impossible that He will those that are incompatible with them. Hence it is impossible for Him to will things that are simply impossible.

Again. As was proved above,1 God, by willing His own being, which is His own goodness, wills all things as bearing a likeness to Him. Now in so far as a thing is incompatible with the notion of being as such, it cannot retain a likeness to the first, that is, the divine being, which is the source of being. Wherefore God cannot will that which is incompatible with the notion of being as such. Now just as irrationality is incompatible with the notion of man as such, so is it incompatible with the notion of being as such, that anything be at the same time a being and a non-being. Hence God cannot will affirmation and negation to be true at the same time. Yet this is implied in everything which is in itself impossible, that it is incompatible with itself, in as much as it implies a contradiction. Therefore God’s will cannot be of things impossible in themselves.

Moreover. The will is only of some understood good. Wherefore that which is not an object of the intellect, cannot be an object of the will. Now things in themselves impossible are not an object of understanding, since they imply a contradiction, except perhaps through an error of one who understands not the property of things: and this cannot be said of God. Therefore things in themselves impossible cannot be an object of God’s will.

Further. According as a thing is related to being, so is it related to goodness. But impossibles are things that cannot be. Therefore they cannot be good. Neither therefore can they be willed by God, Who wills only the things that are or can be good.

Chapter LXXXV

that the divine will does not remove contingency from things, nor impose absolute necessity on them

From what has been said we may gather that the divine will does not exclude contingency, nor impose absolute necessity on things.

For God wills all that is requisite for the thing which He wills, as already stated.1 Now it is befitting some things, according to the mode of their nature, that they be contingent and not necessary. Therefore He wills certain things to be contingent. Now the efficacy of the divine will requires not only that what God wills to be should be, but also that it should be in the mode that God wills it to be: for even in natural agents, when the active force is strong, it likens its effects to itself not only in its species, but also in its accidents, which are a kind of mode of that thing. Therefore the efficacy of the divine will does not remove contingency.

Moreover. God wills the good of the universe the more especially than any particular good, according as the likeness of His goodness is more completely found therein.2 Now the completeness of the universe demands that some things should be contingent, else not all the degrees of being would be contained in the universe. Therefore God wills some things to be contingent.

Again. The good of the universe consists in a certain order, as stated in 11 Metaph.3 Now the order of the universe requires that certain causes be changeable; since bodies belong to the perfection of the universe and they move not unless they be moved. Now from a changeable cause contingent effects follow: since the effect cannot have more stable being than the cause. Hence we find that, though the remote cause be necessary, yet if the proximate cause be contingent, the effect is contingent. This is evidenced by what happens with the lower bodies: for they are contingent on account of the contingency of their proximate causes, although their remote causes, which are the heavenly movements, are necessary. Therefore God wills some things to happen contingently.

Further. Necessity by supposition in a cause cannot argue absolute necessity in its effect. Now God wills something in the creature not of absolute necessity, but only of necessity by supposition, as we have proved.1 Wherefore from the divine will we cannot argue absolute necessity in creatures. Now this alone excludes contingency, since even contingents that are indifferent to either of two alternatives become necessary by supposition: thus it is necessary that Socrates be moved if he runs. Therefore the divine will does not exclude contingency from the things willed.

Hence it does not follow, if God wills a thing, that it happens of necessity, but that this conditional proposition is true and necessary, If God wills a thing, it will be: and yet the consequence is not necessary.

Chapter LXXXVI

that a reason of the divine will can be assigned

We can gather from what has been said that it is possible to assign a reason of the divine will.

For the end is the reason of willing the means. Now God wills His goodness as an end, and He wills all else as means to that end.2 Therefore His goodness is the reason why He wills other things which are different from Him.

Again. The particular good is directed to the good of the whole as its end, as the imperfect to the perfect. Now things are the object of the divine will according to their place in the order of good.3 Hence it follows that the good of the universe is the reason why God wills each particular good in the universe.

Again. As we have shown above,4 supposing God to will a certain thing, it follows of necessity that He wills whatever is required for that thing. Now that which imposes necessity on something else, is the reason why this other thing is. Therefore the reason why God wills that which is requisite for a thing, is that the thing for which it is requisite may be.

Accordingly we may proceed thus in assigning the reason of the divine will. God wills man to have reason that man may be; He wills man to be that the universe may be complete; and He wills the good of the universe because it is befitting His goodness.

Yet these three reasons do not indicate the same relationship. For the divine goodness neither depends on the perfection of the universe nor gains anything from it. While though the perfection of the universe depends necessarily on certain particular goods, which are the essential parts of the universe, it depends on others not of necessity, although a certain goodness or beauty accrues to the universe through them, for instance through such things as are merely for the protection or beauty of the other parts. And the particular good depends necessarily on those things which are absolutely required for it: although this also has certain things which are for its better being. Wherefore sometimes the reason of the divine will indicates only fittingness, sometimes utility, and sometimes necessity by supposition; but absolutely necessity only when God wills Himself.

Chapter LXXXVII

that nothing can be the cause of the divine will

Now although it is possible to assign some reason of the divine will, it does not follow that anything is the cause of that will.

For the end is to the will the cause of willing. Now the end of God’s will is His goodness. Therefore this is the cause of God’s willing, and is the selfsame as the act of His will.1

But none of the other things willed by God is the cause of His willing: although one of them is the cause of another being directed to the divine goodness. And it is in this sense that God wills one of them on account of another.

Nevertheless it is clear that there is no need to allow of any discursion in the divine will. Because where there is one act, we cannot find discursion, as we have proved above1 with regard to the intellect. Now God by one act wills His goodness and all else,2 since His action is His essence.

By what we have said we refute the error of some who say that all things proceed from God according to His simple will, so that no reason is to be given for anything except that God wills it.3

Moreover. This is contrary to Divine Scripture which declares that God made all things in accordance with the order of His Wisdom, as expressed in the psalm:4 Thou hast made all things in wisdom. Again it is written (Ecclus. 1:10) that God poured out His wisdom upon all His works.

Chapter LXXXVIII

that in god there is free-will

It is possible to conclude from the foregoing that free-will is to be found in God.

For free-will is applied to those things that one wills not of necessity but of one’s own accord: wherefore in us there is free-will in regard to our wishing to run or walk. Now God wills not of necessity things other than Himself, as we have shown above.5 Therefore it is fitting that God should have free-will.

Again. The divine will, in those things to which it is not determined by its nature, is inclined in a way by the intellect, as we have shown above.6 Now man to the exclusion of other animals is said to have free-will, because he is inclined to will by the judgment of his reason, and not by natural impulse as brute animals are. Therefore there is free-will in God.

Again. According to the Philosopher (3 Ethic.1) will is of the end, but choice is of the means to the end. Wherefore since God wills Himself as end, and other things as means to the end,2 it follows that in regard to Himself He has will only, but in respect of other things choice. Now choice is always an act of free-will. Therefore free-will is befitting God.

Further. Through having free-will man is said to be master of his own actions. Now this is most befitting the first agent, whose action depends on no other. Therefore God has free-will.

This may also be gathered from the very signification of the word. For the free is that which is its own cause according to the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics:3 and to none is this more befitting than to the first cause which is God.4

Chapter LXXXIX

that the passions of the appetite are not in god

From the foregoing we may conclude that the passions of the appetite are not in God.

For there is no passion in the intellective appetite, but only in the sensitive, as is proved in 7 Phys.5 Now no such appetite can be in God, since He has no knowledge through senses, as clearly results from what has been said.6 Therefore it follows that no passion of the appetite is in God.

Further. Every passion of the appetite is accompanied by a bodily change, for instance in respect of the contraction and dilatation of the heart or something of the kind. But none of these can possibly happen in God, since He is not a body nor a power in a body, as we have shown above.1 Therefore there is no passion of the appetite in Him.

Again. In every passion of the appetite the patient is somewhat drawn outside its ordinary, even, or connatural disposition: a sign of which is that these passions if they become intense cause an animal’s death. But it is impossible for God to be in any way drawn outside His natural disposition, since He is utterly unchangeable, as was shown above.2 It is therefore evident that these passions cannot be in God.

Moreover. Every emotion that is accompanied by a passion, has one definite object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. For a passion has an impulse to some one thing, even as nature has: and on this account it needs to be curbed and ruled by reason. Now the divine will is not in itself determined to one in things created, except by the ordering of His Wisdom, as was proved above.3 Therefore there is no emotional passion in Him.

Again. Every passion is in a subject that is in potentiality. But God is altogether free of potentiality, since He is pure act.4 Therefore He is agent only, and in no way can passion take place in Him.

Accordingly all passion by reason of its genus is absent from God.

Some passions, however, are absent from God not only by reason of their genus, but also on account of their species. For every passion takes its species from its object. Wherefore a passion whose object is wholly unbefitting God is absent from God on account of its proper species. Such a passion is sorrow or pain: for its object is an actually inherent evil, just as the object of joy is a good present and possessed. Sorrow, therefore, and pain by their very nature cannot be in God.

Again. The formality of a passion’s object is taken not only from good or evil, but also from the fact that a person is referred in some mode to the one or the other: for thus it is that hope and joy differ. Wherefore if the mode in which a person is referred to the object—that mode being essential to the passion—is not becoming to God, neither can the passion itself be becoming to God, and this by reason of its proper species. Now although hope has a good for its object, this is a good not already acquired, but to be yet obtained. And this cannot be competent to God, on account of His perfection, which is so great that nothing can be added to it.1 Hope therefore cannot be in God, even by reason of its species: nor again desire of anything not possessed.

Moreover. Just as the divine perfection excludes from God the potentiality of acquiring any additional good, so too and much more it excludes the potentiality to evil.2 Now fear regards evil that may be imminent, even as hope regards a good to be acquired. Wherefore fear by reason of its species is absent from God on two counts: both because it is befitting only one that is in potentiality, and because its object is an evil that can become present.

Again. Repentance denotes a change in the appetite. Wherefore the idea of repentance is inapplicable to God,3 both because it is a kind of sorrow, and because it implies a change of will.

Further. Without error in the cognitive power, it is impossible for that which is good to be apprehended as evil. Nor does it happen that the evil of one can be the good of another, save in particular goods, wherein the corruption of one is the generation of another:4 while the universal good is nowise impaired by any particular good, but is reflected by each one. Now God is the universal good, and by partaking of His likeness all things are said to be good.5 Hence no one’s evil can be to Him a good. Nor is it possible for Him to apprehend as evil that which is good simply, and is not evil to Him: because His knowledge is without error, as we have proved above.6 Hence envy cannot possibly be in God, even according to the nature of its species; not only because envy is a kind of sorrow, but because it grieves for the good of another, and thus looks upon another’s good as its own evil.

Again. To grieve for a good is like desiring an evil: for the former results from a good being deemed an evil, while the latter results from an evil being deemed a good. Now anger is the desire of another’s evil in revenge. Therefore anger is far removed from God according to its specific nature; not only because it is an effect of sorrow, but also because it is a desire for revenge on account of sorrow arising from a harm inflicted.

Also, whatsoever passions are species or effects of the above, are equally removed from God.

Chapter XC

that in god are delight and joy, nor are they incompatible with the divine perfection

There are, however, certain passions which, though unbecoming to God as passions, nevertheless contain nothing in their specific nature incompatible with the divine perfection.

Among these are joy and delight. For joy has for its object a present good. Wherefore neither by reason of its object which is a good, nor by reason of the way in which it is referred to that object, which is actually possessed, is joy, according to its specific nature, incompatible with the divine perfection.

Hence it is evident that joy or delight, properly speaking, is in God. Because just as good and evil apprehended are the object of the sensible appetite, so are they the object of the intellective appetite. For it belongs to both to ensue good and to avoid evil, whether so in truth, or in the estimation: except that the object of the intellective appetite is more universal than that of the sensitive appetite, since the intellective appetite regards good or evil simply, whereas the sensitive appetite regards good or evil according to the senses; even as the object of the intellect is more universal than that of the senses. Now the operations of the appetite take their species from their objects. Accordingly we find in the intellective appetite, which is the will, operations specifically similar to those of the sensitive appetite, differing in this, that in the sensitive appetite they are passions, on account of its connection with a bodily organ, whereas in the intellective appetite they are pure operations. For just as by the passion of fear which, in the sensitive appetite, one shuns a future evil, so, without passion, the intellective appetite has a like operation. Since then joy and delight are not inapplicable to God according to their species, but only as passions, while they are in the will according to their species, but not as passions, it follows that they are not absent from the divine will.

Again. Joy and delight are a kind of repose of the will in the object of its willing. Now God is supremely at rest in Himself, Who is the principal object of His will, as finding all sufficiency in Himself.1 Therefore by His will He rejoices and delights supremely in Himself.

Further. Delight is a perfection of operation, as the Philosopher teaches (10 Ethic.2), for it perfects operation as beauty perfects youth. Now God has a most perfect operation in understanding, as shown above.3 Therefore if our act of understanding is delightful on account of its perfection, God’s act of understanding will be most delightful to Him.

Moreover. Everything naturally rejoices in its like4 as being congenial to it; except accidentally, in so far as this thing is detrimental to it, thus potters quarrel among themselves,5 because one hinders the profit of another. Now every good is a likeness of the divine goodness, as stated above:6 nor is any good prejudicial to it. Therefore God rejoices in every good. Therefore joy and delight are in Him properly speaking. Yet joy and delight differ in aspect. For delight is caused by a good conjoined in reality, while joy does not require this conjunction, because the mere repose of the will in the thing willed suffices for the notion of joy. Hence delight is only in a conjoined good, if it be taken in its proper sense: whereas joy is in a separate good. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, God delights in Himself, but rejoices in Himself in other things.

Chapter XCI

that in god there is love

In like manner it follows that love is in God1 as an act of His will.

For it belongs properly to the nature of love that the lover wills the good of the beloved. Now God wills His own and others’ good, as stated above.2 Accordingly then God loves both Himself and other things.

Again. True love requires one to will another’s good as one’s own. For a thing whose good one wills merely as conducive to another’s good, is loved accidentally: thus he who wills wine to be preserved that he may drink it, or who loves a man that he may be useful or pleasing to him, loves the wine or the man accidentally, but himself properly speaking. Now God loves each thing’s good as its own, since He wills each thing to be in as much as it is good in itself: although He directs one to the profit of another. God therefore truly loves both Himself and other things.

Moreover. Since everything naturally wills or desires its own good in its own way, if the nature of love is that the lover will or desire the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him. Wherefore it appears that the proper notion of love consists in the affection of one tending to another as one with himself in some way: for which reason Dionysius describes love as a unitive force.1 Hence the greater the thing that makes the lover one with the beloved, the more intense is the love: for we love those more who are united to us by the origin of birth, or by frequent companionship, than those who are merely united to us by the bond of human nature. Again, the more the cause of union is deeply seated in the lover, the stronger the love: wherefore sometimes a love that is caused by a passion becomes more intense than a love arising from natural origin or from some habit, although it is more liable to be transitory. Now the cause of all things being united to God, namely His goodness, which all things reflect, is exceeding great and deeply seated in God, since Himself is His own goodness.2 Wherefore in God not only is there true love, but also most perfect and most abiding love.

Again. On the part of its object, love does not denote anything inconsistent with God: since that object is a good. Nor again, as regards the way in which it is referred to its object, since a thing when possessed is loved not less, but more, because a good is more closely united to us when possessed. Wherefore in natural things movement towards an end is more intense if the end be near (although the contrary happens accidentally sometimes, for instance when we discover something repugnant to love in the beloved, for then possession diminishes love). Accordingly love is not inconsistent with the divine perfection, as regards its specific nature. Therefore it is in God.

Further. It belongs to love to seek union as Dionysius says.3 For since, on account of likeness or becomingness between lover and beloved, the affection of the lover is somehow united to the beloved, the appetite tends to the completion of the union, namely that the union which was begun in the affections be completed in actions. Wherefore it belongs to friends to rejoice in mutual companionship, living together, and common pursuits.4 Now God moves all other things to union: for in as much as He gives them being and other perfections, He unites them to Himself as far as possible. Therefore God loves both Himself and other things.

Again. Love is the source of all the emotions.1 For joy and desire are only of a good that is loved; fear and sorrow are only of evil that is contrary to the beloved good; and from these all the other emotions arise. Now joy and delight are in God, as we have shown above.2 Therefore in God there is love.

Someone, however, might think that God loves not one thing more than another. For if intenseness and remissness are proper to a changeable nature, they cannot apply to God, from whom all change is far removed.3

Again. None of the other things that are said of God by way of operation, are applied to Him more or less: since He knows not one thing more than another, nor rejoices more in this than in that.

Accordingly it must be observed that while other operations of the soul are about one object only, love alone appears to be directed to a twofold object. For if we understand or rejoice, it follows that we are referred somehow to some object: whereas love wills something to someone, since we are said to love that to which we will some good, in the way aforesaid. Hence when we want a thing, we are said simply and properly to desire it, and not to love it, but rather to love ourselves for whom we want it: and in consequence we are said to love it accidentally and improperly. Accordingly other operations are intense or remiss in proportion to the energy alone of the action. But this cannot apply to God: because energy of action is measured by the force from which it proceeds, and every divine action is of one and the same force. On the other hand love may be intense or remiss in two ways. In one way, as regards the good that we will someone; according to which we are said to love that person more for whom we will a greater good. In another way, as regards the energy of the action, according to which we are said to love that person more, for whom, although we will not a greater good, nevertheless we will an equal good with greater fervour and efficacy. In the first way, accordingly, nothing forbids us to say that God loves one thing more than another, according as He wills for it a greater good. But in the second way this cannot be said, for the same reason as we have stated in the case of other operations.

It is therefore clear from what has been said,1 that none of our emotions, properly speaking, can be in God, except joy and love: and yet even these are not in Him as they are in us, by way of passion.

That joy or delight is in God is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said in the psalm:2 At Thy right hand are delights even to the end: divine Wisdom, which is God, as we have proved,3 says (Prov. 9)4: I was delighted every day, playing before Him, and (Luke 15:10): There is joy in heaven5 upon one sinner doing penance. Also the Philosopher says (7 Ethic.)6 that God rejoices with one simple delight.

Scripture also makes mention of God’s love (Deut. 33:3): He hath loved the people; (Jerem. 31:3): I have loved thee with an everlasting love; (Jo. 16:27): For the Father Himself loveth you. Certain philosophers7 also taught that God’s love is the principle of things: in agreement with which is the saying of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv.) that God’s love did not allow Him to be unproductive.

It must, however, be observed that even other emotions which by their specific nature are inapplicable to God, are applied to God in Holy Writ, not indeed properly, as we have shown,8 but metaphorically, on account of a likeness either of effects, or of some preceding emotion.

I say of effects, because sometimes His will, by the ordering of His Wisdom, tends to an effect to which a person is inclined through a defective passion: thus a judge punishes out of justice, as an angry man out of anger. Accordingly sometimes God is said to be angry, in as much as by the ordering of His Wisdom He wills to punish someone, according to the saying of the psalm:1 When His wrath shall be kindled in a short time. He is said to be merciful, in as much as out of His good-will He removes man’s unhappiness,2 even as we do the same through the passion of mercy. Hence the psalm3 says: The Lord is compassionate and merciful, long-suffering and plenteous in mercy. Sometimes also He is said to repent, in as much as in accordance with the eternal and unchangeable decree of His providence, He makes what He destroyed before, or destroys what previously He made: even as those who are moved by repentance are wont to do. Hence (Gen. 6:7): It repenteth Me that I have made man.4 That this cannot be taken in the proper sense is clear from the words of 1 Kings 15:29: The Triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance.

I also say on account of a likeness to a preceding emotion. For love and joy, which are in God properly, are the principles of all the emotions: love by way of moving principle; joy by way of end: wherefore even an angry man rejoices while punishing, as having obtained his end. Hence God is said to grieve, in as much as certain things occur contrary to those He loves and approves: even as we grieve for what has happened against our will. This is instanced (Isa. 59:15, 16): God5 saw, and it appeared evil in His eyes, because there is no judgment. And He saw that there is not a man, and He stood astonished, because there is none to oppose Himself.

By what has been said we can refute the error of certain Jews who ascribed to God anger, sorrow, repentance, and all such passions in their proper sense, failing to discriminate between the proper and the metaphorical expressions of Scripture.

Chapter XCII

how virtues are to be ascribed to god

In sequence to what has been said we must show how virtues are to be ascribed to God. For just as His being is universally perfect, in some way containing within itself the perfection of all beings,1 so must His goodness in some way comprise the various kinds of goodness of all things.2 Now virtue is a kind of goodness of the virtuous person, since in respect thereof he is said to be good, and his work good.3 It follows therefore that the divine goodness contains in its own way all virtues.

Wherefore none of them is ascribed as a habit to God, as it is to us. For it is not befitting God to be good through something else added to Him, but by His essence: for He is altogether simple.4 Nor does He act by anything added to His essence, since His action is His being, as we have shown.5 Therefore His virtue is not a habit, but His essence.

Again. Habit is imperfect act, a mean as it were between potentiality and act: wherefore one who has a habit is compared to a person asleep.6 But in God there is most perfect act. Hence act in Him is not like a habit, as knowledge, but like to consider which is an ultimate and perfect act.

Again. Habit perfects a potentiality; but in God nothing is potential but only actual.7 Therefore a habit cannot be in Him.

Further. Habit is a kind of accident: and this is utterly foreign to God, as we have proved above.8 Neither therefore is virtue ascribed to God as a habit, but only as His essence.

Now since it is by human virtues that human life is regulated, and since human life is twofold, contemplative and active, those virtues which belong to the active life, as perfecting it, cannot be becoming to God.

For the active life of man consists in the use of bodily goods: wherefore those virtues regulate the active life, by which we use these goods aright. But these goods cannot be befitting God. Therefore neither can these virtues, in so far as they regulate this life.

Again. The like virtues perfect man’s conduct in his civil life, wherefore they do not seem very applicable to those who have nothing to do with the civil life. Much less therefore can they be applied to God, whose conduct and life are far removed from the manner of human life.

Moreover. Some of the virtues that are concerned with the active life regulate us in regard to the passions. These we cannot ascribe to God. For those virtues which are concerned with the passions take their species from those very passions as from their proper objects: wherefore temperance differs from fortitude because the former is about desires, while the latter is about fear and daring. But in God there are no passions, as we have proved.1 Neither therefore can these virtues be in God.

Again. These same virtues are not in the intellective part of the soul, but in the sensitive part, wherein alone can the passions be, as is proved in 7 Phys.2 But there is no sensitive faculty in God, but only intellect.3 It follows, therefore, that these virtues cannot be in God, even according to their proper signification.

Some of the passions about which these virtues are concerned result from an inclination of the appetite to some bodily good that is pleasant to the senses, for instance, meat, drink, and sexual matters, and in respect of the desires for these things there are sobriety, chastity, and speaking in a general way, temperance and continency. Wherefore, since bodily pleasures are utterly removed from God, the aforesaid virtues neither apply to God properly, since they are about the passions, nor even are they applied to God metaphorically in the Scriptures, because no likeness to them is to be found in God, as regards a likeness in their effects.1

And there are some passions resulting from an inclination of the appetite to a spiritual good, such as honour, dominion, victory, revenge, and so forth; and about our hopes, darings, and any acts whatsoever of the appetite in respect of these things, there are fortitude, magnanimity, meekness, and other like virtues. These cannot be in God properly, because they are about the passions; but they are applied metaphorically to God in Scripture, on account of a likeness of effect: for instance (1 Kings 2:2): There is none strong like our God; and (Mich. 6):2 Seek the meek, seek the good.

Chapter XCIII

that in god there are the moral virtues which are about actions

Now there are some virtues which regulate man’s active life, and are concerned not with passions but with actions, such as truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, and art.

Now since virtue derives its species from its object or matter, while the actions that are the matter or object of these virtues are not inconsistent with the divine perfection; neither is there in these virtues according to their proper species, any thing for which they should be excluded from the divine perfection.

Again. These virtues are perfections of the will and intellect, which are principles of operation without passion. Now in God there are will and intellect wherein there is no lack of perfection.1 Therefore these virtues cannot be lacking in God.

Moreover. The proper reason about all things that take their being from God exists in the divine intellect, as we have proved above.2 Now the reason in the craftsman’s mind about the thing to be made, is art: wherefore the Philosopher says (6 Ethic.)3 that art is right reason about things to be made. Therefore art is properly in God: and for this reason it is said (Wis. 7:21): Wisdom, the Artificer4 of all things, taught me.

Again. God’s will, in things other than Himself, is determined to one particular thing by His knowledge, as was shown above.5 Now knowledge, directing the will to operation, is prudence, since prudence, according to the Philosopher (6 Ethic.6) is right reason about things to be done. Therefore prudence is in God: and this is what is said (Job 26.)7: With Him is prudence and strength.

Again. It was shown above8 that through willing a particular thing, God wills whatever is required for that thing. Now that which is requisite for a perfection of a thing is due to it. Therefore in God there is justice, which consists in rendering to each one what is his.9 Wherefore it is said in the psalm:10 The Lord is just and hath loved justice.

Moreover. As shown above,11 the last end, for the sake of which God wills all things, nowise depends on the things directed to the end, neither as to its being nor as to any perfection. Wherefore He wills to communicate His goodness to a thing not that He may gain thereby, but because the very act of communicating is befitting Him as the source of goodness. Now to give not for a gain expected from the giving, but through goodness and becomingness, is an act of liberality, as the Philosopher teaches (4 Ethic.)1. Therefore God is most liberal, and as Avicenna says,2 He alone can properly be called liberal, since every other agent, except God, gains by his action some good which is the end in view. Scripture declares this His liberality when it says in the psalm:3 When Thou openest Thy hand they shall all be filled with good; and (James 1:5): Who giveth to all men abundantly and upbraideth not.

Again. All that receive being from God must needs bear His likeness, in as much as they are, and are good, and have their proper types in the divine intellect, as we have shown above.4 Now it belongs to the virtue of truth according to the Philosopher (4 Ethic.)5 that a man by his words and deeds show himself such as he is. Therefore in God is the virtue of truth. Hence it is said (Rom. 3:4): Now God is true, and in the psalm:6 All Thy ways are truth.

But whatever virtues are directed to certain actions of subjects in reference to superiors, are inapplicable to God: for instance, obedience, religion, and the like which are due to a superior.

Again, the aforesaid virtues cannot be ascribed to God in respect of any of their acts that may be imperfect. Thus prudence as to its act of taking good counsel is not befitting God. For since counsel is an inquiry (6 Ethic.7), whereas the divine knowledge is not inquisitive, as was proved above,8 it cannot become it to take counsel. Wherefore we read (Job 26:3): To whom hast Thou given counsel? Perhaps to him that hath no wisdom? and (Isa. 40:14): With whom hath He consulted, and who hath instructed Him? On the other hand, as regards the act of judging of things counselled and the choice of those approved, nothing hinders prudence being ascribed to God. However, counsel is sometimes ascribed to God, either by reason of a likeness in the point of secrecy, for counsels are taken in secret; wherefore the secrets of the divine wisdom are called counsels metaphorically, for instance Isa. 25:1, according to another version:1 May Thy counsel of old be verified; or in the point of satisfying those who seek counsel of Him, for it belongs to one who understands even without discursion, to instruct inquirers.

Likewise justice as to its act of commutation cannot be ascribed to God: since He receives naught from any one. Hence we read (Rom. 11:35): Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? and (Job. 41:2): Who hath given Me before that I should repay him? However, we are said metaphorically to give certain things to God, in as much as God accepts our gifts. Hence it is befitting Him to have not commutative, but only distributive, justice. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii.) that God is praised for His justice, because He distributes to all according to their merits: as expressed by those words of Matt. 25:15: He gave … to everyone according to his proper ability.

It must be noted, however, that the actions about which the aforesaid virtues are concerned do not by their nature depend on human affairs, for to judge of what has to be done, and to give or distribute something, belongs not to man alone but to every intelligent being. But so far as they are confined to human concerns, they, to a certain extent, take their species from them, just as a crooked nose makes a species of ape.2 Accordingly the aforesaid virtues, so far as they regulate man’s active life, are directed to these actions as confined to human affairs and taking their species from them. In this way they cannot be ascribed to God. But so far as the aforesaid actions are understood in a general sense, they can be adapted even to things divine. For just as man is a dispenser of human things, such as money or honours, so is God the bestower of all the goods of the universe. Hence the aforesaid virtues in God have a more universal range than in man: for as justice in man relates to the state or the household, so God’s justice extends to the whole universe. Wherefore the divine virtues are called exemplar1 virtues: because things that are limited and particularized are likenesses of absolute beings, as the light of a candle in comparison with the light of the sun. But other virtues which properly are not applicable to God have no exemplar in the divine nature, but only in the divine Wisdom, which contains the proper types of all beings;2 as is the case with other corporeal things.

Chapter XCIV

that the contemplative virtues are in god

There can be no doubt that the contemplative virtues are most becoming to God.

For since wisdom consists in the knowledge of the highest causes, according to the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics,3 and since God knows Himself principally, nor knows aught save by knowing Himself, as we have proved,4 Who is the first cause of all; it is evident that wisdom ought to be especially ascribed to Him. Hence we read (Job 9:4): He is wise in heart; and (Ecclus. 1:1): All wisdom is from the Lord God and hath been always with Him. The Philosopher, too, says at the beginning of his Metaphysics5 that it is a divine, not a human, possession.

Again. Since science is the knowledge of a thing by its proper cause,6 and since He knows the order of all causes and effects, as we have shown above,7 it is evident that science is properly in Him: not that science however which is caused by reasoning,8 as our science is caused by a demonstration. Hence it is written (1 Kings 2:3): The Lord is a God of all knowledge.

Further. Since immaterial knowledge of things without discoursing is understanding;9 and since God has this kind of knowledge about all things, as proved above,10 it follows that in Him is understanding. Hence we read (Job 12:13): He hath counsel and understanding.

In God these virtues are the exemplars of ours, as the perfect of the imperfect.

Chapter XCV

that god cannot will evil

From what has been said it can be proved that God cannot will evil.

For the virtue of a thing is that by which one produces a good work.1 Now every work of God is a work of virtue, since His virtue is His essence, as we have shown above.2 Therefore He cannot will evil.

Again. The will never tends towards evil unless there be an error in the reason, at least as regards the particular object of choice. For since the object of the will is an apprehended good, the will cannot tend towards an evil unless, in some way, it is proposed to it as a good; and this cannot be without an error. Now there can be no error in the divine knowledge, as we have shown.3 Therefore God’s will cannot tend to evil.

Moreover. God is the sovereign good, as was proved above.4 Now the sovereign good does not suffer the company of evil, as neither does the supremely hot suffer an admixture of cold. Therefore the divine will cannot be inclined to evil.

Further. Since good has the aspect of end, evil cannot be an object of the will except the latter turn away from its end. But the divine will cannot turn away from its end, because He cannot will anything except by willing Himself, as we have proved.5 Therefore He cannot will evil.

It is therefore evident that in Him free-will is naturally established in good.

This is expressed in the words of Deut. 32:4: God is faithful and without any iniquity, and Habac. 1:13: Thy eyes are … pure … and Thou canst not look on iniquity.

Hereby is confuted the error of the Jews who assert in the Talmud that God sins sometimes and is cleansed from sin; and also of the Luciferiani who say that God sinned in casting out Lucifer.

Chapter XCVI

that god hates nothing, nor can the hatred of anything be ascribed to him

Hence it appears that hatred of a thing cannot be ascribed to God.

Because as love is related to good, so is hatred to evil: for we will good to those whom we love; but evil to those whom we hate. Therefore if God’s will cannot be inclined to evil, as was proved above,1 it is impossible for Him to hate anything.

Again. As we have shown above,2 God’s will tends to things other than Himself, in as much as, by willing and loving His being and goodness, He wills it to be poured forth, as far as possible, by communicating its likeness. Accordingly that which God wills in things other than Himself, is that the likeness of His goodness be in them. Now the goodness of each thing consists in its partaking of the divine likeness: since every other goodness is nothing but a likeness of the first goodness.3 Therefore God wills good to everything: and consequently He hates nothing.

Again. From the first being all others take the origin of their being.4 Wherefore if He hates any one of the things that are, He wills it not to be, because to be is a thing’s good. Hence He wills His action not to be, whereby that thing is brought into being mediately or immediately; for it has been proved above,5 that if God wills a thing, it follows that He wills whatever is required for that thing. But this is impossible. And this is evident, if things are brought into being by His will, since in that case the action whereby things are produced must be voluntary: and likewise if He be the cause of things naturally, because just as His nature pleases Him, so also everything that His nature requires pleases Him. Therefore God hates not anything.

Further. That which is found naturally in all active causes, must most of all be found in the first active cause. Now every active cause loves its effect as such in its own way, for instance parents love their children, a poet his poems, a craftsman his handiwork.1 Much more therefore God hates nothing, since He is the cause of all.

This agrees with the saying of Wis. 11:25: Thou lovest all the things that are and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.

And yet God is said metaphorically to hate certain things: and this in two ways. First, from the fact that God in loving things, and willing their good to be, wills the contrary evil not to be. Wherefore He is said to hate evils, since we are said to hate that which we will not to be; according to Zach. 8:17, Let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his friend; and love not a false oath, for all these are the things that I hate, saith the Lord. But such things are not His effects as subsistent things, to which hatred or love are directed properly speaking.

The other way is due to God willing some greater good that cannot be without the privation of a lesser good. And thus He is said to hate, since to do more than this were to love. For, in this way, for as much as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe, which good is impossible without the punishment or destruction of some, He is said to hate those whose punishment or destruction He wills; according to Mal. 1:3: I have hated Esau, and the words of the psalm:2 Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity, thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie: the bloody and the deceitful man the Lord will abhor.

Chapter XCVII

that god is a living being

From what has been already proved, it follows of necessity that God is a living being.

For it has been shown1 that in God there are intelligence and will. Now intelligence and will are only in that which lives. Therefore God is a living being.

Again. Life is ascribed to certain things in as much as they seem to be set in motion of themselves and not by another. For which reason, things which seem to be moved of themselves, the cause of which movement is not perceived by the unlearned, are described metaphorically as living: for instance we speak of the living water of a flowing source, but not of a tank or stagnant pond; and of ‘quick’-silver, which seems to have a kind of movement. For properly speaking those things alone are themselves in motion, which move themselves, being composed of mover and moved, such as animate beings. Wherefore such things alone are said to live, while all others are moved by some other thing, either as generating them, or as removing an obstacle, or as impelling them. And since sensible operations are accompanied by movement, furthermore whatever moves itself to its proper operations, although these be without movement, is said to live: wherefore intelligence, appetite and sensation are vital actions. Now God especially works not as moved by another but by Himself, since He is the first active cause.2 Therefore to live is befitting Him above all.

Again. The divine being contains every perfection of being, as was shown above.3 Now life is a kind of perfect existence; wherefore living beings are placed above not-living things in the order of beings. Therefore God’s being is life. Therefore He is a living being.

This is confirmed by the authority of divine Scripture. For it is said (Deut. 32:40) in the person of the Lord: I will say: I live for ever, and in the psalm:1 My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.

Chapter XCVIII

that god is his own life

From this it further appears that God is His own life.

For life in a living being is the same as to live expressed in the abstract; just as a running is in reality the same as to run. Now in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher declares (2 De Anima).2 For since an animal is said to be living because it has a soul whereby it has existence, as it were by its proper form, it follows that to live is nothing but a particular kind of existence resulting from a particular kind of form. Now God is His own existence, as proved above.3 Therefore He is His own living and His own life.

Again. Intelligence is a kind of life, as the Philosopher declares (2 De Anima4): since to live is the act of a living being. Now God is His own act of intelligence, as we have proved.5 Therefore He is His own living and His own life.

Moreover. If God were not His own life, since He is a living being as shown above,6 it would follow that He is living by a participation of life. Now whatever is by participation is reduced to that which is by its essence. Wherefore God would be reduced to something preceding Him whereby He would live. But this is impossible, as is evident from what has been said.7

Again. If God is a living being, as we have proved,8 it follows that life is in Him. Wherefore if He be not His own life, there will be something in Him that is not Himself: and consequently He will be composite. But this was disproved above.1 Therefore God is His own life.

This is What is said (Jo. 14:6): I am the life.

Chapter XCIX

that god’s life is eternal

It follows from this that God’s life is eternal. For nothing ceases to live except by being severed from life. But nothing can be severed from itself: for all severance results from the separation of one thing from another. Therefore it is impossible that God cease to live, since Himself is His own life, as we have proved.2

Again. Whatever sometimes is and sometimes is not, results from a cause: for nothing brings itself from not-being to being: since what is not yet, acts not. Now the divine life has no cause, as neither has the divine existence. Therefore He is not sometimes living and sometimes not living, but is ever living. Therefore His life is eternal.

Again. In every operation the operator remains, although sometimes the operation is transitory by way of succession: wherefore in movement the thing moved remains the same identically though not logically. Hence where action is the agent itself, it follows that nothing passes by in succession, but that the whole is throughout the same simultaneously. Now in God to understand and to live are God Himself, as was proved.3 Therefore His life is without succession and is simultaneously whole.4 Therefore it is eternal.

Moreover. God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved above.5 But that which begins or ceases to live, or is subject to succession in living, is changeable: for the life of a being begins by generation and ceases by corruption, and succession results from change of some kind. Therefore God neither began to be, nor will cease to be, nor is subject to succession in living. Therefore His life is eternal.

Wherefore it is said (Deut. 32:40) in the person of the Lord: I live for ever; and (1 Jo. 5.1): This is the true God and life eternal.

Chapter C

that god is happy

It remains for us to show from the foregoing that God is happy. For happiness is the proper good of every intellectual nature. Since then God is intelligent,2 His proper good is happiness. Now He is compared to His proper good, not as that which tends to a good not yet possessed—for this belongs to a nature that is changeable and in potentiality,3 but as that which already possesses its proper good. Wherefore He not only desires happiness, as we do, but enjoys it. Therefore He is happy.

Moreover. An intellectual nature desires and wills above all that which is most perfect in it, and this is its happiness: and the most perfect thing in every being is its most perfect operation: for power and habit are perfected by operation; wherefore the Philosopher says that happiness is a perfect operation.4 Now the perfection of operation depends on four things. First, on its genus, namely that it abide in the operator: and by an operation abiding in the operator I mean one by which nothing else is done besides the operation, for instance to see or to hear. For the like are perfections of those things whose operations they are, and can be something ultimate, because they are not directed to something made as their end. On the other hand, an operation or action from which there follows something done besides the action itself, is a perfection of the thing done, not of the doer, and is compared to the doer as its end. Hence such an operation of the intellectual nature, is not beatitude or happiness. Secondly, on the principle of operation, that it should be an operation of the highest power. Hence happiness in us is not by an operation of the senses, but by an operation of the intellect perfected by a habit. Thirdly, on the object of the operation. For this reason ultimate happiness in us consists in understanding the highest object of our intellect. Fourthly, on the form of operation, namely that the operation should be performed perfectly, easily, constantly, and pleasurably. Now such is the operation of God. For He is intelligent; and His intellect is the sovereign power, nor needs to be perfected by a habit, since it is perfect in itself, as we proved above.1 He also understands Himself, Who is the highest of intelligible objects, perfectly, without any difficulty, and pleasurably. Therefore He is happy.

Again. Every desire is set at rest by happiness; because once it is possessed nothing remains to be desired, for it is the last end. Accordingly He must be happy, since He is perfect in all things that can be desired; wherefore Boethius says that happiness is a state made perfect by the assemblage of all good things.2 Now such is the divine perfection that it contains every perfection with simplicity, as shown above.3 Therefore He is truly happy.

Again. As long as a person lacks that which he needs, he is not yet happy: for his desire is not yet set at rest. Whosoever, therefore, is self-sufficient, needing nothing, is happy. Now it was proved above4 that God needs not other things, since His perfection depends on nothing outside Him: nor does He will other things for His own sake as their end, as though He needed them, but merely because this is befitting His goodness. Therefore He is happy.

Further. It has been proved5 that God cannot will what is impossible. Now it is impossible for anything to accrue to Him that He has not already, since He is nowise in potentiality, as we have shown.6 Therefore He cannot will to have what He has not. Whatever then He wills He has. Nor does He will anything ill, as we have proved.1 Therefore He is happy, according as some assert that a happy man is one who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.2

Holy Writ also bears witness to His happiness (1 Tim. 6):3 Which in His times He shall show, Who is blessed and … mighty.

Chapter CI

that god is his own happiness

It follows from this that God is His own happiness.

For His happiness is His intellectual operation, as we have shown:4 and it was proved above5 that God’s act of intelligence is His substance. Therefore He is His own happiness.

Again. Happiness, since it is the last end, is that which everyone wills principally, whether he has a natural inclination for it, or possesses it already. Now it has been proved6 that God principally wills His essence. Therefore His essence is His happiness.

Further. Whatever a person wills he directs to his happiness: for happiness is what is not desired on account of something else, and is the term of the movement of desire in one who desires one thing for the sake of another, else that movement will be indefinite. Since then God wills all other things for the sake of His goodness Which is His essence,7 it follows that He is His own happiness, even as He is His own essence and His own goodness.8

Moreover. There cannot be two sovereign goods: for if either lacked what the other has, neither would be sovereign and perfect. Now it has been shown above9 that God is the sovereign good. And it will be proved that happiness is the supreme good since it is the last end. Therefore happiness and God are one and the same. Therefore God is His own happiness.

Chapter CII

that god’s happiness is perfect and singular, surpassing all other happiness

Furthermore, from what has been said we are able to consider the excellence of the divine happiness.

For the nearer a thing is to happiness, the more perfectly is it happy. Hence, although a person be called happy on account of his hope of obtaining happiness, his happiness can nowise be compared to the happiness of one who has already actually obtained it. Now that which is happiness itself is nearest of all to happiness: and this has been proved1 to be true of God. Therefore He is singularly and perfectly happy.

Again. Since joy is caused by love, as was proved,2 where there is greater love there is greater joy in possessing the thing loved. Now, other things being equal, every being loves itself more than another: a sign of which is, that the nearer a thing is to one, the more is it naturally loved. Therefore God rejoices more in His own happiness, which is Himself, than the other blessed in their happiness, which is not themselves. Therefore His happiness sets His desire more at rest, and is more perfect.

Further. That which is by essence transcends that which is by participation: thus the nature of fire is found to be more perfect in fire itself than in that which is ignited. Now God is happy essentially.3 And this can apply to no other: for nothing besides Him can be the sovereign good, as may be gathered from what has been said.4 Hence it follows that whosoever besides Him is happy, is happy by participation. Therefore God’s happiness surpasses all other happiness.

Moreover. Happiness consists in the perfect operation of the intellect, as we have proved.1 Now no other intellectual operation is comparable with His operation. This is evident not only from its being a subsistent operation, but also because by the one operation God understands Himself perfectly as He is, as well as all things, both those which are and those which are not, both good and evil.2 Whereas in other intelligent beings their act of understanding themselves is not subsistent, but the act of a subsistence. Nor can anyone understand God, the supremely intelligible, as perfectly as He perfectly is: since no one’s being is perfect as the divine being is perfect, and no being’s operation can be more perfect than its substance. Nor is there any other intellect that knows all those things even which God can make, for then it would comprehend the divine power. Moreover whatsoever things another intellect knows, it knows them not all by one same operation. Therefore God is incomparably happy above all things.

Again. The more united a thing is, the more perfect its power and goodness. Now a successive operation is divided according to various portions of time. Wherefore its perfection can nowise be compared with the perfection of that operation which is simultaneously whole without any succession: especially if it pass not away in an instant but abide eternally. Now the divine act of intelligence is void of succession, since it exists eternally, simultaneously whole:3 whereas our act of understanding is successive, for as much as it is accidentally connected with continuity and time. Therefore God’s happiness infinitely surpasses man’s: even as the duration of eternity surpasses the passing now of time.

Again. Weariness, and the various occupations which in this life must needs interrupt our contemplation wherein especially consists human happiness, if there be any in this life; errors, doubts, and the various misfortunes to which the present life is subject—all these show that human happiness, especially in this life, cannot bear comparison with the happiness of God.

Moreover. The perfection of the divine happiness may be gathered from the fact that it comprises all manner of happiness in the most perfect way.1 In regard to contemplative happiness, it contains the most perfect everlasting consideration of Himself and other things: and in regard to active happiness, it comprises the governance, not of one man’s life, or of one household or city or kingdom, but of the whole universe.

False and earthly happiness is but a shadow of that most perfect happiness. For it consists of five things, according to Boethius,2 namely pleasure, wealth, power, honour and renown. But God has the most supreme pleasure in Himself, and universal joy in all good things, without any admixture of the contrary.3 For wealth He possesses in Himself an all-sufficiency of all good things, as we have proved above.4 For power He has infinite might.5 For honour He has supremacy and governance over all things.6 For renown He has the admiration of every intellect which knows Him in any degree whatever.7

To him therefore who is singularly happy, be honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen.

Chapter I

connection of the foregoing with the sequel

I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands (Ps. 142:5).

It is impossible to know a thing perfectly unless we know its operation: since from the mode and species of its operation we gauge the measure and quality of its power, while the power of a thing shows forth its nature: because a thing has naturally an aptitude for work according as it actually has such and such a nature.

Now the operation of a thing is twofold, as the Philosopher teaches (9 Metaph.);1 one that abides in the very worker and is a perfection of the worker himself, such as to sense, to understand, and to will; and another that passes into an outward thing, and is a perfection of the thing made that results from it, such as to heat, to cut, and to build.

Now both of the aforesaid operations are competent to God: the former, in that He understands, wills, rejoices, and loves; the latter, in that He brings forth things into being, preserves them, and rules them. Since, however, the former operation is a perfection of the operator, while the latter is a perfection of the thing made, and since the agent is naturally prior to the thing made and is the cause thereof, it follows that the first of the aforesaid operations is the reason of the second, and naturally precedes it, as a cause precedes its effect. This is, in fact, clearly seen in human affairs: for the thought and will of the craftsman is the origin and reason of the work of building.

Accordingly the first of the aforesaid operations, as a simple perfection of the operator, claims for itself the name of operation, or again of action: while the second, as being a perfection of the thing made, takes the name of work,1 wherefore those things which a craftsman brings into being by an action of this kind are said to be his handiwork.

Of the former operation of God we have already spoken in the foregoing Book, where we treated of the divine knowledge and will.2 Wherefore in order to complete our treatise of the divine truth, it remains for us to treat of the latter operation, whereby, to wit, things are made and governed by God.

We may gather this order from the words quoted above. For first he speaks of meditation on the first kind of operation, when he says: I meditated on all Thy operations, so that we refer operation to the divine intelligence and will. Then he refers to meditation on God’s works when he says, and I meditated on the works3 of Thy hands, so that by the works of His hands we understand heaven and earth, and all that is brought into being by God, as the handiwork produced by a craftsman.

Chapter II

that the consideration of creatures is useful for building up our faith

This meditation on the divine works is indeed necessary in order to build up man’s faith in God.

First, because through meditating on His works we are able somewhat to admire and consider the divine wisdom. For things made by art are indications of the art itself, since they are made in likeness to the art. Now God brought things into being by His wisdom: for which reason it is said in the psalm:1 Thou hast made all things in wisdom. Hence we are able to gather the wisdom of God from the consideration of His works, since by a kind of communication of His likeness it is spread abroad in the things He has made. For it is said (Ecclus. 1:10): He poured her out, namely wisdom, upon all His works: wherefore the psalmist after saying:2 Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me: it is high, and I cannot reach to it, and after referring to the aid of the divine enlightening, when he says: Night shall be my light, etc., confesses himself to have been helped to know the divine wisdom by the consideration of the divine works, saying: Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well.

Secondly, this consideration leads us to admire the sublime power of God, and consequently begets in men’s hearts a reverence for God. For we must needs conclude that the power of the maker transcends the things made. Wherefore it is said (Wis. 13:4): If they, the philosophers, to wit, admired their power and their effects, namely of the heavens, stars, and elements of the world, let them understand … that He that made them is mightier than they. Also it is written (Rom. 1:20): The invisible things of God3 … are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity. And this admiration makes us fear and reverence God. Hence it is said (Jerem. 10:6, 7): Great is Thy name in might. Who shall not fear Thee, O King of nations?

Thirdly, this consideration inflames the souls of men to the love of the divine goodness. For whatever goodness and perfection is generally apportioned among various creatures, is all united together in Him universally, as in the source of all goodness, as we proved in the First Book.4 Wherefore if the goodness, beauty, and sweetness of creatures are so alluring to the minds of men, the fountainhead of the goodness of God Himself, in comparison with the rivulets of goodness which we find in creatures, will draw the entranced minds of men wholly to itself. Hence it is said in the psalm,1 Thou hast given me, O Lord, a delight in Thy doings; and in the works of Thy hands I shall rejoice: and elsewhere2 it is said of the children of men: They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, that is of all creatures, and Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. For with Thee is the fountain of life. Again it is said (Wis. 13:1) against certain men: By these good things that are seen, namely creatures that are good by participation, they could not understand Him that is,3 good to wit, nay more, that is goodness itself, as we have shown in the First Book.

Fourthly, this consideration bestows on man a certain likeness to the divine perfection. For it was shown in the First Book4 that God, by knowing Himself, beholds all other things in Himself. Since then the Christian faith teaches man chiefly about God, and makes him to know, creatures by the light of divine revelation, there results in man a certain likeness to the divine wisdom. Hence it is said (2 Cor. 3:18): But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image.

Accordingly it is evident that the consideration of creatures helps to build up the Christian faith. Wherefore it is said (Ecclus. 42:15): I will … remember the works of the Lord, and I will declare the things I have seen: by the words of the Lord are His works.

Chapter III

that the knowledge of the nature of creatures avails for refuting errors against god

The consideration of creatures is likewise necessary not only for the building up of faith, but also for the destruction of errors. For errors about creatures sometimes lead one astray from the truth of faith, in so far as they disagree with true knowledge of God. This happens in several ways.

First, because through ignorance of the nature of creatures men are sometimes so far misled as to deem that which can but derive its being from something else, to be the first cause and God, for they think that nothing exists besides visible creatures. Such were those who thought that any kind of body was God: of whom it is said (Wis. 13:2): Who … have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon to be the gods.

Secondly, because they ascribe to certain creatures that which belongs to God alone. This also results from error about creatures: for one does not ascribe to a thing that which is incompatible with its nature, unless one is ignorant of its nature: for instance if we were to ascribe three feet to a man. Now that which belongs to God alone is incompatible with the nature of a creature: even as that which belongs to man alone is incompatible with another thing’s nature. Hence the foregoing error arises from ignorance of the creature’s nature. Against this error it is said (Wis. 14:21): They gave the incommunicable name1 to stones and wood. Into this error fell those who ascribe the creation of things, or the knowledge of the future, or the working of miracles to causes other than God.

Thirdly, because something is withdrawn from the divine power in its working on creatures, through ignorance of the creature’s nature. This is evidenced in those who ascribe to things a twofold principle, and in those who aver that things proceed from God, not by the divine will, but by natural necessity, and in those who withdraw either all or some things from divine providence, or who deny that it can work outside the ordinary course of things. For all these are derogatory to the divine power. Against these it is said (Job 22:17): Who … looked upon the Almighty as if He could do nothing, and (Wis. 12:17): Thou showest Thy power, when men will not believe Thee to be absolute in power.

Fourthly. Man, who is led by faith to God as his last end, through ignoring the natures of things, and consequently the order of his place in the universe, thinks himself to be beneath certain creatures above whom he is placed: as evidenced in those who subject man’s will to the stars, and against these it is said (Jerem. 10:2): Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear; also in those who deem the angels to be the creators of souls, and human souls to be mortal; and in those who hold any like opinions derogatory to the dignity of man.

Accordingly it is clear that the opinion is false of those who asserted that it mattered not to the truth of faith what opinions one holds about creatures, so long as one has a right opinion about God, as Augustine relates in his book De Origine Animœ:1 since error concerning creatures by subjecting the human mind to causes other than God amounts to a false opinion about God, and misleads the minds of men from God, to Whom faith strives to lead them.

Wherefore Scripture threatens punishment to those who err about creatures, as to unbelievers, in the words of the psalm:2 Because they have not understood the works of the Lord and the operations of His hands, Thou shalt destroy them, and shalt not build them up; and (Wis. 2:21): These things they thought and were deceived, and further on:3 They esteemed not the honour of holy souls.

Chapter IV

that the philosopher and the theologian treat of creatures in different ways

Now it is evident from what has been said that the teaching of the Christian faith treats of creatures in so far as they reflect a certain likeness of God, and forasmuch as error concerning them leads to error about God. And so they are viewed from a different point by the aforesaid teaching, and by that of human philosophy. For human philosophy considers them as such; wherefore we find that the different parts of philosophy correspond to the different genera of things. On the other hand the Christian faith does not consider them as such, for instance it considers fire not as such, but as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to Him in any way whatsoever. For as it is stated (Ecclus. 42:16, 17), Full of the glory of the Lord is His work. Hath not the Lord made the saints to declare all His wonderful works? Hence also the philosopher and the believer consider different matters about creatures. For the philosopher considers such things as belong to them by their own nature: for instance that fire tends upwards. Whereas the believer considers about creatures only such things as belong to them in respect of their relation to God: for instance that they are created by God, are subject to God, and so forth.

Wherefore it argues not imperfection in the teaching of faith, if it overlooks many properties of things, such as the shape of the heavens, and the quality of its movement: since neither does the physicist consider the same characters of a line as the geometrician, but only such as are accidental thereto, as the term of a natural body.

Any matters, however, that the philosopher and the believer in common consider about creatures, are delivered through different principles on the one hand and on the other. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things: whereas the believer has recourse to the First Cause, for instance because it has been thus delivered by God, or because it conduces to God’s glory, or because God’s power is infinite. Hence (the teaching of faith) should be called the greatest wisdom, since it considers the highest cause, according to the saying of Deut. 4:6: For this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations. Wherefore human philosophy is a handmaid to her as mistress. For this reason sometimes divine wisdom argues from the principles of human philosophy: since also among philosophers the First Philosophy makes use of the teachings of all sciences in order to establish its purpose. Hence again both teachings do not follow the same order. For in the teaching of philosophy which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures, and the last of God: whereas in the teaching of faith which considers creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration about God takes the first place, and that about creatures the last. And thus it is more perfect: as being more like God’s knowledge, for He beholds other things by knowing Himself.

Wherefore, according to this order, after what has been said in the First Book about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the things which proceed from Him.

Chapter V

order of the things to be said

We shall treat of these things in the following order. First we shall discourse of the bringing forth of things into being:1 secondly, of their distinction:2 thirdly, of the nature of these same things brought forth and distinct from one another, so far as it concerns the truth of faith.3

Chapter VI

that it becomes god to be the source of being to other things

Taking then as granted the things that were proved in the foregoing Book, let us now proceed to prove that it becomes God to be the source and cause of being to other things.

For it was shown above1 by the proof of Aristotle that there is a first efficient cause which we call God. Now an efficient cause brings its effects into being. Therefore God is the cause of being to other things.

Again. It was shown in the First Book2 by the argument of the same author, that there is a first immovable mover, which we call God. Now the first mover in any order of movements is the cause of all the movements in that order. Since then many things are brought into being by the movements of the heaven, and since God has been proved to be the first mover in the order of those movements, it follows that God is the cause of being to many things.

Moreover. That which belongs to a thing by its nature, must needs be in that thing universally; as for man to be rational, and for fire to tend upwards. Now it belongs to a being in act that it should enact an effect; for every agent acts according as it is in act.3 Therefore it is natural to every being in act to enact something existing in act. Now God is being in act, as we proved in the First Book.4 Therefore it is competent to Him to produce something in act, to which He is the cause of being.

Further. It is a sign of perfection in things of the lower world, that they are able to produce their like, as stated by the Philosopher (4 Meteor.).5 Now God is supremely perfect, as was proved in the First Book.6 Therefore it is competent to Him to produce something in act like unto Himself, so that He is the cause of its being.

Again. It was shown in the First Book7 that God wills to communicate His being to other things by way of likeness. Now it belongs to the will’s perfection to be the principle of action and movement, as stated in 3 De Anima.8 Since then God’s will is perfect,9 it lacks not the power of communicating His being to a thing by way of likeness. And thus He will be the cause of its being.

Further. The more perfect the principle of a thing’s action is, to so many more and further distant things can it extend its action: thus fire, if weak, heats only that which is nigh, but, if strong, heats even distant things. Now pure act, which is God,1 is more perfect than act mingled with potentiality, as it is with us. But act is the principle of action. Since, then, by the act which is in us we are able to proceed not only to actions that abide in us, such as intelligence and volition, but also to actions that pass on to outward things, and through which certain things are made by us; much more can God, in that He is in act, not only understand and will, but also produce an effect. And thus He can be the cause of being to other things.

Hence it is said (Job. 5:9): Who doth great things and unsearchable … things without number.

Chapter VII

that in god there is active power

It follows from this that God is powerful, and that active power is fittingly ascribed to Him.

For active power is the principle of acting on another as such.2 Now it becomes God to be the principle of being to other things. Therefore it becomes Him to be powerful.

Moreover. Just as passive potentiality is consequent upon being in potentiality, so active potency is consequent upon being in act: for a thing is active because it is in act, and passive because it is in potentiality.3 Now it becomes God to be in act.4 Therefore active power is becoming to Him.

Again. The divine perfection includes the perfection of all things, as was proved in the First Book.5 Now active power belongs to the perfection of a thing: since a thing is found to be the more perfect in proportion as it is more powerful. Therefore God cannot be devoid of active power.

Further. Whatever acts, has the power to act, since that which has not the power to act, cannot possibly act; and what cannot possibly act, of necessity does not act. Now God acts and moves, as was proved above.1 Therefore He has the power to act; and active but not passive potency is fittingly ascribed to Him.

Hence it is said in the psalm:2 Thou art mighty (potens), O Lord, and elsewhere:3 Thy power and Thy justice, O God, even to the highest great things Thou hast done.

Chapter VIII

that god’s power is his substance

We may also conclude from this that the divine power is God’s very substance.

For active power becomes a thing according as this is in act.4 Now God is very act; nor is He being in act by some act that is not Himself, since in Him there is no potentiality, as we have proved in the First Book.5 Therefore He is His own power.

Again. Whatever is powerful and is not its own power, is powerful by participating another’s power. But nothing can be ascribed to God by participation, for He is His own being, as we proved in the First Book.6 Therefore He is His own power.

Moreover. Active power belongs to a thing’s perfection, as stated above.7 Now every perfection of God is contained in His very being, as was shown in the First Book.8 Therefore the divine power is not other than His very being. Now God is His own being, as we proved in the First Book.9 Therefore He is His own power.

Again. In those things whose powers are not their substance, their powers are accidents: hence natural power is placed in the second species of accident.1 But in God there can be no accident, as was proved in the First Book.2 Therefore God is His own power.

Further. Whatever is by another is reduced to that which is by its very self, being thus reduced to that which is first. Now other agents are reduced to God as first agent.3 Therefore He is agent by His very self. But that which acts by its very self, acts by its essence: and that by which a thing acts is its active power. Therefore God’s very essence is His active power.

Chapter IX

that god’s power is his action

From this we can show that God’s power is not other than His action.

For things that are identical with one and the same thing, are identical with one another.4 Now God’s power is His substance, as we have proved:5 and His action is also His substance, as we showed in the First Book6 with regard to His intellectual operation: for this applies equally to His other operations. Therefore in God power is not distinct from action.

Again. The action of a thing is a complement of its power: for it is compared to power as second act to first. Now the divine power is not completed by another than Himself, since it is God’s very essence.7 Therefore in God power is not distinct from action.

Moreover. Just as active power is something acting, so is its essence something being. Now God’s power is His essence, as we have proved.8 Therefore His action is His being. But His being is His substance.9 Therefore God’s action is His substance, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Further. An action that is not the substance of the agent, is in the agent as an accident in its subject: wherefore action is reckoned among the nine predicaments of accident.1 Now there can be nothing accidental in God.2 Therefore God’s substance is not other than His power.

Chapter X

in what way power is ascribed to god

Since, however, nothing is its own principle, and God’s action is not other than His power,3 it is clear from the foregoing that power is ascribed to God, not as the principle of action, but as the principle of the thing made. And since power implies relation to something else under the aspect of principle thereof,—for active power is the principle of acting on something else, according to the Philosopher (5 Metaph.)4—it is evident that power is ascribed to God in relation to things made, according to reality, and not in relation to action, except according to our way of understanding, for as much as our intellect considers both, the divine power and action to wit, by different concepts. Wherefore, if certain actions are becoming to God, which do not pass into something made but remain in the agent, power is not ascribed to God in their respect, except according to our manner of understanding, and not according to reality. Such actions are intelligence and volition. Accordingly God’s power, properly speaking, does not regard suchlike actions, but only their effects. Consequently intellect and will are in God, not as powers, but only as actions.

It is also clear from the foregoing that the manifold actions ascribed to God, as intelligence, volition, the production of things, and the like, are not so many different things, since each of these actions in God is His own very being, which is one and the same thing. How one thing may remain true while having many significations, may be clearly seen from what has been shown in the First Book.1

Chapter XI

that something is said of god in relation to creatures

Now as power is becoming to God in relation to His effects,2 and as power conveys the notion of a principle, as we have stated;3 and since principle denotes relationship to that which proceeds from it, it is evident that something can be said of God relatively, in relation to His effects.

Again. It is inconceivable that one thing be referred to another, unless conversely the latter be referred to it. Now we speak of other things in relation to God; for example as regards their being which they have from God, as already proved,4 they are dependent upon Him. Therefore conversely we may speak of God in relation to creatures.

Further. Likeness is a kind of relation. Now God, even as other agents, produces something like Himself.5 Therefore something is said of Him relatively.

Moreover. Knowledge denotes relation to the thing known. Now God has knowledge not only of Himself, but also of other things.6 Therefore something is said of God in relation to other things.

Again. Mover implies relation to thing moved, and agent to thing done. Now God is an agent, and an unmoved mover, as already proved.7 Therefore relations are predicated of Him.

Again. First implies some kind of relation, and so does supreme. Now it was proved in the First Book8 that He is the first being and the supreme good.

It is therefore evident that many things are said of God relatively.

Chapter XII

that relations said of god in reference to creatures are not really in god

These relations however which refer to His effects cannot possibly be in God.

For they cannot be in Him as accidents in a subject, since no accident is in Him, as we proved in the First Book.1 Neither can they be God’s very substance: because, since relative terms are those which essentially refer somehow to something else, as the Philosopher says (Predic.),2 it would follow that God’s substance is essentially referred to something else. Now that which is essentially referred to another, depends in some way thereon, since it can neither exist nor be understood without it. Hence it would follow that God’s substance is dependent on something else outside it: and thus it would not be of itself necessary being, as we have proved in the First Book.3 Therefore suchlike relations are not really in God.

Again. It was proved in the First Book4 that God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is compared to other beings as knowable things to our knowledge: since opinion or speech is true or false according as a thing is or is not, according to the Philosopher (Predic.).5 Now though a thing is said to be knowable in relation to knowledge, the relation is not really in the knowable, but only in the knowledge: wherefore according to the Philosopher (5 Metaph.),6 the knowable is so called relatively, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it. Therefore the said relations are not really in God.

Further. The aforesaid relations are said of God not only with respect to those things that are actual, but also with respect to those that are in potentiality: because He both has knowledge of them, and in reference to them is called the first being and the sovereign good. But that which is actual has no real relation to that which is not actual but potential: else it would follow that there are actually an infinite number of relations in the same subject, since potentially infinite numbers are greater than the number two which is prior to them all. Now God is not related to actual things otherwise than to potential things, for He is not changed by the fact that He produces certain things.1 Therefore He is not related to other things by a relation really existing in Him.

Moreover. Whatever receives something anew, must needs be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now certain relations are said of God anew: for instance that He is Lord or governor of a thing which begins anew to exist. Wherefore if a relation were predicated of God as really existing in Him, it would follow that something accrues to God anew, and consequently that He is changed either essentially or accidentally: the contrary of which was proved in the First Book.2

Chapters XIII and XIV

how the aforesaid relations are predicated of god

Nevertheless it cannot be said that the aforesaid relations exist extraneously as something outside God.

For since God is the first being and sovereign good,3 it would be necessary to consider yet other relations of God to those relations that are realities. And if these also are realities, we shall again have to find third relations: and so on indefinitely. Therefore the relations by which God is referred to other things are not really existing outside God.

Again. A thing is predicated denominatively in two ways. For a thing may be denominated from that which is outside it; for instance from place a person is said to be somewhere, and from time somewhen: and a thing may be denominated from that which is in it, as a person is denominated white from whiteness. On the other hand a thing is not found to be denominated from a relation as extraneous, but as inherent: for a man is not denominated a father except from fatherhood which is in him. Therefore it is impossible for the relations whereby God is referred to creatures to be realities outside Him.

Since then it has been proved1 that they are not really in Him, and yet are predicated of Him,2 it remains that they are ascribed to Him according only to our way of understanding, from the fact that other things are referred to Him. For our intellect, in understanding one thing to be referred to another, understands at the same time that the latter is related to the former; although sometimes it is not really related at all.

Wherefore it is also evident that the aforesaid relations are not said of God in the same way as other things predicated of God. For all other things, as wisdom, will, predicate His essence, whereas the aforesaid relations do not by any means, but solely according to our way of understanding. And yet our understanding is not false. Because from the very fact that our intellect understands that the relations of the divine effects terminate in God Himself, it predicates certain things of Him relatively: even so we understand and express the knowable relatively from the fact that our knowledge is referred to it.

3 It is also clear from the foregoing that it is not prejudicial to God’s simplicity if many relations are predicated of Him, although they do not signify His essence: because they are consequent upon our way of understanding. For nothing hinders our intellect understanding many things, and being referred in many ways to that which is in itself simple, so as thus to consider the simple thing under a manifold relationship. And the more simple a thing is, the greater its virtue, and of so many more things is it a principle, and consequently it is understood as related in so many more ways: thus a point is a principle of more things than a line is, and a line of more things than a surface. Wherefore the very fact that many things are said of God relatively, bears witness to His supreme simplicity.

Chapter XV

that god is to all things the cause of being

Now, since we have proved1 that God is the source of being to some things, we must further show that everything besides Himself is from Him.

For whatever belongs to a thing otherwise than as such, belongs to it through some cause, as white to a man: because that which has no cause is something first and immediate, wherefore it must needs belong to the thing essentially and as such. Now it is impossible for any one thing to belong to two and to both of them as such. For that which is said of a thing as such, does not go beyond that thing: for instance to have three angles equal to two right angles does not go beyond a triangle. Accordingly if something belongs to two things, it will not belong to both as such: wherefore it is impossible for any one thing to be predicated of two so as to be said of neither by reason of a cause, but it is necessary that either the one be the cause of the other,—for instance fire is the cause of heat in a mixed body, and yet each is called hot;—or else some third thing must be cause of both, for instance fire is the cause of two candles giving light. Now being is said of everything that is. Wherefore it is impossible that there be two things neither of which has a cause of its being, but either both the things in question must have their being through a cause, or else the one must be the cause of being to the other. Hence everything that, in any way whatever, is, must needs be from that to which nothing is a cause of being. Now we have proved above2 that God is this being to which nothing is a cause of its being. Therefore from Him is everything that, in any way whatever, is. If however it be said that being is not a univocal predicate, the above conclusion follows none the less. For it is not said of many equivocally, but analogically: and thus it is necessary to be brought back to one thing.

Moreover. That which belongs to a thing by its nature, and not by some other cause, cannot be diminished and deficient therein. For if something essential be subtracted from or added to a nature, there will be at once another nature: even as it happens in numbers, where the addition or subtraction of unity changes the species.1 And if the nature or quiddity of a thing remain entire, although something is found to be diminished, it is clear that this does not depend simply on that nature, but on something else, through the absence of which it is diminished. Wherefore that which belongs to one thing less than to others, belongs to it not through its nature alone, but through some other cause. Consequently that thing will be the cause of all in a certain genus, to which thing the predication of that genus belongs above all; hence that which is most hot is seen to be the cause of heat in all things hot, and that which is most light is the cause of all things that have light. Now God is being above all, as we have proved in the First Book.2 Therefore He is the cause of all of which being is predicated.

Further. The order of causes must needs correspond to the order of effects, since effects are proportionate to their causes.3 Wherefore, as proper effects are reduced to their proper causes, so that which is common in proper effects must needs be reduced to some common cause: even so, above the particular causes of the generation of this or that thing, is the sun the universal cause of generation; and the king is the universal cause of government in his kingdom, above the wardens of the kingdom and of each city. Now being is common to all. Therefore above all causes there must be a cause to which it belongs to give being. But God is the first cause, as shown above.1 Therefore it follows that all things that are, are from God.

Again. That which is said to be essentially so and so is the cause of all that are so by participation: thus fire is the cause of all things ignited as such. Now God is being by His essence, because He is being itself:2 whereas everything else is being by participation: for there can be but one being that is its own being, as was proved in the First Book.3 Therefore God is the cause of being to all other things.

Further. Everything that is possible to be and not to be has a cause: because considered in itself it is indifferent to either, so that there must needs be something else that determines it to one. Wherefore, since we cannot proceed to infinity, there must needs be some necessary thing that is the cause of all things that it is possible to be and not to be. Now there is a necessary thing that has a cause of its necessity: and here again we cannot proceed to infinity, so that we must come to something that is of itself necessary to be. And this can be but one, as we showed in the First Book:4 and this is God. Therefore everything other than Him must be reduced to Him as the cause of its being.

Moreover. God is the maker of a thing, inasmuch as He is in act, as we have proved above.5 Now by His actuality and perfection He contains all the perfections of things, as we have shown in the First Book;6 and thus He is virtually all things. Therefore He is the maker of all. But this would not be if something else were of a nature to be otherwise than from Him: for nothing is of a nature to be from another, and not to be from another, since if it be of a nature not to be from another, it is of itself necessary to be, and thus can never be from another. Therefore nothing can be except from God.

Again. The imperfect originate from the perfect, as seed from an animal. Now God is the most perfect being and the sovereign good, as was shown in the First Book.7 Therefore He is to all things the cause of being, especially since it was proved1 that there can be but one such thing.

This is confirmed by divine authority. For it is said in the psalm:2 Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all the things that are in them: and (Jo. 1:3): All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing: and (Rom. 11:36): Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things: to Him be glory for ever.

This sets aside the error of the ancient physicists who asserted that certain bodies had no cause of their being: likewise of some who say that God is not the cause of the substance of heaven, but only of its movement.

Chapter XVI

that god brought things into being out of nothing

From this it is clear that God brought things into being out of no pre-existing thing as matter.

For if a thing is an effect of God, either something exists before it, or not. If not, our point is proved, namely that God produces an effect from no pre-existing thing. If however something exists before it, we must either go on to infinity,—which is impossible in natural causes, as the Philosopher proves (2 Metaph.)3—or we must come to some first thing that presupposes no other. And this can only be God. For it was shown in the First Book4 that He is not the matter of any thing, nor can there be anything other than God the being of which is not caused by God, as we have proved.5 It follows therefore that God in producing His effects requires no prejacent matter out of which to produce His work.

Further. Every matter is constricted to some particular species by the form with which it is superendued. Hence to produce an effect out of prejacent matter by enduing it with a form in any way belongs to an agent that aims at some particular species. Now a like agent is a particular agent, since causes are proportionate to their effects.1 Therefore an agent that requires of necessity prejacent matter out of which to work its effect, is a particular agent. But God is an agent as being the universal cause of being, as was proved above.2 Therefore He needs no prejacent matter in His action.

Again. The more universal an effect, the higher its proper cause: because the higher the cause, to so many more things does its virtue extend. Now to be is more universal than to be moved: since some beings are immovable, as also philosophers teach, for instance stones and the like. It follows therefore that above the cause which acts only by causing movement and change, there is that cause which is the first principle of being: and we have proved3 that this is God. Therefore God does not act merely by causing movement and change. Now everything that cannot bring things into being save from prejacent matter, acts only by causing movement and change, since to make aught out of matter is the result of movement or change of some kind. Consequently it is not impossible to bring things into being without prejacent matter. Therefore God brings things into being without prejacent matter.

Again. That which acts only by movement and change is inconsistent with the universal cause of being; since by movement and change a being is not made from absolute non-being, but this being from this non-being. Now God is the universal cause of being, as we have proved.4 Therefore it is not becoming to Him to act only by movement or change. Neither then is it becoming to Him to need preexisting matter, in order to make something.

Moreover. Every agent produces something like itself in some way. Now every agent acts according as it is actually. Consequently to produce an effect by causing in some way a form inherent to matter, will belong to that agent, which is actualized by a form inherent to it, and not by its whole substance. Hence the Philosopher proves (7 Metaph.)1 that material things, which have forms in matter, are engendered by material agents that have forms in matter, and not by per se existing forms. Now God is actual being not by a form inherent to Him, but by His whole substance, as we have proved above.2 Therefore the proper mode of His action is to produce a whole subsistent thing, and not merely an inherent thing, namely a form in matter. And every agent that requires no matter for its action, acts in this way. Therefore God requires no preexisting matter in His action.

Further. Matter is compared to an agent as the recipient of the action proceeding from the agent: for the action which is the agent’s as proceeding therefrom, is the patient’s as residing therein. Wherefore matter is required by an agent that it may receive the agent’s action: since the agent’s action received in the patient is the patient’s act and form, or some beginning of a form therein. Now God does not act by an action that requires to be received in a patient: because His action is His substance, as already proved.3 Therefore He requires no prejacent matter in order to produce an effect.

Further. Every agent that requires prejacent matter in acting, has a matter proportionate to its action, so that whatever is in the potency of the agent, is all in the potentiality of the matter: otherwise it could not bring into act all that are in its active power, and thus would have that power, with regard to such things, to no purpose. Now matter has no such proportion to God. For matter is not in potentiality to any particular quantity, as the Philosopher declares (3 Phys.):4 whereas the divine power is simply infinite, as we proved in the First Book.5 Therefore God requires no prejacent matter as necessary for His action.

Again. Of different things there are different matters: for the matter of spiritual things is not the same as that of corporeal things, nor that of heavenly bodies the same as that of corruptible bodies. This is evident from the fact that receptivity which is a property of matter is not of the same kind in the aforesaid: for receptivity in spiritual things is intelligible, thus the intellect receives the species of intelligible objects, but not according to their material being: while heavenly bodies receive newness of situation, but not newness of being, as lower bodies do. Therefore there is not one matter that is in potentiality to universal being. But God’s activity regards all being universally.1 Therefore no matter corresponds proportionately to Him. Therefore He requires not matter of necessity.

Moreover. Wherever in the universe certain things are in mutual proportion and order, one of them must proceed from the other, or both from some one: for order must be founded in one by its corresponding with another; else order or proportion would be the result of chance, which is inadmissible in the first principles of things, because it would follow yet more that all else are from chance.2 If, then, there be any matter proportionate to the divine action, it follows that either the one is from the other, or both from a third. But since God is the first being and the first cause,3 He cannot be the effect of matter, nor can He be from any third cause. Therefore it follows that if there be matter proportionate to God’s action, He is the cause thereof.

Again. That which is the first of beings, must needs be the cause of the things that are: for if they were not caused they would not be set in order thereby, as we have already proved.4 Now between act and potentiality there is this order, that, although in the one and same thing which is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act, potentiality precedes act in point of time, whereas act precedes by nature; nevertheless, speaking simply, act must needs precede potentiality, which is evidenced by the fact that potentiality is not reduced to act save by a being in act. But matter is a being in potentiality. Therefore God Who is pure act must needs be simply prior to matter, and consequently the cause thereof. Therefore matter is not necessarily presupposed for His action.

Again. Primary matter is in some way, for it is a being in potentiality. Now God is the cause of all things that are, as we have proved.1 Therefore God is the cause of primary matter: to which nothing is pre-existent. Therefore the divine action needs no pre-existing nature.

Divine Scripture confirms this truth, saying (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth. For to create is nothing else than to bring something into being without prejacent matter.

Hereby is refuted the error of the ancient philosophers who asserted that matter has no cause whatever, because they observed that in the actions of particular agents something is always prejacent to action: whence they drew the opinion common to all that from nothing naught is made.2 This is true in particular agents. But they had not yet arrived at the knowledge of the universal agent, which is the active cause of all being, and of necessity presupposes nothing for His action.

Chapter XVII

that creation is neither movement nor change

Having proved the foregoing, it is evident that God’s action, which is without prejacent matter and is called creation, is neither movement nor change, properly speaking.

For all movement or change is the action of that which is in potentiality as such.3 Now in this action there pre-exists nothing in potentiality to receive the action, as we have proved.4 Therefore it is neither movement nor change.

Again. The extremes of a movement or change are included in the same order: either because they come under one genus, as contraries, for instance in the movement of growth and alteration, and when a thing is carried from one place to another; or because they have one potentiality of matter in common, as privation and form in generation and corruption. But neither of these applies to creation: for it admits of no potentiality, nor of anything of the same genus that may be presupposed to creation, as we have proved.1 Therefore there is neither movement nor change therein.

Further. In every change or movement there must be something that is conditioned otherwise now and before: since the very name of change shows this.2 But when the whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there can be no same thing that is conditioned in one way and in another, for it would not be produced, but presupposed to production. Therefore creation is not a change.

Further. Movement and change must needs precede that which is made by change or movement: because having been made is the beginning of rest and the term of movement. Wherefore all change must be movement or the term of a movement that is successive. For this reason, what is being made, is not: for as long as movement lasts, something is being made and is not: whereas in the term itself of movement, wherein rest begins, no longer is a thing being made, but it has been made. Now in creation this is impossible: for if creation preceded as movement or change, it would necessarily presuppose a subject, and this is contrary to the nature of creation. Therefore creation is neither movement nor change.

Chapter XVIII

how to solve the objections against creation

From this we may see the vacuity of those who gainsay creation by arguments taken from the nature of movement and change: such as that creation must needs, like other movements and changes, take place in some subject, and that it implies the transmutation of non-being into being, like that of fire into air.

For creation is not a change, but the very dependence of created being on the principle whereby it is produced. Hence it is a kind of relation. Wherefore nothing prevents its being in the creature as its subject. Nevertheless creation would seem to be a kind of change according only to our way of understanding: in so far, to wit, as our intellect grasps one and the same thing as previously non-existent, and as afterwards existing.

It is clear however that if creation is a relation, it is a thing: and neither is it uncreated, nor is it created by another relation. For since a created effect depends really on its creator, this relation must needs be some thing. Now every thing is brought into being by God.1 Therefore it receives its being from God. And yet it is not created by a different creation from the first creature which is stated to be created thereby. Because accidents and forms, just as they are not per se, so neither are they created per se, since creation is the production of a being, but just as they are in another, so are they created when other things are created.

Moreover. A relation is not referred through another relation,—for in that case one would go on to infinity,—but is referred by itself, because it is essentially a relation. Therefore there is no need for another creation whereby creation itself is created, so that one would go on to infinity.

Chapter XIX

that in creation there is no succession

It is also clear from the foregoing that all creation is without succession.

For succession is proper to movement: while creation is not a movement nor the term of a movement, as change is.1 Therefore there is no succession therein.

Again. In every successive movement there is some mean between its extremes: for a mean is that which a continuously moved thing reaches first before reaching the term.2 Now between being and non-being which are as the extremes of creation, no mean is possible. Therefore there is no succession therein.

Moreover. In every making wherein there is succession, a thing is becoming before it has been made, as is proved in 6 Phys.3 Now this cannot happen in creation. Because the becoming which would precede being made, would need a subject. And this could not be the creature itself whose creation is in question, since it is not before it is made. Nor would it be in the maker, because to be moved is the act not of the mover, but of the thing moved.4 It follows that becoming would have for its subject some pre-existing matter of the thing made. But this is incompatible with creation.5 Therefore there can be no succession in creation.

Further. Every making that proceeds by succession must needs take time: since before and after in movement are reckoned by time.6 Now time, movement, and the thing subject to movement are all simultaneously divided.7 This is evident in local movement: for that which is moved with regularity passes through half a magnitude in half the time. Now the division in forms that corresponds to division of time is according to intensity and remissness: thus if a thing is heated to such a degree in so much time, it is heated to a less degree in less time. Accordingly succession in any movement or making is possible according as the thing in respect of which there is motion is divisible: either according to quantity, as in local movement and increase; or according to intensity and remission, as in alteration. Now the latter occurs in two ways. First, because the form which is the term of movement is divisible in respect of intensity and remission, as when a thing is in motion towards whiteness: secondly, because such a division happens in dispositions to such a form; thus the becoming of fire is successive on account of the previous alteration as regards the dispositions to the form. But the substantial being itself of a creature is not divisible in this way, for substance cannot be more or less.1 Nor do any dispositions precede creation, since there is no pre-existing matter, for disposition is on the part of matter. It follows therefore that there cannot be succession in creation.

Further. Succession in the making of things results from a defect of the matter, that is not suitably disposed from the beginning for the reception of the form: wherefore, when the matter is already perfectly disposed for the form, it receives it in an instant. For this reason, since a diaphanous body is always in the last disposition for light, it is actually illumined as soon as the luminous body is present: nor does any movement precede on the part of the illuminable body, but only local movement on the part of the illuminant, which becomes present. But in creation nothing is required beforehand on the part of matter: nor does the agent lack anything for His action, that may afterwards accrue to Him through movement, since He is utterly immovable, as we have shown in the First Book of this Work.2 It follows therefore that creation is instantaneous. Hence in the same instant a thing is being created and is created, just as in the same instant a thing is being illumined and is illumined.

Hence divine Scripture declares that the creation of things took place in an indivisible instant, when it says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth: which beginning Basil expounds as the beginning of time,3 and this must be indivisible as is proved in 6 Phys.4

Chapter XX

that no body can create

Hence it is evident that no body can produce anything by creation.

For no body acts unless it be moved: since agent and patient must be together, as also maker and that which is made:1 and those things are together which are in the same place, as stated in 6 Phys.,2 and a body does not acquire a place except by movement. But no body is moved except in time. Wherefore whatever is done by the action of a body is done successively: whereas creation, as we have proved,3 is without succession. Therefore nothing can be produced by way of creation by any body whatever.

Further. Every agent that acts through being moved, of necessity moves that on which it acts, for the thing made and the thing patient are consequent upon the disposition of maker and agent, since every agent produces its like. Hence, if the agent, while varying in disposition, acts in as much as it is changed by movement, it follows that also in the patient and the thing made there is a succession of dispositions, which is impossible without movement. Now no body moves unless it be moved, as we have proved. Therefore nothing results from the action of a body, except by the movement or change of the thing made. But creation is neither change nor movement, as proved above.4 Therefore no body can cause a thing by creating it.

Again. Since agent and effect must needs be like each other, a thing cannot produce the whole substance of the effect, unless it act by its entire substance; thus the Philosopher proves conversely (7 Metaph.),5 that if a form without matter acts by its whole self, it cannot be the proximate cause of generation wherein the form alone is brought into act. Now no body acts by its whole substance, although the whole of it acts: for since every agent acts by the form whereby it is actual, that alone is able to act by its whole substance, the whole of whose substance is a form: and this can be said of no body, because every body has matter, since every body is changeable. Therefore no body can produce a thing as to the whole substance of that thing, and this is essential to creation.

Further. To create belongs exclusively to an infinite power. For an agent’s power is so much the greater, according as it is able to bring into act a potentiality more distant from act: for instance that which can produce fire from water in comparison with that which can produce it from air. Hence where pre-existing potentiality is altogether removed, all proportion to a determinate distance is surpassed; and thus the power of an agent that produces something without any pre-existing potentiality, must surpass all conceivable proportion to the power of an agent that produces something out of matter. But no power of a body is infinite, as the Philosopher proves in 8 Phys.1 Therefore no body can create a thing, for this is to make something out of nothing.

Moreover. Mover and moved, maker and made must be together, as proved in 7 Phys.2 Now a bodily agent cannot be present to its effect except by contact, whereby the extremes of contiguous things come together.3 Wherefore it is impossible for a body to act save by contact. But contact is of one thing in relation to another. Hence where there is nothing pre-existent besides the agent, as happens in creation, there can be no contact. Therefore no body can act by creating.

Thus we may see the falseness of the position of those who say that the substance of the heavenly bodies causes the matter of the elements, since matter can have no cause except that which acts by creating: because matter is the first subject of movement and change.

Chapter XXI

that it belongs to god alone to create

It can also be shown from the foregoing that creation is an action proper to God, and that He alone can create.

For since the order of actions is according to the order of agents, because the more excellent the agent the more excellent the action: it follows that the first action is proper to the first agent. Now creation is the first action; since it presupposes no other, while all others presuppose it. Therefore creation is the proper action of God alone, Who is the first agent.1

Again. It was proved that God creates things, from the fact that there can be nothing besides Himself that is not created by Him.2 Now this cannot be said of anything else: because nothing else is the universal cause of being. To God alone, therefore, does creation belong as His proper action.

Further. Effects correspond proportionately to their causes: so that, to wit, we ascribe actual effects to actual causes, and potential effects to potential causes; and in like manner particular effects to particular causes, and universal effects to universal causes, as the Philosopher teaches (2 Phys.).3 Now being is the first effect; and this is evident by reason of its universality. Wherefore the proper cause of being is the first and universal agent, which is God. Whereas other agents are the causes, not of being simply, but of being this, for example, of being a man, or of being white. But being simply is caused by creation which presupposes nothing, since nothing can pre-exist outside being simply. By other makings this or such a being is made: because this or such a being is made from an already existing being. Therefore creation is God’s proper action.

Moreover. Whatever is caused with respect to some particular nature, cannot be the first cause of that nature, but only a second and instrumental cause. For Socrates, since he has a cause of his humanity, cannot be the first cause of human nature: because, seeing that his human nature is caused by some one, it would follow that he is the cause of himself, since he is what he is by human nature. Consequently a univocal generator must be like an instrumental agent in relation to that which is the primary cause of the whole species. Hence it is that all the lower active causes must be compared to the higher causes as instrumental to primary causes. Now every substance other than God has being caused by another, as was proved above.1 Wherefore it is impossible for it to be a cause of being otherwise than as instrumental and as acting by virtue of another. But an instrument is never employed save in order to cause something by the way of movement: for the very notion of an instrument is that it is a mover moved. Creation, however, is not movement, as we have proved.2 Therefore no substance besides God can create anything.

Again. An instrument is employed on account of its being adapted to the effect, that it may be a medium between the first cause and the effect, and be in contact with both, and thus the influence of the first reaches the effect through the instrument. Hence there must be something that receives the influence of the first, in that which is caused by the instrument. But this is contrary to the nature of creation; since it presupposes nothing. It follows therefore that nothing besides God can create, neither as principal agent nor as instrument.

Further. Every instrumental agent carries out the action of the principal agent by some action proper and connatural to itself: thus natural heat produces flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw works for the completion of a bench by cutting. Accordingly if there is a creature that works for the purpose of creating as an instrument of the first creator, it must do so by some action due and proper to its own nature. Now the effect corresponding to the instrument’s proper action precedes in the order of generation the effect which corresponds to the principal agent, whence it is that the ultimate end corresponds to the first agent: for the cutting of the wood precedes the form of the bench, and digestion of food precedes the generation of flesh. Consequently there must be effected by the proper operation of the creating instrument something which, in the order of generation, precedes being, which is the effect corresponding to the action of the first creator. But this is impossible: because the more common a thing is the more does it precede in the order of generation: thus animal precedes man in the generation of a man, as the Philosopher says in his book on the Generation of Animals.1 Therefore it is impossible for a creature to create, whether as principal or as instrumental agent.

Again. That which is caused in respect of some nature, cannot be the cause of that nature simply, for it would be its own cause: whereas it can be the cause of that nature in this individual; thus Plato is the cause of human nature in Socrates, but not simply, since he is himself caused in respect of human nature. Now that which is the cause of something in this individual, communicates the common nature to some particular thing whereby that nature is specified or individualized. But this cannot be by creation, which presupposes nothing to which something can be communicated by an action. Therefore it is impossible for anything created to be the cause of something else by creation.

Moreover. Since every agent acts in so far as it is actual, it follows that the mode of action must follow the mode of a thing’s actuality: wherefore the hot thing which is more actually hot, gives greater heat. Consequently anything whose actuality is determined to genus, species, and accident, must have a power determined to effects like the agent as such: since every agent produces its like. Now nothing that has determinate being can be like another of the same genus or species, except in the point of genus or species: because in so far as it is this particular thing, one particular thing is distinct from another. Nothing, therefore, that has a finite being, can by its action be the cause of another, except as regards its having genus or species—not as regards its subsisting as distinct from others. Therefore every finite agent postulates before its action that whereby its effect subsists as an individual. Therefore it does not create: and this belongs exclusively to an agent whose being is infinite, and which contains in itself the likeness of all beings, as we have proved above.1

Again. Since whatever is made, is made that it may be, if a thing is said to be made that was before, it follows that it is not made per se but accidentally; whereas that is made per se which was not before. Thus, if from white a thing is made black, a black thing is made and a coloured thing is made, but black per se, because it is made from not-black, and coloured accidentally, since it was coloured before. Accordingly, when a being is made, such as a man or a stone, a man is made per se, because he is made from not-man; but a being is made accidentally, since he is not made from not-being simply, but from this particular not-being, as the Philosopher says (1 Phys.).2 When therefore a thing is made from not-being simply, a being is made per se. Therefore it follows that it is made by that which is per se the cause of being: since effects are referred to their proportionate causes. Now this is the first being alone, which is the cause of a being as such; while other things are causes of being accidentally, and of this particular being per se. Since then to produce a being from no pre-existing being is to create, it follows that it belongs to God alone to create.

The authority of Holy Writ bears witness to this truth, for it declares that God created all things (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth. And Damascene says in the second part of his book:3 All those who say that the angels are creators of any substance whatsoever, are children of their father the devil; for those who are creatures are not creators.

Hereby is refuted the error of certain philosophers who said that God created the first separate substance, by whom the second was created, and so on, in a certain order, to the last.1

Chapter XXII

that god can do all things

Hence it is clear that the divine power is not determined to one particular effect.

For if it belongs to God alone to create, it follows that what things soever cannot be produced by their cause save by way of creation, must be immediately produced by Him. Now the like are all separate substances, which are not composed of matter and form, and the existence of which we will suppose for the present:2 and likewise all corporeal matter. These things then, being distinct from one another, are the immediate effect of the aforesaid power. Now no power that produces immediately a number of effects, otherwise than from matter, is determined to one effect. I say immediately: for, if it produced them through intermediaries, the diversity might be owing to the intermediary causes. And I say otherwise than from matter: because the same agent by the same action causes different effects according to the diversity of matter; thus the heat of fire hardens clay and melts wax. Therefore God’s power is not determined to one effect.

Again. Every perfect power extends to all those things to which its per se and proper effect can extend: thus the art of building, if perfect, extends to whatever can have the nature of a house. Now God’s power is the per se cause of being, and being is its proper effect, as stated above.3 Therefore it extends to all that is not incompatible with the notion of being: for if His power were confined to one effect alone, it would be the cause of a being, not as such, but as this particular being. Now the opposite of being, which is non-being, is incompatible with the notion of being. Wherefore God can do all things but those which include the notion of non-being: and such are those that imply a contradiction. It follows, therefore, that God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction.

Again. Every agent acts in so far as it is actual. Wherefore the mode of an agent’s power in acting follows its mode of actuality: for man begets man, and fire begets fire. Now God is perfect act, possessing in Himself the perfections of all things, as was proved above.1 Therefore His active power is perfect, and extends to all things whatsoever that are not incompatible with the notion of actuality. But these are only those which imply a contradiction. Therefore God can do all except these things.

Moreover. To every passive potentiality there corresponds an active potentiality: since potentiality is for the sake of act, as matter for the sake of form. Now a being in potentiality cannot come to be in act save by the power of something in act. Wherefore potentiality would be without purpose were there no active power of an agent that could reduce it to act: and yet nothing in the things of nature is void of purpose. Thus we find that all things that are in the potentiality of matter in things subject to generation and corruption, can be reduced to act by the active power which is in the heavenly body which is the first active force in nature. Now just as the heavenly body is the first agent in regard to lower bodies, so God is the first agent in respect of all created being. Wherefore God can do by His active power all whatsoever is in the potentiality of created being. And all that is not incompatible with created being is in the potentiality of created being, just as whatever destroys not human nature is in the potentiality of human nature. Therefore God can do all things.

Further. That some particular effect is not subject to the power of some particular agent, may be due to three things. First, because it has no affinity or likeness to the agent: for every agent produces its like in some way. Hence the power in human seed cannot produce a brute animal or a plant, and yet it can produce a man who surpasses the things mentioned. Secondly, on account of the excellence of the effect, which surpasses the capacity of the active power: thus the active power of a body cannot produce a separate substance. Thirdly, because the effect requires a particular matter on which the agent cannot act: thus a carpenter cannot make a saw, because his art does not enable him to act on iron of which a saw is made. Now in none of these ways can any effect be withheld from the divine power. For neither on account of unlikeness in the effect can anything be impossible to Him: since every thing, in so far as it has being, is like Him, as we have proved above:1—nor again on account of the excellence of the effect: since it has been proved2 that God is above all beings in goodness and perfection:—nor again on account of a defect in matter, since He is the cause of matter, which cannot be caused except by creation. Moreover in acting He needs no matter: since He brings a thing into being without anything pre-existent.3 Wherefore lack of matter cannot hinder His action from producing its effect.

It remains therefore that God’s power is not confined to any particular effect, but is able to do simply all things: and this means that He is almighty.

Hence also divine Scripture teaches this as a matter of faith. For it is said (Gen. 17:1) in the person of God: I am the Almighty God: walk before Me and be perfect: and (Job 42:2): I know that Thou canst do all things: and (Luke 1:37) in the person of the angel: No word shall be impossible with God.

Hereby is refuted the error of certain philosophers who asserted that only one effect was immediately produced by God, as though His power were confined to the production thereof; and that God cannot do otherwise than act according to the course of natural things, of which it is said (Job 22:17): (Who) … looked upon the Almighty as if He could do nothing.

Chapter XXIII

that god does not act of natural necessity

From this it may be proved that God acts among creatures not by necessity of His nature, but by the judgment of His will.

For the power of every agent that acts of natural necessity is confined to one effect. The consequence is that all natural things always happen in the same way, unless there be an obstacle; whereas voluntary things do not. Now the divine power is not directed to only one effect, as we have proved above.1 Therefore God acts, not of natural necessity, but by His will.

Again. Whatever implies no contradiction, is subject to the divine power, as we have proved.2 Now many things are not among those created, which nevertheless, if they were, would not imply a contradiction: as is evident chiefly with regard to number, the quantities and distances of the stars and other bodies, wherein if the order of things were different, no contradiction would be implied. Wherefore many things are subject to the divine power that are not found to exist actually. Now whoever does some of the things that he can do, and does not others, acts by choice of his will and not by necessity of his nature. Therefore God acts not of natural necessity but by His will.

Again. Every agent acts according as the likeness of its effect is in it: for every agent produces its like. Now whatever is in something else, is in it according to the mode of the thing in which it is. Since, then, God is intelligent by His essence, as we have proved,3 it follows that the likeness of His effect is in Him in an intelligible way. Therefore He acts by His intellect. Now the intellect does not produce an effect except by means of the will, the object whereof is a good understood, which moves the agent as his end. Therefore God works by His will, and not by a necessity of His nature.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (9 Metaph.),1 action is twofold: one which remains in the agent and is its perfection, for instance to see; the other, which passes into outward things and is a perfection of the thing done, as to burn in the case of fire. Now God’s action cannot belong to the kind of actions which are not in the agent: since His action is His substance, as already proved.2 Therefore it must be of that kind of actions which are in the agent, and are as a perfection thereof. But the like are only the actions of one who has knowledge and appetite. Therefore God works by knowing and willing: and consequently not by a necessity of His nature, but by the judgment of His will.

Further. That God works for an end can be evident from the fact that the universe is not the result of chance, but is directed to a good, as stated by the Philosopher (11 Metaph.).3 Now the first agent for an end must be an agent by intellect and will: because things devoid of intellect, work for an end as directed to the end by another. This is evident in things done by art: for the flight of the arrow is directed towards a definite mark by the aim of the archer. And so likewise must it be in the works of nature. For in order that a thing be rightly directed to a due end, it is necessary that one know the end itself, and the means to that end, as also the due proportion between both; and this belongs only to an intelligent being. Since, therefore, God is the first agent, He works not by a necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will.

Moreover. That which acts by itself precedes that which acts by another: because whatever is by another must be reduced to that which is by itself, lest we proceed to infinity. Now that which is not master of its own action, does not act by itself; since it acts as directed by another and not as directing itself. Therefore the first agent must act in such a way that it is master of its own action. But one is not master of one’s own action except by the will. Therefore it follows that God, Who is the first agent, acts by His will and not by a necessity of His nature.

Again. The first action belongs to the first agent, as the first movement to the first movable. Now, the action of the will naturally precedes the action of nature: because the more perfect is naturally first, although in some particular thing it may be last in time. Now the action of a voluntary agent is more perfect: a proof of which is that among us agents which act by will are more perfect than those which act by natural necessity. Therefore to God, Who is the first agent, that action is due which is by the will.

Further. The same is evident from the fact that where both actions are united, the power which acts by will is above that which acts by nature, and uses the latter as an instrument: for in man the intellect which acts by the will is higher than the vegetative soul which acts by a necessity of its nature. Now the divine power is above all beings. Therefore it acts on all things by will, not by natural necessity.

Again. The will has for its object a good considered as a good: whereas nature does not compass the idea of good in general, but the particular good which is its perfection. Since, then, every agent acts for as much as it intends a good, because the end moves the agent, it follows that the agent by will is compared to the agent by natural necessity as a universal to a particular agent. Now the particular agent is compared to the universal agent, as posterior thereto, and as its instrument. Therefore the first agent must be voluntary and not an agent by natural necessity.

Divine Scripture teaches us this truth. For it is said in the psalm:1 Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, and (Eph. 1:11): Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.

Hilary also in his book De Synodis2 says: God’s will gave substance to all creatures. And further on: All things were created such as God willed them to be.

Hereby also is refuted the error of certain philosophers who asserted that God works by natural necessity.

Chapter XXIV

that god works according to his wisdom

From the foregoing it is clear that God produces His effects according to His wisdom.

For the will is moved to act by some kind of apprehension: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. Now God is a voluntary agent, as we have proved.1 Since, then, in God there is none but intellectual apprehension, and since He understands nothing except by understanding Himself,2 to understand Whom is to be wise, it follows that God works according to His wisdom.

Again. Every agent produces its like. Hence it follows that every agent works by that according to which it bears a likeness to its effect: thus fire heats according to the mode of its heat. Now in every voluntary agent, as such, the likeness to his effect is in respect of the apprehension of his intellect: for if the likeness to his effect were in a voluntary agent according only to the disposition of his nature, he would only produce one effect, since the natural reason of one is only one. Therefore every voluntary agent produces an effect according to the reason of his intellect. Now God works by His will, as already proved.3 Therefore He brings things into being by the wisdom of His intellect.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (1 Metaph.)4 it belongs to a wise man to set things in order: because the ordering of things cannot be done except by the knowledge of the things ordered as to their relation and proportion both to one another and to something higher which is their end: since the mutual order of certain things is on account of their order to the end. Now knowledge of the mutual relations and proportions of certain things belongs only to one who has an intellect; while it belongs to wisdom to judge of certain things by the highest cause.5 Wherefore it follows that all ordering is done by the wisdom of an intelligent being. Thus in mechanics those who direct the order of buildings are called the wise men of the building craft. Now the things produced by God have a mutual order which is not casual, as it is the same always or for the most part. Hence it is evident that God brought things into being by ordering them. Therefore God brought things into being by His wisdom.

Further. Things that proceed from the will are either things that may be done, such as acts of virtue, which are the perfections of the doer: or they pass into outward matter and are things that can be made. Wherefore it is clear that created things proceed from God as made. Now the reason about things to be made is art, as the Philosopher says.1 Therefore all created things are compared to God as products of art to the craftsman. But the craftsman brings his handiwork into being by the ordering of his wisdom and intellect. Therefore God also made all creatures by the ordering of His intellect.

This is confirmed by divine authority: for it is said in the psalm:2 Thou hast made all things in wisdom, and (Prov. 3:19): The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth.

Hereby is set aside the error of some who said that all things depend on God’s simple will without any reason.3

Chapter XXV

how the almighty is said to be unable to do certain things

From the foregoing we may gather that though God is almighty, He is nevertheless said to be unable to do certain things.

For it was shown above4 that in God there is active potentiality: while it had already been proved in the First Book1 that there is no passive potentiality in Him: whereas we are said to be able in respect of either potentiality. Wherefore God is unable to do those things the possibility of which belongs to passive potentiality. What suchlike things are must be the subject of our inquiry.

In the first place, then, active potentiality is directed to action, while passive potentiality is directed to being. Consequently potentiality to being is in those things only which have matter subject to contrariety. Since therefore passive potentiality is not in God, He is unable as regards anything that appertains to His being. Therefore God cannot be a body, and so forth.

Again. The act of this passive potentiality is movement.2 Wherefore God, to Whom passive potentiality is unbecoming, cannot be changed. It may be further concluded that He cannot be changed in respect of each kind of movement: for instance that He cannot be increased, nor diminished, nor altered, nor generated, nor corrupted.

Moreover. Since to fail is a kind of corruption, it follows that He is unable to fail in anything.

Further. Every failing is in respect of some privation. But the subject of privation is the potentiality of matter. Therefore He can nowise fail.

Again. Since weariness results from defect of power, and forgetfulness from defect of knowledge, it is clear that He can neither be weary nor forget.

Moreover. Nor can He be overcome or suffer violence. For these things happen only to those things that are of a movable nature.

Likewise neither can He repent, nor be angry or sorrowful: since all these denote passion and defect.

Again. Since the object and effect of an active potentiality is something made, and since no potentiality is operative, if the ratio of object be lacking,—thus the sight sees not if the actually visible be lacking:—it follows that God is unable to do whatever is contrary to the ratio of being as being, or of made being as made. What these things are, we must inquire.

In the first place that which destroys the ratio of being is contrary to the ratio of being. Now the ratio of being is destroyed by the opposite of being: as the ratio of man is destroyed by the opposite of man or of his parts. Now the opposite of being is not-being. Consequently God is unable to do this, so as to make the one and same thing to be and not to be at the same time; which is for contradictories to be simultaneous.

Again. Contradiction is included in contraries and privative opposites: for to be white and black is to be white and not white, and to be seeing and blind is to be seeing and not seeing. Hence it amounts to the same that God is unable to make opposites to be simultaneously in the same subject and in the same respect.

Moreover. The removal of an essential principle of a thing implies the removal of the thing itself. If, then, God cannot make a thing at the same time to be and not to be, neither can He make a thing to lack any of its essential principles while the thing itself remains: for instance that a man have no soul.

Further. Since the principles of certain sciences, for instance of logic, geometry, and arithmetic, are taken only from the formal principles of things, on which the essence of those things depends, it follows that God cannot make the contraries of these principles: for instance, that genus be not predicable of species, or that lines drawn from centre to circumference be not equal, or that the three angles of a rectilinear triangle be not equal to two right angles.

Hence it is also evident that God cannot make the past not to have been. Because this also includes a contradiction, since it is equally necessary for a thing to be while it is, and to have been while it was.

There are also some things which are incompatible with the ratio of thing made, as made. These also God cannot do, since whatever God makes, must be something made. Hence it is evident that God cannot make God. For it belongs to the ratio of thing made that its being depends on another cause. And this is contrary to the ratio of that which we call God, as is evident from the foregoing.1

For the same reason God cannot make a thing equal to Himself. Because a thing whose being depends not on another, is greater in being and other excellencies than that which depends on another, which belongs to the ratio of a thing made.

Likewise God cannot make a thing to be preserved in being without Himself. For the preservation of a thing in being depends on its cause. Wherefore if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed. Consequently, if there could be a thing that is not preserved in being by God, it would not be His effect.

Again. Since He is an agent by will,2 He cannot do those things which He cannot will. Now we may realize what He cannot will if we consider how it is possible for necessity to be in the divine will: since what is of necessity is impossible not to be, and what is impossible to be, necessarily is not.

It is therefore evident that God cannot make Himself not to be, or not to be good or happy: because He necessarily wills Himself to be, and to be good and happy, as we proved in the First Book.3

Again, it was shown above4 that God cannot will anything evil. Therefore it is evident that God cannot sin.

Likewise it was proved above5 that God’s will cannot be changeable: and consequently it cannot make that which is willed by Him, not to be fulfilled. It must however be observed that He is said to be unable to do this in a different sense from that in which He is said to be unable to do the things mentioned before. Because God is simply unable either to will or to make the foregoing. Whereas God can do or will these, if we consider His power or will absolutely, but not if we presuppose Him to will the opposite: for the divine will, in respect of creatures, has no necessity, except on a supposition, as we proved in the First Book.1 Hence all these statements, God cannot do the contrary of what He has decreed to do, and any like sayings are to be understood in the composite sense: for thus they imply a supposition of the divine will with regard to the opposite. But if they be understood in the divided sense, they are false, because they refer to God’s power and will absolutely.

And as God acts by will, so also does He act by intellect and knowledge, as we have proved.2 Hence He cannot do what He has foreseen that He will not do, or omit to do what He has foreseen that He will do, for the same reason that He cannot do what He wills not to do, or omit to do what He wills. Also, each assertion is conceded and denied in the same sense, namely that He be said to be unable to do these things, not indeed absolutely, but on a certain condition or supposition.

Chapter XXVI

that the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects

Forasmuch as it has been proved3 that the divine power is not limited to certain determined effects, and this because He acts not by a necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will; lest some one perhaps should think that His intellect or knowledge can only reach to certain effects, and that consequently He acts by a necessity of His knowledge, although not by a necessity of His nature: it remains to be shown that His knowledge or intellect is not confined to any limits in its effects.

For it was proved above4 that God comprehends all other things that can proceed from Him, by understanding His essence, in which all such things must necessarily exist by a kind of likeness, even as effects are virtually in their causes. If, then, the divine power is not confined to certain definite effects, as we have shown above,1 it is necessary to pronounce a like opinion on His intellect.

Further. We have already proved2 the infinity of the divine intellect. Now, no matter how many finite things we add together, even though there were an infinite number of finite things, we cannot equal the infinite, for it infinitely exceeds the finite, however great. Now it is clear that nothing outside God is infinite in its essence: since all else are by the very nature of their essence included under certain definite genera and species. Consequently, however many and however great divine effects be taken, it is always in the divine essence to exceed them: and so it can be the ratio of more. Wherefore the divine intellect, which knows the divine essence perfectly, as we have shown above,3 surpasses all finitude of effects. Therefore it is not necessarily confined to these or those effects.

Again. It was shown above4 that the divine intellect knows an infinite number of things. Now God brings things into being by the knowledge of His intellect. Therefore the causality of the divine intellect is not confined to a finite number of effects.

Moreover. If the causality of the divine intellect were confined to certain effects, as though it produced them of necessity, this would be in reference to the things which it brings into being. But this is impossible; for it was shown above5 that God understands even those things that never are, nor shall be, nor have been. Therefore God does not work by necessity of His intellect or knowledge.

Further. God’s knowledge is compared to things produced by Him, as the knowledge of the craftsman to his handiwork. Now every art extends to all the things that can be comprised under the genus subject to that art: thus the art of building extends to all houses. Now the genus subject to the divine art is being: since God by His intellect is the universal principle of being, as we have proved.6 Therefore the divine intellect extends its causality to whatever is not incompatible with the notion of being: for all such things, considered in themselves, are of a nature to be contained under being. Therefore the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects.

Hence it is said in the psalm:1 Great is the (Vulg., our) Lord, and great is His power, and of His wisdom there is no number.

Hereby we set aside the opinion of certain philosophers who say that from the very fact that God understands Himself, this particular disposition of things flows from Him necessarily: as though He did not give each thing its limits, and all things their disposition by His own counsel, as the Catholic faith declares.

It is to be observed, however, that although God’s intellect is not confined to certain effects, yet He decides on certain determinate effects with a view to producing them ordinately by His wisdom. Thus it is said (Wis. 11:21): Lord, Thou hast ordered all things in number, weight, and measure.

Chapter XXVII

that the divine will is not confined to certain effects

It may also be proved from the foregoing that neither is His will, by which He works, necessitated to produce certain determinate effects.

For it behoves the will to be proportionate to its object. Now the object of the intellect is a good understood, as stated above.2 Hence the will has a natural aptitude to extend to whatever the intellect can propose to it under the aspect of good. If, then, the divine intellect is not confined to certain effects, as we have shown,3 it follows that neither does the divine will produce certain determinate effects of necessity.

Further. Nothing acting by will produces a thing without willing. Now it was proved above1 that God wills nothing other than Himself of absolute necessity. Therefore effects proceed from the divine will not of necessity but by its free ordinance.

Chapters XXVIII and XXIX

how there is anything due in the production of things

Again. From what has been said it may be shown that God in the creation of things did not work of necessity, as though He brought things into being as a debt of justice.

For justice, according to the Philosopher (5 Ethic.),2 is towards another person to whom it renders his due. But nothing, to which anything may be due, is presupposed to the universal production of things. Therefore the universal production of things could not result from a debt of justice.

Again. Since the act of justice is to render to each one that which is his own,3 the act by which a thing becomes one’s own precedes the act of justice, as appears in human affairs: for a man by working has a right to call his own that which, as an act of justice, is rendered to him by the person who pays him. Therefore the act whereby a person first acquires something of his own cannot be an act of justice. Now a created thing begins to have something of its own by creation. Therefore creation does not proceed from a debt of justice.

Further. No one owes something to another except from the fact that in some way he depends on him or receives something either from him or from a third, on whose account he owes something to the other: for thus a son is a debtor to his father, because he receives being from him; a master to his servant, because he receives from him the service he requires; and every man is a debtor to his neighbour for God’s sake, from Whom we have received all good things. But God is dependent on no one, nor needs He to receive anything from another, as is manifestly clear from what has been said.1 Therefore it was not on account of a debt of justice that God brought things into being.

Moreover. In every genus that which is on account of itself precedes that which is on account of another. Consequently that which is simply first of all causes, is a cause on its own account only: whereas that which acts by reason of a debt of justice does not act on its own account only, for it acts on account of the thing to which the debt is due. Therefore God, since He is the first cause and the first agent,2 did not bring things into being from a debt of justice.

Hence it is said (Rom. 11:35, 36): Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? For of Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things; and (Job 41:2): Who hath given Me before that I should repay him? All things that are under heaven are Mine.

Hereby is refuted the error of some who strive to prove that God cannot do save what He does, because He cannot do except what He ought to do. For He does not produce things from a debt of justice, as we have proved.

Nevertheless, although nothing to which anything can be due precedes the universal creation of things, something uncreated precedes it, and this is the principle of creation. This may be considered in two ways. For the divine goodness precedes as the end and first motive of creation, according to Augustine, who says:3 Because God is good we exist. Also His knowledge and will precede, as by them things are brought into being.

Accordingly if we consider the divine goodness absolutely, we find nothing due in the creation of things. For in one way a thing is said to be due to someone on account of another person being referred to him, in that it is his duty to refer to himself that which he has received from that person: thus it is due to a benefactor that he be thanked for his kindness, inasmuch as he who has received the kindness owes this to him. But this kind of due has no place in the creation of things: since there is nothing pre-existent to which it can be competent to owe anything to God, nor does any favour of His pre-exist. In another way something is said to be due to a thing in itself: since that which is required for a thing’s perfection is necessarily due to it: thus it is due to a man to have hands or strength, since without these he cannot be perfect. Now God’s goodness needs nothing outside Him for its perfection. Therefore the production of creatures is not due to Him by way of necessity.

Again. God brings things into being by His will, as we have shown above.1 Now it is not necessary, if God wills His own goodness to be, that He should will other things than Himself to be produced: because the antecedent of this conditional proposition is necessary, but not the consequent: for it was shown in the First Book2 that God necessarily wills His own goodness to be, but does not necessarily will other things. Therefore the production of creatures is not necessarily due to the divine goodness.

Moreover. It has been proved3 that God brings things into being neither by necessity of His nature, nor by necessity of His knowledge, nor by necessity of His will, nor by necessity of His justice. Therefore by no manner of necessity is it due to the divine goodness that things be brought into being.

It may be said however that it is due to Him by way of a certain becomingness. But justice properly speaking requires a debt of necessity: since what is rendered to someone out of justice, is due to him by a necessity of right.

Accordingly it cannot be said that the production of creatures arose either from a debt of justice whereby God is the creature’s debtor, or from a debt of justice whereby He is a debtor to His goodness, if justice be taken in the proper sense. But if justice be taken in a broad sense, we may speak of justice in the creation of things, in so far as the creation is becoming to the divine goodness.

If, however, we consider the divine ordinance whereby God decided by His intellect and will to bring things into being, then the production of things proceeds from the necessity of the divine ordinance:1 for it is impossible that God should decide to do a certain thing which afterwards He did not, otherwise His decision would be either changeable or weak. It is therefore necessarily due to His ordinance that it be fulfilled. And yet this due is not enough for the notion of justice properly so called in the creation of things, wherein we can consider nothing but the action of God in creating: and there is no justice properly speaking between one same person and himself, as the Philosopher says (5 Ethic.).2 Therefore it cannot be said properly that God brought things into being from a debt of justice, for the reason that He ordained by His knowledge and will to produce them.

3 If, however, we consider the production of a particular creature, it will be possible to find therein a debt of justice by comparing a subsequent creature to a preceding one. And I say preceding, not only in time but also in nature.

Accordingly in those divine effects which were to be produced first, we find no due: but in the subsequent production we find a due, yet in a different order. For if those things that are first naturally, are also first in being, those which follow become due on account of those which precede: for given the causes, it is due that they should have actions whereby to produce their effects. On the other hand if those which are first naturally are subsequent in being, then those which are first become due on account of those which come afterwards; thus it is due that medicine precede in order that health may follow. And in either case there is this in common,—that what is due or necessary is claimed by that which is naturally first from that which is naturally subsequent.

Now the necessity that arises from that which is subsequent in being, and yet is first by nature, is not absolute but conditional necessity: namely, if this must be done, then that must precede. Accordingly with regard to this necessity, a due is found in the production of creatures in three ways. First, so that the conditional due is on the part of the whole universe of things in relation to each part thereof that is necessary for the perfection of the universe. For if God willed such a universe to be made, it was due that He should make the sun and moon, and suchlike things without which the universe cannot be. Secondly, so that the conditional due be in one creature in relation to another: for instance, if God willed the existence of plants and animals, it was due that He should make the heavenly bodies, whereby those things are preserved; and if He willed the existence of man, it behoved Him to make plants and animals and the like, which man needs for perfect existence: although God made both these and other things of His mere will. Thirdly, so that the conditional due be in each creature in relation to its parts, properties, and accidents, on which the creature depends either for its being, or for some one of its perfections: thus, given that God willed to make man, it was due, on this supposition, that He should unite in him soul and body, and furnish him with senses and other like aids, both within and without. In all of which, if we consider the matter rightly, God is said to be a debtor not to the creature, but to the fulfilment of His purpose. There is also in the universe another kind of necessity whereby a thing is said to be necessary absolutely. This necessity depends on causes which precede in being, for instance on essential principles, and on efficient or moving causes. But this kind of necessity cannot find place in the first creation of things, as regards efficient causes. For there God alone was the efficient cause, since to create belongs to Him alone, as we have proved above;1 while in creating, He works not by a necessity of His nature, but by His will, as we have shown above;1 and those things which are done by the will cannot be necessitated, except only by the supposition of the end, on account of which supposition it is due to the end that those things should be whereby the end is obtained. On the other hand, with regard to formal and material causes, nothing hinders us from finding absolute necessity even in the first creation of things. For from the very fact that certain bodies were composed of the elements, it was necessary for them to be hot or cold: and from the very fact that a superficies was drawn in the shape of a triangle, it was necessary that it should have three angles equal to two right angles. Now this necessity results from the relation of an effect to its material or formal cause. Wherefore on this account God cannot be said to be a debtor, but rather does the debt of necessity affect the creature. But in the propagation of things, where the creature is already an efficient cause, an absolute necessity can arise from the created efficient cause: thus the lower bodies are necessarily influenced by the movement of the sun.

Accordingly from the aforesaid kinds of due, natural justice is found in things, both as regards the creation of things, and as regards their propagation. Wherefore God is said to have produced and to govern all things justly and reasonably.

Wherefore by what we have said we remove a twofold error: of those, namely, who, setting limits to the divine power, said that God cannot make except what He makes, because He is bound so to make:2 and of those who assert that all things result from His simple will, without any other reason, either to be sought in things, or to be assigned.3

Chapter XXX

how there can be absolute necessity in created things

Now though all things depend on God’s will as their first cause, which is not necessitated in operating except by the supposition of His purpose, nevertheless absolute necessity is not therefore excluded from things, so that we, be obliged to assert that all things are contingent:—which some one might think to be the case, for the reason that they have arisen from their cause, not of absolute necessity: since in things a contingent effect is wont to be one that does not necessarily result from a cause. Because there are some created things which it is simply and absolutely necessary must be.

For it is simply and absolutely necessary that those things be in which there is no possibility of not being. Now some things are so brought by God into being, that there is in their nature a potentiality to non-being. This happens through their matter being in potentiality to another form. Wherefore those things, wherein either there is no matter, or, if there is, it has not the possibility of receiving another form, have not a potentiality to non-being. Hence it is simply and absolutely necessary for them to be.

If, however, it be said that things which are from nothing, so far as they are concerned, tend to nothing, and that in consequence there is in all creatures a potentiality to non-being:—it is clear that this does not follow. For created things are said to tend to nothing in the same sense as they are from nothing: and this is not otherwise than according to the power of the agent. Wherefore in created things there is not a potentiality to non-being: but there is in the Creator the power to give them being or to cease pouring forth being into them: since He works in producing things, not by a necessity of His nature, but by His will, as we have proved.1

Again. Since created things come into being through the divine will, it follows that they are such as God willed them to be. Now the fact that God is said to have brought things into being by His will, and not of necessity, does not exclude His having willed certain things to be which are of necessity, and others which are contingently, so that there may be an ordinate diversity in things. Nothing, therefore, prevents certain things produced by the divine will being necessary.

Further. It belongs to God’s perfection that He bestowed His likeness on created things, except as regards those things with which created being is incompatible: since it belongs to a perfect agent to produce its like as far as possible. Now to be simply necessary is not incompatible with the notion of created being: for nothing prevents a thing being necessary which nevertheless has a cause of its necessity, for instance, the conclusions of demonstrations. Therefore nothing prevents a certain thing being so produced by God, that nevertheless it is simply necessary for it to be: in fact, this is a proof of the divine perfection.

Moreover. The further distant a thing is from that which is being of itself, namely God, the nearer is it to non-being. Wherefore the nearer a thing is to God, the further is it removed from non-being. Now things that already are, are near to non-being through having a potentiality to non-being. Consequently, those things which are nearest to God, and for that reason most remote from non-being, must be such that there is no potentiality to non-being in them, so that the order in things be complete: and the like are necessary absolutely. Therefore some created things have being necessarily.

Accordingly it must be observed that if the universe of created beings be considered as coming from their first principle, we find that they depend on the will, not on a necessity of their principle, except on a necessity of supposition, as already stated.1 If, however, they be considered in relation to their proximate principles, they are found to have absolute necessity. For nothing prevents certain principles being produced, not of necessity, and yet, these being supposed, such and such an effect follows of necessity: thus the death of this animal has absolute necessity from the very fact that it is composed of contraries, although it was not absolutely necessary for it to be composed of contraries. In like manner that such and such natures were produced by God, was voluntary: and yet, once they are so constituted, something results or happens that has absolute necessity.

In created things, however, necessity is to be taken in various ways in relation to various causes. For since a thing cannot be without its essential principles which are matter and form, that which belongs to a thing by reason of its essential principles must needs have absolute necessity in all things.

Now from these principles, in so far as they are principles of being, a threefold absolute necessity is found in things. First in relation to the being of the thing of which they are the principles. And since matter, as regards what it is, is being in potentiality; and since what can be, can also not be; in relation to their matter certain things are necessarily corruptible; for instance, an animal, through being composed of contraries, and fire, through its matter being susceptive of contraries. But form, as regards what it is, is act, and by it things exist actually. Wherefore from it there results necessity in some things. This happens either because those things are forms without matter,—and thus there is no potentiality to non-being in them, but by their forms they are always in the act of being, as in the case of separate substances—or because their forms are so perfect as to equal the whole potentiality of their matter, wherefore there remains no potentiality to another form, nor, in consequence, to non-being, as in the case of heavenly bodies. But in those things wherein the form does not fulfil the whole potentiality of matter, there still remains a potentiality to another form. Wherefore in them there is not necessity of being, but the act of being is, in them, the result of form overcoming matter, as in the case of the elements and things composed of them. Because the form of an element does not reach matter in its whole potentiality: for matter does not receive the form of one element, except by being subjected to the one of two contraries. While the form of a mixed body reaches matter as disposed by a determinate mode of mixture. Now there must be one same subject of contraries, and of all intermediaries resulting from the mixture of the extremes. Wherefore it is evident that all things which either have contraries, or are composed of contraries, are corruptible. And things which are not so, are everlasting: unless they be corrupted accidentally, as forms which are not subsistent, and have being through being in matter.

In another way there is absolute necessity in things from their essential principles, by relation to the parts of their matter or form, if it happens that in certain things these principles are not simple. For since the proper matter of man is a mixed body, with a certain temperament and endowed with organs, it is absolutely necessary that a man should have in himself each of the elements, humours, and principal organs. Likewise if man is a rational mortal animal, and this is the nature or form of a man, it is necessary for him to be both animal and rational.

Thirdly, there is absolute necessity in things through the relations of their essential principles to the properties consequent upon their matter or form: thus it is necessary that a saw be hard, since it is of iron, and that a man be capable of learning.

But necessity of the agent may regard either the action itself, or the consequent effect. The former kind of necessity is like the necessity of an accident which it owes to the essential principles. For just as other accidents result from the necessity of essential principles, so does action from the necessity of the form whereby the agent actually is: since it acts so far as it is actual. Yet this happens differently in the action which remains in the agent, such as to understand and to will, and in the action which passes into something else, such as to heat. For in the former kind of action, the form by which the agent becomes actual causes necessity in the action itself, since for its being nothing extrinsic is required as term of the action. Because when the sense is made actual by the sensible species, it is necessary for it to perceive, and in like manner, when the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species. But in the second kind of action, necessity of action results from the form, as regards the power to act: for if fire is hot, it is necessary that it have the power to heat, although it is not necessary that it heat, since it may be hindered by something extrinsic. Nor does it affect the point at issue, whether by its form one agent be sufficient alone for the action, or whether it be necessary to have an assemblage of many agents in order to do the one action; for instance many men to row a boat: since all are as one agent, who is made actual by their being united together in one action.

The necessity which results from an efficient or moving cause in the effect or thing moved, depends not only on the agent, but also on a condition of the thing moved and of the recipient of the agent’s action, which recipient either is nowise in potentiality to receive the effect of such an action,—as wool to be made into a saw,—or else its potentiality is hindered by contrary agents, or by contrary dispositions inherent to the movable, or by contrary forms, offering an obstacle that is stronger than the power of the agent in acting; thus iron is not melted by a feeble heat.

Hence, in order that the effect follow, it is necessary that there be in the patient potentiality to receive, and in the agent conquest of the patient, so that it be able to transform it to a contrary disposition. And if the effect, resulting in the patient through its conquest by the agent, be contrary to the natural disposition of the patient, there will be necessity of violence, as when a stone is thrown upwards. But if it be not contrary to the natural disposition of the subject, there will be necessity not of violence, but of the natural order, as in the movement of the heavens, which results from an extrinsic active principle, and nevertheless is not contrary to the natural disposition of the movable subject, wherefore it is not a violent but a natural movement. It is the same in the alteration of lower bodies by the heavenly bodies: for there is a natural inclination in the lower bodies to receive the influence of the higher bodies. It is also thus in the generation of the elements: since the form to be introduced by generation is not contrary to primary matter, which is the subject of generation, although it is contrary to the form to be cast aside, because matter under a contrary form is not the subject of generation. Accordingly it is clear from what we have said that the necessity resulting from an efficient cause depends, in some things, on the disposition of the agent alone, but in others on the disposition of both agent and patient. If then this disposition, by reason of which the effect follows of necessity, be absolutely necessary in both agent and patient, there will be absolute necessity in the efficient cause: as in those things which act necessarily and always. On the other hand, if it be not absolutely necessary but may be removed, no necessity will result from the efficient cause except on the supposition that both have the disposition required for action: as, for instance, in those things which are sometimes hindered in their operation either through defective power, or through the violence of a contrary: wherefore they do not act always and necessarily, but in the majority of cases.

From a final cause there results necessity in things in two ways. In one way, forasmuch as it is first in the intention of the agent. In this respect necessity results from the end in the same way as from the agent: since the agent acts in so far as it intends the end, both in natural and in voluntary actions. For in natural things, the intention of the end belongs to the agent according to the latter’s form, whereby the end is becoming to it: wherefore the natural thing must needs tend to the end according to the virtue of its form: thus a heavy body tends towards the centre according to the measure of its gravity. And in voluntary matters, the will inclines to act for the sake of an end forasmuch as it intends that end: although it is not always inclined to do this or that, which are on account of the end, as much as it desires the end, when the end can be obtained not by this or that alone, but in several ways.

In another way necessity results from the end according as this is posterior in being. This is not absolute but conditional necessity: thus we say that it will be necessary for a saw to be made of iron, if it is to do the work of a saw.

Chapter XXXI

that it is not necessary for creatures to have been always

It remains for us to prove from the foregoing that it is not necessary for created things to have been from eternity.

Because if it be necessary for the universe of creatures, or any particular creature whatsoever, to be, it must have this necessity either of itself or from another. But it cannot have it of itself. For it was proved above1 that every being must be from the first being. Now that which has being, not from itself, cannot possibly have necessity of being from itself: since what must necessarily be, cannot possibly not be; and consequently that which of itself has necessary being, has of itself the impossibility of not being; and therefore it follows that it is not a non-being; wherefore it is a being.

If, however, this necessity of a creature is from something else, it must be from a cause that is extrinsic; because whatever we may take that is within the creature, has being from another. Now an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. From the efficient cause, however, it follows that the effect is necessarily, when it is necessary for the agent to act: for it is through the agent’s action that the effect depends on the efficient cause. Accordingly if it is not necessary for the agent to act in order that the effect be produced, neither is it absolutely necessary for the effect to be. Now God does not act of necessity in producing creatures, as we have proved above.1 Wherefore it is not absolutely necessary for the creature to be, as regards necessity dependent on the efficient cause. Likewise neither is it necessary as regards the necessity that depends on the final cause. For things directed to an end do not derive necessity from the end, except in so far as without them the end either cannot be,—as preservation of life without food,—or cannot be so well,—as a journey without a horse. Now the end of God’s will, from which things came into being, can be nothing else but His goodness, as we proved in the First Book.2 And this does not depend on creatures, neither as to its being,—since it is per se necessary being,—nor as to well-being,—since it is by itself good simply; all of which were proved above.3 Therefore it is not absolutely necessary for the creature to be: and consequently neither is it necessary to suppose that the creature has been always.

Again. That which proceeds from a will is not absolutely necessary, except perhaps when it is necessary for the will to will it. Now God, as proved above,4 brought things into being, not by a necessity of His nature, but by His will: nor does He necessarily will creatures to be, as we proved in the First Book.5 Therefore it is not absolutely necessary for the creature to be: and therefore neither is it necessary that it should have been always.

Moreover. It has been proved above6 that God does not act by an action that is outside Him, as though it went out from Him and terminated in a creature, like heating which goes out from fire and terminates in wood. But His will is His action; and things are in the way in which God wills them to be. Now it is not necessary that God will the creature always to have been; since neither is it necessary that God will a thing to be at all, as we proved in the First Book.7 Therefore it is not necessary that creatures should have been always.

Again. A thing does not proceed necessarily from a voluntary agent except by reason of something due. But God does not produce the creature by reason of any debt, if we consider the production of all creatures absolutely, as we have shown above.1 Therefore God does not necessarily produce the creature. Neither therefore is it necessary, because God is eternal, that He should have produced the creature from eternity.

Further. It has been proved2 that absolute necessity in created things results, not from a relation to a principle that is of itself necessary to be, namely God, but from a relation to other causes which are not of themselves necessary to be. Now the necessity resulting from a relation which is not of itself necessary to be, does not necessitate that something should have been always: for if something runs it follows that it is in motion, but it is not necessary for it to have been always in motion, because the running itself is not necessary. Therefore nothing necessitates that creatures should always have been.

Chapter XXXII

arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from god’s side of the question

Since, however, many have held that the world has been always and of necessity, and have endeavoured to prove this, it remains for us to give their arguments, so as to show that they do not necessarily prove the eternity of the world.3 In the first place we shall set forth the arguments that are taken from God’s side; secondly, those which are taken from the side of creatures;4 thirdly, those which are taken from the manner of their making, on account of which they are said to begin to be anew.5

On the part of God the following arguments are produced in order to prove the eternity of the world.

Every agent that acts not always, is moved either per se or accidentally: per se, as fire which was not always burning, begins to burn, either because it is newly lit, or because it is newly transferred so as to be near the fuel:—accidentally, as the mover of an animal begins anew to move the animal with some movement made in its regard; either from within,—as an animal begins to be moved when it awakes after its digestion is complete,—or from without, as when there newly arise actions that lead to the beginning of a new action. Now God is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we proved in the First Book.1 Therefore God always acts in the same way. But created things are established in being by His action. Therefore creatures always have been.

Again. The effect proceeds from the active cause by the latter’s action. But God’s action is eternal: else He would become an actual agent from being an agent in potentiality: and it would be necessary for Him to be reduced to actuality by some previous agent, which is impossible. Therefore the things created by God have been from eternity.

Moreover. Given a sufficient cause, its effect must necessarily be granted. For if, given the cause, it were still unnecessary to grant its effect, it would be therefore possible that, given the cause, the effect would be or not be. Therefore the sequence of the effect to its cause would only be possible: and what is possible, requires something to reduce it to actuality. Hence it will be necessary to suppose some cause whereby it comes about that the effect is made actual, and thus the first cause was not sufficient. But God is the sufficient cause of creatures being produced: else He would not be a cause; rather would He be in potentiality to a cause: since He would become a cause by the addition of something: which is impossible. Therefore it would seem necessary, since God is from eternity, that the creature was also from eternity.

Again. A voluntary agent does not delay to carry out his purpose of making a thing, except on account of something expected and not yet present: and this latter is either sometimes in the agent himself, as where one awaits perfect capability to do something, or the removal of an obstacle to one’s capability; and sometimes it is outside the agent, as when one awaits the presence of a person in whose presence the action is to be done; or at least when one awaits the presence of a suitable time which has not yet arrived. For if the will be complete, the power follows suit at once, unless there be a fault therein: thus at the command of the will the movement of a limb follows at once, unless there be a fault in the motive power which carries out the movement. Hence it is clear that, when one wills to do a thing and it is not done at once, it must be either that this is owing to a fault in the power, of which fault one awaits the removal, or else the will to do it is not complete. And by the will being complete I mean that it wills to do this thing absolutely and from every point of view, whereas the will is incomplete when one does not will absolutely to do this thing, but on a certain condition that does not yet obtain, or when one does not will it except a present obstacle be removed. Now it is evident that whatever God now wills to be, He has willed from eternity to be: for a new movement of the will cannot accrue to Him. Neither could any fault or obstacle affect His power: nor could anything else be awaited for the universal production of creatures, since nothing besides Him is uncreated, as we have proved above.1 Therefore it is seemingly evident that He produced the creature from eternity.

Further. An intellectual agent does not choose one thing rather than another except on account of the one preponderating over the other. But where there is no difference there can be no preponderance. Hence where there is no difference, there is no choice of the one rather than of the other. And for this reason there will be no action of an agent equally indifferent to both of two alternatives, as neither is there of matter; for such a potentiality is like the potentiality of matter. Now, there can be no difference between non-being and non-being. Therefore one non-being is not more eligible than another non-being. But besides the whole universe of creatures there is nothing but the eternity of God. And in nothingness it is impossible to assign any difference of moments, so that it be more fitting to make a certain thing in one moment than in another: nor, again, in eternity, the whole of which is uniform and simple, as we proved in the First Book.1 It follows, therefore, that God’s will is indifferent to produce creatures through the whole of eternity. Consequently His will is either that the creature should never be produced in His eternity, or that it should always have been produced. But it is clear that His will is not that the creature should never be made in His eternity, since it is evident that creatures were formed by His will. Therefore it remains that necessarily, as it seems, the creature has been always.

Again. Things directed to an end take their necessity from the end, especially in those that are done voluntarily. Hence it follows, that as long as there is no change in the end, things directed to the end suffer no change or are produced invariably, unless there arise some new relation between them and the end. Now the end of creatures, that proceed from the divine will, is the divine goodness, which alone can be the end of the divine will.2 Wherefore since the divine goodness is unchangeable both in itself and in relation to the divine will throughout all eternity, it would seem that creatures are brought into being by the divine will in the same way through the whole of eternity: for it cannot be said that any new relation to the end accrued to them, if it be supposed that they were utterly non-existent before a particular time from which they are supposed to have begun their existence.

Further. Since the divine goodness is most perfect, when we say that all things came from God on account of His goodness, the sense is not that anything accrued to Him from creatures; but that it belongs to goodness to communicate itself to others as far as possible, and it is by doing so that goodness makes itself known. Now since all things partake of God’s goodness in so far as they have being, the more lasting they are the more they participate the goodness of God: wherefore the everlasting being of a species is called a divine being.1 But the divine goodness is infinite. Consequently it belongs thereto to communicate itself in an infinite manner, and not only at a particular time. Therefore it would seem to belong to the divine goodness that some creatures should have existed from eternity.

Accordingly these are the arguments taken from God’s side, which would seem to show that creatures have been always.

Chapter XXXIII

arguments of those who would prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of creatures

There are also other arguments, taken from the point of view of creatures, that would seem to prove the same conclusion.

For things which have no potentiality to non-being, cannot possibly not be. Now there are some creatures in which there is no potentiality to non-being. For there cannot be potentiality to non-being except in those things which have matter subject to contrariety: since potentiality to being and to non-being is a potentiality to privation and form, of which matter is the subject; and privation is always connected with the opposite form, since it is impossible for matter to be without any form at all. But there are certain creatures in which the matter is not subject to contrariety: either because they are entirely devoid of matter; for instance intellectual substances, as we shall show further on,2 or because they have no contrary, as heavenly bodies, and this is proved by their movement, which has no contrary. Therefore it is impossible for certain creatures not to exist: and consequently it is necessary that they exist always.

Again. A thing’s endurance in being is in proportion to its power of being, except accidentally, as in those which are corrupted by violence. But there are certain creatures in which there is a power of being not for any definite time, but for ever; for instance the heavenly bodies and intellectual substances, because they are incorruptible through having no contrary. It follows, then, that it is competent to them to be always. But that which begins to exist, is not always. Therefore it is not becoming to them that they begin to exist.

Further. Whenever a thing begins to be moved anew, the mover, or the moved, or both, must be conditioned otherwise now while the movement is, than before when there was no movement: for there is a certain habitude or relation in the mover to the thing moved, for as much as it moves actually; and the new relation does not begin without a change either in both or at least in one or other of the extremes. Now that which is conditioned otherwise now and heretofore, is moved.1 Therefore, before the movement that begins anew, there must be a previous movement either in the movable or in the mover. It follows, in consequence, that every movement is either eternal, or has another movement preceding it. Therefore movement always has been; and consequently movable also. Therefore there have always been creatures: since God is utterly immovable, as we proved in the First Book.2

Further. Every agent that engenders its like, intends to preserve perpetual being in the species, for it cannot be preserved perpetually in the individual. But it is impossible for the desire of nature to be frustrated. Therefore it follows that the species of generable things are everlasting.

Again. If time is everlasting, movement must be everlasting, since it is the reckoning of movement:3 and consequently movables must be everlasting, since movement is the act of a movable.1 Now time must needs be perpetual. For time is inconceivable without a now: even as a line is inconceivable without a point. But now is always the end of the past and the beginning of the future, for this is the definition of the now.2 Wherefore every given now has time preceding it and following it: and consequently no now can be either first or last. It follows therefore that movables which are created substances are from eternity.

Again. One must either affirm or deny. If, therefore, by denying a thing we suppose its existence, that thing must needs be always. Now time is a thing of this kind. For if time was not always, we can conceive it as not being previously to being: and in like manner, if it will not be always, its non-being must follow its being. Now there can be no before and after in duration unless there be time; since the reckoning of before and after is time.3 Consequently time must have been before it began to be, and will be after it has ceased to be: and therefore time is eternal. But time is an accident: and an accident cannot be without a subject. And its subject is not God, Who is above time; since He is utterly immovable, as we proved in the First Book.4 Therefore it follows that some created substance is eternal.

Moreover. Many propositions are such that to deny them is to affirm them: for instance whoso denies that truth exists, supposes the existence of truth, for he supposes that the denial which he utters is true. It is the same with one who denies this principle that contradictories are not simultaneous: since by denying this he asserts that the negative which he utters is true, and that the opposite affirmative is false, and thus that both are not true about the same thing. Accordingly if, as we have proved,5 a thing which through being denied has to be admitted, must be always, it follows that the aforesaid propositions, and all that result from them, are everlasting. But such propositions are not God. Therefore something beside God must be eternal.

These, then, and similar arguments may be taken from the standpoint of creatures to prove that creatures have been always.

Chapter XXXIV

arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making

Again, other arguments may be taken from the point of view of the making, in order to prove the same conclusion.

For what is asserted by all in common cannot possibly be entirely false: because a false opinion is a weakness of the understanding, even as a false judgment about its proper sensible results from a weakness of the sense. Now defects are accidental, since they are beside the intention of nature. And what is accidental cannot be always and in everything: for instance, the judgment given by all tastes about savours cannot be false. Consequently the judgment given by all about a truth cannot be erroneous. Now it is the common opinion of all philosophers that from nothing, naught is made.1 Wherefore this must be true. Hence if a thing is made, it must be made from something: and if this also is made, it must also be made from something. But this cannot go on indefinitely, for then no generation would be completed, since it is not possible to go through an infinite number of things. Therefore we must come to some first thing that was not made. Now every thing that has not always been, must have been made. Therefore the thing from which all things were first made, must be eternal. But this is not God, since He cannot be the matter of a thing, as we proved in the First Book.2 Therefore it follows that something beside God is eternal, namely primary matter.

Moreover. If a thing is not in the same state now and before, it must be, in some way, changed, for to be moved is not to be in the same state now as before.1 Now everything that begins to be anew, is not in the same state now as before. Therefore this must result from some movement or change. But every movement or change is in a subject, for it is the act of a movable.2 Now, since movement precedes that which is made by movement, for movement terminates therein, it follows that before anything made there pre-exists a movable subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must necessarily come to some first subject that begins not anew but always has been.

Again. Whatever begins to be anew, it was possible, before it was, that it would be. For if not, it was impossible for it to be and necessary for it not to be: and so it would always have been a non-being and it never would have begun to be. Now that for which it is possible to be is a subject potentially a being.3 Therefore before everything that begins to be anew, there must pre-exist a subject which is a potential being. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must suppose some first subject which did not begin to be anew.

Again. No permanent substance is while it is being made: for it is made in order that it may be, wherefore it would not have to be made if it were already. But while it is being made, there must be something that is the subject of the making: since a making, seeing that it is an accident, cannot be without a subject. Therefore whatever is made has a pre-existing subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, it follows that the first subject was not made, but is eternal. Whence it also follows that something beside God is eternal, because He cannot be the subject of making or movement.

Accordingly these are the arguments, through clinging to which as though they were demonstrations some people say that things created have necessarily been always. Wherein they contradict the Catholic faith, which affirms that nothing beside God has always been, and that all things have begun to be, save the one eternal God.

Chapter XXXV

solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those that were taken from the standpoint of god

We must, accordingly, show that the foregoing reasons do not necessarily conclude: and first, those that are produced on the part of the agent.1

For it does not follow that God is moved either per se or accidentally if His effect begin to be anew; as the first argument pretended. Because newness of effect may argue change of the agent in so far as it proves newness of action: since it is impossible for a new action to be in the agent, unless the latter be in some way moved, at least from inaction to action. But newness of effect does not prove newness of action in God, since His action is His essence, as we have proved above.2 Neither therefore can newness of effect argue change in God the agent.

And yet it does not follow, if the action of the first agent is eternal, that His effect is eternal, as the second argument inferred. For it has been shown above,3 that in producing things God acts voluntarily. Not, however, as though there were an intermediate action of His,—as in us the action of the motive power intervenes between the act of the will and the effect,—as we have proved in a foregoing chapter:4 but His act of understanding and willing must be His act of making. Now the effect follows from the intellect and the will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. And just as every other condition of the thing made is determined by the intellect, so is time appointed to it: for art determines not only that this thing is to be such and such, but that it is to be at this particular time, even as a physician determines that a draught is to be taken at such and such a time. Wherefore, if his willing were per se efficacious for producing the effect, the effect would follow anew from his former will, without any new action on his part. Therefore nothing prevents our saying that God’s action was from eternity, whereas His effect was not from eternity, but then when from eternity He appointed.

Hence it is also clear that, although God is the sufficient cause of bringing things into being, it is not necessary to suppose that because he is eternal His effect is eternal; as the third argument contended. For if we suppose a sufficient cause, we suppose its effect, but not an effect outside the cause: for this would be through insufficiency of the cause, as if for instance a hot thing failed to give heat. Now the proper effect of the will is for that thing to be which the will wills: and if something else were to be than what the will wills, this would be an effect that is not proper to the cause but foreign thereto. But just as the will, as we have said, wills this thing to be such and such, so does it will it to be at such and such a time. Wherefore, for the will to be a sufficient cause, it is not necessary for the effect to be when the will is, but when the will has appointed the effect to be. On the other hand, it is different with things which proceed from a cause acting naturally: because the action of nature is according as nature is; wherefore the effect must necessarily follow if the cause exist. Whereas the will acts, not according to the mode of its being, but according to the mode of its purpose. And consequently, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, so the effect of a voluntary agent follows the mode of his purpose.

From the foregoing it is again clear that the effect of the divine will is not delayed, although it was not always, whereas it was always willed, as the fourth reason argued. Because the object of the divine will is not only the existence of the effect, but also the time of its existence. Wherefore the thing willed, namely that a creature should exist at such and such a time, is not delayed: because the creature began to exist at the time appointed by God from eternity.

Nor can we conceive a diversity of parts of any duration before the beginning of the whole creature, as was supposed in the fifth argument. For nothingness has neither measure nor duration. And the duration of God which is eternity, has no parts, but is utterly simple, having no before and after, since God is immovable, as stated in the First Book.1 Wherefore there is no comparison between the beginning of the whole creature and any various signate parts of an already existing measure, to which parts the beginning of creatures can be related in a like or unlike manner, so that there need be a reason in the agent why He should have produced the creature at this particular point of that duration, and not at some particular or subsequent point. Such a reason would be necessary if there were some duration divisible into parts, beside the whole creature produced, as happens in particular agents, who produce their effect in time but do not produce time itself. But God brought into being both the creature and time together. Hence in this matter we have not to consider the reason why He produced them now and not before, but only why not always. This may be made clear by a comparison with place. For particular bodies are produced not only at a determined time, but also in a determined place; and since time and place by which they are contained are extraneous to them, there must needs be a reason why they are produced in this place and time rather than in another: whereas in the whole heaven, outside which there is no place, and together with which the entire place of all things is produced, we have not to consider the reason why it is produced here and not there: and through thinking that this reason ought to be a matter of consideration, some have fallen into error, so as to place the infinite in bodies. In like manner, in the production of the entire creature, outside which there is no time, and together with which time is produced simultaneously, we have not to consider the reason why it was produced now and not before, so that we be led to grant the infinity of time; but only why it was not always produced, or why after non-being, or so as to imply a beginning.

For the purpose of inquiring into this question, the sixth argument was adduced on the part of the end, which alone can bring about necessity in those things which are done voluntarily. Now the end of God’s will can only be His goodness. And He does not act in order to bring this end into being, as a craftsman works in order to produce his handiwork: since His goodness is eternal and unchangeable, so that nothing can accrue thereto. Nor could it be said that God works for His betterment. Nor again does He act in order to obtain this end for Himself, as a king fights in order to obtain possession of a city: for He is His own goodness. It remains therefore that He acts for an end, by producing an effect, so that it participate His end. Accordingly in thus producing an effect on account of an end, the uniform relation of the end to the agent is not to be taken as a reason for His work being eternal: but rather we should consider the relation of the end to the effect which is made on account of the end, so that the effect be produced in such a way as to be most fittingly directed to the end. Consequently from the fact that the end is uniformly related to the agent, we cannot conclude that the effect is eternal.

Nor is it necessary that the divine effect should have been always, because thus it is more fittingly directed to the end, as the seventh argument seemed to infer: but it is more fittingly directed to the end by the fact that it was not always. For every agent that produces an effect in participation of his own form, intends to produce his likeness therein. Wherefore it was becoming to God’s will to produce the creature in participation of His goodness, so that it might reflect the divine goodness by its likeness. But this reflection cannot be by way of equality, as a univocal effect reflects its cause,—so that it be necessary for eternal effects to be produced by the divine goodness: but it is after the manner in which the transcendent is reflected by that which is transcended. Now the transcendence of the divine goodness over the creature is especially manifested by the fact that creatures have not been always. For thereby it is manifest that all else beside Him has Him as the author of its being; and that His power is not constrained to produce these effects, as nature is to natural effects; and consequently that He is a voluntary and intelligent agent. The opposite of which some have affirmed, through maintaining the eternity of creatures.

Accordingly on the part of the agent there is nothing to oblige us to hold the eternity of creatures.

Chapter XXXVI

solution of the arguments produced on the part of the things made

In like manner again, neither is there, on the part of creatures, anything to induce us to assert their eternity.

For the necessity of being that we find in creatures, from which the first argument is taken, is a necessity of order, as was shown above:1 and a necessity of order does not compel the subject of a like necessity to have been always, as we proved above.2 For although the substance of heaven, through being devoid of potentiality to non-being, has a potentiality to being, yet this necessity follows its substance. Wherefore its substance once brought into being, this necessity involves the impossibility of not being: but it does not make it impossible for the heaven not to be, from the point of view where we consider the production of its very substance.

Likewise the power to be always, from which the second argument proceeded, presupposes the production of the substance. Hence where the production of the heaven’s substance is in question, this power cannot be a sufficient argument for that substance’s eternity.

Again, the argument adduced in sequence does not compel us to admit the eternity of movement. For it has been made clear1 that without any change in God the agent, it is possible for Him to do something new that is not eternal. And if it is possible for something to be done by Him anew, it is evident that something can also be moved by Him anew: since newness of movement is consequent upon the ordinance of the eternal will to the effect that movement be not always.

Likewise the intention which natural agents have of perpetuating the species, which was the starting point of the fourth argument, presupposes that natural agents are already in being. Wherefore this argument has no place, save in natural things already brought into being, but not when it is a question of the (first) production of things. The question as to whether it is necessary to admit that generation will go on for ever will be discussed in the sequel.2

Also the fifth argument, taken from time, supposes rather than proves the eternity of movement. For since before and after and continuity of time are consequent upon before and after and continuity of movement, according to the teaching of Aristotle,3 it is clear that the same instant is the beginning of the future, and the end of the past, because in movement there is something assignable that is the beginning and end of the various parts of movement. Wherefore it will not be necessary for each instant to be thus, unless every assignable instant that we conceive in time be between before and after in movement, and this is to suppose that movement is eternal. But he who supposes that movement is not eternal, can say that the first instant of time is the beginning of the future, and the end of no past. Nor is it incompatible with the succession of time, if we place therein a now that is a beginning and not an end, because a line in which we place a point that is a beginning and not an end, is stationary and not transitory; since even in a particular movement which also is not stationary but transitory, it is possible to designate something as only a beginning and not an end of movement: for otherwise all movement would be perpetual, which is impossible.

That we suppose the non-being of time to precede its being, if time began, does not compel us to say that time is, if we suppose that it is not, as the sixth argument inferred. For the before that we speak of as being before time was, does not imply any part of time in reality but only in our imagination. Because when we say that time has being after non-being, we mean that there was no part of time before this signate now: thus, when we say that there is nothing above the heaven, we do not mean that there is a place outside the heaven which can be said to be above in relation to the heaven, but that there is no place above it. In either case the imagination can apply a measure to the already existing thing: and just as this measure is no reason for admitting infinite quantity in a body, as stated in 3 Phys.,1 so neither is it a reason for supposing that time is eternal.

The truth of propositions which one has to grant even if one denies them, and from which the seventh argument proceeded, has the necessity of that relation which is between predicate and subject. Wherefore it does not compel a thing to be always: except perhaps (as understood by) the divine intellect in which all truth is rooted, as we showed in the First Book.2

Hence it is clear that the arguments taken from creatures do not compel one to assert the eternity of the world.

Chapter XXXVII

solution of the arguments taken from the making of things

It remains for us to show that neither does any argument taken from the point of view of the making of things compel us to draw the aforesaid conclusion.3

The common opinion of the philosophers who asserted that from nothing naught is made, on which the first argument was based, holds good for that particular making which they had under consideration. For since all our knowledge begins from the senses which are about singulars, human speculations proceeded from particular to universal considerations. Wherefore those who sought the principle of things considered only the particular makings of beings, and inquired in what manner this particular fire or this particular stone was made. At first, considering the making of things more from an outward point of view than it behoved them to do, they stated that a thing is made only in respect of certain accidental dispositions, such as rarity, density, and so forth; and they said, in consequence, that to be made was nothing else than to be altered, for the reason that they understood everything to be made from an actual being. Later on, they considered the making of things more inwardly, and made a step forward to the making of things in regard to their substance: for they asserted that a thing does not need to be made, except accidentally, from an actual being, and that it is made per se from a being in potentiality. But this making, which is of a being from any being whatsoever, is the making of a particular being, which is made for as much as it is this being, for instance a man or a fire, but not for as much as it is considered universally: for there was previously a being which is transformed into this being. Entering still more deeply into the origin of things, they considered at last the procession of all created being from one first cause; as appears from the arguments given above1 which prove this. In this procession of all being from God it is not possible for anything to be made from something already existing: since it would not be the making of all created being.

The early natural philosophers had no conception of such a making, for it was their common opinion that from nothing naught is made. Or if any of them conceived the idea, they did not consider that the name of making was applicable thereto, since the word making implies movement or change, whereas in this origin of all being from one first being, the transformation of one being into another is inconceivable, as we have proved.1 For which reason neither does it belong to the natural philosophers to consider this same origin of things, but to the metaphysician, who considers universal being and things that are devoid of movement. We, however, by a kind of metaphor transfer the name making even to that origin, so that we say that anything whatsoever is made, if its essence or nature originates from something else.

Wherefore it is clear that neither is the second argument cogent, which was taken from the nature of movement. For creation cannot be described as a change save metaphorically, in so far as the created thing is considered to have being after non-being: in which way one thing is said to be made out of another, even in those things where the one is not changed into the other, for the sole reason that one succeeds the other, as day out of night. Nor does the nature of movement that is brought into the argument justify the conclusion (since what nowise exists is not in any particular state) that when it begins to exist, it is in a different state now and before. Hence again it is evident that there is no need for a passive potentiality to precede the existence of all created being, as the third argument inferred. For this is necessary in those things which take their origin of being from movement, since movement is the act of a potential being.2 But before a created thing was, it was possible for it to be, through the power of the agent, by which power also it began to be: or it was possible on account of the habitude of the terms, in which no incompatibility is found, which kind of possibility is said to be in respect of no potentiality, as the Philosopher says (5 Metaph.).3 For this predicate being is not incompatible with this subject world or man, as measurable is incompatible with diameter; and thus it follows that it is not impossible for it to be, and consequently that before it was, it was possible for it to be, apart from all potentiality. But in those things which are made by movement, it is necessary that they be previously possible in respect of a passive potentiality: and it is with regard to these that the Philosopher employs this argument (7 Metaph.).1

From this it is also clear that neither is the fourth argument conclusive for the purpose. For in things made by movement, to be made and to be are not simultaneous, because succession is found in their making. Whereas in things that are not made by movement, their making is not before their being.

It is therefore evident that nothing prevents our asserting that the world has not been always: and this is affirmed by the Catholic faith (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth; and (Prov. 8:22) it is said of God: Before He made anything from the beginning, etc.

Chapter XXXVIII

arguments by which some endeavour to prove that the world is not eternal

Now there are some arguments brought forward by certain people to prove that the world was not always: they are taken from the following.

For it has been proved that God is the cause of all things. But a cause must precede in duration the things made by its action.

Again. Since all being is created by God, it cannot be said to be made from some being, so that it must be made from nothing, and consequently has being after non-being.

Also, because it is not possible to pass by an infinite number of things. Now if the world were always, an infinite number of things would have now been passed by: since what is past, is passed by, and if the world was always, there is an infinite number of days or an infinite number of solar revolutions.

Further. It follows that an addition is made to the infinite, since every day something is added to the past days or revolutions.

Moreover. It follows that it is possible to go on to infinity in efficient causes, if there was always generation; and we are bound to admit this latter if the world was always: because the son’s cause is his father, and another man is the latter’s father, and so on indefinitely.

Again. It will follow that there is an infinite number of things: namely the immortal souls of an infinite number of men.

Now since these arguments do not conclude of absolute necessity, although they are not devoid of probability, it is enough merely to touch upon them, lest the Catholic faith seem to be founded on empty reasonings, and not, as it is, on the most solid teaching of God. Wherefore it seems right that we should indicate how those arguments are met by those who asserted the eternity of the world.

For the first statement that an agent necessarily precedes the effect brought about by its operation, is true of those things which act by movement, because the effect is not until the movement is ended, and the agent must necessarily exist even when the movement begins. On the other hand in those things which act instantaneously, this is not necessary: thus as soon as the sun reaches the point of the East, it enlightens our hemisphere.

Also, that which is said in the second place is of no avail. For in order to contradict the statement, Something is made from something, if this be not granted, we must say Something is not made from something, and not, Something is made from nothing, except in the sense of the former: whence we cannot conclude that it is made after not being.

Again, the third argument is not cogent. For though the infinite in act be impossible, it is not impossible in succession, since any given infinite taken in this sense is finite. Hence each of the preceding revolutions could be passed by, since it was finite. But in all of them together, if the world had been always, there would be no first revolution. Wherefore there would be no passing through them, because this always requires two extremes.

Again, the fourth argument put forward is weak. For nothing hinders the infinite receiving an addition on the side on which it is finite. Now supposing time to be eternal, it follows that it is infinite anteriorly but finite posteriorly, since the present is the term of the past.

Nor is the argument cogent which is given in the fifth place. For it is impossible, according to philosophers, to have an infinite number of active causes which act together simultaneously: because the effect would have to depend on an infinite number of simultaneous actions. Such are causes that are per se infinite, because their infinity is required for their effect. On the other hand in causes that do not act simultaneously, this is not impossible, according to those who assert that generation has always been. And this infinity is accidental to the causes, for it is accidental to the father of Socrates that he is another man’s son or not. Whereas it is not accidental to the stick forasmuch as it moves the stone, that it be moved by the hand, since it moves forasmuch as it is moved.

The objection taken from souls is more difficult. And yet the argument is not of much use, since it takes many things for granted.1 For some of those who maintained the eternity of the world, asserted that human souls do not survive the body. Some said that of all souls there survives only the separate intellect, or the active intellect according to some, or even the passive intellect according to others. Some have held a kind of rotation in souls, saying that the same souls after several centuries return to bodies. And some do not consider it incongruous that there should be things actually infinite in those which have no order.

Nevertheless one may proceed to prove this more efficiently from the end of the divine will, as we have indicated above.2 For the end of God’s will in the production of things, is His goodness as manifested in His effects. Now God’s might and goodness are especially made manifest in that things other than Himself were not always. For the fact that they have not always been clearly shows that other things beside Himself have their being from Him. It also shows that He does not act by a necessity of His nature, and that His power is infinite in acting. Therefore it was most becoming to the goodness of God, that He should give His creatures a beginning of their duration.

From what has been said we are able to avoid the various errors of the pagan philosophers. Some of whom asserted the eternity of the world; others asserted that the matter of the world is eternal, out of which at a certain time the world began to be formed; either by chance; or by some intellect; or else by attraction and repulsion. For all these suppose something eternal beside God: which is incompatible with the Catholic faith.

Chapter XXXIX

that the distinction of things is not from chance

Having disposed of those matters which relate to the production of things, it remains for us to treat of those which call for our consideration as regards the distinction of things.1 Of these the first that we have to prove is that the distinction of things is not from chance.

For chance occurs only in those things which it is possible to be otherwise, since we do not ascribe to chance those that are necessarily and always. Now it was shown above2 that certain things have been created in whose nature there is no possibility of not being, such as immaterial substances and those which are not composed of contraries. Wherefore it is impossible that their substances be from chance. But it is by their substances that they are mutually distinct. Therefore their distinction is not from chance.

Moreover. Since chance is only in those things that are possibly otherwise, and since the principle of this possibility is matter and not their form, which in fact determines the possibility of matter to one; it follows that those things which are distinct by their forms are not distinct by chance, but perhaps those things are, whose distinction is from matter. But the distinction of species is from the form, and the distinction of singulars in the same species, is from matter. Wherefore the specific distinction of things cannot be from chance, but perhaps chance causes the distinction of certain individuals.

Also. Since matter is the principle and cause of casual things, as we have shown, there may be chance in the making of things produced from matter. But it was proved above1 that the first production of things into being was not from matter. Wherefore there is no place for chance in them. Yet the first production of things must needs have included their distinction: since there are many created things which are neither produced from one another, nor from something common, because they do not agree in matter. Therefore it is impossible for the distinction of things to be from chance.

Again. A per se cause is before an accidental cause. Hence if later things are from a determinate per se cause, it is unfitting to say that the first things are from an undeterminate accidental cause. Now the distinction of things naturally precedes their movements and operations: since determinate movements and operations belong to things determinate and distinct. But movements and operations of things are from per se and determinate causes, since we find that they proceed from their causes in the same way either always or for the most part. Therefore the distinction of things is also from a per se determinate cause, and not from chance, which is an indeterminate accidental cause.

Moreover. The form of anything that proceeds from an intellectual voluntary agent is intended by the agent. Now the universe of creatures has for its author God Who is an agent by His will and intellect, as proved above.1 Nor can there be any defect in His power, so that He fail of His intention: since His power is infinite, as was proved above.2 It follows therefore that the form of the universe is intended and willed by God. Therefore it is not from chance: for we ascribe to chance those things which are beside the intention of the agent. Now the form of the universe consists in the distinction and order of its parts. Therefore the distinction of things is not from chance.

Further. That which is good and best in the effect is the end of its production. But the good and the best in the universe consists in the mutual order of its parts, which is impossible without distinction: since by this order the universe is established as one whole, and this is its best. Therefore the order of the parts of the universe and their distinction is the end of the production of the universe. Therefore the distinction of things is not from chance.

Holy Writ bears witness to this truth, as is clear from Gen. 1:1, where after the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the text continues (verse 4), God … divided the light from the darkness, and so on: so that not only the creation of things, but also their distinction is shown to be from God, and not from chance, but as the good and the best of the universe. Wherefore it is added (verse 31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers who affirmed that there was only a material cause, and no other, from which all things were made by expansion and cohesion.3 For these are compelled to say that the distinction of things which we observe in the universe resulted, not from the intentional ordinance of one, but from the chance movement of matter.

Likewise is excluded the opinion of Democritus and Leucippus,4 who postulated an infinite number of material principles, namely indivisible bodies of the same nature, but differing in shape, order, and position, to whose convergence—which must needs be fortuitous, since they denied the existence of an active cause—they ascribed the diversity among things, on account of the three aforesaid differences of atoms, to wit, of shape, order, and position: wherefore it followed that the distinction of things was by chance: and from what has been said this is clearly false.

Chapter XL

that matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things

Furthermore, it is evident from the foregoing that the distinction of things is not on account of a diversity of matter as its first cause. For nothing determinate can proceed from matter except by chance: because matter is in potentiality to many things, of which if only one were to result, it must needs be that this happens in the minority of cases, and such is that which happens by chance, especially if we remove the intention of an agent. Now it was proved1 that the distinction of things is not from chance. It follows therefore that it is not on account of a diversity of matter, as its first cause.

Again. Those things which result from the intention of an agent, are not on account of matter as their first cause. For an active cause precedes matter in acting: because matter does not become an actual cause except in so far as it is moved by an agent. Wherefore if an effect is consequent upon a disposition of matter and the intention of an agent, it does not result from matter as its first cause. For this reason we find that those things which are referable to matter as their first cause, are beside the intention of the agent; for instance monsters and other mischances of nature. But the form results from the intention of the agent. This is proved thus. The agent produces its like according to its form, and if sometimes this fails, it is from chance on account of a defect in the matter. Therefore forms do not result from a disposition of matter as their first cause; on the contrary, matters are disposed in such a way that such may be their forms. Now the specific distinction of things is according to their forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the diversity of matter as its first cause.

Moreover. The distinction of things cannot result from matter except in those which are made from pre-existing matter. Now many things are distinguished from one another which cannot be made from pre-existing matter: for instance, the celestial bodies, which have no contrary, as their movement shows. Therefore the diversity of matter cannot be the first cause of the distinction of things.

Again. Whatever things having a cause of their being are distinct from one another, have a cause of their distinction: because a thing is made a being according as it is made one, undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now if matter, by its diversity, is the cause of the distinction of things, we must suppose that matters are in themselves distinct. Moreover it is evident that every matter has being from something else, since it was proved above1 that everything, that is in any way whatsoever, is from God. Therefore something else is the cause of distinction in matters: and consequently the first cause of the distinction of things cannot be a diversity of matter.

Again. Since every intellect acts for the sake of good, it does not produce a better thing for the sake of an inferior thing: and it is the same with nature. Now all things proceed from God Who acts by His intellect, as stated above.2 Therefore inferior things proceed from God for the sake of better things, and not vice versa. But form is more noble than matter, since it is its perfection and act. There fore He does not produce such and such forms for the sake of such and such matters, but rather He produced such and such matters that there might be such and such forms. Therefore the specific distinction in things, which is according to their form, is not on account of their matter: but on the contrary matters were created diverse, that they might be suitable for diverse forms.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of Anaxagoras, who postulated an infinite number of material principles, which at first were mixed together in one confused mass, but which an intellect subsequently separated, thus establishing a distinction among things:1 as well as the opinions of any who held the distinction of things to be the result of various material principles.

Chapter XLI

that the distinction of things is not on account of a contrariety of agents

From the above we may also prove that the cause of distinction among things is not a diversity or even a contrariety of agents.

For if the diverse agents who cause the diversity among things, are ordered to one another, there must be some cause of this order: since many are not united together save by some one. And thus the principle of this order will be the first and sole cause of the distinction of things. If, on the other hand, these various agents are not ordered to one another, their convergence to the effect of producing the diversity of things will be accidental: wherefore the distinction of things will be by chance; the contrary of which has been proved above.2

Again. Ordered effects do not proceed from diverse causes having no order, except perhaps accidentally, for diverse things as such do not produce one. Now things mutually distinct are found to have a mutual order, and this not by chance: since for the most part one is helped by another. Wherefore it is impossible that the distinction among things thus ordered, be on account of a diversity of agents without order.

Moreover. Things that have a cause of their distinction cannot be the first cause of the distinction of things. Now, if we take several co-ordinate agents, they must needs have a cause of their distinction: because they have a cause of their being, since all beings are from one first being, as was shown above;1 and the cause of a thing’s being is the same as the cause of its distinction from others, as we have proved.2 Therefore diversity of agents cannot be the first cause of distinction among things.

Again. If the diversity of things comes of the diversity or contrariety of various agents, this would seem especially to apply, as many maintain, to the contrariety of good and evil, so that all good things proceed from a good principle, and evil things from an evil principle: for good and evil are in every genus. But there cannot be one first principle of all evil things. For, since those things that are through another, are reduced to those that are of themselves, it would follow that the first active cause of evils is evil of itself. Now a thing is said to be such of itself, if it is such by its essence. Therefore its essence will not be good. But this is impossible. For everything that is, must of necessity be good in so far as it is a being; because everything loves its being and desires it to be preserved; a sign of which is that everything resists its own corruption; and good is what all desire.3 Therefore distinction among things cannot proceed from two contrary principles, the one good, and the other evil.

Further. Every agent acts in as much as it is actual; and in as much as it is in act, everything is perfect: and everything that is perfect, as such, is said to be good. Therefore every agent, as such, is good. Wherefore if a thing is essentially evil, it cannot be an agent. But if it is the first principle of evils, it must be essentially evil, as we have proved. Therefore it is impossible that the distinction among things proceed from two principles, good and evil.

Moreover. If every being, as such, is good, it follows that evil, as such, is a non-being. Now, no efficient cause can be assigned to non-being, as such, since every agent acts for as much as it is an actual being, and every agent produces its like. Therefore no per se efficient cause can be assigned to evil, as such. Therefore evils cannot be reduced to one first cause that is of itself the cause of all evils.

Further. That which results beside the intention of the agent, has no per se cause, but befalls accidentally: for instance when a man finds a treasure while digging to plant. Now evil cannot result in an effect except beside the intention of the agent, for every agent intends a good, since the good is what all desire.1 Therefore evil has not a per se cause, but befalls accidentally in the effects of causes. Therefore we cannot assign one first principle to all evils.

Further. Contrary agents have contrary actions. Therefore we must not assign contrary principles to things that result from one action. Now good and evil are produced by the same action: thus by the same action water is corrupted and air generated. Therefore the difference of good and evil that we find in things is no reason for affirming contrary principles.

Moreover. That which altogether is not, is neither good nor evil. Now that which is, for as much as it is, is good, as proved above. Therefore a thing is evil forasmuch as it is a non-being. But this is a being with a privation. Wherefore evil as such is a being with a privation, and the evil itself is this very privation. Now privation has no per se efficient cause: since every agent acts inasmuch as it has a form: wherefore the per se effect of an agent must be something having that form, because an agent produces its like, except accidentally. It follows, then, that evil has no per se efficient cause, but befalls accidentally in the effects of causes which are effective per se.

Consequently there is not one per se principle of evil: but the first principle of all things is one first good, in whose effects evil is an accidental consequence.

Hence it is said (Isa. 45:6, 7): I am the Lord and there is none other God:1 I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil: I am the Lord that do all these things: and (Ecclus. 11:14): Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches, are from God: and (ibid. 33:15): Good is set against evil … so also is the sinner against a just man. And so look upon all the works of the Most High. Two and two, and one against another.

God is said to make or create evils, in so far as He creates things that are good in themselves, and yet hurtful to others: for instance, the wolf, although in his species he is a good of nature, is nevertheless evil to the sheep, and likewise fire to water, inasmuch as it is corruptive thereof. In like manner He causes in men those evils which are called penal. Wherefore it is said (Amos 3:6): Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done? In this sense Gregory says:2 Even evils, which have no natural subsistence of their own, are created by the Lord. But He is said to create evils when He employs creatures that are good in themselves to punish us who do evil.

Hereby is excluded the error of those who asserted contrary first principles. This error began with Empedocles. For he held that there are two first active principles, attraction and repulsion, of which he asserted that attraction is the cause of generation, and repulsion the cause of corruption. Wherefore it would seem as Aristotle says (1 Metaph.)3 that he was the first to assert two contrary principles, good and evil.

Pythagoras asserted two primaries, good and evil, as formal however and not as active principles. For he stated that these two are the genera under which all other things are comprised, as the Philosopher declares (1 Metaph.).4

Now, though these errors of the earlier philosophers were refuted by those of later times, certain men of perverted sense have presumed to combine them with Christian doctrine. The first of these was Marchius,1—from whom the Marchians take their name,—who under the guise of a Christian founded a heresy, holding the existence of two contrary principles. He was followed by the Cerdonians, afterwards by the Marchianists, and lastly by the Manichees, who especially spread this error abroad.

Chapter XLII

that the first cause of the distinction of things is not the order of secondary agents

We may also prove from the same premisses that the distinction of things is not caused by the order of secondary agents; as those maintained who held that God, since He is one and simple, produces but one effect, which is the first created substance: and that this, because it cannot equal the simplicity of the first cause,—not being pure act, but having a certain admixture of potentiality—has a certain multiplicity, so that it is able to produce some kind of plurality; and that in this way, effects ever failing of the simplicity of their causes, the multiplication of effects results in the diversity of the things whereof the universe consists.2

Accordingly this opinion does not assign one cause to the entire diversity of things, but a different cause to each particular effect: and the entire diversity of things it ascribes to the concurrence of all causes. Now we say that those things happen by chance, which result from the concurrence of various causes, and not from one determinate cause. Wherefore the distinction of things and the order of the universe would be the result of chance.

Moreover. That which is best in things caused is reduced, as to its first cause, to that which is best in causes: for effects must be proportionate to their causes.3 Now the best among all things caused is the order of the universe, wherein the good of the universe consists, even as in human affairs the good of the nation is more God-like than the good of the individual.1 Hence we must reduce the order of the universe to God as its proper cause, Whom we have proved above2 to be the sovereign good. Therefore the distinction of things, wherein consists the order of the universe, is the result not of secondary causes, but rather simplicity of the first cause.

Further. It seems absurd to assign a defect in things as cause of that which is best in things. Now the best in things caused is their distinction and order, as shown above.3 Therefore it is unreasonable to assert that this distinction is the result of secondary causes failing of the simplicity of the first cause.

Again. In all ordered active causes, where action is directed to an end, the ends of the secondary causes must be directed to the end of the first cause: thus the ends of the arts of war, horsemanship, and bridle-making are directed to the end of the political art.4 Now the origin of beings from the first being is by an action directed to an end: since it is according to intellect, as we have proved;5 and every intellect acts for an end. If, therefore, in the production of things there are any secondary causes, it follows that their ends and actions are directed to the end of the first cause, and this is the last end in things caused. And this is the distinction and order of the parts of the universe, which order is the ultimate form, so to speak. Therefore the distinction and order in things is not on account of the actions of secondary causes; but rather the actions of secondary causes are on account of the order and distinction to be established in things.

Further. If the distinction of the parts of the universe and their order is the proper effect of the first cause, through being the ultimate form and the greatest good in the universe, it follows that the distinction and order of things must be in the intellect of the first cause: because in things that are made by an intellect, the form produced in the things made proceeds from a like form in the intellect: for instance, the house which exists in matter proceeds from the house which is in an intellect. Now the form of distinction and order cannot be in an active intellect, unless the forms of the things which are distinct and ordered be therein. Wherefore in the divine intellect there are the forms of various things distinct and ordered, nor is this incompatible with His simplicity, as we have proved above.1 Accordingly, if things that are outside the mind proceed from forms that are in the intellect, it will be possible, in things that are effected by an intellect, for many and diverse things to be caused immediately by the first cause, notwithstanding the divine simplicity, on account of which some fell into the aforesaid opinion.

Again. The action of one who acts by intellect terminates in the form which he understands, and not in another, except accidentally and by chance. Now God is an agent by His intellect, as we have proved:2 nor can His action be affected by chance, since He cannot fail of His action.3 It follows, therefore, that He produces His effect for the very reason that he understands and intends that same effect. But by the same idea that He understands one effect, He can understand many effects other than Himself. Wherefore He can at once cause many things without any intermediary.

Moreover. As we have shown above,4 the power of God is not confined to one effect, and this is befitting His simplicity: because the more a power is united, the nearer it approaches to infinity, being able to extend to so many more things. But it does not follow that one thing only can be made by one, except when the agent is determined to one effect. Wherefore, we are not bound to conclude that, because God is one and utterly simple, therefore many things cannot proceed from Him, except by means of certain things that fail of His simplicity.

Further. It was shown above1 that God alone can create. Now there are many things which cannot come into being except by creation: such as all those which are not composed of form and matter subject to contrariety; because the like must needs be incapable of being generated, since all generation is from a contrary and from matter.2 Such are all intellectual substances, and all heavenly bodies, and even primary matter itself. We must therefore assert that all such things have taken the origin of their being from God immediately.

Hence it is said (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth: and (Job 37:18): Thou perhaps hast made the heavens with Him, which are most strong as if they were of molten brass.

By the foregoing we exclude the opinion of Avicenna,3 who says that God, by understanding Himself, produced one first intelligence, in which there is already potentiality and act; that this, through understanding God, produces the second intelligence; through understanding itself as being in act, produces the soul of the sphere; and through understanding itself as being in potentiality, produces the substance of the first sphere. And thus starting from this point he explains the causing of the diversity of things by secondary causes.

We also exclude the opinion of certain early heretics who said that not God but the angels created the world: of which error Simon Magus is said to have been the original author.

Chapter XLIII

that the distinction among things does not result from some secondary agent introducing various forms into matter

Certain modern heretics say that God created the matter of all things visible, but that this was diversified with various forms by an angel. The falseness of this opinion is evident. For the heavenly bodies, wherein no contrariety is to be found, cannot have been formed from any matter: since whatever is made from pre-existing matter, must needs be made from a contrary. Wherefore it is impossible that any angel should have formed the heavenly bodies from matter previously created by God.

Moreover. The heavenly bodies either have no matter in common with the lower bodies, or they only have primary matter in common with them: for the heaven neither is composed of elements, nor is of an elemental nature: which is proved by its movement which differs from that of all the elements. And primary matter could not by itself precede all formed bodies, since it is nothing but pure potentiality, and all actual being is from some form. Therefore it is impossible that an angel should have formed all visible bodies from matter previously created by God.

Again. Everything that is made, is made to be, since making is the way to being. To each thing caused, therefore, it is becoming to be made as it is becoming to be. Now being is not becoming to form alone, nor to matter alone, but to the composite: for matter is merely in potentiality, while form is whereby a thing is, since it is act. Hence it follows that the composite, properly speaking, is. Therefore it belongs to it alone to be made, and not to matter without form. Therefore there is not one agent that creates matter only, and another that induces the form.

Again. The first induction of forms into matter cannot be from an agent acting by movement only, for all movement towards a form is from a determinate form towards a determinate form: because matter cannot be without all form, wherefore some form is presupposed in matter. But every agent intending a merely material form must needs be an agent by movement: for since material forms are not subsistent of themselves, and their being is to be in matter, they cannot be brought into being except either by the production of the whole composite, or by the transmutation of matter to this or that form. Therefore it is impossible that the first induction of forms into matter be from someone creating the form only, but it must be from Him Who is the Creator of the whole composite.

Further. Movement towards a form comes naturally after local movement: for it is the act of that which is more imperfect, as the Philosopher proves.1 Now in the natural order things that come afterwards are caused by those which come before. Wherefore movement towards a form is caused by local movement. But the first local movement is the movement of the heaven. Therefore all movement towards a form takes place through the means of the heavenly movement. Hence those things that cannot be made through the means of the heavenly movement, cannot be made by an agent that cannot act except by movement: and such must be the agent that cannot act except by inducing form into matter, as we have proved.2 Now many sensible forms cannot be produced by the heavenly movement except by means of certain presupposed determinate principles: thus certain animals are not made except from seed. Therefore the original production of these forms, for producing which the heavenly movement is not sufficient without the pre-existence of those forms in the species, must needs proceed from the Creator alone.

Again. Just as local movement of fart and whole are the same, like that of the whole earth and of one clod,3 so the change of generation is the same in the part and in the whole. Now the parts of those things that are subject to generation and corruption are generated by acquiring actual forms from forms in matter, and not from forms existing outside matter, since the generator must be like the thing generated, as the Philosopher proves in 7 Metaph.1 Neither therefore can the total acquisition of forms by matter be effected by any separate substance, such as an angel: but this must be done either by means of a corporeal agent, or by a creative agent, acting without movement.

Further. Even as being is first among effects, so does it correspond to the first cause as its proper effect. Now being is by form and not by matter. Therefore the first causation of forms is to be ascribed especially to the first cause.

Moreover. Since every agent produces its like, the effect obtains its form from that to which it is likened by the form it acquired: even as the material house acquires its form from the art, which is the likeness of the house in the mind. Now all things are like God Who is pure act, inasmuch as they have forms whereby they become actual: and inasmuch as they desire forms, they are said to desire the divine likeness.2 Therefore it is absurd to say that the formation of things belongs to another than God the Creator of all.

Hence it is that in order to exclude this error, Moses after saying (Gen. 1:1) that God, in the beginning, created heaven and earth, added how He distinguished all things by forming them in their respective species. Moreover the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:16) that in Christ3 were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible.

Chapter XLIV

that distinction among things did not result from the diversity of merits or demerits

It remains now for us to show that the distinction among things did not result from different movements of the free-will of rational creatures, as Origen maintained in his Peri Archon.4 For he wished to refute the objections and errors of the early heretics, who strove to prove that the different nature of good and evil in things is owing to contrary agents. But on account of the great difference which he observed both in natural and in human things, which difference apparently is not preceded by any merits,—for instance that some bodies are lightsome, some dark, that some are born of pagans, some of Christians,—he was compelled to assert that all differences to be found in things have proceeded from a difference of merits, in accordance with the justice of God. For he says that God, of His mere goodness, first made all creatures equal, all of them being spiritual and rational: and these by their free-will were moved in divers ways, some adhering to God more, and some less, some withdrawing from God more, and some less; and in this way there resulted through divine justice, various grades in spiritual substances, so that some were angels in their various orders, some human souls in their various states, some demons in their various states: and on account of the diversity among rational creatures, he said that God had established diversity among corporeal creatures, so that the more noble spiritual substances were united to the more noble bodies, and thus the corporeal creature would minister in all other various ways to the diversity of spiritual substances.

But this opinion is clearly convicted of falsehood. For among effects, the better a thing is, the more does it obtain precedence in the intention of the agent. Now the greatest good in things created is the perfection of the universe, consisting in the order of distinct things: because in all things the perfection of the whole takes precedence of the perfection of each part. Wherefore the diversity of things results from the principal intention of the first agent, and not from a diversity of merits.

Again. If all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, we must say that one of them does not depend on another in its action. Now that which results from the concurrence of various causes, one of which does not depend on another, is casual. Therefore according to the aforesaid opinion, this distinction and order of things is casual: and this is impossible, as proved above.1

Moreover. That which is natural to a person, is not acquired by him by his will: for the movement of the will, or free-will, presupposes the existence of the willer, and for this his nature is required. Accordingly, if the various grades of rational creatures were derived from a movement of the free-will, all rational creatures would have their respective grade not naturally but accidentally. But this is impossible. For since the specific difference is natural to each thing, it would follow that all created rational substances are of one species, namely angels, demons, human souls, and the souls of the heavenly bodies (which Origen supposed to be animated). That this is false is proved by the diversity of natural actions: because the mode by which the human intellect naturally understands is not the same as that which sense and imagination, or the angelic intellect and the soul of the sun demand: unless perhaps we picture the angels and heavenly bodies with flesh and bones and like parts, so that they may have organs of sense, which is absurd. It follows, therefore, that the diversity of intellectual substances is not the result of a diversity of merits which are according to movements of the free-will.

Again. If things that are natural are not acquired by a movement of the free-will; whereas the union of a rational soul with such a body is acquired by the soul on account of preceding merit or demerit according to the movement of the free-will; it would follow that the union of this soul with this body is not natural. Therefore neither is the composite natural. Yet man and the sun and the stars, according to Origen, are composed of rational substances and such and such bodies. Therefore all these things which are the noblest of corporeal substances, are unnatural.

Again. If the union of this rational substance with this body is becoming to this rational substance not as such a substance, but as having so merited, its union with this body is not an essential but an accidental union. Now, a species does not result from things united accidentally, because from such a union there does not result a thing essentially one: for white man or clothed man is not a species. It would follow, therefore, that man is not a species, nor yet the sun, nor the moon, nor anything of the kind.

Moreover. Those things which result from merit may be changed for better or for worse: because merits and demerits may increase or diminish, especially according to Origen, who said that the free-will of every creature is always flexible to either side. Wherefore, if a rational soul has been allotted this body on account of preceding merit or demerit, it will follow that it can be united again to another body, and not only that the human soul takes another human body, but also that it may sometimes take a sidereal body, which is in accordance with the Pythagorean fable, that any soul enters any body.1 This is both erroneous according to philosophy,—which teaches that determinate matters and movables are allotted to determinate forms and movers,—and heretical according to faith, which declares that in the resurrection the soul resumes the same body which it has left.

Further. Since there can be no multitude without distinction, if from the beginning rational creatures were formed in any number, they must have had some diversity. Therefore one of them had something which another had not. And if this was not the result of a difference in merit, for the same reason neither was it necessary for the difference of grades to result from a difference of merits.

Again. Every distinction is either according to a division of quantity, which is only in bodies,—wherefore, according to Origen, it could not be in the bodies first created,—or according to formal division. But this latter cannot be without distinction of grades, since such a distinction is reduced to that of privation and form: and thus one of the condivided forms must needs be better and the other less good. Hence, according to the Philosopher,2 the species of things are like numbers, one of which is in addition to or in subtraction from the other. Accordingly, if there were many rational substances created from the beginning, there must have been a distinction of grades among them.

Again. If rational creatures can subsist without bodies, there was no need to set up a distinction in the corporeal nature on account of the various merits of rational creatures: since even without a diversity of bodies it was possible to find various grades in rational substances. And if rational substances cannot subsist without bodies, it follows that the corporeal creature also was formed from the beginning together with the rational creature. Now the corporeal creature is further removed from the spiritual, than spiritual creatures are from one another. If, therefore, God from the beginning established such a great distance among His creatures without any previous merits, there was no need for a difference of merits to precede in order that rational creatures should be established in different grades.

Further. If the diversity of corporeal creatures corresponds to the diversity of spiritual creatures, for the same reason the uniformity of corporeal nature would correspond to the uniformity of rational creatures. Therefore the corporeal nature would have been created even if the preceding merits of the rational creature had been not different but uniform. Hence primary matter would have been created, which is common to all bodies,—but under one form only. But in it there are many forms in potentiality. Wherefore it would have remained imperfect, its one form alone being reduced to act: and this is unbefitting the divine goodness.

Again. If the diversity of the corporeal creature results from the different movements of the rational creature’s free-will, we shall have to say that the reason why there is only one sun in the world, is because only one rational creature was moved by its free-will in such a way as to merit to be united to such a body. Now it was by chance that only one sinned thus. Therefore it is by chance that there is only one sun in the world, and not for the need of corporeal nature.

Further. Since the spiritual creature does not merit to be degraded except for sin,—yet it is degraded from its height, wherein it is invisible, through being united to visible bodies,—it would seem to follow that visible bodies are joined to spiritual creatures on account of sin. And this would seem to approach to the error of the Manichees who said that these visible things proceeded from the evil principle.1

The authority of Holy Writ is in evident contradiction with this error. For in each making of visible creatures Moses speaks in terms such as these:2 God saw that it was good, etc., and afterwards in reference to all, he adds: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. Hence we are clearly given to understand that the corporeal and visible creatures were made because it is good for them to be, and this is in keeping with the divine goodness, and not on account of any merits or sins of rational creatures.

Origen seems not to have taken into consideration that, when we give a thing not as a due, but as a free gift, it is not contrary to justice if we give unequal things, without weighing the difference of merits, since payment is due to those who merit. Now God, as stated above,3 brought things into being, not as though it were due to them, but out of mere bounty. Therefore the diversity of creatures does not presuppose diversity of merits.

Again, since the good of the whole is better than the good of each part, it does not befit the best maker to lessen the good of the whole in order to increase the good of some of the parts: thus a builder does not give to the foundation the goodness which he gives to the roof, lest he should make a crazy house. Therefore God the maker of all would not make the whole universe the best of its kind, if He made all the parts equal, because many degrees of goodness would be wanting to the universe, and thus it would be imperfect.

Chapter XLV

what is in truth the first cause of the distinction of things

From what we have said it may be shown what is truly the first cause of the distinction of things.

Since every agent intends to induce its likeness into its effect, as far as the effect can admit of it, it does this the more perfectly, according as it is more perfect itself: for it is clear that the hotter a thing is, the hotter it makes a thing, and the better the craftsman, the more perfectly he induces the form of his art into matter. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore it belonged to God to induce His likeness into created things most perfectly, as far as is befitting to a created nature. But created things cannot come by a perfect likeness to God, with respect to only one species of the creature: because, since the cause surpasses its effect, that which in the cause is simply and unitedly, is found in the effect to have a composite and multiple nature,—unless the effect reach to the species of the cause, which does not apply to the case in point, since the creature cannot be equal to God. Therefore there was need for multiplicity and variety in things created, in order that we might find in them a perfect likeness to God according to their mode.

Moreover. Just as things made of matter are in the passive potentiality of matter, so things made by an agent must be in the active potentiality of the agent. Now the passive potentiality of matter would not be perfectly reduced to act if one only of those things to which matter is in potentiality were reduced to act. Therefore if an agent, whose potentiality embraces several effects, were to make only one of them, its potentiality would not be so perfectly reduced to act as when it makes several. Now by the active potentiality being reduced to act, the effect receives the likeness of the agent. Therefore there would not be a perfect likeness of God in the universe, if all things were of one degree. For this reason therefore is there distinction in created things, in order that they may receive God’s likeness more perfectly by multiplicity than by unity.

Further. A thing approaches the more perfectly to God’s likeness, according as it is like Him in more things. Now in God is goodness, and the outpouring of that goodness into other things. Therefore the creature approaches more perfectly to God’s likeness if it is not only good, but can also act for the goodness of other things, than if it were merely good in itself: even as that which both shines and enlightens is more like the sun than that which only shines. Now a creature would be unable to act for the goodness of another creature, unless in creatures there were plurality and inequality: because the agent is distinct from and more noble1 than the patient. Therefore it was necessary that there be also different species of things, and consequently different degrees in things.

Again. A plurality of goods is better than one finite good, since they contain this and more besides. Now all goodness of the creature is finite, for it fails of God’s infinite goodness. Therefore the universe of creatures, if they are of many degrees, is more perfect than if things were of but one degree. But it becomes the sovereign good to make what is best. Therefore it was becoming that It should make many degrees of creatures.

Further. The goodness of the species surpasses the good of the individual, even as the formal exceeds that which is material. Hence multitude of species adds more to the goodness of the universe than multitude of individuals in one species. Therefore it concerns the perfection of the universe, that there be not only many individuals, but that there be also different species of things, and consequently different degrees in things.

Again. Whatever acts by intellect, reproduces the species of its intellect in the thing made; for thus an agent by art produces his like. Now God made the creature as an agent by intellect and not by a necessity of His nature, as we proved above.1 Therefore the species of God’s intellect is reproduced in the creature made by Him. But an intellect that understands many things is not sufficiently reproduced in one only. Since, then, the divine intellect understands many things, as was proved in the First Book,2 It reproduces itself more perfectly if It produces many creatures of all degrees than if It had produced one only.

Moreover. Supreme perfection should not be wanting to a work made by the supremely good workman. Now the good of order among diverse things is better than any one of those things that are ordered taken by itself: for it is formal in respect of each, as the perfection of the whole in respect of the parts. Therefore it was unbecoming that the good of order should be wanting to God’s work. Yet this good could not be if there were no diversity and inequality of creatures.

Accordingly, there is diversity and inequality in things created, not by chance,3 not as a result of a diversity of matter,4 not on account of certain causes5 or merits6 intervening, but from God’s own intention in that He willed to give the creature such perfection as it was possible for it to have.

Hence it is said (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good, after it had been said of each that they are good. For each one in its nature is good, but all together are very good, on account of the order of the universe, which is the ultimate and noblest perfection in things.

Chapter XLVI

that for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there should be some intellectual creatures

Such being the cause of diversity among things, it remains for us to inquire into the diverse things, as far as this concerns the truth of faith: for this was the third thing we proposed to do.1 We shall show, first, that as a result of the divine ordinance allotting to creatures that perfection which is best in keeping with their mode, certain creatures were made intellectual so as to occupy the highest point in the universe.

For then is an effect most perfect when it returns to its source; wherefore of all figures the circle, and of all movements the circular, are the most perfect, because in them a return is made to the beginning. Hence, in order that the universe of creatures may attain its ultimate perfection, creatures must return to their principle. Now each and every creature returns to its principle, in so far as it bears a likeness to its principle, in keeping with its being and nature, wherein it has a certain perfection: even as all effects are most perfect when they are most like their effective cause, as a house when it is most like art, and fire when it is most like its generator. Since then God’s intellect is the principle of the creature’s production, as we proved above,2 it was necessary for the creature’s perfection that some creatures should be intelligent.

Moreover. Second perfection in things adds to first perfection. Now, as the being and nature of a thing is considered as pertaining to its first perfection, so is operation considered as belonging to its second perfection. Wherefore, for the complete perfection of the universe, there should be some creatures which return to God not only in likeness of nature, but also by their operation. And this cannot be save by the act of the intellect and will: since not even God Himself has any other operation towards Himself than these. Therefore it was necessary for the greatest perfection of the universe that there should be some intellectual creatures.

Further. In order that creatures might render perfectly a representation of the divine goodness, it was necessary, as above stated,1 that things should not only be made good, but also that they should operate for the goodness of others. Now a thing is perfectly likened to another in its operation, when not only the action is of the same species, but also the mode of acting is the same. Hence it was necessary, for the highest perfection of things, that there should be some creatures who act in the same way as God. But it has been proved above2 that God acts by intellect and will. Therefore it was necessary for some creatures to have intelligence and will.

Moreover. Likeness of the effect to its efficient cause is considered on the part of the effect’s form which pre-exists in the agent: for an agent produces its like as regards the form whereby it acts. Now the form of the agent is received in the effect sometimes indeed according to the same mode of being as it has in the agent,—thus the form of the fire generated has the same mode of being as the form of the generating fire,—and sometimes, according to another mode of being,—thus the form of the house which exists intelligibly in the craftsman’s mind, is received in the house that is outside the mind, according to a material manner: and it is clear that the former likeness is more perfect than the latter. Now, the perfection of the universe of creatures consists in a likeness to God, just as the perfection of every effect consists in a likeness to its efficient cause. Therefore the highest perfection of the universe requires not only the second likeness of the creature to God, but also the first, as far as possible. But the form whereby God produces the creature, is an intelligible form in Him, since He is an agent by intellect, as proved above.3 Therefore the highest perfection of the universe requires that there should be some creatures in which the form of the divine intellect is reproduced according to an intelligible mode of being: and this means that there should be creatures of an intellectual nature.

Again. Nothing but His goodness moves God to the production of creatures, which goodness He wished to communicate to other things by way of likeness to Himself, as shown above.1 Now likeness to another is found in a thing in two ways: in one way, as regards natural being, as the likeness of fiery heat is in the thing heated by fire; in another way, as regards knowledge, as the likeness of fire is in sight or touch. In order, therefore, that the likeness of God might be in things in such ways as are possible, it behoved that the divine goodness should be communicated by likeness not only in being but also in knowledge. But an intellect alone is capable of knowing the divine goodness. Therefore it was necessary that there should be intellectual creatures.

Further. In all things becomingly ordered the relation of second to last imitates the order of first to all both second and last, though sometimes defectively. Now it has been proved2 that God comprises all creatures in Himself. And this is reproduced in corporeal creatures, although in a different way: for the higher body is even found to comprise and contain the lower, yet according to quantitative extension, whereas God contains all creatures in a simple manner, and not by extension of quantity. Hence, in order that the imitation of God in this way also might not be lacking to creatures, intellectual creatures were made that prise and contain the lower, yet according to quantitative extension, but simply by way of intelligibility: since what is understood is in the intelligent subject, and is grasped by his intellectual operation.

Chapter XLVII

that intellectual substances are capable of willing

Now these intellectual substances must needs be capable of willing.

For there is in all things a desire for good, since the good is what all desire, as philosophers1 teach. This desire, in things devoid of knowledge, is called natural appetite: thus a stone desires to be below. In those which have sensitive knowledge, it is called animal appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible. In those which understand, it is called intellectual or rational appetite, which is the will. Therefore intellectual substances have a will.

Again. That which is by another is reduced to that which is by itself as preceding it; wherefore according to the Philosopher (8 Phys.),2 things moved by another are reduced to the first self-movers: also, in syllogisms, the conclusions which are known from other things, are reduced to first principles which are self-evident. Now, in created substances, we find some which do not move themselves to act, but are moved by force of nature, for instance inanimate things, plants and dumb animals, for it is not in them to act or not to act. Therefore there must be a reduction to some first things which move themselves to action. But the first in created things are intellectual substances, as shown above.3 Therefore these substances move themselves to act. Now this is proper to the will, whereby a substance has the dominion of its action, because it is in it to act and not to act. Therefore created intellectual substances have a will.

Moreover. The principle of every operation is the form whereby a thing is actual, since every agent acts for as much as it is actual. Wherefore the mode of an operation consequent upon a form must be in accordance with that form. Hence a form that does not proceed from that which acts by that form, causes an operation over which the agent has no dominion: whereas if there be a form that proceeds from that which acts thereby, the agent will have dominion over the consequent operation. Now natural forms, consequent upon which are natural movements and operations, do not proceed from those things whose forms they are, but wholly from extrinsic agents, since by a natural form a thing has being in its own nature, and nothing can be cause of its own being. Wherefore things that are moved naturally do not move themselves: for a heavy body does not move itself downwards, but its generator which gave it its form.1 Again, in dumb animals, the forms, sensed or imagined, which result in movement, are not discovered by the dumb animals themselves, but are received by them from exterior sensibles which act on their senses, and judged of by their natural estimative faculty. Hence, though they are said after a fashion to move themselves, in so far as one part of them moves, and another is moved, yet the actual moving is not from themselves, but partly from external objects sensed, and partly from nature. For in so far as their appetite moves their members, they are said to move themselves, wherein they surpass inanimate beings and plants; and in so far as the act of their appetite is in them a necessary sequel to the forms received through their senses and the judgment of their natural estimative power, they are not the cause of their own movement. Hence they have not dominion over their own action. But the form understood, whereby the intellectual substance acts, proceeds from the intellect itself, being conceived and, after a fashion, thought out by it: as may be seen in the form of art, which the craftsman conceives and thinks out, and whereby he works. Accordingly, intellectual substances move themselves to act, as having dominion over their actions. Therefore they have a will.

Again. The active force should be proportionate to the patient, and motive power to the movable. Now in things possessed of knowledge the apprehensive power is related to the appetitive, as the motive power to the movable: since that which is apprehended by the sense, imagination, or intellect, moves the intellectual or animal appetite. But intellective apprehension is not confined to certain objects, but is of all things: wherefore the Philosopher says of the passive intellect (3 De Anima)1 that it is that whereby we become all things. Hence the appetite of an intellectual substance has a habitude to all things. Now it is proper to the will to have a habitude to all things: wherefore the Philosopher says (3 Ethic.)2 that it is of both the possible and the impossible. Therefore intellectual substances have a will.

Chapter XLVIII

that intellectual substances are of free-will in acting

From this it is clear that the aforesaid substances are of free-will3 in acting.

That they act by judgment is clear, since through their intellective knowledge they judge of things to be done. And they must needs have freedom if, as proved,4 they have dominion over their action. Therefore the aforesaid substances are of free-will in acting.

Again. The free is that which is its own cause.5 Wherefore that which is not the cause of its own acting is not free in acting. Now whatever things are not moved, nor act except they be moved by others, are not a cause of their own acting. Therefore self-movers alone have liberty in acting. These alone act by judgment: because the self-mover is divided into mover and moved; and the mover is the appetite moved by intellect, imagination, or sense, to which faculties judgment belongs. Of these then those alone judge freely which in judging move themselves. Now, no judging power moves itself to judge unless it reflect on its own action: for if it moves itself to judge it must needs know its own judgment: and this belongs to the intellect alone. Hence irrational animals have, in a sense, free movement or action, but not free judgment: whereas inanimate beings, which are moved only by others, have not even free action or movement; while intellectual beings have freedom not only of action, but also of judgment, and this is to have free-will.

Further. The apprehended form is a moving principle according as it is apprehended under the aspect of good or fittingness: because the external action in self-movers comes from the judgment whereby it is judged that something is good or fitting through the aforesaid form. Accordingly, if he who judges moves himself to judge, he must needs, by some higher form, move himself to judge. And this form can be no other than the idea itself of good or fittingness, whereby one judges of any determinate good or fitting thing. Wherefore those alone move themselves to judge who apprehend the common notion of goodness or fittingness. And these are intellectual beings alone. Therefore intellectual beings alone move themselves not only to act, but also to judge. Therefore they alone are free in judging, and this is to have free-will.

Moreover. Movement and action do not follow from a universal concept save through the medium of a particular apprehension: because movement and action are about particular things. Now the intellect is naturally apprehensive of universals. Wherefore, in order that movement and action of any kind follow from the apprehension of the intellect, it is necessary for the universal concept of the intellect to be applied to particulars. But the universal contains many particulars potentially. Hence application of the intellectual concept may be made to many and divers things. Consequently the judgment of the intellect about matters of action is not determined to one thing only. Therefore all intellectual beings have free-will.

Further. Certain things lack liberty of judgment, either because they have no judgment at all, as plants and stones; or because they have a judgment determined by nature to one thing, as irrational animals, for the sheep by its natural estimate judges the wolf to be harmful to it, and as a result of this judgment flies from the wolf; and the same applies to others. Whatever beings therefore have a judgment that is not determined to one thing by nature, must needs have free-will. Now such are all intellectual beings. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself in general. Wherefore, since the intellect moves the will by the form apprehended; and since in all things mover and moved must needs be mutually proportionate; the will of an intellectual substance will not be determined by nature otherwise than to the good in general. Hence, whatever be offered to it under the aspect of good, it is possible for the will to be inclined thereto, since there is no natural determination to the contrary to prevent it. Therefore in all intellectual beings the will’s act resulting from the judgments of the intellect is free: and this is to have free-will which is defined as the free judgment of reason.

Chapter XLIX

that the intellectual substance is not a body

From the foregoing it is shown that no intellectual substance is a body.

For no body is found to contain anything except by quantitative commensuration: wherefore also if a thing contain a whole thing in the whole of itself, each part will contain a part, the greater part a greater part, and the lesser part a lesser part. But an intellect does not contain a thing understood by quantitative commensuration: because by its whole self it understands and comprehends both whole and part, things both great and small in quantity. Therefore no intelligent substance is a body.

Moreover. No body can receive the substantial form of another body, unless it lose its own form by corruption. But an intellect is not corrupted, but rather is it perfected by receiving the forms of all bodies; since it is perfected by understanding, and understands by having in itself the forms of things understood. Therefore no intellectual substance is a body.

Further. The principle of distinction between individuals of the same species is the division of matter in respect of quantity: because the form of this fire differs not from the form of that fire, except by the fact of its being in different parts into which matter is divided; nor is this otherwise than by division of quantity, without which substance is indivisible. Now that which is received into a body, is received into it according to quantitative division. Therefore a form is not received into a body, except as individualized. If, therefore, an intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individualized. But the intellect understands things by their forms which it has at its disposal. Consequently the intellect would not understand universals but only particulars. Now this is clearly false. Therefore no intellect is a body.

Again. Nothing acts except in accordance with its species, because the form is the principle of action in everything. If, therefore, an intellect be a body, its action will not transcend the order of bodies. Wherefore it would understand nothing but bodies. Now this is clearly false: since we understand many things that are not bodies. Therefore the intellect is not a body.

Again. If an intelligent substance is a body, it is either finite or infinite. Now, it is impossible for a body to be infinite actually, as is proved in the Physics.1 Therefore it is a finite body, if we suppose it to be a body at all. But this is impossible, since in no body can there be infinite power, as we have proved above.2 Now the power of the intellect in understanding is in a manner infinite, for by adding it understands species of numbers to infinitude, and likewise species of figures and proportions. Moreover it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite in its compass, since it contains individuals which are potentially infinite. Therefore the intellect is not a body.

Moreover. It is impossible for two bodies to contain one another, since the container exceeds the contained. Yet two intellects contain and comprehend one another, when one understands the other. Therefore the intellect is not a body.

Again. No body’s action reflects on the agent: for it is proved in the Physics,1 that no body is moved by itself except in respect of a part, so that, namely, one of its parts be mover and the other moved. Now the intellect by its action reflects on itself, for it understands itself not only as to a part, but as to the whole. Therefore it is not a body.

Again. A body’s action is not the object of that body’s action, nor is its movement the object of its movement, as proved in the Physics.2 But the action of the intellect is the object of its action: for just as the intellect understands a thing, so does it understand that it understands, and so on indefinitely. Therefore an intellectual substance is not a body.

Hence it is that Holy Writ calls intellectual substances spirits: in which way it is wont to name God Who is incorporeal, according to Jo. 4:24, God is a spirit. And it is said (Wis. 7:22, 23): For in her, namely Divine Wisdom, is the spirit of understanding, … containing all intelligible spirits.3

Hereby is excluded the error of the early natural philosophers, who held that there was none but corporeal substance: wherefore they said that even the soul is a body, either fire, air, or water, or something of the kind.4 Which opinion some have endeavoured to introduce into the Christian faith, by saying that the soul is the effigy of a body, like a body outwardly imitated.

Chapter L

that intellectual substances are immaterial

It follows from this that intellectual substances are immaterial. For everything composed of matter and form is a body: since matter cannot receive various forms except in respect of its various parts. And this diversity of parts cannot be in matter except inasmuch as common matter is divided into several by the dimensions existing in matter: for without quantity substance is indivisible. Now it has been proved1 that an intelligent substance is a body. It follows therefore that it is not composed of matter and form.

Moreover. Just as man does not exist apart from this man, so matter exists not apart from this matter. Accordingly, whatever subsistent thing is composed of matter and form, is composed of individual form and matter. Now the intellect cannot be composed of individual matter and form. For the species of things understood become actually intelligible through being abstracted from individual matter. And according as they are actually intelligible, they become one with the intellect.2 Therefore the intellect also must be without individual matter. Therefore the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form.

Further. The action of anything composed of matter and form, belongs not to the form alone, nor to the matter alone, but to the composite: because to act belongs to that which has being, and being belongs to the composite through its form: wherefore the composite also acts through its form. Accordingly, if the intelligent substance be composed of matter and form, to understand will be the act of the composite. But action terminates in a thing like the agent, wherefore the composite in generating, produces not a form but a composite. If, therefore, to understand be an action of the composite, it would understand neither form nor matter, but only the composite. Therefore the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form.

Again. The forms of sensible things have a more perfect being in the intellect than in sensible things; since they are more simple and extend to more objects: for by the one intelligible form of man, the intellect knows all men. Now a form existing perfectly in matter makes a thing to be actually such, for instance to be fire or to be coloured: and if it does not make a thing to be actually such, it is in that thing imperfectly, for instance the form of heat in the air that carries it, and the power of the first agent in its instrument. Consequently were the intellect composed of matter and form, the forms of the things understood would make the intellect to be actually of the same nature as that which is understood. And this leads to the error of Empedocles, who said that the soul knows fire by fire, and earth by earth,1 and so on. But this is clearly unreasonable. Therefore the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form.

Further. Whatever is in something is therein according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore if the intellect be composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be in the intellect materially, just as they are outside the mind. Consequently, just as outside the mind they are not actually intelligible, neither would they be when they are in the intellect.

Again. Forms of contraries, according to the being which they have in matter, are contrary: hence they exclude one another. But according as they are in the intellect they are not contrary: in fact one contrary is the intelligible ratio of the other, since one is understood through the other. Consequently they have not a material being in the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not composed of matter and form.

Further. Matter does not receive a fresh form except by movement or change. But the intellect is not moved through receiving forms; rather is it perfected, and is at rest, while understanding, whereas its understanding is hindered by movement.1 Consequently forms are not received by the intellect as by matter or a material thing. Wherefore it is clear that intelligent substances are immaterial as well as incorporeal.

Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.): On account of the rays of the divine goodness all intellectual substances are subsistent, and are known to be both incorporeal and immaterial.

Chapter LI

that the intellectual substance is not a material form

From the same premisses it may be shown that intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and do not exist in matter as though their being depended on matter.

Because forms dependent on matter as regards their being properly speaking have not being themselves, but the composites through them. Hence if intellectual substances were forms of this kind, it would follow that they have material being, just as they would if they were composed of matter and form.

Again. Forms that subsist not of themselves cannot act of themselves, but the composites act through them. If therefore intellectual natures were forms of this kind, it would follow that they do not themselves understand, but the things composed of them and matter. Consequently an intelligent being would be composed of matter and form. And this has been proved2 to be impossible.

Moreover. If the intellect were a form in matter and not self-subsistent, it would follow that what is received into the intellect is received into matter: because such forms as have their being tied to matter, do not receive anything without its being received into matter. Since, then, the reception of forms into the intellect is not a reception of forms into matter, it is impossible that the intellect be a material form.

Further. To say that the intellect is a non-subsistent form and buried in matter, is the same in reality as to say that the intellect is composed of matter and form, and the difference is merely nominal: for in the former case the intellect will be indicated as the form of the composite, while in the latter, the intellect denotes the composite itself. Wherefore if it is false that the intellect be composed of matter and form,1 it will be false that it is a non-subsistent and material form.

Chapter LII

that in created intellectual substances there is a difference between being and what is

Now although intellectual substances are not corporeal, nor composed of matter and form, nor existing in matter as material forms, we must not think that they equal the divine simplicity. For a certain composition is to be found in them, forasmuch as in them being is not the same as what is.

For if being is subsistent, nothing besides being is added thereto. Because even in those things whose being is not subsistent, that which is in an existing thing beside its being, is indeed united to the existing thing, but it is not one with its being, except accidentally, in so far as there is one subject having being and that which is beside being: thus it is clear that in Socrates, beside his substantial being, there is white, which is distinct from his substantial being, since to be Socrates and to be white are not the same save accidentally. Consequently if being is not in a subject, there will remain no way in which that which is beside being can be united to it. Now being, as being, cannot be diverse, but it can be differentiated by something beside being: thus the being of a stone is other than the being of a man. Hence that which is subsistent being can be one only. Now it was shown above2 that God is His own subsistent being: wherefore nothing beside Him can be its own being. Therefore in every substance beside Him, the substance itself must needs be distinct from its being.

Moreover. A common nature, if considered in the abstract, can only be one: although those that have that nature may be found to be many. For if the nature of animal subsisted as separate by itself, it would not have the things belonging to a man or to an ox. Now if we remove the differences which constitute a species, there remains the nature of the genus without division, since the same differences constitute the species, which divide the genus. Accordingly, if being itself is common like a genus, a separate self-subsistent being can only be one. If, however, it be not divided by differences, as a genus is, but, as it is in truth, by the fact that it is the being of this or that, it is yet more evident that what exists of itself can only be one. It follows, therefore, since God is subsistent being, that nothing beside Him is its own being.

Again. There cannot possibly be a twofold being absolutely infinite, for being that is absolutely infinite contains every perfection of being, so that if two things had such an infinity, there would be nothing in which they differed. Now subsistent being must needs be infinite, because it is not limited by any recipient. Therefore there cannot be any subsistent being outside the first.

Again. If there is a self-subsistent being, nothing is applicable to it except that which belongs to a being as being: since what is said of a thing, not as such, is not applicable thereto except accidentally, by reason of the subject: so that if we suppose it to be separated from its subject, it is nowise applicable to it. Now to be caused by another is not applicable to a being, as being, otherwise every being would be caused by another, and consequently we should have to proceed to infinity in causes, which is impossible, as shown above.1 Therefore that being which is subsistent, must needs not be caused. Therefore no caused being is its own being.

Moreover. The substance of a thing appertains to it of itself and not by another: wherefore to be actually lightsome is not of the air’s substance, since it comes to it from something else. Now every created thing has being from another, else it would not be caused. Therefore in no created being is its being the same as its substance.

Again. Since every agent acts in so far as it is actual, it belongs to the first agent which is most perfect to be actual in the most perfect way. Now a thing is the more perfectly actual, the more its actuality is posterior in the order of generation, for actuality is posterior in time to the potentiality in the one and same subject which passes from potentiality to actuality. Also act itself is more perfectly actual than that which has act, for the latter is actual on account of the former. Accordingly, these premisses being supposed, it is clear from what has been already proved1 that God alone is the first agent. Therefore it belongs to Him alone to be actual in the most perfect way, to be, that is, the most perfect act. Now this is being, in which generation and all movement terminates: since every form and act is in potentiality before it acquires being. Therefore it belongs to God alone to be His own being, just as it belongs to Him alone to be the first agent.

Moreover. Being itself belongs to the first agent in respect of His proper nature: for God’s being is His substance, as we have proved above.2 Now that which belongs to a thing in respect of its proper nature, does not belong to others except by way of participation; as heat to other bodies than fire. Wherefore being itself belongs to all others except the first agent by a kind of participation. But that which belongs to a thing by participation is not its substance. Therefore it is impossible that the substance of a thing other than the first agent, should be being itself.

Hence (Exod. 3:14) the name proper to God is stated to be who is, because it is proper to Him alone that His substance is not distinct from His being.

Chapter LIII

that in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality

From the foregoing it is evident that in created intellectual substances there is composition of act and potentiality.

For in whatever thing we find two, of which one is the complement of the other, the ratio of one of them to the other is as the ratio of potentiality to act: since nothing is completed save by its proper act. Now in the created intellectual substance we find two things, namely its substance and its being, which is not its very substance, as we have proved.1 Now this very being is the complement of the existing substance, since a thing is actual by the fact that it has being. It follows therefore that in each of the aforesaid substances there is composition of act and potentiality.

Moreover. That which is received by a thing from an agent, must be an act: since it belongs to an agent to make a thing actual. Now it was proved above2 that all other substances have being from the first agent: and it is through having being from another that the substances thus caused exist. Consequently being is in the substances caused as an act of theirs. But that in which there is act, is a potentiality: since act as such refers to potentiality. Therefore in every created substance there is potentiality and act.

Again. Whatsoever participates a thing is compared to the thing participated as potentiality to act: since by that which is participated the participator is made to be actually such. Now it was shown above3 that God alone is essentially being, and all other things participate being. Therefore every created substance is compared to its being as potentiality to act.

Further. The likeness of a thing to its efficient cause results from act: because the agent produces its like in so far as it is in act. Now the likeness of every created substance to God is by being itself, as shown above.1 Therefore being is compared to all created substances as their act. Whence it follows that in every created substance there is composition of act and potentiality.

Chapter LIV

that composition of substance and being is not the same as composition of matter and form

Now composition of matter and form is not of the same nature as composition of substance and being, although both result from potentiality and act.

First, because matter is not the very substance of a thing, else it would follow that all forms are accidental, as the early natural philosophers maintained; but matter is part of the substance.

Secondly, because being itself is the proper act, not of matter, but of the whole substance: for being is the act of that whereof we can say that it is. Now being is said, not of matter but of the whole. Therefore we cannot say of matter that it is, but the substance itself is that which is.

Thirdly, because neither is the form being itself, but they are related as things in an order: because form is compared to being as light to enlightening, or whiteness to being white.

Also, because being itself is compared as act even to the very form. For in things composed of matter and form, the form is said to be the principle of being, for the reason that it is the complement of substance, whose act being is: even as transparency is to the air the principle of being lightsome, in that it makes the air the proper subject of light.

Wherefore in things composed of matter and form, neither matter nor form, nor even being itself, can be described as that which is. Yet the form can be described as that whereby it is, forasmuch as it is the principle of being: but the whole substance is what is; and being is that whereby the substance is called a being.

But in intellectual substances, which are not composed of matter and form, as shown above,1 and wherein the form itself is a subsistent substance, the form is what is, and being is the act whereby it is.

Consequently in them there is but one composition of act and potentiality, a composition namely of substance and being, which by some is said to be of what is and being, or of what is and whereby it is.

On the other hand in things composed of matter and form there is a twofold composition of act and potentiality: the first, of the substance itself which is composed of matter and form; the second, of the already composite substance, and being, which composition can also be said to be of what is and being, or of what is and whereby it is.

It is therefore evident that composition of act and potentiality covers more ground than composition of form and matter. Wherefore matter and form divide a natural substance, while potentiality and act divide being in general. For this reason whatever is consequent upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to created substances whether material or immaterial; for instance to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfected. Whereas whatsoever things are proper to matter and form, as such, for instance to be generated and to be corrupted and so forth, are proper to material substances, and are nowise applicable to created immaterial substances.

Chapter LV

that intellectual substances are incorruptible

From the foregoing it is clearly shown that every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

For all corruption consists in separation of form from matter: simple corruption, from separation of the substantial form, relative corruption from separation of an accidental form. Because so long as the form remains, the thing must exist, since by the form the substance is made the proper recipient of being. But where there is not composition of form and matter, there can be no separation of the same: wherefore neither can there be corruption. Now it has been proved1 that no intellectual substance is composed of matter and form. Therefore no intellectual substance is corruptible.

Moreover. That which belongs to a thing per se, is necessarily in it always and inseparably: thus roundness is per se in a circle and accidentally in a coin, wherefore it is possible for a coin to be made not round, whereas it is impossible for a circle not to be round. Now, being is a per se consequence of form, for per se means according as it is such;2 and a thing has being according as it has a form. Hence substances that are not themselves forms, can be deprived of being, in so far as they lose a form, just as a coin is deprived of roundness according as it ceases to be round. Whereas substances that are themselves forms can never be deprived of being: thus if a substance were a circle, it could never be made not round. Now, it was shown above3 that intellectual substances are themselves subsistent forms, therefore they cannot possibly cease to exist: and consequently they are incorruptible.

Further. In every corruption potentiality remains after the removal of act: for a thing is not corrupted into non-being, just as neither is a thing generated from absolute non-being. But in intellectual substances, as we have proved,1 the act is being itself, while the substance is by way of potentiality. Consequently if an intellectual substance were corrupted, it will remain after its corruption: which is utterly impossible. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Again. In every thing that is corrupted there must be potentiality to non-being. Wherefore if there be a thing wherein there is not potentiality to non-being, such a thing is not corruptible. Now there is no potentiality to non-being in an intellectual substance. For it is clear from what we have said2 that a complete substance is the proper recipient of being. But the proper recipient of an act is compared as potentiality to that act in such a way that it is nowise in potentiality to the opposite: thus fire is compared to heat in such a way that it is nowise in potentiality to cold. Consequently neither in corruptible substances is there potentiality to non-being in the complete substance except by reason of the matter. But there is no matter in intellectual substances, for they are complete simple substances.3 Hence there is no potentiality to non-being in them. Therefore they are incorruptible.

Further. In whatsoever things there is composition of potentiality and act, that which holds the place of first potentiality, or of first subject, is incorruptible: wherefore even in corruptible substances primary matter is incorruptible. Now in intellectual substances that which holds the place of first potentiality and subject, is their complete substance. Therefore their substance is itself incorruptible. But nothing is corruptible except through its substance being corruptible. Therefore all intellectual natures are corruptible.

Moreover. Whatsoever is corrupted, is corrupted either per se or accidentally. But intellectual substances cannot be corrupted per se. Because all corruption is by a contrary. For an agent, since it acts according as it is an actual being, always brings something into actual being by its action. Consequently, if by this same actual being, something is corrupted through ceasing from actual being, this must result from their mutual contrariety, since contraries are things which exclude one another.1 Hence whatsoever is corrupted per se must either have a contrary, or be composed of contraries. But neither of these can be said of intellectual substances. A sign of this is that in the intellect things even of contrary nature cease to be contraries: for white and black are not contraries in the intellect, since they do not exclude one another, in fact rather do they follow from one another, seeing that by understanding the one we understand the other. Therefore intellectual substances are not corruptible per se. Moreover, neither are they corrupted accidentally. For thus accidents and non-subsistent forms are corrupted. Now it was shown above2 that intellectual substances are subsistent. Therefore they are altogether incorruptible.

Further. Corruption is a kind of change: and change must needs be the term of a movement, as is proved in the Physics.3 Consequently whatsoever is corrupted must be moved. Now it was proved in the Physics4 that whatsoever is moved is a body. Hence it follows that whatsoever is corrupted is moved,—if it be corrupted per se,—or else that it is a form or a bodily force dependent on a body, if it be corrupted accidentally. But intellectual substances are neither bodies, nor forces or forms dependent on a body.5 Therefore they are not corrupted either per se or accidentally: and consequently they are altogether incorruptible.

Again. Whatsoever is corrupted, is corrupted through being passive to something, since to be corrupted is itself to be passive. Now no intellectual substance can be passive with such a passion as leads to corruption. Because to be passive is to be receptive: and that which is received into an intellectual substance, must needs be received according to the mode thereof, namely intelligibly. Now that which is thus received into an intellectual substance, perfects the intellectual substance and does not corrupt it, since the intelligible is the perfection of the intelligent. Therefore an intelligent substance is incorruptible.

Further. Just as the sensible is the object of sense, so the intelligible is the object of the intellect. But the sense is not corrupted by a proper corruption except through being excelled by its object, for instance the sight by very brilliant objects, and the hearing by very loud sounds, and so on. And I say by proper corruption: because the sense is corrupted also accidentally on account of its subject being corrupted. This kind of corruption, however, cannot happen to the intellect, since it is not the act of any body, as depending on the body, as we have proved above.1 And it is clear that it is not corrupted through being excelled by its object, because he who understands very intelligible things, understands things less intelligible not less but more.2 Therefore the intellect is nowise corruptible.

Moreover. The intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect: hence the intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one.3 Accordingly, whatever is applicable to the intelligible, as such, must be applicable to the intellect, as such, since perfection and perfectible belong to the one genus. Now the intelligible, as such, is necessary and incorruptible, for necessary things are perfectly knowable by the intellect: whereas contingent things, as such, are only deficiently knowable, because about them we have not science but opinion, so that the intellect has science about corruptibles in so far as they are incorruptible, that is, according as they are universal. Therefore it follows that the intellect is incorruptible.

Again. A thing is perfected according to the mode of its substance. Consequently, we can gather the mode of a thing’s substance from the mode of its perfection. Now the intellect is not perfected by movement, but by the fact of its being outside movement: for we are perfected, as regards the intellective soul, by science and prudence, when the movement both of the body and of the soul’s passions are subdued, as the Philosopher states (7 Phys.).1 Hence the mode of an intelligent substance is that its being is superior to movement, and consequently superior to time: whereas the being of every corruptible thing is subject to movement and time. Therefore it is impossible that an intelligent substance be corruptible.

Further. It is impossible for a natural desire to be vain: since nature does nothing vainly.2 Now every intelligent being naturally desires everlasting being, and to be everlastingly not merely in its species, but also in the individual. This is proved as follows. The natural appetite, in some, results from apprehension: thus the wolf naturally desires the slaying of the animals on which it feeds, and man naturally desires happiness. In some it results without apprehension from the sole inclination of their natural principles, which inclination is, in some, called the natural appetite; thus a heavy body desires to be below. In both ways things have a natural desire for being: a sign of which is that not only things devoid of knowledge resist corruptives according to the power of their natural principles, but also those which have knowledge resist the same according to the mode of their knowledge. Consequently those things lacking knowledge in whose principles there is a power of perpetuating their being, so that they remain ever the same as to individual identity, naturally desire to be perpetuated even in their individual identity: whereas those whose principles contain no such power, but only the power of perpetuating their being in the same species, desire also to be perpetuated in this way. Hence we must observe this same difference in those things which have a desire of being, together with knowledge, so that, to wit, those who have no knowledge of being except as now, desire to be as now, but not to be always, because they do not apprehend perpetual being. Yet they desire perpetuity of the species, albeit without knowledge, because the generative power, which conduces to this effect, is a preamble and not a subject of knowledge. Wherefore those things which know and apprehend perpetual being, desire it with the natural desire. Now this applies to all intelligent substances. Therefore all intelligent substances, by their natural appetite, desire to be always: and consequently it is impossible that they cease to be.

Further. Whatsoever things begin to be, and cease, have both through the same potentiality: because the same potentiality regards being and not being. Now intelligent substances could not begin to be except through the potentiality of the first agent: since they are not made out of matter that could exist before them, as we have proved.1 Consequently there is no potentiality in respect of their not being, except in the first agent, inasmuch as He is able not to pour being into them. But nothing can be said to be corruptible by reason of this potentiality alone:—both because things are said to be necessary and contingent according to a potentiality that is in them, and not according to God’s potentiality, as we proved above:2—and because God, the Author of nature, does not take from things that which is proper to their respective natures; and it was shown above3 that perpetual being is a property of intellectual natures, wherefore God will not take this from them. Therefore intellectual substances are in every way incorruptible.

Hence in the psalm,4 Praise ye the Lord from the heavens, after mentioning together the angels and heavenly bodies, the text continues:5 He hath established them for ever and for ages of ages, thus designating the perpetuity of the aforesaid.

Dionysius also (Div. Nom. iv.) says that on account of the rays of the divine goodness the intelligible and intellectual substances subsist, are, and live: and their life never fails nor diminishes, for they are free from the universal corruption, knowing neither generation nor death, and they are raised above restless and ever-flowing change.

Chapter LVI

in what way it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body

Now since it has been shown1 that an intellectual substance is neither a body, nor a force dependent on a body, it remains for us to inquire whether an intellectual substance can be united to the body.

In the first place it is clear that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of a mixture. For things that are mixed together must needs be altered in relation to one another. And this does not happen except in those things whose matter is the same, and which can be active and passive in relation to one another.2 But intellectual substances have no matter in common with corporeal substances, since they are immaterial, as we have proved above.3 Therefore they cannot be mixed with bodies.

Further. Things that are mixed, remain not actually but only virtually, after the mixture is made: for were they to remain actually it would not be a mixture but only an accumulation, wherefore a body formed by a mixture of elements is no one of them.4 But this cannot possibly happen to intellectual substances, since they are incorruptible, as we have proved above.5

Therefore an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of a mixture.

It is likewise evident that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of contact properly so called. For contact is only between bodies, since things are in contact when they come together at their extremes,6 as the points, lines, or superficies which are the extremes of bodies. Therefore it is not possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body by way of contact.

Hence it follows that neither by continuity, nor fellowship or connecting tie is it possible for one thing to result from an intellectual substance with the body. For none of these is possible without contact.

And yet there is a kind of contact whereby it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to a body. For natural bodies are mutually alterative when in contact with one another: so that they are united to one another not only as to their quantitative extremes, but also in like manner to qualities or forms, when an alterative impresses its like on the thing altered. And although, if we consider only the quantitative extremes, there is need in all cases for contact to be mutual, nevertheless if we consider action and passion, we shall find certain things to be touching only, and others only touched: since the heavenly bodies touch the elemental bodies in this way, in so far as they alter them; and yet they are not touched by them, since they do not suffer from them. Accordingly if there be any agents which are not in contact by their quantitative extremes, they will be said nevertheless to touch, in so far as they act, in which sense we say that a person who makes us sorrowful touches us. Wherefore it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to a body by contact, by touching it in this way. For intellectual substances act on bodies and move them, since they are immaterial and more actual.

This contact however is not quantitative but virtual. Wherefore this contact differs from bodily contact in three ways. First, because by this contact the indivisible can touch the divisible. Now this cannot happen in bodily contact, because nothing but what is indivisible can be touched by a point. Whereas an intellectual substance, although indivisible, can touch a divisible quantity, in so far as it acts upon it. For a point is indivisible in one way, and an intellectual substance in another. A point is indivisible as being the term of a quantity, wherefore it has a determined position in a continuous quantity, beyond which it cannot stretch. But an intellectual substance is indivisible, as being outside the genus of quantity: so that no quantitative indivisible is assigned with which it can come into contact. Secondly, because quantitative contact is only in respect of extremes, whereas virtual contact regards the whole thing touched. For it is touched inasmuch as it suffers and is moved. Now this is according as it is in potentiality: and potentiality regards the whole and not the extremes of the whole. Wherefore the whole is touched. Whence follows the third difference. Because in quantitative contact which takes place in regard to the extremes, that which touches must be outside that which is touched, and cannot pierce it, since it is hindered by it. Whereas virtual contact, which applies to intellectual substances, since it reaches inwards, makes the touching substance to be within the thing touched, and to penetrate it without hindrance.

Accordingly an intellectual substance can be united to a body by virtual contact. Now things united by contact of this kind are not one simply. For they are one in action and passion, which is not to be one simply. For one is predicated in the same way as being. But to be an agent does not signify being simply. Consequently neither is to be one in action to be one simply.

Now one simply is taken in three ways: either as being indivisible, or as being continuous, or as being logically one. But the one which is indivisible cannot result from an intellectual substance and a body: for the one of this latter kind must needs be composed of the two. Nor again can the one that is continuous, because the parts of the continuous are parts of quantity. It remains therefore for us to inquire whether from an intellectual substance and a body can be formed the one which is one logically.

Now from two things that stay there does not result something logically one, except from substantial form and matter: since from subject and accident there does not result one logically, for the idea of man is not the same as the idea of white. Hence it remains for us to inquire whether an intellectual substance can be the substantial form of a body. And to those who consider the question reasonably it would seem that this is impossible.1

For from two actually existing substances there cannot be made something one: because the act of a thing is that whereby it is distinguished from another. Now an intellectual substance is an actually existing substance, as is clear from what has been said:2 and so likewise is a body. Therefore, seemingly, something one cannot be made from an intellectual substance and a body.

Again. Form and matter are contained in the same genus: since every genus is divided into act and potentiality. But intellectual substance and body are of different genera. Therefore it does not seem possible that one be the form of the other.

Moreover. Everything whose being is in matter must be material. Now if an intellectual substance is the form of a body, its being must be in corporeal matter, since the being of the form is not beside the being of the matter. Hence it will follow that an intellectual substance is not immaterial, as above it was proved to be.3

Again. That which has its being in a body cannot possibly be separated from that body. Now it is proved by philosophers that the intellect is separate from the body, and that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. Therefore an intellectual substance is not the form of a body, for thus its being would be in a body.

Further. That which has its being in common with a body, must have its operation in common with a body, because a thing acts inasmuch as it is a being: nor can the active power of a thing surpass its essence, since power results from the essential principles. But if an intellectual substance be the form of a body, its being must be common to it and the body: because from form and matter there results one thing simply, that exists by one being. Consequently an intellectual substance will have its operation in common with the body, and its power will be a power in a body: which has been proved to be impossible.4

Chapter LVII

the opinion of plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body

Moved by these and like reasons some have asserted that no intellectual substance can be the form of a body. But since man’s very nature seemed to controvert this opinion, in that he appears to be composed of intellectual soul and body, they devised certain solutions so as to save the nature of man.

Accordingly, Plato and his school held that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as form to matter, but only as mover to movable, for he said that the soul is in the body as a sailor in a boat.1 In this way the union of soul and body would only be by virtual contact, of which we have spoken above.2 But this would seem inadmissible. For according to the contact in question, there does not result one thing simply, as we have proved:3 whereas from the union of soul and body there results a man. It follows then that a man is not one simply, and neither consequently a being simply, but accidentally.

In order to avoid this Plato said that a man is not a thing composed of soul and body, but that the soul itself using a body4 is a man: thus Peter is not a thing composed of man and clothes, but a man using clothes.

But this is shown to be impossible. For animal and man are sensible and natural things. But this would not be the case if the body and its parts were not of the essence of man and animal, and the soul were the whole essence of both, as the aforesaid opinion holds: for the soul is neither a sensible nor a material thing. Consequently it is impossible for man and animal to be a soul using a body, and not a thing composed of body and soul.

Again. It is impossible that there be one operation of things diverse in being. And in speaking of an operation being one, I refer not to that in which the action terminates, but to the manner in which it proceeds from the agent:—for many persons rowing one boat make one action on the part of the thing done, which is one, but on the part of the rowers there are many actions, for there are many strokes of the oar,—because, since action is consequent upon form and power, it follows that things differing in forms and powers differ in action. Now, though the soul has a proper operation, wherein the body has no share, namely intelligence, there are nevertheless certain operations common to it and the body, such as fear, anger, sensation, and so forth; for these happen by reason of a certain transmutation in a determinate part of the body, which proves that they are operations of the soul and body together. Therefore from the soul and body there must result one thing, and they have not each a distinct being.

According to the opinion of Plato this argument may be rebutted. For it is not impossible for mover and moved, though different in being, to have the same act: because the same act belongs to the mover as wherefrom it is, and to the moved as wherein it is.1 Wherefore Plato held that the aforesaid operations are common to the soul and body, so that, to wit, they are the soul’s as mover, and the body’s as moved.

But this cannot be. For as the Philosopher proves in 2 De Anima,2 sensation results from our being moved by exterior sensibles. Wherefore a man cannot sense without an exterior sensible, just as a thing cannot be moved without a mover. Consequently the organ of sense is moved and passive in sensing, but this is owing to the external sensible. And that whereby it is passive is the sense: which is proved by the fact that things devoid of sense are not passive to sensibles by the same kind of passion. Therefore sense is the passive power of the organ. Consequently the sensitive soul is not as mover and agent in sensing, but as that whereby the patient is passive. And this cannot have a distinct being from the patient. Therefore the sensitive soul has not a distinct being from the animate body.

Further. Although movement is the common act of mover and moved, yet it is one operation to cause movement and another to receive movement; hence we have two predicaments, action and passion.1 Accordingly, if in sensing the sensitive soul is in the position of agent, and the body in that of patient, the operation of the soul will be other than the operation of the body. Consequently the sensitive soul will have an operation, proper to it: and therefore it will have its proper subsistence. Hence when the body is destroyed it will not cease to exist. Therefore sensitive souls even of irrational animals will be immortal: which seems improbable. And yet it is not out of keeping with Plato’s opinion. But there will be a place for inquiring into this further on.2

Moreover. The movable does not derive its species from its mover. Consequently if the soul is not united to the body except as mover to movable, the body and its parts do not take their species from the soul. Wherefore at the soul’s departure, the body and its parts will remain of the same species. Yet this is clearly false: for flesh, bone, hands, and like parts, after the soul’s departure, are so called only equivocally,3 since none of these parts retains its proper operation that results from the species. Therefore the soul is not united to the body merely as mover to movable, or as man to his clothes.

Further. The movable has not being through its mover, but only movement. Consequently if the soul be united to the body merely as its mover, the body will indeed be moved by the soul, but will not have being through it. But in the living thing to live is to be.4 Therefore the body would not live through the soul.

Again. The movable is neither generated through the mover’s application to it nor corrupted by being separated from it, since the movable depends not on the mover for its being, but only in the point of being moved. If then the soul be united to the body merely as its mover, it will follow that neither in the union of soul and body will there be generation, nor corruption in their separation. And thus death which consists in the separation of soul and body will not be the corruption of an animal: which is clearly false.

Further. Every self-mover is such that it is in it to be moved and not to be moved, to move and not to move.1 Now the soul, according to Plato’s opinion, moves the body as a self-mover.2 Consequently it is in the soul’s power to move the body and not to move it. Wherefore if it be united to it merely as mover to movable, it will be in the soul’s power to be separated from the body at will, and to be reunited to it at will: which is clearly false.

That the soul is united to the body as its proper form, is proved thus. That whereby a thing from being potentially is made an actual being, is its form and act. Now the body is made by the soul an actual being from existing potentially: since to live is the being of a living thing.3 But the seed before animation is only a living thing in potentiality, and is made an actually living thing by the soul. Therefore the soul is the form of the animated body.

Moreover. Since both being and operation belong neither to the form alone, nor to the matter alone, but to the composite, being and action are ascribed to two things, one of which is to the other as form to matter; for we say that a man is healthy in body and in health, and that he is knowing in knowledge and in his soul, wherein knowledge is a form of the soul knowing, and health of the healthy body. Now to live and to sense are ascribed to both soul and body: for we are said to live and sense both in soul and body: but by the soul as by the principle of life and sensation. Therefore the soul is the form of the body.

Further. The whole sensitive soul has to the whole body the same relation as part to part. Now part is to part in such a way that it is its form and act, for sight is the form and act of the eye. Therefore the soul is the form and act of the body.

Chapter LVIII

that the nutritive, sensitive, and intellective faculties in man are not three souls

But the foregoing arguments,1 according to the opinion of Plato, can be answered, so far as the matter in hand is concerned. For Plato2 holds that in us the same soul is not intellective, nutritive, and sensitive. Hence, even if the sensitive soul were the form of the body, we should not have to conclude that an intellectual substance can be the form of a body. That this opinion is impossible, we must show as follows. Things that are ascribed to one same thing according to various forms, are predicated of one another accidentally: for a white thing is said to be musical accidentally, because whiteness and music are ascribed to Socrates. Consequently if in us the intellective, sensitive, and nutritive soul are various forces or forms, those things which are ascribed to us in respect of these forms will be predicated of one another accidentally. Now in respect of the intellective soul we are said to be men, according to the sensitive soul animals, according to the nutritive soul living. Therefore this predication Man is an animal, or An animal is a living thing, will be accidental. But it is a per se3 predication, since man, as man, is an animal, and animal, as animal, is a living thing. Therefore it is from the same principle that one is a man, an animal, and a living thing.

If, however, it be said that even if the aforesaid souls be distinct, it does not follow that the predication mentioned will be accidental, because these souls are mutually subordinate: we reply to this also. For the sensitive power is subordinate to the intellect, and the nutritive power to the sensitive, as potentiality is subordinate to act: for the intellect comes after the sensitive, and the sensitive after the nutritive in the order of generation; since in generation an animal is made before a man. Consequently if this order makes the aforesaid predications to be per se, this will not be taking per se in the sense that arises from the form, but in that which arises from matter and subject, as a superficies is said to be coloured.1 But this is impossible. Because when we use per se in this sense, that which is formal is predicated per se of the subject, as when we say: The superficies is white or The number is even. Again when we use per se in this way, the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate, as number in the definition of even. But here the contrary happens: because man is not predicated of animal per se, but contrariwise: and again the subject is not placed in the definition of the predicate, but vice versa. Therefore the aforesaid definitions are not made per se by reason of the order in question.

Further. A thing has unity. from the same cause as it has being; for one is consequent upon being. Since then a thing has being from its form, it will have unity also from its form. Consequently if we say that there are in man three souls, as different forms, man will not be one being but several. Nor will the order of forms suffice for the unity of man: because to be one with respect to order is not to be one simply; since unity of order is the least of unities.

Again. The aforesaid2 difficulty will again arise, namely that from the intellective soul and the body there results one thing not simply but only accidentally. For whatever accrues to a thing after its complete being, accrues thereto accidentally, since it is outside its essence. Now every substantial form makes a complete being in the genus of substance, for it makes an actual being and this particular thing. Consequently whatever accrues to a thing after its first substantial form, will accrue to it accidentally. Hence, since the nutritive soul is a substantial form,—for living is predicated substantially of man and animal,—it will follow that the sensitive soul accrues accidentally, and likewise the intellective. And so neither animal nor man denotes one thing simply, nor a genus or species in the category of substance.

Moreover. If man, in Plato’s opinion, is not a thing composed of body and soul, but a soul using a body,1 this is to be understood either of the intellective soul only, or of the three souls, if there be three, or of two of them. If of three or two, it follows that man is not one thing, but two or three, for he is three souls or at least two. And if this be understood of the intellective soul only, so that the sensitive soul be understood to be the body’s form, and the intellective soul, using the animated and sensified body, to be a man, this would again involve absurdities, namely that man is not an animal, but uses an animal; and that man does not sense but uses a sentient thing. And since these statements are inadmissible, it is impossible that there be in us three souls differing in substance, the intellective, the sensitive, and the nutritive.

Further. One thing cannot be made of two or three, without something to unite them, unless one of them be to the other as act to potentiality: for thus are matter and form made one thing, without anything outside uniting them. Now if there be several souls in man, they are not mutually related as matter and form, but are only supposed to be acts and principles of action. It follows consequently, if they be united to form one thing, for instance a man or an animal, that there is something to unite them. But this cannot be the body, since rather is the body united together by the soul, a sign of which is that when the soul departs, the body perishes. It results then that there must be something more formal to make these several things into one. And this will be the soul rather than those several that are united by this thing. Wherefore if this again has various parts, and is not one thing in itself, there will still be need of something to unite them. Since then we cannot go on indefinitely, we must come to something that is one in itself. And such especially is the soul. Therefore there must be but one soul in one man or in one animal.

Again. If that which belongs to the department of the soul in man is composed of several things, it follows that as the whole together is to the whole body, so each of them is to each part of the body. Nor does this disagree with Plato’s opinion: for he placed the rational soul in the brain, the nutritive in the liver, and the appetite in the heart.1 But this is shown to be false, for two reasons. First, because there is a part of the soul which cannot be ascribed to any part of the body, namely the intellect, of which it has been proved2 that it is not the act of any part of the body. Secondly, because it is evident that the operations of different parts of the soul are observed in the same part of the body: as evidenced in animals which live after being cut in two, since the same part has the movement, sensation, and appetite whereby it is moved; and again the same part of a plant, after being cut off, is nourished, grows and blossoms, whence it is evident that the various parts of the soul are in the one and same part of the body. Therefore there are not different souls in us, allotted to different parts of the body.

Moreover. Different forces that are not rooted in one principle do not hinder one another in acting, unless perhaps their action be contrary, which does not happen in the case in point. Now we find that the various actions of the soul hinder one another, since when one is intense another is remiss. It follows, then, that these actions, and the forces that are their proximate principles, must be reduced to one principle. But this principle cannot be the body, both because there is an action in which the body has no part, namely intelligence; and because, if the body as such were the principle of these forces and actions, they would be found in all bodies, which is clearly false. Consequently it follows that their principle is some one form, by which this body is such a body: and this is the soul. Therefore it follows that all the soul’s actions which are in us, proceed from one soul. Wherefore there are not several souls in us.

This is in agreement with what is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus:1 Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which supplies the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reason.

Chapter LIX

that man’s possible intellect is not a separate substance

Others2 there have been, who discovered another reason for maintaining that the intellectual soul cannot be united to the body as its form. For they say that the intellect which Aristotle calls possible,3 is a separate substance not united to us as a form.

They endeavour to prove this from the words of Aristotle, who says, speaking of this intellect, that it is separate, not mixed with the body, simple, impassible;4 which could not be said of it, if it were the body’s form.

Also, from the demonstration whereby he proves5 that, since the possible intellect receives all the species of sensible things through being in potentiality to them, it must needs lack them all. Even so the pupil which receives the species of all colours, lacks all colour; for if by itself it had any colour, that colour would prevent it seeing other colours; in fact it would see nothing but under that colour. The same would happen with the possible intellect, if by itself it had any form or nature of sensible things. Yet it would have to be so if it were bound up with the body. Likewise, if it were the form of a body: because, since from form and matter there is made one thing, the form must participate something of the nature of which it is the form. Consequently it is impossible that the possible intellect be bound up with the body, or be the act or form of a body.

Further. If it were the form of a material body, the receptivity of such an intellect would be of the same kind as the receptivity of primary matter; because that which is the form of a body, receives nothing without its matter. Now primary matter receives individual forms, in fact they are individualized through being in matter. Therefore the possible intellect would receive forms as they are individual: and consequently would not be cognizant of universals, which is clearly false.

Further. Primary matter is not cognizant of the forms which it receives. Consequently if the receptivity of the possible intellect were the same as of primary matter, neither would the possible intellect know the forms it receives: and this is false.

Moreover. There cannot possibly be an infinite power in a body, as proved by Aristotle (8 Phys.).1 Now the possible intellect is, in a manner, of infinite power, since by it we judge of an infinite number of things, inasmuch as by it we know universals, under which potentially infinite particulars are contained. Therefore the possible intellect is not a power in a body.

For these reasons Averroes2 was moved, and likewise some of the ancients, as he says, to hold that the possible intellect, by which the soul understands, has a separate being from the body, and is not the form of the body.

Since however such an intellect would nowise belong to us, nor should we understand thereby, unless it were in some way united to us, he defines the way in which it comes into touch with us,3 saying that the species actually understood is the form of the possible intellect, just as the actually visible is the form of the visual power. Hence there results one thing from the possible intellect and the actually understood form. Consequently the possible intellect is united to whomsoever the aforesaid understood form is united. Now it is united to us by means of the phantasm which is a kind of subject of that understood form: and in this way the possible intellect also is in touch with us.

But it is easy to see that all this is nonsensical and impossible. For the one who understands is the one who has intellect. And the thing understood is the thing whose intelligible species is united to the intellect. Consequently though the intelligible species united to the intellect is in a man in some way, it does not follow that the man is the one who understands, but only that he is understood by the separate intellect.

Further. The actually understood species is the form of the possible intellect, as the visible species in act is the form of the visual power, or of the eye itself. Now the understood species is compared to the phantasm as the visible species in act is compared to the coloured object outside the soul: in fact he uses this comparison himself, as also does Aristotle.1 Therefore by the intelligible form the possible intellect is in touch with the phantasm which is in us, in the same way as the visual power with the colour that is in the stone. But this contact does not make the stone to see but to be seen. Therefore also the aforesaid contact of the possible intellect with us, does not make us to understand, but only to be understood. Now it is clear that it is properly and truly said that man understands, for we would not inquire into the nature of the intellect except for the fact that we understand ourselves. Therefore the aforesaid manner of contact is not sufficient.

Again. Every knower by its cognitive power is united to its object, and not vice versa, just as every operator by its operative power is united to the thing operated. Now man is intelligent by his intellect as by his cognitive power. Therefore he is not united to the intellect by the intelligible form, but by the intellect he is united to the intelligible.

Moreover. That by which a thing operates must be its form, for nothing acts except in so far as it is in act, and a thing is not in act except by that which is its form; wherefore Aristotle proves that the soul is a form, from the fact that an animal lives and senses through the soul.1 Now man understands, and this by his intellect only: wherefore Aristotle when inquiring into the principle whereby we understand describes to us the nature of the possible intellect.2 Therefore the possible intellect must be united to us formally and not merely by its object.

Further. The intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one,3 just as the sense in act and the sensible in act.4 Not so however are the intellect in potentiality and the intelligible in potentiality, nor the sense in potentiality and the sensible in potentiality. Wherefore the species of a thing according as it is in the phantasms is not actually intelligible, for it is not thus that it is one with the intellect in act, but as abstracted from the phantasms: even so neither is the species of colour actually perceived according as it is in the stone, but only according as it is in the pupil. Now according to the opinion stated above the intelligible species is in contact with us only according as it is in the phantasms. Therefore it is not in contact with us according as it is one with the possible intellect as its form. Consequently it cannot be the means of bringing the possible intellect into contact with us: since according as it is in contact with the possible intellect it is not in contact with us, nor vice versa.

Now it is evident that he who devised this opinion was deceived by an equivocation. For colours existing outside the soul, given the presence of light, are actually visible as being able to move the sight, and not as actually perceived, according as they are one with the sense in act. In like manner the phantasms are made actually intelligible by the light of the active intellect, so that they can move the possible intellect, but not so that they be actually understood, according as they are one with the possible intellect made actual.

Again. Where the living thing has a higher operation, there is a higher kind of life corresponding to that operation. For in plants we find only an action pertaining to nutrition. In animals we find a higher operation, namely sensation and local movement: wherefore the animal lives by a higher kind of life. But in man we find a yet higher vital operation than in the animal, namely intelligence. Therefore man must have a higher kind of life. Now life is through the soul. Therefore man will have a higher soul, whereby he lives, than is the sensitive soul. But none is higher than the intellect. Therefore the intellect is man’s soul: and consequently it is his form.1

Further. That which is consequent on the operation of a thing, does not give a thing its species: because operation is a second act, whereas the form whereby a thing has species is the first act. Now the union of the possible intellect with man, according to the above opinion, is consequent on man’s operation: for it takes place through the medium of the phantasm which, according to the Philosopher,2 is a movement resulting from the sense in act. Therefore man does not take his species from that union: and consequently man differs from dumb animals by the fact that he has an intellect.

Moreover. If man takes his species from being rational and having an intellect, whoever is in the human species, is rational and intelligent. But a child, even before leaving the womb, is in the human species: and yet it has not phantasms that are actually intelligible. Therefore a man has not an intellect through the intellect being in contact with man by means of an intelligible species the subject of which is a phantasm.

Chapter LX

that man derives his species not from the passive, but from the possible intellect

To these arguments there is a reply on the lines of the foregoing opinion.1 For the said Averroes2 maintains that man differs in species from brutes by the intellect which Aristotle calls passive, which is the same as the cogitative power that is proper to man, in place of which other animals have a certain natural estimative power. And it belongs to this cogitative power to distinguish individual intentions and to compare them with one another: just as the intellect which is separate and unmixed compares and distinguishes universal intentions. And since by this power, together with the imagination and memory, the phantasms are prepared to receive the addition of the active intellect, whereby they are made actually intelligible—just as certain arts prepare the matter for the master craftsman—therefore the aforesaid power is called by the name of intellect or reason, which physicians declare to be seated in the middle cell of the head. And according to the disposition of this power, one man differs from another in genius and other points pertaining to intelligence. Also by the use and practice thereof man acquires the habit of science: so that the habits of science are in this passive intellect as their subject. Moreover this passive intellect is in the child from the beginning, and through it the child receives its human species before understanding actually.

But it is easy to see that all this is untrue and an abuse of terms. For vital operations are compared to the soul, as second acts to the first, as Aristotle declares in 2 De Anima.3 Now in the one subject first act precedes the second in point of time, just as knowledge precedes consideration. Hence in whatever thing we find a vital operation, we must place some part of the soul that will be compared to that operation as first to second act. Now man above other animals has a proper operation, namely intelligence and reasoning, which is the operation of man, as man, as Aristotle states (1 Ethic.).1 Therefore we must place in man a principle that properly gives him his species, and is compared to the act of intelligence as first to second act. But this cannot be the aforesaid passive intellect, since the principle of this same operation must needs be impassible and not mixed with the body, as the Philosopher proves,2 whereas it is clearly the contrary with the passive intellect. Therefore it is not possible that the species whereby man differs from other animals, should come to him through the cogitative power that is called the passive intellect.

Again. That which is a passion of the sensitive part cannot place a thing in a higher kind of life than the sensitive life: just as that which is a passion of the nutritive soul, does not place a thing in a higher kind of life than the nutritive. Now it is clear that the imagination and the like powers which are consequent upon it, such as the memory and so forth, are passions of the sensitive faculty, as the Philosopher proves in his book De Memoria.3 Consequently an animal cannot be placed by these powers or by any one of them, in a higher kind of life than the sensitive. But man is in a higher kind of life, as is proved from the Philosopher (2 De Anima),4 who in distinguishing the kinds of life, places the intellective which he ascribes to man, above the sensitive which he ascribes to all animals in common. Therefore it is not through the aforesaid cogitative power that man is a living being with a life proper to himself.

Moreover. Every self-mover, as the Philosopher proves (8 Phys.),5 is composed of mover and moved. Now man, like the animals, is a self-mover. Therefore mover and moved are parts of him. But the first mover in man is the intellect, for the intellect by its intelligible object moves the will. Nor can it be said that the passive intellect alone is the mover, since the passive intellect is only of particulars, while in moving there comes into play both the universal opinion which belongs to the possible intellect, and the particular statement which may belong to the passive intellect, as we gather from Aristotle (3 De Anima,1 and 7 Ethic.).2 Therefore the possible intellect is a part of man: and is the most noble and most formal thing in him: and consequently he takes his species from it and not from the passive intellect.

Further. The possible intellect is proved not to be the act of a body from the fact of its taking cognizance of all sensible forms in the universal.3 Therefore no power, the operation of which can extend to the universals of all sensible forms, can be the act of a body. Now such is the will: since our will can extend to all the things that we can understand, at least so that we will to know them. Moreover the act of the will is clearly directed to the universal: since, as Aristotle says in his Rhetoric,4 we hate the robber-kind in the universal, but are enraged only with the individuals. Consequently the will cannot be the act of a part of the body, nor can it be consequent upon a power that is an act of the body. Now any part of the soul is an act of the body, except the intellect alone properly so called. Hence the will is in the intellective part, wherefore also Aristotle says (3 De Anima)5 that the will is in the reason, but the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. On account of this the acts of the concupiscible and irascible are associated with passion; whereas the act of the will is not, but with choice. Now man’s will is not outside man, as though it were vested in a separate substance, but is in man himself. Else he would not be master of his own actions, for he would be acted upon by the will of a separate substance: and in him there would only be the appetitive powers that operate with passion, namely the irascible and the concupiscible, which are in the sensitive part, as in other animals which are acted upon rather than act themselves. But this is impossible and would do away with all moral philosophy and social intercourse. Wherefore the possible intellect must be in us, so that we differ thereby from dumb animals, and not only by the passive intellect.

Again. Just as nothing is able (potens) to act except through an inherent active potentiality, so nothing is able to be passive except through an inherent passive potentiality: for the combustible is not only able to be burnt because there is something able to burn it, but also because it has in itself a potentiality to be burnt. Now to understand is a kind of passion, as stated in 3 De Anima.1 Since then a child is potentially understanding, although he understands not actually, there must be in him a potentiality whereby he is able to understand: and this potentiality is the possible intellect. Consequently the possible intellect must already be in touch with the child before he understands actually. Therefore the contact of the possible intellect with man is not through the actually understood form; but the possible intellect itself is in a man from the beginning as a part of him.

The said Averroes replies to this argument.2 For he says that a child is said to be understanding potentially in two ways. First, because the phantasms in him are potentially intelligible; secondly, because the possible intellect is able (potens) to come in touch with him, and not because the intellect is already united to him.

Now we have to prove that either way is insufficient. For the potentiality by which the agent is able to act is distinct from the potentiality whereby the patient is able to be passive, and they differ as being opposite to one another. Consequently from the fact that a thing is able to be active, it is not competent to it to be passive. Now to be able to understand is to be able to be passive, since to understand is a kind of passion, according to the Philosopher.3 Therefore the child is not said to be able to understand, from the mere fact that the phantasms in him are able to be actually understood, since this pertains to being able to act; for the phantasms move the possible intellect.

Again. A potentiality consequent on the species of a thing does not belong to it by reason of that which does not give that thing its species. Now ability to understand is consequent on the human species, for understanding is an operation of man as such. Whereas the phantasms do not give man his species, on the contrary they are consequent on his operation. Therefore the child cannot be said to be potentially understanding by reason of the phantasms.

Likewise, neither can a child be said to be potentially understanding, because the possible intellect is able to be in touch with him. For a person is said to be able to act or to be passive by active or passive potentiality, just as he is said to be white by whiteness. Now he is not said to be white before whiteness is united to him. Therefore neither is one said to be able to act or to be passive before the active or passive potentiality is in him. Consequently it cannot be said of a child that he is able to understand before the possible intellect, which is the power of understanding, is in touch with him.

Further. A person is said in one way to be able to act before having the nature whereby he acts, and in another way after he has the nature already, but is accidentally hindered from acting: even as a body is said in one way to be able to be lifted upwards before it is light, and in another way after it is made light, but is hindered in its movement. Now a child is potentially understanding, not as though he has not yet the nature to understand, but as having an obstacle to understanding, for he is hindered from understanding on account of the manifold movements in him, as stated in 7 Physic.1 Wherefore he is not said to be potentially understanding, on account of the possibility of coming in touch with the possible intellect which is the principle of understanding, but because it is already in touch with him and is hindered from its proper action; so that as soon as the obstacle is removed, he understands.

Again. A habit is that whereby one acts at will.1 Consequently a habit must be in the same subject as the operation that is according to that habit. But to consider by understanding, which is the act of the habit of science, cannot be in the passive intellect, but belongs to the possible intellect, because in order that a power understand, it behoves it not to be the act of a body. Therefore the habit of science is not in the passive but in the possible intellect. Now science is in us, since according thereto we are said to know scientifically. Therefore the possible intellect also is in us, and has not a being separate from us.

Further. The assimilation of science is of the knower to the thing known. Now the knower is not assimilated to the thing known, as such, except in respect of universal species, for science is about such things. But universal species cannot be in the passive intellect,—since it is a power using an organ,—but only in the possible intellect. Therefore science is not in the passive, but only in the possible intellect.

Moreover. The intellect in habit, as the opponent admits,2 is the effect of the active intellect. Now the effects of the active intellect are things actually intelligible, the proper recipient of which is the possible intellect, to which the active intellect is compared as art to material, according to Aristotle (3 De Anima).3 Consequently the intellect in habit, which is the habit of science, must be in the possible, and not in the passive intellect.

Further. It is impossible that the perfection of a higher substance depend on a lower. Now the perfection of the possible intellect depends on the action of man, for it depends on the phantasms which move the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is not a higher substance than man. Therefore it must be part of man as his act and form.

Again. Whatsoever things are separate as to being, are also separate as to operation, because things are for the sake of their operations, as first act for the sake of the second: wherefore Aristotle says (1 De Anima),1 that if any operation of the soul is apart from the body, it is possible for the soul to be separated. Now the operation of the possible intellect requires the body: for the Philosopher says (3 De Anima)2 that the intellect can act by itself, that is it can understand, when it has been made actual by a species abstracted from phantasms, which are not apart from the body. Therefore the possible intellect is not altogether separate from the body.

Moreover. A thing has by nature those attributes without which its connatural operation cannot be accomplished: thus Aristotle proves (2 De Cœlo)3 that if the movement of the stars were progressive like that of animals, nature would have given them the organs of progressive movement. Now the operation of the possible intellect is accomplished through corporeal organs, which are necessary as subjects of the phantasms. Therefore nature has united the possible intellect to corporeal organs: and consequently it has not a being separate from the body.

Again. If it had a being separate from the body, it would understand substances that are separate from matter rather than sensible forms, for they are more intelligible, and more conformed to the intellect. Yet it cannot understand substances that are altogether separate from matter, since there are no phantasms of them: whereas this intellect nowise understands without phantasms, as Aristotle says (3 De Anima);4 because the phantasms are to it as sensibles to the senses, and without these the sense has no sensation. Therefore it is not a substance separate from the body in being.

Further. In every genus the passive potentiality extends as far as the active potentiality of that genus; wherefore there is not in nature a passive potentiality, to which there does not correspond a natural active potentiality. But the active intellect makes only the phantasms to be intelligible. Therefore neither is the passive intellect moved by other intelligibles than the species abstracted from the phantasms: and thus it is unable to understand separate substances.

Moreover. The species of sensible things are in separate substances intelligibly, and by those species they have knowledge of sensibles. If therefore the possible intellect understood separate substances, it would receive in them the knowledge of sensibles. Consequently it would not receive this knowledge from phantasms, since nature’s abundance does not consist of superfluities.

If, however, it be said that separate substances have no knowledge of sensibles, it must at least be granted that they have a higher knowledge. And this knowledge must not be lacking to the possible intellect, if it understands the said substances. Consequently it will have a twofold knowledge: one after the manner of separate substances, the other received from the senses: one of which would be superfluous.

Further. It is the possible intellect whereby the soul understands, as stated in 3 De Anima.1 If therefore the possible intellect understands separate substances, we also understand them. Yet this is clearly untrue, for we stand in relation to them as the eye of the owl to the sun, as Aristotle says.2

To these arguments it is replied according to the aforesaid opinion.3 The possible intellect, so far as it is self-subsistent, understands separate substances, and is in potentiality to them as a transparent body to the light. Whereas in so far as it is in touch with us, it is in potentiality from the beginning to forms abstracted from the phantasms. Hence we do not from the beginning understand separate substances by it. But this will not hold. For the possible intellect, according to them, is said to be in touch with us, through being perfected by intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms. Consequently the intellect is to be considered as in potentiality to these species before being in touch with us. Wherefore it is not by its being in touch with us that it is in potentiality to these species.

Further. According to this, the fact of its being in potentiality to these species would belong to it not in itself but through something else. Now a thing ought not to be defined by those things which do not belong to it in itself. Therefore the definition of the possible intellect should not be taken from its being in potentiality to the aforesaid species, as Aristotle defines it in 3 De Anima.1

Further. It is impossible for the possible intellect to understand several things at the same time, unless it understand one through another: since one power is not perfected at the same time by several acts except according to order. If, therefore, the possible intellect understands separate substances, and species abstracted from phantasms, it must either understand separate substances through these species, or vice versa. Now whichever be granted, it follows that we understand separate substances. For if we understand the natures of sensibles forasmuch as the possible intellect understands them, and the possible intellect understands them through understanding separate substances, we must understand them in the same way. And in like manner if the case be the reverse. But this is clearly false. Therefore the possible intellect does not understand separate substances: and consequently it is not a separate substance.

Chapter LXI

that the aforesaid opinion is contrary to that of aristotle

Since, however, Averroes endeavours to strengthen his position by appealing to authority, and says2 that Aristotle was of the same opinion, we shall prove clearly that the aforesaid opinion is contrary to that of Aristotle.

First, because Aristotle (2 De Anima)3 defines the soul by saying that the soul is the first act of an organic physical body having life potentially, and afterwards he adds4 that this definition applies universally to every soul, not, as the said Averroes pretends,1 expressing a doubt on the point, as evidenced by the Greek text and the translation of Boethius. Afterwards in the same chapter2 he adds that certain parts of the soul are separable. Now these are no other than the intellective parts. It follows therefore that these parts are acts of the body.

Nor is this gainsaid by what he says afterwards:3 Nothing so far is clear about the intellect and the power of understanding, but it would seem to be another kind of soul. For he does not wish by this to except the intellect from the common definition of a soul, but to exclude it from the natures proper to the other parts: thus he who says Animals that fly are of another kind from those that walk, does not remove the common definition of animal from those that fly. Wherefore, to show in what sense he said another he adds: And this alone can be separated as the everlasting from the corruptible. Nor is it Aristotle’s intention, as the said Commentator pretends,4 to say that he has not yet made it clear concerning the intellect, whether the intellect be the soul, as he had done concerning the other principles. For the genuine text does not read, nothing has been declared or nothing has been said, but nothing is clear; which we must understand as referring to that which is proper to the soul, and not as referring to the common definition. And if, as he says,5 soul is said equivocally of the intellect and other (souls), he (Aristotle) would first have explained the equivocation, and given the definition afterwards, as is his wont. Else his argument would have laboured under an equivocation; which is not allowable in demonstrative sciences.

Again. In 2 De Anima6 he reckons the intellect among the powers of the soul: and in the passage quoted7 he calls it the power of understanding. Therefore the intellect is not outside the human soul, but is one of its powers.

Again. In the 3 De Anima,1 when he begins to speak of the possible intellect, he calls it a part of the soul, for the text reads: Of the part of the soul whereby the soul has knowledge and wisdom: thus clearly indicating that the possible intellect is a part of the soul.

He is yet more explicit2 when he goes on to declare the nature of the possible intellect, in these words: By the intellect I mean that by which the soul knows and understands. This evidently denotes that the intellect is a part of the human soul, whereby the soul understands.

Therefore the aforesaid position is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, and to the truth: and consequently is to be rejected as a mere fabrication.

Chapter LXII

against the opinion of alexander about the possible intellect

Having taken these sayings of Aristotle into consideration, Alexander asserted that the possible intellect is a power in us, so that the common definition of a soul given by Aristotle (2 De Anima)3 might apply thereto. But as he could not understand how an intellectual substance could be the form of a body, he said that the aforesaid power is not rooted in an intellectual substance, and that it is consequent on the mixture of the elements in the human body. For the particular mode of mixture in the human body makes man to be in potentiality to receive the inflow of the active intellect, which is always in act, and according to him is a separate substance, the result of which inflow is that man is made to understand actually. Now in man that whereby he is potentially understanding is the possible intellect. Consequently it followed apparently that the possible intellect in us is a result of a particular mixture.

But at the first glance this opinion is seen to be in contradiction with both the words and the proof of Aristotle. For as already stated1 Aristotle proves in the 3 De Anima2 that the possible intellect is not mixed with the body. Now this could not be said of a power resulting from the mixture of the elements: for a thing of the kind must needs be rooted in the mixture itself of the elements, as we see in the case of taste, smell, and the like. Therefore seemingly the aforesaid opinion of Alexander is inconsistent with the words and proof of Aristotle.

To this Alexander replies that the possible intellect is merely the preparedness in the human nature to receive the inflow of the active intellect. And preparedness is not a particular sensible nature, nor is it mixed with the body: for it is a relation and the order of one thing to another.

But this clearly disagrees with the intention of Aristotle. For Aristotle proves that the reason why the possible intellect is not confined to any particular sensible nature, and consequently is not mixed with the body, is because it is receptive of all the forms of sensibles, and cognizant of them. Now this cannot be understood of preparedness, for it denotes not receiving but being prepared to receive. Therefore Aristotle’s proof refers not to preparedness, but to a prepared recipient.

Moreover. If what Aristotle says of the possible intellect applies to it inasmuch as it is a preparedness, and not on account of the nature of the subject prepared, it follows that it applies to every preparedness. Now in the senses there is a preparedness to receive sensibles actually. Therefore the same applies to the senses as to the possible intellect. And yet Aristotle clearly says the contrary, when he shows the difference between the receptivity of sense and of intellect, from the fact that sense is corrupted by the excellence of its objects, but not the intellect.

Again. Aristotle says of the possible intellect that it is passive to the intelligible, that it receives intelligible species, that it is in potentiality to them. He also compares it to a tablet whereon nothing is written. None of which things can be said of preparedness, but only of the subject prepared. It is therefore contrary to the intention of Aristotle that the possible intellect should be the same as preparedness.

Again. The agent is more noble than the patient, and the maker than the thing made,1 as act in comparison with potentiality. Now the more immaterial a thing is the more noble it is. Therefore the effect cannot be more immaterial than the cause. But every cognitive power, as such, is immaterial: hence Aristotle says of sense (2 De Anima)2 that it is receptive of sensible species without matter. Consequently it is impossible for a cognitive power to result from a mixture of elements. Now the possible intellect is the highest cognitive power in us: for Aristotle says (3 De Anima)3 that the possible intellect is whereby the soul knows and understands. Therefore the possible intellect is not caused by the mixture of the elements.

Moreover. If the principle of an operation proceeds from certain causes, that operation must not surpass those causes, since the second cause acts by virtue of the first. Now even the operation of the nutritive soul exceeds the power of the elemental qualities: for Aristotle proves (2 De Anima)4 that fire is not the cause of growth, but its concause so to speak, while its principal cause is the soul, to which heat is compared as the instrument to the craftsman. Consequently the vegetative soul cannot be produced by the mixture of the elements, and much less, therefore, the sense and possible intellect.

Again. To understand is an operation in which no bodily organ can possibly communicate. Now this operation is ascribed to the soul, as also to man; for we say that the soul understands or man, by his soul. Consequently there must needs be in man a principle, independent of the body, which is the source of that operation. But the preparedness that results from the mixture of the elements is clearly dependent on the body. Therefore preparedness is not this principle. And yet this latter is the possible intellect, since Aristotle says (3 De Anima)5 that the possible intellect is whereby the soul knows and understands. Therefore preparedness is not the possible intellect.

If, however, it be said that the principle of the aforesaid operation in us is the intelligible species made actual by the active intellect: this is seemingly insufficient. For, since man from being intentionally understanding is made actually understanding, it follows that not only does he understand by the intelligible species, by which he is made to understand actually, but also by an intellective power, which is the principle of the aforesaid operation, as happens also with the senses. Now Aristotle affirms that this power is the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is independent of the body.

Further. The species is not actually intelligible except in so far as it is expurgated of material being. But this cannot happen so long as it is in a material potentiality, which namely is caused from material principles, or is the act of a material organ. Therefore it must be granted that we have in ourselves an intellective power which is immaterial.

Again. The possible intellect is described by Aristotle1 as being part of the soul. Now the soul is not a preparedness but an act, since preparedness is the order of potentiality to act. And yet act is followed by a certain preparedness to a further act, for instance the act of transparency is followed by an order to the act of light. Therefore the possible intellect is not a mere preparedness, but is an act.

Moreover. Man obtains species and human nature according to that part of the soul which is proper to him, namely the possible intellect.2 Now nothing obtains species and nature according as it is in potentiality, but according as it is in act. Since then preparedness is nothing more than order of potentiality to act, it is impossible that the possible intellect be merely a certain preparedness in human nature.

Chapter LXIII

that the soul is not a temperament, as galen asserted

The opinion of the physician Galen about the soul is akin to the aforesaid opinion of Alexander concerning the possible intellect.

For he says that the soul is a temperament.1 He was moved to make this assertion by the fact that we see resulting from various temperaments in us, various passions which are ascribed to the soul: for some who have, for example, a choleric temperament, are easily angered, while melancholic persons are prone to be sad. Consequently the same arguments avail to disprove this opinion, as were adduced against the opinion of Alexander,2 as well as some that apply specially thereto.

For it was proved above3 that the operation of the vegetative soul, sensitive knowledge and, much more, the operation of the intellect surpass the power of the active and passive qualities. Therefore the temperament cannot be the principle of the soul’s operations: and consequently it is impossible for the soul to be the temperament.

Again. Seeing that the temperament is something set up by contrary qualities as a kind of mean between them, it cannot possibly be a substantial form; because substance has no contrary, nor is it a recipient of more or less.4 But the soul is a substantial, not an accidental, form: else a thing would not obtain species or form from its soul. Therefore the soul is not the temperament.

Further. The temperament does not move an animal’s body by local movement: for it would follow the movement of the predominant element, and thus would always be moved downwards. But the soul moves the body in all directions. Therefore the soul is not the temperament.

Moreover. The soul rules the body, and curbs the passions that result from the temperament. For by temperament some are more prone than others to desire or anger, and yet refrain more from these things, on account of something that keeps them in check, as may be seen in those who are continent. But the temperament does not this. Therefore the soul is not the temperament.

Apparently he was deceived through failing to observe that passions are ascribed to the temperament in one way, and to the soul in another. For they are ascribed to the temperament as causing a disposition, and in respect of that which is material in the passions, for instance the heat of the blood and the like; whereas they are ascribed to the soul as their principal cause, and in respect of what is formal in the passions, for instance the desire of vengeance in anger.

Chapter LXIV

that the soul is not a harmony

Not unlike the foregoing opinion is the view of those who say that the soul is a harmony. For they meant that the soul is a harmony not of sound, but of contraries, whereof they observed animate bodies to be composed. In the De Anima1 this opinion is apparently set down to Empedocles: Gregory of Nyssa2 ascribes it to Dinarchus: and it is to be refuted in the same way as the foregoing opinion, as well as by arguments proper to itself.

For every mixed body has harmony and temperament. Nor can harmony move a body, nor rule it, nor curb the passions, any more than temperament can do so. Again, it is subject to intension and remission, like temperament. All of which show that the soul is neither harmony nor temperament.

Again. The notion of harmony applies more to the qualities of the body than to those of the soul: for health is harmony of the humours; strength, of sinews and bones; beauty, of limbs and colours. Whereas it cannot be said of what things sense or intellect or other parts of the soul are the harmony. Therefore the soul is not a harmony.

Moreover. Harmony is taken in two senses. In one way, for the composition itself, in another for the manner of composition. Now the soul is not a composition: because each part of the soul would have to be the composition of some of the parts of the body; and this cannot be verified. Likewise, it is not the manner of a composition: because, since in the various parts of the body there are various manners or proportions of composition, each part of the body would have a distinct soul, for bone, flesh, and sinew would have different souls, since they are composed in different proportions: which is clearly false. Therefore the soul is not a harmony.

Chapter LXV

that the soul is not a body

There were also others who wandered further from the truth, by asserting that the soul is a body. And although these had different and various opinions, it will suffice to refute them here in general.

For living things, since they are physical beings, are composed of matter and form. Now they are composed of a body, and of a soul which makes them actually living. Therefore one of these must be the form, and the other the matter. But the body cannot be the form, since the body is not in something else as its matter and subject. Therefore the soul is the form. Consequently it is not a body, since no form is a body.

Again. It is impossible for two bodies to coincide. Now the soul is not apart from the body while the latter lives. Therefore the soul is not a body.

Moreover. Every body is divisible. And whatever is divisible requires something to keep together and unite its parts. Consequently if the soul were a body, it would have something else to hold it together, and this yet more would be the soul: since we observe that when the soul departs the body perishes. And if this again be divisible, we must at length either come to something indivisible and incorporeal, which will be the soul, or we shall go on to infinity, which is impossible. Therefore the soul is not a body.

Again. As we proved above,1 and as it is proved in 8 Phys.,2 every self mover is composed of two parts of which the one is mover, the other moved. Now an animal is a self-mover, and the mover therein is the soul, while the body is moved. Consequently the soul is an unmoved mover. But no body moves without being moved, as we proved above.3 Consequently the soul is not a body.

Further. It was proved above4 that intelligence cannot be the act of a body. But it is the act of a soul. Therefore, at least the intellective soul is not a body.

As to the arguments by which some have tried to prove that the soul is a body, it is easy to solve them. For they prove that the soul is a body from the son being like his father even in the accidents of the soul, notwithstanding that the son is begotten of his father by bodily detachment. Also because the soul suffers with the body. Also because it is separate from the body, and separation is between bodies that touch one another.

But against this it has been already stated5 that the bodily temperament is somewhat the cause of the soul’s passions by way of a dispositive cause. Again, the soul does not suffer with the body except accidentally because, since it is the form of the body, it is moved accidentally through the body being moved. Also the soul is separate from the body, not as that which touches from that which is touched, but as form from matter: although there is a certain contact between the incorporeal and a body, as we have shown.6

Moreover many men were moved to take up this position through believing that there is nothing that is not a body, being unable to outstrip their imagination which is only about bodies. Wherefore this opinion is put forward in the person of the foolish as saying of the soul (Wis. 2:2): The breath in our nostrils is smoke, and speech a spark to move our heart.

Chapter LXVI

against those who say that intellect and sense are the same

Some of the early philosophers came near to these through thinking that intellect differs not from sense.1 But this is impossible.

For sense is found in all animals: whereas animals other than man have no intellect. This is evident from the fact that they do diverse and opposite things, not as though they had intelligence, but as moved by nature, performing certain determinate operations that are uniform within the same species: thus every swallow builds its nest in the same say. Therefore intellect is not the same as sense.

Further. Sense is not cognizant except of singulars: for every sensitive power knows by individual species, since it receives the species of things in corporeal organs. But the intellect is cognizant of universals, as evidenced by experience. Therefore intellect differs from sense.

Moreover. The knowledge of the senses does not extend beyond things corporeal. This is clear from the fact that sensible qualities, which are the proper objects of the senses, are only in corporeal things, and without them the senses know nothing. On the other hand the intellect knows things incorporeal, for instance, wisdom, truth, and the relations of things. Therefore intellect and sense are not the same.

Again. Sense knows neither itself nor its operation: for sight neither sees itself, nor sees that it sees, but this belongs to a higher power, as is proved in De Anima.2 But the intellect knows itself, and knows that it understands. Therefore intellect is not the same as sense.

Further. Sense is corrupted by an excelling sensible. But intellect is not corrupted by the excellence of the intelligible; in fact, he who understands greater things, can afterwards better understand lesser things.1 Therefore the sensitive power differs from the intellective.

Chapter LXVII

against those who say that the possible intellect is the imagination

The opinion of those who held that the possible intellect is not distinct from the imagination2 was akin to the foregoing. But this is evidently false.

For imagination is also in other animals. A sign of this is that in the absence of sensibles they shun or seek them, which would not be the case did they not retain an imaginary apprehension of them. But intellect is not in them, since they offer no evidence of intelligent action. Therefore imagination and intellect are not the same.

Further. Imagination is only about things corporeal and singular: since the fancy is a movement caused by actual sensation, as stated in De Anima.3 But the intellect is about universals and incorporeal things. Therefore the possible intellect is not the imagination.

Moreover. It is impossible for the same thing to be mover and moved. Now the phantasms move the possible intellect, as sensibles move the senses, as Aristotle states (3 De Anima).4 Therefore the possible intellect cannot be the same as the imagination.

Further. It is proved in 3 De Anima5 that the intellect is not an act of a part of the body: whereas the imagination has a determinate bodily organ. Therefore the imagination is not the same as the possible intellect.

Hence it is said (Job 35:11): Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructeth us more than the fowls of the air. Whereby we are given to understand that man has a cognitive power above sense and imagination, which are in other animals.

Chapter LXVIII

how an intellectual substance can be the form of the body

Accordingly from the foregoing arguments we are able to conclude that an intellectual substance can be united to the body as its form. For if an intellectual substance is not united to the body merely as its mover, as Plato stated, nor is in contact with it merely by the phantasms, as Averroes held, but as its form; and if the intellect whereby man understands is not a preparedness in human nature, as Alexander maintained, nor the temperament, as Galen said, nor harmony, according to Empedocles, nor a body, nor the senses or imagination, as the ancients asserted, it follows that the human soul is an intellectual substance united to the body as its form. This can be made evident as follows.

For one thing to be another’s substantial form, two conditions are required. One of them is that the form be the principle of substantial being to the thing of which it is the form: and I speak not of the effective but of the formal principle, whereby a thing is, and is called a being. Hence follows the second condition, namely that the form and matter combine together in one being, which is not the case with the effective principle together with that to which it gives being. This is the being in which a composite substance subsists, which is one in being, and consists of matter and form. Now an intellectual substance, as proved above,1 is not hindered by the fact that it is subsistent, from being the formal principle of being to matter, as communicating its being to matter. For it is not unreasonable that the composite and its form itself should subsist in the same being, since the composite exists only by the form, nor does either subsist apart from the other.

It may however be argued that an intellectual substance cannot communicate its being to corporeal matter, so that the intellectual substance and the corporeal matter have together one being: because different genera have different modes of being, and a more noble mode belongs to a more noble substance. This would be said reasonably if this being belonged in the same way to matter as to the intellectual substance. But it is not so. For it belongs to corporeal matter as its recipient and subject raised to something higher, while it belongs to the intellectual substance as its principle, and in accordance with its very nature. Wherefore nothing prevents an intellectual substance from being the human body’s form, which is the human soul.

In this way we are able to perceive the wondrous connection of things. For we always find the lowest in the higher genus touching the highest of the lower genus: thus some of the lowest of the animal kind scarcely surpass the life of plants, such as oysters which are immovable, have only the sense of touch, and are fixed to the earth like plants. Hence Blessed Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.) that Divine wisdom has united the ends of higher things with the beginnings of the lower. Accordingly we may consider something supreme in the genus of bodies, namely the human body equably attempered, which touches the lowest of the higher genus, namely the human soul, and this occupies the last degree in the genus of intellectual substances, as may be seen from its mode of understanding. Hence it is that the intellectual soul is said to be on the horizon and confines of things corporeal and incorporeal,2 inasmuch as it is an incorporeal substance, and yet the form of a body. And a thing is not less one that is composed of an intellectual substance and corporeal matter, than that which results from the form of fire and its matter, but perhaps more so: since the more a form overcomes matter, the more one is that which is made from it and matter.

Now though form and matter have one being, it does not follow that matter always equals the being of the form. In fact, the more noble the form, the more it surpasses matter in its being. This is clear to one who looks into the operations of forms, from the consideration of which we know their natures, since a thing operates according as it is. Consequently a form whose operation surpasses the condition of matter, itself also surpasses matter in the excellence of its being.

For we find certain lowest forms, which are capable of no operation except such as comes within the compass of the qualities which are the dispositions of matter, for instance heat, cold, moisture and dryness, rarity, density, gravity and levity, and the like; such are the elemental forms. Consequently these forms are altogether material, and wholly merged in matter.

Above these we find the forms of mixed bodies: and these, although they do not extend to any operations that cannot be accomplished through the aforesaid qualities, nevertheless sometimes produce those effects by a higher power which they receive from the heavenly bodies, and which is consequent upon their species; thus the loadstone attracts iron.

Again, above these we find certain forms whose operations include some which surpass the power of the aforesaid qualities, although the same qualities assist organically in their operation; such are the souls of plants; and these again are like not only to the powers of heavenly bodies, in surpassing the active and passive qualities, but also to the movers of heavenly bodies, inasmuch as they are the principles of movement in living things, which move themselves.

Above these forms we find other forms like the higher substances, not only in moving, but also in knowing, and thus they are capable of operations to which the aforesaid qualities do not help even organically, and yet these operations are not accomplished save by means of a corporeal organ: such are the souls of dumb animals. For sensation and imagination are not accomplished by heating and cooling, although these are necessary for the due disposition of the organ.

And above all these forms we find a form like the higher substances even as regards the kind of knowledge, which is intelligence: and thus it is capable of an operation which is accomplished without any corporeal organ at all. This is the intellective soul, for intelligence is not effected by a corporeal organ. Consequently it follows that this principle whereby man understands, namely the intellective soul, which surpasses the condition of corporeal matter, is not wholly encompassed by and merged in matter, as are other material forms. This is indicated by its operation, in which corporeal matter has no part. And yet since the human soul’s act of intelligence needs powers, namely imagination and sense which operate through corporeal organs, this by itself shows that the soul is naturally united to the body in order to complete the human species.

Chapter LXIX

solution of the arguments by which it was proved above that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form

Taking the foregoing1 into consideration, it is not difficult to solve the arguments given above2 against the aforesaid union. In the first argument something false is taken for granted. Because body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but one actually existing substance is made from them: for man’s body is not actually the same while the soul is present, and when the soul is absent: and it is the soul that makes it to be actually.

The statement, contained in the second objection, that form and matter belong to the same genus, is true, not as though they were both species of the same genus, but because they are the principles of the same species. Accordingly, the intellectual substance and the body, which if they existed apart would be species of different genera, through being united are of the same genus as principles thereof.

Nor does it follow that the intellectual substance is a material form, although its being is in matter; as the third argument contended. For it is not in matter as merged in matter, or wholly encompassed by matter, but in another way, as stated.

Nor does the intellectual substance being united to the body as its form prevent the intellect beings separate from the body, as the philosophers say. For we must consider in the soul, both its essence and its power. According to its essence it gives being to such and such a body, while according to its power it accomplishes its proper operations. If therefore an operation of the soul be accomplished by means of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which is the principle of that operation, is the act of that part of the body by which its operation is accomplished: thus sight is the act of the eye. If, however, its operation be not accomplished by means of a corporeal organ, its power will not be the act of a body. It is in this sense that the intellect is said to be separate, and this does not preclude the substance of the soul of which the intellect is a power, otherwise the intellective soul, from being the act of the body, as the form which gives being to such a body.

And although the soul by its substance is the form of the body, it is not necessary that its every operation be performed by means of the body, and that consequently its every power be the act of a body, as the fifth argument supposed. For it has been already shown that the human soul is not such a form as is wholly merged in matter, but is of all other forms raised highest above matter. Consequently it can produce an operation without the body, as being independent of the body, in operating: since not even in being does it depend on the body.

In the same way it is clear that the reasons whereby Averroes tries to confirm his opinion,1 do not prove that the intellectual substance is not united to the body as its form.

For the expressions used by Aristotle in reference to the possible intellect, when he says that it is impassible, unmixed, and separate, do not oblige us to admit that the intellective substance is not united to the body as the form whence the latter has being. For they are also true if we say that the intellective power, which Aristotle calls the power of understanding,2 is not the act of an organ, as though it exercised its operation thereby. This is in fact shown by his proof: since he proves that it is unshackled and separate, from its operation whereby it understands all things; and because operation belongs to a power as to its principle.

It is consequently clear that neither does Aristotle’s proof show that the intellective substance is not united to the body as its form. For if we suppose that the soul’s substance is thus united to the body in being, and that the intellect is not the act of any organ, it will not follow that the intellect has a particular nature,—I refer to the natures of sensibles: since it is not admitted to be a harmony,3 nor the reason of an organ,—as Aristotle says (2 De Anima)4 of sense that it is like the reason of an organ:—for the intellect has not a common operation with the body.

That Aristotle, by saying that the intellect is unshackled or separate, does not mean to exclude its being a part or power of the soul which is the form of the whole body, is clear from what he says at the end of the First Book of De Anima,5 against those who said that different parts of the soul are in different parts of the body: If the whole soul contains the whole body it is meet that each of its parts should contain some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is difficult to conceive what part the intellect contains and how.

It is also evident, since the intellect is not the act of any part of the body, that its receptiveness is not that of primary matter: forasmuch as its receptiveness and operation are altogether without a corporeal organ.

Nor again is the infinite power of the intellect excluded, since its power is not ascribed to a magnitude, but is founded on the intellectual substance, as stated.

Chapter LXX

that according to the words of aristotle we must say that the intellect is united to the body as its form

Now, since Averroes endeavours to confirm his opinion especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle,1 it remains to be shown that according to Aristotle’s opinion we must say that the intellect as to its substance is united to a body as its form.

For Aristotle in the Eighth Book of Physics2 proves that in movers and things moved it is impossible to go on to infinity. Whence he concludes that we must needs come to some first moved thing, which either is moved by an immovable mover, or moves itself. Of these two he takes the latter, namely that the first movable moves itself, for this reason, that what is per se always precedes that which is by another. Then he shows that a self-mover is of necessity divided into two parts, one of which is mover and the other moved. Consequently the first self-mover must consist of two parts, the one moving, the other moved. Now every such thing is animate.3 Wherefore the first movable, namely the heaven, is animate according to the opinion of Aristotle. Hence in 2 De Cœlo4 it is expressly stated that the heaven is animate, and for this reason we must ascribe to the heaven differences of position not only in relation to us, but also in relation to itself. Let us then inquire with what kind of soul, according to Aristotle’s opinion, the heaven is animated.

In 11 Metaph.1 he proves that in the heaven’s movement we may consider something that moves and is wholly unmoved, and something that moves and is also moved. Now that is which moves and is wholly unmoved, moves as an object of desire, desirable of course by that which is moved. And he shows that it moves not as desirable by the desire of concupiscence, which is the desire of sense, but as desirable by intellectual desire: wherefore he says that the first unmoved mover is desirable and intellectual. Consequently that which is moved by it, namely the heaven, is desiring and understanding in a more noble way than we are, as he proves further on. Therefore the heaven is composed, according to Aristotle’s opinion, of an intellectual soul and a body. He refers to this when he says (2 De Anima)2 that in certain things there is the faculty and act of understanding, for instance in men, and in any other like or more noble things, namely the heaven.

Now it is clear that the heaven has not a sensitive soul, according to the opinion of Aristotle: since it would have various organs, which is not in keeping with the heaven’s simplicity. In order to point this out Aristotle goes on to say that those corruptible things which have intellect have all the other powers,3 so as to imply that some incorruptible things, namely the heavenly bodies, have intellect without the other powers of the soul.

Therefore it cannot be said that the intellect comes into contact with the heavenly bodies through phantasms: but we must say that the intellect, by its substence, is united to the heavenly body as its form.

Consequently, since the human body is the most noble of all lower bodies, and by the equability of its temperament is most like the heaven which is free of all contrariety, it follows that in the opinion of Aristotle, the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any phantasms, but as its form.

As regards what we have said about the heaven being animate, we have not said it as though we asserted it to be in keeping with the teaching of faith, to which it matters not whether we state it to be so or otherwise. Hence Augustine says (Enchir.):1 Nor do I consider it as certain whether the sun, moon, and all the stars belong to the same company, i.e. of the angels; although some think them to be bodies endowed with light, without sense or intelligence.

Chapter LXXI

that the soul is united to the body immediately

We are able to conclude from the foregoing that the soul is united to the body immediately, nor must we admit any medium as uniting the soul to the body; whether it be the phantasms, as Averroes maintained;2 or its powers, as some say; or the corporeal spirit, as others have asserted.

For it has been proved3 that the soul is united to the body as its form. Now a form is united to matter without any medium whatever: since to be the act of such and such a body is competent to a form by its very nature and not by anything else. Consequently neither is there anything that makes one thing out of matter and form, except the agent which reduces the potentiality to act, as Aristotle proves (8 Metaph.):4 for matter and form are related as potentiality and act.

It may be said however that there is a medium between the soul and the body, not in the point of being, but as regards movement and in the order of generation. As regards movement, since in the movement whereby the soul moves the body there is a certain order among moved and movers. For the soul produces all its operations through its powers, so that it moves the body by means of its power, and again the members by means of the vital spirit, and again one organ by means of another. In the order of generation dispositions to a form precede the form in matter, although they are posterior thereto in being. Consequently the body’s dispositions whereby it is rendered the proper perfectible subject of such and such a form, may in that sense be described as a medium between the soul and body.

Chapter LXXII

that the whole soul is in the whole body and in each part thereof

From the same premisses we can prove that the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part thereof.

For the proper act must be in its proper perfectible subject. Now the soul is the act of an organic body,1 not of one organ only. Therefore it is in the whole body, and not only in one part, according to its essence whereby it is the form of the body.

And the soul is the form of the whole body in such a way as to be also the form of each part. For were it the form of the whole and not of the parts, it would not be the substantial form of that body: thus the form of a house, which is the form of the whole and not of each part, is merely an accidental form. That it is the substantial form both of the whole and of the parts, is clear from the fact that both the whole and the parts take their species from it. Wherefore, when it departs, neither whole nor parts retain the same species: for the eye or flesh of a dead person are only so called equivocally.2 Accordingly if the soul is the act of each part, and an act is in the thing of which it is the act, it follows that it is by its essence in each part of the body.

That this applies to the whole soul is evident. For since whole denotes relation to parts, it follows that whole is taken in various senses, according to the various meanings of parts. Now part is taken in two ways. First, forasmuch as a thing is divided according to quantity; thus two cubits is a part of three cubits. Secondly, forasmuch as a thing is divided by a division of its essence; thus form and matter are said to be parts of a composite. Hence a whole is spoken of in reference both to quantity and to essential perfection. Now whole and part in reference to quantity are not applicable to forms save accidentally, namely in so far as they are divided when the quantitative subject is divided. On the other hand whole or part in reference to essential perfection is found in forms by their very nature. Speaking then of this kind of totality, which is applicable to forms by their very nature, it is clear regarding every form that the whole of it is in the whole (subject), and the whole of it in each part thereof: for just as whiteness is in a whole body in respect of the whole essence of whiteness, so is it in each part thereof. It is otherwise with the totality which is ascribed to forms accidentally: for in this sense we cannot say that the whole whiteness is in each part. Accordingly, if there be a form that is not divided when its subject is divided, as the souls of perfect animals, there will be no need for a distinction, since only one totality is applicable to them: and we must say absolutely that the whole of it is in each part of the body. Nor is this difficult to conceive for one who understands that the soul is not indivisible in the same way as a point, and that an incorporeal is not united to a corporeal being in the same way as bodies are united together, as we have expounded above.1

Nor is it inconsistent that the soul, since it is a simple form, should be the act of parts so various. Because the matter of every form is adapted to it according to its requirements. Now the more noble and simple a form is, the greater is its power: and consequently the soul which is the noblest of the lower forms, though simple in substance, is manifold in power and has many operations. Wherefore it needs various organs in order to accomplish its operations, of which organs the various powers of the soul are said to be the acts; for instance sight of the eye, hearing of the ears, and so forth. For this reason perfect animals have the greatest variety of organs, while plants have the least.

This explains why certain philosophers have stated that the soul is in some particular part of the body: thus Aristotle (De Causa Motus Anim.)1 says that it is in the heart, because one of its powers is ascribed to that part of the body. For the motive power, of which Aristotle was treating in that book, is chiefly in the heart, by which the soul communicates movement and other like operations to the whole body.

Chapter LXXIII

that there is not one possible intellect in all men

From what has been said it is evidently shown that there is not one possible intellect of all present, future, and past men, as Averroes fancies (3 De Anima).2

For it has been proved that the substance of the intellect is united to the human body as its form.3 Now one form cannot possibly be in more than one matter, because the proper act is produced in its proper potentiality, since they are mutually proportionate. Therefore there is not one intellect of all men.

Again. To every mover proper instruments are due, for the piper uses one kind of instrument, and the builder another. Now the intellect is compared to the body as the latter’s mover, as Aristotle declares (3 De Anima).4 Just as, therefore, it is impossible for the builder to use the instruments of a piper, so is it impossible for the intellect of one man to be the intellect of another.

Further. Aristotle (1 De Anima)5 reproves the ancients for that while treating of the soul, they said nothing about its proper recipient: as though it could happen that, according to the Pythagorean fables, any soul might put on any body. It is therefore not possible for the soul of a dog to enter the body of a wolf, or for a man’s soul to enter any body other than a man’s. Now, the proportion between man’s soul and man’s body is the same as between the soul of this man and the body of this man. Consequently it is impossible for the soul of this man to enter a body other than this man’s. But it is the soul of this man whereby this man understands, since according to Aristotle’s opinion (3 De Anima)1 man understands by his soul. Therefore the intellect of this and that man is not the same.

Moreover. A thing has being and unity from the same cause: for one and being are consequent upon one another. Now every thing has being through its form. Therefore the unity of a thing is consequent upon the unity of the form. Consequently it is impossible that there should be one form of several individuals. Now the form of this individual man is his intellective soul. Therefore there cannot possibly be one intellect of all men.

If, however, it be said that the sensitive soul of this man is distinct from the sensitive soul of that one, and to that extent there is not one man, although there is one intellect; this cannot stand. For each thing’s proper operation is a consequence and an indication of its species. Now just as the proper operation of an animal is sensation, so the operation proper to man is understanding, as Aristotle says (1 Ethic.).2 Hence it follows that just as this individual is an animal by reason of sense, according to Aristotle (2 De Anima),3 so is he a man by reason of that whereby he understands. But that whereby the soul,—or man through the soul—understands, is the possible intellect, as stated in 3 De Anima.4 Therefore this individual is a man through the possible intellect. Consequently if this man has a distinct sensitive soul from that man’s, and yet not a distinct possible intellect but one and the same, it will follow that they are two animals, but not two men: which is clearly impossible. Therefore there is not one possible intellect of all men.

The said Commentator replies to these arguments (3 De Anima),1 by saying that the possible intellect comes into contact with us by its form, that is by the intelligible species, the subject of which is the phantasma existing in us, and which is distinct in distinct subjects. Wherefore the possible intellect is individualized in different subjects, not by reason of its substance, but by reason of its form.

It is clear from what has been said above that this reply is of no avail. For it was shown above2 that it is impossible for man to understand if the possible intellect merely comes thus into contact with us.

And granted that the said contact were sufficient for man to have intelligence, nevertheless the reply adduced does not solve the arguments given above. For according to the opinion in question, nothing pertaining to the intellect will be individualized according to the number of men, excepting only the phantasm. And this very phantasm will not be individualized according as it is actually understood, because thus it is in the possible intellect, and abstracted from material conditions by the active intellect. Now the phantasm, as understood potentially, does not surpass the degree of the sensitive soul. Consequently this man will still remain indistinct from that one, except as regards the sensitive soul: and there will follow the absurdity already indicated, that this and that man are not several men.

Further. Nothing derives its species through that which is in potentiality, but by that which is in act. Now the phantasm as individualized is merely in potentiality to intelligible being. Therefore this individual does not derive the species of intellective animal, that is the nature of man, from the phantasm as individualized. And consequently it will still follow that what gives the human species is not individualized in different subjects.

Again. That through which a living thing derives its species is its first and not its second perfection, as Aristotle states in 2 De Anima.1 But the phantasm is not the first but a second perfection; because the imagination is movement caused by sense in act, as stated in De Anima.2 Therefore it is not from the individual phantasm that man derives his species.

Moreover. Phantasms that are understood potentially, are of various kinds. Now that from which a thing derives its species ought to be one, since of one thing there is one species. Therefore man does not derive his species through the phantasms as individualized in various subjects, in which way they are understood potentially.

Again. That from which a man derives his species, must needs always remain the same in the same individual as long as the individual lasts: else the individual would not always be of one and the same species, but sometimes of this one, and sometimes of that one. Now the phantasms do not always remain the same in one man; but some come anew, while other previous ones pass away. Therefore the human individual neither derives his species through the phantasm, nor comes thereby into touch with the principle of his species, which is the possible intellect.

If, however, it be said that this man derives his species, not from the phantasms themselves, but from the powers in which the phantasms reside, namely those of imagination, memory, and cogitation, which latter is proper to man and is called by Aristotle (3 De Anima)3 the passive intellect, still the same impossibilities follow. Because, since the cogitative power has an operation only about particulars, the intentions whereof it composes and divides, and has a corporeal organ whereby it acts, it does not surpass the genus of the sensitive soul. Now man, by his sensitive soul, is not a man but an animal. Therefore it still remains that the only thing which is numbered in us is that which belongs to man as an animal.

Further. The cogitative power, since it operates through an organ, is not that whereby we understand: because understanding is not the operation of an organ. Now that whereby we understand is that by which man is man: because understanding is man’s proper operation consequent upon his species.1 Therefore it is not by the cogitative power that this individual is a man, nor is it by this power that man differs essentially from dumb animals, as the Commentator imagines.

Further. The cogitative power is not directed to the possible intellect whereby man understands, except through its act by which the phantasms are prepared, so that by the active intellect they may be made actually intelligible, and perfect the possible intellect. Now this operation does not always remain the same in us. Consequently it is impossible for man either to be brought into contact thereby with the principle of the human species, or to receive its species therefrom. It is therefore evident that the above reply is to be utterly rejected.

Again. That by which a thing operates or acts is a principle to which the operation is a sequel not only as to its being, but also in the point of multitude or unity: since from the same heat there is only one heating or active calefaction, although to be heated or passive calefaction may be manifold, according to the diversity of things heated simultaneously by the same heat. Now the possible intellect is whereby the soul understands, as Aristotle states (3 De Anima).2 Consequently if the possible intellect of this and that man is one and the same in number, the act of intelligence will of necessity be one and the same in both. But this is clearly impossible: since the one operation cannot belong to different individuals. It is therefore impossible for this and that man to have the one possible intellect. And if it be said that the very act of understanding is multiplied according to the difference of phantasms; this cannot stand. For as we have stated, the one action of the one agent is multiplied only according to the different subjects into which that action passes. But understanding, willing, and the like are not actions that pass into outward matter, but remain in the agent himself, as perfections of that same agent, as Aristotle declares (9 Metaph.).1 Therefore one act of understanding of the possible intellect cannot be multiplied by reason of a diversity of phantasms.

Further. The phantasms are related to the possible intellect somewhat as agent to patient: in which sense Aristotle says (3 De Anima)2 that to understand is in a sense to be passive. Now the passiveness of the patient is differentiated according to the different forms or species of the agents, and not according to their numerical distinction. For the one passive subject is heated and dried at the same time as the result of two active causes, namely heating and drying: whereas from two heating agents there do not result two heatings in one heatable subject, but only one; unless the agents happen to differ in species. For since two heats of the same species cannot be in one subject, and movement is counted according to the term whereto, if the movement be at one time and in the same subject, there cannot be a double heating in one subject. And I say this unless there be more than one species of heat: thus in the seed there is said to be the heat of fire, of heaven, and of the soul.3 Wherefore the possible intellect’s act of understanding is not multiplied according to the diversity of phantasms, except in respect of its understanding various species,—so that we may say that its act of understanding is different when it understands a man, and when it understands a horse—but one act of understanding these things is at the same time becoming to all men. Consequently it will still follow that the act of understanding is identically the same in this and that man.

Again. The possible intellect understands man, not as this man, but as man simply, as regards his specific nature. Now this nature is one, however much the phantasms of man be multiplied, whether in one man or in several, according to the various human individuals, which properly speaking the phantasms represent. Consequently the multiplication of phantasms cannot cause the multiplication of the possible intellect’s act of understanding in respect of one species. Hence it will still follow that there is one identical act of several men.

Again. The possible intellect is the proper subject of the habit of science: because its act is to consider according to science. Now an accident, if it be one, is not multiplied except according to the subject. Consequently if there be one possible intellect of all men, it will follow of necessity that the same specific habit of science, for instance the habit of grammar, is identically the same in all men: which is unthinkable. Therefore the possible intellect is not one in all.

To this, however, they reply that the subject of the habit of science is not the possible intellect, but the passive intellect and the cogitative power.1

But this cannot be. For as Aristotle proves (2 Ethic.),2 from like acts like habits are formed which again produce like acts. Now the habit of science is formed in us by acts of the possible intellect, and we are capable of performing the same acts according to the habit of science. Wherefore the habit of science is in the possible, not the passive, intellect.

Further. Science is about the conclusions of demonstrations: for a demonstration is a syllogism that makes us know scientifically, as Aristotle states (1 Poster.).3 Now the conclusions of demonstrations are universal like their premisses. Therefore science will be in the power that is cognizant of universals. Now the passive intellect is not cognizant of universals, but of particular intentions. Therefore it is not the subject of the scientific habit.

Further. This is refuted by several arguments adduced above, when we were discussing the union of the possible intellect to man.4

Seemingly the fallacy of placing the habit of science in the passive intellect arose from the fact that men are observed to be more or less apt for the considerations of sciences according to the various dispositions of the cogitative and imaginative powers.

But this aptitude depends on these powers as on remote dispositions, in the same way as it depends on perfection of touch and bodily temperament; in which sense Aristotle says (2 De Anima)1 that men of perfect touch and of soft flesh are well apt of mind. But from the habit of science there results an aptitude for consideration as from the proximate principle of that action: because the habit of science must perfect the power whereby we understand, so that it act easily at will even as other habits perfect the powers in which they reside.2

Again. The dispositions of the aforesaid powers are on the part of the object, namely of the phantasm, which on account of the goodness of these powers is prepared in such a way as easily to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect. Now the dispositions on the part of the objects are not habits, but those dispositions are, which are on the part of the powers: for the habit of fortitude is not the disposition whereby fearsome objects become objects of endurance, but a habit whereby a part of the soul, namely the irascible, is disposed to endure fearsome objects. It is consequently evident that the habit of science is not in the passive intellect, as the said Commentator asserts, but rather in the possible intellect.

Again. If there is one possible intellect for all men, it must be allowed that if, as they assert, men have been always, the possible intellect has always existed: and much more the active intellect, since the agent is more noble than the patient, as Aristotle says (3 De Anima).3 Now if the agent is eternal, and the recipient eternal, the things received must be eternal. Consequently the intelligible species were from eternity in the possible intellect. Hence it does not receive any intelligible species anew. But sense and imagination are not required for anything to be understood except that the intelligible species may be derived from them. Wherefore neither sense nor imagination will be necessary for understanding. And we shall come back to Plato’s opinion that we do not acquire knowledge from the senses, but that we are awakened by them to the recollection of things we knew before.1

To this the said Commentator replies2 that the intelligible species have a twofold subject, from one of which, namely the possible intellect, they derive eternity, while from the other, the phantasm to wit, they derive newness: even as the subject of the visible species is twofold, namely the object outside the soul, and the faculty of sight.

But this reply cannot stand. For it is impossible that the action and perfection of an eternal thing should depend on something temporal. Now phantasms are temporal, being renewed daily by virtue of the senses. Consequently the intelligible species by which the possible intellect is made actual and operates cannot depend on the phantasms, as the visible species depends on things that are outside the soul.

Moreover. Nothing receives what it already has: because the recipient must needs be void of the thing received, according to Aristotle.3 Now the intelligible species, before my sensation or yours, were in the possible intellect, for those who were before us would not have understood, unless the possible intellect had been reduced to act by the intelligible species. Nor can it be said that these species already received into the possible intellect, have ceased to exist: because the possible intellect not only receives but also keeps what it receives; wherefore in the 3 De Anima4, it is called the abode of species. Consequently species are not received from our phantasms into the possible intellect. Therefore it were useless for our phantasms to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect.

Again. The thing received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient.5 But the intellect is in itself above movement. Wherefore what is received into it, is received fixedly and immovably.

Further. Since the intellect is a higher power than the senses, it follows that it is more united: and for this reason we observe that one intellect exercises judgment on various kinds of sensibles which appertain to various sensitive powers. Hence we are able to gather that the operations appertaining to the various sensitive powers, are united in the one intellect. Now some of the sensitive powers receive only, for instance the senses, while some retain, as imagination and memory, wherefore they are called store-houses.1 It follows therefore that the possible intellect both receives and retains what it has received.

Moreover. It is useless to say that in natural things what is acquired by movement remains not but forthwith ceases to be: since the opinion of those who say that all things are ever in motion is repudiated, because movement must terminate in repose. Much less therefore can it be said that what is received into the possible intellect is not retained.

Again. If from the phantasms that are in us the possible intellect does not receive any intelligible species, because it has already received from the phantasms of those who were before us; for the same reason it receives from none of the phantasms of those who were preceded by others. But if the world is eternal, as they say, every one was preceded by some others. Consequently the possible intellect never receives any species from the phantasms. Wherefore it was useless for Aristotle to place the active intellect, in order to make the phantasms actually intelligible.2

Further. It follows from this seemingly that the possible intellect needs not the phantasms in order to understand. Now we understand by the possible intellect. Neither therefore would we stand in need of phantasms in order to understand: and this is clearly false, and contrary to Aristotle’s opinion.3 And if it be said that for the same reason we should not need a phantasm in order to consider the things the species of which are retained in the possible intellect, even if different persons have different possible intellects:—which is contrary to Aristotle, who says that the soul by no means understands without a phantasm:1—it is evident that this objection is to no purpose. For the possible intellect like every substance operates according to the mode of its nature. Now, according to the mode of its nature it is the form of the body. Wherefore it understands immaterial things indeed, but it considers them in something material. A sign of this is that in teaching universal principles we propose particular examples, so that our statements are viewed in them. Consequently the possible intellect is related in one way to the phantasm which it needs, before having the intelligible species, and in another way after receiving the intelligible species. For before, it needs it in order to receive from it the intelligible species; wherefore it stands in relation to the possible intellect as the object moving it. But after the species has been received into it, it needs the phantasm as the instrument or foundation of its species: wherefore it is related to the phantasm as efficient cause. For by the command of the intellect there is formed in the imagination a phantasm corresponding to such and such an intelligible species, and in this phantasm the intelligible species is reflected as an exemplar in the exemplate or image. Accordingly, if the possible intellect had always had the species, it would never be compared to the phantasms as the recipient to the object moving it.

Again. The possible intellect is whereby the soul and man understand, according to Aristotle.2 If, however, the possible intellect be one in all and eternal, it follows that in it are already received all the intelligible species of the things that are or have been known by any men whatsoever. Wherefore each one of us, who understands by the possible intellect, in fact whose act of understanding is the act itself of understanding of the possible intellect, will understand all that is or has been understood by anyone whatsoever: which is clearly false.

To this the aforesaid Commentator replies by saying that we do not understand by the possible intellect, except forasmuch as it is in contact with us through our phantasms. And since phantasms are not the same in all, nor arranged in the same way, neither is whatever one person understands, understood by another. Also this reply would seem to accord with what has been stated above. Because, even if the possible intellect is not one, we do not understand the things the species of which are in the possible intellect, without the presence of phantasms disposed for that purpose.

That this reply cannot wholly avoid the difficulty, is proved thus. When the possible intellect has been made actual by the reception of the intelligible species, it can act of itself, as Aristotle says (3 De Anima).1 Hence we observe that when we have once received knowledge of a thing, it is in our power to consider it again at will. Nor are we hindered on account of phantasms: because it is in our power to form phantasms adapted to the consideration that we wish to make; unless perchance there be an obstacle on the part of the organ to which the phantasm appertains, as happens in madmen and those suffering from lethargy, who cannot freely exercise their imagination and memory. For this reason Aristotle says (8 Phys.)2 that one who already has the habit of science, although he be considering potentially, needs no mover to reduce him from potentiality to act, except one that removes an obstacle; but is able at will to proceed to actual consideration. Now if the intelligible species of all sciences be in the possible intellect, which we must needs admit if it be one and eternal, the intellect will need phantasms in the same way as one who already has science needs them in order to consider according to that science, which also it cannot do without phantasms. Since then every man understands by the possible intellect forasmuch as it is reduced to act by the intelligible species, every man will be able to consider at will the things known in every science. This is clearly false, for thus no one would need a teacher in order to acquire a science. Therefore the possible intellect is not one and eternal.

Chapter LXXIV

of the opinion of avicenna, who asserted that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect

The position of Averroes, however, seems to clash with the arguments given above. For he says in his book De Anima1 that the intelligible species do not remain in the possible intellect, except when they are being actually understood.

He endeavours to prove this, because, as long as the apprehended forms remain in the apprehensive power, they are actually apprehended; since sense is made actual through being identified with the thing actually sensed, and likewise the intellect when actual is identified with the thing actually understood.2 Hence, seemingly, whenever sense or intellect becomes one with the thing sensed or understood, through having its form, there is actual apprehension through sense or intellect. And he says that the powers which preserve the forms that are not actually apprehended, are not apprehensive powers, but store-houses of the apprehensive faculties; for instance the imagination, which is the storehouse of forms apprehended by the senses, and the memory, which, according to him, is the store-house of intentions apprehended without the senses, as when the sheep apprehends the enmity of the wolf. And it so happens that these powers preserve forms which are not actually apprehended, inasmuch as they have certain corporeal organs wherein forms are received in a manner akin to apprehension. For which reason the apprehensive power by turning to these store-houses apprehends actually. Whence he concludes that it is impossible for the intelligible species to be preserved in the possible intellect, except while it understands actually. It follows then—either that the intelligible species themselves are preserved in some corporeal organ or some power having a corporeal organ,—or else that intelligible forms exist of themselves, and that our possible intellect is compared to them as a mirror to the things which are seen in a mirror;—or again that whenever the possible intellect understands actually, the intelligible species are infused anew into the possible intellect by a separate agent. Now the first of these three is impossible, because forms existing in powers which use corporeal organs are only potentially intelligible: while the second is the opinion of Plato, which Aristotle refutes in his Metaphysics.1 Wherefore he concludes by accepting the third, namely that whenever we understand actually, the intelligible species are infused into our possible intellect by the active intellect, which he asserts to be a separate substance.

And if anyone argues against him that then there is no difference between a man when he first learns, and when afterwards he wishes to consider actually what he has previously learnt, he replies that to learn is merely to acquire the perfect aptitude for uniting oneself with the active intelligence so as to receive the intelligible form therefrom. Wherefore before learning there is in man a mere potentiality for such a reception, and to learn is as it were the potentiality adapted.

Moreover, it would seem to be in agreement with this position, that Aristotle in his book De Memoria,2 proves that the memory is not in the intellective faculty, but in the sensitive part of the soul. Whence it follows, seemingly, that the preserving of the species does not belong to the intellective part.

Nevertheless, if we consider it carefully, this position, as regards its origin, differs little or not at all from that of Plato. For Plato asserted that intelligible forms are separate substances, from which knowledge flows into our souls: while he (Avicenna) affirms that knowledge flows into our souls from one separate substance which, according to him, is the active intellect. Now it matters not, as regards the manner of acquiring knowledge, whether our knowledge be caused by one or several separate substances, since in either case it follows that our knowledge is not caused by sensible objects: whereas the contrary is proved by the fact that a person who lacks one sense, lacks also the knowledge of those sensibles that are known through that sense.

Moreover, the statement that through considering singulars which are in the imagination, the possible intellect is enlightened with the light of the active intellect so as to know the universal: and that the actions of the lower powers, namely of the imagination, memory, and cogitative powers, adapt the soul to receive the emanation of the active intellect is a pure invention. For we see that our soul is the more disposed to receive from separate substances, according as it is further removed from corporeal and sensible things: since by withdrawing from that which is below one approaches to that which is above. Therefore it is not likely that the soul is disposed to receive the influence of a separate intelligence, by considering corporeal phantasms.

Plato, however, was more consistent with the principle on which his position was based. Because he held that sensibles do not dispose the soul to receive the influence of separate forms, but merely arouse the intellect to consider the things the knowledge of which it had received from an external cause. For he maintained that knowledge of all things knowable was caused in our souls from the outset by separate forms; hence he said that to learn is a kind of remembering. In fact this is a necessary consequence of his position: because, since separate substances are immovable and unchangeable, the knowledge of things is always reflected from them in our soul, which is capable of that knowledge.

Moreover. That which is received in a thing is therein according to the mode of the recipient. Now the being of the possible intellect is more stable than the being of corporeal matter. Therefore, since forms that flow into corporeal matter from the active intelligence are, according to him, preserved in that matter, much more are they preserved in the possible intellect.

Again. Intellective knowledge is more perfect than sensitive. Wherefore, if there is something to preserve things apprehended in sensitive knowledge, a fortiori will this be the case in intellective knowledge.

Again. We find that when, in a lower order of powers, various things belong to various powers, in a higher order they belong to one: thus the common sense apprehends the objects sensed by all the proper senses. Hence to apprehend and to preserve, which, in the sensitive part of the soul, belong to different powers, must needs be united in the highest power, namely the intellect.

Further. The active intelligence, according to him, causes all scientific knowledge. Wherefore if to learn is merely to be adapted to union with the active intelligence, he who learns one science, does not learn that one more than another: which is clearly false.

It is also clear that this position is in conflict with the opinion of Aristotle, who says (3 De Anima)1 that the possible intellect is the abode of the species: which is the same as to say that it is the store-house of intelligible species, to use the words of Avicenna.

Again. He adds further on2 that, when the possible intellect acquires knowledge, it is capable of acting by itself, although it understand not actually. Therefore it needs not the influence of any higher agent.

He also says (8 Phys.)3 that before learning, man is in essential potentiality to knowledge, and consequently needs a mover by which to be reduced to actuality; whereas after he has already learnt, he needs no mover per se. Therefore he does not need the influence of the active intellect.

He also says (3 De Anima)4 that the phantasms are to the possible intellect what sensibles are to the senses. Wherefore it is clear that the intelligible species result in the possible intellect from the phantasms and not from a separate substance.

As to the arguments which would seem to favour the contrary it is not difficult to solve them. For the possible intellect is in perfect act in respect of the intelligible species, when it considers actually; but when it does not actually consider, it is not in perfect act, but is in a state between potentiality and act. This is what Aristotle says (3 De Anima),1 namely that when this part, the possible intellect to wit, is identified with a thing, it is said to know it actually. And this happens when it is capable of acting by itself. Even thus it is also somewhat in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning or discovering.

The memory is assigned to the sensitive part, because it is of something as conditioned by a determinate time, for it is only of what is past. Consequently, since it does not abstract from singular conditions, it does not belong to the intellective part which is of universals. Yet this does not preclude the possible intellect being able to preserve intelligibles which abstract from all particular conditions.

Chapter LXXV

solution of the arguments which would seem to prove the unity of the possible intellect

We must now show the inefficacy of such arguments as are adduced to prove the unity of the possible intellect.2

For seemingly every form that is one specifically and many in number is individualized by matter: since things that are one in species and many in number, agree in form and differ in matter. Wherefore if the possible intellect is multiplied numerically in different men, whereas it is one in species, it must needs be individualized in this and that man by matter. This is not however by matter which is a part of the intellect itself, because then its reception would be of the same kind as that of primary matter, and it would receive individual forms; which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. It follows, therefore, that it is individualized by matter which is the human body of which it is supposed to be the form. Now every form that is individualized by matter whereof it is the act, is a material form. Because the being of a thing must needs depend on that from which it has its individuality: for just as common principles belong to the essence of the species, so individualizing principles belong to the essence of this particular individual. Hence it follows that the possible intellect is a material form: and consequently that it neither receives anything nor operates without a corporeal organ. And this again is contrary to the nature of the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is not multiplied in different men, but is one for all.

Again. If there were a different possible intellect in this and that man, it would follow that the species understood is numerically distinct in this and that man, though one specifically: for, since the possible intellect is the proper subject of species actually understood, if there be many possible intellects, the intelligible species must needs be multiplied numerically in different intellects. Now species or forms that are the same specifically and different numerically, are individual forms. But these cannot be intelligible, since intelligibles are universal, not particular. Therefore it is impossible for the possible intellect to be multiplied in different human individuals: and consequently it must be one in all.

Again. The master imparts the knowledge that he possesses to his disciple. Either, then, he imparts the same knowledge numerically, or he imparts a knowledge that is different numerically but not specifically. The latter is apparently impossible, since then the master would cause his knowledge to be in his disciple, as he causes his form to be in another by begetting one like to him in species; and this would seem to apply to material agents. It follows, therefore, that he causes the same knowledge numerically to be in his disciple. But this would be impossible unless there were one possible intellect for both. Therefore seemingly there must needs be but one possible intellect for all men.

Nevertheless, just as the aforesaid position is void of truth, as we have proved,1 so the arguments adduced in support thereof are easy of solution.

For we contend that while the possible intellect is specifically one in different men, it is nevertheless many numerically: yet so as not to lay stress on the fact that the parts of a man do not by themselves belong to the genus or species, but only as principles of the whole. Nor does it follow that it is a material form dependent, as to its being, on the body. For just as it is competent to the human soul in respect of its species to be united to a body of a particular species, so this particular soul differs only numerically from that one through having a habitude to a numerically different body. Thus human souls are individualized,—and consequently the possible intellect also which is a power of the soul,—in relation to the bodies, and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies.

His second argument fails through not distinguishing between that whereby one understands, and that which is understood. For the species received into the intellect is not that which is understood. Because, since all arts and sciences are about things understood, it would follow that all sciences are about species existing in the possible intellect. And this is clearly false, for no science takes any consideration of such things except Logic and Metaphysics. Nevertheless whatever there is in all the sciences is known through them. Consequently in the process of understanding the species received into the possible intellect is as the thing by which one understands, and not as that which is understood: even as the coloured image in the eye is not that which is seen, but that by which we see. On the other hand that which is understood is the very essence of the things existing outside the soul, even as things outside the soul are seen by corporeal sight: since arts and sciences were devised for the purpose of knowing things as existing in their respective natures.

Nor does it follow that, because science is about universals, universals are subsistent of themselves outside the soul, as Plato maintained. For, although true knowledge requires that knowledge correspond to things, it is not necessary that knowledge and thing should have the same mode of being. Because things that are united in reality are sometimes known separately: thus a thing is at once white and sweet, yet sight knows only the whiteness, and taste only the sweetness. So too the intellect understands a line existing in sensible matter, apart from the sensible matter, although it can also understand it with sensible matter. Now this difference occurs according to the difference of intelligible species received into the intellect: for the species is sometimes an image of quantity alone, and sometimes is an image of a quantitative sensible substance. In like manner, although the generic and specific natures are never save in particular individuals, yet the intellect understands the specific and generic natures without understanding the individualizing principles: and this is to understand universals. And thus these two are not incompatible, namely that universals do not subsist outside the soul, and that the intellect, in understanding universals, understands things that are outside the soul. That the intellect understands the generic or specific nature apart from the individualizing principles results from the condition of the intelligible species received into it, for it is rendered immaterial by the active intellect, through being abstracted from matter and material conditions whereby a particular thing is individualized. Consequently the sensitive powers are unable to know universals: because they cannot receive an immaterial form, since they always receive in a corporeal organ.

Therefore it does not follow that the intelligible species is numerically one in this and that person who understand: for the result of this would be that the act of understanding in this and that person is numerically one, since operation follows the form which is the principle of the species. But in order that there be one thing understood, it is necessary that there be an image of one and the same thing. And this is possible if the intelligible species be numerically distinct: for nothing prevents several distinct images being made of one thing, and this is how one man is seen by several. Hence it is not incompatible with the intellect’s knowledge of the universal that there be several intelligible species in several persons. Nor does it follow from this, if intelligible species be several in number and specifically the same, that they are not actually intelligible but only potentially, like other individual things. For individuality is not incompatible with actual intelligibility: since it must be admitted that both possible and active intellects are individual things, if we suppose them to be separate substances, not united to the body and subsistent of themselves, and yet they are intelligible. But it is materiality which is incompatible with intelligibility: a sign of which is that for forms of material things to be actually intelligible, they need to be abstracted from matter. Consequently in those things in which individualization is effected by particular signate matter, the things individualized are not actually intelligible; whereas if individualization is not the result of matter, nothing prevents things that are individual from being actually intelligible. Now intelligible species, like all other forms, are individualized by their subject which is the possible intellect. Wherefore, since the possible intellect is not material, it does not deprive of actual intelligibility the species which it individualizes.

Further. In sensible things, just as individuals are not actually intelligible if there be many in one species, for instance horses or men, so neither are those individuals which are alone in their species, as this particular sun or this particular moon. Now species are individualized in the same way by the possible intellect, whether there be several possible intellects or one; whereas they are not multiplied in the same way in the one species. Therefore it matters not, as regards the actual intelligibility of the species received into the possible intellect, whether there be one or several possible intellects in all.

Again. The possible intellect, according to the same Commentator, is the last in the order of intelligible substances, which in his opinion are several. Nor can it be denied that some of the higher substances are cognizant of the things which the possible intellect knows: since, as he says himself, the forms of the effects caused by the movement of a sphere are in the movers of the spheres. Hence it will still follow that, even if there be one possible intellect, the intelligible forms are multiplied in different intellects. And although we have stated that the intelligible species received into the possible intellect, is not that which is understood, but that whereby one understands, this does not prevent the intellect, by a kind of reflexion, from understanding itself and its act of intelligence, and the species whereby it understands. In fact it understands its act of intelligence in two ways: first in particular, for it understands that it understands in a particular instance; secondly, in general, in as much as it argues about the nature of its act. Consequently it understands both the intellect and the intelligible species in like manner in two ways: both by perceiving its own existence and that it has an intelligible species, which is a kind of particular knowledge, and by considering its own nature and that of the intelligible species, which is a kind of universal knowledge. In this latter sense we treat of the intellect and things intelligible in sciences.

From what has been said the solution to the third argument is also evident. For his statement that knowledge in the disciple and in the master is numerically one, is partly true and partly false. It is numerically one as regards the thing known, but not as regards the intelligible species whereby it is known, nor again as regards the habit itself of knowledge. And yet it does not follow that the master causes knowledge in the disciple in the same way as fire generates fire: since things are not in the same way generated by nature as by art. For fire generates fire naturally, by reducing matter from potentiality to the act of its form, whereas the master causes knowledge in his disciple after the manner of art, since to this purpose is assigned the art of demonstration which Aristotle teaches in the Posterior Analytics, for a demonstration is a syllogism that makes us know.1

It must, however, be observed, in accordance with Aristotle’s teaching in 7 Metaph.,2 that there are some arts in which the matter is not an active principle productive of the art’s effect; such is the art of building, since in timber and stone there is not an active force tending to the production of a house, but merely a passive aptitude. On the other hand there is an art the matter of which is an active principle tending to produce the effect of the art; such is the medical art, since in the sick body there is an active principle conducive to health. Consequently the effect of an art of the first kind is never produced by nature but is always the result of the art. But the effect of an art of the second kind is the result both of art, and of nature without art: for many are healed by the action of nature without the art of medicine. In those things that can be done both by art and by nature, art copies nature;3 for if a person is taken ill through a cold cause, nature cures him by heating. Now the art of teaching is like this art. For in him that is taught there is an active principle conducive to knowledge, namely the intellect, and those things which are naturally understood, namely first principles. Wherefore knowledge is acquired in two ways, both by discovery without teaching, and by teaching. Consequently the teacher begins to teach in the same way as the discoverer begins to discover, namely by offering to the disciple’s consideration principles known by him, since all learning results from pre-existing knowledge;4 and by drawing conclusions from those principles; and again by proposing sensible examples, from which there result, in the disciple’s mind, the phantasms which are necessary that he may understand. And since the outward action of the teacher would have no effect, without the inward principle of knowledge, which is in us from God, hence among theologians it is said that man teaches by outward ministration, but God by inward operation: even so the physician is said to minister to nature when he heals. Accordingly knowledge is caused in the disciple by his master, not by way of natural action, but after the manner of art, as stated.

Further. Since the same Commentator places the habits of science in the passive intellect as their subject,1 the unity of the possible intellect nowise causes numerical unity of knowledge in disciple and master. For it is evident that the passive intellect is not the same in different individuals, since it is a material power. Consequently this argument consistently with his position is not to the point.

Chapter LXXVI

that the active intellect is not a separate substance but part of the soul

From the foregoing we may also conclude that neither is there one active intellect in all, as Alexander and Avicenna maintained, who do not hold that there is one possible intellect in all.

For since agent and recipient are mutually proportionate, it follows that to every patient there corresponds a proper agent. Now the possible intellect is compared to the active as the proper patient or recipient of the latter, since it is related to it as art to matter, as stated in 3 De Anima.2 Hence if the possible intellect is part of the human soul, and multiplied according to the number of individuals, as we have shown,3 the active intellect also will be the like, and not one for all.

Again. The active intellect makes the species to be actually intelligible, not that itself may understand by them, especially as a separate substance, since it is not in potentiality, but that the possible intellect may understand by them. Therefore it does not make them to be otherwise than as required by the possible intellect in order that it may understand. But it makes them to be such as it is itself, since every agent produces its like.1 Therefore the active intellect is proportionate to the possible intellect: and consequently, since the possible intellect is a part of the soul, the active intellect is not a separate substance.

Moreover. Just as primary matter is perfected by natural forms which are outside the soul, so the possible intellect is perfected by forms actually understood. Now natural forms are received into primary matter, not by the action of only one separate substance, but by the action of a form of the same kind,—of a form, namely, that is in matter: even as this particular flesh is begotten through a form that is in this particular flesh and bones, as Aristotle proves in 7 Metaph.2 Consequently if the possible intellect is a part of the soul and not a separate substance, as we have shown,3 the active intellect, by whose action the intelligible species result therein, will not be a separate substance, but an active force of the soul.

Again. Plato held that knowledge in us is caused by ideas, which he affirmed to be separate substances; and Aristotle refutes this opinion in 1 Metaph.4 Now it is clear that our knowledge depends on the active intellect as its first principle. If, then, the active intellect were a separate substance, there would be little or no difference between this opinion and Plato’s which was refuted by the Philosopher.

Again. If the active intellect be a separate substance, its action must needs be continuous and uninterrupted: or at least we must say that it is not continued or interrupted at our will. Now its action is to make phantasms actually intelligible. Either, therefore, it will do this always, or not always. If not always, this will nevertheless not be at our discretion. Now, we understand actually when the phantasms are made actually intelligible. Consequently it follows that either we always understand, or that it is not in our power to understand actually.

Further. A separate substance stands in the same relation to all the phantasms that are in any men whatsoever: even as the sun stands in the same relation to all colours. Now sensible things are perceived by those who know as well as by those who are ignorant: and consequently the same phantasms are in both. Hence they will be made intelligible by the active intellect in either case: and consequently both will equally understand.

It may be said, however, that the active intellect for its own part is always active, but that the phantasms are not always made actually intelligible, but only when they are disposed thereto. Now, they are disposed thereto by the act of the cogitative power, the use of which is in our power. Consequently to understand actually is in our power. It is for this reason that not all men understand the things whereof they have the phantasms, since not all have the requisite act of the cogitative power, but only those who are instructed and accustomed.

Nevertheless this reply is seemingly not quite sufficient. For this disposition to understand, which is effected by the cogitative power, must either be a disposition of the possible intellect to receive intelligible forms, emanating from the active intellect, as Avicenna maintains, or a disposition of the phantasms to be made actually intelligible, as Averroes and Alexander assert. Now, the former would seem improbable. Because the possible intellect by its very nature is in potentiality with regard to species actually intelligible, wherefore it stands in the same relation to them as a transparent body to light or to coloured images. And if a thing by its very nature is capable of receiving a certain form, it needs no further disposition to that form: unless perchance it contain contrary dispositions, as the matter of water is disposed to the form of air by the removal of cold and density. But there is nothing contrary in the possible intellect to prevent it receiving any intelligible species whatsoever: since the intelligible species even of contraries are not themselves contrary in the intellect, as Aristotle proves in 7 Metaph.,1 for one is the reason for knowing the other. And the falsity which is incidental to the intellect’s judgment in composition and division, results not from the presence in the intellect of certain things understood, but from its lack of certain things. Therefore the possible intellect, for its own part, requires no preparation in order to receive the intelligible species emanating from the active intellect.

Further. Colours which light has made actually visible, without fail impress their likeness on the diaphanous body and consequently on the sight. Consequently if the phantasms themselves on which the active intellect has shed its light did not impress their likeness on the possible intellect, but merely disposed it to receive them, the phantasms would not stand in the same relation to the possible intellect as colours to the sight, as Aristotle asserts.2

Again. According to this the phantasms, and consequently the senses would not be of themselves necessary for us to understand; but only accidentally, as it were inciting and preparing the possible intellect to receive. This is part of the Platonist theory, and contrary to the order which Aristotle assigns to the generation of art and science, in the first Book of Metaphysics3 and the last Book of Posterior Analytics;4 where he says that memory results from sensation; experience from many memories; from many memories the universal apprehension which is the beginning of science and art. This opinion of Avicenna, however, is in keeping with what he says about the generation of natural things.5 For he holds that all lower agents, by their actions, prepare matter to receive the forms which emanate from a separate active intelligence into their respective matters. Hence also, for the same reason, he holds that the phantasms prepare the possible intellect; and that the intelligible forms emanate from a separate substance.

In like manner, if it be supposed that the active intellect is a separate substance, it seems unreasonable that the phantasms should be prepared by the cogitative power in order that they be actually intelligible and move the possible intellect. For this is seemingly in keeping with the opinion of those who say that the lower agents merely dispose to the ultimate perfection, and that this ultimate perfection is caused by a separate agent: which is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle in 7 Metaph.1 For it would seem that the human soul is not less perfectly equipped for understanding than the lower things of nature for their proper operations.

Moreover. In this lower world the more noble effects are produced not by higher agents alone, but also require agents of their own genus, for the sun and man generate a man.2 In like manner we observe that in other perfect animals, some of the lower animals are generated by the mere action of the sun, without an active principle of their own genus; for instance animals engendered of putrefaction. Now understanding is the most noble effect that takes place in this lower world. Therefore it is not enough to ascribe it to a remote agent, unless we suppose it to have also a proximate cause. This argument however does not avail against Avicenna, because he holds3 that any animal can be generated without seed.

Again. The intention of the effect shows the agent. Wherefore animals engendered of putrefaction are not intended by a lower nature but only by a higher, since they are produced by a higher nature only: for which reason Aristotle (7 Metaph.)4 says that they are effects of chance. Whereas animals that are produced from seed, are intended both by the higher and the lower nature. But this effect which is to abstract universal forms from the phantasms, is in our intention, and not merely in the intention of the remote agent. Therefore it follows that in us there must be a proximate principle of such an effect: and this is the active intellect. Therefore it is not a separate substance, but a power of our soul.

Again. The nature of every mover includes a principle sufficient for the natural operation thereof: and if this operation consists in an action, that nature includes an active principle, as appears in the powers of the nutritive soul of plants; while if this operation is a passion, it includes a passive principle, as appears in the sensitive powers of animals. Now man is the most perfect of all lower movers. And his proper and natural operation is to understand: which is not completed without some passion, in so far as the intellect is passive to the intelligible; nor again without action, in so far as the intellect makes things that are potentially intelligible to be intelligible actually. Therefore the respective principles of both, namely the active and possible intellects, must be in man’s nature and neither of these must be separate, as to its being, from the soul of man.

Again. If the active intellect be a separate substance, it is evident that it is above man’s nature. Now an operation which man performs by the power alone of a higher substance is a supernatural operation; such as the working of miracles, prophesying, and other like things which men do by God’s favour. Since, then, man cannot understand except by the power of the active intellect, if the active intellect be a separate substance, it will follow that intelligence is not a natural operation to man: and consequently man cannot be defined as being intellectual and rational.

Further. Nothing operates save by a power that is in it formally: wherefore Aristotle (2 De Anima)1 proves that the thing whereby we live and sense is a form and an act. Now both actions, namely of the active and possible intellects, are competent to man: for man abstracts from phantasms, and receives in his mind actual intelligibles; since otherwise we should not have become cognizant of these actions unless we experienced them in ourselves. Therefore the principles to which these actions are ascribed, namely the possible and active intellects, must be powers formally existing in us.

If, however, it be said that these actions are ascribed to man in so far as the aforesaid intellects are in conjunction with us, as Averroes says,1 it has already been shown2 that the possible intellect’s conjunction with us, if it be a separate substance, such as he holds it to be, does not suffice for us. to understand by its means. The same evidently applies to the active intellect. For the active intellect is to the intelligible species that are received into the possible intellect, as art to the artificial forms which art produces in matter, as appears from the example given by Aristotle in 3 De Anima.3 Now art-forms do not acquire the action of art, but only a formal likeness, so that neither can the subject of these forms exercise the action of the craftsman. Therefore neither can man exercise the operation of the active intellect, through the intelligible species being made actual in him by the active intellect.

Again. A thing that cannot set about its proper operation unless it be moved by an outward principle, is moved to operate rather than moves itself: wherefore irrational animals are moved to operate rather than move themselves, since their every operation depends on the outward principle which moves them: for their sense, moved by the outward sensible, makes an impression on their imagination, and thus there is an orderly process in all their powers down to the motive powers. Now man’s proper operation is intelligence, the first principle whereof is the active intellect which produces the intelligible species, to which in a sense the possible intellect is passive, and this being made actual moves the will. If, then, the active intellect is a substance outside man, all man’s operation depends on an outward principle: and consequently he will not move himself but will be moved by another. Hence he will not be the master of his own operations, nor will he be deserving of praise or blame; and there will be an end to all moral science and social intercourse, which is absurd. Therefore the active intellect is not a substance separate from man.

Chapter LXXVII

that it is not impossible for the possible and active intellect to concur in the one substance of the soul

Perhaps it will seem impossible to someone that one and the same substance, namely, that of our soul, should be in potentiality to all intelligibles,—which belongs to the possible intellect,—and should make them actual,—which belongs to the active intellect: since a thing acts not as it is in potentiality, but as it is in act. Wherefore it does not appear how the active and possible intellect can concur in the one substance of the soul.

If, however, one look into the matter rightly, nothing impossible or difficult follows. For nothing hinders one thing from being in one respect in potentiality with regard to some other thing, and in act in another respect, as we observe in natural things: for air is actually damp and potentially dry, whereas with earth it is the other way about. Now we find this same comparison between the intellective soul and the phantasms. For the soul has something in act to which the phantasm is in potentiality, and is in potentiality to something which is found actually in the phantasms. Because the substance of the human soul has immateriality, and, as is evident from what has been said,1 it consequently has an intellectual nature, since such is every immaterial substance. Yet it does not follow that it is likened to this or that determinate thing, which is required in order that our soul may know this or that thing determinately: for all knowledge results from the likeness of the known in the knower. Hence the intellective soul remains itself in potentiality to the determinate likenesses of things that can be known by us, and these are the natures of sensible things. It is the phantasms that offer us these determinate natures of sensible things: which phantasms, however, have not yet acquired intelligible being,—since they are images of sensible things even as to material conditions, which are the individual properties,—and moreover are in material organs. Wherefore they are not actually intelligible. And yet, since in the individual man whose image the phantasms reflect it is possible to conceive the universal nature apart from all the individualizing conditions, they are intelligible potentially. Accordingly they have intelligibility potentially, though they are actually determinate as images of things: whereas it was the other way about in the intellective soul. Consequently there is in the intellective soul an active power in respect of the phantasms, rendering them actually intelligible, and this power of the soul is called the active intellect. There is also in the soul a power that is in potentiality to the determinate images of sensible things; and this is the power of the possible intellect.

Nevertheless that which is found in the soul differs from what is found in natural agents. Because in the latter one thing is in potentiality to something according to the same mode as it is actually found in another: for the matter of the air is in potentiality to the form of water in the same way as it is in water. Hence natural bodies which have a common matter are mutually active and passive in the same order. Whereas the intellective soul is not in potentiality to the likenesses of things which are in the phantasms, according to the mode in which they are there, but according as these images are raised to something higher, by being abstracted from the individualizing conditions of matter, so that they become actually intelligible. Consequently the action of the active intellect on the phantasm precedes the reception by the possible intellect. Wherefore the pre-eminence of the action is ascribed, not to the phantasms but to the active intellect. For this reason Aristotle says1 that it is compared to the possible intellect as art to matter.

We should have a perfect example of this if the eye, besides being a diaphanous body and receptive of colours, had sufficient light to make colours actually visible; even as certain animals are said to throw sufficient light on objects by the light of their eyes, for which reason they see more by night and less by day, because their eyes are weak, since they are moved by a dim, and confused by a strong light. There is something like this in our intellect forasmuch as with regard to things most manifest it is as the eye of the owl with regard to the sun:2 so that the little intellectual light which is connatural to us is sufficient for our act of intelligence.

It is clear that the intellectual light connatural to our soul suffices to cause the action of the active intellect, if we consider why it is necessary to place an active intellect in the soul. For the soul was found to be in potentiality to intelligibles, as the senses to sensibles: since just as we do not always sense, so neither do we always understand. Now these intelligibles which the human intellective soul understands were asserted by Plato to be intelligible of themselves, namely ideas: wherefore it was unnecessary for him to admit an active intelligence in respect of intelligibles. But if this were true, it would follow that the more things are intelligible of themselves, the more would they be understood by us. Yet this is clearly false: because the nearer things are to our senses the more intelligible are they to us, though in themselves they are less intelligible. Consequently Aristotle was moved to assert that those things which are intelligible to us, are not certain things that are intelligibles in themselves, but that they are made intelligible from sensibles. Hence he had to place a power which would do this; and this is the active intellect. Wherefore the reason for placing the active intellect is that it may make intelligibles proportionate to us. Now this does not exceed the mode of the intellectual light connatural to us. Therefore nothing hinders us from ascribing the action of the active intellect to the light of our soul, and especially since Aristotle compares the active intellect to a light.1

Chapter LXXVIII

that aristotle’s opinion concerning the active intellect was not that it is a separate substance, but rather that it is part of the soul

Since however some agree with the above opinion2 in the belief that it reflects the mind of Aristotle, we must show from his words that in his opinion the active intellect is not a separate substance.

For he says,3 in the first place, that just as in every nature there is something like the matter in every genus, which is in potentiality to all that comes under that genus; while there is also a cause like the efficient cause, as art in relation to matter, so must these differences be in the soul. The latter, namely that which is as matter in the soul, is the (possible) intellect wherein all things intelligible are made: whereas the former, which is as the efficient cause in the soul, is the intellect by which we make all things (namely actually intelligible), and this is the active intellect, which is like a habit, and not a power. In what sense he calls the active intellect a habit, he explains by adding that it is as a light, since in a manner light makes potential colours to be colours actually, in so far, to wit, as it makes them to be actually visible: because this is what is ascribed to the active intellect in regard to intelligibles.

From this we gather that the active intellect is not a separate substance but rather a part of the soul: for he says explicitly that the possible and active intellect are differences of the soul and that they are in the soul. Therefore neither of them is a separate substance.

Again. His argument proves this also. Because in every nature wherein we find potentiality and act, there is something by way of matter that is in potentiality to the things of that genus, and something by way of agent, that reduces the potentiality to act: even as in the products of art, there is art and matter. Now the intellective soul is a nature in which we find potentiality and act, since sometimes it is actually understanding and sometimes potentially. Therefore in the nature of the intellective soul there is something by way of matter, that is in potentiality to all intelligibles, and this is called the possible intellect, and there is something by way of efficient cause which makes all things actual and is called the active intellect. Consequently both intellects, according to the argument of Aristotle, are in the nature of the soul, and are not something separate as to being from the body of which the soul is the act.

Moreover. Aristotle says that the active intellect is like a habit that is a light. Now a habit does not designate something existing by itself, but something belonging to one who has it (habentis). Therefore the active intellect is not a substance existing separately by itself, but is part of the human soul.

The text of Aristotle, however, does not mean that the effect of the active intellect may be described as a habit, as though the sense were: The active (intellect) makes man to understand all things, which is like a habit. For the meaning of habit, as the commentator Averroes says on this very passage, is that he who has the habit understands by that which is proper to him, by himself, and whenever he will, without any need therein of something extrinsic: since he explicitly likens to a habit, not the effect itself, but the intellect by which we make all things. And yet we are not to understand that the active intellect is a habit in the same way as a habit is in the second species of quality, in which sense some have said that the active intellect is the habit of principles. Because this habit of principles is derived from sensibles, as Aristotle proves (2 Poster.);1 and consequently it must needs be the effect of the active intellect, to which it belongs to make actually intelligible the phantasms that are understood potentially. But habit is to be taken as contrasted with privation and potentiality: in which sense every form and act may be called a habit. This is evident since he asserts that the active intellect is a habit in the same way as light is a habit.

After this he adds that this, namely the active, intellect is separate, unmixed, impassible, and an actually existing substance. Now of these four conditions which he ascribes to the active intellect, he had already1 explicitly ascribed two to the possible intellect, namely that it is unmixed and separate. He had applied the third,2 namely that it is impassible, with a distinction; for he proves in the first place that it is not passible as the senses are, and afterwards he shows that, taking passion broadly, it is passive in so far as it is in potentiality to intelligibles. But as to the fourth he absolutely denies it of the possible intellect, and says that it was in potentiality to intelligibles, and none of these things was actual before the act of intelligence.3 Accordingly in the first two the possible intellect agrees with the active; in the third it agrees partly, and partly differs; while in the fourth the active differs altogether from the possible intellect. He proves these four conditions of the active intellect by one argument, when he goes on to say:4 For the agent is always more noble than the patient, and the active principle than matter. For he had said above that the active intellect is like an efficient cause, and the possible intellect like matter. Now by this middle proposition the two first conditions are proved, thus: “The agent is more noble than the patient and matter. But the possible intellect, which is as patient and matter, is separate and untrammelled, as proved above. Much more therefore is the agent.” The others are proved by this middle proposition thus: “The agent is more noble than the patient and matter, in that it is compared thereto as agent and actual being to patient and potential being. Now, the possible intellect is, in a sense, patient and potential being. Therefore the active intellect is a non-passive agent and an actual being.” And it is evident that neither from these words of Aristotle can we gather that the active intellect is a separate substance: but that it is separate in the same sense as he had already said of the possible intellect, namely as not having an organ. When he says that it is an actually existing substance, this is not inconsistent with the substance of the soul being in potentiality, as we have shown above.1 Then he goes on to say:2 Now knowledge when actual is identical with the thing:3 where the Commentator says that the active intellect differs from the possible, because that which understands and that which is understood are the same in the active, but not in the possible intellect. But this is clearly contrary to the meaning of Aristotle. For he had employed the same words before4 in speaking of the possible intellect, where he says of the possible intellect that it is intelligible as intelligibles are: since in things void of matter, understanding and that which is understood are the same, because speculative knowledge is identified with that which it speculates. For he clearly wishes to show that the possible intellect is understood like other intelligibles, from the fact that the possible intellect, as understanding actually, is the same as that which is understood. Moreover he had said a little earlier5 that, in a manner, the possible intellect is potentially the intelligibles, but is nothing actually before it understands, where he clearly gives one to understand that by understanding actually it becomes the intelligibles. Nor is it surprising that he should say this of the possible intellect: since he had already6 said this of sense and the sensible in act. For the sense becomes actual by the species actually sensed; and in like manner the possible intellect becomes actual by the intelligible species in act; and for this reason the intellect in act is said to be the intelligible itself in act. Accordingly we must say that Aristotle, after defining the possible and active intellects, begins here to describe the intellect in act, when he says that actual knowledge is the same as the thing actually known.

Afterwards he says:1 But that which is in potentiality, in point of time, precedes in one subject, but not altogether in point of time. Which distinction between potentiality and act is employed by him in several places: namely that act is naturally prior to potentiality, but that in point of time, potentiality precedes act in one and the same subject that is changed from potentiality to act: and yet that absolutely speaking potentiality does not precede act even in point of time, since potentiality is not reduced to act except by an act. He says, therefore, that the intellect which is in potentiality, namely the possible intellect considered as being in potentiality, precedes the intellect in act in point of time; and this, be it said, in one and the same subject. But not altogether, i.e. universally: because the possible intellect is reduced to act by the active intellect, which again is in act, as he said, by some possible intellect made actual; wherefore he said (3 Phys.)2 that before learning a man needs a teacher to reduce him from potentiality to act. Accordingly in these words he shows the relation of the possible intellect, as in potentiality, to the intellect in act.

Then he says:3 But it does not sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand. Whereby he indicates the difference between the intellect in act and the possible intellect. For he said above4 of the possible intellect that it does not understand always, but sometimes does not understand, when it is in potentiality to intelligibles, and sometimes understands, when, to wit, it is them actually. Now the intellect becomes actual by becoming the intelligibles, as he had already stated. Consequently it is not competent to it to understand sometimes, and sometimes not to understand.

Afterwards he adds: But that alone is separate which is (intellect) truly. This cannot apply to the active intellect, since it alone is not separate, for he had already said the same of the possible intellect. Nor can it apply to the possible intellect, since he had already said this of the active intellect. It follows, then, that it is said of that which includes both, namely the intellect in act, of which he was speaking: because this alone in our soul is separate and uses no organ, which belongs to the intellect in act, namely that part of the soul whereby we understand actually and which includes both the possible and active intellect. Wherefore he adds that only this part of the soul is immortal and everlasting, as being independent of the body, through being separate therefrom.

Chapter LXXIX

that the human soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted

From the foregoing, then, we can clearly show that the human soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted.

For it was proved above1 that every intellectual substance is incorruptible. Now man’s soul is an intellectual substance, as we have proved.2 Therefore it follows that the human soul is incorruptible.

Again. Nothing is corrupted on account of that wherein its perfection consists: for these changes are contrary to one another, those namely which tend to perfection and corruption. Now the perfection of the human soul consists in a certain abstraction from the body: for the soul is perfected by knowledge and virtue; and as to knowledge it is perfected the more it considers immaterial things, while the perfection of virtue consists in man not following the passions of the body, but tempering and curbing them according to reason. Therefore the soul is not corrupted through being separated from the body.

If, however, it be said that the soul’s perfection consists in its being separated from the body as regards operation; and its corruption, in its being separated as regards being, this reply is not to the point. Because a thing’s operation points to its substance and being, since a thing acts according as it is a being, and a thing’s proper operation follows its proper nature. Wherefore the operation of a thing cannot be perfected except in so far as that thing’s substance is perfected. Hence if the soul is perfected, as to its operation, in quitting the body, its incorporeal substance will not fail in its being, through being separated from the body.

Again. That which properly perfects man in his soul is something incorruptible: because the proper operation of man, as man, is to understand; since it is in this that he differs from brutes, plants, and inanimate things. Now the object of the act of understanding is properly the universal and the incorruptible as such: and perfection should be proportionate to the perfectible. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.

Moreover. The natural appetite cannot possibly be frustrated. Now man naturally desires to exist always: which is evidenced by the fact that being is that which all things desire; and man by his intellect apprehends being not merely as now, as dumb animals do, but simply.1 Therefore man acquires perpetuity in regard to his soul, which apprehends being simply and for all time.

Again. Whatever is received in a thing is received therein according to the mode of that in which it is. Now the forms of things are received in the possible intellect according as they are actually intelligible. And they are actually intelligible according as they are immaterial, universal, and consequently incorruptible. Therefore the possible intellect is incorruptible. But, as we proved above,2 the possible intellect is part of the human soul. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.

Again. Intelligible being is more lasting than sensible being. Now in sensible things that which is by way of first recipient, namely primary matter, is incorruptible as to its substance. Much more so therefore is the possible intellect which is the recipient of intelligible forms. Therefore the human soul also, whereof the intellect is a part, is incorruptible.

Moreover. The maker is more noble than the thing made, as also Aristotle says.1 But the active intellect makes things actually intelligible, as shown above.2 Since, then, things actually intelligible, as such, are incorruptible, much more will the active intellect be incorruptible. Therefore such is also the soul, the light of which is the active intellect, as appears from what has been already stated.3

Again. No form is corrupted except either by the action of its contrary, or by the corruption of its subject, or by the failing of its cause: by the action of its contrary, as heat is destroyed by the action of cold; by the corruption of its subject, as the faculty of sight is destroyed through the destruction of the eye: and by the failing of its cause, as the light of the air fails through the sun, which was its cause, failing to be present. But the human soul cannot be destroyed by the action of a contrary, for nothing is contrary thereto, since by the possible intellect it is cognizant and receptive of all contraries. Likewise it cannot be corrupted through the corruption of its subject; for it has been proved above4 that the human soul is a form independent of the body as to its being. Moreover it cannot be destroyed through the failing of its cause, since it can have none but an eternal cause, as we shall show further on.5 Therefore the human soul can nowise be corrupted.

Again. If the soul be corrupted through the corruption of the body, it follows that its being is weakened through the body being weakened. Now if a power of the soul is weakened through the weakening of the body, this is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as the power of the soul needs a bodily organ; thus the sight is weakened, accidentally however, through the weakening of the organ. This is made clear as follows. If some weakness were essentially attached to the power, the latter would never be repaired through the organ being repaired: yet we see that, however much the power of sight may seem to be weakened, if the organ be repaired, the sight is repaired: wherefore Aristotle says (1 De Anima)1 that if an old man were to be given the eye of a young man, he would certainly see as well as a young man does. Accordingly, since the intellect is a power of the soul that needs no organ, as shown above,2 it is not weakened, either essentially or accidentally, by old age or any other bodily weakness. If, on the other hand, the operation of the intellect happen to be affected by fatigue or some hindrance on account of the weakness of the body, this is owing not to weakness of the intellect itself, but to the weakness of the powers which the intellect needs, namely of the imagination, memory, and cogitative power. It is therefore clear that the intellect is incorruptible. Consequently the human soul is also, since it is an intellective substance.

This is also proved from the authority of Aristotle. For he says (1 De Anima)3 that the intellect is clearly a substance and incorruptible: and it may be gathered from what has been already said4 that this cannot refer to a separate substance that is either the possible or the active intellect.

It also follows from the very words of Aristotle (11 Metaph.),5 where he says, speaking against Plato, that moving causes pre-exist, whereas formal causes are simultaneous with the things whereof they are causes: for when a man is healed, then is there health, and not before; against Plato’s statement that the forms of things exist before the things themselves. And, after saying this, he goes on to say: As to whether anything remains afterwards, this must be inquired into. For in some this is not impossible: for example, if the soul be of a certain kind, not of any kind, but if it be intellectual. From which it is clear, since he is speaking of forms, that he means that the intellect which is the form of man, remains after the matter, namely after the body.

It is also clear from the foregoing words of Aristotle that, although he states the soul to be a form, he does not assert it to be non-subsistent and therefore corruptible, as Gregory of Nyssa1 would have him mean: since he excludes the intellective soul from the generality of other forms, by saying that it remains after the soul, and that it is a substance.

The teaching of the Catholic Faith is in keeping with the foregoing. For it is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus:2 We believe that man alone has a subsistent soul, which survives even after it has put off the body, and is the life-giving source of the senses and faculties; neither does it die when the body dies, as the Arabian asserts, nor after a short interval of time, as Zeno pretends, because it is a living substance.

Hereby is set aside the error of the ungodly in whose person Solomon says (Wis. 2:2): We are born of nothing, and after this we shall be as if we had not been; and in whose person Solomon says (Eccles. 3:19): The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both is equal: as man dieth, so they also die: all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than beast. For it is clear that he speaks not in his own person but in that of the ungodly, since at the end of the book3 he says as though deciding the point: Before … the dust return into its earth from whence it was, and the spirit return to Him (Vulg.,—to God) Who gave it. Moreover there are innumerable passages of Holy Writ that declare the immortality of the soul.

Chapters LXXX and LXXXI

arguments to prove that the soul is corrupted when the body is corrupted

Certain arguments would seem to show that human souls cannot possibly remain after the body.

For if human souls are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, as we have proved above,1 it follows that when the bodies are destroyed, the souls cannot remain in their multitude. Wherefore one of two alternatives must follow: either that the human soul altogether ceases to exist; or that only one remains. And this would seem to concur with the opinion of those who state that only that which is one in all men is incorruptible, whether this be the active intellect alone, as Alexander says, or the possible besides the active intellect, according to Averroes.2

Moreover. The formal ratio is the cause of specific difference. Now, if many souls remain after the corruption of bodies, they must differ from each other: because, as there is identity where there is oneness of substance, so is there difference where there are many in substance. But in souls that survive bodies there can be no difference other than formal, since they are not composed of matter and form, as we have proved above of every intellectual substance. Hence it follows that they differ specifically. And yet souls are not changed to another species by the corruption of the body, since whatever is changed from species to species is corrupted. It follows therefore that even before they were separated from their bodies, they were different in species. Now composites derive their species from their form. Consequently individual men will differ specifically. Which is absurd. Therefore it is seemingly impossible that many souls should survive their bodies.

Again. According to those who hold the eternity of the world it would seem altogether impossible to maintain that human souls remain in their multitude after the death of he body. For if the world exists from eternity, movement is from eternity: and consequently generation also is eternal. But if generation be eternal, an infinite number of men have died before us. Consequently, if the souls of the dead remain in their multitude after death, we must say that there is actually an infinite number of souls of men already dead. But this is impossible: since the actually infinite cannot exist in nature. Therefore it follows, if the world is eternal, that souls do not remain many after death.

Again. That which accrues to a thing and departs from it without the latter being corrupted, accrues to it accidentally, for this is the definition of an accident.1 Hence if the soul be not corrupted when parted from the body, it would follow that the soul is united to the body accidentally. Consequently man is an accidental being, composed of soul and body. And it will follow moreover that there is no human species, since one species does not result from things united accidentally; for white man is not a species.

Moreover. There cannot possibly be a substance that has no operation. Now all operation of the soul ends with the body: which is proved by induction. For the nutritive powers of the soul operate through the bodily qualities, and through a bodily instrument, and act on the body which is perfected by the soul, is nourished and increased, and from which is severed the seed for the purpose of generation. Again, all the operations of the powers belonging to the sensitive soul are accomplished through bodily organs: some of them being accomplished with a certain bodily transmutation, for instance those which are called passions of the soul, such as love, joy, and the like. Moreover, though understanding is not an operation fulfilled through a bodily organ, yet its objects are the phantasms which stand in relation to it, as colours to the sight:2 wherefore, as the sight cannot see without colours, so the intellective soul cannot understand without phantasms.

Further, the soul, in order to understand, needs the powers which prepare the phantasms so as to make them actually intelligible, namely the cogitative power and the memory, which clearly cannot remain after the body, since they are acts of certain organs of the body, and operate through those organs. Hence Aristotle says that the soul does not understand without phantasms,1 and that it understands nothing without the passive intellect,2 which he calls the cogitative power, and which is corruptible. For this reason he says (1 De Anima)3 that man’s act of understanding is corrupted when something within him is corrupted, namely the phantasm or the passive intellect. And it is stated in 3 De Anima4 that after death we do not remember what we knew in life. It is accordingly evident that no operation of the soul can remain after death. Therefore neither does its substance remain, since no substance can be without operation.

5Now, since these arguments lead to a false conclusion, as was shown above,6 we must endeavour to answer them. And, in the first place, it must be observed that whatever things have to be adapted and proportionate to one another, are together multiplied or unified, each by its own cause. Wherefore if the being of one depends on the other, its unity or multiplicity depends also thereon; otherwise it depends on some other extrinsic cause. Now form and matter need always to be mutually proportionate and naturally adapted, so to speak, because the proper act is produced in its proper matter. Consequently matter and form must always agree in point of multitude and unity. Hence if the being of the form depend on matter, its multiplication, as also its unity, depends on matter. But if not, the form must needs be multiplied according to the multiplication of the matter, that is together with matter, and in proportion thereto: yet not so that the unity or multiplicity of the very form depend on matter. Now it has been shown7 that the human soul is a form independent of matter as to its being. Wherefore it follows that souls are indeed multiplied according as bodies are multiplied, and yet the multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls. Therefore it does not follow that the plurality of souls ceases with the destruction of bodies, as the first argument concluded.

From this the reply also to the second argument is clear. For it is not every difference of forms that causes a difference of species, but only that which is in respect of formal principles, or of a different kind of form; since it is clear that the form is essentially distinct in this and that fire, and yet neither fire nor form is specifically different. Accordingly multitude of souls separated from their bodies results from the substantial distinction of forms, since one soul is substantially distinct from another; and yet this distinction does not result from a distinction in the essential principles of the soul, nor from a different kind of soul, but from the various co-aptation of souls to bodies, because this soul is adapted to this and not to that body, and that soul to another body, and so on. And this co-aptation remains in the soul even after the body has perished, even as the soul’s substance remains through being independent of the body in the point of being. For the soul according to its substance is the form of the body, else it would be united to the body accidentally, and consequently the union of body and soul would result in one thing not essentially but accidentally. Now it is as forms that souls need to be adapted to their bodies. Therefore it is clear that these same various co-aptations remain in separated souls, and consequently the plurality of souls remains also.

The third argument given above has been the occasion for some who held the world to be eternal, to fall into various strange opinions. For some granted the conclusion absolutely, and said that human souls perish altogether with their bodies. Others said that of all souls there remains some one thing separate that is common to all, namely the active intellect according to some, or besides this the possible intellect, according to others. Others however held that souls remain in their multitude after bodies, but lest they should be compelled to admit an infinite number of souls, they said that the same souls are united to different bodies after a certain time. This was the Platonists’ opinion, of which we shall treat further on.1 Others again, avoiding all the above statements, said that it is not impossible for separate souls to be actually infinite in number. Because in things not ordered to each other to be actually infinite is to be infinite accidentally, and they hold that there is no reason not to admit this. This is the opinion of Avicenna and Algazel. We do not find it expressly stated by Aristotle to which of these opinions he adhered, although he holds explicitly the eternity of the world. The last however of the above opinions is not inconsistent with the principles laid down by him. For in 3 Phys. and 1 Cœl. et Mund.,2 he proves that the actually infinite is impossible in natural bodies, but not in immaterial substances. Nevertheless it is certain that this question offers no difficulty to those who profess the Catholic faith, since they do not admit the world to be eternal.

Again, if the soul remain after the destruction of the body, it does not follow that it must have been accidentally united to it, as the fourth argument concluded. For an accident is described as that which may be present or absent without the corruption of the subject composed of matter and form. Now, if this be referred to the principles of the composite subject, it is found to be untrue. For it is clear that primary matter is not subject to generation and corruption, as Aristotle proves (1 Phys.).3 Wherefore it remains in its essence when the form departs. And yet the form was united to it not accidentally but essentially, since it was united to it in one being. Likewise the soul is united to the body in one being, as we proved above.4 Wherefore, though it survive the body, it is united to it essentially and not accidentally. That primary matter does not remain actually after the form except in respect of the act of another form, whereas that the human soul remains in the same act, is due to the fact that the human soul is form and act, whereas primary matter is a being in potentiality.

As to the statement put forward in the fifth argument, that no operation can remain in the soul when separated from the body, we say that it is false; since those operations remain which are not exercised through organs. Such are to understand and to will. But those operations do not remain which are performed through bodily organs, such as the operations of the nutritive and sensitive powers.

It must be observed, however, that the soul understands in a different way when separated from the body and when united to it, even as it has a different mode of existence: because a thing acts according as it is. For although the being of the soul while united to the body, is absolute and independent of the body, nevertheless the body is the lodging as it were and the subject that receives it. Wherefore in consequence its proper operation, which is to understand, though not depending on the body as though it were performed through a bodily organ, has its object in the body, namely the phantasms. Hence, as long as the soul is in the body, it cannot understand without a phantasm; neither can it remember except through the powers of cogitation and memory, by which the phantasms are prepared, as stated above.1 For this reason understanding, as regards this mode, as also remembering, is destroyed when the body perishes. On the other hand the separated soul has its being apart from the body. Wherefore neither will its operation, which is to understand, be performed in dependence upon certain objects existing in bodily organs, which are the phantasms; but it will understand by itself after the manner of substances wholly separate from bodies as to their being, of which we shall speak further on.2 From which substances, moreover, as from things higher than itself, it will be able to receive a more abundant inflow so as to understand more perfectly. We have a sign of this in the young.3 For the soul, the more it is withdrawn from being occupied about its own body, is rendered more apt to understand certain higher things: wherefore the virtue of temperance, which withdraws the soul from bodily pleasures, above all makes men apt in understanding. Moreover, men while asleep and not using their bodily senses, and when there is no disturbance of the humours or vapours to hinder them, are influenced by higher beings so as to perceive certain future things that surpass the purview of human reasoning: and this is much more the case with those who are in a faint or an ecstasy; forasmuch as they are the more withdrawn from the senses of the body. Nor does this happen unreasonably: because, since the human soul, as shown above,1 is on the boundary line of corporeal and incorporeal substances, as though it were on the horizon of eternity and time, by withdrawing from the lower world it approaches to the higher. Wherefore when it shall be wholly separated from the body, it will be perfectly likened to separate substances as to the manner of understanding and will receive their influence abundantly.

Accordingly, though our act of understanding as regards its mode in the present life ceases when the body perishes, another and higher mode of understanding will take its place.

Remembrance however, since it is an act performed through a bodily organ, as Aristotle proves in his book De Memoria et Reminiscentia,2 cannot remain in the soul after the body, unless remembrance be taken equivocally for the understanding of those things which the soul knew before: for the soul must needs remember what it knew in life, since the intelligible species are received indelibly into the possible intellect, as we have shown above.3

With regard to the other operations of the soul, such as to love, to rejoice, and the like, we must beware of equivocation. Because sometimes they are taken for passions of the soul: and thus they are acts of the sensible appetite in respect of the irascible and concupiscible faculties, together with a certain bodily transmutation. And thus they cannot remain in the soul after death, as Aristotle proves in his book De Anima.4 But sometimes they are taken for a simple act of the will, that is without any passion. Wherefore Aristotle says in the seventh book1 of Ethics that God rejoices by one simple operation, and in the tenth book2 that in the contemplation of wisdom there is wonderful pleasure, and in the eighth book,3 he distinguishes the love of friendship from the love that is a passion. Now since the will is a power that uses no organ, as neither does the intellect, it is clear that these things, in so far as they are acts of the will, remain in the separated soul.4

Hence it cannot be concluded from the foregoing arguments that man’s soul is mortal.

Chapter LXXXII

that the souls of dumb animals are not immortal

From what has been said it may be clearly proved that the souls of dumb animals are not immortal.

For it has been already shown5 that no operation of the sensitive part can possibly be without the body. Now we cannot find in the souls of dumb animals any operation superior to those of the sensitive part, for they neither understand nor reason. This appears from the fact that all animals of the same species operate in the same way, as though moved by nature and not as operating by art: thus every swallow builds its nest, and every spider spins its web, in the same way.6 Therefore the souls of dumb animals have no operation that is possible without the body. Since, then, every substance has some operation, the soul of a dumb animal cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore it perishes when the body perishes.

Again. Every form that is separate from matter is actually understood: for the active intellect makes species to be actually intelligible, in so far as it abstracts them, as appears from what has been said.7 But, if the dumb animal’s soul remains after its body has perished, it will be a form separate from matter. Therefore it will be a form actually understood. Now, in things separate from matter, that which understands is the same as that which is understood, as Aristotle says in 3 De Anima.1 Therefore the soul of a dumb animal, if it survive the body, will be intellectual: which is impossible.

Again. In everything that is able to attain to a certain perfection we find a natural desire for that perfection, since good is what all desire,2 yet so that each thing desires the good proper to it.3 Now, in dumb animals we do not find a natural desire for perpetual existence, except as regards perpetuity of species, inasmuch as we find in them the desire for begetting whereby the species is perpetuated, which desire is found in both plants and inanimate things, but not as regards the appetite that is proper to an animal as such, which appetite is consequent upon apprehension. For, since the sensitive soul does not apprehend except here and now, it cannot possibly apprehend perpetual existence. Neither therefore does it desire it with animal appetite. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal is not capable of perpetual existence.

Moreover. Since pleasures perfect operations, as Aristotle says in 10 Ethic.,4 the operation of a thing is directed to that in which it takes pleasure as in an end. Now all pleasures of dumb animals are referred to the preservation of the body: for they delight not in sounds, perfumes, and sights, except in so far as they are indicative of foods or venereal matters, which are the objects of all their pleasures. Hence all their operations are directed to the preservation of their bodily existence, as their end. Therefore they have no existence apart from the body.

The teaching of the Catholic faith is in keeping with this statement. For it is said (Gen. 9)5 of the dumb animal’s soul: The life thereof (Vulg., of all flesh) is in the blood, as though to say: Its existence depends on the permanence of the blood. It is also said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus:1 We declare that man alone has a subsistent soul, that is, which has life of itself: and that the souls of dumb animals perish with the body.

Moreover, Aristotle (2 De Anima)2 says that the intellective part of the soul is distinguished from the other parts as incorruptible from corruptible.

This puts out of court the opinion of Plato3 who held that the souls even of dumb animals are immortal.

And yet it would seem possible to prove that the souls of dumb animals are immortal. For if a thing has a per se operation belonging to itself, it also is self-subsistent. Now the sensitive soul in dumb animals has a per se operation wherein the body has no part, namely to move: because a mover is composed of two parts, one of which is mover and the other moved;4 wherefore, since the body is something moved, it follows that the soul alone is mover: therefore it is self-subsistent. Consequently it cannot be corrupted accidentally when the body perishes: since those things alone are corrupted accidentally which have not per se being. Nor can it be corrupted per se: seeing that it has no contrary, nor is it composed of contraries. It follows therefore that it is altogether incorruptible.

The argument of Plato,5 whereby he proved that every soul is immortal, would seem to come to the same as this; because, to wit, the soul moves itself; and whatever moves itself must needs be immortal. For the body dies not except when it is abandoned by that which moved it; and a thing cannot abandon itself: and consequently, according to him, that which moves itself cannot die. And so he concluded that every moving soul, even that of dumb animals, is immortal. We have said that this argument comes to the same as the preceding, because, since in Plato’s opinion nothing moves unless it be moved, that which moves itself is a per se mover and therefore has a per se operation.

Again, Plato held that the sensitive soul has an operation of its own, not only in moving but also in sensing.1 For he declared that sensation is a movement of the soul itself which senses: and that the soul, being moved thus, moved the body to sensation.2 Wherefore when he defined sense he said that it is the movement of the soul through the body.3

Now it is clear that these statements are false. For to sense is not to move, but to be moved: because from being potentially sentient the animal is made actually sentient through the sensible objects by which the senses are impressed. But it cannot be said that the sense is passive to the sensible in the same way as the intellect is passive to the intelligible object, so that sensation could be an operation of the soul without a bodily instrument, in the same way as understanding is. For the intellect apprehends things as abstracted from matter and material conditions which are the principles of individuality; whereas the sense does not. This is evidenced by the sense being confined to particular objects, while understanding is of universals. It is therefore clear that the senses are passive to things as existing in matter: while the intellect is not, but according as they are subject to abstraction. Therefore the passion of the intellect is without corporeal matter, whereas the passion of the senses is not.

Again. Different senses are receptive of different sensibles, sight, for instance, of colours, hearing of sounds. Now this difference clearly arises from the different dispositions of the organs: for the organ of sight needs to be in potentiality to all colours, and the organ of hearing to all sounds. But if this reception took place without any corporeal organ, the same faculty would be receptive of all sensible objects: since an immaterial power, for its own part, stands in an equal relation to all such qualities: wherefore the intellect, through not using a corporeal organ, takes cognizance of all sensible objects. Therefore there is no sensation without a corporeal organ.

Further. Sense is corrupted by excellence of its object; but the intellect is not, because he who understands higher objects of intelligence, is able to understand others, not less but more.1 Consequently the passion caused in the sense by the sensible differs in kind from that which is caused in the intellect by the intelligible: the passion of the intellect, occurring without a corporeal organ, while the passion of the sense is connected with a corporeal organ, the harmony of which is destroyed by the excellence of the sensible.

Plato’s statement that a soul moves itself may seem to be well founded by reason of what we observe in regard to bodies. For seemingly no body moves unless it is moved: wherefore Plato said that every mover is moved. And since we cannot go on to infinity as though every thing moved were moved by another, he stated that in each order the first mover moved itself. From this it followed that the soul, which is the first mover in the movement of animals, is something that moves itself.

But this is shown to be false, on two counts. First, because it has been proved2 that whatever is moved per se is a body: wherefore, since a soul is not a body, it is impossible for it to be moved save accidentally.

Secondly, because, since a mover, as such, is in act, while the thing moved, as such, is in potentiality, and since nothing can be, in the same respect, in act and potentiality; it will be impossible for the same thing to be, in the same respect, mover and moved, but if a thing is stated to move itself, one part thereof must needs be mover and the other part moved. It is in this way that an animal is said to move itself, because the soul is mover and the body moved. Since, however, Plato did not hold that the soul is a body, although he made use of the word movement which properly speaking belongs to bodies, he did not mean movement in this strict sense but referred it in a more general way to any operation: in which sense Aristotle also says (3 De Anima)3 that sensation and understanding are movements: but in this way movement is the act, not of that which is in potentiality but of that which is perfect. Consequently, when he said that the soul moves itself, by this he meant to say that it acts without the help of the body, whereas it is the other way about with other forms which exercise no action apart from matter: for that which heats is not heat by itself but something hot. Hence he wished to conclude that every soul which causes movement is immortal: because that which has a per se operation must needs also have per se existence.

But it has been already proved that the operation of the soul of a dumb animal, sensation to wit, cannot be without the body. And this is much more evident as regards its operation of appetite. Because all things pertaining to the appetite of the sensitive faculty, are manifestly accompanied by a certain bodily transmutation, and are known as passions of the soul.

From this it follows that not even is movement an operation of the sensitive part without an organ. For the soul of a dumb animal moves not except through sense and appetite: because the power which is said to execute movement, makes the members obedient to the command of the appetite: so that the body is perfected with powers directed to its being moved rather than with powers of moving.

It is accordingly clear that no operation of the dumb animal’s soul can be independent of the body: and from this we necessarily conclude that the dumb animal’s soul perishes with the body.

Chapter LXXXIII

that the human soul begins to exist with the body

Since, however, the same things are found to have both a beginning of being and an end of being, it may seem to some one that, since the human soul has no end of its being, neither has it had any beginning of being, but always has been. And seemingly this can be proved by the following arguments.

For that which will never cease to be, has the power to be always. And that which has the power to be always, can never be truly said not to be: since a thing’s duration in existence extends as far as its power to exist. Now of everything that has begun to be it is at some time true to say that it is not. Therefore that which will never cease to be, at no time begins to be.

Further. The truth of intelligibles is not only incorruptible, but, for its own part, is eternal: because it is necessary; and whatever is necessary is eternal, since for that which necessarily is, not to be is an impossibility. Now it is from the incorruptibility of intelligible truth that the soul is proved to have incorruptible being.1 Therefore by similar reasoning, from its eternity we can prove the eternity of the soul.

Moreover. A thing is not perfect if it lack several of its principal parts. Now it is clear that the principal parts of the universe are intellectual substances, to which genus, as shown above,2 human souls belong. Consequently if every day as many human souls begin to exist as men are born, it is evident that many of its principal parts are added to the universe every day, and that it lacks many such parts. Therefore it follows that the universe is imperfect: which is impossible.

Furthermore some argue from the authority of Holy Writ. For it is stated (Gen. 1)3 that on the seventh day God ended His work which He had made: and He rested … from all His work which He had done. But this would not be so, if He made new souls every day. Therefore new human souls do not begin to exist, but they have existed from the beginning of the world.

For these, then, and like reasons some, supposing the world to be eternal, have said that as the human soul is incorruptible, so has it existed from eternity. Hence those, namely the Platonists, who maintained that human souls in their universality are immortal, held that they have also existed from eternity, and are united to bodies at one time, at another separated from them, this vicissitude depending on certain fixed periods of years.4 On the other hand, those who maintained that human souls are immortal in respect of some one thing which remains over from all men after death, held that this same one thing has existed from eternity; whether it be the active intellect alone, as Alexander said, or, besides this, the passive intellect, as Averroes asserted.1 This too is apparently the meaning of Aristotle’s words: since, speaking of the intellect, he says that it is not only incorruptible, but also perpetual.2

Some, however, professing the Catholic faith, yet imbued with the teachings of the Platonists, have held a middle course. For since, according to the Catholic faith, nothing is eternal besides God, they maintained, not that human souls are eternal, but that they were created with or rather before the visible world, and yet are united anew to bodies. Of those who professed the Christian faith Origen was the first to hold this opinion,3 and afterwards several followed him. In fact, this opinion survives to this day among heretics, of whom the Manichees agree with Plato in asserting the eternity and transmigration of souls.

But it can be easily proved that the foregoing opinions are not founded upon truth. For we have already shown above4 that there is not but one possible or active intellect for all. Wherefore it remains for us to proceed against those opinions which state that there are many human souls, but that they existed before bodies, either from eternity or from the formation of the world. This would seem unreasonable for the following reasons.

For it was shown above5 that the soul is united to the body as its form and act. Now although act is naturally prior to potentiality, yet in one and the same subject it is posterior to it in time: since a thing is moved from potentiality to act. Wherefore the seed that is potentially living6 precedes the soul which is the act of life.

Again. It is natural to every form to be united to its proper matter: else that which is made of form and matter would be something beside nature. Now that which is becoming to a thing according to nature is ascribed to it before that which is becoming thereto beside nature: since what becomes a thing beside nature is in that thing accidentally, whereas what is becoming to it according to nature is in it per se; and that which is accidental always comes after that which is per se.1 Therefore it is becoming to the soul to be united to the body before being separated from the body. Therefore it was not created before the body to which it is united.

Moreover. Every part that is separated from its whole is imperfect. Now the soul, since it is a form, as proved above,2 is a part of the human species. Consequently as long as it exists by itself apart from the body, it is imperfect. But the perfect precedes the imperfect in the order of natural things. Therefore it is not becoming to the order of nature that the soul should have been created apart from the body before being united to the body.

Moreover. If souls were created without their bodies, we must inquire how they came to be united to those bodies. For this was either by force or by nature. If by force; since whatever is the result of force is against nature, it follows that the union of soul and body is unnatural. Wherefore man, who is composed of both, is something unnatural: and this is clearly false. Moreover, intellectual substances are of a higher order than heavenly bodies. Now nothing violent or contrary is to be found in heavenly bodies. Much less, therefore, is there in intellectual substances. On the other hand, if souls are united to bodies naturally, it follows that as soon as they were created souls had a natural desire to be united to bodies. Now the natural appetite is forthwith brought into act unless there be an obstacle, as instanced in the movement of heavy and light bodies: because nature always works in the same way. Consequently, from the very moment of their creation they would have been united to bodies unless there were something to prevent it. But everything that hinders the realization of the natural appetite does violence thereto. Therefore it was by violence that at some time souls were separate from bodies. Now this is unreasonable: both because in such substances there can be nothing violent, as we have proved; and because the violent and the unnatural, since they are accidental, cannot precede that which is according to nature, nor can they be consequent upon the whole species.

Further. Since everything naturally desires its own perfection, it is for matter to desire form and not vice versa. Now the soul is compared to the body as form to matter, as was shown above.1 Therefore the union of the soul and body answers to the desire not of the soul but rather of the body.

If, however, it be said that both are natural to the soul, namely union with the body and separation from the body, according to different times:—this is seemingly impossible. Because changes that occur naturally in a subject are accidental, such as youth and old age. Hence if union with and separation from the body are natural changes as regards the soul, union with the body will be an accident of the soul: and consequently the man resulting from this union will not be a per se but an accidental being.

Further. Whatever is subject to alteration according to a difference of time, is subject to the heavenly movement, which the whole course of time follows. Whereas intellectual and incorporeal substances, among which are separate souls, are above the whole order of bodies: wherefore they cannot be subject to heavenly movements. Therefore it is impossible for them that, according to a difference of time, they should be naturally, now united, now separated, or desire naturally this at one time, and that at another.

If, however, it be said that they are united to bodies neither by violence nor by nature, but by deliberate choice:—this is impossible. For no one wishes to come to a worse state except he be deceived. Now the separate soul is of a higher state than when united to the body; especially according to the Platonists, who say that through being united to the body it forgets what it knew before and is balked in the pure contemplation of truth.1 Therefore it is not willingly united to the body except it be deceived. But there cannot be in the soul any cause of deception, since according to them it is supposed to have all knowledge. Nor can it be said that its judgment in a particular matter of choice, proceeding from its universal knowledge, is upset on account of the passions, as happens in the incontinent: because passions of this kind are not without a bodily alteration, so that they cannot be in the separate soul. It remains therefore that if the soul existed before the body, it would not be united to the body of its own will.

Further. Any effect resulting from the concurrence of two mutually independent wills, is a casual effect: for instance, when a person intent on buying meets his creditor on the market place without the latter having agreed with him to go there. Now the will of the begetter, on which the begetting of the body depends, is not dependent on the will of the separate soul which desires to be united. Since then the union of soul and body cannot take place without the concurrence of both wills, it follows that such union is casual: so that the begetting of a man is not from nature but from chance: which is clearly false, since it results in the majority of cases.

And again, if it be said that the soul is united to the body not from nature, nor of its own will, but by divine ordinance;—this also seems inadmissible, if souls were created before bodies. For God fashioned each thing according to a manner becoming its nature: hence it is said of each creature (Gen. 1) God seeing (Vulg.,—saw) that it was good, and of all together: God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good. Consequently, if He created souls separate from bodies, we must needs say that this manner of being is more becoming their nature. Now, it is not in keeping with the ordinance of the divine goodness to bring things down to a lower state, but rather to raise them to a better. Therefore it could not have been by divine ordinance that the soul was united to the body.

Further. It is not in keeping with the order of divine wisdom to raise up lower things to the detriment of higher. Now bodies that are subject to generation and corruption obtain the lowest place in the order of things. Therefore it was not becoming the order of divine wisdom to raise up human bodies by uniting pre-existing souls to them: since this could not be done without detriment to the latter, as proved from what has been said.

Origen took note of this, and since he maintained that human souls were created from the beginning, he said that they were united to bodies by divine ordinance, but as a punishment. For he was of opinion that they had sinned before bodies were formed, and that according to the gravity of their sin they were enclosed in bodies more or less noble as in so many prisons.1

But this opinion cannot stand. Because punishment is something contrary to a good of nature, and for this reason is said to be evil. If, therefore, the union of soul and body is something penal, it is not a good of nature. Yet this is impossible: for it is intended by nature, since it is the end of natural generation. Moreover it would follow that to be a man is not good according to nature; whereas it is said (Gen. 1:31) after the creation of man: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.

Further. Good does not result from evil except by accident. Consequently, if it was appointed that the soul should be united to the body on account of a sin of the separate soul, since this union is a good, it follows that it is accidental. Therefore it was by chance that man was made. But this is derogatory to divine wisdom, whereof it is said (Wis. 11:21) that It ordered all things in number, weight, and measure.2

This is also clearly opposed to the teaching of the Apostle. For it is said (Rom. 9:11, 12) of Jacob and Esau, that when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil … it was said that the elder shall serve the younger. Therefore, before this was said, their souls had not committed any sin: and yet this was said after their conception, as appears from Gen. 25:23.

When we were treating of the distinction of things,1 we adduced against the position of Origen several arguments, which may also be employed here. Wherefore, omitting them, let us pass on to others.

Again. We must admit that the human soul either needs the senses, or not. Now experience would seem to make it clear that it needs the senses: because whoever lacks a certain sense, has no knowledge of the sensibles that are known through that sense: thus one born blind has neither knowledge nor any understanding whatever of colours. Moreover if the soul need not the senses in order to understand, we should not find in man any relation between sensitive and intellective knowledge. Yet we observe the contrary: for sensation leads to memories, and these lead us to take observation of things, whereby we arrive at the understanding of the universal principles of sciences and arts.2 Accordingly, if the human soul needs the senses in order to understand; since nature fails no thing in what is necessary for the accomplishment of its proper operation,—thus it supplies with fitting organs of sense and movement those animals which are animated with the powers of sense and movement,—the human soul must not have been fashioned without the necessary assistance of the senses. But the senses are inoperative without corporeal organs, as shown above.3 Therefore the soul was not made without the organs of the body.

If, however, the human soul does not need the senses in order to understand, and for this reason is said to have been created apart from the body: we are compelled to say that before being united to the body, it understood by itself all scientific truths. In fact the Platonists granted this,4 when they held that ideas,—which in Plato’s opinion are the separate intelligible forms of things,—are the cause of knowledge: wherefore the separate soul, since there was no obstacle in the way, received full knowledge of all sciences. We must therefore say, since it is found to be ignorant when united to the body, that it forgets the knowledge it had previously. The Platonists grant this also, and allege as a proof of this that however ignorant a man may be, if he be questioned methodically about things that are taught in the sciences, he will answer the truth: thus if a man has forgotten some of the things which he knew before, and some one suggests to him consecutively the things which he has forgotten, he recalls them to his memory. Whence it also followed that to learn is nothing else than to remember. Accordingly it follows, as a necessary consequence of this opinion, that union with the body hinders the soul from understanding. Now nature does not unite a thing to that which causes an obstacle to its operation, rather does it unite it to that whereby its operation is rendered more prompt. Consequently the union of body and soul will not be natural: and so man will not be a natural thing, nor will his generation be natural: which statements are clearly false.

Further. The last end of anything is that which it strives to obtain by its operations. Now man by all his well ordered and right operations strives to attain the contemplation of truth: for the operations of the active powers are so many preparations and dispositions to the contemplative powers. Therefore the end of man is to arrive at the contemplation of truth. For this purpose, then, was the soul united to the body, whereby a man comes into being. Therefore it is not through union with the body that the soul loses knowledge; on the contrary, it is united to the body that it may acquire knowledge.

Again. If a man who is ignorant of the sciences be questioned about matters pertaining to the sciences, he will not answer the truth except as regards universal principles which no one ignores, since they are known to all in the same way and naturally. Afterwards however, if he be questioned consecutively, he will answer the truth about things closely connected with the principles, while bearing those principles in mind; and he will continue to do so, as long as he is able to apply the force of those principles to the matters on which he is questioned. From this, accordingly, it is clear that knowledge is caused anew in the person questioned by the first principles; and not by the remembrance of a knowledge he had possessed before.

Further. If the knowledge of conclusions were as natural to the soul as knowledge of principles, all would have the same opinion about conclusions as they have of principles: since things that are natural are the same for all. Now all have not the same opinion about conclusions, but only about principles. It is therefore clear that the knowledge of principles is natural to us, but not the knowledge of conclusions. Now from that which is natural to us we acquire that which is not natural: even as in external things we make with our hands all the products of art. Therefore we have no knowledge of conclusions save that which we obtain from principles.

Again. Forasmuch as nature is ever directed to one thing, it follows that of one power there is naturally one object, for instance colour is the object of sight, sound of hearing. Wherefore the intellect, since it is one power, has one natural object, of which it has knowledge per se and naturally. And this object must be that under which are comprised all things known by the intellect: just as under colour are comprised all colours, which are per se visible. Now this is no other than being. Therefore our intellect knows being naturally, and whatever is per se comprised under being as such; and on this knowledge is based the knowledge of first principles, such as the incompatibility of affirmation and negation, and the like. Consequently, these principles alone are known naturally by our intellect; while conclusions are known through them: even as through colour the sight knows both common and accidental sensibles.

Further. That which we acquire through the senses was not in the soul before (its union with) the body. Now, knowledge of principles is caused in us from sensibles: for had we not perceived some whole by our senses, we should be unable to understand that a whole is greater than its part: just as a man born blind is unable to have an idea of colours. Neither, therefore, had the soul any knowledge of principles before (its union with) the body: and much less, of other things. Consequently Plato’s proof of the existence of the soul before its union with the body cannot stand.

Again. If all souls existed before the bodies to which they are united, it would seem to follow that the same soul is united to different bodies according to the vicissitudes of time. In fact this is an evident consequence of the opinion of those who hold the eternity of the world. For, if men have been begotten from eternity, it follows that an infinite number of human bodies have been begotten and corrupted during the whole course of time. Therefore we must say either that an actually infinite number of souls pre-existed, if each soul is united to a single body, or—if the number of souls be finite—that the same soul is united at one time to this, at another time to that body. And the same would seem to follow if we suppose that souls existed before bodies, but that generation was not from eternity. For although it be supposed that the begetting of men has not always been, one cannot doubt that it can be of infinite duration: because each man is so formed by nature, that unless he be accidentally hindered, he is able to beget another even as he himself was begotten of another. Yet this is impossible if, supposing a finite number of souls, one soul cannot be united to several bodies. Wherefore several who have asserted the existence of souls before bodies, maintained the transmigration of souls. But this is impossible. Therefore souls did not exist before bodies.

That one soul cannot possibly be united to different bodies is proved thus. Human souls do not differ specifically from one another, but only numerically: else men also would differ in species from one another. Now numerical distinction arises from material principles. Consequently the distinction among human souls will have to be taken from something material. Not, however, as though matter were part of the soul: for it has been shown above1 that the soul is an intellectual substance and that no such substance has any matter. It remains, therefore, that in the manner indicated above2 the distinction and plurality of souls must be taken from their relation to the different matters to which souls are united. Consequently if there are different bodies, they must needs have different souls united to them. Therefore one is not united to several.

Again. It has been proved above3 that the soul is united to the body as its form. Now forms must be proportionate to their respective matters: since they are related the one to the other as potentiality to act: for the proper act corresponds to the proper potentiality. Therefore one soul is not united to several bodies.

Moreover. The power of the mover should be proportionate to its mobile: for not every power moves every movable. Now it cannot be said that the soul, even were it not the form of the body, is not its mover, for the animate differs from the inanimate by sense and movement. Therefore different souls must correspond to different bodies.

Again. In things subject to generation and corruption, the same identical thing cannot be reproduced by generation: for, since generation and corruption are movements towards substance, in things that are generated and corrupted, the substance does not remain the same, as it does in things that are moved locally. Now, if the one soul is united successively to various generated bodies, the same identical man will be reproduced by generation. This is a necessary consequence for Plato, who said that man is a soul clad with a body.4 It follows also for all the others: because, since the unity, even as the being, of a thing follows its form, it follows that those things are one in number, whose form is one in number. Therefore it is not possible for one soul to be united to several bodies: and from this it follows also that neither were souls before bodies.

The Catholic faith declares itself in agreement with this truth. For it is said in the psalm:1 He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them: because, to wit, God fashioned a soul for each one separately, and neither created them all together, nor united one to different bodies. Hence it is also declared in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus:2 We affirm that the souls of men were not created from the beginning together with other intellectual natures, nor all at the same time, as Origen pretended.

Chapter LXXXIV

solution of the foregoing arguments

The arguments whereby it is proved that souls have existed from eternity, or that, at least, they existed before bodies,3 are easily solved.

For the first statement, that the soul has the power to be always, must be granted: but it must be observed that the power and potentiality of a thing extend not to what has been, but to what is or will be: wherefore possibility has no place in the past. Therefore from the fact that the soul has the power to be always we may conclude, not that it always was, but that it always will be.

Further. That to which a power is directed does not follow from the power unless the power be supposed. Hence, although the soul has the power to be always, we cannot infer that the soul is always, except after it has already received this power. And if we presume that it received this power from eternity, we shall be begging the question at issue, namely whether the soul has been from eternity.

As to the second objection about the eternity of the truth which the soul understands:—we must observe that the eternity of a truth understood may be taken in two ways: in one way, as to the thing understood; in another as to that whereby it is understood. If the understood truth be eternal as regards the thing understood, it follows that the thing understood is eternal, but not the one who understands: whereas if the understood truth be eternal as to that whereby it is understood, it would follow that the soul which understands it is eternal. Now the understood truth is eternal not in the latter but in the former way: for it is clear from what has been said that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands truth, are acquired by us from the phantasms through the active intellect.1 Hence it cannot be inferred that the soul is eternal, but that the truths understood are based on something eternal, for their foundation is in the first truth, as in the universal cause which contains all truth. But the soul is compared to this eternal thing, not as subject to form, but as a thing to its proper end, because the true is the good of the intellect and the end thereof.2 Now from a thing’s end we can argue about its duration, just as we can argue about its beginning from its efficient cause: since what is directed to an eternal end must be capable of enduring for ever. Consequently, from the eternity of intelligible truth we can prove that the soul is immortal, but not that it is eternal. That neither can the latter be proved from the eternity of the agent is clear from what has been said above3 when we were discussing the eternity of creatures.

The third objection which refers to the perfection of the universe is not cogent. For the perfection of the universe regards the species, not the individuals: since the universe is continually receiving an addition of individuals to the pre-existing species. Now human souls do not differ specifically among themselves, but only numerically, as we have proved.4 Consequently it is not inconsistent with the perfection of the universe, if new souls be created.

Hence we may gather the reply to the fourth objection. For it is stated at the same time (Gen. 1)1 that God ended His work, and that He rested … from all His work which He had done. Since, then, the ending or perfecting of creatures regards the species and not the individuals, so God’s rest must be understood to refer to the cessation from forming new species, but not new individuals, the like of which, in the species, have existed before. Accordingly, as all human souls are of one species, even as are all men, it is not incompatible with the aforesaid rest if God creates new souls from day to day.

It must, however, be observed that we do not find it stated by Aristotle that the human intellect is eternal; and yet he is wont to say this of those things which, in his opinion, always have been. But he declares that it is everlasting;2 and this can be said of those things that always will be, although they have not always been. Hence (11 Metaph.)3 in excluding the intellective soul from the conditions of other forms, he did not say that this form was before matter,—and yet Plato said this of ideas, so that it would seem consistent with the subject of which he4 was treating that he should say something of the kind of the soul,—but he said that it remains after the body.

Chapter LXXXV

that the soul is not made of god’s substance

From the foregoing it is clear that the soul is not of God’s substance.

For it has been shown above5 that the divine substance is eternal, and that nothing pertaining thereto begins anew. Whereas human souls did not exist before bodies, as we have proved.6 Therefore the soul cannot be of the divine substance.

Moreover. It was shown above that God cannot be the form of anything. Whereas the soul is the form of the body, as we have proved.1 Therefore it is not of the divine substance.

Further. Everything from which something is made is in potentiality to that which is thus made from it. But God’s substance is not in potentiality to anything: for it is pure act, as we proved above.2 Therefore it is impossible that the soul or any other thing whatsoever be made from God’s substance.

Again. That from which something is made is changed in some way. But God is utterly unchangeable, as we proved above.3 Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made from Him.

Moreover. The soul shows evident signs of variation in knowledge and virtue, and their opposites: whereas in God there is no variation whatever, neither per se, nor accidental.4

Again. It was shown above5 that God is pure act, wherein there is no potentiality: whereas in the human soul we find both potentiality and act; for it contains the possible intellect which is in potentiality to all that is intelligible, besides the active intellect, as shown above.6 Therefore the human soul is not from the divine nature.

Again. Since the divine substance is altogether indivisible,7 the soul cannot be part thereof, but only the whole. Now the divine substance cannot possibly be but one, as we showed above.8 It follows, therefore, that there would be for all men only one soul as regards the intellect: and this has been refuted above.9 Therefore the soul is not from the divine substance.

This opinion arose apparently from a triple source. For some maintained that no substance is incorporeal. Consequently they asserted that God is the most noble body, whether this be air, fire, or any other thing that they considered to be a principle, and they affirmed that the soul was of the nature of this body. For they all ascribed to the soul, whatever they considered to be a principle, as Aristotle says (1 De Anima):1 and thus it followed that the soul is from the divine substance. From this root sprang the opinion of Manes who thought that God is a bright body extending through infinite space, whereof, said he, the human soul is a fragment.2

But this opinion was refuted above, both because we proved that God is not a body;3 and because we have shown that neither the human soul nor any intellectual substance is a body.

Some have maintained that for all men there is but one intellect, whether active only, or both active and possible, as stated above.4 And since the ancients asserted that every separate substance is God, it followed that our soul, namely the intellect whereby we understand, is of the divine nature. Wherefore even nowadays certain adherents to the Christian faith, who hold that the active intellect is a separate being, say expressly that the active intellect is God.

But this opinion about the unity of our active intellect was disproved above.5

Possibly also, this opinion may have arisen from the very likeness of our soul to God. For it is on account of man’s soul that intelligence, which is esteemed most proper to God, is found to be befitting to no substance in this lower world, save man alone. Hence it might seem that the soul was allied to the divine nature: and especially so to those men who were convinced of the human soul’s immortality.

Moreover this would seem to be confirmed by the fact that after it had been said (Gen. 1):6 Let Us make man to Our image and likeness, it is added:7 God formed man of the slime of the earth; and breathed into his face the breath of life. From which text some wished to conclude that the soul is of the divine nature: since he who breathes into another’s face, puts forth into another the identical thing which was in himself. And so Scripture would seem to imply that God put into man something divine in order to give him life.

But the aforesaid likeness does not prove that man is a part of the divine substance: for in understanding he suffers from manifold defects, which cannot be said of God. Wherefore this likeness indicates an imperfect image rather than consubstantiality. In fact Scripture indicates this when it says that man was made to God’s image. Hence the aforesaid breathing shows that life came forth from God into man by way of a certain likeness, and not according to identity of substance. For which reason also the spirit of life is stated to have been breathed into his face: because, since the organs of several senses are situate in this part of the body, the signs of life are more evidenced in the face. Accordingly God is said to have breathed the spirit into man’s face, because He gave man the spirit of life, but not by parting it from His own substance. For he who breathes the breath of his body into the face of someone, whence the metaphor is apparently taken, blows into his face the air, but does not send forth part of his substance into him.

Chapter LXXXVI

that the human soul is not transmitted with the semen

It may be shown from the foregoing that the human soul is not transmitted with the semen, as though it were sown by coition.

For any principles whatsoever that cannot exercise their operations without the body cannot begin to exist apart from the body: because a thing’s being is proportionate to its operation, since everything operates according as it is a being. On the other hand, those principles which exercise their operations without the body, are generated apart from the generation of the body. Now the operation of the nutritive and sensitive soul cannot be without the body, as is evident from what has been said:1 whereas the operation of the intellective soul is not exercised through an organ of the body, as stated above.2 Consequently the nutritive and sensitive souls are generated through the generation of the body; but not the intellective soul. Now the transmission of the semen is directed to the generation of the body. Therefore the nutritive and sensitive souls begin to exist through the transmission of the semen; but not the intellective soul.

Again. If the human soul began to exist by transmission with the semen, this could only be in two ways. In one way, so that we understand it to be in the semen actually, as though it were accidentally severed from the soul of the generator, just as the semen is severed from the body. This may be seen in annulose animals, that live after being cut in two, and in which there is one soul actually and several in potentiality: for when the body of such an animal is divided, the soul begins to be actually in each living part. In another way, so that we understand the semen to possess a virtue productive of the intellective soul: and thus the intellective soul would be in the semen virtually, but not actually.

But the former of these is impossible for two reasons. First, because, since the intellective soul is the most perfect of souls and endowed with the highest power, its proper matter is a body having a great variety of organs, whereby its manifold operations can be accomplished. Consequently it cannot possibly be actually in the separated semen; since not even the souls of perfect irrational animals are multiplied by division as happens in annulose animals. Secondly, because, since the intellect, which is the proper and principal power of the intellective soul, is not the act of any part of the body, it cannot be accidentally divided through the body being divided: and consequently neither can the intellective soul.

The second is also impossible. For the active force in the semen promotes the generation of the animal by transmuting the body: because a material force cannot act otherwise. Now every form that begins to exist through the transmutation of matter, has a being dependent on matter: because the transmutation of matter reduces it from potentiality to act, and thus terminates in the actual being of matter, which results from its union with a form; wherefore, if thereby the being of the form also begins simply, the being of the form will consist merely in its being united to matter, and consequently the form will be dependent on matter for its being. Therefore, if the human soul is brought into being by an active force in the semen, it follows that its being is dependent on matter, like the being of other material forms: whereas the contrary of this has been proved above.1 Therefore the intellective soul is nowise brought into being through the transmission of the semen.

Moreover. Every form that is brought into being through the transmutation of matter, is brought forth from the potentiality of matter: since the transmutation of matter is its reduction from potentiality to act. Now the intellective soul cannot be brought forth from the potentiality of matter: for it has been shown above2 that the intellective soul surpasses the whole potentiality of matter, since it has an operation apart from matter, as was proved above.3 Therefore the intellective soul is not brought forth into being through the transmutation of matter; and neither, consequently, by the action of a power residing in the semen.

Further. No active force acts beyond its genus. But the intellective soul surpasses the whole genus of bodies: since it has an operation that is raised above all bodies, namely intelligence. Therefore no bodily force can produce an intellective soul. Now whatever action proceeds from a force that is in the semen, results from a bodily force; because the formative force acts through the medium of the threefold heat, of fire, of heaven, and of the soul. Therefore the intellective soul cannot be brought into being by a force residing in the semen.

Further. It is absurd to state that an intellective substance is either divided through a body being divided, or produced by a bodily virtue. Now the human soul is an intellective substance, as we proved above.1 Therefore it cannot be said that it is divided through the semen being divided, or that it is brought into being by an active virtue in the semen. Consequently the human soul nowise begins to exist through the transmission of the semen.

Further. If the generation of a thing causes a certain thing to exist, the corruption of the former will cause the latter to cease to exist. Now the corruption of the body does not cause the soul to cease to exist, for the latter is immortal, as we have proved above.2 Neither, therefore, is the generation of the body the cause of the soul beginning to exist. But the transmission of the semen is the proper cause of the generation of the body. Therefore the transmission of the semen is not the cause of the soul being brought into existence.

Hereby is excluded the error of Apollinaris and his followers who said that souls are generated by souls, as bodies by bodies.3

Chapter LXXXVII

that the human soul is brought into being through creation by god

From what has been said it can be proved that God alone brings the human soul into being.

For whatever is brought into being, is either generated per se or accidentally, or is created. Now the human soul is not generated per se: since it is not composed of matter and form, as shown above.4 Neither is it generated accidentally: for, since it is the form of the body, it would be generated through the body being generated, which results from the active force in the semen, and this has been disproved.1 Since then the human soul has a beginning of its existence, for it is neither eternal nor exists before the body, as we have shown,2 it follows that it comes forth into being by creation. Now we have proved that God alone can create. Therefore He alone brings forth the human soul into being.

Moreover. Everything whose substance is not its being has an author of its being, as shown above.3 Now the human soul is not its own being: for this is peculiar to God alone, as already proved.4 Therefore it has an active cause of its being. But that which has being per se, is also caused per se: whereas that which has not being per se, but only together with some other thing, is caused, not per se, but through this other thing being caused: thus the form of fire is caused when the fire is made. Now it is proper to the human soul, as compared with other forms, to be subsistent in its own being, and to communicate to the body the being proper to itself.5 Therefore the human soul has its becoming per se, in contrast to other forms which have their becoming accidentally, through the making of the composite. But, since the human soul has not matter as part of itself, it cannot be made from something. It remains, therefore, that it is made from nothing: and thus it is created. And seeing that creation is the proper work of God, as we proved above,6 it follows that it is created immediately by God alone.

Further. Things belonging to the same genus come into being in the same way, as we proved above.7 Now the soul belongs to the genus of intellectual substances: and it is inconceivable that these should come into being save by the way of creation. Therefore the human soul comes into being through creation by God.

Again. Whatsoever is brought into being by an agent, acquires from the latter, either something that is the principle of being in that particular species, or absolute being itself. Now the soul cannot be brought into being in such a way as to acquire something as the principle of its being, as happens in things composed of matter and form, which are generated through acquiring a form in act: because the soul does not contain something in itself by way of principle of its being, for it is a simple substance, as was shown above.1 Hence it remains that it is not brought into being by an agent except by receiving from it being absolutely. Now being is the proper effect of the first and universal agent: for secondary agents act by impressing the likeness of their forms on the things they make, which likenesses are the forms of the things made. Therefore the soul cannot be brought into being except by the first and universal agent, which is God.

Further. The end of a thing corresponds to its principle: for a thing is perfect when it attains its proper principle, whether by likeness, or in any way whatever. Now the end and ultimate perfection of the human soul is to soar above the whole order of creatures and to reach the First Principle, which is God. Therefore the proper principle of the soul’s origin is God.

We also find this implied in Holy Writ (Gen. 1). For whereas while speaking of the formation of other animals, it ascribes their souls to other causes, for instance when it says:2 Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature with a living soul, and in like manner as to other things; when it comes to man, it indicates the creation of the soul by God, by saying:3 God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life.

Hereby is excluded the error of those who hold that souls were created by angels.

Chapter LXXXVIII

arguments for proving that the human soul is formed from the semen

Nevertheless there are some objections to the foregoing.1

For since man is an animal inasmuch as he has a sensitive soul; and the notion of animal applies univocally to man and other animals; it would seem that man’s sensitive soul is of the same genus as the souls of other animals. Now things of the same genus have the same manner of coming into being. Wherefore the sensitive soul of man, as also of other animals, comes into being through a force residing in the semen. But the intellective and sensitive soul are the same in man, as we proved above.2 Consequently it would seem that the intellective soul also comes into being through a seminal virtue.

Further. As Aristotle teaches (De Gener. Animal.),3 in point of time the fetus is an animal before it is a man. Now, while it is an animal and not a man, it has a sensitive and not an intellective soul: and there can be no doubt that this sensitive soul, even as in other animals, is formed by the active virtue of the semen. But that very same sensitive soul is potentially intellective, just as that animal is potentially a rational animal,—unless by chance it be said that the supervening intellective soul is a distinct substance, which has been refuted above.4 Therefore, seemingly, the substance of the intellective soul is caused by a virtue in the semen.

Again. Since the soul is the form of the body, it is united to the body in being. Now, things that are one in being are the term of one action and of one agent: for if there were several agents and consequently several actions, effects diverse in being would result. Consequently the being of soul and body must be the term of the one action of one agent. But, it is clear that the body results from the action of a virtue in the semen. Therefore the soul which is its form is the effect of the same action, and not of some separate agent.

Moreover. Man generates his like in species by a virtue residing in the semen after separation. Now, every univocal agent generates its like in species through causing the form of the thing generated, which derives its species from that form. Therefore the human soul, whence man derives his species, is produced by a virtue residing in the semen.

Again. Apollinaris argues as follows.1 Whoever completes a work, co-operates with the agent. But, if souls are created by God, He completes the generation of children who are sometimes born of adulterers. Therefore God co-operates with adulterers; and this seemingly is inadmissible.

Again, in a book2 ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa we find arguments in support of the same statement. This is how he argues. Soul and body together make one thing, and this is one man. If therefore the soul is made before the body, or the body before the soul, one and the same thing will precede and follow itself: which is seemingly impossible. Therefore body and soul are made at the same time. But the body begins to exist at the separation of the semen. Therefore the soul also is brought into being through the separation of the semen.

Again. The operation of an agent would seem to be imperfect, if he does not bring an entire thing into being, but only some part thereof.3 Therefore if God were to bring the soul into being, while the body was formed by the virtue of the semen, which two things are parts of one, namely man, the operation of both God and the seminal virtue would seem to be imperfect; which is clearly inadmissible. Hence man’s soul and body are produced by one and the same cause. Now, it is clear that man’s body is produced by the virtue of the semen. Therefore the soul is also.

Again. In everything generated from seed, all the parts of the thing generated are together virtually contained in the seed, though they appear not actually. Thus in wheat or any other seed we see that the grass with stem, stalks, fruit, and beard are virtually contained in the original seed; afterwards the seed spreads forth and by a kind of natural consequence reaches perfection without taking to itself anything outside itself.1 Now it is clear that the soul is part of man. Therefore the human seed contains virtually the human soul; and this does not take its origin from any external principle.

Moreover. Things that have the same process and term must have the same principle of origin. Now in the generation of a man we find the same process and term in the body as in the soul. For the soul’s operations become more and more manifest, as the members are developed in shape and size: thus the operation of the nutritive soul is apparent at first; afterwards, the operation of the sensitive soul, and lastly, the body being fully developed, the operation of the intellective soul.2 Therefore the body and soul have the same principle. But the principle of origin in the body is through the separation of the semen. Therefore the same is the principle of the soul’s origin.

Again. That which is conformed to a thing, is fashioned by the action of the thing to which it is conformed: for instance the wax that is conformed to the seal, receives this conformity from the impression of the seal. Now it is evident that the body of a man or of any animal is conformed to its own soul; because its organs are so arranged as required by the soul’s operations to be exercised by them.3 Therefore the body is formed by the action of the soul: wherefore Aristotle says (2 De Anima)4 that the soul is the efficient cause of the body. But this would not be so were not the soul in the semen: because the body is fashioned by the power that is in the semen. Therefore the human soul is in the semen: and consequently takes its origin from the separation of the semen.

Again. Nothing lives except by a soul. Now the semen is living.1 This is proved in three ways. First, because it is severed from a living being. Secondly, because the semen gives signs of vital heat and vital operations, which are indications of a living thing. Thirdly, because the seeds of plants when put into the soil, unless they had life in themselves, could not gather heat from the soil, which is inanimate, so as to live. Therefore the soul is in the semen: and consequently it originates with the severing of the semen.

Moreover. If the soul were not before the body, as we have proved;2 and did not begin to be at the severance of the semen, it follows that the body is formed first, and the newly created soul infused into the body afterwards. Now, were this true, it would further follow that the soul is for the sake of the body: because that which is on another’s account is found to come after it; even so clothes are made for man. But this is false, since on the contrary the body is for the soul’s sake, since the end is always of greater excellence. We must therefore conclude that the soul originates together with the severance of the semen.

Chapter LXXXIX

solution of the foregoing arguments

For the easier solution of the foregoing arguments, we must first of all set down certain points, in order to explain the order and process of the generation of man, as well as of animals in general.

In the first place then it must be observed that the opinion of those is false who say that the vital operations that appear in the embryo before its ultimate completion, do not proceed from a soul or soul’s power, existing therein, but from the soul of the mother. For if this were true, the embryo will no longer be an animal: since every animal consists of soul and body. Moreover vital operations do not proceed from an extrinsic active principle, but from an internal force; and it is in this that inanimate things differ from the living, to which it properly belongs to move themselves. Because that which is nourished assimilates nourishment: wherefore in the subject nourished there must needs be an active nutritive power, since the agent produces its like. And much more evident is this in the operation of the senses: because to see and to hear are competent to a person through some faculty existing in him and not in another. Wherefore if the embryo is observed to be nourished and even to sense before its final development, that cannot be ascribed to the soul of the mother.

And yet it cannot be said that the soul, as to its complete essence, is in the semen from the very beginning, and that the operations of the soul are not apparent on account of the lack of organs. For, since the soul is united to the body as its form, it is not united to a body other than one of which it is properly the act. Now the soul is the act of an organic body.1 Consequently the soul is not actually in the semen before the organization of the body, but only potentially or virtually. Wherefore Aristotle says (2 De Anima)2 that seed and fruit are potentially living as long as they put aside, i.e., are without, the soul; yet the thing of which the soul is the act, is potentially living, but is not without a soul. It would also follow, if the soul were in the semen from the beginning, that the generation of an animal would be by the mere severance, as happens in annulose animals, where two are made from one. For if the semen were animated as soon as severed, it would at once have a substantial form. Now every substantial generation precedes, and does not follow, the substantial form; and if any changes follow the substantial form, they are directed, not to the being but to the well-being of the thing generated. Accordingly the generation of the animal would be completed in the mere severance of the semen: and all subsequent changes would have nothing to do with generation.

Even more absurd would this be if applied to the rational soul:—both because it cannot possibly be divided according to the division of the body, so that it be possible for it to be in the semen after severance:—and because it would follow that whenever pollution occurs without conception taking place, rational souls would nevertheless be multiplied.

Nor can it be asserted, as some say, that although from the moment of severance the soul is not in the semen actually but virtually, on account of the lack of organs; yet this very virtue of the semen (which is a body capable of receiving organs though it has them not actually) is proportionately a potential but not an actual soul to the semen; and that, since the life of a plant requires fewer organs than the life of an animal, when first the semen is sufficiently prepared for plant-life, this same virtue of the semen becomes a vegetative soul; and then, when the organs have been yet more perfected and multiplied, the same virtue advances to the state of a sensitive soul; and further still, the form of the organs being perfected, the same soul becomes rational, not indeed by the action of this seminal virtue, but by the action of an external agent, for which reason they imagine Aristotle to have said that the intellect is from without (De Gener. Animal.).1 For according to this opinion it would follow that the same identical virtue is at one time a purely vegetative soul, and afterwards a sensitive soul: so that the substantial form itself would be perfected more and more by stages. It would also follow that the substantial form would be brought from potentiality to act not at once but by degrees. And again, that generation, like alteration, is a continuous movement. All of which things are impossible in nature. A conclusion still more inadmissible would follow, namely that the rational soul is mortal. For nothing that accrues as a form to that which is corruptible makes it naturally incorruptible, else a corruptible thing would be changed into an incorruptible one, which is impossible, since they differ in genus, as stated in 10 Metaph.1 Now the substance of the sensitive soul, since in the aforesaid process it is stated to be generated accidentally by the generated body, must needs be corruptible at the corruption of the body. If therefore the same soul becomes rational by a light introduced within it, which light is related to it as a form (for the sensitive is potentially intellective); it follows of necessity that the rational soul perishes when the body perishes. And this is impossible: as we proved above,2 and as the Catholic faith teaches.

Therefore the self-same virtue which is severed together with the semen and is called the formative virtue, is not the soul, nor does it become the soul in the process of generation: but, since it is based, as on its proper subject, on the (vital) spirit contained in the frothy semen, it causes the formation of the body in so far as it operates by virtue of the father’s soul, to whom generation is ascribed as the principal agent, and not by virtue of the soul of the person conceived, even after the soul is in that person: for the subject conceived does not generate itself, but is generated by the father. This is clear to anyone who considers each power of the soul separately. For it cannot be ascribed to the soul of the embryo by reason of the generative power; not only because the generative power does not exercise its operation until the work is completed of the nutritive and augmentative powers which are its auxiliaries, since to generate belongs to that which is perfect; but also because the work of the generative power is directed, not to the perfection of the individual, but to the preservation of the species. Nor again can it be ascribed to the nutritive power, the work of which is to assimilate nourishment to the subject nourished, which is not apparent here; since in the process of formation the nourishment is not assimilated to something already existing, but is advanced to a more perfect form and more approaching to a likeness to the father. Likewise neither can it be ascribed to the augmentative power: since it belongs to this power to cause a change, not of form, but of quantity. As to the sensitive and intellective part, it is clear that it has no operation appropriate to such a formation. It remains then that the formation of the body, especially as regards the foremost and principal parts, is not from the form of the subject generated, nor from a formative power acting by virtue of that form, but from (a formative power) acting by virtue of the generative soul of the father, the work of which soul is to produce the specific like of the generator.

Accordingly this formative power remains the same in the aforesaid spirit from the beginning of the formation until the end. Yet the species of the subject formed remains not the same: because at first it has the form of semen, afterwards of blood, and so onwards until it arrives at its final complement. For although the generation of simple bodies does not proceed in order, since each of them has an immediate form of primary matter; in the generation of other bodies, there must be an order in the generations, by reason of the many intermediate forms between the first elemental form and the final form which is the term of generation: wherefore there are a number of generations and corruptions following one another.

Nor is it unreasonable if one of the intermediates be generated and then at once interrupted, because the intermediate stages have not a complete species but are on the way to a species: hence they are generated, not that they may remain, but that the final term of generation may be reached through them. Nor need we wonder if the transmutation of generation be not throughout continuous, and that there are many intermediate generations; for this happens also in alteration and growth, since neither alteration nor growth is continuous throughout, but only local movement is truly continuous, as we find proved in 8 Physic.1

Accordingly, the more noble a form is and the further removed it is from the elemental form, the more numerous must needs be the intermediate forms, through which the ultimate form is reached by degrees, and consequently the more numerous will be the intermediate generations. Wherefore in the generation of an animal or a man in which the form is most perfect, there are many intermediate forms and generations, and consequently corruptions, since the generation of one is the corruption of another.1 Therefore the vegetative soul, which comes first, when the embryo lives the life of a plant, is corrupted, and is succeeded by a more perfect soul which is both nutritive and sensitive, and then the embryo lives an animal life; and when this is corrupted it is succeeded by the rational soul introduced from without: although the preceding souls were produced by the virtue in the semen.

Keeping these points before the mind, it is easy to answer the objections.2

For in reply to the first objection, where it is stated that the sensitive soul must have the same manner of origin in man and in irrational animals, because animal is predicated of both univocally,—we say that this is not necessary. Because although the sensitive souls in man and dumb animals agree generically, they differ specifically, like the things of which they are the forms. For just as the animal that is a man differs specifically from other animals in the point of being rational, so the sensitive soul of man differs specifically from the sensitive soul of a dumb animal in this, that it is also intellective. Wherefore the sensitive soul in the dumb animal has no more than the sensitive faculty, and consequently neither its being nor its operation is raised above the body; and so it must needs be generated together with the body, and perish when the body perishes. On the other hand the sensitive soul in a man, through having besides the sensitive nature an intellective power in consequence of which it follows that it is raised above the body both in being and in operation, is neither generated through the generation of the body, nor perishes through the body’s corruption. Hence the different manner of origin in the aforesaid souls is not on the part of the sensitive faculty whence the generic nature is taken, but on the part of the intellective faculty, whence the specific difference is derived. Therefore we can conclude a difference not of genus but only of species.

When it is objected in the second place that the thing conceived is an animal before a man, this does not prove that the rational soul is transmitted together with the semen. Because the sensitive soul whereby it was an animal does not remain, but is succeeded by a soul that is both sensitive and intellective, whereby it is at the same time both animal and man, as explained above.

The statement in the third objection, that the actions of different agents do not terminate in one thing made, must be understood as referring to different agents of which one is not ordered to the other. For if they be ordered the one to the other, they must have one effect: for the first active cause acts on the effect of the secondary active cause more intimately than does the secondary cause: hence we find that an effect produced by a principal agent through an instrument is more properly ascribed to the principal agent than to the instrument. Now it happens sometimes that the action of the principal agent attains to something in the effect produced, to which the action of the instrument does not attain: thus the vegetative power produces the species of flesh, which the heat of fire that is its instrument cannot produce, although it acts dispositively thereto by dissolving and consuming. Since then every active force of nature is compared to God as an instrument is compared to the first and principal agent, nothing hinders the action of nature, in one and the same subject generated which is a man, from terminating in a part of man and not in the whole which is the effect of God’s action. Accordingly the human body is fashioned at the same time both by the power of God as the principal and first agent, and by the power of the semen as secondary agent: but God’s action produces the human soul, which the seminal power cannot produce, but to which it disposes.

Hence the reply to the fourth objection is clear: because a man begets his like in species, in so far as the seminal virtue in him operates dispositively towards the ultimate form whence man derives his species.

That God should co-operate with adulterers in the action of nature involves no contradiction. For it is not the nature but the will that is evil in adulterers: and the action which proceeds from their seminal virtue is natural and not voluntary. Wherefore it is not unreasonable that God co-operate in their action by giving it its ultimate perfection.

As to the sixth objection, it is clear that the conclusion does not necessarily follow. For even if we grant that man’s body is fashioned before the soul is created, or vice versa, it does not follow that the self-same man precedes himself: since a man is not his body nor his soul. But it follows that some part of him precedes the other. In this there is nothing unreasonable: because matter precedes form in point of time; matter, that is to say, considered as being in potentiality to form, but not as actually perfected by a form, for as such it is simultaneous with the form. Accordingly the human body, considered as in potentiality to the soul, and as not yet having a soul, precedes the soul in point of time: but then it is human, not actually, but only potentially. On the other hand when it is human actually, as being perfected by the human soul, it neither precedes nor follows the soul, but is simultaneous with it.

Nor again does it follow, if the soul is not produced by the seminal virtue, but only the body, that the operation both of God and of nature is imperfect, as the seventh argument inferred. Because both body and soul are made by the power of God: although the fashioning of the body is from Him by means of the natural virtue in the semen, whereas He produces the soul immediately. Neither does it follow that the action of the seminal virtue is imperfect; since it fulfils the purpose for which it is intended.

It must also be noted that the seed contains virtually whatever does not surpass a corporeal virtue, for instance the grass with the stem, stalks, and so forth. Whence we cannot conclude that the part of man which surpasses the whole corporeal virtue, is contained virtually in the seed, as the eighth argument inferred.

That the operations of the soul seem to develop in the process of human generation, according as the parts of the body develop, does not prove that the human soul and body have the same principle, as the ninth argument suggested: but it proves that the disposition of the body’s parts is necessary for the soul’s operation.

The statement of the tenth objection, that the body is conformed to the soul, and that for this reason the soul fashions a body like to itself, is partly true and partly false. For if it be understood of the soul of the begetter, the statement is true; whereas it is false if it be referred to the soul of the begotten. Because the body is not formed by the virtue of the soul of the begotten, as regards the body’s foremost and principal parts, but by the virtue of the soul of the begetter, as we proved above.1 For all matter is similarly configured to its form; and yet this configuration results not from the action of the subject generated but from the action of the generator.

As to the eleventh objection about the life of the semen at the beginning of its severance:—it is clear from what has been said that it is not living except potentially: wherefore it has a soul then not actually but virtually. In the process of generation it has a vegetative and a sensitive soul by the virtue of the semen, which do not remain but pass away when the rational soul takes their place.

Nor again, if the fashioning of the body precedes the human soul, does it follow that the soul is for the sake of the body, as the twelfth objection inferred. For one thing is for another’s sake in two ways. First, for the sake of its operation, or preservation, or any like thing consequent upon being: and the like are posterior to the thing for the sake of which they are: thus clothes are for man, and tools for the workman. Secondly, a thing is for another’s sake, i.e. for the sake of its being; and thus a thing which is for the sake of another precedes the latter in the order of time but follows it in the order of nature. It is in this way that the body is for the sake of the soul: just as all matter is for the sake of a form. It would be otherwise if from soul and body there resulted a thing that is not one in being; as those assert who deny that the soul is the form of the body.

Chapter XC

that an intellectual substance is united as a form to no other than the human body

Since it has been proved1 that a certain intellectual substance, the human soul to wit, is united to a body as its form, it remains for us to ask whether any intellectual substance can be united as form to any other body. Indeed, as regards heavenly bodies, we have shown above2 what was Aristotle’s opinion as to their being animated with an intellective soul, and that Augustine leaves the question unsolved. Wherefore the present inquiry must be confined to elemental bodies. That an intellectual substance is not united as form to any elemental body save that of man is evidently clear. For were it united to some other, it would be united either to a mixed or to a simple body. But it cannot be united to a mixed body. Because that body, in respect of its genus, would have to surpass other mixed bodies, in evenness of temperament: since we see that mixed bodies have forms so much the more noble, the nearer they approach to an even temperament; and so if that which has a most noble form, such as an intellectual substance, be a mixed body, it must have a most even temperament. For this reason we find that a soft flesh and a delicate touch are signs of a keen understanding.3 Now the most even temperament is that of the human body. Consequently, if an intellectual substance be united to a mixed body, the latter must have the same nature as the human body. Moreover its form would be of the same nature as the human soul, if it were an intellectual substance. Therefore there would be no specific difference between that animal and man. Again, neither can an intellectual substance be united as form to a simple body, such as air, water, fire, or earth. Because each of these bodies is like in the whole and in the parts: since a part of air has the same nature and species as the whole air, for it has the same movement; and the same applies to the others. Now like movers have like forms. Accordingly if any part of any one of the aforesaid bodies, air for instance, be animated with an intellectual soul, for the same reason the whole air and all its parts will be animated. But this is seen clearly to be false: because there is no sign of vital operations in the parts of the air or of other simple bodies. Therefore an intellectual substance is not united as form to any part of the air or of similar bodies.

Again. If an intellectual substance be united as form to one of the simple bodies, it will have either an intellect only, or it will have other powers, for instance those which belong to the sensitive or to the nutritive part, as in man. If it have the intellect only, there is no use in its being united to the body. For every form of a body exercises a proper operation through the body. And the intellect has no operation pertaining to the body, except in so far as it moves the body: because understanding is not an operation that can be exercised by an organ of the body; nor is willing, for the same reason. Again, the movements of the elements are from natural movers, namely their generators, and they move not themselves. Wherefore it does not follow that they are animated because they have movement. If, on the other hand, the intellectual substance, which is supposed to be united to an element or to a part thereof, have other parts of the soul, since these parts are parts of certain organs, it follows that we shall find diversity of organs in the body of the element. But this is inconsistent with its simplicity. Therefore an intellectual substance cannot be united as form to an element or to a part thereof.

Moreover. The nearer a body is to primary matter, the less noble it is, according as it is more in potentiality and less in complete actuality. Now the elements are nearer than mixed bodies to primary matter, since they are the proximate matter of mixed bodies. Consequently the elemental bodies are less noble than mixed bodies as to their species. Wherefore, since the more noble bodies have more noble forms, it is impossible that the noblest form of all, which is the intellective soul, be united to the bodies of the elements.

Again. If the elemental bodies or any parts thereof, were animated by the noblest kind of soul, which is the intellective soul, it would follow that the more akin a body is to the elements, the nearer it approaches to life. Now this does not appear to be the case, but rather the contrary: for plants have less of life than animals, and yet they are more akin to earth; while minerals, which are still more akin, have no life at all. Therefore an intellectual substance is not united as form to an element or to a part thereof.

Further. Exceeding contrariety is destructive of life in all corruptible movers: for excessive heat or cold, wet or dryness, are fatal to animals and plants. Now these contraries exceed especially in the elemental bodies. Therefore life cannot possibly be in them. Therefore it is impossible for an intellectual substance to be united to them as their form.

Moreover. Although the elements are incorruptible as a whole, each of their parts is corruptible as having contrariety. If, therefore, some parts of the elements have cognitive substances united to them, it seems that the power of discerning corruptives should especially be ascribed to them. Now this is the sense of touch, which discriminates between hot and cold and like contraries: and for this very reason it is in all animals, as though it were necessary for preservation from corruption. But this sense cannot possibly be in a simple body: since the organ of touch needs to have contraries not actually but potentially; and this is the case only in mixed and tempered bodies. Therefore it is not possible that any parts of the elements be animated with an intellective soul.

Again. Every living body has some kind of local movement proceeding from its soul: for the heavenly bodies (if indeed they be animated)1 have a circular movement; perfect animals a progressive movement; shell-fish a movement of expansion and contraction; plants a movement of increase and decrease; all of which are kinds of local movement. Whereas in the elements there is no sign of movement proceeding from a soul, but only such as is natural. Therefore they are not living bodies.

If, however, it be said that although an intellectual substance be not united as a form to an elemental body or part thereof, yet it is united thereto as its mover:—the former is impossible if applied to the air. For since a part of the air has no bounds of its own, no determinate part of the air can have its own proper movement on account of which an intellectual substance be united to it.

Moreover. If an intellectual substance be naturally united to a body as a mover to its proper movable, the motive power of that substance must be confined to the movable body to which it is naturally united; since the power of every proper mover does not, in moving, go beyond its proper movable. Now it seems absurd to say that the power of an intellectual substance does not, in moving, exceed a determinate part of an element, or some mixed body. Therefore seemingly it must not be said that an intellectual substance is naturally united to an elemental body as its mover, unless it be united thereto also as its form.

Again. The movement of an elemental body can proceed from other principles besides an intellectual substance. Wherefore this movement is not a sufficient reason for intellectual substances to be naturally united to elemental bodies.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of Apuleius and certain Platonists, who asserted that the demons are animals with an aerial body, a rational mind, passive in soul, and eternal in duration: and of certain heathens who held the elements to be animated, wherefore they offered them divine worship.2 Again, the opinion is refuted of those who said that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them, which respectively partake of the nature of the higher or lower elements.

Chapter XCI

that there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies

It may be shown from the foregoing that there are some intellectual substances which are in no way united to bodies.

For it has been proved above1 that when the body perishes the substance of the intellect remains inasmuch as it is everlasting. And if the substance of the intellect which remains be one in all, as some assert,2 it follows of necessity that it is, in its being, separate from the body. And thus our point is proved, namely that some intellectual substance subsists apart from a body. If, however, many intellectual souls survive the destruction of bodies, it will be competent to some intellectual substances to subsist apart from a body: especially since it has been proved3 that souls do not pass from one body to another. Now this separation from bodies is accidentally competent to souls, since they are naturally forms of bodies. But that which is accidental must be preceded by that which is per se.4 Therefore there are some intellectual substances, naturally prior to souls, to which it is per se competent to subsist apart from a body.

Moreover. Whatever belongs to the generic nature must belong to the specific nature: whereas certain things belong to the specific nature which are not in the generic nature. Thus rational belongs to the essence of man, but not to the essence of animal. Now that which belongs to the specific nature and not to the generic nature, does not of necessity belong to every species of the genus: for there are many species of irrational animals. And it belongs to the intellectual substance, by reason of its genus, to be per se subsistent, since it has a per se operation, as we have shown above.1 Now it belongs to the nature of a per se subsistent thing, not to be united to another. Therefore it does not belong to the nature of an intellectual substance to be united to another, although it does belong to the nature of some intellectual substance, namely the soul. Therefore there are some intellectual substances that are not united to a body.

Again. The higher nature in its lowest degree touches the lower nature in its highest degree.2 Now the intellectual nature is higher than the corporeal: and it touches it in respect of one of its parts, namely the intellective soul. Therefore it follows that, just as the body that is perfected by the intellective soul is the highest in the genus of bodies, so the intellective soul that is united to a body is the lowest in the genus of intellectual substances. Therefore there are some intellectual substances not united to bodies which, in the order of nature, are higher than the soul.

Again. If, in a genus, there be something imperfect, we find that there is something above it which, in the order of nature, is perfect in that genus.3 Now forms that are in matter are imperfect acts: since they have not complete being. Wherefore there are some forms that are complete acts, subsistent in themselves, and having a complete species. But every form that subsists in itself without matter is an intellectual substance: since immunity from matter gives intellectual being, as was shown above.4 Therefore there are some intellectual substances that are not united to bodies: for every body is material.

Moreover. Substance can be without quantity, although there cannot be quantity apart from substance: because substance precedes the other genera in time, idea, and knowledge.5 But no corporeal substance is without quantity. Therefore there can be some things in the genus of substance that are altogether without a body. Now all possible natures are found in the order of things: otherwise the universe would be imperfect. Moreover in everlasting things there is no difference between actual and possible being.1 Therefore there are some substances subsistent apart from a body, below the first substance which is God, Who is in no genus, as we proved above;2 and above the soul which is united to a body.

Further. If we find a thing composed of two, and one of these which is the less perfect be found to exist by itself, the one which is more perfect and less dependent on the other is also to be found by itself.3 Now a certain substance is found to be composed of an intellectual substance and a body, as shown above.4 And a body is found existing by itself, as evidenced in all inordinate bodies. Much more therefore are some intellectual substances found existing without being united to bodies.

Again. The substance of a thing should be proportionate to its operation: because operation is the act and the good of the operator’s substance. Now understanding is the proper operation of an intellectual substance. Wherefore an intellectual substance should be such as is competent to exercise the aforesaid operation. But since understanding is an operation that is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ, it needs not the body except in so far as intelligible objects are taken from sensibles. Yet this is an imperfect way of understanding: since the perfect way of understanding is to understand things that are intelligible by their nature: whereas that only those things be understood which are not intelligible in themselves, but are rendered intelligible by the intellect, is an imperfect way of understanding. Therefore, if before every imperfect thing there must needs be something perfect in the same genus,5 it follows that above human souls which understand by receiving from phantasms, there are some intellectual substances which understand things that are intelligible in themselves, without receiving knowledge from sensibles, and for this reason are by their nature altogether separate from bodies.

Further. Aristotle argues (11 Metaph.)1 as follows. A movement that is continuous, regular, and so far as it is concerned, unfailing, must needs be from a mover which is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we have proved above.2 Also, several movements must proceed from several movers. Now the movement of the heaven is continuous, regular, and so far as it is concerned, unfailing: and besides the first movement, there are many such movements in the heaven, as is proved by the observations of astronomers. Hence there must be several movers who are not moved, neither per se nor accidentally. But no body moves unless itself be moved, as we proved above.3 Moreover an incorporeal mover that is united to a body, is moved accidentally according as the body is moved, as instanced by the soul. Therefore there must be several movers, that are neither bodies nor united to bodies. Now the heavenly movements proceed from an intellect, as was shown above.4 Therefore there are several intellectual substances that are not united to bodies. This agrees with the opinion of Dionysius who says (Div. Nom. iv.) in speaking of the angels, that they are understood to be immaterial and incorporeal.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Sadducees who said that there is no spirit:5 as also the assertion of the philosophers of old who said that every substance is corporeal:6 and the opinion of Origen who said that with the exception of the Divine Trinity, no substance can subsist apart from a body:7 and of all those others who hold that all the angels, both good and bad, have bodies naturally united to them.8

Chapter XCII

of the great number of separate substances

It must here be noted that Aristotle attempts to prove that not only some intellectual substances exist apart from a body, but also that they are of the same number, neither more nor less, as the movements observed in the heaven.1

Thus, he proves that in the heaven there are no movements that cannot be observed by us, from the fact that every movement in the heaven is on account of the movement of some star, which is perceptible to the senses: since the spheres carry the stars and the movement of the carrier is on account of the movement of the carried. Again he proves that there are no separate substances from which some movement does not result in the heaven: because, since the heavenly movements are directed to the separate substances as their respective ends; if there were any separate substances besides those which he enumerates, there would be certain movements directed to them as an end: otherwise such movements would be imperfect. Wherefore he concludes from these premisses that separate substances are not more numerous than the movements that are and can be observed in the heaven: and all the more since there are not several heavenly bodies within the same species, so that there might also be several movements unknown to us.

But this argument is not cogent. For in things directed to an end, necessity depends on the end, as he himself teaches (2 Phys.),2 and not vice versa. Wherefore if as he states the heavenly movements are directed to separate substances as their respective ends; we cannot necessarily conclude the number of the aforesaid substances from the number of the movements. For it might be said that there are some separate substances of a higher nature than those which are the proximate ends of the heavenly movements; even as, if tools be on account of the men who work by means of them, this does not hinder there being other men who do not work immediately with those tools, but direct the workers. Hence Aristotle himself adduces this argument, not as cogent but as probable: for he says:1 Wherefore it is reasonable to reckon such to be the number of unchangeable substances and principles: for we may leave it to more capable persons to decide the point with certainty.

It remains, then, to be shown that the intellectual substances that are separate from bodies are far more numerous than the heavenly movements. For intellectual substances transcend, in their genus, all corporeal nature. Wherefore we must mark the degrees of the aforesaid substances according to their transcendency above corporeal nature. Now some intellectual substances are raised above corporeal substance in their generic nature alone, and are nevertheless united to bodies as forms, as shown above.2 And since the being of intellectual substances, as regards its genus, is nowise dependent on a body, as we have proved,3 we find a higher grade of the aforesaid substances, which, though not united to bodies as forms, are nevertheless the proper movers of certain definite bodies. In like manner the nature of an intellectual substance does not depend on its causing movement, since to move is consequent upon their principal operation which is to understand. Hence there will be a yet higher grade of intellectual substances, which are not the proper movers of certain bodies, but are raised above movers.

Moreover. Even as that which acts by its nature, acts by its natural form, so that which acts by its intelligence acts by its intellectual form, as instanced in those who act by their art. Accordingly, as the natural agent is proportionate to the patient by reason of its natural form, so the intelligent agent is proportionate to the patient and to the thing made, through the form of its intellect; so that, in effect, the intellective form is such that it can be induced by the agent’s action into the matter which receives it. Hence the proper movers of the spheres,—since they move by their intellect (if we wish to uphold the opinion of Aristotle on this point1)—must needs have such intelligences as are in harmony with the movements of the spheres, and reproducible in natural things. But above these intelligible concepts we can apprehend some that are yet more universal: because the intellect apprehends the forms of things in a manner that is more universal than is their being in things: for which reason we find that the form of the speculative intellect is more universal than that of the practical intellect, and among the practical arts, the concept of the commanding art is more universal than that of the executive art. Now we must assign degrees to intellectual substances according to the degree of intellectual operation proper to them. Therefore there are some intellectual substances above those which are the proper and proximate movers of certain definite spheres.

Again. Seemingly the order of the universe requires that whatever is more noble among things should exceed in quantity or number the less noble: since the less noble would seem to be for the sake of the more noble. Hence the more noble things, as existing for their own sake, should be as numerous as possible. Hence we find that incorruptible, i.e. the heavenly, bodies so far surpass corruptible, i.e. the elemental, bodies, that the latter are inconsiderable in quantity as compared with the former. Now just as the heavenly bodies, being incorruptible, are more noble than the elements which are corruptible, so intellectual substances are more noble than all bodies, even as the immovable and the immaterial is more noble than the movable and material. Therefore separate intellectual substances surpass in number the whole multitude of material things: and consequently they are not confined to the number of heavenly movements.

Again. The species of material things are multiplied not through their matter but through their form. Now, forms existing apart from matter, have a more complete and universal being than forms existing in matter: because forms are received into matter according to the receptivity of matter. Wherefore seemingly forms existing apart from matter, which we call separate substances, are not less in number than the species of material things.

Yet we do not therefore say that separate substances are the species of these sensible things, as the Platonists maintained.1 For since they could not attain to the knowledge of the aforesaid substances except from sensibles, they supposed those substances to be of the same species as these, or rather to be the species of these latter: even as a person who had not seen the sun, moon, and stars, and heard that they were incorruptible bodies, might call them by the names of these corruptible bodies, thinking them to be of the same species as these: which would not be possible. In like manner it is impossible that immaterial substances be of the same species as material, or that they be the species of the latter substances: because the specific nature of these sensible things requires matter, though not this matter, which is the proper principle of the individual: even as the specific nature of man requires flesh and bones, but not this flesh and these bones, which are the principles of Socrates and Plato. Accordingly we do not say that separate substances are the species of these sensibles, but that they are other species more noble than these, forasmuch as the pure is raised above the mixture. And thus those substances must needs be more numerous than the species of these material things.

Further. The possibility of multiplication applies to a thing in its intelligible being rather than in its material being. For we grasp, with our intellect, many things which cannot have being in matter; the result being that any straight line can be produced mathematically, but not in nature; while it is possible for the rarefaction of bodies, the velocity of movements, the diversity of shapes to be multiplied indefinitely in thought, although it is impossible in fact. Now, separate substances have intelligible being by their nature: and consequently a greater multiplicity is possible in them than in material substances, taking into account their respective properties and natures. Now in things everlasting there is no distinction between actual and possible being.1 Therefore the multitude of separate substances surpasses that of material bodies.

Holy Writ bears witness to this. For it is stated (Dan. 7:10): Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him. And Dionysius (Cœl. Hier. xiv.) says that the number of those substances surpasses all material multitude.

Hereby we set aside the error of those who said that the number of the separate substances corresponds to the number of heavenly movements, or of the heavenly spheres: as well as the error of Rabbi Moses,2 who said that the number ascribed by Scripture to the angels is not the number of separate substances, but of forces in this lower world; as if one were to give to the concupiscible power the name of spirit of concupiscence, and so on.

Chapter XCIII

that there are not several separate substances of one species

From what has been said concerning these substances, it may be shown that there are not several separate substances of one species.

For it has been proved above3 that separate substances are subsistent quiddities. Now, the species of a thing is signified by its definition, for this is the sign of a thing’s quiddity.4 Hence a subsistent quiddity is a subsistent species. Therefore there cannot be several separate substances unless they be several species.

Further. Whatever things are the same in species but differ numerically, have matter: since a difference resulting from form, involves a specific difference: whereas that which results from matter, causes a diversity of number.1 Now, separate substances are utterly devoid of matter, whether as part of themselves, or by being united to matter as its form.2 Therefore they cannot possibly be several of one species.

Moreover. The purpose for which, in corruptible things, there are several individuals in one species, is that the specific nature which cannot be preserved for ever in one individual, may be preserved in many:3 wherefore even in incorruptible bodies there is but one individual in one species. Now the nature of a separate substance can be preserved in one individual, since they are incorruptible, as we proved above.4 Therefore there is no need for several individuals of the same species in those substances.

Again. In each individual, that which belongs to the species is more noble than that which is the principle of individuality, existing apart from the specific nature. Consequently the multiplicity of species adds more nobility to the universe, than the multiplicity of individuals of one species. Now, the perfection of the universe applies especially to separate substances. Therefore it is more in keeping with the perfection of the universe, that they should be many differing in species, than that they should be multiplied numerically within the same species.

Further. Separate substances are more perfect than the heavenly bodies. Now, in the heavenly bodies, by reason of their perfection, one species contains but one individual:5 both because each one of them consists of the whole matter pertaining to its species, and because the one individual possesses perfectly the power of its species for the fulfilment of the purpose to which that species is directed in the universe, as especially may be seen in the sun and moon. Much more therefore should we find but one individual of the one species in the separate substances.

Chapter XCIV

that the separate substance and the soul are not of one species

Furthermore it can be proved from the foregoing that the soul is not of the same species with separate substances.

For there is a greater difference between the human soul and a separate substance than between one separate substance and another. Now, separate substances are all specifically distinct from one another, as we have proved.1 Much more, therefore, is a separate substance specifically distinct from the soul.

Moreover. Each thing has its proper being according to its specific nature: because things which have a different kind of being have a different species. Now, the being of the human soul and that of a separate substance are not of the same kind; since the body cannot communicate in the being of a separate substance, whereas it can communicate in the being of the human soul, which is united in being to the body as form to matter. Therefore the human soul differs in species from separate substances.

Again. That which is specified by itself, cannot be of the same species as that which is not specified by itself but is part of a species. Now, the separate substance is specified by itself: whereas the soul is not, but is part of the human species. Hence it is impossible that the soul be of the same species as separate substances; except on the supposition that man be of the same species as they, which is clearly impossible.

Further. The species of a thing is gathered from its operation: since operation indicates the power which reveals the essence. Now, the proper operation of a separate substance and of the intellective soul is understanding. But the separate substance’s mode of understanding is wholly different from that of the soul: because the soul understands by receiving from the phantasms; but not so the separate substance, since it has no corporeal organs, wherein phantasms must needs be. Therefore the human soul and the separate substance are not of the same species.

Chapter XCV

how we are to understand genus and species in separate substances

It is necessary to consider wherein species differ in separate substances. For in material things of the same genus and differing in species, the ratio of the genus is derived from the material principle, and the specific difference from the formal principle. Thus the sensitive nature, whence is derived the ratio of animal, is, in man, material in respect of the intellective nature, whence is derived the specific difference of man, namely rational. Consequently, if separate substances are not composed of matter and form, as is evident from what has been said,1 it is not clear how we are to ascribe to them genus and specific difference.

Accordingly it must be observed that the various species of things possess the nature of being in degrees. For in the first division of being we find at the very outset something perfect, namely substantial (per se) being and actual being, and something imperfect, namely, accidental being and potential being. In like manner if we run through the various species, we find that one species has an additional grade of perfection over another, for instance animals over plants, and animals endowed with locomotion over those that are immovable. Again, in colours one species is seen to be more perfect than another, according as it approaches to whiteness. Hence Aristotle (8 Metaph.)2 says that the definitions of things are like a number, the species of which is changed by the subtraction or addition of unity: in the same way as a different species results in definitions, if a difference be removed or added. Wherefore the ratio of a determinate species consists in this, that the common nature is placed in a determinate degree of being. And since in things composed of matter and form, the form is the term as it were, and that which is determined thereby is the matter or something material: it follows that the ratio, of the genus must be taken from the material, and the specific difference from the formal element. Hence there results one thing from difference and genus, even as from matter and form. And just as it is one and the same nature that results from matter and form, so the difference does not add an extraneous nature to the genus, but is a determination of the generic nature itself: for instance if we take as a genus an animal with feet, a difference thereof will be an animal with two feet, which difference clearly adds nothing extraneous to the genus.

It is therefore evident that it is accidental to the genus and difference, that the determination denoted by the difference be caused by a principle other than the generic nature, since the nature signified by the definition is composed of matter as determined, and form as determining. Hence if there be a simple nature, it will be determined by itself, nor will it need to have two parts, one determining and the other determined. Consequently the ratio of genus will be derived from the ratio of its nature, and its specific difference will be derived from its determination in that it is placed in a determinate grade of being.

It also follows from this that if any nature be without limits and infinite in itself, as we have shown to be the case with the divine nature,1 we cannot ascribe to it either genus or species: and this agrees with what, we have proved about God.2

Moreover, since the difference of species is attributed to separate substances according as various degrees are ascribed to them, and since there are not several individuals in one species,3 it is clear, from what has been said, that no two separate substances are equal in degree, but that one is naturally above another. Hence it is stated (Job 38:33): Dost thou know the order of heaven? And Dionysius says (Cœl. Hier. x.) that even as in the whole multitude of angels there is a supreme, middle, and lowest hierarchy, so in each hierarchy there is a highest, a middle, and a lowest order, and in each order, highest, middle, and lowest angels.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of Origen,1 who said that all spiritual substances were created equal from the beginning, among which he reckoned even souls; and that the difference which we find among these substances, in that this one is united to a body, and that one not, that this one is higher and that one lower, results from a difference of merits. For we have shown that this difference of degree is natural; that the soul is not of the same species as separate substances;2 nor the separate substances themselves of the same species with one another, and that they are not equal in the order of nature.

Chapter XCVI

that separate substances do not gather their knowledge from sensibles

From what has been laid down it may be shown that separate substances do not receive intellective knowledge from sensible things.

For sensibles by their very nature are adapted to be apprehended by the sense, as intelligibles by the intellect. Wherefore every substance that is capable of knowledge, and derives that knowledge from sensibles, is endowed with sensitive cognition; and consequently has a body united to it naturally, since sensitive knowledge is impossible without a bodily organ. But separate substances have not a body naturally united to them, as we proved above.3 Therefore they do not derive intellective knowledge from sensible things.

Moreover. A higher power must needs have a higher object. Now the intellective power of a separate substance is higher than that of the human soul: since the human soul’s intelligence is the lowest in the order of intellects, as we proved above.1 And the object of the human soul’s intelligence is a phantasm, as stated above;2 and this is higher in the order of objects than a sensible thing existing outside the mind, as appears from the order of cognitive powers. Consequently the object of a separate substance cannot be a thing existing outside the mind, as the direct object whence it derives its knowledge; nor can it be a phantasm. It follows, in consequence, that the object of the separate substance’s intellect is something higher than a phantasm. Now, nothing is higher than a phantasm, in the order of knowable objects, save that which is intelligible actually. Wherefore separate substances do not derive intellectual knowledge from sensibles, but they understand things which are intelligible even in themselves.

Again. The order of intelligibles is in accordance with the order of intellects. Now things intelligible in themselves are, in the order of intelligibles, above those things which are not intelligible but for the fact that we make them intelligible: and such must needs be all intelligibles taken from sensibles; because sensibles are not in themselves intelligible. But such are the intelligibles which our intellect understands. Therefore the intellect of the separate substance, since it is above our intellect, does not understand intelligibles received from sensibles, but it understands those which are intelligible actually.

Moreover. The mode of a thing’s proper operation is in keeping with the mode of that thing’s substance and nature. Now a separate substance is an intellect existing by itself and not in a body. Consequently, its intellectual operation will be directed to intelligibles that are not founded on a body. But all intelligibles taken from sensibles are somewhat founded on bodies, for instance our intelligibles are founded on the phantasms which are in bodily organs. Therefore separate substances do not derive knowledge from sensibles.

Further. Just as primary matter is the lowest in the order of things sensible, and is consequently only in potentiality to all sensible forms, so the possible intellect, being the lowest in the order of things intelligible, is in potentiality to all intelligibles, as is clear from what has been said.1 Now those things which, in the order of sensibles, are above primary matter, have their form actually, whereby they are established in sensible being. Therefore separate substances, which, in the order of intelligibles, are above the human possible intellect, are actually in intelligible being: for the intellect that receives knowledge from sensibles is in intelligible being not actually, but potentially. Therefore a separate substance does not receive knowledge from sensibles.

Again. The perfection of a higher nature does not depend on a lower nature. Now the perfection of separate substances, since they are intellectual, consists in understanding. Therefore their understanding does not depend on sensible things, in such a way as to derive knowledge from them.

Hence it is evident that in separate substances there is not an active and a possible intellect, except perhaps in an equivocal sense. Because a possible and an active intellect are found in the intellective soul forasmuch as it derives its knowledge from sensibles: since it is the active intellect that makes the species received from sensibles to be actually intelligible, and the possible intellect is that which is in potentiality to the knowledge of all forms of sensible things. Wherefore, since separate substances do not derive their knowledge from sensibles, there is not in them an active and a possible intellect. Hence Aristotle (3 De Anima)2 in establishing the possible and active intellects, states that we need to place them in the soul.

It is also evident that in these same substances local distance cannot hinder the knowledge of separate substances. For local distance is per se referable to sense, and not to the intellect except accidentally, in so far as it receives from sense, because sensibles move the senses at a determinate distance. Now things intelligible actually, in so far as they move the intellect, are not in place, for they are separate from corporeal matter. Since then separate substances do not derive intellective knowledge from sensibles, local distance has no effect on their knowledge.

Again, it is clear that time has nothing to do with their intellectual operation. For just as things actually intelligible are apart from place, so are they apart from time: because time is consequent upon local movement; wherefore it measures only such things as are somehow in place. Consequently the understanding of a separate substance transcends time: whereas time is incidental to our intellectual operation, since we derive our knowledge from phantasms which relate to a determinate time. Hence it is that in composition and division our intellect always includes time past or future, but not in understanding what a thing is. For it understands what a thing is by abstracting intelligibles from sensible conditions: wherefore, in respect of that operation, it understands the intelligible apart from time and all conditions of things sensible. Whereas it composes and divides by applying previously abstracted intelligibles to things, and in this application time must of necessity be implied.

Chapter XCVII

that the intellect of a separate substance always understands actually

From the foregoing it is also clear that the intellect of a separate substance always understands actually.

For that which is sometimes in act and sometimes in potentiality, is measured by time. But the intellect of a separate substance transcends time, as we have proved.1 Therefore it is not sometimes actually understanding and sometimes not.

Moreover. Every living substance exercises actually some operation by virtue of its nature, although other operations are in it potentially: thus animals are always in the process of nourishment, although they do not always sense. Now, separate substances are living substances, as is clear from what has been said.2 Therefore by their nature they must needs be always actually understanding.

Again. The separate substances, according to the teaching of philosophers, move the heavenly bodies by their intellect. Now the movement of the heavenly bodies is always continuous. Therefore the understanding of separate substances is continuous and perpetual.

The same conclusion follows even if we deny that they move the heavenly bodies, since they are higher than the heavenly bodies. Wherefore, if the proper operation of a heavenly body, which is its movement, is continuous, much more will the proper operation of separate substances, namely understanding, be continuous.

Moreover. Whatever sometimes operates and sometimes does not operate, is moved either per se or accidentally. Wherefore the fact that we are sometimes understanding and sometimes not understanding, is due to an alteration in the sensible faculty, as stated in 7 Phys.3 But separate substances are not moved per se, since they are not bodies; nor are they moved accidentally, since they are not united to bodies. Therefore their proper operation, which is to understand, is continual in them without any interruption.

Chapter XCVIII

how one separate substance understands another

If separate substances understand things that are by themselves intelligible, as we have proved;1 and if separate substances are by themselves intelligible, since freedom from matter makes a thing intelligible by itself, as appears from the foregoing,2 it follows that separate substances understand separate substances as their proper objects. Wherefore each of them knows itself and others.

Each one indeed knows itself otherwise than the possible intellect knows itself. For the possible intellect is in potentiality in intelligible being, and is made actual by the intelligible species, even as primary matter is made actual in sensible being by a natural form. Now nothing is known according as it is only in potentiality, but a thing is known according as it is in act; hence the form is the principle whereby we know the thing which is made actual thereby, and in like manner the cognitive power is made actually cognizant by some species. Accordingly our intellect does not know itself except by the species whereby it is made actual in intelligible being; for which reason Aristotle (3 De Anima)3 says that it is knowable in the same way as other things, namely by species derived from phantasms, as by their proper forms. On the other hand separate substances, by their nature, exist actually in intelligible being. Wherefore each one of them knows itself by its essence, and not by the species of another thing. Since, however, all knowledge is according as the image of the thing known is in the knower; and since one separate substance is like another as regards the common generic nature, while they differ the one from the other in regard to the species, as appears from the foregoing;4 it would seem to follow that the one does not know the other, as regards its proper specific nature, but only as regards the common nature of their genus.

Accordingly some1 say that one separate substance is the efficient cause of another. Now in every efficient cause there must be the image of its effect, and likewise in every effect there must be the likeness of its cause: because every agent produces its like. Hence in the higher separate substance there exists the likeness of the lower, as in the cause there is the likeness of its effect; while in the lower there is the likeness of the higher, as in the effect there is the likeness of its cause. Now if we consider non-univocal causes, the likeness of the effect exists in the cause in a more eminent manner, and the likeness of the cause is in its effect in a less eminent manner. And the higher separate substances must needs be causes of this kind with respect to the lower separate substances: because they are placed in various degrees which are not of one species. Therefore a lower separate substance knows a higher according to the mode of the substance knowing, and not according to the mode of the substance known, but in a lower manner: whereas the higher knows the lower in a more eminent way. This is the meaning of the statement in De Causis,2 that an intelligence knows what is below it, and what is above it, according to the mode of its substance: because the one is the cause of the other.

But since we have shown above3 that intellectual separate substances are not composed of matter and form, they cannot be caused except by way of creation. Now to create belongs to God alone, as we proved above.4 Therefore one separate substance cannot be the cause of another.

Further. It has been proved5 that the principal parts of the universe are all created immediately by God. Therefore one of them is not caused by another. Now each of the separate substances is a principal part of the universe, much more than the sun or moon: since each of them has its proper species, which is also more noble than any species of things corporeal. Therefore one of them is not caused by another, but all are produced immediately by God.

Hence, according to the foregoing, each of the separate substances knows God by its natural knowledge, according to the mode of its substance, whereby they are like God as their cause. But God knows them as their proper cause, having in Himself the likeness of them all. Yet one separate substance is unable to know another in this way, since one is not the cause of another.

We must, therefore, observe that, since none of these substances according to its essence is an adequate principle of the knowledge of all other things, it is necessary for each of them, in addition to its own substance, to have some intelligible images, whereby each of them is enabled to know another in its proper nature.

This can be made clear in the following manner. The proper object of an intellect is an intelligible being: and this includes all possible differences and species of being: because whatever can be, is intelligible. Now, since all knowledge is caused by some kind of likeness, the intellect is unable to know its object wholly, unless it has in itself the likeness of all being and of all its differences. But such a likeness of all being can only be an infinite nature, which is not confined to any species or genus of being, but is the universal principle and active force of all being: and this is the divine nature alone, as we proved in the First Book.1 And every other nature, since it is confined to some genus or species of being, cannot be a universal likeness of all being. It follows, therefore, that God alone, by His essence, knows all things; while every separate substance, by its nature, knows its own species alone with a perfect knowledge: whereas the possible intellect does not know itself at all thus, but by its intelligible species, as stated above.2

Now from the very fact that a particular substance is intellectual, it is capable of understanding all being. Wherefore, as a separate substance is not, by its nature, made actually to understand all being, that substance, considered in itself, is in potentiality, as it were, to the intelligible images whereby all being is known, and these images will be its acts, according as it is intellectual. But it is not possible that these images be otherwise than several: for it has been already proved that the perfect image of the whole universal being cannot but be infinite; and just as the nature of a separate substance is not infinite, but limited, so an intelligible image existing therein cannot be infinite, but is confined to some species or genus of being: wherefore several such images are requisite for the comprehension of all being. Now, the higher a separate substance is, the more is its nature similar to the divine; and consequently it is less limited, as approaching nearer to the perfection and goodness of the universal being, and for this reason it has a more universal participation of goodness and being. Consequently the intelligible images that are in the higher substance are less numerous and more universal. This agrees with the statement of Dionysius (Cœl. Hier. xii.) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge: and it is said in De Causis1 that the higher intelligences have more universal forms. Now, the highest point of this universality is in God, Who knows all things by one, namely His essence: whereas the lowest is in the human intellect, which, for each intelligible object, requires an appropriate intelligible species commensurate with that object.

It follows that with the higher substances knowledge through more universal forms is not more imperfect, as it is with us. For through the image of animal, whereby we know something in its genus only, we have a more imperfect knowledge than through the image of man, whereby we know the complete species: since to know a thing as to its genus only, is to know it imperfectly and potentially as it were, whereas to know a thing as to its species, is to know it perfectly and actually. Now our intellect, since it obtains the lowest place in intellectual substances, requires images particularized to that extent that to each proper object of its knowledge there must needs correspond a proper image in it: wherefore, by the image of animal it knows not rational, and consequently neither does it know man, except in a certain respect. On the other hand the intelligible image that is in a separate substance is of more universal virtue, and suffices to represent more things. Consequently it argues not a more imperfect but a more perfect knowledge: because it is virtually universal, like the active form in a universal cause which, the more universal it is, the greater the extent of its efficiency, and the more efficacious its production. Therefore by one image it knows both animal and the differences of animal: or again it knows them in a more universal or more limited way according to the order of the aforesaid substances.

Hence we may take examples of this, as we have stated, in the two extremes, namely in the divine and human intellects. For God knows all things by one, namely His essence: while man requires different likenesses to know different things. Moreover the higher his intellect, the more things is he able to know through fewer: wherefore we need to give particular examples to those who are slow of intelligence, in order that they may acquire knowledge about things.

Now since a separate substance, considered in its nature, is in potentiality to the images by which all being is known, we must not think that it is devoid of all such images: for such is the disposition of the possible intellect before it understands, as stated in 3 De Anima.1 Nor again must we think that it has some of them actually, and others potentially only: even as primary matter in the lower bodies has one form actually and others potentially; and as our possible intellect, when we are already possessed of knowledge, is in act in respect of some intelligibles, and in potentiality in respect of others. For since these separate substances are not moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we have proved,2 whatever is potential in them, must be actual; else they would pass from potentiality to act, and thus they would be moved per se or accidentally. There is, therefore, in them potentiality and act as regards intelligible being, just as there is in the heavenly bodies as regards natural being. For the matter of a heavenly body is so perfected by its form, that it does not remain in potentiality to other forms: and in like manner the intellect of a separate substance is wholly perfected by intelligible forms, with respect to its natural knowledge. On the other hand our possible intellect is proportionate to the corruptible bodies to which it is united as a form: because it is made to have certain intelligible forms actually in such a way that it remains in potentiality to others. For this reason it is stated in De Causis1 that an intelligence is full of forms, since, to wit, the whole potentiality of its intellect is perfected by intelligible forms. And thus one separate substance is able to understand another through these intelligible forms.

Someone, however, may think that, since a separate substance is intelligible by its nature, there is no need to assert that one is understood by another through intelligible species, but that they understand one another by the very essence of the substance understood. For it would seem that the fact of a substance being understood through an intelligible species is accidental to material substances, from their not being actually intelligible through their essence: wherefore it is necessary for them to be understood through abstract intentions. Moreover this seems in accord with the statement of the Philosopher who says (11 Metaph.)2 that in separate substances there is no distinction between matter, intellect, the act of understanding, and the thing understood.

And yet if this be granted it involves not a few difficulties. First, because the intellect in act is the thing understood in act according to the teaching of Aristotle:3 and it is difficult to see how one separate substance is identified with another when it understands it.

Again. Every agent or operator acts through its form, to which its operation corresponds, as heating corresponds to heat; wherefore we see the thing whose species informs the sight. Yet it does not seem possible for one separate substance to be the form of another, since each has its being separate from the other. Therefore it is seemingly impossible for the one to be seen by the other through its essence.

Moreover. The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands. Now a lower substance cannot be a perfection of a higher. It would follow, therefore, that the higher would not understand the lower, if each were understood through its essence and not by another species.

Further. The intelligible object is within the intellect as to that whereby it is understood. Now no substance enters into the mind save God alone, Who is in all things by His essence, presence, and power. Therefore it is seemingly impossible for a separate substance to be understood by another through its essence, and not through its image in that other.

This must indeed be true according to the opinion of Aristotle who says that understanding takes place through the fact that the thing understood in act is one with the intellect in act. Wherefore a separate substance, although it is by itself actually intelligible, is nevertheless not understood in itself except by an intellect with which it is one. And it is thus that a separate substance understands itself by its essence: so that according to this the intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding are the same thing.

But according to the opinion of Plato, understanding takes place through contact of the intellect with the thing understood. So that, in consequence, one separate substance can understand another through its essence, when it is in spiritual contact with it; the higher understanding the lower, by enclosing and containing it by its power as it were, and the lower understanding the higher, as though it grasped it as its own perfection. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that the higher substances are intelligible as the food of the lower substances.

Chapter XCIX

that separate substances know material things

By these aforesaid forms, then, a separate substance knows not only other separate substances, but also the species of corporeal things.

For, since their intellect is perfect in respect of its natural perfection, being wholly in act, it follows that it comprehends its object, intelligible being to wit, in every respect. Now intelligible being comprises also the species of corporeal things. Therefore a separate substance knows them.

Again. Since the species of things are differentiated as the species of numbers, as stated above,1 it follows that the higher species contains in some way that which is in the lower, even as the greater number contains the lesser. Seeing then that separate substances are above corporeal substances, it follows that whatever is contained in corporeal substances materially, is contained in separate substances intelligibly; for that which is in a thing, is there according to the mode of the thing in which it is.

Again. If the separate substances move the heavenly bodies, as philosophers say, whatever results from the movement of the heavenly bodies is ascribed to those same bodies as instruments, since they move through being moved; and to the separate substances that move them, as principal agents. Now they act and move by their intellect. Consequently they cause whatever is done by the movement of the heavenly bodies, just as the craftsman works through his tools. Hence their forms which are generated and corrupted are in separate substances intelligibly. Wherefore Boethius, in his book De Trinitate,2 says that from forms that are without matter came the forms that are in matter. Therefore separate substances know not only separate substances, but also the species of material things. For if they know the species of bodies subject to generation and corruption as being the species of their proper effects, much more do they know the species of heavenly bodies, as being the species of their proper instruments.

Wherefore, since the intellect of a separate substance is in act, having all the images to which it is in potentiality; and since it has the power to comprehend all the species and differences of being, it follows of necessity that every separate substance knows all natural things and their whole order.

Yet seeing that the intellect in act is the thing actually understood,1 someone might think that a separate substance does not understand material things; for it would seem incongruous that a material thing should be the perfection of a separate substance.

But if the point be considered aright, the thing understood is a perfection of the one who understands, according to the image thereof in the intellect, for the stone which is outside the soul is not a perfection of our possible intellect. Now the image of the material thing is in the intellect of a separate substance immaterially, according to the mode of a separate substance, and not according to the mode of a material substance. Wherefore there is no reason why we should not say that this image is a perfection of the separate substance’s intellect, as its proper form.

Chapter C

that separate substances know singulars

Since in the intellect of a separate substance the images of things are more universal than in our intellect, and more efficacious as a medium of knowledge, it follows that separate substances, through the images of material things, know material things not only according to their generic or specific nature, but also according to their individual nature.

For seeing that the species of things in the intellect must needs be immaterial, they cannot, as existing in our intellect, be the principle of knowing singulars, which are individualized by matter: because the species of our intellect are of such limited virtue, that one leads to the knowledge only of one. Wherefore, just as the image of the generic nature cannot lead to the knowledge of genus and difference, so that the species be known thereby, in like manner the image of the specific nature cannot lead to the knowledge of the principles of individuality, which are material principles, so that the individual be known thereby in its singularity. On the other hand the image in the intellect of a separate substance, since it is of a more universal virtue, being at the same time one and immaterial, is able to lead to the knowledge of both the specific and the individualizing principles, so that through it the separate substance is able by its intellect to know not only the generic and specific natures, but also the individual nature. Nor does it follow that the form through which it knows is material; nor that such forms are infinite according to the number of individuals.

Further. Whatever a lower power can do, that can a higher power do, but in a higher way. Hence the lower power works by many instruments, whereas the higher power works by one only. For a power, the higher it is, the more is it consolidated and unified, whereas, on the other hand, the lower power is disunited and multiplied. Hence we observe that the one power of the common sense apprehends the various kinds of sensibles which the five external senses perceive. Now the human soul is lower than a separate substance in the order of nature: and it is cognizant of universals and singulars through two principles, namely, sense and intellect. Consequently a separate substance, being higher, knows both in a higher way by one principle, namely the intellect.

Again. The order in which the intelligible species of things reach our intellect is contrary to the order in which they reach the intellect of a separate substance. For they reach our intellect by a process of analysis, and by abstraction from material and individualizing conditions; so that it is not possible for us to know singulars through them. On the other hand they reach the intellect of a separate substance by a process of synthesis as it were: since it has intelligible species through its likeness to the first intelligible species, viz. the divine intellect, which is not abstracted from things, but productive of them. Now, it is productive not merely of the form but also of the matter which is the principle of individuality. Wherefore the species of the intellect of a separate substance represent the whole thing, not only the principles of its species, but also the principles of its individuality. Consequently we must not deny separate substances the knowledge of singulars, although our intellect is unable to know singulars.

Further. If the heavenly bodies are moved by the separate substances, according to the statement of philosophers, since separate substances act and move by their intellect, they must needs know the movable that they move: and this is some particular thing, for universals are immovable. Their positions also, which are changed by their movement, are singular things, and cannot be unknown to the substance which moves them by its intellect. We must, therefore, say that separate substances know singulars connected with these material things.

Chapter CI

whether separate substances know all things at the same time by their natural knowledge

Now since the intellect in act is the thing actually understood, as the sense in act is the thing actually sensed;1 and since the same thing cannot be several things actually at the same time, it would seem impossible for the intellect of a separate substance to have various species of things intelligible, as we have stated above.2

But it must be noted that not all is actually understood, the intelligible species of which is actually in the intellect. For since a substance which has understanding has also a will, and consequently has the control of its action, it is in its power, when it already has an intelligible species, to make use of it for understanding actually; or, if it have several species, to use one of them. Wherefore we do not actually consider all the things whereof we possess knowledge. Therefore an intellectual substance that has knowledge through several species, uses one of them as it will, and thereby knows actually at the same time all that he knows by one species; for they are all as one intelligible thing in so far as they are known through one (species), even as our intellect knows at the same time several things compared or related to one another as one individual thing. But it does not know at the same time the things which it knows through different species. Therefore as there is one understanding so is there one thing actually understood.

Accordingly in the intellect of a separate substance there is a certain succession of understandings: there is not, however, movement properly speaking, since act does not succeed potentiality, but act succeeds act. Whereas the divine intellect, forasmuch as it knows all things through one, namely the divine essence, and because its act is its essence, knows all things at the same time. Consequently there is no succession in His understanding, but His act of intelligence is wholly perfect at the same time, and endureth through all ages. Amen.

Chapter I

foreword

The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods. For the Lord will not reject His people. For in His hands are all the ends of the earth and the heights of the mountains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed the dry land (Ps. 94:3 seqq.)1

We have shown in the preceding books that there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God, and who of the abundance of His perfection, bestows being on all that exists, so that He is proved to be not only the first of beings, but also the beginning of all. Moreover He bestows being on others, not through natural necessity, but according to the decree of His will, as we have shown above.2 Hence it follows that He is the Lord of the things made by Him: since we dominate over those things that are subject to our will. And this is a perfect dominion that He exercises over things made by Him, forasmuch as in their making He needs neither the help of an extrinsic agent, nor matter as the foundation of His work: since He is the universal efficient cause of all being.

Now everything that is produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by that agent: because the good and the end are the proper object of the will, wherefore whatever proceeds from a will must needs be directed to an end. And each thing attains its end by its own action, which action needs to be directed by him who endowed things with the principles whereby they act.

Consequently God, who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all things with being, must needs be the Ruler of all, Himself ruled by none: nor is any thing to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there any thing that does not owe its being to Him. Therefore as He is perfect in being and causing, so is He perfect in ruling.

The effect of this ruling is seen to differ in different things, according to the difference of natures. For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a resemblance to Him and reflect His image: wherefore not only are they directed, but they direct themselves to their appointed end by their own actions. And if in thus directing themselves they be subject to the divine ruling, they are admitted by that divine ruling to the attainment of their last end; but are excluded therefrom if they direct themselves otherwise.

Others there are, bereft of intelligence, which do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another. Of these some being incorruptible, even as they are not patient of defect in their natural being, so neither do they wander, in their own action, from the direction to their appointed end, but are subject, without fail, to the ruling of the supreme ruler; such are the heavenly bodies, whose movements are invariable. Others, however, being corruptible, are patient of defects in their natural being; yet this defect is supplied to the advantage of another: since when one thing is corrupted, another is generated. Likewise, they fail from their natural direction in their own actions, yet this failing is compensated by some resultant good. Whence it is clear that not even those things which are seen to wander from the direction of the supreme ruling, escape from the power of the supreme ruler: because also these corruptible bodies, even as they are created by God, so too are they perfectly subject to Him. Wherefore, considering this, the Psalmist, filled with the divine spirit, in order to give us an illustration of the divine government, first describes to us the perfection of the supreme governor,—as to His nature when he says, God: as to His power, when he says, a great Lord, implying that He needs no one for His power to produce its effect: as to His authority, when he says, A great king above all gods, since, although there be many rulers, yet are all subject to His rule. Secondly, he describes to us the manner of this government. As regards intellectual beings, which, if they submit to His rule, receive from Him their last end which is Himself; wherefore he says, For the Lord will not reject His people. As regards things corruptible which, albeit at times they wander from their proper mode of action, never escape the power of the supreme ruler, he says, Because in His hands are all the ends of the earth. And as regards the heavenly bodies, which transcend the highest summits of the earth, that is of corruptible bodies, and always maintain the order of the divine government, he says, And the mountain heights are His. Thirdly, he assigns the reason of this universal government, for the things that God made must needs be governed by Him. To this he refers when he says, For the sea is His, etc.

Since then in the First Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and, in the Second, of the perfection of the divine power, inasmuch as He is the creator and lord of all: it remains for us in this Third Book to treat of His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as He is the end and governor of all. We must therefore proceed in this wise, so as first to treat of Him as the end of all things; secondly of His universal government, inasmuch as He governs every creature: thirdly, of that special government, whereby He governs creatures endowed with intelligence.

Chapter II

that every agent acts for an end

Accordingly we must first show that every agent, by its action, intends an end.

For in those things which clearly act for an end, we declare the end to be that towards which the movement of the agent tends: for when this is reached, the end is said to be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended; as may be seen in the physician who aims at health, and in a man who runs towards an appointed goal. Nor does it matter, as to this, whether that which tends to an end be cognitive or not: for just as the target is the end of the archer, so is it the end of the arrow’s flight. Now the movement of every agent tends to something determinate: since it is not from any force that any action proceeds, but heating proceeds from heat, and cooling from cold; wherefore actions are differentiated by their active principles. Action sometimes terminates in something made, for instance building terminates in a house, healing ends in health: while sometimes it does not so terminate, for instance, understanding and sensation. And if action terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends by that action towards that thing made: while if it does not terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends to the action itself. It follows therefore that every agent intends an end while acting, which end is sometimes the action itself, sometimes a thing made by the action.

Again. In all things that act for an end, that is said to be the last end, beyond which the agent seeks nothing further: thus the physician’s action goes as far as health, and this being attained, his efforts cease. But in the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go; else actions would tend to infinity, which is impossible, for since it is not possible to pass through an infinite medium,1 the agent would never begin to act, because nothing moves towards what it cannot reach. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Moreover. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, these actions must needs result either in something made, or not. If the result is something made, the being of that thing made will follow after an infinity of actions. But that which presupposes an infinity of things, cannot possibly be, since an infinite medium cannot be passed through.1 Now impossibility of being argues impossibility of becoming: and that which cannot become, it is impossible to make. Therefore it is impossible for an agent to begin to make a thing for the making of which an infinity of actions are presupposed.—If, however, the result of such actions be not something made, the order of these actions must be either according to the order of active forces, (for instance if a man feel that he may imagine, and imagine that he may understand, and understand that he may will): or according to the order of objects, (for instance I consider the body that I may consider the soul, which I consider in order to consider a separate substance, which again I consider so that I may consider God). Now it is not possible to proceed to infinity, either in active forces, as neither is this possible in the forms of things, as proved in 2 Metaph., since the form is the principle of activity: or in objects, as neither is this possible in beings, since there is one first being, as we have proved above.1 Therefore it is not possible for agents to proceed to infinity: and consequently there must be something, which being attained, the efforts of the agent cease. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Further. In things that act for an end, whatsoever comes between the first agent and the last end, is an end in respect to what precedes, and an active principle in respect of what follows. Hence if the effort of the agent does not tend to something determinate, and if its action, as stated, proceeds to infinity, the active principles must needs proceed to infinity: which is impossible, as we have shown above. Therefore the effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate.

Again. Every agent acts either by nature or by intelligence. Now there can be no doubt that those which act by intelligence act for an end; since they act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action, and act through such preconception, for this is to act by intelligence. Now just as in the preconceiving intellect there exists the entire likeness of the effect that is attained by the action of the intellectual being, so in the natural agent there pre-exists the similitude of the natural effect, by virtue of which similitude its action is determined to the appointed effect: for fire begets fire, and an olive produces an olive. Wherefore even as that which acts by intelligence tends by its action to a definite end, so also does that which acts by nature. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Moreover. Fault is not found save in those things which are for an end: for we do not find fault with one who fails in that to which he is not appointed; thus we find fault with a physician if he fail to heal, but not with a builder or a grammarian. But we find fault in things done according to art, as when a grammarian fails to speak correctly; and in things that are ruled by nature, as in the case of monstrosities. Therefore every agent, whether according to nature, or according to art, or acting of set purpose, acts for an end.

Again. Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent to many effects does not produce one rather than another: wherefore from that which is indifferent to either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end.

There are, however, certain actions which would seem not to be for an end, such as playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without attention, such as scratching one’s beard, and the like: whence some might be led to think that there is an agent that acts not for an end.—But we must observe that contemplative actions are not for another end, but are themselves an end. Playful actions are sometimes an end, when one plays for the mere pleasure of play; and sometimes they are for an end, as when we play that afterwards we may study better. Actions done without attention do not proceed from the intellect, but from some sudden act of the imagination, or some natural principle: thus a disordered humour produces an itching sensation and is the cause of a man scratching his beard, which he does without his mind attending to it. Such actions do tend to an end, although outside the order of the intellect. Hereby is excluded the error of certain natural philosophers of old, who maintained that all things happen by natural necessity, thus utterly banishing the final cause from things.

Chapter III

that every agent acts for a good

Hence we must go on to prove that every agent acts for a good.

For that every agent acts for an end clearly follows from the fact that every agent tends to something definite. Now that to which an agent tends definitely must needs be befitting to that agent: since the latter would not tend to it save on account of some fittingness thereto. But that which is befitting to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts for a good.

Further. The end is that wherein the appetite of the agent or mover is at rest, as also the appetite of that which is moved. Now it is the very notion of good to be the term of appetite, since good is the object of every appetite.1 Therefore all action and movement is for a good.

Again. All action and movement would seem to be directed in some way to being: either for the preservation of being in the species or in the individual; or for the acquisition of being. Now this itself, being to wit, is a good: and for this reason all things desire being. Therefore all action and movement is for a good.

Furthermore. All action and movement is for some perfection. For if the action itself be the end, it is clearly a second perfection of the agent. And if the action consist in the transformation of external matter, clearly the mover intends to induce some perfection into the thing moved: towards which perfection the movable tends, if the movement be natural. Now when we say a thing is perfect, we mean that it is good. Therefore every action and movement is for a good.

Also. Every agent acts according as it is actual. Now by acting it tends to something similar to itself. Therefore it tends to an act. But an act has the ratio of good: since evil is not found save in a potentiality lacking act. Therefore every action is for a good.

Moreover. The intellectual agent acts for an end, as determining on its end: whereas the natural agent, though it acts for an end, as proved above,1 does not determine on its end, since it knows not the ratio of end, but is moved to the end determined for it by another. Now an intellectual agent does not determine the end for itself except under the aspect of good; for the intelligible object does not move except it be considered as a good, which is the object of the will. Therefore also the natural agent is not moved, nor does it act for an end, except in so far as this end is a good: since the end is determined for the natural agent by an appetite. Therefore every agent acts for a good.

Again. To shun evil and to seek good are in the same ratio: even as movement from below and upward movement are in the same ratio. Now we observe that all things shun evil: for intellectual agents shun a thing for the reason that they apprehend it as an evil: and all natural agents, in proportion to their strength, resist corruption which is the evil of everything. Therefore all things act for a good.

Again. That which results from the agent’s action beside his intention, is said to happen by chance or luck. Now we observe in the works of nature that either always or more often that happens which is best: thus in plants the leaves are so placed as to protect the fruit; and the parts of an animal are so disposed as to conduce to the animal’s safety. Wherefore, if this happens beside the intention of the natural agent, it will be the result of chance or luck. But that is impossible: because things that happen always or frequently, are not casual or fortuitous, but those which occur seldom. Therefore the natural agent tends to that which is best: and much more evidently is this so with the intellectual agent. Therefore every agent intends a good in acting.

Moreover. Whatever is moved is brought to the term of movement by the mover and agent. Therefore mover and moved tend to the same term. Now that which is moved, since it is in potentiality, tends to an act, and consequently to perfection and goodness: for by its movement it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore mover and agent by moving and acting always intend a good.

Hence the philosophers in defining the good said: The good is the object of every appetite; and Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv.) says that all things desire the good and the best.

Chapter IV

that evil is unintentional in things

It follows from the above that evil is incidental to things beside the intention of an agent.

For when the result of an action differs from the intention of the agent, it is clear that such result occurs unintentionally. Now evil differs from good which every agent intends. Therefore evil happens beside the intention.

Also. Defect in effect and action results from defect in the principle of action: thus a monstrosity results from a defect in the seed, and limping results from a curvature of the leg. Now an agent acts according as it is possessed of active force, and not according as it suffers from defective power. And according as it acts, it intends the end. Wherefore it intends an end corresponding to its power. Hence whatever follows corresponding to the defective power, will be beside the agent’s intention. And this is evil. Therefore evil occurs beside the intention.

Again. The movement of the thing moved has the same tendency as the motion of the mover. Now the thing moved tends per se to good, but to evil it tends accidentally and unintentionally. This is most evident in generation and corruption. For matter, while it underlies one form, is in potentiality to another form, and to the privation of the form which it has already: thus when it is under the form of air, it is in potentiality to the form of fire and the privation of the form of air. And the transformation of matter terminates in both at the same time: in the form of fire by reason of fire being generated, and in the privation of the form of air, by reason of the air being corrupted. But the intention and appetite of matter is not towards the privation, but towards the form: for it does not tend towards the impossible; and it is impossible for matter to be alone under a privation, whereas it is possible for it to be under a form. Therefore it is unintentional that it terminate in privation: and it terminates therein in so far as it attains the form which it intends, the necessary result whereof is the privation of the other form. Therefore in generation and corruption the transformation of matter is directed per se to the form, and privation results unintentionally. And the same must needs apply to all manner of movement: so that in every movement there is generation and corruption in some respect: for instance, when a thing is changed from white to black, a white thing is corrupted and a black one is made. Now the good is according as matter is perfected by the form, and potentiality by its proper act: while evil is according as it is deprived of its proper act. Consequently, whatever is moved intends in its movement, to attain some good; and it attains evil beside its intention. Hence, since every agent and mover tends to the good, evil occurs beside the intention of the agent.

Moreover. In those things that act by intelligence or any kind of instinct, intention follows apprehension; because the intention is towards that which is apprehended as an end. Accordingly if something is attained that has no species in the apprehension, it will be beside the intention: for instance, if one were to intend to eat honey, and were to eat gall thinking that it was honey, this will be beside the intention. But every intellectual agent tends to something in so far as he considers it under the aspect of good, as we have shown above.1 Wherefore if this be not a good but an evil, it will be beside the intention. Therefore that which acts by intelligence does not work evil except unintentionally. Therefore, since to tend to a good is common to intellectual and natural agents, evil does not ensue from the intention of an agent except beside that intention. In this sense Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv.) that evil is unintentional and, involuntary.

Chapters V and VI

arguments that would seem to prove that evil is not beside the intention

There are, however, some objections that would seem to run counter to this conclusion.

For that which occurs beside the intention of the agent is said to happen fortuitously, casually and seldom.2 But evil is not said to happen fortuitously and casually, nor does it occur seldom but always or frequently. For in the physical order generation is ever accompanied by corruption. And in voluntary agents sin is of frequent occurrence, since it is as difficult to behave virtuously, as to find the centre of a circle, as Aristotle states (2 Ethic. ix.). Therefore it would seem that evil is not an unintentional occurrence.

Again. Aristotle says (3 Ethic. v.) expressly that vice is voluntary; and he proves this from the fact that a man does an injustice voluntarily, and it is absurd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions voluntarily does not wish to be unjust, and that he who rapes voluntarily does not wish to be incontinent; and again from the fact that legislators punish evil-doers as doing evil voluntarily. Therefore evil would seem not to be unintentional or involuntary.

Further. Every natural movement has an end intended by nature. Now corruption is a natural movement, even as generation. Therefore its end, which is privation having the aspect of evil, is intended by nature; even as the form and the good, which are the end of generation.

1 In order that the solution of the arguments here given may be made clear we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance, or as in its action. In a substance that is evil through its lacking something natural and due to it, for that a man have not wings, is not an evil to him, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man have not fair hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he have no hands, which are natural and due to him, if he be perfect; and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due; and consequently the aspect of evil is always in a privation thus understood.

Matter, since it is in potentiality to all forms, is adapted by nature to all of them, yet no one is due to it; since it can be actually perfect without any particular one. Nevertheless, some one of them is due to one of those things that are made of matter: for there can be no water without the form of water, nor can there be fire without the form of fire. Accordingly the privation of such a form, in relation to matter, is not an evil to matter: but in relation to that thing of which it is the form, it is an evil thereof; thus the privation of the form of fire is an evil of fire. And since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to exist except forasmuch as they are in a subject, if privation be an evil in relation to the subject wherein it is, it will be an evil simply: otherwise it will be the evil of something but not simply. Hence that a man be deprived of a hand is an evil simply; but that matter be deprived of the form of air is not an evil simply, but an evil of the air. On the other hand, privation of order or due proportion in an action, is an evil of the action. And since to every action order and proportion are due, such a privation in an action must needs be an evil simply.

Accordingly, taking these remarks into account, we must note that what is unintentional is not always fortuitous or casual, as the first argument stated. For if that which is unintentional be always or frequently the result of that which was intended, it will not happen fortuitously or casually: thus if a man intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, and becomes drunk through drinking, this will be neither fortuitous nor casual: but it would be casual if such a result were to occur seldom.

Therefore the evil of natural corruption, although it ensue beside the intention of the generator, follows nevertheless always, since the presence of one form is ever accompanied by the privation of another. Wherefore corruption does not ensue casually, nor even seldom: although sometimes privation is not an evil simply, but the evil of some particular thing, as stated above. If, however, the privation be such as to deprive the thing generated of that which is due to it, it will be casual and an evil simply, as in the birth of monstrosities: for this does not follow of necessity from that which was intended, but is opposed thereto; since the agent intends the perfection of the thing generated.

Evil of action occurs in natural agents through a defect in the active force. Hence if the agent’s force be defective, this evil ensues beside the intention; yet it will not be casual, because it follows of necessity from such an agent: provided always that the agent in question always or frequently suffer this defect. But it will be casual if this defect seldom accompanies this agent. In voluntary agents the intention is directed to some particular good, if the action is to follow: for movement is not caused by universals but by particulars about which actions are. Accordingly, if the good that is intended is accompanied always or frequently by the privation of a rational good, moral evil ensues not casually, but either always or frequently: as in the case of a man who desires intercourse with a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure is connected the inordination of adultery: wherefore the evil of adultery is not a casual sequel. It would, however, be a casual evil, if sin were to ensue seldom from what he intends: as in one who while firing at a bird, kills a man.

That anyone should intend suchlike goods which frequently result in privation of a rational good, is due to the fact that many live a sensuous life; because sensible things are the more manifest to us, and move more efficaciously in a world of individual things among which operation takes place: and privation of the rational good ensues from many goods of that kind. Hence it follows that, although evil is beside the intention, it is nevertheless voluntary, as the second argument states, accidentally however and not per se. For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake: while the will is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it simply: for instance the man who throws his cargo overboard for the sake of safety, intends not the throwing of his cargo, but safety, and he wills the throwing of the cargo, not simply but for the sake of safety. In like manner for the sake of obtaining a sensible good a man wills to perform an inordinate action, neither intending the inordinateness nor willing it simply, but for the sake of something in particular. In the same way, therefore, sin and vice are said to be voluntary, as the throwing of a ship’s cargo into the sea.

The third objection is solved on the same lines. For the change of corruption is never found without the change of generation: and consequently neither is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. Hence nature does not intend the end of corruption apart from the end of generation, but both at the same time. For it is not the absolute intention of nature that there be no water, but that there be air, the existence of which precludes the existence of air. Accordingly nature intends directly that there should be air; but it does not intend that there should not be water except in so far as this is involved by the existence of air. Wherefore privations are not intended by nature directly, but accidentally: whereas forms are intended directly.

From the foregoing it is clear that what is evil simply, is utterly beside the intention in the operations of nature, for example the birth of monstrosities: but what is evil not simply but relatively, is intended by nature, not directly but accidentally.

Chapter VII

that evil is not an essence

From this it follows that no essence is evil in itself.

For evil, as we have said,1 is nothing else but the privation of what is connatural and due to anyone: for the word evil is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, but is the non-existence of something in a substance.2 Therefore evil is not a real essence.

Again. A thing has being in respect of its essence. Now in so far as it has being, it has a share of good: for if good is what all desire, being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore a thing is good in so far as it has an essence. But good and evil are opposed to each other. Therefore nothing is evil in so far as it has an essence. Therefore no essence is evil.

Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something made. But evil cannot be an agent, for that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is actually existing and perfect. In like manner neither can it be something made: since the term of every generation is a form and a good. Therefore nothing is evil as to its essence.

Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything desires what is like and becoming to it. Now everything by acting intends a good, as we proved above.3 Therefore no being as such is evil.

Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For if it be in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of that thing. And if it be in the genus of accident, it must needs flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance: although perchance it may not be natural to some other substance; thus heat is natural to fire, whereas it is not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself, cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil; since it is the privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore no essence is evil in itself.

Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form: since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the ratio of goodness: for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends; and is the act whereby whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Further. Being is divided into act and potentiality. Now act, as such, is a good: because, in so far as a thing is in act, it is perfect. Again potentiality is a good: for potentiality tends to act, as clearly may be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary thereto. Moreover it is in the same genus as act. Also privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore everything that is, in whatever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is a good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Again. It has been proved in the Second Book1 of this work, that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God: and we have shown in the First Book2 that God is perfect goodness. Since, then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil. Hence it is that it is said (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good: and (Eccles. 3:11): He hath made all things good in their time: and (1 Tim. 4:4): Every creature of God is good.

Again Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv.) that evil is not a thing that exists, per se to wit, nor is it something in things that exist, as an accident, like whiteness or blackness.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature.

Chapters VIII and IX

arguments whereby seemingly it is proved that evil is a nature or a thing

It would seem that certain arguments militate against the aforesaid statement.

For each thing derives its species from its proper difference. Now evil is a specific difference in certain genera, namely in moral habits and acts: because as virtue according to its species is a good habit, so the contrary vice is an evil habit according to its species: and the same applies to virtuous and vicious acts. Therefore evil gives certain things their species. Therefore it is an essence, and is natural to certain things.

Further. Each of two contraries is a nature: for if it predicated nothing, one of the contraries would be a pure privation or negation. But good and evil are stated to be contraries. Therefore evil is a nature.

Again. Aristotle in his Predicaments (Categor. viii. 27) says that good and evil are the genera of contraries. Now every genus has an essence or nature: for there are no species or differences of non-being, so that what is not cannot be a genus. Therefore evil is an essence and a nature. Also. Whatever is active is a thing. Now evil as such is active: for it counteracts and corrupts good. Therefore evil as such is a thing.

Moreover. Whatever can be more or less must be a thing admitting of degrees: since negations and privations do not admit of being more or less. Now among evils we find one to be worse than another. Therefore seemingly, evil must be a thing.

Furthermore. Thing and being are convertible terms. Now evil exists in the world. Therefore it is a thing and a nature.

1These objections, however, are easily solved. For evil and good in morals are said to be specific differences, as the first argument stated, because morality depends on the will: for a thing comes under the head of morals so far as it is voluntary. Now the will’s object is the end and the good. Hence moral matters are specified by their end: even as natural actions are by the form of their active principle, for instance, the action of heating is specified by heat. Since then good and evil are predicated in respect of the universal direction to an end, or the privation of that direction, it follows that in morals the first difference is that of good and evil. Now for one genus there must be one first measure: and the measure in morals is reason. Consequently good and evil in moral matters must depend on the end appointed by reason. Accordingly, in morals, that which derives its species from an end that is in accord with reason, is said to be specifically good: and that which derives its species from an end discordant from reason, is said to be specifically bad. And yet this end, though it sets aside the end appointed by reason, is nevertheless some kind of good, such as a pleasurable object of the senses, or something similar, so that in some animals this end is good, and even in man when it is moderated by reason. Also it happens that what is evil for one, is good for another. Wherefore evil, so far as it is a specific difference in the moral genus, does not denote a thing essentially evil; but something that is good in itself, but evil for man, in so far as it removes the order of reason, which is man’s good. From this it follows that evil and good are contraries forasmuch as they are applied to the moral genus; and not in their absolute signification, as the second objection stated: but evil, as such, is a privation of good.

In the same way we may understand the saying that evil and good, taken in the moral order, are the genera of contraries, on which the third objection was based. For of all moral contraries, either both are evil, as prodigality and stinginess; or one is good and the other evil, as liberality and stinginess. Hence moral evil is both a genus and a difference, not through being the privation of a good appointed by reason, whence it is called evil, but through the nature of the action or habit that is directed to an end incompatible with the right end appointed by reason: thus a blind man is a human individual, not as being blind, but as being this particular man: and irrational is a difference of animal, not through the privation of reason, but on account of this particular nature to which privation of reason is consequent. It may also be said that Aristotle asserts evil and good to be genera, not in his own opinion, since he does not number them among the ten first genera in each of which some contrariety is found, but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who affirmed that good and evil are supreme genera and first principles. Under each of them he placed ten supreme contraries: so that we have the good which is definite, which is equal, which is one, which is on the right hand, the male, the restful, the straight, the luminous, the square, and lastly, the good: while under evil he placed the indefinite, the unequal, the manifold, the left-hand, the female, the moving, the crooked, the darksome, the oblong, and lastly, the evil. In this way and in several passages of his works on logic, he employs examples according to the opinions of other philosophers, as being probable at the time.

Moreover this saying contains a certain amount of truth: for it is impossible that a probable statement should be utterly false. Now of all contraries one is perfect, while the other is incomplete, as containing some kind of privation: thus white and hot are perfect, while cold and black are imperfect, as indicating a kind of privation. Since then incompleteness and privation are a kind of evil, while every perfection and completeness comes under the head of good: it follows that in contraries, one seems to be comprised under good, while the other approaches to the notion of evil. In this way good and evil are seemingly genera of all contraries. In this way too it is clear how evil is opposed to good, which was the line taken by the fourth objection. Because in so far as form and end, which have the aspect of good, and are the true principles of action, involve privation of a contrary form and end, the action that is consequent upon this form and end, is ascribed to privation and evil: accidentally however, since privation, as such, is not a principle of action. Rightly therefore does Dionysius say (De Div. Nom. iv.) that evil does not oppose good, except by virtue of a good: and in itself it is powerless and weak, as not being a principle of action. Evil, however, is said to corrupt good, not only as acting by virtue of a good, as explained: but formally by itself; even as blindness is said to corrupt the sight, through being the very corruption of sight: in the same way whiteness is said to colour the wall, because it is the very colour of the wall.

A thing is said to be a greater or lesser evil by reason of its distance from the good. For thus it is that things which imply privation admit of degrees, as inequality and unlikeness: thus to be more unequal is to be more distant from equality: and to be more unlike is to go further from likeness.

Wherefore that is said to be more evil, which is more deprived of good, as being more distant from good. But privations are subject to increase not as having a kind of essence, as qualities and forms, as the fifth argument presumed, but through the increase of the cause of privation: thus air is more darksome, according as the light is impeded by the interposition of more obstacles, for thus it is further removed from a participation of light.

Again evil is said to be in the world, not as though it had an essence, or were some thing, as the sixth argument supposed, but forasmuch as a thing is said to be evil with evil: even as blindness and privation of any kind is said to be, because an animal is blind with blindness.

For being is predicated in two ways, as the Philosopher teaches (4 Metaph. vii.). First as indicating the essence of a thing; and thus it is divided into the ten categories: in this way no privation can be called a being. Secondly as denoting a synthetical truth: in this way evil and privation are called a being, forasmuch as a thing is said to be deprived by a privation.

Chapter X

that the cause of evil is a good

We may conclude from the foregoing that evil is not caused except by a good.

For were some evil caused by an evil; since evil does not act save by virtue of a good, as proved above,1 it follows that good itself is the primary cause of evil.

Again. That which is not, is not the cause of anything. Therefore every cause must be some being. Now evil is not a being, as shown above.2 Therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. Hence if evil be caused by something, this must be a good.

Again. Whatever is properly and by itself the cause of something intends its proper effect. Hence, if evil by itself be the cause of something, it would intend its proper effect, namely evil. But this is false, for it has been shown3 that every agent intends a good. Therefore evil is not the cause of anything by itself, but only accidentally. Now every accidental cause is reduced to a per se cause. But good alone can be a per se cause, and evil cannot be a per se cause. Therefore evil is caused by good.

Further. Every cause is either matter, or form, or agent, or end. But evil cannot be either matter or form: for it has been shown above4 that being whether actual or potential is a good. Neither can it be an agent: since a thing acts forasmuch as it is actual and has a form. Nor again can it be an end, since it is beside the intention, as we have shown.5 Therefore evil cannot be the cause of a thing: and if anything be the cause of an evil, that evil must be caused by a good.

Since, however, evil and good are opposite to each other: and one opposite cannot be the cause of the other except accidentally; thus a cold thing causes heat as stated in Phys. viii. 1; it follows that good cannot be the effective cause of evil except accidentally.

In the physical order, this accident may be on the part of the agent, or on the part of the effect. On the part of the agent, as when the agent’s power is defective, the result being that the action is defective, and the effect deficient: thus when the power of the digestive organ is defective, the result is imperfect digestion of the food and an indigested humour, which are physical evils. Now it is accidental to the agent as such, that its power be defective: for it acts, not as having a defective power, but as having some power: for if it lacked power altogether, it would not act at all. Accordingly evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent, forasmuch as the agent’s power is defective. Hence it is said that evil has not an efficient, but a deficient, cause: because evil does not follow from an active cause, except in so far as this cause is defective in power, and in this respect it is not effective.—And it comes to the same if defect in the action and effect, results from a defect in the instrument, or in any thing else required for the agent’s action: as when the motive power causes a limp on account of crookedness in the tibia: for the agent acts by both, its power and its instrument.

On the part of the effect, evil is caused by good accidentally, either on the part of the matter of the effect, or on the part of its force. For if the matter be indisposed to receive the impression of the agent the effect must needs be defective: thus a deformed offspring results from an indisposition of matter. Nor is it put down to defect in the agent, if it fail to transform an indisposed matter to perfect actuality: since to each natural agent there is appointed a power in proportion to its nature, and if it go not beyond that power, it will not on that account fall short of its power, but only when it falls short of the measure of power due to it by nature.

On the part of the effect’s form, evil occurs accidentally, in so far as one form necessarily involves the privation of another, wherefore the generating of one thing is necessarily followed by the corruption of another. But this evil is not an evil of the effect intended by the agent, as was made clear above,1 but of the other thing.

Accordingly it is evident that evil is caused only accidentally by a good.—And the same applies to things produced by art, for Art, in its work, copies nature,2 and faults occur in both in the same way.

In morals, however, the case would seem to be different: because moral fault does not apparently follow from a defective power: since weakness of power either wholly excludes, or at least diminishes, moral fault: for weakness does not deserve punishment which is due to guilt, but rather mercy and pardon: seeing that moral fault must be voluntary and not necessary. But if we consider the matter carefully, we shall find that there is a likeness in one respect, and unlikeness in another. There is unlikeness in that moral fault is considered in the action alone, and not in some effect produced, for moral virtues are directed not to making but to doing. Whereas the arts are directed to making, for which reason it has been stated that faults occur in them in the same way as in nature. Therefore moral evil is considered as resulting not from the matter or form of the effect, but only from the agent.

Now, in moral actions four active principles are to be found in due order. The first of these is the executive power, namely the motive force, whereby the members are moved to execute the will’s command. Hence this power is moved by the will which is a second principle. And the will is moved by the judgement of the apprehensive power, which judges that a particular thing is good or evil, which are objects of the will, the one moving to pursuit, the other to flight. Again the apprehensive power is moved by the thing apprehended. Hence the first active principle in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive power; the third is the will; and the fourth is the motive force, which carries out the command of reason.

Now the act of the executive power already presupposes moral good or evil. For these external acts do not belong to morals, except forasmuch as they are voluntary. Wherefore if the act of the will be good, the external act will also be good, and evil, if it be evil. And there would be nothing savouring of moral evil if the defect in a defective external act has nothing to do with the will: for limping is not a moral but a physical evil. Therefore a defect in this executive power, either wholly excuses or diminishes moral fault.—Again, the act whereby the object moves the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault: for the visible object moves the sight according to the natural order of things; and so too does every object move a passive power.—Again the act, considered in itself, of the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault; since a defect therein either excuses or diminishes moral fault, in the same way as a defect in the executive power: for weakness and ignorance equally excuse or diminish sin.—It follows, then, that moral fault is found first and chiefly in the sole act of the will: and an act is logically called moral, precisely because it is voluntary. Therefore the root and origin of moral fault is to be sought in the act of the will.

But there is a difficulty, seemingly, attendant upon this inquiry. For since a defective act results from a defect in the active principle, we must presuppose a defect in the will to precede the moral fault. And if this defect be natural, it will always adhere to the will: so that the will must be guilty of moral fault whenever it acts: whereas acts of virtue prove this to be false. But if the defect be voluntary, it is already a moral fault, the cause whereof will still remain to be sought: and thus the reason will carry on indefinitely. Accordingly we must say that the defect already existing in the will is not natural, lest it follow that the will sins in every act: and that neither is it casual or fortuitous, for then there would be no moral fault in us, since casual things are unforeseen and outside the domain of reason. Therefore it is voluntary. Yet it is not a moral fault: lest we be forced to proceed indefinitely. How this may be, remains to be considered.—The perfection of every active principle depends on a higher active principle; for the second agent acts by virtue of the first. While, therefore, the second agent remains subordinate to the first, it acts unfailingly: but it fails in acting, if it happen to stray from the order of the first agent: as in the case of an instrument that falls short of the first agent’s movement. Now it has been said that, in the order of moral actions, two principles precede the will; to wit, the apprehensive power, and the apprehended object, which is the end. And since for each movable there is a corresponding proper motive power, every apprehensive power is not the motive force due to every appetitive power, but this one belongs to this, and another to that. Accordingly, just as the proper motive force of the sensitive appetite is the apprehensive power of the senses, so the proper motive force of the will is the reason.

Again, since the reason is able to apprehend many goods and many ends; and each one has its proper end: the will also must have as its end and first motive force, not any, but a definite good. Hence when the will tends to its act, through being moved by the apprehension of reason that presents to it its proper good, a right action follows. Whereas when the will breaks away at the apprehension of the sensitive power, or even of the reason which presents some good other than its proper good, there follows in the will’s act a moral fault.

Consequently, the sin of action in the will is preceded by lack of order to reason, and to its proper end: to reason, as when the will, on the sudden apprehension of a sense, tends to a good that is pleasurable to sense:—to its due end, as when by deliberating the reason arrives at some good which is not good now, or in some particular way; and yet the will tends to that good as though it were its proper good. Now this lack of order is voluntary: for it is in the will’s power to will or not to will. Again it is in the will’s power that the reason actually consider the matter, or cease from considering it; or that it consider this matter, or that. Nor is this lack of order a moral evil: for if the reason were to consider nothing, or to consider any good whatever, as yet there is no sin, until the will tends to an undue end: and this itself is an act of the will.

Accordingly both in the physical and in the moral order it is clear that evil is not caused by good except accidentally.

Chapter XI

that the subject of evil is a good

From what we have said it can be shown that every evil is seated in some good.

For evil cannot exist by itself: since it has no essence, as was proved above.1 Therefore evil needs to be in some subject. Now every subject, as it is a substance, is a good, as is evident from what has been said.2 Therefore every evil is in a good.

Also. Evil is a privation, as we have shown.3 Now privation and the lacking form are in the same subject. But the subject of a form is a being in potentiality to that form, and this being is a good: for potentiality and act are in the same genus. Therefore privation, that is an evil, is in some good as its subject.

Moreover. A thing is called evil because it hurts:4 nor otherwise than because it hurts a good: for it is good to hurt evil, since the corruption of evil is good. Now it would not hurt a good formally, unless it were in that good: thus blindness is hurtful to a man forasmuch as it is in him. Therefore evil must be in a good.

Again. Evil is not caused except by good, and then only accidentally.5 Now whatever is accidental is reducible to that which is per se. Consequently together with the evil effect that is caused accidentally by a good, there must be some good which is the per se effect of that good, so as to be the foundation of that evil: because what is accidental is founded on what is per se.

Seeing, however, that good and evil are mutually opposed; and that one of two opposites cannot be the subject of the other, but expels it: someone at a cursory glance might think it unreasonable to state that good is the subject of evil.

And yet it is not unreasonable if the truth be sought thoroughly. For good, even as being, is predicated universally: since every being, as such, is good, as we have shown.1 Now it is not unreasonable that non-being should have being for its subject: because every privation is a non-being, and yet its subject is a substance, which is a being. But non-being is not in an opposite being as its subject: for blindness is not universal non-being, but a particular kind of non-being, namely privation of sight: therefore it is not in sight, as its subject, but in an animal. In like manner evil has for its subject, not the opposite good;—for it is the privation of this good,—but some other good: thus moral evil is in a natural good; and an evil of nature, to wit privation of a form, is in matter, which is a good as a being in potentiality.

Chapter XII

that evil does not entirely destroy good

It is clear from the foregoing that however much evil be increased it can never destroy good entirely: since there must always remain the subject of evil, as long as evil remains. Now the subject of evil is a good.2 Therefore, some good must always remain. But seeing that evil may be increased indefinitely, and that good is always diminished by the increase of evil: it would seem that good is decreased by evil indefinitely. Now a good that can be diminished by evil must needs be finite: because infinite good is incompatible with evil, as we proved in the First Book.3 Seemingly, therefore, sometimes a good is wholly destroyed by evil: since if something is subtracted indefinitely from the finite, this must at length be destroyed through such subtraction.

Nor may it be said, as some say, that if the subsequent subtraction be made in the same proportion as the preceding one, and continue thus indefinitely, the good cannot be destroyed, as may be seen in the division of a continuous quantity. Thus if from a line two cubits long you subtract half, and from the remainder subtract half, and continue thus indefinitely, there will always remain something to be divided. But in this process of division that which is subtracted afterwards must always be less in quantity: for half of the whole which was subtracted at first, is greater in absolute quantity than half of the half, albeit the same proportion remains. This, however, nowise applies to the diminution of good by evil. Because the more a good is diminished by an evil, the weaker it becomes, and thus it will be more capable of diminution by the subsequent evil. Again this subsequent evil may be equal to or greater than the previous one: wherefore it will not happen that a smaller quantity of good will always be subsequently subtracted from the good, even if the same proportion be observed.

We must therefore find a different solution. It is clear from what has been already said,1 that evil entirely destroys the opposite good, as blindness destroys sight: yet there must needs remain the good which is the subject of that evil. And this subject, as such, has the aspect of a good, considered as in potentiality to the actuality of the good which is removed by the evil. Wherefore the less it is in potentiality to that good, the less good will it be. Now a subject becomes less in potentiality to a form, not indeed by the mere subtraction of some part of that subject; nor by the subtraction of some part of its potentiality; but by the fact that the potentiality is hindered by a contrary actuality from reaching to the actuality of the form: thus according as heat is the more increased in a subject, the less is that subject potentially cold. Wherefore good is diminished by evil more by the addition of its contrary, than by the subtraction of good. This applies also to what we have said of evil. For we have said2 that evil is incidental beside the intention of the agent, which always intends some good, the result of which is the exclusion of some other good opposed thereto. Hence the more we increase that intended good, the result of which is an evil beside the agent’s intention, the more the potentiality to the contrary good will be diminished: and it is thus that the diminution of good by evil increases.

Now this diminution of good by evil cannot go on indefinitely in the physical order. Because all physical forms and forces are limited, and reach a certain term beyond which they cannot reach. Consequently neither can a contrary form, nor can the power of a contrary agent, be increased indefinitely, so as to result in the indefinite diminution of good by evil.

On the other hand this diminution can proceed indefinitely in moral matters. Because the intellect and will have no limit fixed to their actions: for the intellect can proceed indefinitely in understanding: wherefore the mathematical species of numbers and figures are infinite. In like manner the will goes on indefinitely in willing: since he who wills to commit a theft, can so will again, and so on to infinity. Now the more the will tends to undue ends, the more difficult is it for it to return to its proper and due end: as is evident in those who have acquired a vicious habit through sinning frequently. Hence the good of natural aptitude may be diminished indefinitely by moral evil; yet it will never be entirely destroyed, and will always accompany the nature that remains.

Chapter XIII

that evil has a cause of some kind

It can be shown from what precedes that although evil has no per se cause, yet every evil must needs have an accidental cause.

For whatever is in a thing as its subject, must needs have a cause: since it results either from the principles of the subject, or from some external cause. Now evil is in good as its subject, as shown above.1 Therefore evil must have a cause.

Again. That which is in potentiality to either of two opposites, is not actuated by either except by some cause: for no potentiality actuates itself. Now evil is the privation of that which is connatural and due to anyone:2 since it is on account of this that a thing is said to be evil. Therefore evil is in a subject that is in potentiality to evil and its opposite. Therefore evil must have some cause.

Moreover. Whatever is in a thing in addition to its nature, supervenes through some other cause; for whatever is natural to it is permanent, unless something else be in the way: wherefore a stone is not borne upwards, unless someone throw it, and water is not heated unless something make it hot. Now evil, in whatever subject it be, is always there in addition to the nature of that subject, since it is the privation of what is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil must always have a cause, either per se or accidental.

Further. Every evil is consequent to some good;3 thus corruption is consequent to generation. Now every good has a cause, except the Sovereign Good, in which there is no evil, as proved in the First Book.4 Therefore every evil has a cause, from which it results accidentally.

Chapter XIV

that evil is an accidental cause

From the same premises it is clear that although evil is not a per se cause, it is nevertheless an accidental cause. For if A is the cause of B per se, whatever is accidental to A is the accidental cause of B: thus white which is accidental to the builder, is the accidental cause of the house. Now every evil is in some good.5 And every good is in some way the cause of something: for matter is in some way the cause of form; while the converse is true in a sense: and the same applies to the agent and the end. Wherefore there does not follow an indefinite sequence in causes, if each thing be the cause of something else, because the circle to be observed in causes and effects is composed of various kinds of cause. Therefore evil is an accidental cause.

Again. Evil is a privation, as shown above.1 Now privation is an accidental principle in movable things, even as matter and form are per se principles. Therefore evil is an accidental cause of something.

Moreover. From a defect in the cause there follows defect in the effect. Now defect in a cause is an evil. And yet it cannot be a per se cause; since a thing is not a cause in that it is defective, but in that it is a being: since were it wholly defective, it would be the cause of nothing. Therefore evil is a cause of something, not per se, but accidentally.

Further. If we run through all the kinds of cause, we find that evil is an accidental cause. In the species of efficient cause, because defect in effect and action results from a defect in the efficient cause. In the species of material cause, because a fault in the effect arises from indisposition in the matter. In the species of formal cause, because every form is accompanied by the privation of the opposite form. And in the species of final cause, because evil is united to the undue end, inasmuch as the due end is hindered thereby. It is therefore evident that evil is an accidental cause, and cannot be a cause per se.

Chapter XV

that there is no sovereign evil

It follows from this that there cannot be a sovereign evil, that is the principle of all evils.

For a sovereign evil must needs exclude the association of all good: just as the sovereign good is that which is wholly disconnected from all evil. Now there cannot be an evil entirely apart from good: for it has been proved that evil is seated in some good.1 Therefore nothing is supremely evil.

Again. If anything be supremely evil, it must be essentially evil: even as the supreme good is that which is essentially good. But this is impossible: since evil has no essence, as was shown above.2 Therefore it is impossible to suppose a supreme evil that is the principle of evils.

Also. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. Now every evil is caused by a good, as we have proved.3 Therefore evil is not a first principle.

Further. Evil does not act except by virtue of a good; as we have proved.4 But a first principle acts by its own virtue. Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Moreover. Since that which is accidental is subsequent to that which is per se,5 the accidental cannot be first. Now evil does not occur except accidentally and unintentionally, as we have proved.6 Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Again. Every evil has an accidental cause, as we have shown.7 But a first principle has no cause, either per se, or accidental. Therefore evil cannot be the first cause in any genus.

Furthermore. A per se cause precedes one that is accidental.8 But evil is none but an accidental cause, as we have proved.9 Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees, who maintained the existence of a sovereign evil, that is the first principle of all evils.

Chapter XVI

that the end of everything is a good

Accordingly if every agent acts for some good, as we have shown above,10 it follows that good is the end of each thing. For everything is directed by its action to some end; since either the action itself is an end; or the end of the action is also the end of the agent: and this is its good.

Again. The end of a thing is the term of its appetite. Now the appetite of a thing terminates in a good: for the Philosopher defines good as the object of all appetite.1 Therefore the end of everything is a good.

Moreover. That toward which a thing tends while it is without it, and wherein it rests when it has it, is its end. Now anything that is without its proper perfection, is moved towards it, as far as in it lies: and if it have that perfection, it rests therein. Therefore the end of a thing is its perfection. But the perfection of a thing is its good. Therefore every thing is directed to good as its end.

Further. Things that know the end, and things that do not know the end, are equally directed to the end: although those which know the end are moved thereto per se; whereas those which do not know it, tend thereto as directed by another, as may be seen in the archer and the arrow. Now those that know the end, are always directed to a good as their end; because the will which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under the aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore also those things that do not know the end, are directed to a good as their end. Therefore the end of all is a good.

Chapter XVII

that all things are directed to one end, which is god

From the foregoing it is clear that all things are directed to one good as their last end.

For if nothing tends to something as its end, except in so far as this is good,2 it follows that good, as such, is an end. Consequently that which is the supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one Supreme good, namely God, as we have shown in the First Book.1 Therefore all things are directed to the Supreme good, namely God, as their end.

Again. That which is supreme in any genus, is the cause of everything in that genus:2 thus fire which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in other bodies. Therefore the supreme good, namely God, is the cause of goodness in all things good. Therefore He is the cause of every end being an end: since whatever is an end, is such, in so far as it is good. Now the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so.3 Therefore God is supremely the end of all things.

Further. In every series of causes, the first cause is more a cause than the second causes: since the second cause is not a cause save through the first. Therefore that which is the first cause in the series of final causes, must needs be more the final cause of each thing, than the proximate final cause. Now God is the first cause in the series of final causes: for He is supreme in the order of good things. Therefore He is the end of each thing more even than any proximate end.

Moreover. In all mutually subordinate ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding end: thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man; and is given to him that he may be purged; and he be purged that he may be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of those that precede. Now all things are subordinate in various degrees of goodness to the one supreme good, that is the cause of all goodness: and so, since good has the aspect of an end, all things are subordinate to God as preceding ends under the last end. Therefore God must be the end of all.

Furthermore. The particular good is directed to the common good as its end: for the being of the part is on account of the whole:4 wherefore the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man.5 Now the supreme good, namely God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on him: and the good whereby each thing is good, is the particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, God to wit, as their end.

Again. Order among ends is consequent to the order among agents: for just as the supreme agent moves all second agents, so must all the ends of second agents be directed to the end of the supreme agent: since whatever the supreme agent does, it does for its own end. Now the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all to their actions, and consequently to their ends. Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are directed by the first agent to its proper end. Now the first agent in all things is God, as we proved in the Second Book.1 And His will has no other end but His own goodness, which is Himself, as we showed in the First Book.2 Therefore all things whether they were made by Him immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are directed to God as their end. But this applies to all things: for as we proved in the Second Book,3 there can be nothing that has not its being from Him. Therefore all things are directed to God as their end.

Moreover. The last end of every maker, as such, is himself: for what we make we use for our own sake: and if at any time a man make a thing for the sake of something else, it is referred to his own good, whether his use, his pleasure, or his virtue. Now God is the cause of all things being made; of some immediately, of others by means of other causes, as we have explained above.4 Therefore He is the end of all things.

And again. The end holds the highest place among causes, and it is from it that all other causes derive their actual causality: since the agent acts not except for the end, as was proved.5 And it is due to the agent that the matter is brought to the actuality of the form: wherefore the matter is made actually the matter, and the form is made the form, of this particular thing, through the agent’s action, and consequently through the end. The later end also, is the cause of the preceding end being intended as an end: for a thing is not moved towards a proximate end, except for the sake of the last end. Therefore the last end is the first cause of all. Now it must needs befit the First Being, namely God, to be the first cause of all, as we proved above.1 Therefore God is the last end of all.

Hence it is written (Prov. 16:13): The Lord hath made all things for himself: and (Apoc. 22:13), I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last.

Chapter XVIII

how god is the end of things

It remains to ask how God is the end of all things: and this shall be made clear from what has been said.

For He is the end of all things, yet so as to precede all in being.2 Now there is an end which, though it holds the first place in causing forasmuch as it is in the intention, is nevertheless last in execution. This applies to any end which the agent sets up by his action: thus the physician by his action sets up health in the sick man, which is nevertheless his end. There is also an end which, just as it precedes in causing, so also does it precede in being: even so that which one intends to acquire by one’s motion or action, is said to be one’s end, for instance fire seeks to reach a higher place by its movement, and the king seeks to take a city by fighting. Accordingly God is the end of things as something to be obtained by each thing in its own way.

Again. God is at once the last end of things, and the first agent, as we have shown.3 Now the end effected by the agent’s action, cannot be the first agent, but rather is it the agent’s effect. God, therefore, cannot be the end of things, as though He were something effected, but only as something already existing and to be acquired.

Further. If a thing act for the sake of something already in existence, and if by its action some result ensue; something through the agent’s action must accrue to the thing for the sake of which it acts: thus soldiers fight for the cause of their captain, to whom victory accrues, which the soldiers bring about by their actions. Now nothing can accrue to God from the action of anything whatever: since His goodness is perfect in every way, as we proved in the First Book.1 It follows, then, that God is the end of things, not as something made or effected by them, nor as though He obtained something from things, but in this way alone, that things obtain Him.

Moreover. The effect must tend to the end, in the same way as the agent acts for the end. Now God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as though He gained something by His action, but as bestowing something thereby: since He is not in potentiality so that He can acquire something, but solely in perfect actuality, whereby He is able to bestow. Things therefore are not directed to God, as to an end that can gain something, but that they may obtain Himself from Him according to their measure, since He is their end.

Chapter XIX

that all things tend to be like unto god

From the fact that they acquire the divine goodness, creatures are made like unto God. Wherefore if all things tend to God as their last end, so as to acquire His goodness,2 it follows that the last end of things is to become like unto God.

Moreover. The agent is said to be the end of the effect forasmuch as the effect tends to be like the agent: wherefore the form of the generator is the end of the act of generation.3 Now God is the end of things in such wise as to be also their first active cause. Therefore all things tend to a likeness to God, as their last end.

Again. Things give evidence that they naturally desire to be:1 so that if any are corruptible, they naturally resist corruptives, and tend to where they can be safeguarded, as the fire tends upwards and earth downwards. Now all things have being in so far as they are like God, who is self-subsistent being: for they are beings only by participation. Therefore all things desire as their last end to be like God.

Further. All creatures are images of the first agent, namely God: since the agent produces its like.2 Now the perfection of an image consists in representing the original by its likeness thereto: for this is why an image is made. Therefore all things are for the purpose of acquiring a divine similitude, as their last end.

Again. Each thing by its movement or action tends to some good as its end, as proved above.3 Now a thing partakes of the good, in so far as it is like to the sovereign goodness, which is God. Therefore all things, by their movements and actions, tend to a divine likeness as their last end.

Chapter XX

how things imitate the divine goodness

From what has been said it is clear that the last end of all things is to become like God. Now, that which has properly the aspect of an end, is the good.4 Therefore, properly speaking, things tend to become like to God forasmuch as He is good.

Now, creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God: although each thing imitates the divine goodness, according to its mode. For the divine goodness is simple, being, as it were, all in one. Because the divine being contains the whole fulness of perfection, as we proved in the First Book.5 Wherefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God’s being is His perfect goodness: for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God, as though the sum total of His goodness were God’s very being. Again, God’s being is the substance of the existing God.1 But this cannot be so in other things. For it was proved in the Second Book,2 that no created substance is its own being. Wherefore, if a thing is good so far as it is: and nothing is its own being: none is its own goodness, but each one is good by having a share of good, even as by having a share of being it is a being.

Also. All creatures are not placed on the same level of goodness. For in some the substance is both form and actuality: such, to wit, as are competent, by the mere fact that they exist, to be actually and to be good. Whereas in others, the substance is composed of matter and form: and such are competent to be actually and to be good, but by some part of their being, namely their form. Accordingly God’s substance is His goodness: whereas a simple substance participates goodness, by the very fact that it exists: and a composite substance, by some part of itself.

In this third degree of substances, diversity is to be found again in respect of being. For in some composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potentiality of matter: so that the matter retains no potentiality to another form: and consequently neither is there in any other matter a potentiality to this same form. Such are the heavenly bodies, which consist of their entire matter.—In others the form does not fill the whole potentiality of matter: so that the matter retains a potentiality to another form: and in another part of matter there remains potentiality to this form; for instance in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in substance, it is clear that together with this form which does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potentiality of matter, nor with that which is a form essentially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potentiality to something else, for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality;1 and since evil is the privation of good: it is clear that in this last order of substances, good is changeable, and has an admixture of the opposite evil; which cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore the substance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness.

We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of this substance composed of matter and form. For since matter considered in itself is being in potentiality, and since form is its act; and again since a composite substance derives actual existence from its form: it follows that the form is, in itself, good; the composite substance is good as having its form actually; and the matter is good, as being in potentiality to the form. And although a thing is good in so far as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is only being potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order, for a thing is said to be good, not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end; but even though it has not attained the end, so long as it is directed to the end, for this very reason it is said to be good. Accordingly matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being: and yet this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely, on account of this very order. This shows that the good, in a sense, extends further than being; for which reason Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv.) that the good includes both existing and non-existing things. For even non-existent things, namely matter considered as subject to privation, seek a good, namely to exist. Hence it follows that matter also is good; for nothing but the good seeks the good.

In yet another way the creature’s goodness falls short from God’s. For, as we have stated, God, in His very being, has supreme perfection of goodness. Whereas the creature has its perfection, not in one thing but in many: because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Wherefore, in respect of one and the same thing, virtue, wisdom, and operation are predicated of God; but of creatures, in respect of different things: and the further a creature is from the sovereign goodness, the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that although the first and sovereign good is utterly simple, and the substances nearest to it in goodness, approach likewise thereto in simplicity; yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher; elements, for instance, than animals and men, because they are unable to reach the perfection of knowledge and understanding, to which animals and men attain.

From what has been said, it is evident that, although God possesses His perfect and entire goodness in respect of His simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Wherefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness: thus a man who being despoiled of virtue is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense, namely as a being, and as a man; but not absolutely; in fact rather should he be called evil. Accordingly it is not the same in every creature, to be and to be good: although each one is good, inasmuch as it exists: whereas in God to be and to be good are simply one and the same.

If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God’s goodness as its end; and a thing is like God’s goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved: it is clear that things are directed to God as their end, not only in respect of their substantial being, but also in respect of such things as are accidental thereto and belong to its perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing’s perfection.1

Chapter XXI

that things have a natural tendency to be like god forasmuch as he is a cause

It is clear from the foregoing that things have a tendency to be like God also in the point of their being causes of others.

For the creature tends to be like God by its operation. Now, by its operation, one thing is the cause of another. Therefore things tend to a divine similitude in this also, that they are causes of other things.

Again. Things tend to be like God, forasmuch as He is good, as stated above.2 Now it is out of His goodness that God bestows being on others; for all things act forasmuch as they are actually perfect. Therefore all things seek to be like God, by being causes of others.

Moreover. Order towards good, is itself a good, as we have shown above.3 Now every thing forasmuch as it is the cause of another, is directed to a good: for good alone is caused per se, and evil is caused only by accident, as we have proved.4 Therefore it is a good to be a cause of others. Now in respect of any good to which a thing tends, that thing’s tendency is to a divine similitude; since every created good is by reason of a share in the divine goodness. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness by being causes of other things.

Again. That the effect tends to be like the agent, amounts to the same as that the agent causes its likeness in its effect: for the effect tends to the end towards which it is directed by the agent. Now the agent tends to assimilate the patient to itself, not only in respect of its being, but also in respect of its causality: because the agent gives to its natural effect not only those natural principles whereby it subsists, but also those whereby it is a cause of other things; thus the animal, when begotten, receives from its begetter both the power of self-nourishment, and the power of generation. Therefore the effect tends to be like the agent, not only in the point of species, but also in the point of its causality of other things. Now things tend to be like God, even as effects tend to be like the agent, as proved above.1 Therefore things have a natural tendency towards a divine likeness in this, that they are causes of other things.

Moreover. A thing is most perfect when it is able to produce its like: for that light shines perfectly, which gives light to others. Now whatever tends to its own perfection, tends to a divine likeness. Wherefore a thing tends to a divine likeness from the very fact that it tends to be the cause of other things.

Since however a cause, as such, is higher than its effect, it is evident that to tend in this way to a divine likeness, so as to be a cause of other things, belongs to the highest grade among things.

Furthermore. A thing is perfect in itself before being able to cause another, as we have stated already. Hence to be the cause of other things is a perfection that accrues, to a thing last. Since then the creature tends to a divine likeness in many points,2 this remains last, that it seek a likeness to God by being a cause of others. Wherefore Dionysius says (Cœl. Hier. iii.) that it is of all things most godlike to be God’s co-operator; in which sense the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:9): We are God’s coadjutors.

Chapter XXII

how things are directed in various ways to their respective ends

It may be shown from the foregoing that the last means whereby a thing is directed to its end is its operation; in various ways, however, according to the variety of operations. For some things have an operation whereby they move something else; such are heating, and cutting: and some have an operation in being moved by another: such are being heated, and being cut. Some operations are a perfection of an actually existing operator, and do not tend to the transmutation of something else: in the former respect these differ from passion and movement, and in the latter from an action which effects a transmutation on some external matter: as an instance of such an operation we have understanding, sensation, will. Wherefore it is clear that things which are set to move or operate only, without moving or making any thing themselves, tend to the divine likeness in that they are perfect in themselves; while those which make and move, as such, tend to a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things; and that those which move through being moved tend to the divine likeness in both ways.

The lower bodies, in so far as they are moved with natural movements, are considered to be moved only, and not to move except accidentally: for if a stone in its descent puts into motion something that stood in its path, it is an accident: and the same applies to alteration and other movements. Wherefore the end of such movements is that they attain to a divine likeness in the point of their being perfect in themselves, as having their proper form and their proper place.

The heavenly bodies, however, move because they are moved: so that the end of their movement is to attain to a divine likeness in both respects. As regards their own perfection, inasmuch as a heavenly body may be actually where previously it was potentially.—Nor does it for this reason attain less to its perfection, although it retains its potentiality to be where it was before. For in the same way does primary matter tend to its perfection by acquiring actually the form which it had potentially before, although it ceases to have the one which it had before actually: for thus matter receives successively all the forms to which it has a potentiality, so that its whole potentiality is actualized successively; which could not happen all at one time. Wherefore, since a heavenly body is in potentiality to a particular whereabouts, even as primary matter is to a particular form, it attains to its perfection by the fact that its entire potentiality to a particular whereabouts is successively actualized, which could not happen simultaneously.

Inasmuch as they move by moving, the end of their movement is the attainment of a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. Now they are the causes of other things, by causing generation and corruption and other movements in this lower world. Accordingly the movements of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are principles of movement, are directed to generation and corruption in the world beneath them. And it is not unreasonable that the movements of heavenly bodies conduce to the generation of these lower things, although these inferior bodies are of small account in comparison with the heavenly bodies, and yet the end should be of greater account than the means. For the generator’s action tends to the form of the generated: and yet that which is generated is not of greater worth than the generator, but, in univocal agents, is of the same species with it. Because the generator intends as its ultimate end not the form of the generated (which form is the end of generation); but the likeness to the Divine Being in the perpetuation of the species, and the diffusion of His goodness, by bestowing its specific form on others, and being the cause of other things. Likewise the heavenly bodies, although of more account than the lower bodies, nevertheless intend by means of their movements the generation of the latter bodies, and to bring to actuality the forms of things generated; not indeed as though this were their ultimate end; but as a means whereby to attain to an ultimate end, the divine likeness, to wit, in that they are causes of other things.

We must take note, however, that a thing, according as it participates in a likeness to God’s goodness, which is the object of His will, so too has it a share in a similitude to God’s will, whereby things are brought into being and preserved. The higher beings, however, participate in a likeness to the divine goodness in a more simple and universal manner; but the lower beings, in a more particular and divided way. Wherefore between heavenly and lower bodies, we observe a likeness, not of equiparance, as in things belonging to the same species; but as that which is to be observed between the universal agent and a particular effect. Wherefore just as in this lower world the intention of the particular agent is confined to good of this or that species, so is the intention of the celestial body inclined to the common good of the corporeal substance, which by generation is preserved, multiplied, and increased.

But since, as already stated, everything moved, as such, tends, as towards a divine likeness, to be perfect in itself; and since a thing is perfect in so far as it becomes actual: it follows that the intention of every thing that is in potentiality is to tend to actuality by way of movement. Consequently the more an act is posterior and perfect, the more is the appetite of matter inclined thereto. Therefore the appetite whereby matter seeks a form, must tend towards the last and most perfect act to which matter can attain, as to the ultimate end of generation. Now certain grades are to be found in the acts of forms. For primary matter is in potentiality, first of all, to the elemental form. While under the elemental form, it is in potentiality to the form of a mixed body: wherefore elements are the matter of a mixed body. Considered as under the form of a mixed body, it is in potentiality to a vegetative soul: for the act of such a body is a soul. Again, the vegetative soul is in potentiality to the sensitive, and the sensitive to the intellective. This is proved by the process of generation: for in generation we have first the fetus living with a plant life, afterwards with animal life, and lastly with human life. After this no later or more noble form is to be found in things subject to generation and corruption. Therefore the last end of all generation is the human soul, and to this does matter tend as its ultimate form. Consequently the elements are for the sake of the mixed body, the mixed body for the sake of living things: and of these plants are for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man. Therefore man is the end of all generation. And whereas the same thing is the cause of generation and preservation of things, the order of the preservation of things is in keeping with the aforesaid order of their generation. Hence we find that mixed bodies are preserved by the qualities becoming to the elements: plants are nourished by mixed bodies; animals derive their nourishment from plants; and some that are more perfect and powerful from the imperfect and weak. Man employs all kinds of things for his own use: some for food, some for clothing. Hence by nature he was made naked, as being able to make himself clothes from other things; even as nature provided him with no becoming nourishment except milk, so that he might supply himself with food from a variety of things. Some he employs as a means of transit: for he is inferior to many animals in swiftness and sustaining power, as though other animals were furnished for his needs. And over and above he employs all things endowed with a sensitive life for the perfection of his intellectual knowledge. Wherefore of man is it said in Psalm 8:8, the words being addressed to God: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet. And Aristotle says (1 Polit. xi., xii.) that man exercises a natural sovereignty over all animals.

If, therefore, the movement of the heaven is directed to generation; and all generation is directed to man as the last end of this genus: it is evident that the end of the heavenly movement is directed to man as its last end in the genus of things subject to generation and movement.

This is expressed (Deut. 4:19) where it is said that God made the heavenly bodies for the service of all the nations.

Chapter XXIII

that the movement of the heaven is from an intellective principle

It can also be shown from the foregoing that the first principle that causes the heavenly movement is intellective.

For nothing that acts according to its own species intends a form higher than its own, since every agent intends its like.1 Now a heavenly body, forasmuch as it acts by its own movement, intends the ultimate form, which is the human intellect, which is higher than any corporeal form, as we have proved above.2 Therefore the heavenly body acts to the effect of generation, not in respect of its own species, as the principal agent does, but in respect of the species of some higher intellectual agent, in relation to which the heavenly body is like an instrument in relation to a principal agent. Now the heaven acts to the effect of generation, inasmuch as it is moved. Therefore the heavenly body is moved by some intellectual substance.

Again. Whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another, as we proved above.3 Therefore the body of heaven is moved by another. Now this other is either wholly separated from it; or else it is united to it, so that what is composed of heaven and its mover is said to move itself, inasmuch as one part thereof is moved, and the other is mover. If this be the case; since whatever moves itself is living and animate,4 it follows that the heaven is animate. And not otherwise than with an intellectual soul; for it could not be animated with a nutritive soul, since in the heavenly body there is no generation or corruption; nor with a sensitive soul, since the heavenly body has no variety of organs. Therefore it follows that it is moved by an intellective soul.—If, on the other hand, it be moved by an extrinsic mover, this will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it be corporeal, it does not cause movement without being moved, for no body moves unless it be moved, as was shown above.5 So that this too will require to be moved by another. But as it is not possible to have an infinite series of bodies, we must come to some incorporeal first mover. Now that which is utterly separated from a body must be intellectual, as we have shown.6 Therefore the movement of the heaven which is first among corporeal beings, is caused by some intellectual substance.

Moreover. Heavy and light bodies are moved by their generator and by that which removes obstacles, as is proved in 8 Phys. iv.: for it is impossible that their form be mover and the matter moved, for nothing is moved except a body. Now as the elemental bodies are simple, and there is no composition in them, except that of matter and form, so too are the heavenly bodies simple. Hence if they be moved as heavy and light bodies, it follows that they are moved per se by their generator, and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle. But this is impossible: for these bodies cannot be generated, because there is no contrariety in them: and their movements cannot be hindered. Therefore these bodies must needs be moved by things that cause movement by a power of apprehension: which power cannot be sensitive, as we have proved. Therefore it must be an intellective power.

Further. If the principle of the heavenly movement be from nature alone, without any kind of apprehension, it follows that it must be the form of the heavenly body, as is the case with the elements: for although simple forms do not cause movement, they are principles of movements, since natural movements, like all other natural properties, follow from them. Now it is impossible that the heavenly movement follow the form of the heavenly body as its active principle: because thus the form is the principle of local movement, inasmuch as to a particular body, in respect of its form, is due a particular place, to which it is moved by virtue of its form that tends to that place: and because the generator gives this form, it is said to be a mover: even so it is due to fire, in respect of its form, to be in a higher place. Now one place is not more due to a heavenly body in respect of its form, than another. Therefore nature alone is not the principle of the heavenly movement: and consequently the principle of its movement must be something that moves it by apprehension.

Again. Nature always tends to one thing: wherefore things that come from nature, come always in the same way, unless they be hindered: and this seldom happens. Therefore that which is essentially difform cannot possibly be an end towards which nature tends. Now movement is essentially such; for that which is moved, as such, is conditioned otherwise now and before.1 Consequently nature cannot intend movement for its own sake. Therefore it intends through movement to obtain rest which in relation to movement is as one to many: for a thing is at rest which is conditioned in the same way now as before. Accordingly if the heavenly movement were from nature alone, it would be directed to some kind of rest: whereas the contrary is the case, for it is unceasing. Therefore the movement of the heaven is not from nature as its active principle, but from an intelligent substance.

Also. In every movement that is of nature as its active principle, if approach to a particular term be natural, recession from that term must be unnatural and contrary to nature: thus a heavy body naturally seeks a lower place, and recedes therefrom unnaturally. Therefore if the movement of the heaven were natural, since it tends to the west naturally, it would be contrary to nature for it to return from the west to the east. But this is impossible: for nothing in the heavenly movement is violent or unnatural. Consequently it is impossible for nature to be the active principle of the heavenly movement. Therefore its active principle is some apprehensive power, which must be an intelligence, as we have proved above. Therefore the heavenly body is moved by an intelligent substance.

And yet we must not deny that the heavenly movement is natural. For a movement is said to be natural, not only on account of its active principle, but also on account of its passive principle. This is evident in the generation of simple bodies: since such generation cannot be called natural in relation to the active principle. Because for a thing to be moved naturally by an active principle, it must have this active principle within itself, for nature is a principle of movement in a thing in which it is:2 whereas the active principle in the generation of a simple body, is without. Therefore it is not natural by reason of its active principle, but only by reason of its passive principle, namely matter, wherein there is a natural appetite for its natural form. Accordingly the movement of the heavenly body, as to its active principle, is not natural, but voluntary and intellectual: while as to its passive principle it is natural; since a heavenly body has a natural inclination for that movement.

This is made clear if we consider the relation of a heavenly body to its place. For a thing is passive and moved according as it is in potentiality, and it is active and moves according as it is in a state of actuality. Now a heavenly body considered in its substance, and as in potentiality, is indifferent to any place, even as primary matter is indifferent to any form, as we have stated.1 But it is otherwise with a heavy or light body, which, considered in itself, is not indifferent to any place, and has a definite place appointed to it by reason of its form. Wherefore the nature of heavy and light bodies is the active principle of their movements, while the nature of a heavenly body is the passive principle of its movement. Consequently we must not think that it is moved by violence, like heavy and light bodies, which are moved by us through our intelligence. For heavy and light bodies have a natural aptitude for a movement contrary to that with which they are moved by us; and so they are moved by us violently; albeit the movement of an animal’s body, whereby that body is moved by the soul, is not violent to that body as animated, although it is violent in so far as that body is something heavy. On the other hand the heavenly bodies have no aptitude for a contrary movement, but only for that wherewith they are moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is both voluntary, as regards its active principle, and natural, as to its passive principle.

That the heavenly movement be voluntary in respect of its active principle, is not inconsistent with the fact that it is one and uniform, for all that the will is indifferent to many things and is not determined to any one. For just as nature is determined to one by its power, so is the will determined to one by its wisdom, by which the will is unerringly directed to one end.

It is evident from the foregoing that neither approach to any one place nor recession therefrom is contrary to nature. For this happens in the movement of heavy and light bodies for two reasons. First, because the intention of nature, in heavy and light bodies, is determined towards one place: wherefore just as the body naturally tends thereto, so does it recede therefrom against nature: secondly, because two movements, one of which approaches a given term and the other recedes therefrom, are contrary. If, however, we take not the last but a middle place in the movement of heavy and light bodies, both approach thereto and recession therefrom are natural: because the whole movement comes under the intention of nature: and the movements are not contrary, but are one continuous movement.

It is the same in the movement of heavenly bodies: because the intention of nature is not towards one determinate place, as we have said already: moreover the movement with which a body moved in a circle recedes from any given place, is not contrary to the movement with which it approaches towards it, but is one continuous movement: so that any given point in the heavenly movement is like a middle point, and not like the term in a straight movement.

Nor does it make any difference, as to the present question, whether the heavenly body be moved by an intellectual substance united to it, so as to be its soul, or by a separate substance: nor whether each heavenly body be moved by God immediately; or none, and each be moved by the intermediary of created intellectual substances: or only the first heavenly body by God immediately, and the others through the intermediary of created substances: so long as we admit that the heavenly movement is caused by an intellectual substance.

Chapter XXIV

how even things devoid of knowledge seek the good

If, as we have shown,1 the heavenly body is moved by an intelligent substance, and the movement of the heavenly body is directed to generation in this lower world: it follows that the generations and movements of these lower bodies proceed from the intention of an intelligent substance. For the intention of the principal agent bears on the same thing as that of the instrument. Now the heaven is the cause of the movements of lower bodies by reason of its movement with which it is moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is as an instrument of an intelligent substance. Therefore the forms and movements of the lower bodies are caused by an intelligent substance; and are intended by it as by a principal agent, and by the heavenly body, as by an instrument.

Now the species of things caused and intended by an intellectual agent must pre-exist in his intellect: just as the forms of the products of art pre-exist in the mind of the craftsman and flow thence into his work. Consequently all forms that are in these lower bodies, and all their movements flow from intellectual forms which are in the intellect of some substance or substances. Hence Boetius says (De Trin. ii.) that forms which are in matter originated in forms that are immaterial. In this respect the saying of Plato1 is verified, that separate forms are the principles of forms that exist in matter: although Plato held them to be per se subsistent, and to be the immediate cause of the forms of sensible bodies: whereas we hold them to exist in an intellect, and to cause lower forms through the heavenly movement.

And since whatever is moved by anything per se and not accidentally, is directed thereby towards the end of its movement;2 and since the heavenly body is moved by an intellectual substance; and the heavenly body, by its movement, causes all movement in this lower world; it follows of necessity that the heavenly body is directed to the end of its movement, by an intellectual substance, and consequently all lower bodies to their respective ends.

Accordingly it is easy to understand how natural bodies devoid of knowledge are moved and act for the sake of an end. For they tend to an end, as directed thereto by an intelligent substance: in the same way as an arrow, directed by the archer, tends to the mark. Because as the arrow receives its direction to a fixed end through the aim of the archer, so too natural bodies receive an inclination to their natural ends from their natural movers, whence they derive their forms, powers and movements.

Wherefore it is also clear that every work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance: because an effect is ascribed more especially to the direction of the first mover towards the end, than to the instruments which receive that direction. For this reason the operations of nature are seen to proceed in an orderly manner even as the operations of a wise man.

It is therefore evident that even things devoid of knowledge can work for an end, and desire good with a natural appetite. Also that they seek a divine likeness, as well as their own perfection. Nor does it matter in which way we express it, the former or the latter. Because by tending to their own perfection, they tend to a good, since a thing is good forasmuch as it is perfect. And according as a thing tends to be good, it tends to a divine likeness: since a thing is like unto God forasmuch as it is good. Now this or that particular good is so far appetible as it bears a likeness to the first goodness. Therefore the reason why a thing tends to its own good, is because it tends to a divine likeness, and not vice versa. It is clear therefore that all things seek a divine likeness as their last end.

A thing’s own good can be understood in several ways. First, in the sense that it is proper to that thing on the part of the individual. Thus an animal desires its own good, when it desires food, whereby its existence is preserved.—Secondly, as being proper to that thing on the part of its species. Thus an animal desires its own good, forasmuch as it desires to beget offspring and to feed it, as well as whatever else conduces to the preservation or defence of the individuals of its species.—Thirdly, on the part of the genus. And thus an equivocal agent, for instance the heaven, desires its own good, in causing.—Fourthly, on the part of a likeness of analogy between effect and cause. Thus God, who is outside all genera, gives being to all things on account of his own goodness.

This clearly proves that the more perfect a thing’s power, and the higher its degree of goodness, the more universal its desire for good, and the greater the range of goodness to which its appetite and operation extend. For imperfect things extend no further than their own individual good; but perfect things extend to the good of the species; more perfect things, to the good of the genus; and God who is most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being. Wherefore it is said by some, not without reason, that good, as such, is self-diffusive,1 because the better a thing is, the further does the outpouring of its goodness extend. And since, in every genus, that which is most perfect is the exemplar and measure of all that belongs to that genus,2 it follows that God, who is most perfect in goodness, and pours forth his goodness most universally, is in his outpouring the exemplar of all things that pour forth goodness. Now one thing becomes a cause of another by pouring forth its own goodness into that other. And so it is again evident that whatever tends to be the cause of something else, tends to a divine likeness, and yet tends to its own good. Consequently it is not unreasonable to say that the movements of heavenly bodies, and the actions of their movers, are in a way for the sake of these bodies that are generated and corrupted, and of less account than they are. For they are not for the sake of these as their last end: but by intending the generation of these, they intend their own good, and the divine likeness as their last end.

Chapter XXV

that to know god is the end of every intelligent substance

Now, seeing that all creatures, even those that are devoid of reason, are directed to God as their last end: and that all reach this end in so far as they have some share of a likeness to him:1 the intellectual creature attains to him in a special way, namely through its proper operation, by understanding him. Consequently this must be the end of the intelligent creature, namely to understand God.

For, as we have shown above,2 God is the end of each thing: wherefore as far as it is possible to it each thing intends to be united to God as its last end. Now a thing is more closely united to God by reaching in a way to the very substance of God; which happens when it knows something of the divine substance,—than when it reaches to a divine likeness. Therefore the intellectual substance tends to the knowledge of God as its last end.

Again. The operation proper to a thing is the end thereof: for it is its second perfection; so that when a thing is well conditioned for its proper operation it is said to be efficient and good. Now understanding is the proper operation of the intellectual substance: and consequently it is its end. Therefore whatever is most perfect in this operation, is its last end; especially in those operations which are not directed to some product, such as understanding and sensation. And since operations of this kind take their species from their objects, by which also they are known, it follows that the more perfect the object of any such operation, the more perfect is the operation. Consequently to understand the most perfect intelligible, namely God, is the most perfect in the genus of this operation which is to understand. Therefore to know God by an act of intelligence is the last end of every intellectual substance.

Someone, however, might say that the last end of an intellectual substance consists indeed in understanding the best intelligible: but that what is the best intelligible for this or that intellectual substance, is not simply the best intelligible; and that the higher the intellectual substance, the higher is its best intelligible. So that possibly the supreme intellectual substance has for its best intelligible that which is best simply, and its happiness will consist in understanding God: whereas the happiness of any lower intellectual substance will consist in understanding some lower intelligible, which however will be the highest thing understood by that substance. Especially would it seem not to be in the power of the human intellect to understand that which is simply the best intelligible, on account of its weakness: for it is as much adapted for knowing the supreme intelligible, as the owl’s eye for seeing the sun.1

Nevertheless it is evident that the end of any intellectual substance, even the lowest, is to understand God. For it has been shown above2 that God is the last end towards which all things tend. And the human intellect, although the lowest in the order of intelligent substances, is superior to all that are devoid of understanding. Since then a more exalted substance has not a less exalted end, God will be the end also of the human intelligence. Now every intelligent being attains to its last end by understanding it, as we have proved. Therefore the human intellect attains to God as its end, by understanding Him.

Again. Just as things devoid of intelligence tend to God as their end, by way of assimilation, so do intelligent substances by way of knowledge, as clearly appears from what has been said. Now although things devoid of reason tend towards a likeness to their proximate causes, the intention of nature does not rest there, but has for its end a likeness to the sovereign good, as we have proved,3 although they are able to attain to this likeness in a most imperfect manner. Therefore however little be the knowledge of God to which the intellect is able to attain, this will be the intellect’s last end, rather than the perfect knowledge of lower intelligibles.

Moreover. Everything desires its last end most of all. Now the human intellect desires, loves and enjoys the knowledge of divine things, although it can grasp but little about them, more than the perfect knowledge which it has of the lower world. Therefore man’s last end is to understand God in some way or other.

Further. Everything tends to a divine likeness as its own end. Therefore a thing’s last end is that whereby it is most of all like unto God. Now the intellectual creature is especially likened to God in that it is intellectual: since this likeness belongs to it above other creatures, and includes all other likenesses. And in this particular kind of likeness it is more like God in understanding actually than in understanding habitually or potentially: because God is always actually understanding, as we proved in the First Book.1 And in understanding actually he is especially like God, in understanding God: because by understanding Himself God understands all other things, as we proved in the First Book.2 Therefore the last end of every intelligent substance is to understand God.

Again. That which is lovable only on account of another, is for the sake of that which is lovable for its own sake alone: because we cannot go on indefinitely in the appetite of nature, since then nature’s desire would be in vain, for it is impossible to pass through an infinite number of things. Now all practical sciences, arts and powers are lovable only for the sake of something else, since their end is not knowledge, but work. But speculative sciences are lovable for their own sake, for their end is knowledge itself. Nor can we find any action in connexion with man, that is not directed to some other end, with the exception of speculative consideration. For even playful actions, which would seem to be done without any purpose, have some end due to them, namely that the mind may be relaxed, and that thereby we may afterwards become more fit for studious occupations: else we should always have to be playing, if play were desirable for its own sake, and this is unreasonable. Accordingly practical art is directed to speculative art, and again every human operation, to intellectual speculation, as its end. Now, in all sciences and arts that are mutually subordinate, the last end apparently belongs to the one from which others take their rules and principles: thus the art of sailing, to which belongs the ship’s end, namely its use, provides rules and principles to the art of ship-building. And such is the relation of metaphysics to other speculative sciences, for all others depend thereon, since they derive their principles from it, and are directed by it in defending those principles; moreover metaphysics is wholly directed to God as its last end, wherefore it is called the divine science.1 Therefore the knowledge of God is the last end of all human knowledge and actions.

Furthermore. In all mutually subordinate agents and movers, the end of the first agent must be the end of all: even as the end of the commander in chief is the end of all who are soldiering under him. Now of all the parts of man, the intellect is the highest mover: for it moves the appetite, by proposing its object to it; and the intellective appetite or will, moves the sensitive appetites, namely the irascible and concupiscible, so that we do not obey the concupiscence, unless the will command; and the sensitive appetite, the will consenting, moves the body. Therefore the end of the intellect is the end of all human actions. Now the intellect’s end and good are the true,2 and its last end is the first truth. Therefore the last end of all man and of all his deeds and desires, is to know the first truth, namely God.

Moreover. Man has a natural desire to know the causes of whatever he sees: wherefore through wondering at what they saw, and ignoring its cause, men first began to philosophize, and when they had discovered the cause they were at rest.3 Nor do they cease inquiring until they come to the first cause; and then do we deem ourselves to know perfectly when we know the first cause.4 Therefore man naturally desires, as his last end, to know the first cause. But God is the first cause of all. Therefore man’s last end is to know God.

Besides. Man naturally desires to know the cause of any known effect. Now the human intellect knows universal being. Therefore it naturally desires to know its cause, which is God alone, as we proved in the Second Book.1 Now one has not attained to one’s last end until the natural desire is at rest. Therefore the knowledge of any intelligible object is not enough for man’s happiness, which is his last end, unless he know God also, which knowledge terminates his natural desire, as his last end. Therefore this very knowledge of God is man’s last end.

Further. A body that tends by its natural appetite to its place, is moved all the more vehemently and rapidly, the nearer it approaches its end: wherefore Aristotle proves (1. De Cœl. viii.) that a natural straight movement cannot be towards an indefinite point, because it would not be more moved afterwards than before. Hence that which tends more vehemently to a thing afterwards than before, is not moved towards an indefinite point but towards something fixed. Now this we find in the desire of knowledge: for the more one knows, the greater one’s desire to know. Consequently man’s natural desire in knowledge tends to a definite end. This can be no other but the highest thing knowable, which is God. Therefore the knowledge of God is man’s last end.

Now the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called happiness or beatitude: for it is this that every intelligent substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude or happiness of any intelligent substance is to know God.

Hence it is said (Matth. 5:8): Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God: and (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life: that they may know thee, the only true God. Aristotle agrees with this statement (10 Ethic. vii.) when he says that man’s ultimate happiness is contemplative, in regard to his contemplating the highest object of contemplation.

Chapter XXVI

does happiness consist in an act of the will?

Since the intellectual substance attains to God by its operation, not only by an act of understanding but also by an act of the will, through desiring and loving Him, and through delighting in Him, someone might think that man’s last end and ultimate happiness consists, not in knowing but in loving God or in some other act of the will towards Him: especially seeing that the object of the will is the good, which has the aspect of an end, whereas the true, which is the object of the intellect, has not the aspect of an end except forasmuch as it also is a good. Wherefore seemingly man does not attain to his last end by an act of his intellect, but rather by an act of his will.

Further. The ultimate perfection of operation is delight, which perfects operation as beauty perfects youth, as the Philosopher says (10 Ethic. iv.). Hence if the last end be a perfect operation, it would seem that it must consist in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

Again. Delight apparently is desired for its own sake so that it is never desired for the sake of something else: for it is silly to ask of anyone why he seeks to be delighted. Now this is a condition of the ultimate end, namely that it be sought for its own sake. Therefore seemingly the last end consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

Moreover. All agree in their desire for the last end, for it is a natural desire. Now more people seek delight than knowledge. Therefore delight would seem to be the last end rather than knowledge.

Furthermore. The will is seemingly a higher power than the intellect: for the will moves the intellect to its act; since when a person wills, his intellect considers by an act what he holds by a habit. Wherefore seemingly the act of the will is higher than the act of the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the last end, which is beatitude, consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

But this can be clearly shown to be impossible. For since happiness is the proper good of the intellectual nature, it must needs become the intellectual nature according to that which is proper thereto. Now appetite is not proper to the intellectual nature, but is in all things, although it is different in different things. This difference, however, arises from things having a different relation to knowledge. For things wholly devoid of knowledge have only a natural appetite: those that have a sensitive knowledge, have also a sensitive appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible appetites are comprised. And those which have intellective knowledge, have also an appetite proportionate to that knowledge, namely the will. The will therefore, forasmuch as it is an appetite, is not proper to the intellectual nature, but only in so far as it is dependent on the intellect. On the other hand the intellect is in itself proper to the intellectual nature. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, rather than in an act of the will.

Again. In all powers that are moved by their objects, the object is naturally prior to the acts of those powers: even as the mover is naturally prior to the movable being moved. Now such a power is the will: for the appetible object moves the appetite. Therefore the will’s object is naturally prior to its act: and consequently its first object precedes its every act. Therefore an act of the will cannot be the first thing willed. But this is the last end, which is beatitude. Therefore beatitude or happiness cannot be the very act of the will.

Besides. In all those powers which are able to reflect on their acts, their act must first bear on some other object, and afterwards the power is brought to bear on its own act. For if the intellect understand that it understands, we must suppose first that it understands some particular thing, and that afterwards it understands that it understands: for this very act of intelligence which the intellect understands, must have an object. Hence either we must go on for ever, or if we come to some first thing understood, this will not be an act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. In the same way the first thing willed cannot be the very act of willing, but must be some other good. Now the first thing willed by an intelligent nature, is beatitude or happiness: because for its sake we will whatever we will. Therefore happiness cannot consist in an act of the will.

Further. The truth of a thing’s nature is derived from those things which constitute its essence: for a true man differs from a man in a picture, by the things which constitute man’s essence. Now false happiness does not differ from true in an act of the will: because whatever be proposed to the will as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely, it makes no difference to the will, desiring, loving, or enjoying that good: the difference is on the part of the intellect, as to whether the good proposed as supreme be truly so or not. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists essentially in an act of the intellect rather than of the will.

Again. If an act of the will were happiness itself, this act would be either desire, or love, or joy. But desire cannot possibly be the last end. For desire implies that the will is tending to what it has not yet; and this is contrary to the very notion of the last end.—Nor can love be the last end. For a good is loved not only while it is in our possession, but even when it is not: because it is through love that we seek by desire what we have not: and if love of a thing we possess is more perfect, this arises from the fact that we possess the good we love. It is one thing, therefore, to possess the good which is our end; and another to love it, which love before we possessed was imperfect, and perfect after we obtained possession.—Nor again is delight the last end. For it is possession of the good that causes delight; whether we are conscious of possessing it actually; or call to mind our previous possession; or hope to possess it in the future. Therefore delight is not the last end.—Therefore no act of the will can be happiness itself essentially.

Furthermore. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable for its own sake. But this is not true. Because the desirability of a delight depends on what gives rise to the delight: since that which arises from good and desirable operations, is itself good and desirable, but that which arises from evil operations, is itself evil and to be avoided. Therefore its goodness and desirability are from something else: and consequently it is not itself the last end or happiness.

Moreover. The right order of things agrees with the order of nature: for in the natural order things are directed to their end without any error. Now, in the natural order delight is on account of operation and not conversely. For it is to be observed that nature has joined delight with those animal operations which are clearly directed to necessary ends; for instance to the use of food that is directed to the preservation of the individual; and to sexual matters, that are appointed for the preservation of the species: since were there no pleasure, animals would abstain from the use of these necessary things. Therefore delight cannot be the last end.

Again. Delight, seemingly, is nothing else than the quiescence of the will in some becoming good, just as desire is the inclining of the will towards the attaining of some good. Now just as by his will, a man is inclined towards an end, and rests in it; so too have natural bodies a natural inclination to their respective ends, and are at rest when they have once attained their end. Now it is absurd to say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is not to be in its proper place, but that it is the quiescence of the inclination towards that place. For if it were nature’s chief intent that this inclination should be quiescent, it would not give such an inclination: but it gives it so that the body may tend towards its place: and when it has arrived there, as though it were its end, quiescence of the inclination follows. Hence this quiescence is not the end, but accompanies the end. Neither therefore is delight the ultimate end, but accompanies it. Much less therefore is happiness any act of the will.

Besides. If a thing have something extrinsic for its end, the operation whereby it first obtains that thing will be called its last end: thus for those whose end is money, possession is said to be their end, but not love or desire. Now the last end of the intellective substance is God. Hence that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beatitude. And this is understanding: since we cannot will what we do not understand. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect, and not an act of the will.

From what has been said we can now solve the arguments that were objected in the contrary sense. For it does not necessarily follow that happiness is essentially the very act of the will, from the fact that it is the object of the will, through being the highest good, as the first argument reasoned. On the contrary the fact that it is the first object of the will, shows that it is not an act of the will, as appears from what we have said.

Nor does it follow that whatever perfects a thing in any way whatever, must be the end of that thing; as the second objection argued. For a thing perfects another in two ways: first it perfects a thing that has its species; secondly it perfects a thing that it may have its species. Thus the perfection of a house considered as already having its species, is that to which the species “house” is directed, namely to be a dwelling: for one would not build a house but for that: and consequently we must include this in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be perfect. On the other hand the perfection that conduces to the species of a house, is both that which is directed to the completion of the species, for instance its essential principles; and that which conduces to the preservation of the species, for instance the buttresses which are made to support the building; and those things which make the house more fit for use, for instance, the symmetry of the building. Accordingly that which is the perfection of a thing considered as already having its species, is its end; as the end of a house is to be a dwelling. Likewise, the operation proper to a thing, its use, as it were, is its end. On the other hand whatever perfects a thing by conducing to its species, is not the end of that thing: in fact the thing is its end; thus matter and form are for the sake of the species. For although the form is the end of generation, it is not the end of the thing already generated and having its species, but is required in order that the species be complete. Again, things that preserve the thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, although they perfect the animal, are not the animal’s end, but vice versa. And again, those things that adapt a thing for the perfection of its proper specific operations, and for the easier attainment of its proper end, are not the end of that thing, but vice versa: for instance, a man’s comeliness and bodily strength, and the like, of which the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. viii., ix.) that they conduce to happiness instrumentally.—Now delight is a perfection of operation, not as though operation were directed thereto in respect of its species, for thus it is directed to other ends; thus eating, in respect of its species, is directed to the preservation of the individual: but it is like a perfection that is conducive to a thing’s species: since for the sake of the delight we perform more attentively and becomingly an operation we delight in. Wherefore the Philosopher (10 Ethic. iv.) says that delight perfects operation as beauty perfects youth: for beauty is for the sake of the one who has youth.—Nor is the fact that men seek delight not for the sake of something else but for its own sake, a sufficient indication that delight is the last end, as the third objection argued. Because delight, though it is not the last end, nevertheless accompanies the last end: since delight arises from the attainment of the end.

Nor do more people seek the pleasure that comes from knowledge, than knowledge itself. But more there are who seek sensible delights than intellectual knowledge and the delight consequent thereto: because those things that are without, are better known to the majority, in that human knowledge takes its beginning from sensible objects.

The suggestion put forward by the fifth argument, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, as being the latter’s motive force, is clearly untrue. Because the intellect moves the will, first and per se: for the will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good: whereas the will moves the intellect accidentally as it were, in so far, to wit, that the act of intelligence is itself apprehended as a good, and on that account is desired by the will, the result being that the intellect understands actually. Even in this, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never seek the act of intelligence, did not the intellect first apprehend its act of intelligence as a good.—And again, the will moves the intellect to actual operation, in the same way as an agent is said to move; whereas the intellect moves the will in the same way as the end moves, for the good understood is the end of the will. Now the agent in moving comes after the end, for the agent does not move except on account of the end. It is therefore clear that the intellect is simply higher than the will; while the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a restricted sense.

Chapter XXVII

that human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures

From what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of the table and of sex.

It has been shown1 that according to nature’s order, pleasure is on account of operation, and not conversely. Wherefore if an operation be not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations which are followed by the pleasures mentioned above, are not the last end: for they are directed to certain manifest ends; eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of children. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore happiness does not consist in them.

Again. The will is higher than the sensitive appetite: for it moves it, as stated above.2 But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved.3 Much less therefore does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures which are seated in the sensitive appetite.

Moreover. Happiness is a good proper to man: for it is an abuse of terms to speak of dumb animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are common to man and beast. Therefore we must not assign happiness to them.

Besides. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him; for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now these pleasures consist in man being united through his senses to things beneath him, namely certain sensible objects. Therefore we must not assign happiness to suchlike pleasures.

Further. That which is not good unless it be moderate, is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate: for otherwise they would frustrate one another. Therefore these pleasures are not in themselves man’s good. But the sovereign good is good essentially, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore suchlike pleasures are not man’s supreme good, which is happiness.

Again. In all per se predications, if A be predicated of B simply, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B: thus if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing heats most. Accordingly if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much is very good. But this is clearly false: because it is considered sinful to use them too much: besides it is hurtful to the body, and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore they are not per se man’s good: and human happiness does not consist in them.

Again. Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being directed to happiness.1 If therefore human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue: for the act of temperance is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures; whence that act takes its name. Therefore man’s happiness is not in these pleasures.

Furthermore. The last end of everything is God, as was proved above.1 We must therefore posit as man’s last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid pleasures from his chief approach to God, which is effected by contemplation, to which these same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things, and consequently withdraw him from intelligible things. Therefore human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans who ascribed man’s happiness to pleasures of this kind: in their person Solomon says (Eccles. 5:17): This therefore hath seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink, and enjoy the fruit of his labour … and this is his portion: and (Wis. 2:9): Let us everywhere leave tokens of joy: for this is our portion, and this is our lot.

The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted: for they pretended that, in the state of final happiness, after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the table: wherefore they are called ‘Chiliastae,’2 or believers in the Millennium.

The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted: who pretend that the reward of the righteous consists in suchlike pleasures: for happiness is the reward of virtue.

Chapter XXVIII

that happiness does not consist in honours

From the foregoing it is also clear that neither does man’s supreme good, or happiness, consist in honours.

For man’s ultimate end and happiness is his most perfect operation, as we have shown above.1 But man’s honour does not consist in something done by him, but in something done to him by another who shows him honour. Therefore man’s happiness must not be placed in honours.

Again. That which is on account of another good and desirable thing is not the last end. Now such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured, except on account of some other good in him. For this reason do men seek to be honoured, as though wishing to have a voucher for some good that is in them: so that they rejoice more in being honoured by the great and the wise.2 Therefore we must not assign man’s happiness to honours.

Besides. Happiness is obtained through virtue. Now virtuous deeds are voluntary, else they were not praiseworthy. Therefore happiness must be a good obtainable by man through his will. But it is not in a man’s power to secure honour, rather is it in the power of the man who pays honour.3 Therefore happiness is not to be assigned to honours.

Moreover. Only the good can be worthy of honour: and yet it is possible even for the wicked to be honoured. Therefore it is better to become worthy of honour, than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not man’s supreme good.

Furthermore. The supreme good is the perfect good. Now the perfect good is incompatible with any evil. But that which has no evil in it cannot possibly be evil. Therefore that which is in possession of the supreme good cannot be evil. Yet it is possible for an evil person to receive honour. Therefore honour is not man’s supreme good.

Chapter XXIX

that man’s happiness consists not in glory

Wherefore it is evident also that man’s supreme good does not consist in glory which is the recognition of one’s good name.

For glory, according to Cicero,1 is the general recognition and praise of a person’s good name, and in the words of Ambrose2 consists in being well known and praised. Now men seek praise and distinction through being famous, so that they may be honoured by those whom their fame reaches. Therefore glory is sought for the sake of honour: and consequently if honour be not the sovereign good, much less is glory.

Again. Those goods are worthy of praise, whereby a man shows himself to be directed to his end. Now he who is directed to his end has not yet reached his last end. Therefore praise is not bestowed on one who has reached his last end: rather does he receive honour as the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. xii.). Therefore glory cannot be the supreme good: since it consists chiefly in praise.

Besides. It is better to know than to be known: because only the higher things know; whereas the lowest are known. Therefore man’s supreme good cannot be glory, which consists in a man being known.

Further. A man does not seek to be known except in good things: and in evil things he seeks to be hidden. Therefore to be known is good and desirable, on account of the good things that are known in a man. Therefore these good things are better still. Consequently glory, which consists in a man being known, is not his supreme good.

Moreover. The supreme good must needs be perfect, for it satisfies the appetite. But the knowledge of one’s good name, wherein glory consists, is imperfect: for it is beset with much uncertainty and error. Therefore glory of this kind cannot be the supreme good.

Furthermore. Man’s supreme good must be supremely stable in human things: for it is natural to desire unfailing endurance in one’s goods. Now glory, which consists in fame, is most unstable; since nothing is more changeable than human opinion and praise. Therefore such glory is not man’s supreme good.

Chapter XXX

that man’s happiness does not consist in wealth

Hence it is evident that neither is wealth man’s supreme good. For wealth is not sought except for the sake of something else: because of itself it brings us no good, but only when we use it, whether for the support of the body, or for some similar purpose. Now the supreme good is sought for its own, and not for another’s sake. Therefore wealth is not man’s supreme good.

Again. Man’s supreme good cannot consist in the possession or preservation of things whose chief advantage for man consists in their being spent. Now the chief advantage of wealth is in its being spent; for this is its use. Therefore the possession of wealth cannot be man’s supreme good.

Moreover. Acts of virtue deserve praise according as they lead to happiness.1 Now acts of liberality and magnificence which are concerned with money, are deserving of praise, on account of money being spent, rather than on account of its being kept: and it is from this that these virtues derive their names.2 Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in the possession of wealth.

Besides. Man’s supreme good must consist in obtaining something better than man. But man is better than wealth: since it is something directed to man’s use. Therefore not in wealth does man’s supreme good consist.

Further. Man’s supreme good is not subject to chance. For things that happen by chance, escape the forethought of reason: whereas man has to attain his own end by means of his reason. But chance occupies the greater place in the attaining of wealth. Therefore human happiness consists not in wealth.

Moreover. This is evident from the fact that wealth is lost unwillingly. Also because wealth can come into the possession of evil persons, who, of necessity, must lack the sovereign good. Again because wealth is unstable. Other similar reasons can be gathered from the arguments given above.1

Chapter XXXI

that happiness consists not in worldly power

In like manner neither can worldly power be man’s supreme happiness: since in the achievement thereof chance can effect much. Again it is unstable; and is not subject to man’s will; and is often obtained by evil men. These are incompatible with the supreme good, as already stated.2

Again. Man is said to be good especially according as he approaches the supreme good. But in respect to his having power, he is not said to be either good or evil: since not everyone who can do good deeds is good, nor is a person evil because he can do evil deeds. Therefore the supreme good does not consist in being powerful.

Besides. Every power implies reference to something else. But the supreme good is not referred to anything further. Therefore power is not man’s supreme good.

Moreover. Man’s supreme good cannot be a thing that one can use both well and ill: for the better things are those that we cannot abuse.3 But one can use one’s power both well and ill: for rational powers can be directed to contrary objects. Therefore human power is not man’s supreme good.

Further. If any power be man’s supreme good, it must be most perfect. Now human power is most imperfect: for it is based on human will and opinion, which are full of inconsistencies. Also the greater a power is reputed to be, the greater number of people does it depend on: which again conduces to its weakness, since what depends on many, is in many ways destructible. Therefore man’s supreme good does not consist in worldly power. Consequently man’s happiness consists in no external good: for all external goods, which are known as goods of chance, are contained under those we have mentioned.

Chapter XXXII

that happiness consists not in goods of the body

Like arguments avail to prove that man’s supreme good does not consist in goods of the body, such as health, beauty and strength. For they are common to good and evil: and are unstable: and are not subject to the will.

Besides. The soul is better than the body, which neither lives, nor possesses these goods, without the soul. Wherefore the soul’s good, such as understanding and the like, is better than the body’s good. Therefore the body’s good is not man’s supreme good.

Again. These goods are common to man and other animals: whereas happiness is a good proper to man. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in the things mentioned.

Moreover. Many animals surpass man in goods of the body: for some are fleeter than he, some more sturdy, and so on. Accordingly, if man’s supreme good consisted in these things, man would not excel all animals: which is clearly untrue. Therefore human happiness does not consist in goods of the body.

Chapter XXXIII

that human happiness is not seated in the senses

By the same arguments it is evident that neither does man’s supreme good consist in goods of his sensitive faculty. For these goods again, are common to man and other animals.

Again. Intellect is superior to sense. Therefore the intellect’s good is better than the sense’s. Consequently man’s supreme good is not seated in the senses.

Besides. The greatest sensual pleasures are those of the table and of sex, wherein the supreme good must needs be, if seated in the senses. But it does not consist in them.1 Therefore man’s supreme good is not in the senses.

Moreover. The senses are appreciated for their utility and for knowledge. Now the entire utility of the senses is referred to the goods of the body. Again, sensitive knowledge is directed to intellective: wherefore animals devoid of intelligence take no pleasure in sensation except in reference to some bodily utility, in so far as by sensitive knowledge they obtain food or sexual intercourse. Therefore man’s supreme good which is happiness is not seated in the sensitive faculty.

Chapter XXXIV

that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of moral virtue

It is clear that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral works.

For human happiness, if ultimate, cannot be directed to a further end. But all moral deeds can be directed to something else. This is clear from a consideration of the principal among them. Because deeds of fortitude in time of war are directed to victory and peace: for it were foolish to go to war merely for its own sake.2 Again deeds of justice are directed to keeping peace among men, through each one possessing his own in peace. The same applies to all other virtues. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in moral deeds.

Again. The purpose of the moral virtues is that through them we may observe the mean in the passions within us, and in things outside us. Now it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of man’s life; since both passions and external things can be directed to something less. Therefore it is not possible that the practice of moral virtue be man’s final happiness.

Further. Since man is man through having reason, his proper good which is happiness must needs be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Now that which reason has in itself is more proper to reason than what it effects in something else. Seeing then that the good of moral virtue is something effected by reason in something other than itself, it cannot be man’s greatest good which is happiness: rather must it be a good that is in reason itself.

Moreover. We have already proved1 that the last end of all is to become like God. Therefore that in which man chiefly becomes like God, is his happiness. Now this is not in regard to moral actions, since suchlike actions cannot be ascribed to God, except metaphorically; for it is not becoming to God to have passions, or the like, with which moral virtue is concerned. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness, which is his last end, does not consist in moral actions.

Furthermore. Happiness is man’s proper good. Therefore that good, which of all goods is most proper to man in comparison with other animals, is the one in which we must seek his ultimate happiness. Now this is not the practice of moral virtue; for animals share somewhat either in liberality, or in fortitude: whereas no animal has a share in intellectual action. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral actions.

Chapter XXXV

that ultimate happiness does not consist in the act of prudence

It is also evident from the foregoing that neither does man’s happiness consist in the act of prudence.

For acts of prudence are solely about matters of moral virtue. But human happiness does not consist in the practice of moral virtue.2 Neither therefore does it consist in the practice of prudence.

Again. Man’s ultimate happiness consists in man’s most excellent operation. Now man’s most excellent operation in respect of what is proper to man, is in relation to most perfect objects. But the act of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect objects of intellect or reason: since it is not about necessary things, but about contingent practical matters.1 Therefore its act is not man’s ultimate happiness.

Besides. That which is directed to another as its end, is not man’s ultimate happiness. Now the act of prudence is directed to another as its end: both because all practical knowledge, under which prudence is comprised, is directed to operation: and because prudence gives man a good disposition as regards things directed to the end, as may be gathered from Aristotle (6 Ethic, xiii.). Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in the practice of prudence.

Furthermore. Irrational animals have no share of happiness: as Aristotle proves (1 Ethic, ix.). Yet some of them have a certain share of prudence: as may be gathered from the same authority (1 Metaph. i., ii.). Therefore happiness does not consist in an act of prudence.

Chapter XXXVI

that happiness does not consist in the practice of art

It is also evident that it cannot consist in the practice of art.

For even the knowledge of art is practical, and so is directed to an end, and is not the ultimate end.

Besides. The end of the practice of art is the thing produced by art: and such a thing cannot be the ultimate end of human life; since rather is it we who are the end of those products, for they are all made for man’s use. Therefore final happiness cannot consist in the practice of art.

Chapter XXXVII

that man’s ultimate happiness consists in contemplating god

Accordingly if man’s ultimate happiness consists not in external things, which are called goods of chance; nor in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive faculty; nor as regards the intellective faculty, in the practice of moral virtue; nor as regards intellectual virtue in those which are concerned about action, namely art and prudence; it remains for us to conclude that man’s ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of the truth.

For this operation alone is proper to man, and none of the other animals communicates with him therein.

Again. This is not directed to anything further as its end: since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake.

Again. By this operation man is united to things above him, by becoming like them: because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in separate substances. Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever.

Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it.

Further. All other human operations seem to be directed to this as their end. Because perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered,1 and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which all the regulations of the civil life are directed. So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations are brought into the service of those who contemplate the truth. Now, it is not possible that man’s ultimate happiness consist in contemplation based on the understanding of first principles: for this is most imperfect, as being universal and containing potential knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human study, and comes to us from nature, and not through the study of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object: since happiness must consist in an operation of the intellect in relation to the highest objects of intelligence. It follows then that man’s ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things. It is therefore evident by way of induction that man’s ultimate happiness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.1

Chapter XXXVIII

that human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of god which is possessed generally by the majority

It remains for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ultimate happiness of the intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God, which is in almost all men, whether from the fact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other principles of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book:2 or, as seems nearer to the truth, because by his natural reason, man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God. For seeing that natural things are arranged in a certain order,—since there cannot be order without a cause of order—men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who arranges in order the things that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration: even so, when we see a man in motion, and performing other works, we perceive that m him there is a cause of these operations, which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of soul, but without knowing yet what the soul is, whether it be a body, or how it brings about operations in question.

Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness.

For the operation of the happy must be without any defect: and this knowledge is subject to an admixture of many errors. Some believed that there is no other ordainer of mundane things than the heavenly bodies; wherefore they said that the heavenly bodies are gods.—Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them; as though they deemed the movements and natural operations thereof, not to be due to another ordainer, and the order in other things to be caused by them.—Some, deeming human acts not to be subject to any but a human ordinance, declared that men who cause order in other men are gods.—Accordingly this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.

Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as their end: indeed, it is in everyone almost from the very beginning. Therefore happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God.

Again. No one appears to be blamed for lacking happiness: nay, those who have it not and seek it are praised. Whereas he who lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God, is seemingly very much to be blamed: since it is a very clear sign of a man’s dullness of perception, if he fail to perceivesuch evident signs of God’s existence: even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, understood not that he has a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalm (13:1–52:1): The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.

Further. Knowledge of a thing in general only, and not in respect of a property thereof, is most imperfect; for instance knowledge of man from the fact that he is moved, for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known only potentially: because the proper is only potentially contained in the common. Now happiness is a perfect operation: and man’s supreme good must needs be in respect of what he is actually, and not in respect of what he is only potentially: since potentiality perfected by act has the aspect of a good. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge of God is not sufficient for our happiness.

Chapter XXXIX

that man’s happiness does not consist in the knowledge of god acquired by demonstration

There is also another knowledge of God, higher than the one just mentioned, which is acquired by means of a demonstration, and which approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of him: since by means of a demonstration many things are removed from him, so that in consequence we understand him as something apart from other things.1 For demonstration proves that God is immovable, eternal, incorporeal, utterly simple, one, and the like, as we have shown in the First Book. Now we arrive at the proper knowledge of a thing not only by affirmation, but also by negation: for just as it is proper to man to be a rational animal, so is it proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. Yet there is this difference between these two modes of knowledge, that when we have proper knowledge of a thing by affirmation, we know what that thing is, and how it is distinguished from others: whereas when we have proper knowledge of a thing by negations, we know that it is distinct from others, but remain ignorant of what it is. Such is the proper knowledge of God, that can be obtained by demonstrations. But neither does this suffice for man’s ultimate happiness. For things belonging to one species for the most part attain to the end of that species, because nature achieves its purpose always or nearly always, and fails in a few instances on account of some corruption. Now happiness is the end of the human species; since all men naturally desire it. Therefore happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless some obstacle occur to some whereby they be debarred1 from it. Few, however, attain to the possession of the aforesaid knowledge of God by way of demonstration, on account of the obstacles to this knowledge, mentioned at the beginning of this work.2 Therefore this knowledge is not essentially man’s happiness.

Again. Actual existence is the end of that which exists potentially, as was made clear above.3 Wherefore happiness that is the last end, is an act free of any potentiality to a further act. Now this knowledge of God that is acquired by way of demonstration is still in potentiality to a further knowledge of God, or to the same knowledge, but by a better way: because those who came afterwards endeavoured to add something to the knowledge of God besides that which they found handed down to them by those who preceded them. Therefore such knowledge is not man’s ultimate happiness.

Further. Happiness excludes all unhappiness: for no man can be at the same time happy and unhappy. Now deception and error have a large place in unhappiness, since all naturally avoid them. But the aforesaid knowledge of God is subject to the admixture of many errors: as evidenced by many who knew some truths about God through demonstration, yet, following their own opinions, when they lacked proof, fell into many errors. And if some there were who by the way of demonstration discovered the truth about divine things, without any admixture of error in their opinions, it is evident that they were very few: which is inconsistent with happiness which should be the common end. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not seated in such knowledge as this.

Moreover. Happiness consists in a perfect operation. Now perfect knowledge requires certitude: hence we cannot be said to know, unless we be certain that it cannot be otherwise, as stated in 1 Poster. ii. But the aforesaid knowledge is beset with uncertainty: as evidenced by the diversity of sciences about divine things, elaborated by those who endeavoured to discover something about them by the way of demonstration. Therefore ultimate happiness does not consist in suchlike knowledge.

Besides. When the will has obtained its last end, its desire is at rest. Now the ultimate end of all human knowledge is happiness. Therefore happiness is essentially that knowledge of God the possession of which leaves no knowledge to be desired of anything knowable. Such, however, is not the knowledge which philosophers were able to have about God by the way of demonstration: because even when we have that knowledge we still desire to know something more;—things that we know not by means of the aforesaid knowledge. Therefore happiness does not consist in suchlike knowledge of God.

Furthermore. The end of everything that is in potentiality is that it be brought to actuality: for to this does it tend by means of the movement with which it is moved to its end. Now everything that is in potentiality tends to be actualized as far as possible. For there are things in potentiality in that their whole potentiality is reducible to act: so that the end of such a thing is that its whole potentiality be actualized: thus a heavy body, that is outside its medium, is in potentiality to its proper place. There are also things whose potentiality cannot be actualized all at once,—for instance primary matter: so that by its movement it is appetent of actualization by various forms in succession, which cannot be in matter at the same time on account of their diversity. Now our intellect is in potentiality to all things intelligible, as stated in the Second Book.1 And it is possible for two intelligible objects to be in the possible intellect at the same time in respect of the first act which is science: although perhaps not in respect of the second act which is consideration. Accordingly it is clear that the whole potentiality of the possible intellect can be actualized at one time: and consequently this is required for its ultimate end which is happiness. But the aforesaid knowledge which can be acquired about God by the way of demonstration, does not effect this: since when we have it we still are ignorant of many things. Therefore suchlike knowledge of God does not suffice for ultimate happiness.

Chapter XL

that man’s happiness does not consist in the knowledge of god by faith

There is yet another knowledge of God, in one respect superior to the knowledge we have been discussing, namely that whereby God is known by men through faith. In this respect it surpasses the knowledge of God through demonstration, because by faith we know certain things about God, which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration, as we have stated at the beginning of this work.1 But not even in this knowledge of God can man’s ultimate happiness consist.

For happiness is the intellect’s perfect operation, as already declared.2 But in knowledge by faith the operation of the intellect is found to be most imperfect as regards that which is on the part of the intellect:—although it is most perfect on the part of the object:—for the intellect in believing does not grasp the object of its assent. Therefore neither does man’s happiness consist in this knowledge of God.

Again. It has been shown3 that ultimate happiness does not consist chiefly in an act of the will. Now in knowledge by faith the will has the leading place: for the intellect assents by faith to things proposed to it, because it wills, and not through being constrained by the evidence of their truth. Therefore man’s final happiness does not consist in this knowledge.

Besides. The believer assents to things proposed to him by another, but not seen by himself: so that the knowledge of faith resembles hearing rather than seeing. Now a man does not believe in what is unseen by him, and proposed to him by another, unless he thinks this other to have a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed, than he himself has who sees not. Either therefore the believer thinks wrong: or the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the latter also knows these things only through hearing them from another, we cannot proceed thus indefinitely: for then the assent of faith would be without foundation or certitude; since we should not come to some first principle certain in itself, to give certitude to the faith of believers. But it is not possible that the assent of faith be false and without foundation, as is clear from what we have said at the beginning of this work:1 and yet if it were false and baseless, happiness could not consist in suchlike knowledge. There is therefore some knowledge of God that is higher than the knowledge of faith: whether he who proposes faith sees the truth immediately, as when we believe Christ: or receive the truth from him who sees it immediately, as when we believe the Apostles and prophets. Since then man’s happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith.

Moreover. Since happiness is the last end, the natural desire is set at rest thereby. But the knowledge of faith does not set the desire at rest, but inflames it: because everyone desires to see what he believes. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of faith.

Further. Knowledge of God has been declared to be the end, inasmuch as it unites us to the last end of all, namely God. Now the knowledge of faith does not make the thing believed to be perfectly present to the mind: since faith is of distant, and not present things. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7) that so long as we walk by faith, we are pilgrims from the Lord. Yet faith makes God to be present to the heart, since the believer assents to God voluntarily, according to the saying of Ephes. 3:17: That Christ may dwell by faith in our2 hearts. Therefore the knowledge of faith cannot be man’s ultimate happiness.

Chapter XLI

is it possible for man, in this life, to understand separate substances by the study and inquiry of speculative sciences?

The intellectual substance has yet another knowledge of God. For we have said in the Second Book1 that the separate intellectual substance, by knowing its own essence, knows both what is above it, and what is below it, in a way proportionate to its substance. This must especially be the case, if that which is above it, be its cause, since the likeness to the cause must be found in the effect. Wherefore, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances, as proved above,2 it follows that separate intellectual substances, by knowing their own essence, know God Himself by the way of some kind of vision: for the intellect knows by the way of vision the thing whose likeness is in the intellect; just as the likeness of the thing seen by the body, is in the sense of the seer. Whatever intellect, therefore, apprehends a separate substance, by knowing what it is, sees God in a higher way than he is known by any of the kinds of knowledge mentioned above. Accordingly, whereas some3 have deemed man’s ultimate happiness to be in this life, for the reason that he knows separate substances, we must inquire whether in this life man be able to know separate substances: and it is a point that may well be questioned. For our intellect, according to its present state, understands nothing without a phantasm, which stands in the same relation to the possible intellect, whereby we understand, as colours to the sight, as was made clear in the Second Book.4 Hence if, through the intellectual knowledge which is acquired from phantasms, it be possible for any of us to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be possible in this life for someone to understand these same separate substances; and in consequence, by seeing these separate substances, he will participate in that mode of knowledge with which the separate substance, by understanding itself, understands God. If, on the other hand, by knowledge derived from phantasms, it be altogether unable to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be impossible for man in the present state of life to acquire the above mode of divine knowledge.

The possibility of succeeding in understanding separate substances, through knowledge derived from phantasms, has been explained by some in various ways. Avempace1 maintained that by the study of speculative sciences, it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of separate substances, from understanding those things which we know through phantasms. For we are able by the action of the intellect to extract the quiddity of a thing which has quiddity without being its quiddity. Because the intellect is naturally adapted to know any quiddity as such: since the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is. Now if that which is first understood by the possible intellect is something that has a quiddity, we can, by the possible intellect, abstract the quiddity of the thing first understood; and if this quiddity has again a quiddity, it will be again possible to abstract the quiddity of this quiddity. And since we cannot go on indefinitely, we must stop somewhere. Therefore by way of analysis our intellect can arrive at knowing a quiddity that has no quiddity: and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Consequently, through its knowledge of these sensibles, that is acquired from phantasms, our intellect can arrive at understanding separate substances.

He goes on to prove the same statement by another yet similar way. Thus, he lays down that the idea of a thing, for instance of a horse, in me and in you is multiplied only through the multiplication of the spiritual forms, which are different in you and me. It follows then that an idea which is not clothed with any such form, is the same in you and me. Now, as we have proved, the quiddity of the idea, which our intellect by its innate aptitude abstracts, has no spiritual and individual form: for the quiddity of the idea is not the quiddity of the individual, whether corporeal or spiritual, since the thing understood, as such, is universal. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to understand a quiddity the idea of which is the same in all. Such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to know separate substances.

Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, these explanations are frivolous. For since the idea as such is universal, the quiddity of an idea must be the quiddity of a universal, namely genus or species. Now the quiddity of the genus or species of these sensible objects, the intellective knowledge whereof we acquire through phantasms, includes both matter and form. Consequently it is quite unlike the quiddity of a separate substance, which is simple and immaterial. Therefore it is impossible to understand the quiddity of a separate substance, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible object.

Again. A form that cannot as to its very being be separated from a particular subject is not of the same kind as a form which, in its being, is separated from a particular subject, although both may be considered apart from that particular subject. For magnitude is not the same kind of thing as a separate substance, unless we suppose there are separated magnitudes midway between the species and the sensible object, as some Platonists have maintained. But the quiddity of a genus or species of sensible things cannot be separated in its very being, from a particular individual matter; unless perhaps, as the Platonists think, we suppose the species of things to exist separately, which Aristotle has refuted.1 Consequently the aforesaid quiddity is altogether different from separate substances, which are nowise in matter. Therefore it does not follow from the fact that these quiddities are understood, that separate substances can be understood.

Moreover. If we grant that the quiddity of a separate substance is of the same kind as the quiddity of the genus or species of these sensible things, it cannot be said to be of the same specific kind, unless we say that the species of these sensible things are the separate substances themselves, as the Platonists maintained. It follows that they are only of the same kind in the point of quiddity as such; namely in the common ratio of genus and substance. Consequently by means of these quiddities we shall understand nothing about separate substances except their remote genus. Now by knowing the genus, we do not therefore know the species except potentially. Therefore it will not be possible to understand a separate substance through understanding the quiddities of these sensible things.

Besides. A separate substance differs more from sensible things, than one sensible from another. But understanding the quiddity of one sensible does not suffice for understanding the quiddity of another: for a man who is born blind, is quite unable through understanding the quiddity of sound, to understand the quiddity of colour. Much less therefore will anyone, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible substance, be able to understand the quiddity of a separate substance.

Further. If again we grant that the spheres of the separate substance are causes of movement, and that by their movement they cause the forms of sensible substances,1 this mode of knowing separate substances through sensible things, does not suffice for knowing their quiddity. Because from the effect we know its cause either in the point of likeness between cause and effect, or in this, that the effect indicates the power of the cause. In the point of likeness, we do not gather from the effect what the cause is, unless agent and effect be of one species: and this is not the case with separate substances and sensible things. In the point of power, it is again impossible unless the effect equal the power of the cause: since then the whole power of the cause is known from the effect; and the power of a thing indicates its substance. But this cannot apply to the point in question: because the powers of separate substances surpass all the sensible effects that our intellect understands, even as a universal power surpasses a particular effect. It is therefore impossible through understanding sensible objects to arrive at understanding separate substances.

Moreover. Whatever intelligible things we are able to know by means of inquiry and study, belong to one or other of the speculative sciences. Accordingly if through understanding the natures and quiddities of these sensible objects, we succeed in understanding separate substances, it follows that it would be possible to understand separate substances through one or the other speculative science. Yet we do not find this to be the case: for no speculative science teaches what any separate substance is, but only the fact that it is. It is therefore not possible to succeed in understanding separate substances through understanding the natures of sensible objects. And if it be said that such a speculative science is possible, although it has not yet been discovered, this makes no difference, since it is not possible, from any principles known to us, to arrive at understanding the aforesaid substances. Because all the proper principles of any science whatever, depend on the first indemonstrable self-evident principles, the knowledge of which we acquire from sensible objects, as stated in 2 Poster. xv. And sensible objects do not sufficiently lead to the knowledge of immaterial things, as we have proved in the preceding arguments. Therefore no science is possible whereby one may be able to attain to the understanding of separate substances.

Chapter XLII

that in this life we are unable to know separate substances in the manner proposed by alexander1

Alexander supposed the possible intellect to be subject to generation and corruption, on account of its being a disposition of human nature resulting from the mixture of the elements, as we have seen in the Second Book.1 Now it is not possible for a power of this kind to arise above the material world. And so he maintained that our possible intellect can never attain to the understanding of separate substances: but he held that, according to our present state of life, we are able to understand separate substances. He endeavoured to prove this as follows. Whenever a thing is completed as regards being generated, and has reached the ultimate perfection of its substance, its proper operation, whether action or passion, will also be completed: for even as operation follows substance, so does perfection of operation follow perfection of substance: wherefore an animal, when quite perfect, is able to walk by itself. Now the habitual intellect, which is nothing else but the intelligible species formed by the active intellect, and residing in the possible intellect, has a twofold operation. One is to make things potentially understood to be actually understood,—and this it has in reference to the active intellect,—while the other is to understand what is actually understood: for man is able to do these two things by an intellectual habit. Accordingly when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, both of these operations will be completed in the intellect. Now whenever the intellect acquires new species it reaches the complement of its generation. And so its generation must necessarily be completed eventually, unless there be an impediment: since no generation tends to the infinite. Therefore eventually both operations will be completed in the habitual intellect, by its making all things potentially understood to be understood actually,—which is the complement of the first operation;—and by understanding all things intelligible, both separate and not separate.

And seeing that the possible intellect is unable to understand separate substances, according to his opinion, as we have stated; he means that we shall understand separate substances by the habitual intellect, in so far as the active intellect, which according to him is a separate substance, will become the form of the habitual intellect and be united to us: so that thereby we shall understand, even as now we understand by the possible intellect; and, since it is in the power of the active intellect to make things actually understood, which are intelligible potentially, and to understand separate substances, in that state we shall understand separate substances, and all non-separate intelligible things.

According to this explanation, by this knowledge which we derive from phantasms, we attain to the knowledge of the separate substance; not as though the phantasms themselves and the things understood from them, were a means for knowing separate substances, as happens in speculative sciences, which was the position of the previous opinion;1 but because the intelligible species are in us a kind of disposition to this particular form which is the active intellect. This is the first point of difference between these two opinions.

Consequently, when the habitual intellect becomes perfect through these intelligible species produced in us by the active intellect, the active intellect itself becomes a form united to us, as stated. And he calls this the acquired intellect, which, they state, Aristotle held to come from without. And so, although man’s ultimate perfection is not seated in the speculative sciences, as the previous opinion maintained; yet by them man is disposed for the attainment of his ultimate perfection. This is the second point of difference between the second and first opinions.

Thirdly they differ in this, that, according to the first opinion, the active intellect’s act of understanding is the cause of its union with us. Whereas, in the second opinion, the reverse is the case: since it is because it is united to us as a form, that we understand it and other separate substances.

But there is no reason in these statements. For the habitual intellect, like the possible intellect, is supposed by Alexander to be subject to generation and corruption. Now according to him an eternal thing cannot become the form of that which can be generated and corrupted; for this is why he maintains that the possible intellect, which is united to us as a form, is subject to generation and corruption; and that the active intellect, which is incorruptible, is a separate substance. Since then, according to Alexander, the active intellect is supposed to be an eternal separate substance, it will be impossible for the active intellect to become the form of the habitual intellect.

Again. The form of the intellect, as intellect, is the intelligible, just as the form of the sense is the sensible: for the intellect does not receive a thing, properly speaking, except intelligibly, as neither does the sense, except sensibly. If then the active intellect cannot become an intelligible through the habitual intellect, it cannot possibly be its form.

Besides. There are three ways in which we are said to understand by means of something. First, we understand by means of the intellect, which is the power that elicits this operation: wherefore also the intellect may be said to understand, and the very act of the intellect in understanding becomes our act of understanding.—Secondly, we understand by means of the intelligible species: whereby we are said to understand, not as though the species itself understood, but because the intellective power is actuated by it, just as the power of sight is by the species of colour.—Thirdly, as by a medium through knowing which we arrive at the knowledge of something else.

If, then, man at length understands separate substances through his intellect, it must be in one of these ways. It is not in the third way: because Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands the active intellect.—Nor is it in the second way: because to understand by means of an intelligible species is ascribed to the intellective power that is informed by that species: yet Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands separate substances: and consequently we cannot possibly understand separate substances by means of the active intellect in the same way as we understand things by means of an intelligible species.—And if it is as by an intellective power, it follows that the active intellect’s act of understanding is the man’s act of understanding. Now this cannot be unless the substance of the active intellect and the substance of the man be joined together in unity of being: for it is impossible that there be identity of operation where there is distinction of substances. Hence the active intellect will be one in being with man. But not in respect of accidental being: because the active intellect would then be not a substance but an accident: for instance colour added to a body makes one according to accidental being. It would follow then, that the active intellect together with man makes one in substantial being. Therefore it will be either the human soul or a part thereof, and not a separate substance, as Alexander maintained. Therefore the opinion of Alexander does not explain how man can understand separate substances.

Moreover. If the active intellect at any time become the form of this particular man, so that he be able to understand by means of it, for the same reason it may become the form of some other man who will likewise understand by its means: the result being that at the same time two men will understand by means of the active intellect, as their form. But this implies that the active intellect’s act of understanding is the act of understanding of the man who understands by its means, as already stated: and consequently two who understand will have one act of understanding. Which is impossible.

Moreover his reasoning is altogether frivolous. First, because, when the generation of a genus is perfected, its operation must be perfected, yet in keeping with the mode of that, but not of a higher genus: for when the generation of air is perfected, it has generation and complete upward movement, yet not so as to be moved towards the place of fire. Likewise, when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, its operation, which is to understand, will be complete, according to its mode, but not according to the mode of understanding in separate substances, so as to understand separate substances. Consequently from the generation of the habitual intellect it cannot be concluded that at some time man will understand separate substances.

Secondly, because it belongs to the same power to complete an operation and to perform it. Consequently if the perfection of the habitual intellect’s operation be to understand separate substances, it follows that the habitual intellect sometimes understands separate substances. But Alexander does not hold this: for it would follow that to understand separate substances comes to us through the speculative sciences, which are comprised under the habitual intellect. Thirdly, those things that begin to be generated, for the most part are completely generated: since all generations of things are due to definite causes, which produce their effects either always or in the majority of cases. If then, completeness of action follows completeness of generation, it follows that complete operation accrues to things generated, always or most frequently. And yet those who study in order that habitual intellect may be engendered in them do not succeed in understanding separate substances, either in most, or in all, cases: in fact no one has boasted of having attained to this point of perfection. Therefore the perfection of the habitual intellect is not to understand separate substances.

Chapter XLIII

that we cannot understand separate substances in this life, in the manner suggested by averroes1

As the greatest difficulty presented by Alexander’s opinion was that he supposed the habitual intellect to be altogether corruptible, Averroes thought to offer an easier proof that at times we understand separate substances, in that he deemed the possible intellect to be incorruptible and substantially separate from us, just as the active intellect. First, he shows the necessity of admitting that the relation of the active intellect to those principles which we know naturally is either that of agent to instrument or that of form to matter. For the habitual intellect whereby we understand, has not only this action which is to understand, but also this which is to make things actually understood: for we know by experience that both are in our power. Now “to make things actually understood,” indicates more specially the habitual intellect than “to understand”: because it is necessary to make a thing actually understood before one understands it. Now, in us certain things are made actually understood naturally, and not by study or by choice, as the first intelligible principles. And it does not belong to the habitual intellect to make these actually understood, for it belongs to this power to make actually understood those things which we know by study: rather are they a beginning of the habitual intellect, wherefore Aristotle gives the name of understanding to the habit of these principles (6 Ethic, vi.). And they are made actually understood by the active intellect alone: and by them those other things are made actually understood which we know by study. Accordingly to make these things which are by way of consequence understood actually, is an act both of the habitual intellect, as to first principles, and of the active intellect.

Now one action does not proceed from two principles unless one of them be compared to the other as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. Consequently the active intellect must be compared to the first principles of the habitual intellect, either as agent to instrument, or as form to matter.

How this may be possible he explains as follows. Since the possible intellect, according to his opinion, is a separate substance,1 it understands the active intellect and other separate substances, as well as the first principles of speculative knowledge: and consequently it is the subject of both. Now whenever two things come together in one subject, one of them is as the form of the other: even so, since colour and light are in the diaphanous body as their subject, one of them, namely light, must be the form of the other, namely colour. And this is necessary when one of them is ordained to the other, but not when they are united accidentally in the same subject, as whiteness and music. Now the object of speculative knowledge and the active intellect are mutually ordained to each other: since these understood speculative principles are made actually understood by the active intellect. Therefore the active intellect is related to these understood speculative principles as form to matter. Consequently since these same principles are joined to us by phantasms, which are a kind of subject thereof, it follows that the active intellect also is joined to us, being the form of these principles. When therefore these principles are in us potentially only, the active intellect is only joined to us potentially. When some of these principles are in us actually and some potentially, the active intellect is joined to us actually in part, and potentially in part: and then it is said to be moved towards the above conjunction: because as the more things are made actually understood in us, the more perfectly is the active intellect joined to us. And this progress and movement towards conjunction is effected by study in speculative sciences, whereby we acquire true knowledge, and false opinions are put aside, which are outside the order of this movement, just as monstrosities are outside the operation of nature. Wherefore men help one another towards this progress, just as they help one another in speculative sciences. And so when all potential knowledge has become actual in us, the active intellect will be perfectly joined to us as a form, and we shall understand perfectly by it, just as now we understand perfectly by the habitual intellect. Consequently, since it belongs to the active intellect to understand separate substances, we shall then understand separate substances, just as now we understand speculative knowledge. This will be man’s ultimate happiness, wherein man will be a god as it were.

That this explanation is of no account whatever is made clear enough by what we have already said: for it is based on many suppositions that have been already disproved.

First, we have shown above1 that the possible intellect is not a substance distinct from us in being. Hence it does not follow that it is the subject of separate substances: especially since Aristotle asserts1 that the possible intellect is the power of becoming all things, so that seemingly it is the subject of such things only as are made to be understood.

Again. It has also been proved above2 that the active intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul, to which Aristotle assigns the operation of making things to be actually understood, which lies in our power. Hence it does not follow that understanding by means of the active intellect is the cause of our being able to understand separate substances: else we would always understand them.

Further. If the active intellect were a separate substance, it would not be joined to us except by means of species made to be actually understood, according to his explanation: as neither would the possible intellect be united to us: although the possible intellect is related to those species as matter to form, while the active intellect, on the contrary, is related to them as form to matter. Now the species which are made to be actually understood are joined to us, according to him, by means of the phantasms, which stand related to the possible intellect as colours to the sight, but to the active intellect as colours to the light, as may be gathered from the statement of Aristotle (3 De Anima v.). Now we cannot ascribe to a stone in which colour is, either the action of seeing, so that it see; nor the action of the sun, so that it give light. Therefore according to this opinion, we cannot ascribe to man either the action of the possible intellect so that he understand, or the action of the active intellect, so that he understand separate substances, or that he make things to be actually understood.

Besides. According to this opinion, the active intellect is not supposed to be joined to us as a form, except through its being the form of the principles of understanding, whereof it is stated to be the form also because the active intellect and these principles have an action in common, namely to make things actually understood. Consequently it cannot be a form to us, except for as much as the principles of knowledge have an action in common with it. But these principles have no share in the action of understanding separate substances, because they are species of sensible things: unless we return to the opinion of Avempace, that the quiddities of separate substances can be known by means of what we know of the sensible world. Therefore nowise can we understand separate substances by this means.

Moreover. The active intellect bears a different relation to principles of knowledge whereof it is the cause; and to separate substances, whereof it is not the cause, but which it only knows, according to his theory. Therefore if it be joined to us through being the cause of principles of knowledge, it does not follow that it is joined to us, in so far as it knows separate substances: and clearly his argument contains a fallacy of accident.

Again. If we know separate substances by means of the active intellect, this is not because the active intellect is the form of this or that principle of understanding, but through becoming a form in us: for it is thus that we are able to understand by its means. Now it becomes a form in us also by means of the first principles of understanding, according to his own statement. Therefore from the very beginning man can understand separate substances by means of the active intellect. If, however, it be said that the active intellect does not become a form in us perfectly by means of some principles of understanding, so that we be able to understand separate substances:—the sole reason for this is because these principles of understanding do not equal the perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances. But not even all these principles of understanding combined together equal this perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances: since all of them are not intelligible except in so far as they are made to be actually understood: whereas the latter are intelligible by their very nature. Therefore although we shall know all these intelligible principles, it does not follow that the active intellect will become a form in us so perfectly that we understand separate substances by it. Else, if this be not required, we shall have to admit that by understanding anything intelligible, we also understand separate substances.

Chapter XLIV

that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of separate substances as pretended by the aforesaid opinions

But it is impossible to allow that man’s happiness consists in such a knowledge of separate substances as the above mentioned opinions1 maintained.

For it is of no purpose to strive for an end by means which cannot secure that end. Since then man’s ultimate end is happiness, to which his natural desire tends, it is impossible to assign man’s happiness to that which he cannot obtain: else it would follow that man was made in vain, and that his natural desire is void, which is impossible. Now it is clear from what we have said that it is impossible for man to understand separate substances, as laid down by the above mentioned opinions. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in such knowledge of separate substances.

Again. In order that the active intellect be united to us as a form so that by it we may understand separate substances, it is required that the generation of the habitual intellect be complete, according to Alexander;2 or that all the principles of understanding be actualized in us, according to Averroes:3 both of which amount to the same, because the habitual intellect is engendered in us, by the principles of understanding being actualized in us. Now all the species of sensible things are understood potentially. Wherefore, in order that the active intellect be joined to a man, it is necessary that he actually understand by his speculative intellect all the natures of sensible things, and all their powers, operations and movements. But it is impossible for a man to know all this through the principles of speculative sciences, whereby we are moved to the conjunction with the active intellect, as they say: for it is not possible to acquire knowledge of all these things, from those which come under the perception of our senses, whence the principles of speculative sciences are derived. Therefore it is impossible for any man to arrive at this conjunction in the way assigned by them: and consequently man’s happiness cannot consist in such a union.

Besides. Granted that it be possible for man to be united to the active intellect in the manner suggested, it is clear that such a perfection is obtainable by very few; so much so that neither they nor any one else, however much they be advanced and skilled in speculative sciences, have dared to boast of having obtained this perfection. In fact all of them have confessed to ignorance of many things: thus Aristotle, speaking of the quadrature of a circle, and of the reasons for the order in heavenly bodies, himself states (2 De Cœlo v.) that he can only give probable arguments: and he leaves to others to decide what is certain in these things and their movers (11 Metaph. viii.). Now happiness is a common good, to which many can arrive, unless they be prevented, as Aristotle says (1 Ethic, ix.). It is true also of any natural end of a species, that it is obtained by the majority of the members of that species. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot consist in the aforesaid union.

It is clear that Aristotle, whose opinion the philosophers in question endeavoured to follow, did not hold that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a union of this kind. For he proves (1 Ethic, xiii.) that man’s happiness is an operation of his own according to perfect virtue: wherefore he had to treat specially of the virtues, which he divided into moral and intellectual: and he proves (10 Ethic, vii.) that man’s ultimate happiness consists in contemplation. Hence it follows that it is not seated in the act of a moral virtue; nor of prudence or art, and yet these are intellectual virtues. Consequently it must be an operation according to wisdom which is the chief of the three remaining intellectual virtues, namely wisdom, knowledge and understanding, as he proves in 6 Ethic. vii.: for which reason he declares (10 Ethic. viii.) that the wise man is a happy man. Now according to him (6 Ethic. l.c.) wisdom is one of the speculative sciences, and the head of the others: and at the beginning of the Metaphysics, he gives the name of wisdom to the science of which he purposes to treat. Clearly therefore the opinion of Aristotle was that the ultimate happiness which man is able to obtain in this life, is that knowledge of divine things which can be acquired through the speculative sciences. But this last way of knowing divine things, not through speculative sciences, but by a kind of natural process of generation, was invented by some of his commentators.

Chapter XLV

that it is impossible in this life to understand separate substances

Since then in this life separate substances cannot be known by us in the ways mentioned above,1 it remains for us to inquire whether we be able to understand separate substances in this life in any way at all.

Themistius2 seeks to prove that this is possible by an argument a fortiori. For separate substances are more intelligible than material things: since the latter are intelligible in so far as the active intellect causes them to be actually understood; whereas the former are intelligible in themselves. If, therefore, our intellect understands these material things, much more is it adapted to understand separate substances.

This argument must be appraised in the light of the various opinions about the possible intellect. For if the possible intellect is a power independent of matter, and has its being apart from the body, as Averroes maintains, it will follow that it has no necessary relation to things material; so that the more a thing is intelligible in itself, the more will it be intelligible to the possible intellect. But then it would seem to follow, since we understand from the beginning by means of the possible intellect, that we understand separate substances from the beginning: which is clearly false. Averroes seeks to avoid this difficulty, as we have explained above in setting forth his opinion, which we proved to be false.

If, however, the possible intellect is not separate from the body in its very being, from the very fact that it is united in being to such a body, it has a necessary relation to material things, so that only through them can it acquire knowledge of other things. Hence it does not follow, if separate substances be more intelligible in themselves, that they be more intelligible to our intellect. This is proved by the words of Aristotle (2 Metaph. ix.). For he says there that the difficulty of understanding those things is in us and not in them: because our intellect stands in relation to things most evident as the eye of the owl to the sunlight. Consequently, seeing that we cannot arrive at understanding separate substances through understanding material things, as we have proved,1 it follows that our possible intellect can nowise understand separate substances.

This appears again from the relation of the possible to the active intellect. Because a passive power is in potentiality to those things only which are included in the range of its proper active principle: for every passive power has a corresponding active power in nature: otherwise passive power would be useless, since it cannot be brought to actuality, except by an active principle. Hence we find that the sight is not receptive of other than colours which are enlightened by the light. Now the possible intellect is a power in a certain sense passive, and therefore it has its corresponding agent, namely the active intellect, which stands in relation to the possible intellect as light to the sight. Consequently the possible intellect is in potentiality to those intelligible objects only which have been made so by the active intellect. Wherefore Aristotle (3 De Anima v.) in describing each intellect, says that the possible intellect is the power to become all things, while the active intellect is the medium of making all things: so that the power in either case refers to the same objects, being active in the one and passive in the other. Since then separate substances are not made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and only material things are so made, it follows that the possible intellect extends to these alone: and therefore we cannot understand separate substances thereby.

Wherefore Aristotle employed a fitting example: for the owl’s eye can never see the light of the sun. And yet Averroes tries to depreciate this example, saying that the likeness between our intellect in relation to separate substances, and the owl’s eye in relation to the sun’s light, is one of difficulty, not of impossibility: and he proves this as follows. Because if it were impossible for us to understand things intelligible in themselves, separate substances to wit; they would be intelligible without purpose, as to no purpose would a thing be visible, if it could not be seen by any sight.

Now this argument is clearly of no account at all: for even though these substances be never understood by us, they are understood by themselves: so that not without purpose would they be intelligible: as neither is the sun uselessly visible,—to continue Aristotle’s comparison—because the owl cannot see it, since man and other animals can see it.

Accordingly if we suppose the possible intellect to be united in being to the body, it cannot understand separate substances. It makes a difference, however, what we hold with regard to its substance. For if we suppose it to be a material force subject to generation and corruption, as some have maintained,1 it would follow that by its very substance it is confined to the understanding of material things: and consequently it would nowise be able to understand separate substances: since it could not possibly itself be separate.—On the other hand, if the possible intellect, although united to the body, be incorruptible and independent of matter in its being, as we have proved above1; it follows that its being confined to the understanding of material things is incidental to it through its union with the body. And so, when the soul shall be separated from the body, the possible intellect will be able to understand things that are intelligible in themselves, namely separate substances, by the light of the active intellect, which in the soul is like the intellectual light that is in separate substances. This is what our faith holds about our understanding separate substances after death and not in this life.

Chapter XLVI

that in this life the soul does not understand itself by itself

A certain difficulty would seem to arise against what we have been saying, on account of a passage of Augustine which must be carefully discussed. For he says (9 De Trin. iii.): Just as the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things by means of the senses, so does it acquire knowledge of incorporeal things by itself. Therefore it also knows itself by itself, since itself is incorporeal. For it would seem to follow from these words that the soul understands itself by itself, and that by understanding itself, understands separate substances: and this is contrary to what we have proved. We must, accordingly, inquire how the soul understands itself by itself.

Now it cannot possibly be said that by itself it understands what itself is. Because a cognitive power is made actually cognoscent by something in it whereby it knows. And if this be in it potentially, it knows potentially; if it be in it actually, it knows actually; and if it be in a middle way, it knows habitually. Now the soul is always actually present to itself, and never only potentially or habitually. Wherefore, if the soul knows itself by itself, it will always understand actually what itself is: and this is clearly false.

Again. If the soul, by itself, understands what itself is; and since every man has a soul; every man will know what his soul is: which is evidently untrue.

Moreover. Knowledge that results from something implanted in us by nature, is itself natural: for instance the self-evident principles which are known through the light of the active intellect. Accordingly, if by the soul itself we know what the soul is, we shall know it naturally. But no one can err in things that we know naturally: for no one errs in self-evident principles: so that no one would err about what the soul is, if the soul knew this by itself. But this is clearly false: since many have maintained the soul to be this or that body; some, that it consisted in number or harmony.1 Therefore the soul does not, by itself, know what itself is.

Besides. In every order that which is per se precedes and causes that which is accidental. Accordingly that which is known per se, is known before all things that are known through something else, and is the principle through which they are known, for instance first principles in comparison with conclusions. Therefore if the soul, by itself, knows what itself is, this will be known per se, and consequently it will be known first, and will be the principle whereby other things are known. But this is clearly false: for science does not postulate what the soul is as being something already known, but proposes it as a point of inquiry from other sources. Therefore the soul does not by itself know what itself is.

But it is clear that neither did Augustine intend this. For he says (10 De Trin. ix.) that when the soul seeks self-knowledge, it does not seek to see itself as though it were absent, but to discern itself as present: not to know itself, as though it knew not; but in order to distinguish itself from what it knows to be distinct. Whereby he gives one to understand that by itself the soul knows itself as present to itself, but not as distinct from other things. Hence he says that some erred in not distinguishing the soul from things that are different from it. Now through knowing what a thing is, one knows it as distinct from others: wherefore a definition which states what a thing is, distinguishes the thing defined from all others. Consequently Augustine did not mean that the soul by itself knows what itself is.

Neither did Aristotle mean this. He says in fact (3 De Anima, iv.) that the possible intellect understands itself even as it understands other things. Because it understands itself by means of an intelligible species, by which it is brought to actual intelligibility. For, considered in itself, it is only potentially an intelligible being: now nothing is known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act. Wherefore separate substances, the substance whereof is as something actual in the genus of things intelligible, understand by their very substance what they are: whereas our possible intellect understands what it is, through the intelligible species by which it is made actually understanding. And so Aristotle (3 De Anima, iv.) shows the nature of the possible intellect from the act of understanding, namely that it is unmixed with the body and incorruptible, as we explained above.1

Accordingly Augustine means to say that our mind knows itself by itself, inasmuch as it knows that it is: because by the very fact that it perceives itself to act, it perceives that it exists; and since it acts by itself, it knows by itself that it exists.

In this way then the soul, by knowing itself, knows of the separate substances that they are; but not what they are, which is to understand their substance. For when either by demonstration or by faith we know about separate substances that they are certain intellectual substances, in neither way could we receive this knowledge, unless our soul derived from itself the knowledge of intellectual being. Consequently we must use the science about the soul’s intelligence as a principle on which to establish all our knowledge about separate substances.

But it does not follow, if by the speculative sciences we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, that we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what separate substances are, by means of these sciences: because our intelligence, by which we arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, is far removed from the intelligence of a separate substance. Nevertheless through knowing what our soul is, we are able to go so far as to know a remote genus of the separate substances: but this is not the same as to understand their substance.

And just as through the soul itself we know that the soul is, inasmuch as we perceive its acts, and seek by a study of its acts and their objects to know what it is, through the principles of speculative sciences: so too, concerning those things that are in our soul, namely its powers and habits, we know indeed that they are, inasmuch as we perceive their acts; but what they are we gather from the nature of these same acts.

Chapter XLVII

that in this life we are unable to see god in his essence

If, in this life, we are unable to understand separate substances by reason of our intellect’s innate relation to phantasms, much less can we see the divine essence in this life, since it is far above all separate substances. We may take it as a sign of this, that the more our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more is it withdrawn from sensible things. Now the divine substance is the highest term to which contemplation can reach: hence the mind that sees the divine substance must be wholly freed from the senses, either by death or by rapture. Wherefore it is said in God’s person (Exod. 33:20): Man shall not see me, and live.

If it is stated in Holy Writ that some have seen God, we must understand this to have been either through an imaginary vision—or even a bodily vision, the presence of the divine power being shown by corporeal species whether appearing externally, or formed internally in the imagination:—or by gathering some intellectual knowledge of God from His spiritual effects.

A difficulty, however, arises through some words of Augustine which would seem to imply that we are able to understand God in this life. For he says (9 De Trin. vii.) that with the eyes of the soul we see the form of our being and of our actions—whether effected in ourselves or truly and rightly on other bodies—in the eternal truth, from which all temporal things proceed. Again (12 Conf. xxv.) he says: If we both see that what you say is true, and that what I say is true: where, I ask, do we see this? Surely, neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the immutable truth itself which transcends our minds. And (De Vera Relig. xxxi.) he says that we judge of all things according to the divine truth: and again (1. Solil. xv.): We must first know the truth by which other things can be known, referring, it would seem, to the divine truth. It would seem then, from his words, that we see God Himself who is His own truth, and that through Him we know other things.

Other words of his would seem to point to the same conclusion, in 12 De Trin. ii., where he says: It is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things, according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas which, unless they were above the human mind, would surely not be unchangeable. Now unchangeable and eternal ideas cannot be elsewhere than in God, since according to the teaching of faith, God alone is eternal. Accordingly it would seem to follow that we can see God in this life, and that through seeing Him and the ideas of things in Him, we judge of other things.

Yet it is not to be believed that Augustine, by these words, meant that we are able in this life to see God in His essence. We must therefore inquire how, in this life, we see that unchangeable truth, or these eternal ideas, and how judge of them according to it.

Augustine allows that truth is in the soul (2 Solil. xix.): wherefore he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. Now truth is in the soul not only in the same way as God is said to be in all things by His essence; or as He is in all things by His likeness,—a thing being true so far as it is like to God—for then the soul would not be higher than other things in this respect. It is therefore in the soul in a special way, forasmuch as the soul knows the truth. Accordingly just as the soul and other things are said to be true in their nature, according as they are likened to that supreme nature, which is truth itself, since it is its own being understood by itself; so too, that which is known by the soul, is true so far as it bears a likeness to that divine truth which God knows. Wherefore a gloss on Ps. 11:2, Truths are decayed from among the children of men, says that as a mirror gives many reflections of one face, so are many truths reflected in men’s minds from the first truth.1 Now although different things are known, and different things believed to be true, by different people, yet some truths there are in which all men agree, such as first principles both of the speculative and of the practical intellect: inasmuch as a kind of image of the divine truth is reflected in the minds of all men.

Consequently when a mind knows with certitude anything at all, and by tracing it back to the principles by which we judge of everything, comes to see it in those principles, it is said to see all such things in the divine truth or in the eternal ideas, and to judge of all things according to them. This explanation is confirmed by Augustine’s words (1 Solil. viii.): The speculations of science are seen in the divine truth, even as these visible things are seen in the light of the sun: for it is evident that these things are not seen in the body of the sun, but by the light, which is a likeness of the solar brilliance reflected in the air, and cast upon such bodies. Therefore, from these words of Augustine, we cannot conclude that God is seen in His essence in this life, but only as in a mirror: and to this the Apostle witnesses as regards the knowledge of this life (1 Cor. 13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner.

And though this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God more faithfully than creatures of lower degree, yet the knowledge of God that pan be gathered from the human mind, does not surpass the knowledge gathered from sensible things: since even the soul knows what itself is through understanding the nature of sensible things, as already stated.1 Consequently even in this way God is not known in higher fashion than the cause is known from its effect.

Chapter XLVIII

that man’s ultimate happiness is not in this life

Seeing then that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowledge of God whereby he is known by all or many in a vague kind of opinion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby he is known in science through demonstration; nor in that knowledge whereby he is known through faith, as we have proved above:2 and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in His essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God through that which is nearest to Him, so to say,3 as we have proved; and since we must place our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown;4 it is impossible for man’s happiness to be in this life.

Again. Man’s last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more: because if he still has a movement towards something, he has not yet reached an end wherein to be at rest. Now, this cannot happen in this life: since the more man understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him,—this being natural to man,—unless perhaps someone there be who understands all things: and in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone that was a mere man,; seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved.5 Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot possibly be in this life.

Besides. Whatever is in motion towards an end, has a natural desire to be established and at rest therein: hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man desires naturally. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When therefore a man acquires happiness, he also acquires stability and rest; so that all agree in conceiving stability as a necessary condition of happiness: hence the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. x.): We do not look upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon. Now, in this life there is no sure stability; since, however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in the operation, whatever it be, in which his happiness consists. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being: for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end; hence we see that animals which live but a short time, are perfected in a short time. But, if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue,1 whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative matters, wherein man’s ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved:2 for hardly is man able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life: and then in the majority of cases, but a short space of life remains to him. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good: else it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil: just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life; not only from evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For no one is there who at times is not disturbed by inordinate passions; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, wherein virtue consists, either in excess or in deficiency; who is not deceived in some thing or another; or at least ignores what he would wish to know, or feels doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore no man is happy in this life.

Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it: not only shunning it now when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this life, cannot obtain not to die. Therefore it is not possible for man to be happy in this life.

Besides. Ultimate happiness consists not in a habit but in an operation: since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously. Therefore man cannot be entirely happy in this life.

Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. Therefore its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death: since it is possible for every man in this life to encounter sickness, whereby he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue; such as madness and the like which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness therefore always has sorrow naturally connected with it: and consequently it will not be perfect happiness.

But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect, namely in separate substances: and that it is imperfect in man, by way of a kind of participation. Because he can arrive at a full understanding of the truth, only by a sort of movement of inquiry; and fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved.1 Wherefore neither is happiness, in its perfect form, possible to man: yet he has a certain participation thereof, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle’s opinion about happiness. Wherefore (1 Ethic. x.) inquiring whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be most stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfection, are happy as men, as though not attaining to happiness simply, but in a human way.

We must now show that this explanation does not avoid the foregoing arguments. For although man is below the separate substances in the natural order, he is above irrational creatures: wherefore he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further: thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place; and when an animal enjoys sensible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest. Much more therefore when man has obtained his last end, must his natural desire be at rest. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore in this life man does not obtain happiness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore he must obtain it after this life.

Again. The natural desire cannot be void; since nature does nothing in vain.2 But nature’s desire would be void if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore man’s natural desire can be fulfilled. But not in this life, as we have shown. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is after this life.

Besides. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are ever in motion and tending towards perfection: because those who follow, make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as stated in 2 Metaph.3 Therefore in the knowledge of truth man is not situated as though he had arrived at his last end. Since then as Aristotle himself shows (10 Ethic. vii.) man’s ultimate happiness in this life consists apparently in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot possibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life.

Moreover. Whatever is in potentiality tends to become actual: so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of the forms of all things: and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except when it knows all, at least these material things. But man cannot obtain this through speculative sciences, by which in this life we know truth. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

For these and like reasons Alexander and Averroes held that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in human knowledge obtained through speculative sciences, but in that which results from conjunction with a separate substance, which conjunction they deemed possible to man in this life. But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through speculative sciences, he maintained that man attains to happiness, not perfect, but proportionate to his capacity.1

Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, will avoid these straits if we suppose, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the Second Book.2

Therefore man’s ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which he possesses after this life; a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a reward … in heaven (Matt. 5:12) and (Matt. 22:30) states that the saints shall be as the angels: who always see God in heaven (Matt. 18:10).

Chapter XLIX

that separate substances do not see god in his essence through knowing him by their own essences

We must now inquire whether this same knowledge whereby after death separate substances and souls know God by their own essences, be sufficient for their ultimate happiness.

In order to discover the truth in this matter, we must first of all show that to know God in this way, is not to know His essence.

An effect may be known through its cause in several ways. First, when the effect is taken as the means of knowing the existence and qualities of the cause: this happens in sciences which prove the cause from the effect.—Secondly, when the cause is seen in the effect itself, inasmuch as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect: thus a man is seen in a mirror on account of his likeness. This way differs from the first: because in the first there are two knowledges, of effect and of cause, whereof one is the cause of the other; for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of our knowing its cause. Whereas in the second way there is one sight of both: because while seeing the effect we see the cause therein at the same time.—Thirdly, when the very likeness of the cause in the effect is the form by which the cause is known by its effect: for instance if a box had an intellect, and were to know by its own form the art from which that very form had been produced in likeness to that art. But by none of these ways is it possible to know from its effect what the cause is, unless the effect equate the cause, and express the whole power of the cause.

Now separate substances know God by their substances in the same way as a cause is known from its effect; not however in the first way, because then their knowledge would be discursive; but in the second way, inasmuch as one of them sees God in another; and in the third way, inasmuch as each of them sees God in itself. Yet none of them is an effect equalling God’s power, as we have shown in the Second Book.1 Therefore they cannot see the divine essence by this kind of knowledge.

Besides. The intelligible likeness whereby a thing is understood as to its substance, must be of the same species, in fact it must be its species: even as the form of the house, which is in the architect’s mind, is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or rather it is its species; for we do not understand what an ass is, or what a horse is, through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not of the same species as the divine nature, indeed not even of the same genus, as we showed in the First Book.2 Therefore a separate substance cannot possibly understand God through its own nature.

Further. Every created thing is confined to a certain genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself the entire perfection of all being, as we proved in the First Book.3 Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through anything created.

Moreover. Every intelligible species through which the quiddity or essence of a thing is understood, comprehends that thing in representing it: wherefore words signifying what a thing is are called terms and definitions. But no created image can possibly represent God thus: since every created image belongs to some fixed genus, whereas God does not, as was proved in the First Book.4 Therefore it is not possible to understand the divine substance through a created image.

Further. It was proved in the First Book5 that God’s substance is His being. But the being of a separate substance is distinct from its substance, as we proved in the Second Book.6 Therefore the essence of a separate substance is not a sufficient medium whereby God may be seen in His essence.

And yet the separate substance, through its own substance, knows about God, that He is; that He is the cause of all things; that He is above all and far removed from all, not only from the things that are, but even from those that can be conceived by the created mind. This knowledge about God we also are able somewhat to obtain, because from His effects we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause of other things, surpassing all and remote from all. And this is the limit and the highest point of our knowledge in this life where, as Dionysius says (De Myst. Theol. i., ii.), we are united to God as to something unknown. This happens when we know of Him what He is not, while what He is remains utterly unknown. Hence in order to indicate the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it was said to Moses (Exod. 20:21) that he went to the dark cloud wherein God was.

Since, however, the lower nature in its summit attains only to what is lowest in the higher nature, it follows that this same knowledge is more sublime in separate substances than in us. This can be shown as to each way of attaining to this knowledge. For if the cause be known by its effect, the nearer that effect is, and the clearer its resemblance to its cause, the more evident does it make the existence of that cause. Now separate substances, that know God by themselves, are nearer effects and bear a clearer resemblance to God, than the effects through which we know God. Therefore separate substances know more certainly and more clearly than we that God exists.—Again. Since by negations we come by any way whatever to a proper knowledge of a thing, as stated above,1 the more things one knows to be removed from God, and the greater their propinquity, the nearer does one approach to a proper knowledge of Him: even so, he who knows that man is neither inanimate nor insensible, approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of man than one who knows only that he is not inanimate, although neither of them knows what man is. Now, separate substances know more than we, and the things that are nearer to God; and consequently by their intelligence remove from God more things and nearer things from God than we do. Therefore they approach nearer to a proper knowledge of God than we: although neither do they, through understanding themselves, see the divine substance.

Again. The higher the persons over whom one knows a man to be placed the better the knowledge one has of his eminence: thus, although a peasant may know that the king is the highest in the land, yet since he knows only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has business, he does not realize the king’s exalted position, as one who knows the dignity of all the great men of the kingdom, over whom he knows the king to be placed: although neither of them comprehends the height of the kingly rank. Now we know none but the lowest things: and consequently although we know that God is far above all, we do not know the divine supereminence as the separate substances do, to whom the highest orders of things are known, while they know God to be higher than them all.

Again. It is clear that the causality and virtue of a cause are all the better known, according as more and greater effects thereof are known. Wherefore it evidently follows that separate substances know the divine causality and power better than we, although we know him to be the cause of all.

Chapter L

that the natural desire of the separate substances is not set at rest in the natural knowledge they have of god

Now it is not possible that the separate substance’s natural desire rest in such a knowledge of God.

For whatever is imperfect in a species, seeks to acquire the perfection of that species: thus whoso has an opinion about a matter, and therefore imperfect knowledge about it, for this very reason is spurred to the desire for certain knowledge about it. Now the aforesaid knowledge which separate substances have about God without knowing his substance, is an imperfect kind of knowledge; for we do not deem ourselves to know a thing if we know not its substance: so that the chief point in knowing a thing is to know what it is. Therefore this knowledge which the separate substances have about God does not set their appetite at rest, but spurs it on to the vision of the divine substance.

Again. The knowledge of effects is an incitement to know the cause: wherefore men began to philosophize because they sought the causes of things. Therefore the desire for knowledge naturally implanted in all intellectual substances does not rest unless, knowing the substance of effects, they know also the substance of their cause. Consequently, since separate substances know that God is the cause of all the things whose substances they see, their natural desire does not rest, unless they see God’s substance also.

Besides. As there is a connexion between knowing the adequate cause (propter quid) of a thing being so and so, and knowing that it is so (quia est), so is there a connexion between knowing about a thing what it is (quid est), and knowing that it exists (an est). Because if we know the adequate cause of a thing being so and so, we can prove that it is so, e.g. that the moon undergoes eclipse: even so, if we know of a thing, what it is, we can prove that it exists. Such is the teaching in 2 Poster i. Now we observe that those who know that a thing is so and so, naturally seek to know the adequate cause of its being so. Therefore those who know that a thing exists, naturally seek to know what it is; and this is to know its essence. Therefore the natural desire for knowledge is not set at rest by the knowledge of God whereby it is known that He exists.

Further. Nothing finite can set the intellect’s desire at rest. This is proved from the fact that the intellect, given any finite object, strives to go beyond it: so that given a finite line of any length, it strives to apprehend a longer; and it is the same in numbers: and this is the reason why we can add indefinitely to numbers and mathematical lines. Now the excellence and power of any created substance is finite. Therefore the intellect of a separate substance is not satisfied with knowing separate substances, however excellent they be, but still tends by its natural desire to understand the substance which is of infinite excellence, as we proved in the First Book1 concerning the divine substance.

Moreover. Just as there is a natural desire for knowledge in all intellectual natures, so is there in them a natural desire to rid themselves of ignorance or nescience. Now separate substances, as stated,2 know in the manner already mentioned, that God’s substance is above them, and above everything that they understand: wherefore they know that the divine substance is unknown to them. Therefore their natural desire tends to understand the divine substance.

Besides. The nearer a thing is to its end, the greater the desire with which it tends to that end: wherefore we may notice that the natural movement of bodies is increased towards the end. Now the intellect of separate substances is nearer to the knowledge of God than ours: and consequently they desire to know God more intensely than we do. And however much we know that God is, and other things mentioned above,3 we still go on desiring, and seek to know Him in His essence. Much more therefore do separate substances desire this naturally: and consequently their natural desire is not satisfied with the above-mentioned knowledge of God.

Hence we conclude that the ultimate happiness of a separate substance does not consist in the knowledge whereby it knows God by its own substance: since its desire still leads it on to the substance of God.

It also clearly follows from this that ultimate happiness is to be sought nowhere else but in an operation of the intellect: since no desire leads us so high as the desire of knowing the truth. For all our desires, whether of pleasure or of anything else that man wants, can be satisfied with other things: whereas the aforesaid desire rests not until it has reached God, the supreme cause and maker of all. Hence Wisdom rightly says (Ecclus. 24:7): I dwell in the highest places, and my throne is in a pillar of a cloud: and it is said (Prov. 9:3) that Wisdom by her maids inviteth to the tower. They should blush, then, who seek man’s happiness in the lowest things, whereas it is placed on such a height.

Chapter LI

how god may be seen in his essence

Since then it is impossible for a natural desire to be void;—and it would be were it impossible to arrive at understanding the divine substance; for all minds desire this naturally:—we must conclude that it is possible for the divine substance to be seen by means of the intellect; both by separate intellectual substances, and by our souls.

It is sufficiently clear from what has been said, what manner of vision this is. For we have proved1 that the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect in any created species. Wherefore if God’s essence be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it in the divine essence itself: so that in that vision the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision.

Since, however, the intellect is unable to understand any particular substance, unless it be actuated by some species informing it, that is the image of the thing understood; someone might deem it impossible for a created intellect to see the very substance of God in the divine essence as an intelligible species, inasmuch as the divine essence is self-subsistent, and we have proved in the First Book2 that God cannot be the form of anything.

In order to understand this truth, we must note that a self-subsisting substance is either a form alone, or is composed of matter and form. Accordingly, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of something else: because the form therein is already confined to that matter, so that it cannot be the form of another thing. But that which subsists so as nevertheless to be a form alone, can be the form of something else, provided its being be such that some other thing can participate in it, as we have proved concerning the human soul in the Second Book.1 If, however, its being cannot be participated in by another, it cannot be the form of anything; because by its very being it is determined in itself, as material things are by their matter. Now we must consider this as being the case not only with regard to substantial or natural being, but also as regards intelligible being. For, since truth is the perfection of the intellect, that intelligible which is truth itself, will be a pure form in the genus of intelligible things. This applies solely to God: for, since truth is consequent upon being, that alone is its own truth, which is its own being; and this belongs to God alone, as we proved in the Second Book.2 Consequently other subsistent intelligibles are not pure forms in the genus of intelligible things, but have a form in a subject: for each of them is a true thing, but not the truth, even as it is a being, but not being itself. It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands: which cannot be said of the essence of any separate substance. And yet it cannot be the form of another thing as to its natural being: for it would follow that being united to this other, it would constitute one nature; which is impossible, since the divine essence is perfect in itself in its own nature. Whereas the intelligible species in its union with the intellect, does not constitute a nature, but perfects the intellect to the effect of understanding: and this is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine essence.

This immediate vision of God is promised to us in Holy Writ (1 Cor. 13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. It would be impious to understand this in a material way, and imagine a material face in the Godhead: since we have proved3 that God has no body. Nor is it possible for us to see God with a bodily face since the eyes of the body, which are situate in the face, can only see bodily things. Thus then shall we see God face to face, because we shall see Him immediately, even as a man whom we see face to face.

It is according to this vision that we become most like unto God, and participators of His bliss: since God understands His substance by His essence, and this is His bliss. Wherefore it is said (1 Jo. 3:2): When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; because we shall see Him as He is. And (Luke 22:29, 30) our Lord said: I dispose to you, as My Father hath disposed to Me, a banquet,1 that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom. Now these words cannot be understood as referring to the food and drink of the body, but to that which is taken from the table of Wisdom, of which Wisdom says (Prov. 9:5): Eat my bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you. Accordingly, to eat and drink at God’s table is to enjoy the same bliss as that which makes God happy, and to see God as He sees Himself.

Chapter LII

that no created substance can by its natural power arrive at seeing god in his essence

However it is not possible for any created substance to attain, by its own power, to this way of seeing God.

For that which is proper to the higher nature cannot be acquired by a lower nature, except through the action of the higher nature to whom it properly belongs: thus water cannot become hot except through the action of heat. Now to see God in His essence is proper to the divine nature, since to operate through its own form is proper to the operator. Therefore no intellectual substance can see God in the divine essence, unless God Himself bring this about.

Again. A form proper to A does not become B’s except through A’s agency: because an agent produces its like by communicating its form to another. Now it is impossible to see the divine substance unless the divine substance itself become the form by which the intellect understands, as we have proved.1 Therefore no created substance can attain to that vision, except through the divine agency.

Besides. If any two things have to be united together so that one be formal and the other material, their union must be completed by an action on the part of the one that is formal, and not by the action of the one that is material: because the form is the principle of action, whereas matter is the passive principle. Now in order that the created intellect see God’s substance, the divine essence itself must be united to the intellect as an intelligible form, as we have proved.2 Therefore no created intellect can attain to this vision except through the divine agency.

Further. What is so of itself, is the cause of what is so through another.3 Now the divine intelligence sees of itself the divine substance: for the divine intelligence is the divine essence, in which God’s substance is seen, as we proved in the First Book:4 whereas the created intellect sees the divine substance in the divine essence as in something other than itself. Therefore this vision cannot be acquired by the created intellect, except through the action of God.

Moreover. Whatever exceeds the limits of a nature, cannot be acquired by that nature except through the agency of another: thus water does not flow upwards unless it be moved by something else. Now it is beyond the limits of any created nature to see God’s substance: because it is proper to every created intellectual nature to understand according to the mode of its substance: whereas the divine substance cannot be understood thus, as we proved above.5 Therefore no created intellect can possibly attain to a vision of the divine substance except by the agency of God who surpasses all creatures. Hence it is said (Rom. 6:23): The grace of God is life everlasting. For we have proved6 that man’s happiness consists in seeing God, which is called life everlasting: and we are said to obtain this by God’s grace alone, because that vision surpasses the faculty of every creature, and it is impossible to attain thereto except by God’s gift; and when such things are obtained by a creature, it is put down to God’s grace. Again our Lord says (Jo. 14:21): I will manifest myself to him.

Chapter LIII

that the created intellect needs a ray of the divine light in order to see god in his essence

To so sublime a vision the created intellect needs to be raised by some kind of outpouring of the divine goodness. For it is impossible that the proper form of anything become the form of another, unless this other bear some resemblance to the thing to which that form properly belongs: thus light does not actuate a body which has nothing in common with the diaphanous. Now the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intellect, and is proportionate thereto: for these three, understanding, medium of understanding, and object understood, are one in God. Therefore that same essence cannot become the intelligible form of a created intellect, except through the created intellect participating in some divine likeness. Therefore this participation in a divine likeness is necessary in order that the divine substance be seen.

Again. Nothing can receive a higher form unless it be disposed thereto through its capacity being raised: because every act is in its proper power. Now the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. Wherefore in order that the divine essence become the intelligible species to a created intellect, which is requisite in order that the divine substance be seen, the created intellect needs to be raised for that purpose by some sublime disposition.

Besides. If two things from not being united become united, this must be either through both being changed, or one only. Now if we suppose that some created intellect begin to see the divine essence, it follows from what we have said,1 that the divine essence is united to that intellect as an intelligible species. But it is impossible that the divine essence be changed, as we have proved.1 Therefore this union must begin through a change in the created intellect. And this change can only consist in the created intellect acquiring some new disposition.—The same conclusion follows if we suppose some created intellect to be endowed from the outset of its creation with such a vision. For if, as we have proved,2 this vision exceeds the faculty of nature, it is possible to conceive any created intellect as complete in its natural species without its seeing God’s substance. Consequently, whether it see God from the beginning, or begin to see Him afterwards, its nature needs something to be added to it.

Further. Nothing can be raised to a higher operation except through its power being strengthened. Now a power may be increased in two ways. First, by a mere intensifying of the power: thus the active power of a hot subject is increased by the intensity of the heat, so that it is capable of a more vehement action in the same species. Secondly, by the addition of a new form: thus the power of a diaphanous body is increased so that it can give light, through its being made actually lightsome by receiving the form of light anew. This increase of power is necessary in order that there result an operation of another species. Now the natural power of the created intellect is not sufficient for the vision of the divine substance, as we have shown.3 Therefore its power needs to be increased, in order that it attain to that vision. But increase through intensification of the natural power is insufficient: because that vision is not of the same kind as the natural vision of the created intellect: which is clear from the distance of the things seen. Therefore there must be an increase of the intellective power through its receiving a new disposition. Now owing to the fact that we derive our knowledge of intelligible beings from sensible things, we transfer the terms employed in sensual knowledge to our intellectual knowledge; especially those that appertain to the sight, which of all the senses is the highest and most spiritual, and therefore most akin to the intellect: and for this reason intellectual knowledge is called sight. And because bodily sight is not effected without light, those things which serve for the perfection of intellectual vision are called light: wherefore Aristotle (3 De Anima, v.) compares the active intellect to light, because the active intellect makes things actually intelligible, even as light somewhat makes things to be actually visible. Accordingly the disposition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance, is rightly called the light of glory: not that it makes the object actually intelligible, as the light of the active intellect does; but because it makes the intellect able actually to understand.

This is the light of which it is said (Ps. 35:10): In Thy light we shall see light, i.e. the light of the divine substance. Again it is said (Apoc. 22:5):1 The city, namely of the Blessed, hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon … for the glory of God hath enlightened it. Again it is said (Is. 60:19): Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee: but the Lord shall be unto thee for an everlasting light, and thy God for thy glory.—For this reason too, since in God to be is the same as to understand, and because He is to all the cause of their understanding, He is said to be the light (Jo. 1:9): That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world: and (1 Jo. 1:5): God is light: and (Ps. 103:2): Thou … art clothed with light as with a garment.—For this reason too, both God and the angels are described in Holy Writ in figures of fire, on account of the brilliancy of fire.2

Chapter LIV

arguments that would seem to prove that god cannot be seen in his essence; and the solution thereof

Someone will object against the foregoing:

No additional light can help the sight to see things that surpass the natural faculty of corporeal sight: since the sight can see only coloured objects. Now the divine substance surpasses the whole faculty of a created intellect, more even than intelligence surpasses the senses’ capacity. Therefore no additional light can raise the created intellect to see the divine substance.

Again. This light that is received into the created intellect, is something created. Therefore it also is infinitely distant from God: and consequently such a light cannot help the created intellect to see the divine substance.

Besides. If the aforesaid light can do this for the reason that it is an image of the divine substance; since every intellectual substance, for the very reason that it is intellectual, bears a likeness to God, the nature itself of an intellectual substance will suffice for it to see God.

Further. If this light is created; since there is no reason why that which is created should not be connatural to some creature; there might possibly be a creature that would see the divine substance through its connatural light. But the contrary of this has been proved.1

Moreover. The infinite, as such, is unknown.2 Now we proved in the First Book3 that God is infinite. Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through the light in question.

Furthermore. There should be proportion between the understanding and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between the created intellect, even perfected by this light, and the divine substance: for there still remains in infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot be helped by any light to see the divine substance.

By these and like arguments some have been induced to maintain that the divine substance is never seen by a created intellect. This opinion both would destroy the rational creature’s true happiness, which can consist in nothing but the vision of the divine substance, as we have proved,4 and is contrary to the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from what we have said.5 Wherefore it should be rejected as false and heretical.

It is not difficult, however, to answer the above arguments. For the divine substance is not so outside the range of the created intellect, as to be absolutely beyond its reach, as sound is to the sight, or an immaterial substance to the senses: because the divine substance is the first intelligible, and the principle of all intellectual knowledge: yet it is outside the range of the created intellect, as exceeding its power, just as the highest sensibles are outside the range of the senses. Wherefore the Philosopher (2 Metaph.)1 says that our intellect stands in relation to the most evident things, as the owl’s eye does in relation to the sun. Therefore the created intellect needs to be strengthened by some divine light in order to be able to see the divine substance. This solves the first argument.

Moreover, this light raises the created intellect to the vision of God, not on account of its affinity to the divine substance, but on account of the power which it receives from God to produce such an effect: although in its being it is infinitely distant from God, as the second argument stated. For this fight unites the created intellect to God, not in being but only in understanding.

Since, however, it belongs to God Himself to understand His substance perfectly, the light in question is a likeness of God in this that it perfects the intellect for seeing the divine substance. Now no intellectual substance can be like God in this way. For since no created substance’s simplicity is equal to the divine simplicity, it is impossible for the created substance to have its entire perfection in one subject: for this is proper to God, as we proved in the First Book,2 who is being, understanding and blessed in respect of the same. Consequently in the intellectual substance the created light through which it is raised to the beatific vision of God, differs from any light whereby it is perfected in its specific nature, and understands proportionately to its substance. Hence the reply to the third argument is clear.

The fourth argument is solved thus. The vision of the divine substance surpasses all natural power, as was shown.3 Consequently the light whereby the created intellect is perfected in order to see the divine substance must needs be supernatural.

Nor can the fact that God is infinite be an obstacle to the vision of the divine substance, as the fifth objection argued. For He is not said to be infinite by way of privation, as quantity: and the infinite of this kind is reasonably unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form which is the principle of knowledge. But He is said to be infinite negatively, as a per se subsistent form that is not limited by being received into matter. Wherefore that which is infinite in this way is in itself most knowable.

There is indeed proportion between the created intellect and understanding God, a proportion not of measure, but of aptitude, such as of matter for form, or cause for effect. In this way there is no reason against there being in the creature a proportion to God, consisting in the aptitude of an intelligent being for an intelligible object, as well as of effect in respect of its cause. Wherefore the solution of the sixth objection is clear.

Chapter LV

that the created intellect does not comprehend the divine substance

The mode of any action whatever depends on the efficacity of its active principle,—for that which has the stronger heat imparts greater heat: consequently the mode of knowledge also must depend on the efficiency of the principle of knowledge.

Now the light mentioned above1 is a principle of knowing God: since thereby the created intellect is raised to the vision of the divine substance. Accordingly, the mode of the divine vision must be commensurate with the power of this same light. But this light is far short in strength of the clarity of the divine intelligence. Wherefore it is impossible that the divine substance be seen in the aforesaid light as perfectly as it is seen by the divine intellect. Now the divine intellect sees this substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible: because the truth of the divine substance, and the clarity of the divine intellect are equal; nay more, they are one. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly by the aforesaid light see the divine substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. Now whoever knows a thing so as to comprehend it, knows it as perfectly as it is knowable: thus whoever knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, as a matter of opinion based on probable reasons, because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend it; but only he who knows it as a scientific conclusion, through the medium that causes that conclusion. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance.

Again. A finite power cannot in its operation rise to the level of an infinite object. Now the divine substance is something infinite in comparison with every created intellect: since every created intellect is confined to a certain species. Therefore the vision of a created intellect cannot possibly rise to the level of the divine substance in seeing it, namely in seeing the divine substance as perfectly as it is visible. Therefore no created intellect comprehends it.

Further. Every agent acts perfectly so far as it perfectly participates in the form that is the principle of action. Now the intelligible form by which the divine substance is seen, is the divine essence itself: and although it becomes the intelligible form of the created intellect, the created intellect does not grasp it as much as it can be grasped. Therefore it does not see it as perfectly as it can be seen. Therefore it is not comprehended by the created intellect.

Besides. Nothing comprehended goes beyond the limits of the comprehender. Consequently if the created intellect were to comprehend the divine substance, this would not exceed the limits of the created intellect: which is impossible. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance.

We do not however say that the divine substance is seen, yet not comprehended by a created intellect, as though something thereof were seen and something not seen; since the divine substance is utterly simple: but because it is not seen as perfectly by the created intellect as it is visible, even as one who holds a demonstrated conclusion as an opinion is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is scientifically, although there be no part of it that he knows not.

Chapter LVI

that no created intellect, in seeing god, sees all that can be seen in him

Hence it is clear that though the created intellect may see the divine substance, it knows not all that can be seen in the divine substance.

For then alone does it necessarily follow that if one principle be known, all its effects are known in it, when that principle is comprehended by the intellect: because then is a principle known as to its whole power, when all its effects are known from it. Now other things are known from the divine essence, as effects are known from their cause. Consequently since the created intellect cannot know the divine substance so as to comprehend it, it does not follow that because it sees it, it sees also all that can be known in it.

Again. The higher the intellect the more it knows;—either a greater number of things, or at least more about the same things. Now the divine intellect surpasses every created intellect: and consequently it knows more things than any created intellect. Yet it knows not things except through knowing its own essence, as we proved in the First Book.1 Therefore more things are knowable in the divine essence, than any created intellect can see therein.

Besides. The measure of a power is according to what it can do. Consequently to know all that a power can do is the same as to comprehend that power. But, since the divine power is infinite, no created intellect can comprehend it any more than it can comprehend its essence, as we proved above.1 Neither, therefore, can a created intellect know all that the divine power can do. Yet all the things that the divine power can do are knowable in the divine essence, because God knows them all, and not otherwise than in His essence. Therefore a created intellect by seeing the divine essence, does not see all that can be seen in the divine substance.

Moreover. No cognitive power knows a thing except under the aspect of its proper object: thus by sight we do not know a thing except as coloured. Now the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is, namely the essence of a thing, as stated in 3 De Anima, iv. Consequently whatever the intellect knows of a thing, it knows it through the knowledge of its essence, so that whenever by demonstration we become acquainted with the proper accidents of a thing, we take as principle, what that thing is, as stated in 1 Poster. i. iv. On the other hand, if the intellect knows the essence from its accidents, according to the statement in 1 De Anima, i. that accidents are a great help in knowing what a thing is; this is accidental, in so far as the knowledge of the intellect arises from the senses, and so by knowing the accidents as perceived by the senses we need to arrive at knowing the substance: for this reason this does not occur in mathematics, but only in physics. Consequently whatever cannot be known in a thing by knowing its substance must be unknown to the intellect. Now by knowing the substance of one who wills, we cannot arrive at knowing what he wills: because the will does not tend altogether naturally to that which it wills; for which reason the will and nature are said to be two active principles. Therefore the intellect cannot know what a person wills, except that it may do so from certain effects: thus if we see a person working willingly, we know what he willed. Or again from a cause; thus God knows what we will, as also other of His effects, in that He is the cause of our willing. Or again by someone insinuating his will to another, as when by speaking he makes known his likes and dislikes. Since then many things depend on God’s simple will, as we have partly shown above,1 and will show yet more clearly further on;2 although the created intellect may see the divine essence, it does not know all the things that God sees in His essence.

Someone may object to what has been said, that God’s substance is something greater than all the things He can do, or understand, or will, except Himself: wherefore if the created intellect can see God’s substance, much more can it know all that God either understands, or wills, or can do, except Himself.

But if we consider carefully, to know a thing in itself is not the same as to know it in its cause: since there are things which are easy to know in themselves, but not easy to know in their causes. It is true, then, that to know God in Himself is more than to know anything else besides Him, if this can be known in itself. But it belongs to a more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance and to see its effects therein, than to know the divine substance without seeing its effects in it. And it is possible to see the divine substance without comprehending it. But it is not possible to know all that can be known in that substance, without comprehending it, as we have proved.

Chapter LVII

that every intellect of any degree can participate in the divine vision

Since, as we have proved,3 the created intellect is raised by a kind of supernatural light to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intellect of so low a degree, as to its nature, that cannot be raised to this vision.

For we have proved4 that this light cannot be connatural to any creature, but surpasses every created nature in its power. Now that which is done by a supernatural power, is not hindered by any diversity of nature, since the divine power is infinite; so that in the miraculous healing of a sick man, it matters not whether he ail much or little. Consequently the difference of degrees in the intellectual nature does not prevent the lowest in that nature from being raised by the aforesaid light to that vision.

Again. The highest intellect in the order of nature is infinitely distant from God in perfection and goodness: whereas its distance from the lowest intellect is finite: for there cannot be an infinite distance between one finite thing and another. Consequently the distance between the lowest created intellect and the highest, is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the highest created intellect and God. Now that which is as nothing cannot cause an appreciable variation: thus the distance between the centre of the earth and the human eye, is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the human eye and the eighth sphere, compared with which the earth occupies the space of a mere point: for which reason no appreciable variation arises from astronomers considering the human eye as the centre of the earth in their demonstrations. It makes no difference therefore what intellect be raised by the aforesaid light to the vision of God, whether it be of the highest, or of the lowest, or of a middle degree.

Besides. It was proved above1 that every intellect desires naturally to see the divine substance. Now the natural desire cannot be void. Therefore every created intellect can arrive at the vision of the divine substance, the lowliness of its nature being no obstacle.

Hence it is that (Matt. 22:30) our Lord promises men the glory of the angels: They shall be, he says, speaking of men, like the angels of God in heaven. And (Apoc. 20.)2 it is stated that the measure of a man is that of an angel. For this reason nearly everywhere in Holy Writ angels are described in the form of men, either wholly, as the angels who appeared to Abraham in the likeness of men (Gen. 18:2), or in part, as may be seen in the animals (Ezech. 1:8) of which it is said that they had the hands of a man under their wings.

Hereby we refute the error of those who said that however much the human soul be raised, it cannot attain to an equality with the higher intellects.

Chapter LVIII

that it is possible for one to see god more perfectly than another

Whereas the mode of operation results from the form that is the principle of operation, and the aforesaid light is a principle of the vision whereby the created intellect sees the divine substance, as we have proved;1 it follows that the mode of the divine vision is in keeping with the mode of this light. Now it is possible that there be various degrees of participation of this light, so that one receives more light than another. Therefore it is possible that of those who see God, one may see Him more perfectly than another; though both see His substance.

Again. In whatever genus there is one thing higher than the others, we shall find degrees according as these others approach more or less to that thing: thus things are more or less cold according as they approach to fire which is supremely hot. Now God sees His own substance most perfectly, inasmuch as he alone comprehends it, as we have proved above.2 Therefore of those who see Him one sees His substance more perfectly than another, according to their greater or lesser approach to Him.

Besides. The light of glory raises one to the divine vision for the reason that it is a likeness of the divine intellect, as we have stated.3 Now a thing may be more or less like to God. Therefore it is possible for one to see the divine substance more or less perfectly.

Further. Since there is proportion between the end and things directed to the end, it follows that things directed differently to an end, participate in that end differently. Now vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have shown.1 And intellectual substances are not all equally prepared for that end: for some are more virtuous, some less, and virtue is the way to happiness.2 Consequently there must be diversity in the divine vision, in that some see the divine substance more perfectly, some less perfectly. Hence in order to indicate this difference of happiness, our Lord says (Jo. 14:2): In my Father’s house there are many mansions.

Hereby too is excluded the error of those who said that all rewards are equal.

Again, just as the mode of vision indicates a diversity of degrees among the blessed, so the object of the vision shows that their glory is the same: for each one’s happiness consists in his seeing God’s substance, as we have proved. The same thing then makes them all happy, but they do not all derive an equal happiness therefrom. Hence it does not stand in the way of what has been said, that our Lord declares (Matth. 20.) the labourers in the vineyard to have received the same wage, a penny to wit, although they worked not equally: because the same thing is appointed as a reward to be seen and enjoyed, namely God.

Wherein it must also be observed that corporal and spiritual movements are somewhat contrary to each other. For all corporal movements have the identically same first subject, but their ends are diverse: whereas spiritual movements, namely intellectual apprehensions and acts of the will, have various first subjects, but one identical end.

Chapter LIX

how those who see the divine substance see all things

Now forasmuch as the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have proved;3 and since the appetite of everything that has obtained its last end, is at rest: it follows that the natural appetite of the intellectual substance that sees the divine substance must be entirely at rest. Now the natural desire of the intellect is to know all the genera, species and powers of things, and the whole order of the universe: as is evident from the fact that man makes a study of all these things. Therefore everyone that sees the divine substance knows all the things mentioned above.

Again. Intellect and sense differ, as is clear from 3 De Anima iv.,1 in that sense is destroyed or weakened by powerful sensibles, so that afterwards it cannot perceive weaker objects: whereas the intellect, through not being destroyed or weakened by its object, but only perfected thereby, after it has understood a higher intelligible, is not less but more able to understand other intelligibles. Now the highest in the genus of intelligibles is the divine substance. Consequently the intellect which by the divine light is raised to see the substance of God, is a fortiori perfected by the same light so as to see all other intelligibles in the universe.

Besides. Intelligible being is not of less, but may be of greater extent than physical being; for the intellect is naturally adapted to understand all the things in the universe, as well as things that have no physical being, such as negations and privations. Consequently anything required for the perfection of physical being, that and even more is required for the perfection of intelligible being. Now the perfection of intelligible being is when the intellect has reached its last end: even as the perfection of physical being consists in the very making of a thing. Therefore God makes known to the intellect, which sees Him, all the things that He has made for the perfection of the universe.

Moreover. Although of those who see God one sees him more perfectly than another, as we have shown,2 yet each one sees Him so perfectly that all his natural capacity is filled: indeed the vision itself surpasses all natural capacity, as was proved above.3 Therefore everyone that sees the divine substance must needs know in the divine substance all the things to which his natural capacity extends. Now the natural capacity of every intellect extends to the knowledge of all general species, and the order of things. Therefore every one that sees God will know these things in the divine substance.

Wherefore the Lord answered Moses’ request to see the divine substance (Exod. 33:19): I will show thee all good; and Gregory says (Dial. iv. 33): What know they not who know Him that knows all?

If we consider carefully the foregoing, it is clear that those who see the divine substance, in one sense see all things, and in another sense, do not. For if by all we understand those things that belong to the perfection of the universe, it is evident from what has been said that those who see God see all things, as the arguments just adduced prove. Because, as the intellect is, in a sense, all things, whatever belongs to the perfection of nature, belongs also to the perfection of intelligible being: wherefore according to Augustine (2 Super Gen. ad lit., viii.), all things made by the Word of God that they might subsist in their respective natures, were made likewise in the angelic intelligence so as to be understood by the angels. Now, to the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, their properties and forces: because the intention of nature is directed to the specific natures, since individuals are for the sake of the species. Consequently it belongs to the perfection of an intellectual substance to know the nature, forces and proper accidents of every species: and therefore it will obtain this through the vision of the divine essence.—Moreover through its knowledge of natural species the individuals also, contained in these species, are known by the intellect that sees God, as may be gathered from what has been already said of the divine and angelic knowledge.1

On the other hand if by all we understand all that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intellect sees all things in the divine substance, as we have shown.2

This may be considered in respect of several things.

First, as to those things which God can make, but neither has made nor ever will make. For all such things cannot be known without comprehending His power, which is impossible for any created intellect, as we have proved.1 Hence it is said (Job 11:7, seqq.): Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. For these things are said, not as though God were great in dimensive quantity: but because His power is not limited to all that seems great, so that He be unable to make greater still.

Secondly, as to the reasons of things made: which reasons cannot all be known by an intellect without its comprehending the divine goodness. Because the reason for every thing made is taken from the end which the maker has in view. Now the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness: wherefore the reason for things made is that the divine goodness may be spread abroad in things. So that a man would know all the reasons of created things, if he knew every good that can accrue to things according to the order of divine wisdom: and this would be to comprehend the divine goodness and wisdom, which is impossible to any created intellect. Wherefore it is said (Eccles. 8:17): I understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God.

Thirdly, as to those things which depend on God’s will alone: such as predestination, election and justification, and whatever belongs to the creature’s sanctification. Hence it is said (1 Cor. 2:11): No2 man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God.

Chapter LX

that those who see god see all in him at once

Whereas we have shown1 that the created intellect which sees the divine substance, sees therein all the species of things; and since whatever is seen in one species, must needs be seen at once and by one vision, because vision must correspond to the principle of vision: it follows that the intellect which sees the divine substance, sees all, not successively but at once.

Again. The supreme and perfect happiness of the intellectual nature consists in seeing God, as proved above.2 Now happiness results not from a habit but from an act, since it is the ultimate perfection and last end. Consequently whatever we see in the beatific vision of the divine substance is all seen by us actually: and therefore not one thing after another.

Besides. Whenever a thing arrives at its last end, it is at rest: since all movement is to the attainment of an end. Now the last end of the intellect is the vision of the divine substance, as shown above.3 Therefore the intellect that sees the divine substance does not pass from one intelligible thing to another. Therefore whatsoever it knows in this vision, it considers it all actually.

Moreover. In the divine substance the intellect knows all the species of things, as we have proved.4 Now of some genera there are an infinite number of species, for instance of numbers, figures and proportions. Therefore the intellect sees an infinite number of things in the divine substance. But it would not see them all unless it saw them at one time: because it is not possible to pass through the infinite.

Consequently all the intellect sees in the divine substance, it sees at once.

Hence Augustine says (15 De Trin. xvi.): Our thoughts will not then be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another: but we shall see all we know by one glance.

Chapter LXI

that by seeing god a man is made a partaker of eternal life

It follows hence that by the aforesaid vision the created intellect is made a partaker of eternal life. For eternity differs from time in that the latter has its being in a kind of succession, whereas the former is all simultaneously.1 Now it has already been proved2 that there is no succession in the vision in question, and that whatsoever is seen in it, is seen at once and at a glance. Therefore this vision takes place in a kind of participation of eternity. Moreover this vision is a kind of life: because the act of the intellect is life.3 Therefore by that vision the created intellect becomes a partaker of eternal life.

Again. Actions take their species from their objects. Now the object of the aforesaid vision is the divine substance in its very being, and not in some created image, as we have shown.4 Now the being of the divine substance is in eternity, or rather is eternity itself. Therefore the aforesaid vision consists in a participation of eternity.

Besides. If an action takes place in time, this is either because the principle of the action is in time:—for instance the actions of natural things are temporal;—or on account of the term of the action; for instance, the actions which spiritual substances, who are above time, exercise on things subject to time. Now the vision in question is not subject to time on the part of the thing seen, since this is an eternal substance; nor on the part of the medium of vision, which is also the eternal substance; nor on the part of the seer, namely the intellect, whose being is independent of time; because it is incorruptible, as we have proved.5 Therefore this vision is according to a participation of eternity, as altogether transcending time.

Further. The intellective soul is created on the border line between eternity and time as stated in De Causis, and explained above:1 because it is the last in order among intellects; and yet its substance stands above corporal matter, and is independent thereof. On the other hand its action in respect of which it comes into conjunction with lower and temporal things, is itself temporal. Consequently its action by reason of which it comes into conjunction with higher things that are above time, partakes of eternity. Especially does this apply to the vision in which it sees the divine substance. Therefore by this vision it enters into a participation of eternity: and for the same reason, so too does any other created intellect that sees God.

For this reason our Lord says (Jo. 18:3): This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God.

Chapter LXII

that those who see god will see him for ever

It follows from what has been said that those who obtain ultimate happiness from the divine vision, never fall away from it. Because whatever at one time is, and at another time is not, is measured by time, as stated in 4 Phys. xii. Now the vision in question that makes intellectual creatures happy, is not in time but in eternity.2 Therefore no one can lose it having once become a partaker thereof.

Again. The intellectual creature does not arrive at its last end except when its natural desire is at rest. Now just as it naturally desires happiness, so does it desire perpetuity of happiness: because as it is perpetual in its substance, that which it desires for its own sake and not on account of something else, it desires to have always. Consequently happiness would not be its last end unless it endured for ever.

Besides. Whatever is possessed with love causes sorrow if it be known that at length it will be lost. Now since the vision in question which makes the possessor happy is supremely enjoyable and desirable, it is supremely loved by those who possess it. Therefore they could not but be sorrowful, if they knew that they would lose it some time. But if it were not perpetual, they would know this: for it has been shown1 that in seeing the divine substance, they know also other things that naturally are; wherefore much more do they know the conditions of that vision, whether it be perpetual or about to cease eventually. Therefore they would not possess that vision without sorrow. Consequently it would not be true happiness, which should insure from all evil, as we have proved.2

Moreover. That which is moved towards a thing as the end of its movement, is not moved away from it except by violence; as a heavy body, when it is projected upwards. Now it is clear from what has been said3 that every intellectual substance tends to that vision with a natural desire. Therefore it cannot fall away from it except by violence. But nothing is taken away by violence unless the might of him who takes it exceed that of him who caused it. Now the cause of the divine vision is God, as we proved.4 Consequently, as no might exceeds God’s, it is impossible for that vision to be taken away by violence. Therefore it will last for ever.

Further. If a man cease to see what he saw hitherto, this will be either because he loses the faculty of sight—as when a man dies or becomes blind, or is hindered in some other way; or because he wishes no longer to see, as when we turn our eyes away from a thing we saw before; or because the object is withdrawn. And this is invariably true, whether we speak of sensitive or of intellective vision. Now the intellectual substance that sees God cannot lose the faculty of seeing God; neither through ceasing to exist, since it is immortal, as we proved above;5 nor through failure of the light by which it sees God, since that light is received incorruptibly, on the part both of the recipient and of the giver. Nor can it lack the will to enjoy that vision, for it knows its ultimate happiness to consist in that vision: even as it cannot but desire to be happy. Nor will it cease to see through the withdrawal of the object: because that object which is God is unchangeable; nor does He withdraw himself more than we withdraw from Him. Therefore it is impossible for this beatific vision of God ever to cease.

Again. It is impossible for a man to wish to give up a good which he is enjoying, except on account of some evil that he thinks to be attached to the enjoyment of that good, which enjoyment, at least, is an obstacle to a greater good: for just as the appetite desires nothing except under the aspect of a good, so does it shun nothing except as an evil. But in the enjoyment of that vision there cannot be any evil, since it is the greatest good to which the intellectual creature can attain. Nor is it possible that one who enjoys that vision deem any evil to be in it, or anything to be better than it: because the vision of that Supreme Truth excludes any false opinion. Therefore it is impossible that the intellectual substance which sees God ever desire to lose that vision.

Moreover. The reason why we become weary of what we enjoyed hitherto is that it causes some kind of change, by destroying or diminishing one’s power. Hence fatigue is incidental to the exercise of the sensitive powers through the action of the sensible objects on the bodily organ;—in fact the power may be altogether destroyed by too powerful an object;—and after a time they are loth to enjoy that which hitherto had been a pleasant sensation. For the same reason we become weary in mind after long or concentrated thought, because powers that employ organs of the body are subject to fatigue, and in this life it is not possible to give the mind to thought without employing those organs. Now the divine substance does not corrupt but, more than anything, perfects the intellect. Nor does any action performed by a corporeal organ concur in the vision of Him. Therefore it is impossible for anyone to be weary of seeing Him, when they have once enjoyed the sight of Him.

Further. Nothing can be wearisome that is wonderful to him that looks on it: because as long as we wonder at it, it still moves our desire. Now the created intellect always looks with wonder on the divine substance, since no created intellect can comprehend it. Therefore the intellectual substance cannot possibly become weary of that vision: and consequently it cannot of its own choice desist from it.

Besides. If two things were united before, and afterwards become separated, this must be the result of a change in one of them: because just as a relationship does not begin except through a change in one of the relatives, so does it not cease except through a fresh change in one of them. Now the created intellect sees God through being, in some way, united to Him, as proved above.1 Consequently if that vision cease, through the cessation of that union, this must result from a change either in the divine substance, or in the intellect of the one who sees it. But neither of these is possible: since the divine substance is unchangeable, as we proved in the First Book:2 and the intellectual substance is raised above all changes, when it sees the divine substance. Therefore it is impossible to lapse from the happiness of seeing God.

Furthermore. The nearer a thing is to God who is utterly unchangeable, the less changeable and the more enduring is it: so that certain bodies through being far distant from God, cannot last for ever, as stated in 2 De Gener. x. But no creature can come nearer to God than one who sees His substance. Therefore the intellectual creature that sees the divine substance, becomes, in a very high degree, unchangeable. Therefore it can never fall away from that vision. Hence it is said (Ps. 83:5): Blessed are they that dwell in Thy house, O Lord: they shall praise Thee for ever and ever: and elsewhere (Ps. 124:1): He shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. Also (Is. 33:21): Thy eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be removed: neither shall the nails thereof be taken away for ever, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken: because only there our Lord is magnificent: and (Apoc. 3:12): He that shall overcome, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go out no more.

Hereby we refute the error of the Platonists who said that souls after being separated from the body, and obtaining ultimate happiness, begin to desire reunion with the body, and that when the happiness of that life is ended, they are plunged once more into this life of unhappiness: and again that of Origen, who maintained that souls and angels can return from bliss to unhappiness.

Chapter LXIII

how in that ultimate happiness man’s every desire is fulfilled

It is evident from what has been said, that in this happy state which results from the divine vision, man’s every desire is fulfilled, according to Ps. 102:5, Who satisfieth thy desire with good things, and his every end achieved. This is clear to anyone who considers man’s various desires in kind.

There is a desire in man, as an intellectual being, to know the truth: and men pursue this desire by the study of the contemplative life. And this will be most clearly fulfilled in that vision, when the intellect by gazing on the First Truth will know all that it naturally desires to know, as we have proved above.1

There is also a desire in man as a rational being capable of regulating things beneath him: and he pursues this desire in the occupations of the active and civic life. The chief object of this desire is that man’s entire life be regulated in accord with reason, to wit, that he may live according to virtue: because the end of every virtuous man in all his actions is the good of his own virtue, that of the brave man, for instance, that he may act bravely. Now this desire will then be wholly fulfilled: because the reason will be right vigorous, being enlightened with the very light of God lest it stray from righteousness.

Consequent to his life as a citizen, there are also certain goods that man needs for his civic actions. Such is a position of honour, through inordinate desire of which, men become proud and ambitious. Now by this vision men are raised to the highest position of honour, because in a way, they are united to God, as we have proved above.1 Hence, even as God Himself is the King of ages,2 so the Blessed united to Him are said to be kings (Apoc. 20:6): They shall reign with Christ.

There is another desirable thing consequent to the civic life, and this is to be well known; through inordinate desire of which men are said to be desirous of vain glory. Now by this vision the Blessed become well known, not in the opinion of men, who can both deceive and be deceived, but in the most true knowledge both of God and of all the Blessed. Hence this happiness is many times described as glory in Holy Writ: thus it is said in the Psalm (149:5): The saints shall rejoice in glory.

There is yet another desirable thing in the civic life, and this is riches; through inordinate desire of which men become illiberal and unjust. Now in that happy state there is a sufficiency of all goods: inasmuch as the Blessed enjoy him who contains the perfection of all goods. Hence it is said (Wis. 7:11): All good things came to me together with her: wherefore it is said again (Ps. 111:3): Glory and wealth shall be in his house.

There is a third desire in man, common to him and other animals, namely the desire for the enjoyment of pleasure: and this men pursue especially by leading a voluptuous life, and through lack of moderation become intemperate and incontinent. Now in that vision there is the most perfect pleasure, all the more perfect than sensuous pleasure, as the intellect is above the senses; as the good in which we shall delight surpasses all sensible good, is more penetrating, and more continuously delightful; and as that pleasure is freer from all alloy of sorrow, or trouble of anxiety: whereof it is said (Ps. 35:9): They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, and Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. There is also the natural desire, common to all things, whereby all things seek to be preserved in their being, as far as possible: and through lack of moderation in this desire, men become timorous, and spare themselves overmuch in the matter of labour. This desire will be altogether fulfilled when the Blessed obtain perfect immortality, and security from all evil, according to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. 21:4:1 They shall no more hunger or thirst, neither shall the sun fall on them, nor any heat. It is therefore evident that intellectual substances by seeing God attain to true beatitude, when their every desire is satisfied, and when there is a sufficiency of all good things, as is required for happiness, as Aristotle says (10 Ethic, vii. 3). Hence Boethius says (3 De Consol.) that happiness is a state of life made perfect by the accumulation of all goods.

In this life there is nothing so like this ultimate and perfect happiness as the life of those who contemplate the truth, as far as possible here below. Hence the philosophers who were unable to obtain full knowledge of that final beatitude, placed man’s ultimate happiness in that contemplation which is possible during this life. For this reason too, Holy Writ commends the contemplative rather than other forms of life, when our Lord said (Luke 10:42): Mary hath chosen the better part, namely the contemplation of truth, which shall not be taken from her. For contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come: while the active and civic life does not transcend the limits of this life.

Chapter LXIV

that god governs things by his providence

From what has been laid down in the preceding chapters, it has been sufficiently proved that God is the end of all: whence we may further conclude that by His providence He governs or rules all.

For whenever certain things are ordered to a certain end, they are all subject to the disposal of the one to whom chiefly that end belongs. This may be seen in an army: since all the parts of the army, and their actions, are directed to the good of the general, victory to wit, as their ultimate end: for which reason the government of the whole army belongs to the general. In the same way, that art which is concerned with the end dictates and gives laws to the art which is concerned with things directed to the end: as civics controls the military art, and this directs the art of horsemanship; and the art of sailing, the art of ship-building. Since then all things are directed to the divine goodness as their last end, as we have shown above,1 it follows that God to whom that goodness belongs chiefly as essentially possessed, understood and loved, must be the Governor of all.

Again. Whoever makes a thing for the sake of an end makes use of it for that end. Now it has been shown above that whatsoever has being in any way is an effect of God:2 and that God makes all things for an end which is Himself.3 Therefore He uses everything by directing it to its end. But this is to govern. Therefore God, by His providence, is the Governor of all.

Besides. It has been shown that God is the first unmoved mover. Now the first mover moves no less than second movers; more so indeed, because without Him they do not move other things. But all things that are moved, are moved for an end, as was shown above.4 Therefore God moves each thing to its end. Moreover He moves them by his intellect: for it has been proved above1 that He moves not by natural necessity, but by intellect and will. Now to rule and govern by providence is nothing else but to move certain things to their end by one’s intellect. Therefore God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved to their end; whether they be moved corporally, or spiritually, as the seeker is said to be moved by the object desired.

Moreover. It was proved2 that natural bodies are moved and work towards an end, although they have no knowledge of an end, from the fact that always or nearly always that which is best happens to them: nor would they be made otherwise if they were made by art. Now it is impossible that things without knowledge of an end should act for an end, and attain to that end in an orderly manner, unless they be moved to that end by one who has knowledge of the end: as the arrow is directed to the mark by the archer. Therefore the whole operation of nature must be directed by some knowledge. This must be traced back to God mediately or immediately: because every subordinate art and knowledge must take its principles from a higher one, as may be seen in speculative and practical sciences. Therefore God governs the world by His providence.

Further. Things in nature distinct do not converge into one order, unless they be brought together by one controller. Now the universe is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures; and yet they all converge into one order, some things acting on others, some helping or directing others. Therefore there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe.

Moreover. Natural necessity cannot be alleged as the reason for the various phenomena to be observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies: since the movements of some are more numerous than, and wholly different from the movements of others. Therefore the ordering of their movements must come from some providence: and consequently so must the ordering of all those movements and operations here below, that are controlled by the former movements.

Besides. The nearer a thing is to its cause the greater share it has in the effect. Wherefore if we observe that a thing is the more perfectly shared by certain individuals, according as these are nearer to a certain thing, this is a sign that this thing is the cause of that which is shared in various degrees, thus, if certain things are hotter according as they are nearer fire, this shows that fire is the cause of their heat. Now we see that things are all the more perfectly ordered according as they are nearer to God: for in the lower bodies, which are farthest removed from God by unlikeness of nature, we sometimes find defects from the ordinary course of nature, as in monstrosities, and other casual happenings: whereas this never happens in the heavenly bodies, although they are changeable in a certain degree: nor in the separate intellectual substances. Therefore God is the cause of the entire order of things: and consequently He is the governor of the whole universe by His providence.

Further. As we proved above,1 God brought all things into being, not by natural necessity but by His intellect and will. Now His intellect and will can have no other ultimate end but his goodness, namely the bestowal of His goodness on things, as was shown above.2 And things partake of the divine goodness by way of likeness, in being good themselves. And the greatest good in things made by Him, is the good consisting in the order of the universe, which is most perfect as the Philosopher says (11 Metaph. x.) and divine Scripture in like manner (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good, whereas of each single work it was said simply that they were good. Consequently that which is chiefly willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the order of things of which He is the cause. But to govern things is nothing else but to impose order on them. Therefore God by His intellect and will governs all things.

Moreover. Whoever has an end in view, cares more for what is nearest to the last end: because the other ends are directed to this. Now the last end of God’s will is His goodness, the nearest thing to which among created things is the good consisting in the order of the universe: because every particular good of this or that thing is ordained thereto as its end, just as the less perfect is ordained to that which is more perfect: even as each part is for the sake of its whole. Consequently that which God cares for most in created things, is the order of the universe: and therefore He governs it.

Again. Every created thing attains its ultimate perfection by its proper operation, because a thing’s ultimate end and perfection must be either an operation or the term or effect of an operation: and the form whereby a thing is, is its first perfection, as stated in 2 De Anima i. Now the order among effects in respect of different natures and the degrees thereof, issues from divine wisdom as we showed in the Second Book.1 Therefore the order also among the operations, whereby things approach nearer to their ultimate end, does so in like manner. But to direct the actions of things to their end is to govern them. Therefore God by the providence of His wisdom governs and rules things.

Hence Holy Writ acclaims God as Lord and King, according to Psalm 99:2: The Lord, He is God, and Psalm 46:8: God is the King of all the earth: because the king and lord is he whose office it is to rule and govern subjects. Wherefore Holy Writ ascribes the course of events to the divine control (Job 9:7): Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not, and shutteth up the stars, as it were under a seal: and (Ps. 148:6): He hath made a decree and it shall not pass away. Hereby is refuted the error of some physicists of old, who held that everything happens from natural necessity; whence it followed that all things happen by chance, and not by the ordinance of Providence.

Chapter LXV

that god preserves things in existence

From the fact that God governs things by His providence, it follows that He preserves them in existence.

For every thing whereby certain things obtain their end comes under the government of those things: because things are said to be governed or ruled according as they are directed to their end. Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God, the divine goodness to wit, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist: because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things, as we have proved.1 Therefore it belongs to divine providence that things be preserved in existence.

Again. The cause of a thing must needs be the same as the cause of its preservation: because preservation is nothing else than continued existence. Now we have shown above2 that God is the cause of every thing’s existence by His intellect and will. Therefore by His intellect and will He preserves things in existence.

Besides. No particular univocal agent can be the cause of its species simply: thus an individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for then he would be the cause of every man, and consequently of himself, which is impossible. But properly speaking the individual is the cause of the individual. Now the individual man exists forasmuch as the human nature is in this particular matter which is the principle of his individuality. Therefore the human individual is not the cause of a man except in the point of his being the cause of the human form being in this particular matter: and this is to be the principle of the generation of this particular man. It is consequently evident that neither the individual man, nor any other natural univocal agent, is a cause except of the generation of an individual. Now there must needs be some per se active cause of the human species; as is evidenced by his composite nature, and the order of his parts, which is always the same, unless it be hindered accidentally: and the same applies to all other species of natural things. This cause is God either mediately or immediately: for it has been shown1 that He is the first cause of all. Consequently He stands in relation to the species of things as in nature the individual generator to the generation of which He is the cause per se. But generation ceases when the generator’s action ceases. Therefore all the species of things would cease, were the divine operation to cease. Therefore by His operation He preserves things in existence.

Moreover. Although movement may accidentally belong to an existing thing, it is something additional to the thing’s being. Now nothing corporeal is the cause of any thing except in so far as it is moved; because no body acts except through movement, as Aristotle proves.2 Therefore no body is the cause of a thing’s existence, as such, but it is the cause of a thing’s being moved towards existence, that is, of its becoming. Now the existence of a thing is participated existence, since no thing is its own existence, save God, as we proved above.3 Consequently God who is His own being must be first and per se the cause of all being. Accordingly the divine operation stands in the same relation to the existence of things, as the movement of a corporeal mover to the being made and the being moved of things made or moved. Now it is impossible that a thing continue to be made or to be moved if the movement of the mover cease. Therefore a thing cannot possibly continue to exist except through the divine operation.

Further. As the operation of art presupposes the operation of nature, so the operation of nature presupposes the creative operation of God: because art takes its matter from nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue of the products of nature; a house, for instance, by the solidity of the stones. Therefore all natural things would not continue to exist except by the power of God.

Again. The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect, after the action of the agent has ceased, unless it merge into the nature of the effect. Because the forms of things generated, and their properties, remain in them to the end after generation, because they become natural to them. In like manner the reason why habits are hard to remove is that they merge into the nature: whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not for always, because they are in their subject as preparing a way to nature. On the other hand that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus nowise remains after the action of the agent: thus light does not remain in the diaphanous body after the illuminant has been removed. Now existence is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone, as was proved in the First Book.1 Therefore nothing could continue to exist, if the divine operation were to cease.

Further. There are two explanations of the origin of things. One is that proposed by faith, that things were first brought into being by God; the other is that of certain philosophers holding that things emanated from God from eternity.2 According to either explanation it is necessary to say that things are preserved in existence by God. For if things were brought into being by God after not being, their existence as well as their non-existence must result from the divine will: because He permitted things not to be when He so willed, and caused them to be when He so willed. Therefore they exist so long as He wills them to exist. Therefore His will is the preserver of things.—If on the other hand things emanated from God from eternity, we cannot assign a time or an instant when they first emanated from God. Either, therefore, they were never produced by God, or their existence is always emanating from God, as long as they exist. Therefore He preserves things in existence by His operation.

Hence it is said (Heb. 1:3): Upholding all things by the word of His power. Augustine too, says (4 Super Gen. ad lit. xii.): The potency of the Creator, and the power of the Almighty and All-upholder, is the cause of every creature’s subsistence. If this ruling power were withdrawn from His creatures, their form would cease at once, and all nature would collapse. When a man is building a house, and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and has gone: whereas the world would not stand for a single instant, if God withdrew His support. Hereby is refuted the statement of certain authorities quoted in the law of the Moors,1 who in order to be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held that all forms are accidents, and that no accident lasts for two instants, so that things would always be in the process of formation: as though a thing needed not an active cause except while being made.—Wherefore some of them are stated to have maintained that the indivisible bodies of which, they say, all substances are composed, and which alone, according to them, have any permanency, would be able for a time to remain in existence, if God were to withdraw His government from things.—Some of these say indeed that things would not cease to exist unless God caused in them the accident of ceasing-to-be.—All of which is plainly absurd.

Chapter LXVI

that nothing gives existence except in so far as it acts by god’s power

It is evident from what has gone before that all inferior agents do not give existence except in so far as they act by God’s power.

Nothing gives existence except in so far as it is a being in act. Now God preserves things in existence by His providence, as we have proved.2 Therefore it is by God’s power that a thing causes existence.

Again. When several different agents are subordinate to one agent, the effect that proceeds from them in common, must needs be ascribed to them in so far as they are united together in partaking of the movement and power of that agent: for many things do not make one, except in so far as they are one; thus it is clear that all the men in an army work in order to effect a victory; and this effect they bring about forasmuch as they are subordinate to the general, whose proper effect is the victory. Now it was shown in the First Book1 that the first agent is God. Since then existence is the effect common to all agents, for every agent makes a thing to be actually: it follows that they produce this effect in so far as they are subordinate to the first agent, and act by its power.

Besides. In all ordered active causes, the last thing in the order of generation and the first in the intention, is the proper effect of the first cause: thus the form of a house which is the proper effect of the builder, comes into being after the cement, stones and timber have prepared the way, which is the work of the inferior workmen who are subject to the builder. Now in every action, actual being is the chief thing intended, and is the last thing in the order of generation: because, when it is obtained, the active principle ceases to act, and the passive principle ceases to be acted upon. Therefore existence is the proper effect of the first agent, namely God: and whatever gives being, does so in so far as it acts by the power of God.

Moreover. Among the things that can be reached by the power of a secondary agent, the limit in goodness and perfection is that which comes within its range through the power of the first agent: because the secondary agent’s power receives its complement from the first agent. Now the most perfect of all effects is being: since every nature and form is perfected through being actually, and is compared to actual being as a potentiality to act. Therefore existence is what secondary agents produce by the power of the first agent.

Besides. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being: for all others are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first agent, and all other agents produce it by the power of the first agent. And secondary agents which, as it were, particularize and determine the action of the first agent, produce the other perfections, as their proper effects, which are particular kinds of being.

Furthermore. That which is such by its essence, is the proper cause of that which is such by participation: thus fire is the cause of all things that are afire. Now God alone is being by His essence, while all others are beings by participation: for in God alone existence is His essence.1 Therefore the existence of every existing thing is His proper effect, so that whatever brings a thing into existence, does so in so far as it acts by God’s power. Wherefore it is said (Wis. 1:14): God created, that all things might be: and in several passages of Holy Writ it is stated that God makes all things.—Again in De Causis it is said that not even does an intelligence give being except in so far as it is something divine, i.e. in so far as it acts by God’s power.

Chapter LXVII

that in all things that operate god is the cause of their operating

Hence it is clear that in all things that operate God is the cause of their operating. For everyone that operates is in some way a cause of being, either of essential or of accidental being. But nothing is a cause of being except in so far as it acts by God’s power. Therefore everyone that operates acts by God’s power.

Again. Every operation consequent to a certain power, is ascribed to the giver of that power as effect to cause: thus the natural movement of heavy and light bodies is consequent to their form, whereby they are heavy or light, wherefore the cause of their movement is said to be that which produced them, and gave them their form. Now all power of any agent whatsoever is from God, as from the first principle of all perfection. Therefore since all operation is consequent to some power, it follows that God is the cause of every operation.

Moreover. It is clear that every action that cannot continue after the influence of a certain agent has ceased, is from that agent: thus the visibility of colours cannot continue after the action of the sun has ceased to enlighten the air; wherefore without doubt it is the cause of the visibility of colours. The same applies to violent motion, which ceases when the violence of the impelling force has ceased. Now, since God not only gave existence to things when they first began to exist, but also causes existence in them as long as they exist, by preserving them in existence, as we have proved,1; so not only did He give them active forces when He first made them, but is always causing those forces in them. Consequently if the divine influence were to cease, all operation would come to an end. Therefore every operation of a thing is reducible to Him as its cause.

Besides. Whatever applies an active power to action, is said to be the cause of that action: for the craftsman, when he applies the forces of nature to an action, is said to be the cause of that action; as the cook is the cause of cooking which is done by fire. Now every application of power to action is chiefly and primarily from God. For active forces are applied to their proper operations by some movement of the body or of the soul. Now the first principle of either movement is God. For He is the first mover, wholly immovable, as we have proved above.2 Likewise every movement of the will whereby certain powers are applied to action, is reducible to God as the first object of appetite, and the first wilier. Therefore every operation should be ascribed to God as its first and principal agent.

Further. In all ordered active causes, the causes that follow must always act by the power of the first: thus in natural things the lower bodies act by the power of the heavenly bodies; and in voluntary things all the inferior craftsmen act in accordance with the direction of the master craftsman. Now, in the order of active causes, God is the first cause, as we proved in the First Book.1 Consequently all the lower active causes act by His power. Now the cause of an action is the thing by whose power it is done, more even than that which does it: even as the principal agent in comparison with the instrument. Therefore God is more the cause of every action than even secondary active causes.

Further. Every operator is directed through its operation to its ultimate end: since either the operation itself is its last end, or the thing operated, namely the effect of the operation. Now it belongs to God Himself to direct things to their end, as we have proved.2 Therefore we must conclude that every agent acts by the power of God: and consequently it is He who causes the actions of all things.

Hence it is said (Isa. 26:12): Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us:3 and (Jo. 15:5): Without Me you can do nothing: and (Philip. 2:13): It is God who worketh in us4 both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. For this reason Holy Writ often ascribes natural effects to the divine operation: because He it is who works in every agent, natural or voluntary, as it is written in Job 10:10, 11: Hast Thou not milked me as milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews: and again in Psalm 17:14: The Lord thundered from heaven, and the highest gave His voice: hail and coals of fire.

Chapter LXVIII

that god is everywhere

From this it is evident that God must be everywhere and in all things.

For the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous, as the Philosopher proves (7 Phys. ii.). Now God moves all things in their actions, as we have proved.1 Therefore He is in all things.

Again. Whatever is in a place, or in anything whatsoever, is, after a manner, in contact therewith: for a body is located somewhere by contact of dimensive quantity: while an incorporeal thing is said to be somewhere by contact of its power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Accordingly an incorporeal thing stands in relation to being somewhere by its power, as a body to being somewhere by dimensive quantity. And if there were a body having infinite dimensive quantity, it would of necessity be everywhere. Consequently if there be an incorporeal thing with infinite power it must needs be everywhere. Now we proved in the First Book2 that God has infinite power. Therefore He is everywhere.

Besides. As an individual cause is to an individual effect, so is a universal cause to a universal effect. Now the individual cause must needs be present to its proper effect: thus fire by its substance gives out heat, and the soul by its essence gives life to the body. Since, then, God is the universal cause of all being, as we proved in the Second Book,3 it follows that wherever being is to be found, there also is God present.

Furthermore. If an agent be present to but one of its effects, its action cannot extend to other things except through that one, because agent and patient must be simultaneous: thus the motive power moves the various members of the body not otherwise than through the heart. Consequently if God be present to but one of His effects, such as the first movable, which is moved by Him immediately: it would follow that His action cannot extend to other things except through that first effect. But this is unreasonable. For if the action of an agent cannot extend to other things except through some first effect, the latter must correspond proportionately to the agent as regards the agent’s whole power, else the agent could not use its whole power: thus we see that all the movements which the motive power is able to cause, can be performed by the heart. Now there is no creature through which can be done everything that the divine power is capable of doing: for the divine power surpasses infinitely every created thing, as we proved in the First Book.1 Consequently it is unreasonable to say that the divine action does not extend to other things except through some first thing. Therefore He is present, not in one only, but in all His effects.—For it would amount to the same if someone were to say that He is in some, and not in all: because no matter how many divine effects we take, they will not suffice to carry into effect the execution of the divine power.

Moreover. The active cause must needs be joined together with its proximate and immediate effect. Now in each thing there is a proximate and immediate effect of God. For we proved in the Second Book2 that God alone can create. Also, in each thing there is something caused by creation: in bodies, there is primary matter; in incorporeal beings there is their simple essence; as is clear from what we have said in the Second Book.3 Accordingly God must be present in all things at the same time: especially since those things He called into being from non-being, are continually preserved in being by him, as we have proved.4

Wherefore it is said (Jer. 23:24): I fill heaven and earth; and (Ps. 138:8): If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there: if I descend into hell, Thou art present.

Hereby we refute the error of some who said that God is in a definite part of the world, for instance in the first heaven, and in the eastern portion, so that he is the principle of the heavenly movement.—Yet this statement of theirs might be upheld if rightly understood; so that the meaning be, not that God is confined to some particular part of the world, but that in the natural order, owing to the divine motion, all corporeal movement begins in one particular part. For this reason Holy Writ specially describes God as being in heaven, according to Isa. 66:1: Heaven is My throne, and Ps. 113:16: The heaven of heavens is the Lord’s, etc.—However the fact that God works in the lowest bodies some thing outside the ordinary course of nature, that cannot be wrought by the power of a heavenly body, shows clearly that God is immediately present not only to the heavenly body but also to the lowest things.

But we must not think that God is everywhere as though He were distributed throughout local space, one part of Him here, another there, because He is all everywhere: since God, being utterly simple, has no parts.

Nor is He simple in the same way as a point which is the term of a continuous quantity, and consequently occupies a definite place therein; so that one point cannot be elsewhere than in one indivisible place. But God is indivisible as existing altogether outside the genus of continuous quantity. Consequently He is not necessitated by His essence to a definite place, great or small, as though He needed to be in some place: for He was from eternity before there was any place. Yet by the immensity of His power He reaches all things that are in a place, because He is the universal cause of being, as we have stated.1 Accordingly, He is wholly wheresoever He is. And yet again we must not think that He is in things as though He were mingled with them: for we proved in the First Book2 that He is neither the matter nor the form of anything. But He is in all things as active cause.

Chapter LXIX

concerning the opinion of those who withdraw from natural things their proper actions

This3 was an occasion of error to some who thought that no creature has an active part in the production of natural effects: so that, to wit, fire would not heat, but God would cause heat at the presence of fire: and they maintained the like of all natural effects.

They endeavoured to confirm this error with arguments, by showing that no form whether substantial or accidental is brought into being except by the way of creation. Because forms and accidents cannot be made out of matter: since matter is not a part of them. Hence, if they be made, they must be made out of nothing, and this is to be created. And since creation is the act of God alone, as we proved in the Second Book,1 it would seem to follow that God brings into being forms both substantial and accidental.

The opinion of certain philosophers agreed in part with this position. For, seeing that whatever is not per se must result from that which is per se, it would seem that the forms of things which do not exist by themselves but in matter, result from forms that are by themselves without matter: as though forms existing in matter were participations of forms that are without matter. For this reason Plato supposed that the species of sensible things are certain separate forms, which are causes of being to these objects of sense, in so far as these partake of them.

Avicenna maintained that all substantial forms emanate from the active intelligence. But as to accidental forms he held them to be dispositions of matter, resulting from the action of lower agents disposing the matter: and in this he avoided the absurdity of the previous opinion. A sign of this apparently was that no active power can be found in these bodies except the accidental form, active and passive qualities for instance; and these would not seem capable of causing substantial forms.

Moreover in these lower things we find certain things that are not engendered from their like; animals caused through putrefaction, for instance. Wherefore apparently the forms of these are caused by higher principles. And in like manner other forms, some of which are much more perfect. Some too, find proof of this in the inadequacy of natural bodies for action. Because the form of every natural body is annexed to quantity. Now quantity is an obstacle to action and movement: a sign of which they see in the fact that the more we add to the quantity of a body, the heavier it becomes, and the slower its movement. Whence they conclude that no body is active, but that all bodies are purely passive.

They also attempt to prove this again from the fact that every patient is subject to the agent; and that every agent, save the first which creates, requires a subject inferior to itself. But no substance is inferior to a body. Therefore seemingly no body is active.

They add that the corporeal substance is the furthest removed from the first agent: wherefore they do not see how the active power can reach as far as the corporeal substance: and maintain that, as God is purely active, so the corporeal substance, being the lowest thing of all, is purely passive. For these reasons, then, Avicebron1 (Fons Vitæ, tract. ii., iii.) held that no body is active: but that the power of a spiritual substance pervading through bodies produces the actions which seem to be performed by bodies.

Moreover certain Moslem theologians are said to have argued that even accidents are not the result of corporeal activity, because an accident does not pass from one subject to another. Hence they deem it impossible for heat to pass from a hot body into another body so as to heat it: but that all like accidents are created by God.2

However, many absurdities arise from the foregoing positions. For if no inferior cause, above all a body, is active, and if God works alone in all things; since God is not changed through working in various things, no diversity will follow among the effects through the diversity of the things in which God works. Now this is evidently false to the senses: for from the application of a hot body there follows, not cooling but only heating: and from human seed is generated a man only. Therefore the causing of inferior effects is not to be ascribed to the divine power so as to withdraw the causality of inferior agents.

Again. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom that any thing should be done in vain in the works of a wise man. But if creatures did nothing at all towards the production of effects, and God alone wrought everything immediately, other things would be employed by him in vain for the production of effects. Therefore the above position is incompatible with divine wisdom.

Besides. He who gives a principle, gives whatever results from the principle: thus the cause that gives gravity to an element, gives it downward movement. Now to make a thing actual results from being actual, as we see to be the case in God: for He is pure act, and is also the first cause of being in all things, as we proved above.1 If therefore He bestowed His likeness on others in respect of being, in so far as He brought things into being, it follows that He also bestowed on them His likeness in the point of acting, so that creatures too should have their proper actions.

Further. Perfection of effect indicates perfection of cause: since greater power produces a more perfect effect. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore things created by him must needs receive perfection from him. Consequently to detract from the creature’s perfection is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. But if no creature exercises an action for the production of an effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the creature; because it is due to the abundance of its perfection, that a thing is able to communicate to another the perfection that it has. Therefore this opinion detracts from the divine power.

Moreover. Just as it belongs to the good to produce a good, so it belongs to the sovereign good to make a thing best. Now God is the sovereign good, as we proved in the First Book.2 Therefore it belongs to Him to make all things best. Now it is better that the good bestowed on someone should be common to many, than that it should be proper to one: since the common good is always considered more godlike than the good of one only.3 But the good of one becomes common to many, if it flows from the one to the other: and this can only be when the one, by its own action, communicates it to the others: and if it has not the power to transmit it to others, that good remains its own property. Accordingly God communicated His goodness to His creatures in such wise that one thing can communicate to another the good it has received. Therefore it is derogatory to the divine goodness to deny things their proper operations.

Again. To take order away from creatures is to deny them the best thing they have: because each one is good in itself, while altogether they are very good on account of the order of the universe: for the whole is always better than the parts, and is their end. Now if we subtract action from things, the order among things is withdrawn: because, things differing in nature are not bound together in the unity of order, except through the fact that some are active and some passive. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that things have not their proper actions.

Besides. If effects be produced not by the act of creatures but only by the act of God, the power of a created cause cannot possibly be indicated by its effect: since the effect is no indication of the cause’s power, except by reason of the action which proceeds from the power and terminates in the effect. Now the nature of a cause is not known from its effect except in so far as this is an indication of its power which results from its nature. Consequently if creatures exercise no action in producing effects, it will follow that the nature of a creature can never be known from its effect: so that all knowledge of physical science would be denied us, for it is there that arguments from effects are chiefly employed.

Further. By induction it can be proved that like produces like.1 Now, that which is produced in lower things is not a mere form, but a composite of matter and form: because every generation is movement out of something, namely matter, and to something, namely form. Therefore the producer must be not a mere form, but composed of matter and form. Therefore the cause of forms which exist in matter is not the separate species of things, as the Platonists maintained, nor the active intellect, as Avicenna said, but an individual composed of matter and form.

Again. If action is consequent to being actual,1 it is unreasonable that the more perfect act be deprived of action. Now the substantial form is a more perfect act than the accidental. Consequently if the accidental forms in corporeal things have their proper actions,2 much more has the substantial form an operation proper to it. But this action does not consist in disposing matter, because this is effected by alteration, for which accidental forms suffice. Therefore the form of the generator is the principle of the action whereby the substantial form is introduced into the thing generated. The arguments they adduce are easily solved.

For since a thing is made that it may be, just as a form is called a being, not as though itself had being, but because by it the composite is; so neither is the form made, properly speaking, but it begins to be through the composite being brought from potentiality to the act which is the form.

Nor is it necessary that whatever has a form by way of participation, receive it from that which is a form essentially; for it may receive it immediately from something having a like form in a like manner, namely by participation, and acting by virtue of the separate form, if there be any such; and thus like agent produces like effect.

Nor does it follow, because every action of inferior bodies is effected through active or passive qualities, which are accidents, that nothing, save accidents, results from those actions: because even as those accidental forms are caused by the substantial form, which together with matter is the cause of the proper accidents, so do they act by virtue of the substantial form. Now that which acts by virtue of another produces an effect like not only to itself, but also, and more, to that by virtue of which it acts: thus the action of the instrument reproduces in the work done the likeness of the art: so that the action of accidental forms produces substantial forms, inasmuch as they act instrumentally by virtue of substantial forms. As to animals generated from putrefaction, the substantial form is caused in them through the agency of a body, the heavenly body, to wit, that is the first principle of alteration; consequently in this lower sphere whatever acts dispositively to a form, must act by virtue of that body: so that the virtue of the heavenly body suffices without an univocal agent, for the production of certain imperfect forms; whereas for the production of more perfect forms, such as the souls of the higher animals, an univocal agent is required besides the celestial agent: for such animals are not produced otherwise than by seed: hence Aristotle says1 that man and the sun generate man.

Again, it is untrue that quantity is an obstacle to a form’s activity except accidentally, namely in so far as all continuous quantity is in matter. Thus the form which exists in matter, through being less actual, has less active virtue: so that the body which has less matter and more form, fire, for instance, is more active.

But if we suppose the measure of action of which a form existing in matter is capable, then quantity favours an increase rather than a decrease of action: for the greater the fiery body, supposing the heat to be equally intense, the more heat does it give: and supposing an equally intense gravity, the greater a heavy body is, the more rapid will be its natural movement: and for the same reason the slower will its non-natural movement be. Accordingly the fact that heavy bodies are slower in their non-natural movements, through being of greater quantity, is no proof that quantity is an obstacle to action, but rather that it is a help to its increase.

Again it does not follow that all bodies are without action, because in the order of things, corporeal substance is of the lowest kind: since even among bodies one is higher, more formal and more active than another, as fire in comparison with lower bodies, and yet not even the lowest body is excluded from activity. For it is clear that a body cannot be wholly active, since it is composed of matter, which is potential being, and form which is act. For a thing acts according as it is actual: wherefore every body acts in respect of its form, to which the other body, the patient to wit, is compared as regards its matter, as subject, inasmuch as its matter is in potentiality to the form of the agent. If, on the other hand, the matter of the active body be in potentiality to the form of the passive body, they will be mutually active and passive, as in the case of two elementary bodies: or else, one will be purely active and the other purely passive in relation to it, as the heavenly body compared to the elementary body. Accordingly a body acts on a subject not by reason of its entirety, but by reason of the form by which it works.

Nor is it true that bodies are furthest removed from, God. For as God is pure act, things are more or less distant from Him according as they are more or less in act or potentiality. And that of all things is furthest distant from God, which is pure potentiality, namely primary matter, which is therefore purely passive and nowise active. On the other hand, bodies, being composed of matter and form, approach to a likeness to God, inasmuch as they have a form, which Aristotle (1 Phys. ix.) calls a divine thing: wherefore they act inasmuch as they have a form; and are passive, inasmuch as they have matter.

Again, it is absurd to say that a body is not active because accidents do not pass from one subject to another. For when we say that a hot body gives heat, we do not mean that the identical heat which is in the heater passes into the heated body: but that by virtue of the heat in the heater, another heat, individually distinct, becomes actual in the heated body, having been potentially therein before. Because the natural agent does not transmit its own form into another subject, but reduces the passive subject from potentiality to act. Consequently we do not deny creatures their proper actions, although we ascribe all the effects of creatures to God, as operating in all.

Chapter LXX

how the same effect is from god and from the natural agent

Some find it difficult to understand how natural effects are ascribed to God and to the activity of nature. For it would seem impossible that one action should proceed from two agents: hence if the action productive of a natural effect proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God.

Again. If a thing can be done sufficiently by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of several: for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices. Since, then, the divine power suffices to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ for the production of the same effects, the powers of nature also: or if the forces of nature suffice, it is superfluous for the divine power to work for the same effect.

Besides. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce. Therefore, seemingly, it is impossible that God produce the same effects as natural things.

However these arguments offer no difficulty if we mind what has been said already. For two things may be considered in every agent: namely the thing itself that acts, and the power whereby it acts: thus fire by its heat makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower agent depends on the power of the higher agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or applies it to action: thus the craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect, although sometimes he does not give the instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that form, but merely puts it into motion. Consequently the action of the lower agent must not only proceed from it through the latter’s proper power, but also through the power of all the higher agents: for it acts by virtue of them all: and just as the lowest agent is found to be immediately active, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate in the production of the effect: because the power of the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the power of the proximate higher agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the power of the supreme agent is found to produce the effects of itself, as though it were the immediate cause, as may be seen in the principles of demonstration, the first of which is immediate. Accordingly just as it is not unreasonable that one action be produced by an agent and by the virtue of that agent, so is it not absurd that the same effect be produced by the inferior agent and by God, and by both immediately, though in a different way.

It is also evident that there is nothing superfluous if nature produce its proper effect and God produce it also, since nature does not produce it except by God’s power.

Nor is it superfluous, if God can produce all natural effects by Himself, that they should be produced by certain other causes: because this is not owing to insufficiency of His power, but to the immensity of His goodness, wherefore it was His will to communicate His likeness to things not only in the point of their being but also in the point of their being causes of other things: for it is in these two ways that all creatures in common have the divine likeness bestowed on them, as we proved above.1—In this way too the beauty of order is made evident in creatures.

It is, also, clear that the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though part were effected by God and part by the natural agent: but the whole effect proceeds from each, yet in different ways: just as the whole of the one same effect is ascribed to the instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the principal agent.

Chapter LXXI

that divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things

From the foregoing it is also clear that divine providence, which governs things, does not prevent corruption, defects and evil from being in the world. For the divine government whereby God works among things, does not exclude the operation of second causes, as we have already shown.1 Now, a fault may occur in an effect through a fault in the secondary active cause, without there being any fault in the first agent: thus there may be a fault in the work of a craftsman who is perfect in his craft, on account of some defect in the instrument: even so, a man with strong motive power may limp, through no fault in the motive power, but because his leg is not straight. Accordingly in the things moved and governed by God, defect and evil may be found on account of defects in the secondary agents, although there is no defect in God.

Moreover. Perfect goodness would not be found in things, unless there were degrees of goodness, so that, to wit, there be some things better than others: else all the possible degrees of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature be found like to God in the point of being better than others. Moreover this would do away with the chief beauty in things if the order resulting from distinction and disparity were abolished; and what is more, the absence of inequality in goodness would involve the absence of multitude, since it is by reason of things differing from one another that one is better than another: for instance, the animate than the inanimate, and the rational than the irrational. Consequently if there were absolute equality among things there would be but one created good, which is clearly derogatory to the goodness of the creature. Now the higher degree of goodness is that a thing be good and unable to fail from goodness; and the lower degree is of that which can fail from goodness. Wherefore the perfection of the universe requires both degrees of goodness. Now it belongs to the providence of the governor to preserve and not to diminish perfection in the things governed. Therefore it does not belong to the providence of God entirely to exclude from things the possibility of failing from goodness. But evil results from this possibility: because that which can fail, at times does fail; and this very deficiency of the good is evil, as we have proved.1 Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to ward off evil entirely from things.

Again. In every government the best thing is that provision be made for the things governed, according to their mode: for in this consists the justice of the régime. Consequently even as it would be contrary to the right notion of human rule, if the governor of a state were to forbid men to act according to their various duties,—except perhaps for the time being, on account of some particular urgency,—so would it be contrary to the notion of God’s government, if He did not allow creatures to act in accordance with their respective natures. Now through creatures acting thus, corruption and evil result in things; since by reason of the contrariety and incompatibility that exist in things, one thing is corruptive of another. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from things altogether.

Besides. An agent cannot possibly produce an evil, except by reason of its intending some good, as we proved above.2 Now it does not belong to the providence of one who is the cause of all good, to exclude from creatures all intention of any particular good: for thus many goods would be banished from the universe: thus if fire were deprived of the intention of producing its like, a consequence of which is this evil, namely the burning of combustible things; the good consisting in fire being generated and preserved in its species would be done away. Therefore it is not part of divine providence to exclude evil altogether from things.

Further. There are in the world many good things which would have no place unless there were evils: thus there would be no patience of the righteous, if there were no ill-will of the persecutors; nor would there be any place for vindictive justice, were there no crimes; even in the physical order there would be no generation of one thing, unless there were corruption of another. Consequently if evil were entirely excluded from the universe by divine providence, it would be necessary to lessen the great number of good things. This ought not to be, since good is more powerful in goodness, than evil is in malice, as was shown above.1 Therefore evil should not be utterly excluded from things by divine providence.

Again. The good of the whole is of more account than the good of the part. Therefore it belongs to a prudent governor to overlook a lack of goodness in a part, that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole: thus the builder hides the foundation of a house underground, that the whole house may stand firm. Now if evil were taken away from certain parts of the universe, the perfection of the universe would be much diminished; since its beauty results from the ordered unity of good and evil things, seeing that evil arises from the lack of good, and yet certain goods are occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the governor, even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant. Therefore evil should not be excluded from things by divine providence.

Further. Other things, especially those of lower degree, are directed to man’s good as their end. But if there were no evils in the world, man’s good would be lessened considerably, both in his knowledge, and in his desire or love of the good. For his knowledge of the good is increased by comparison with evil, and through suffering evil his desire of doing good is kindled: thus the sick know best what a great good health is; and they, too, are more keen about it than those who have it. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from the world altogether.

Hence it is said (Isa. 45:7): I make peace and create evil: and (Amos 3:6): Shall there be evil in the city, which the Lord hath not done?

Hereby we refute the error of those who through observing the presence of evil in the world, said that there is no God. Thus Boethius (1. de Consol.) introduces a philosopher who asks: If there be a God, whence comes evil? On the contrary, he should have argued: If there is evil, there is a God. For there would be no evil, if the order of good were removed, the privation of which is evil: and there would be no such order, if there were no God.

Moreover by what has been laid down, an occasion of erring is removed from those who denied that divine providence extends to this corruptible world, because they observed that many evils occur in it. They said that incorruptible things alone are subject to God’s providence, because no defects and no evils are to be found in them.

Also we remove an occasion of error from the Manicheans, who posited two first active principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place in the providence of a good God.

Also the doubt is solved of some, namely whether evil deeds are from God. For since we proved1 that every agent produces its action in so far as it acts by the power of God, and that therefore God is the cause of all effects and actions: and since again we proved2 that evil and defect in things ruled by divine providence, result from the condition of the secondary causes, which may be themselves defective, it is evident that evil deeds, considered as defective, are not from God, but from their defective proximate causes: but in so far as they possess activity and entity, they must be from God: even as a limp is from the motive power, in so far as it has movement; but in so far as it has a defect, it is from the crookedness of the leg.

Chapter LXXII

that divine providence does not exclude contingency from things

Just as divine providence does not altogether banish evil from the world, so neither does it exclude contingency, nor impose necessity on things.

For we have already proved3 that the operation of providence, whereby God operates in the world, does not exclude secondary causes, but is fulfilled by them inasmuch as they act by God’s power. Now certain effects are said to be necessary or contingent, in relation to their proximate, not to their remote cause: thus for a plant to bear fruit is a contingent effect, on account of the proximate cause, which is the power of germination that can be hindered and fail, although a remote cause, namely the sun, is a cause that acts of necessity. Since, then, among proximate causes there are many that can fail, not all the effects subject to divine providence will be necessary, but many of them will be contingent.

Again. It belongs to divine providence that the possible degrees of being be fulfilled, as was made evident above.1 Now being is divided into contingent and necessary: and this is a per se division of being. Therefore, if divine providence excluded all contingency, not all the degrees of being would be preserved.

Besides. The nearer things are to God the more they partake in a likeness to Him: and the further they are from Him the more they fail in their likeness to Him. Now those things that are nearest to God are altogether immovable; these are separate substances who approach nearest to a likeness to God who is utterly immovable; while those that are nearest to them and are immediately moved by those that are unchangeable, retain a certain degree of immobility in that they are always moved in the same way, for instance the heavenly bodies. Consequently those that come after the foregoing, and are moved by them, are further removed from the divine immobility, so that, to wit, they are not always moved in the same way: and in this the beauty of order is evident. But every necessary thing, as such, never varies. Therefore it would be incompatible with divine providence, to whom it belongs to establish and preserve order among things, if all things happened of necessity.

Moreover. That which is of necessity, is always. Now nothing corruptible is always. Wherefore if divine providence requires all things to be necessary, it would follow that nothing in the world is corruptible, and consequently nothing could be generated. Hence the whole range of things subject to generation and corruption would be withdrawn from the world: and this would be derogatory to the perfection of the universe.

Further. In every movement there is generation and corruption of a kind: since in a thing that is moved, something begins, and another ceases to be. Consequently if all generation and corruption were banished, through the withdrawal of all things contingent, as we have just proved, in consequence all movement and all movable things would be taken away.

Besides. If the power of a substance be weakened, or if it be hindered by a contrary agent, this argues some change in that power. Consequently if divine providence does not banish movement from things, it will prevent neither the weakening of their power nor the impediment arising from the resistance of another agent. Now it is because that power is sometimes weakened and hindered that nature does not work always in the same way, but sometimes fails in that which is competent to a thing according to its nature, so that natural effects do not follow of necessity. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to impose necessity on the things governed.

Moreover. In things that are duly ruled by providence, there should be nothing vain. Since therefore it is evident that some causes are contingent, seeing that they can be hindered from producing their effects, it is clearly inconsistent with providence that all things should occur of necessity. Therefore divine providence does not impose necessity on things, by excluding contingency from them altogether.

Chapter LXXIII

that divine providence does not exclude free will

Wherefore it is clear that providence does not exclude free will.

For the government of any prudent governor is directed to the perfection of the things governed, as regards its attainment, increase or preservation. Therefore whatever pertains to perfection is to be safeguarded by providence rather than what savours of imperfection and defect. Now in inanimate beings, the contingency of causes arises from imperfection and deficiency: because by their nature they are determined to one effect, which they always produce, unless there be an impediment due either to weakness of power, or some extrinsic agency, or indisposition of matter. For this reason natural causes are not indifferent to one or other result, but more often produce their effect in the same way, and seldom fail. On the other hand it is owing to the perfection of the will that it is a contingent cause, because its power is not confined to one effect, and it is in its power to produce this effect or that, so that it is indifferent to either. Therefore it belongs to divine providence to preserve the freedom of the will, more than contingency in natural causes.

Moreover. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their mode. And the mode of a thing’s action is in keeping with its form which is the principle of action. Now the form through which a voluntary agent acts is not determinate: because the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect, since the apprehended good moves the will objectively; and the intellect has not one determinate form of the effect, but is of such a nature as to understand a multitude of forms; so that the will is able to produce manifold effects. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude freedom of the will.

Again. The things governed are brought to a becoming end by the government of providence: wherefore Gregory of Nyssa1 says of divine providence that it is God’s will from which all existing things receive a fitting end. Now the last end of every creature is to attain to God’s likeness, as we proved above.2 It would therefore be inconsistent with divine providence if any thing were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the voluntary agent attains to God’s likeness in that he acts freely: for we have proved that there is free will in God.3 Therefore providence does not deprive the will of liberty.

Besides. Providence multiplies good things among the subjects of its government. Therefore any thing that would deprive things of many good things does not belong to providence. Now if the will were deprived of freedom, many good things would be done away: for no praise would be given to human virtue; since virtue would be of no account if man acted not freely: there would be no justice in rewarding or punishing, if man were not free in acting well or ill: and there would be no prudence in taking advice, which would be of no use if things occurred of necessity. Therefore it would be inconsistent with providence to deprive the will of liberty.

Hence it is said (Ecclus. 15:14): God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel; and again (ibid., 18): Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him.

Hereby we refute the opinion of the Stoics who held that all things happen of necessity according to the order of infallible causes, which order the Greeks called εἱμαρμένη.

Chapter LXXIV

that divine providence does not exclude chance or luck

It is also evident from what has been said that divine providence does not remove from the world chance and luck.

Chance and luck are said of things that happen seldom. If nothing happened seldom, all things would happen of necessity; because those things that happen more frequently than not, differ from necessary things in this alone, that they may possibly fail in a few instances. Now it would be inconsistent with divine providence if all things happened of necessity, as we proved above.1 Therefore it would also be inconsistent with divine providence if there were no luck or chance in the world.

Again. It would be contrary to the nature of providence if things subject to providence were not to act for an end, since it is the part of providence to direct all things to their end: and again it would be contrary to the perfection of the universe, were there nothing corruptible, nor any defectible power, as we proved above.2 Now it is owing to the fact that an agent acting for the sake of some end fails to attain that end, that certain things happen by chance. Therefore it would be contrary to the nature of providence, and to the perfection of the world, if nothing happened by chance.

Besides. The number and variety of causes result from the ordering of divine providence and disposition. Now given a diversity of causes, it must happen sometimes that one concurs with another, so that one is either hindered or assisted in producing its effect. Now chance occurrences are due to the concurrence of two or more causes, through some end which was not intended ensuing from the concurrence of some cause: for instance, the finding of his debtor by one who went to market to buy something, resulted from the debtor also going to market. Therefore it is not incompatible with divine providence that there be luck and chance in things.

Moreover. That which is not, cannot be the cause of any thing, wherefore a thing must stand in relation to being a cause, in the same way as to being. Wherefore the diversity of order in causes must be in keeping with diversity of order among things. Now it belongs to the perfection of things that not only there be some that are beings per se, but that there be also some accidental beings. Because things which have not their ultimate perfection in their substance, must needs acquire some perfection by means of accidents, which accidents will be all the more numerous, as the things themselves are more distant from God’s simplicity. Now if a subject has many accidents it follows that it is a being accidentally: since subject and accident, or again two accidents in one subject, are one accidentally, for instance a white man, and a musical white thing. Therefore the perfection of the world requires that there should be also accidental causes. But that which results accidentally from a cause, is said to occur by chance or by luck. Therefore it is not inconsistent with providence that certain things happen by chance or luck.

Further. It belongs to the order of divine providence that there be order and degrees among causes. The higher a cause is above its effect, the greater its power, so that its causality extends to a greater number of things. But the intention of a natural cause never extends further than its power: for such an intention would be in vain. Consequently the intention of an individual cause cannot possibly extend to all possible contingencies. Now it is through things happening beside the intention of the agent that things occur by chance or luck. Therefore the order of divine providence requires the presence of luck and chance in the world.

Hence it is said (Eccles. 9:11): I saw that … the race is not to the swift, etc., but time and chance in all, namely here below.

Chapter LXXV

that divine providence is concerned with singular contingencies

From what we have proved it is evident that divine providence reaches to each individual among things subject to generation and corruption.

For apparently the only reason for excluding such things from providence would be their contingent nature, and the fact that many of them are chance or lucky occurrences: since in this alone do they differ from incorruptibles and from the universals of corruptible things, with which it is said that providence is concerned. Now providence is not inconsistent with contingency, chance and luck, as neither is it with voluntary action, as we have proved.1 There is no reason therefore why providence should not be about such things, even as it is about incorruptibles and universals.

Besides. If God’s providence does not extend to these singular things, this is either because He knows them not, or because He is unable or unwilling to care for them. But it cannot be said that God does not know singulars, since we have proved that He has knowledge of them.2 Nor can it be said that God is unable to care for them, since His power is infinite, as we proved above:3 nor that these singulars are incapable of being governed; since we see them to be governed by the purposeful activity of reason, as evidenced in man, or by natural instinct, as evidenced in bees and many dumb animals, which are governed by a kind of natural instinct. Nor can it be said that God is unwilling to govern them: since His will is the universal cause of all good: and the good of things governed consists chiefly in the order of government. Therefore it cannot be said that God has no care for these singulars.

Besides. Every secondary cause, by the mere fact of its being a cause, attains to a likeness to God, as was proved above.1 It is to be universally observed that things which are productive, have the care of the things they produce, thus animals naturally nourish their offspring. Therefore God has care of the things whereof He is the cause. Now He is the cause even of these singulars, as was proved above.2 Therefore He has care of them.

Further. It was proved above3 that God acts on created things, not from natural necessity, but by His will and intellect. Now things that are done by will and intellect are subject to providence, which apparently consists in ruling things by the intellect. Consequently the things done by God are subject to His providence. But it has been proved4 that God works in all second causes, and that all effects of things are to be referred to God as their cause: so that whatever is done in these individuals is His own work. Consequently these individual things, their movements and operations, are subject to divine providence.

Again. A man’s providence is foolish if he cares not for those things without which the things he cares for cannot be. Now it is clear that if all individuals ceased to exist, their universals would likewise cease. Wherefore if God cares only for universals, and neglects these individuals altogether, His providence will be foolish and imperfect.—If, however, someone say that God cares for these individuals so far as to preserve them in existence, but no further; this is quite impossible: since whatever else happens in regard to individuals concerns their preservation or corruption. Consequently, if God cares for individuals as to their preservation, he cares also for whatever happens to them.—Yet someone might say that the mere care of universals suffices for the preservation of individuals in existence; since each species is provided with the means of self-preservation for each individual of that species: thus animals were given organs for taking and digesting food, and horns for self-protection: and the use of these organs does not fail except in the minority, since that which is of nature produces its effect either always or more frequently; so that all the individuals could not cease to exist, although some might. But, according to this way of reasoning, whatever happens to individuals will be subject to providence, even as their preservation in being: because nothing can happen to the individual member of a species, that cannot in some way be referred to the principles of that species. Accordingly individuals are not subject to divine providence as to their preservation in existence, more than in other matters.

Moreover. The order of things in relation to the end is such that accidents are for the sake of substances, in order that the latter may be perfected by them. And in substances matter is for the sake of the form; since it is through the form that matter has a participation in the divine goodness, for the sake of which all things were made, as we proved above.1 Hence it is evident that the individual is for the sake of the universal nature: in sign of which where the universal nature can be preserved in one individual, there are not many individuals of one species, as exemplified in the moon and sun. Now since providence has the ordering of things to their end, it follows that to providence belong both the ends and things directed to the end. Therefore not only universals but also individuals are subject to divine providence.

Again. The difference between speculative and practical knowledge is that speculative knowledge and things connected with it are perfected in the universal, whereas things pertaining to practical knowledge are perfected in the particular: because the end of speculative knowledge is truth which consists first and of its very nature in immaterial and universal things: whereas the end of practical knowledge is operation which is about individual things: hence the physician does not heal a man in general, but this particular man, and the whole of medical science is directed to this. Now it is clear that providence belongs to practical knowledge, since it directs things to their end. Therefore God’s providence would be imperfect, if it extended no further than universals and reached not the individual.

Besides. Speculative knowledge is perfected in the universal rather than in the particular, because universals are known better than individuals: wherefore the knowledge of the most universal principles is common to all. Yet the more perfect in speculative knowledge is he who possesses not only universal but also proper knowledge of things; since he who knows a thing merely in general, knows it only potentially: for which reason the disciple is led from the general knowledge of principles to the proper knowledge of conclusions, by the master who is possessed of both knowledges, just as a thing is brought from potentiality to act by that which is in act. A fortiori therefore the more perfect in practical knowledge is he who directs things to act not only in general but also in particular. Consequently divine providence, being supremely perfect, extends to individuals.

Moreover. Since God is the cause of being as such, as we proved above,1 it follows that His providence must care for being as such; since He governs things inasmuch as He is their cause. Therefore whatever exists, no matter in what way it exists, is subject to His providence. Now individuals are beings, and more so than universals: because universals do not exist by themselves, but only in individuals. Therefore divine providence is concerned about individuals also.

Further. Creatures are subject to divine providence, as being directed thereby to their end, which is the divine goodness. Therefore participation in the divine goodness by creatures is the work of divine providence. But even contingent singulars participate in the divine goodness. Therefore divine providence must extend to them also.

Hence it is said (Matth. 10:29): Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing: and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father, etc., and (Wis. 8:1): She reacheth … from end to end mightily, that is from the highest creatures to the lowest. Moreover (Ezech. 9:9) the opinion is refuted of some who said: The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not, and (Job 22:14) of those who asserted: He doth not consider our things, and He walketh about the poles of heaven.

Hereby is refuted the opinion of some who maintained that divine providence does not extend to these individual things: an opinion ascribed by some to Aristotle, although it cannot be gathered from his words.

Chapter LXXVI

that god’s providence cares for all individuals immediately

Now some have granted that divine providence reaches these individual things, but through certain intermediary causes. For Plato, according to Gregory of Nyssa,1 posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme god, who cares first and foremost for his own, i.e. spiritual and intellectual beings, and consequently for the whole world, as regards genera, species, and the universal causes, i.e. the heavenly bodies. The second consists in the care of individual animals and plants and other things subject to generation and corruption, in the matter of their generation, corruption and other changes. This providence Plato ascribed to the gods who wander about heaven; while Aristotle2 ascribes the causality of such things to the oblique circle. The third providence he places over things concerning human life: and he ascribes it to certain demons who dwell in the neighbourhood of the earth and, according to him, are in charge of human actions. Yet, according to Plato, the second and third providence depend on the first, because the supreme god appointed those of the second and third class as governors.

This opinion accords with the Catholic Faith, in so far as it refers universal providence to God as its first author. But it would seem contrary to the Faith in that it denies that every individual thing is immediately subject to divine providence. This may be proved from what has been already laid down.

For God has immediate knowledge of individuals, as knowing them not merely in their causes, but also in themselves, as we proved in the First Book.1 Now it would seem unreasonable if, knowing individuals, He did not desire their order, wherein the chief good of things consists, since His will is the source of all goodness. Consequently even as He knows individuals immediately, so does He establish order among them immediately.

Again. The order established by providence in the things governed, is derived from the order conceived in the mind of the governor: even as the art-form that is produced in matter is derived from that which is in the mind of the craftsman. Now where there are several in charge, one subordinate to another, the higher must deliver to the inferior the order he has conceived, just as a subordinate art receives its principles from the higher. Accordingly supposing the governors of the second and third rank to be under the chief governor who is the supreme God, it follows that they must receive from the supreme God the order to be established among things. But this order cannot be more perfect in them than in the supreme God: in fact all perfections proceed from Him into other things in descending order, as we proved above.2 And the order of things must be in the governors of the second rank, not only in general, but also as to the individual: else they would be unable to establish order in individuals by their providence. Much more therefore is the order of individuals under the control of divine providence.

Besides. In things ruled by human providence it is to be observed that someone is placed at the head, who has charge of general matters of great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with regard to them: while he himself does not trouble about the order of minor affairs, but leaves this to others lower than himself. And this is owing to a defect on his part, inasmuch as he ignores the conditions of particular matters of less importance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order of every thing, on account of the labour and delay required for the purpose. But such defects are far removed from God: for He knows all individual things, nor does He require labour or time in order to understand them; since by understanding Himself, He knows all other things, as we proved above.1 Therefore He Himself devises the order of all individuals: and His providence is concerned about all individuals immediately.

Moreover. In human affairs the inferior officials by their own skill devise the ordering of the things subjected to their government by the chief governor: which skill they do not receive from the chief, nor its use: for if they received it from the chief, the ordering would be done by the superior, and they would no longer be devisers of this ordering but executors. Now, from what has been said2 it is clear that all wisdom and understanding is caused in every intellect by the supreme God: nor can any intellect understand except by God’s power, even as neither does any agent act except in so far as it acts by God’s power. Therefore God Himself cares for all things immediately by His providence: and whoever is said to govern under Him, is the executor of His providence.

Further. The higher providence gives rules to the lower providence: even as the politician gives rules and laws to the commander in chief; who gives rules and laws to the captains and generals. Consequently if there be other providences subordinate to the highest providence of the supreme God: it follows that God gives the second and third governors the rules of their office. Either, therefore, He gives general rules and laws or particular.—If He gives them general rules, since general rules are not always applicable to particular cases, especially in matters that are subject to movement and change, it would be necessary for these governors of the second or third rank to go beyond the rules given them in deciding about matters confided to their care. Consequently they would exercise judgement on the rules given to them, as to when to act according to them, and when it would be necessary to disregard them: which is impossible, because such a judgement belongs to the superior, since the interpretation of laws and dispensation from their observance belong to Him who made the law. Accordingly judgement concerning general rules that have been given must be pronounced by the governor in chief: and this would not be possible unless he concerned himself immediately with the ordering of individuals. Therefore, on this supposition, he should be the immediate governor of such things.—If, on the other hand, the governors of the second or third rank receive particular rules and laws from the supreme governor, it is clear that then the ordering of these individual matters comes immediately from divine providence.

Moreover. The higher governor always has the right to judge of the arrangements made by the lower governors, whether they be fitting or not. Consequently if the second or third governors are subordinate to God the chief governor: it follows that God judges of the arrangements made by them: which would be impossible if God considered not the ordering of these individual matters. Therefore He personally cares for individuals by Himself.

Again. If God does not care for these lower individuals immediately by Himself; this is either because He despises them or, as some say, lest His dignity should be besmirched by them. But this is unreasonable. For there is more dignity in providing for and planning the ordering of things, than operating in them. Consequently if God works in all things, as was proved above,1 and this far from being derogatory to His dignity, on the contrary, belongs to His all pervading and supreme power, it is nowise contemptible in Him, nor does it besmirch His dignity, if His providence extends to these individual things immediately.

Further. Every wise man who uses his power providently, moderates that use in his actions, by directing the purpose and extent of that use: else his power would not be obsequious to his wisdom. Now it is clear from what has been said that divine providence, in its operations, extends to the lowest things. Consequently divine providence directs which and how many effects are to result from its power, and how they are to result therefrom, even in the very lowest of things. Therefore God Himself by His providence, immediately plans the ordering of all things.

Hence it is said (Rom. 13:1): Those that are, are ordained of God, and (Judith 9:4): Thou hast done the things of old, and hast devised one thing after another, and what thou hast designed hath been done.

Chapter LXXVII

that the execution of divine providence is carried out by secondary causes

It must be observed that two things are required for providence, the order and the execution of the order. The first is the work of the cognitive power, wherefore those that are more perfect in knowledge, are said to order others: for it belongs to the wise man to order. The second is the work of the operative power. Now these two are in inverse proportion to each other. For the ordering is the more perfect according as it extends to the smallest things: whereas the execution of the least things belongs to the lower power proportionate to the effect. In God we find the highest perfection as to both: since in Him is the most perfect wisdom in ordering, and the most perfect power for operation. Consequently, He it is who by His wisdom disposes all things even the very least in their order; and who executes the least or lowest things by means of other inferior powers, through which He operates, as a universal and higher power through an inferior and particular power. It is fitting therefore that there should be inferior active powers to execute divine providence.

Again. It was proved above1 that the divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes. And whatever is effected by the operations of secondary causes, is subject to divine providence, since God directs all individual things by Himself, as was proved above.2 Therefore secondary causes execute divine providence.

Besides. The stronger the power of an agent, the further does its operation extend: thus the greater the fire, the more distant things does it heat. But this is not the case with an agent that does not act through an intermediary, because everything on which it acts is close to it. Since then the power of divine providence is supreme, it must bring its operation to bear on the most distant things through certain intermediaries.

Further. It belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and various executors of his rule: because the greater the number of his subordinates of various degrees, the more complete and extensive is his dominion shown to be. But no government can compare with the divine in point of dignity. Therefore it is fitting that the execution of divine providence be committed to agents of various degrees.

Moreover. Suitable order is a proof of perfect providence, for order is the proper effect of providence. Now suitable order implies that nothing be allowed to be out of order. Consequently the perfection of divine providence requires that it should reduce the excess of certain things over others, to a suitable order. And this is done by allowing those who have less to benefit from the superabundance of others. Since then the perfection of the universe requires that some share more abundantly in the divine goodness, as we proved above,3 the perfection of divine providence demands that the execution of the divine government be fulfilled by those things which have the larger share of divine goodness.

Again. The order of causes excels the order of effects even as the cause excels the effect: consequently it is a greater proof of the perfection of providence. Now if there were no intermediary causes to execute divine providence, there would be no order of causes in the world, but of effects only. Therefore the perfection of divine providence requires intermediary causes for its fulfilment. Hence it is written (Ps. 102:21): Bless the Lord, all ye His hosts: you ministers of His who do His will; and (Ps. 148:8): Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil His word.

Chapter LXXVIII

that by means of intellectual creatures other creatures are ruled by god

Since it belongs to divine providence that order be preserved in the world; and suitable order consists in a proportionate descent from the highest to the lowest, it is meet that divine providence should reach the most distant things according to a certain proportion. This proportion consists in this,—that just as the highest creatures are subject to God and governed by Him, so the lower creatures are subject to and governed by the higher. Now of all creatures the highest is the intellectual, as was proved above.1 Therefore the very nature of divine providence demands that the remaining creatures be ruled by rational creatures.

Again. Whatever creature executes the order of divine providence, does so in so far as it has a share of the power of the supreme providence: even as the instrument has no movement except in so far as through being moved it has a share in the power of the principal agent. Accordingly those things which have the larger share of the power of divine providence, are the executors of divine providence in regard to those whose share is smaller. Now intellectual creatures have a greater share thereof than others: because, while providence requires disposition of order which is effected by the cognitive faculty, and execution which is the work of the operative power, rational creatures have a share of both powers, whereas other creatures have only the latter. Therefore all other creatures are ruled, under divine providence, by rational creatures.

Moreover. To whomsoever God gives a power: it is given in relation to the effect of that power: for then are all things disposed of in the best way, when each one is directed to all the goods that it has a natural aptitude to produce. Now the intellective power by its very nature is a directive and governing faculty: hence we see that when they are united in the one subject, the operative power follows the ruling of the intellective power: as in man the limb moves at the will’s command. The same may be seen also, if they be in different subjects: since those men who excel in the operative power, need to be directed by those who excel in the intellective faculty. Therefore the nature of divine providence requires that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures.

Again. Particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers, as may be seen both in art and in nature. Now it is evident that the intellective power is more universal than any other operative power: because it contains universal forms, whereas all operative powers proceed only from a form proper to the operator. Therefore all other creatures must needs be moved and ruled by intellectual powers.

Moreover. In all ordered powers, that one is directive of another, which has the better knowledge about the plan to be followed: thus we may observe in the arts, that the art which is concerned with the end, whence is taken the entire scheme of the work to be produced, directs and governs the art that is immediately productive of that work: for instance the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding; and the art which gives the form, governs the art which prepares the material: whereas the instruments, through having no knowledge of the scheme, are governed only. Since then intellectual creatures alone are able to know the scheme of the ordering of creatures, it belongs to them to rule and govern all other creatures.

Further. That which is per se, is the cause of that which is by another. Now intellectual creatures alone operate per se, since they are masters of their own actions through having free will: whereas other creatures operate through natural necessity, as being moved by another, Therefore intellectual creatures by their operations move and rule other creatures.

Chapter LXXIX

that the lower intellectual substances are ruled by the higher

Forasmuch as some intellectual creatures are higher than others, as we have shown;1 the lower intellectual nature must needs be governed by the higher.

Again. The more universal powers move the particular powers, as already stated.2 And the higher intellectual natures have more universal forms, as we have proved.3 Therefore they rule the lower intellectual natures.

Besides. The intellective faculty that is nearer to the principle is always found to be the ruler of the intellectual faculty that is more distant from the principle: this is evident both in speculative and in practical science. For the speculative science that receives its principles of demonstration from another, is said to be subalternate to it, and the practical science that is nearer to the end, which is the principle in practical matters,4 is the master science in comparison with the more distant. Since then some intellectual substances are nearer to the first principle, namely God, as we have shown,5 they will be the rulers of the others.

Moreover. The higher intellectual substances receive the influence of divine wisdom more perfectly, since each one receives something according to its mode. Now all things are governed by divine wisdom, so that those which have the greater share of divine wisdom, govern those which have the smaller share. Therefore the lower intellectual substances are governed by the higher.

Wherefore the higher spirits are called both angels, inasmuch as they direct the lower spirits, by message as it were, for angels are called messengers; and ministers, forasmuch as by their operation they execute, even in corporeal things, the order of divine providence: because a minister is like an animate instrument according to the Philosopher.1 This is what is said (Ps. 103:4): Who makest thy angels spirits: and thy ministers a burning fire.

Chapter LXXX

of the order between one angel and another

Since corporeal things are governed by spiritual, as we have proved,2 and since there is order of a kind among corporeal things, it follows that the higher bodies are governed by the higher intellectual substances, and the lower bodies by the lower intellectual substances. And seeing that the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power; while the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body; the higher intellectual substances have powers entirely independent of any corporeal power, and consequently they are not united to bodies; whereas the lower intellectual substances have powers confined to certain limits and dependent on certain corporeal organs for their exercise, and consequently they need to be united to bodies. And just as the higher intellectual substances have a more universal power, so too they receive from God more perfectly the divine disposal of things, in that they are acquainted with the scheme of order, even as regards individuals, through receiving it from God. This manifestation of the divine governance, made by God, reaches to the uttermost intellectual substances: thus it is said (Job 25:3): Is there any numbering of his soldiers? and upon whom shall not his light arise? On the other hand the lower intelligences do not receive this manifestation so perfectly, as to be able to know thereby every detail of the order of divine providence left to their execution, but only in a general way: and the lower their position, the less detailed knowledge of the divine government do they receive through this first manifestation received from above; so much so that the human intellect, which is the lowest in point of natural knowledge, has a knowledge of only certain most general things. Accordingly the higher intellectual substances receive immediately from God the perfection of the knowledge in question; which perfection the other lower intellectual substances need to receive through them: just as we have said above1 that the general knowledge of the disciple is brought to perfection by means of the specific knowledge of the master. Hence it is that Dionysius speaking of the highest intellectual substances which he assigns to the first hierarchy or holy sovereignty, says that they are not sanctified by means of other substances, but that they are placed by God Himself immediately around Him, and as far as possible close to His immaterial and incomprehensible beauty on which they gaze, and in which they contemplate the intelligible concept of His works: and by these, he says, the inferior ranks of heavenly substances are instructed.2

Accordingly the higher intelligences receive their perfection from a higher source of knowledge. Now in every disposition of providence, the order of effects is derived from the form of agents: since the effect must needs proceed from its cause in some kind of likeness. Now it is for the sake of an end that the cause communicates the likeness of its form to the effect. Hence the first principle in the dispositions of providence is the end; the second is the form of the agent; the third is the appointment of the order of effects. Consequently in the order of the intellect the highest degree is the consideration of the idea of order, in the end; the second degree is the same consideration, in the form; while the third is the knowledge of the disposition of order in itself and not in a higher principle. Wherefore the art which considers the end governs the art which considers the form, as the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding. And the art which considers the form governs the art which considers only the order of movements which prepare the way for the form, as the art of shipbuilding governs the handiwork of the builders.

Accordingly there is a certain order among the intelligences who take from God Himself immediate and perfect cognizance of the order of divine providence. The first and highest perceive the ordered scheme of providence in the last end itself which is the divine goodness, some of them, however, clearer than others; and these are called Seraphim, i.e. fiery or setting on fire, because fire is used to designate intensity of love or desire, which are about the end. Hence Dionysius says that this name indicates both their fervent and quivering activity towards God, and their leading lower things to God as their end.1

The second place belongs to those who acquire perfect knowledge of the scheme of providence in the divine form: and these are called Cherubim which signifies fulness of knowledge: for knowledge is made complete through the form of the thing known. Wherefore Dionysius says that their name indicates that they contemplate the highest operative power of the divine beauty.2

The third grade is of those who contemplate the disposition of divine judgements in itself: and they are called Thrones: because the throne is significative of judicial power, according to Ps. 9:5: Thou hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice. Hence Dionysius says that this name signifies that they are God-bearers and adapted for the obedient fulfilment of all divine undertakings.3

What has been said must however be understood, not as though the divine goodness, essence, and knowledge of the disposition of things were three distinct things, but in the sense that according to what we have been saying we may look at the matter in question from different points of view.

Again, there must be order among even the lower spirits who receive from the higher spirits perfect knowledge of the divine order to be fulfilled by them. Because the higher ones are also more universal in their power of understanding; so that they acquire their knowledge of the order of providence from more universal principles and causes, but those beneath them, from more particular causes: for a man who could consider the entire physical order in the heavenly bodies, would be of a higher intelligence than one who needed to turn his mind to lower things in order to perfect his knowledge. Accordingly those who are able to know perfectly the order of providence from the universal causes which stand midway between God, the supremely universal cause, and particular causes, are themselves between those who are able to consider the aforesaid order in God Himself, and those who need to consider it in particular causes. Dionysius assigns these to the middle hierarchy which, as it is governed by the highest, so, says he, does it govern the lowest.1

Again, among these intellectual substances also there must be some kind of order: since the universal disposition of providence is divided, first, among many executors: which belongs to the order of Dominations: because to command what others execute belongs to one having dominion. Hence Dionysius says2 that domination signifies a certain liberty free from servile condition and any subjection. Secondly, it is distributed by the operator and executor in reference to many effects. This is done by the order of Virtues whose name, as Dionysius says in the same passage, designates a certain strength and virility in carrying out the divine operations, without so much as swerving, through weakness, from the divine movement. Hence it is evident that the principle of universal operation belongs to this order: so that apparently the movement of the heavenly bodies belongs to this order also, from which as from universal causes particular effects ensue in nature: wherefore they are called powers of heaven (Lk. 21:26), where it is said: The powers of heaven shall be moved. To the same spirits apparently belongs the execution of those divine works which are done outside the order of nature; for these are the highest of God’s ministries: for which reason Gregory says1 that the Virtues are those spirits through whom miracles are frequently wrought. And if there be anything else of a universal and prominent nature in the fulfilment of the divine ministry, it is fittingly ascribed to this order. Thirdly, the universal order of providence, once established in its effects, is guarded from confusion, by curbing the things which might disturb that order. This belongs to the order of Powers. Wherefore Dionysius says in the same place that the name Powers implies a well-established order, without confusion, in the divine undertakings: and so Gregory says2 that it belongs to this order to check contrary powers.

The lowest of superior intellectual substances are those who receive the knowledge of the order of divine providence in relation to particular causes: these are placed in immediate authority over human affairs. Of them Dionysius says:3 This third rank of spirits presides, in consequence, over the human hierarchy. By human affairs we must understand all lower natures and particular causes, that are subordinated to man and serve for his use, as we have already explained.4 Among these also there is a certain order. For in human affairs there is a common good, namely the good of the city or of the nation,5 and this apparently belongs to the order of Principalities. Hence Dionysius says in the same chapter that the name Principality indicates leadership in a sacred order. Hence (Dan. 10:12–20) mention is made of Michael the Prince of the Jews, of a Prince of the Persians, and of a Prince of the Greeks. And thus the government of kingdoms and the change of supremacy from one nation to another, must belong to the ministry of this order. It would also seem part of their office to instruct those men who are in positions of authority, in matters pertaining to the administration of their office.

There is also a human good, not common to many, but belonging to an individual by himself, yet useful not to one only, but to many: for instance those things which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles of faith, the divine worship, and the like. This belongs to the Archangels of whom Gregory says1 that they announce the greater things: thus we call Gabriel an Archangel, because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, which is an article of faith for all.

There is also a human good that belongs to each one singly. This pertains to the order of Angels of whom Gregory says that they announce minor matters. Hence they are called guardian angels according to Ps. 90:11: He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. Wherefore Dionysius says2 that the Archangels are between the Principalities and Angels, because they have something in common with both: with the Principalities inasmuch as they lead the lower angels, and rightly so, because in human affairs matters of restricted interest must be regulated according to those that are of common interest: and with the Angels, because they announce to the Angels, and through the Angels, to us, for it is the duty of the latter to announce to men what concerns each individual. For this reason the lowest order has received as proper, the name common to all: because, to wit, its duty is to announce to us immediately. And so the name Archangel is as it were composed of both, since Archangel means a Principal Angel.

Gregory assigns the ordering of the heavenly spirits differently:3 for he places the Principalities among the spirits of the second rank, immediately after the Dominations: and the Virtues among the lowest, above the Archangels. But to one who considers the matter carefully, the difference is but small. For, according to Gregory, the Principalities are not placed over nations but over good spirits, as holding the principal place in the execution of the divine ministry: because, says he, to be a principal is to stand in a higher place than others. According to the explanation given above, we said that this belonged to the Virtues.—As to the Virtues, according to Gregory they are assigned to certain particular operations when, in some special case, outside the usual order of things, miracles have to be wrought. In this way they are fittingly numbered among the lowest angels.

Both explanations have the authority of the Apostle. For he says (Eph. 1:20, 21): Setting Him, namely Christ, on his right hand in heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion, where it is clear that in the ascending order he places the Powers above the Principalities, and the Virtues above these, and the Dominations above the last named. This is the order adopted by Dionysius. Whereas speaking of Christ to the Colossians (1:16) he says: Whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers, all things were created by Him and in Him. Here we see that beginning with the Thrones, in the descending order, he places the Dominations under them, beneath these the Principalities, and lower still the Powers. This is the order adopted by Gregory.

Mention is made of the Seraphim, Isa. 6:2, 6; of the Cherubim, Ezech. 1:3; of the Archangels in the canonical epistle of Jude (9): When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, etc.; and of the Angels in the Psalms as already observed.

In all ordered powers there is this in common, that the lower all work by virtue of the higher. Hence what we have stated as belonging to the order of Seraphim, all the lower angels accomplish by virtue thereof: and the same applies to the other orders.

Chapter LXXXI

of the ordering of men among themselves and to other things

In comparison with other intellectual substances, the human soul holds the lowest place: because, as we have already stated,1 when it is first created it receives knowledge of the order of divine providence only in a general way; whereas, in order to acquire perfect knowledge of that order in individual matters, it needs to start from these very things in which the order of divine providence is already established in detail. Consequently the human soul needs bodily organs, so as to be able to receive knowledge from things having bodies. And yet, on account of the weakness of its intellectual light, it is unable to acquire perfect knowledge of things that concern man, without the help of higher spirits, God so disposing that the lower spirits reach perfection through the higher, as we have already proved.2 Since however man has some share of intellectual light, dumb animals which have none at all are subject to man, according to the order of divine providence. Hence it is said (Gen. 1:26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness, that is to say, inasmuch as he is an intelligent being, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth.3 Dumb animals, though bereft of intellect, yet, since they have some kind of knowledge, are placed by the order of divine providence above plants and other things devoid of knowledge. Hence it is said (Gen. 1:29–30): Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat, and to all the beasts of the earth.

Among those that are wholly bereft of knowledge, one thing is placed before another according as one is more capable of action than another. For they have no share in the disposition of providence, but only in the execution.

And since man has both intelligence, and sense, and bodily powers, these things are dependent on one another, according to the disposition of divine providence, in likeness to the order to be observed in the universe. For bodily power is subject to the powers of sense and intellect, as carrying out their commands; and the sensitive power is subject to the intellective, and is controlled by its rule.

In the same way, we find order among men. For those who excel in intelligence, are naturally rulers; whereas those who are less intelligent, but strong in body, seem made by nature for service, as Aristotle says in his Politics.1 The statement of Solomon (Prov. 11:29) is in agreement with this: The fool shall serve the wise; as also the words of Exodus (18:21, 22): Provide out of all the people wise2 men such as fear God … who may judge the people at all times.

And just as in the works of one man there is disorder through the intellect being obsequious to the sensual faculty; while the sensual faculty, through indisposition of the body, is drawn to the movement of the body, as instanced in those who limp: so too, in human government disorder results from a man being set in authority, not on account of his excelling in intelligence, but because he has usurped the government by bodily force, or has been appointed to rule through motives of sensual affection. Nor does Solomon omit to mention this disorder, for he says (Eccles. 10:5, 6): There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince; a fool set in high dignity. Now divine providence does not exclude a disorder of this kind: for it results, by God’s permission, from the fault of the inferior agents; even as we have said of other evils.3 Nor is the natural order wholly perverted by such a disorder: for the government of fools is weak, unless it be strengthened by the counsels of the wise. Hence it is said (Prov. 20:18): Designs are strengthened by counsels: and wars are to be arranged by governments; and (24:5, 6): A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety when there are many counsels. And since the counsellor rules him who receives his counsel, and, in a sense, governs him, it is said (Prov. 17:2) that a wise servant shall rule over foolish sons.

It is therefore evident that divine providence imposes order on all things, and thus the Apostle says truly (Rom. 13:1) that the things which are of God are well ordered.1

Chapter LXXXII

that the inferior bodies are ruled by god by means of the heavenly bodies

Just as in intellectual substances some are of higher and some of lower degree, so too are there in corporeal substances. Now intellectual substances are governed by higher substances, so that the disposition of divine providence may reach down proportionately to the lowest things, as we have already said.2 Therefore in like manner bodies of lower degree are ruled by those of a higher.

Again. The higher a body is as regards its place, the more formal it is: hence it is reasonably the place of a lower body, because form contains even as place does; thus water is more formal than earth, air than water, fire than air. Now the heavenly bodies have a higher place than all others. Therefore they are more formal and consequently more active than all other bodies. Therefore they act on lower bodies: and consequently the latter are ruled by them.

Besides. That which in its nature is perfect without contrariety, is of more universal power than that which in its nature is not perfected without contrariety: because contrariety arises from differences which determine and contract the genus: wherefore in the conception of the intellect, forasmuch as it is universal, the species of contraries are not contrary to one another, since they coexist in the intellect. Now the heavenly bodies are perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety: for they are neither light nor heavy, neither hot nor cold: whereas the inferior bodies are not perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety. This is proved by their movements: for there is no contrary to the circular movement of the heavenly bodies, so that there can be nothing violent in them: whereas there are movements contrary to that of the lower bodies; for instance, downward movement is contrary to upward movement. Therefore heavenly bodies have a more universal power than the inferior bodies. Now universal powers move particular powers, as we have proved.1 Therefore the heavenly bodies move and govern lower bodies.

Moreover. We have shown2 that all other things are ruled by intellectual substances. Now the heavenly bodies resemble the intellectual substances, more than other bodies do, forasmuch as they are incorruptible. Moreover they are nearer to them, inasmuch as they are moved by them immediately, as we have shown above.3 Therefore the lower bodies are ruled by them.

Further. The first principle of movement must be something immovable. Consequently things that approach nearest to immobility, must be the movers of others. Now heavenly bodies approach nearer to the immobility of a first principle than do the inferior bodies: because they have but one species of movement, namely local: whereas other bodies have all manner of movements. Therefore the heavenly bodies move and rule the lower bodies.

Again. In each genus the first is the cause of that which comes after.4 Now the heavenly movement is the first of all movements. First, because local movement precedes all others.—Both in point of time, because it alone can be everlasting, as is proved in 8 Phys. vii.—And naturally: because without it there could be no other: since a thing cannot be increased without a previous alteration, whereby that which was dissimilar is transformed and assimilated: nor can there be alteration without a previous change of place, since in order that there be alteration, the cause of alteration must become nearer to the subject altered than it was before:—And in perfection: because local movement does not cause a thing to vary in respect of something inherent, but only in respect of something extrinsic; and for this reason belongs to a thing already perfect.—Secondly, because even among local movements, circular movement holds the first place.—Both in point of time: because it alone can be everlasting, as proved in 8 Phys. viii.—And naturally: because it excels in simplicity and unity, since it is not divided into beginning, middle and end, but is all middle, as it were.—And in perfection, because it returns to its principle.—Thirdly, because alone the heavenly movement is always regular and uniform; since in the movements of heavy and light bodies the speed increases towards the end if the movement be natural, and decreases if the movement be violent.—Therefore the movement of the heaven must be the cause of all other movements.

Further. As that which is simply immovable is in comparison with movement simply, so is that which is immovable in respect of a particular kind of movement, in comparison with that particular movement. Now that which is simply immovable is the principle of all movement, as we have proved.1 Therefore that which is immovable in respect of alteration, is the principle of all alteration. Now of all things corporeal the heavenly bodies alone are inalterable: this is proved by their disposition which is always the same. Therefore the heavenly body is the cause of alteration in all things alterable. But in this lower world alteration is the principle of all movement: because alteration leads to increase and generation: and the generator is a per se mover in the local movement of heavy and light bodies. Consequently the heaven must be the cause of all movement in these lower bodies.

Therefore it is evident that the lower bodies are governed by God by means of the heavenly bodies.

Chapter LXXXIII

conclusion of the foregoing

From all that has been proved hitherto, we are able to conclude that as regards the design of the order to be imposed on things, God governs all things by Himself.1 Wherefore Gregory commenting on Job 34:13, What other hath He appointed over the earth? says2: He who created the world by Himself governs it by Himself: and Boethius says (De Consol. iii. 12): God rules all things by Himself alone. As to the execution, however, He governs the lower by means of the higher things:—bodily things by means of spiritual things3: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv. 6): In this visible world nothing can be ruled except by means of the invisible creature:—the lower spirits by the higher:4 wherefore Dionysius says5 that the intelligent heavenly substances first of all shed forth the divine enlightenment on themselves, and bestow on us those manifestations which surpass our capacity:—and the lower bodies by the higher:6 wherefore Dionysius says7 that the sun contributes to the generation of visible bodies, as also to life itself, by means of nourishment, growth and perfection, by cleansing and renewing them.

Of all these together Augustine says (3 De Trin. iv:): As the grosser and lower bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power: so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the sinful rational spirit by the righteous rational spirit.

Chapter LXXXIV

that the heavenly bodies do not impress on our intellect

From what has been said it is at once clear that the heavenly bodies cannot be the causes of things concerning our intellect. For it has already been shown1 that the order of divine providence requires the lower things to be ruled and moved by the higher. Now the intellect, in the natural order, surpasses all bodies: as we have proved already.2 Consequently heavenly bodies cannot act directly on the intellect. Therefore they cannot be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect.

Again. No body acts except through movement, as is proved in 8 Phys. vi. Now things that are immovable are not caused by movement: because nothing is the result of the movement of an agent except through the agent moving the patient, while the latter is moved. Consequently things that are wholly outside movement cannot be caused by the heavenly bodies. But things concerning the intellect are wholly outside movement properly speaking, as the Philosopher states (7 Phys. iii.): in fact the soul becomes prudent and wise through being free from movement, as he says in the same place. It is not possible, therefore, that the heavenly bodies be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect.

Besides. If nothing be caused by a body except in so far as the latter causes movement through being moved, it follows that whatever receives an impression from a body, must be moved. Now nothing is moved except a body, as is proved in 6 Phys. iv. Therefore whatever receives an impression from a body, must be either a body or a power of a body. But it was proved in the Second Book1 that the intellect is neither a body nor a power of the body. Therefore the heavenly bodies cannot directly make an impression on the intellect.

Further. Whatever is moved by a thing is reduced thereby from potentiality to act. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act. Therefore every agent and mover must be, in some way, in act with regard to those things to which the subject, passive or moved, is in potentiality. But the heavenly bodies are not actually intelligible, because they are singular sensibles. Since then our intellect is not in potentiality except to what is actually intelligible, it is impossible for the heavenly bodies to act directly on the intellect.

Moreover. A thing’s proper operation follows its nature, which generated things acquire by generation, together with their proper operation: as may be seen in heavy and light things, which have their proper movement as soon as they are generated, unless there be an obstacle, and for this reason the generator is said to be a mover.2 Consequently that which, as regards the principle of its nature, is not subject to the action of the heavenly bodies, cannot be subject to them in respect of its operation. Now the intellective faculty is not caused by any bodily principles, but is entirely from an extrinsic source, as we proved above.3 Therefore the operation of the intellect is not directly subject to the heavenly bodies.

Again. Things caused by the heavenly movements are subject to time, which is the measure of the first heavenly movement.4 Therefore those that wholly abstract from time, are not subject to heavenly movements. Now the intellect in its operation abstracts from time, as also from place: for it considers the universal which abstracts from here and now. Therefore the operation of the intellect is not subject to heavenly bodies.

Further. Nothing acts outside its species. Now the act of the intellect transcends the species and form of any corporeal agent: since every corporeal form is material and individualized; whereas the act of the intellect is universal and immaterial. Consequently no body can understand by means of its corporeal form. Much less, therefore, can any body whatsoever cause the act of intelligence in another.

Besides. A thing is not subject to that which is beneath it in respect of that by which it is united to things above it. Now our soul, inasmuch as it is intelligent, is united to intellectual substances, which in the order of nature are above heavenly bodies: because our soul cannot understand except in so far as it derives its intellectual light from those substances. Therefore the intellectual operation cannot be directly subject to the heavenly movements.

Moreover. We shall find a confirmation of this if we consider what philosophers have said in the matter. The natural philosophers of old, as Democritus, Empedocles and others, held that intellect differs not from sense, as stated in 4 Metaph. iii., and 3 De Anima iii. Hence it follows that, as sense is a corporeal power resulting from a corporeal transmutation, so is the intellect likewise. Wherefore they said, as transmutation of the lower bodies follows transmutation of the higher bodies, that intellectual operation follows the movements of the heavenly bodies: according to the words of Homer:1 The mind of gods and men on earth is even as their day which comes from the father of men and gods, the sun to wit, or rather Jove, whom they called the supreme god, by whom they understood the whole heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv. 11; v. 8).

Hence too, followed the opinion of the Stoics who said that the knowledge of the intellect is caused by images of bodies being imprinted on the mind, just as a mirror, or as a page receives the imprinted characters without any action on its part: as Boethius relates (De Consol. v. 4). According to this opinion it followed that our intellectual knowledge was chiefly the result of impressions received from heavenly bodies: and consequently it was chiefly the Stoics who held that man’s life was bound by a kind of fatal necessity.—This opinion however is shown to be false, as Boethius says (ibid.) by the fact that the intellect is capable of synthesis and analysis, and compares the highest with the lowest, and is cognitive of universals and simple forms, none of which is within the capacity of bodies. Consequently it is evident that the intellect does not merely receive the images of bodies, but is possessed of a power that transcends bodies: for the external senses, which receive only images of bodies, do not extend to the things mentioned above. All subsequent philosophers, however, discerned intellect from sense, and assigned, not bodies but immaterial things, as the cause of our knowledge: thus Plato ascribed this to ideas, and Aristotle to the active intellect.

From all this we may gather that to say that the heavenly bodies are the cause of our knowledge, is a sequel to the opinion of those who held that intellect differs not from sense; as Aristotle observes (De Anima, loc. cit.). Now it is evident that this opinion is false. Wherefore also manifestly false is the opinion of those who maintained that the heavenly bodies are the direct cause of our knowledge.

For this reason Holy Writ assigns as the cause of our knowledge, not a body, but God (Job 35:10, 11): Where is God who made me; who hath given songs in the night; who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructeth us more than the fowls of the air? and (Ps. 93:10): He that teacheth man knowledge.

Nevertheless we must observe that although heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of our knowledge, they can co-operate indirectly towards it. For though the intellect is not a force of the body, yet in us the operation of the intellect cannot be exercised without the operation of bodily forces, namely the imagination, and the powers of memory and thought, as we have already shown.1 Hence it is that when the activity of these powers is hampered by some bodily indisposition, the activity of the intellect is hampered also: as may be seen in cases of frenzy, lethargy and the like. For the same reason goodness of disposition in a man’s body fits him to understand easily, inasmuch as those forces are strengthened by such a disposition: wherefore it is said in 2 De Anima ix., that it is to be observed that men of soft flesh are of quick intelligence. Now the disposition of the human body is subject to the heavenly movements. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, v. 6) that it is not altogether absurd to ascribe the mere differences between bodies to the influence of the stars: and Damascene says (2 De Fide Orth. vii.) that the various planets produce in us various temperaments, habits and dispositions. Consequently the heavenly bodies co-operate indirectly to the goodness of our intelligence: and thus, even as physicians are able to judge of a man’s intelligence from his bodily temperament, as a proximate disposition thereto, so too can an astrologer, from the heavenly movements, as being a remote cause of this disposition. In this sense we can approve of the saying of Ptolemy (Centiloq. xxxviii.): When Mercury is in one of Saturn’s houses at the time of a man’s birth, he bestows on him a quick intelligence of the inner nature of things.

Chapter LXXXV

that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing

It is also evident from the foregoing that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing.

For the will is in the intellective part of the soul, according to the Philosopher (3 De Anima ix.). Therefore if the heavenly bodies cannot make a direct impression on our intellect, as we have proved,1 neither will they be able to influence the will directly.

Moreover. Every act of choice or will in us is caused immediately through an intellectual apprehension: for the apprehended good is the object of the will (3 De Anima x.): wherefore there cannot ensue perverseness of choice, unless the judgement of the intellect err in the particular object of choice, as the Philosopher states (7 Ethic. iii.). But the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our intellectual apprehension. Therefore neither can they be the cause of our choice.

Further. Whatever takes place in this lower world through the influence of heavenly bodies happens naturally; since the things here below are naturally subordinate to them. If, therefore, the heavenly bodies have any influence on our choice, this must happen naturally: so that, in fact, man naturally chooses to perform his actions, even as dumb animals perform theirs from natural instinct, and as inanimate bodies are moved naturally. Consequently there will not be two active principles, namely purpose and nature, but only one, namely nature. But Aristotle proves the contrary (2 Phys. v.). Therefore it is untrue that the influence of heavenly bodies is the cause of our choice.

Besides. Things that happen naturally are brought to their end by definite means; wherefore they always happen in the same way: for nature is determined to one method. But man’s choice tends to the end in various ways, both in morals and in things made by art. Therefore man’s choosing does not come from nature.

Again. Things which are done naturally, for the most part are done rightly: since nature fails but seldom. Consequently if man chose by nature, his choice would be right for the most part; which is clearly false. Therefore man does not choose naturally: yet this would be the case if his choice were subject to the influence of heavenly bodies.

Further. Things of the same species do not differ in those natural operations which result from the specific nature: hence each swallow makes its nest in the same way, and every man equally understands the first principles which are known naturally. Now choosing is an operation that results from the human species. Consequently if man chose naturally, all men would choose in the same way: and this is evidently untrue, both in morals and in things made by art.

Moreover. Virtue and vice are proper principles of choice: because the virtuous and the vicious man differ through choosing contraries. Now civic virtues and vices are not in us by nature but by habituation. The Philosopher proves this (2 Ethic. i.) from the fact that we acquire the habit of those operations to which we are accustomed, especially from childhood. In us therefore choosing does not come from nature: and consequently, it is not caused by the influence of heavenly bodies, in respect of which things happen naturally.

Again. Heavenly bodies make no direct impression except on bodies, as we have shown.1 Consequently if they are the cause of our choosing, this will be by an impression made either on our bodies, or on external bodies. Yet in neither way can they be a sufficient cause of our choosing. For the objective presentation of some corporeal thing cannot be an adequate cause of our choice: since it is clear that when a man meets with something that pleases him, be it meat or woman, the temperate man is not moved to choose these things, whereas the intemperate is. Again no possible change wrought in our bodies by an impression of the heavenly bodies can suffice to cause us to make a choice: since all that results therefrom are certain passions, more or less impetuous; and passions, however turbulent, are not a sufficient cause of choosing, since the same passions lead the incontinent to follow them by choice, and fail to induce the continent man. Therefore it must not be said that the heavenly bodies cause our choice.

Further. No faculty is bestowed without a purpose. Now man has the faculty of judging and counselling about all matters relative to his own actions, whether in the use of externals, or in giving a loose or a tight rein to our internal passions. But this would be of no use, if our choice were the result of the heavenly bodies and not in our own power. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our choice.

Besides. Man is naturally a civil or social animal.1 This is evident from the fact that one man does not suffice for himself if he live alone: because the things are few wherein nature makes adequate provision for man, since she gave him his reason by means of which he might provide himself with all necessaries of life, such as food, clothes and so forth, for the production of which one man is not enough. Wherefore man has a natural inclination for social life. Now, the order of providence does not deprive a thing of what is natural to it: rather is each thing provided for according to its nature, as we have said above.2 Therefore man is not so made by the order of providence that he be deprived of social life. Yet he would be deprived of it, were our choice to proceed from the influence of heavenly bodies, like the natural instinct of other animals.

Moreover laws and precepts of conduct would be useless, were man not the master of his own choice: and useless too would be punishments and rewards for good and wicked, if it were not in our power to choose this or that. And yet, if there were not such things there would be at once an end to social life. Consequently man is not so made according to the order of providence, that his choice should result from the movements of heavenly bodies.

Again. A man’s choice is of good and evil things. Hence, if our choosing is the result of the movements of the stars, it would follow that the stars are the per se cause of wicked deeds. But that which is evil has no natural cause, since evil is incidental to a defective cause, and has no per se cause, as we have proved.1 Therefore it is impossible that our choice be the direct and per se effect of the heavenly bodies.

Someone, however, might endeavour to meet this argument by saying that every evil choice results from the desire of some particular good, as we have proved above:2 thus the choice of the lustful man arises from his desire for a good consisting in sexual pleasure: and some star causes movement to this good in general. In fact this is necessary for the generating of animals: and this common good was not to be omitted on account of the particular evil of an individual, who through this instigation chooses an evil.

But this reply is not sufficient if we suppose the heavenly bodies to be the per se cause of our choice, through making direct impressions on our intellect and will. Because the impression made by a univeral cause is received in a thing according to that thing’s mode. Consequently the effect of a star which causes a movement towards pleasure connected in an ordinate manner with generation, will be received into a thing according to the mode proper thereto: thus we see that various animals have various ways and various times of coming together, as becomes their nature, as Aristotle remarks (De Hist. Anim. v. 8). Hence the intellect and will receive the impression of that star according to their mode. Now when a thing is desired according to the mode of the intellect and reason, there is no sin in the choice, which is always evil through not being according to right reason. Therefore if the heavenly bodies were the cause of our choice, we should never make an evil choice.

Further. No active power extends to things above the species and nature of the agent: because every agent acts through its form. Now, to will, as also to understand, transcends every corporeal species: for just as our intellect understands the universal, so also is our will referred to the universal, for instance we dislike every kind of thief, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii. 4). Therefore the act of the will is not caused by a heavenly body.

Besides. Things directed to an end are proportionate to that end. Now, our choice is directed to happiness as our last end. And this does not consist in bodily goods, but in the union of our soul, through the intellect, with divine things: this was proved above1 to be an article of faith and in accordance with the opinion of philosophers. Therefore heavenly bodies cannot be the cause of our choice. Wherefore it is said (Jerem. 10:2, 3): Be not afraid of the signs of heaven which the heathens fear: for the laws of people are vain.

We hereby refute the opinion of the Stoics,2 who held that all our actions, even our every choice, are governed by the heavenly bodies.—This is also said to have been the opinion of the Pharisees among the Jews of old.3—And the Priscillianists were also guilty of this error, as stated in De Hæresibus.4

This was also the opinion of the ancient physicists, who held that intellect differs not from sense. Wherefore Empedocles, as quoted by Aristotle (3 De Anima iii.), said that the will of man, like that of other animals, is strengthened presently (i.e., according to the present moment), by the movement of the heaven which is the cause of time.

We must observe, however, that although heavenly bodies are not the direct cause of our choosing, by making a direct impression on our will, nevertheless indirectly they do occasion our choice, through making an impression on bodies. This happens in two ways. First the impression made by a heavenly body on bodies other than our own may be an occasion of our making a particular choice: thus when through the action of the heavenly bodies the air becomes intensely cold, we choose to warm ourselves by the fire, or to do something similarly befitting the time being.—Secondly, they may make impressions on our own body, and when the body is affected movements of the passions arise; either because such impressions make us liable to certain passions; for instance the bilious are prone to anger; or because they produce in us a bodily disposition that occasions a particular choice, thus when we are ill, we choose to take medicine.—Sometimes too, the heavenly bodies are a cause of human acts, when through an indisposition of the body a person goes out of his mind, and loses the use of reason. Such persons are not capable of choosing properly speaking, but they are moved by a natural instinct, like dumb animals. It is evident, however, and we know by experience, that such occasions whether exterior or interior are not a necessary cause of choice: since man can use his reason to reject or obey them. But those who follow their natural bent are in the majority, and few, the wise alone to wit, are those who avoid the occasions of ill-doing and who follow not the impulse of nature. Hence Ptolemy says (Centiloq. 8, 7, 1) that the soul of the wise man assists the work of the stars; and that the astrologer cannot read the stars unless he knows well the bent of the mind and the natural temperament, and that the astrologer should not express himself in detail but only in general terms: because the majority resist not their bodily disposition, and so the impression of the stars takes effect in them; but not always in this or that individual who, maybe, uses his reason to resist that inclination.

Chapter LXXXVI

that corporeal effects in this lower world do not result of necessity from the action of the heavenly bodies

Not only are the heavenly bodies unable to necessitate man’s choice, but even corporeal effects do not proceed from them of necessity.

For the impressions of universal causes are received by their effects according to the mode of the recipient. Now the things of this lower world are fluctuating and changeable, both by reason of matter which is in potentiality to several forms, and on account of the contrariety of forms and powers. Therefore the impressions of heavenly bodies are not received of necessity by these lower bodies.

Again. A remote cause does not lead to a necessary result, unless the middle cause be also necessary: in a syllogism, for instance, if the major premiss be a necessary statement, and the minor a contingent statement, the conclusion that follows is not necessary. Now heavenly bodies are remote causes, and the proximate causes of the effects here below are the active and passive forces in the bodies of this lower world; and these are not necessary, but contingent, causes, for they may fail in a few instances. Therefore the heavenly bodies do not produce necessary effects in these lower bodies.

Besides. The heavenly bodies are always moved in the same way. Consequently, if heavenly bodies produced an effect on these lower bodies of necessity, there would be no variety in the things that happen to them. Now, they are not always the same, but only for the most part. Therefore they do not happen necessarily.

Moreover. Many contingencies do not make one necessary thing: since, just as each one of them by itself may fail in its effect, so too may all of them together. Now, it is evident that in these lower bodies each thing that happens through the influence of the heavenly bodies is a contingency. Therefore the things that happen here below through the influence of heavenly bodies are not necessarily connected, since it is evident that each one of them may be hindered.

Further. The action of the heavenly bodies is in keeping with their nature: so that they require matter on which to act. Consequently their action does not remove what is required by matter. Now the matter on which heavenly bodies act is the bodies of the lower world: and since these are by nature corruptible, they can fail in action just as they can fail in being, so that their nature requires that they should not produce their effects of necessity. Therefore the effects of heavenly bodies on the bodies of the lower world do not result of necessity.

Perhaps someone will say that the effects of heavenly bodies must necessarily follow, and yet potentiality is not therefore removed from this lower world, because each effect is in potentiality before it comes into being, and is then said to be possible; but when it is in act, it passes from potentiality to necessity, the whole of which process is subject to the heavenly movements, and consequently a given effect is not prevented from having been possible at one time, although it is necessary that it result at some time:—in fact Albumasar strives thus to plead the cause of possibility, in the First Book of his Introductorium.

But the case for possibility cannot be defended in this way. For there is one kind of possible which follows from that which is necessary. Because that which must be necessarily, is possible; since what cannot possibly be, is impossible, and that which is impossible, necessarily is not. Consequently what must necessarily be, must necessarily not be: which is impossible. Hence it is impossible that the same thing should be necessarily, and yet that at the same time it should be impossible for it to be. Therefore possible being follows from necessary being.

But it is not this kind of possible that we need defend in contradiction to the statement that effects result of necessity: but the possible which is contrary to necessary, in which sense we say that a thing may possibly be or not be. Now a thing is said to be possible or contingent not merely because it is at one time potential and at another time actual, as the foregoing reply supposes: since thus, even in the heavenly movements there is possibility and contingency. For the sun and moon are not always actually in conjunction or opposition, but sometimes actually and sometimes potentially: and yet these are necessary things, since such matters are subject to demonstration. But the possible or contingent that is contrary to the necessary, is of such a nature that there is no necessity for it to be, when it is not. And the reason for this is that it does not result necessarily from its cause. Thus we say that it is a contingency that Socrates will sit, whereas it is a necessity that he will die, because the latter results from its cause necessarily, and not the former. Consequently if it follows necessarily from the movements of the heavenly bodies that their effects will result at some time, there will be nothing possible or contingent contrary to that which is necessary.

We must observe, however, that Avicenna having a mind to prove that the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity, offers the following argument (Metaph. x.). If an effect of the heavenly bodies be hindered, this must be due to some cause either voluntary or natural. Now every cause, whether voluntary or natural, is reducible to some heavenly principle. Therefore even the impediment to the heavenly bodies’ effect results from some heavenly principles. Consequently, if we take the whole heavenly order at once, it is impossible for its effect ever to fail. Whence he concludes that the heavenly bodies must necessarily produce effects in the lower things both voluntary and natural.

This argument, as Aristotle observes (2 Phys. iv.) was employed by some of the ancients, who denied the existence of chance and luck, for the reason that every effect has its definite cause, and that given the cause the effect follows of necessity; so that, since everything happens necessarily, nothing can be referred to luck or chance.

He solves this argument (6 Metaph.),1 by denying the two propositions on which it is based. One is that given any cause whatsoever, the effect must follow of necessity. For this is not true of every cause, since even the per se, proper and sufficient cause of a certain effect may be hindered through the clashing of another cause, so that it fails to produce that effect.—The other proposition which he denies is that not everything that exists in any way whatever has a per se cause, but only that which exists per se; and things which exist accidentally, have no cause at all: for instance that a man be musical is to be ascribed to a cause, but that he be musical as well as white, is not due to any cause. Because whatever things concur on account of a cause, are mutually dependent by reason of that cause, whereas accidental things are not mutually dependent. Consequently they are not the result of a per se active cause, but are merely an accidental result: thus it is accidental to the teacher of music that his pupil be a white man, since it is beside his intention, for his intention is to teach one who has an aptitude for music.

Accordingly given any particular effect, we shall say that it had a cause from which it did not necessarily result, because it might have been hindered by the accidental concurrence of another cause. And although we may trace that concurrent cause to some higher cause, we cannot ascribe to any cause the concurrence itself that proved to be a hindrance. Consequently we cannot say that the hindrance to this or that effect is to be traced to some heavenly principle. Therefore we must not allow that the effects of heavenly bodies happen of necessity in this lower world.

Hence Damascene says in the Second Book2 that heavenly bodies do not cause the generation of things that are made, nor the corruption of things that are destroyed: because, to wit, their effects do not follow of necessity.

Aristotle too, says (2 De Somn. et Vigil.)3 that many things betokened by corporeal things, even heavenly bodies, by water for instance or wind, do not happen. For if a stronger movement arise than that which presaged the future, the latter fails in its effect: even so we often renounce our first intent, on account of other and better thoughts.

Ptolemy also says (1 Quadrip. ii.): Again, we must not think that the things which occur through the influence of higher beings are inevitable, like those which happen by divine decree and are altogether unavoidable, and such as do actually and necessarily occur. He says again in the Centiloquium:1 These principles which I have given you, are midway between the necessary and the possible.

Chapter LXXXVII

that the movement of a heavenly body is not the cause of our choosing by virtue of its soul moving us, as some say

We must observe, however, that Avicenna also (Metaph. x.) holds that the movements of the heavenly bodies are the causes of our choice, not merely by being the occasion thereof,2 but even as a per se cause. For he holds the heavenly bodies to be animate: and, since the heaven’s movement proceeds from its soul, and is the movement of a body, it follows that just as forasmuch as it is a body’s movement, it must have the power to transform bodies, so, forasmuch as it comes from a soul, it must have the power to make impressions on our soul; wherefore the heavenly movement is the cause of our acts of will and choice. The position of Albumasar3 would seem to come to the same as expounded in the First Book of his Introductorium.

But this position is unreasonable. Because any effect that is caused by an agent through an instrument, must be proportionate to the instrument as well as to the agent: for we do not employ any instrument for any effect. Consequently it is not possible to produce by means of an instrument an effect which is utterly outside the scope of its action. Now it is altogether beyond the scope of a body’s action to impress the intellect or will, as proved above;1 except perhaps indirectly by making an impression on the body, as we have said.2 Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body’s soul, if it have one, to make an impression on the intellect and will by means of the movement of that heavenly body.

Moreover. The particular active cause, while acting, bears a resemblance to the universal active cause, and imitates it. Now if a human soul were to make an impression on another human soul through an action of the body, as when it reveals its mind by means of vocal signs, the bodily action that proceeds from the one soul does not reach the other soul except by means of the body: for the vocal sounds play on the organ of hearing, and thus being perceived by the sense, its meaning reaches the understanding. Consequently if the celestial soul makes an impression on our soul by means of a corporeal movement, its action will not reach our soul except through a change effected in our body. But this does not cause our choice, but only occasions it, as we have shown above.3 Therefore the heavenly movement is not the cause but only the occasion of our choice.

Again. Since mover and moved must be simultaneous, as is proved in 7 Phys. ii., it follows that movement must come from the first mover to the last thing moved in a certain order, so that, to wit, the mover moves that which is distant through that which is nearest. Now our body is nearer to the heavenly body which is supposed to be moved by the soul united to it, than our soul which is not ordered to the heavenly body except through its own body. This is proved by the fact that separate intellects are not ordered to a heavenly body, except perhaps as a mover to that which it moves. Therefore the impression of a heavenly body that originates in its soul does not reach our soul save through our body. And our soul is not moved in response to the movement of the body except accidentally, nor does choice result from an impression made on the body except as occasioned thereby, as we have said.1 Therefore the heavenly body’s movement cannot be the cause of our choice through coming from its soul.

Besides. According to the opinion of Avicenna and certain other philosophers, the active intellect is a separate substance which acts on our souls in so far as it makes what is potentially intelligible to be understood actually.2 Now this is the result of abstraction from all material conditions, as is clear from what we have said in the Second Book.3 Consequently that which acts directly on the soul, does so not by means of a corporeal movement, but rather by abstraction of everything corporeal. Therefore the soul of heaven, if it have a soul, cannot be through the heavenly movement the cause of our acts of choosing or understanding.

By the same arguments it can be proved that the heavenly movement is not the cause of our choice by the power of a separate substance, if anyone suppose the heaven not to be animate, but to be moved by a separate substance.

Chapter LXXXVIII

that created substances cannot be the direct causes of our acts of choosing and willing, but god alone

We must not think, however, that the souls of heavenly bodies, if there be any,4 or any intellectual separate substances, can directly impel our will or cause our choice.

For the actions of all creatures are subordinate to divine providence; so that they are unable to act beside its laws. Now it is a law of providence that everything is moved immediately by its proximate cause. Consequently, unless this order be observed, the higher created cause can neither move nor act. Again, the proximate moving cause of the will is the good understood, which is its object, and it is moved thereby as sight by colour. Therefore no created substance can move the will except by means of the good understood: in so far, to wit, as it shows it that a particular thing is good to do: and this is to persuade. Therefore no created substance can act on the will, or cause our choice, except by way of persuasion.

Again. A thing is naturally moved by and passive to that agent by whose form it can be reduced to act: since every agent acts by its form. Now the will is made actual by the appetible object, which stills the movement of its desire. And the will’s desire is satisfied by the divine good alone as its last end, as we have proved above.1 Therefore God alone can move the will as an agent.

Besides. The natural inclination, which we call the natural appetite, of inanimate things for their proper end is like the will or intellectual appetite in intellectual substances. Now a natural inclination cannot be given except by the maker of nature. Therefore the will cannot be inclined to anything except by the cause of the intellectual nature. But this belongs to God alone, as we have proved above.2 Therefore He alone can incline our will to anything.

Moreover. As stated in 3 Ethic. i., a violent action is one in which the principle is external, and the one who suffers violence contributes nothing. Consequently if the will be moved by an external principle, its movement will be violent:—and I speak of being moved by an external principle that moves as an agent, and not as an end. Now the violent is opposed to the voluntary. Therefore it is impossible that the will be moved by an external principle as an agent, and every movement of the will must come from within. But no created substance is united to the intellectual soul in its inmost being except God alone, who alone is the cause and sustainer of its being. Therefore the movement of the will can be caused by none but God alone.

Further. Violent movement is contrary to natural and voluntary movement; because both of these must be from an internal principle. But an external agent does not cause a natural movement except in so far as it causes an internal principle of movement to be in the movable thing: thus the generator that gives the form of gravity to the generated heavy body, gives it a natural downward movement.1 And nothing else external can move a natural body without violence, except perhaps indirectly, as that which removes an obstacle, for such a thing makes use of natural movement or action rather than causes it. Therefore that agent alone can cause a movement of the will without violence, which causes the internal principle of that movement, namely the power itself of the will. And this is God, who alone creates the soul, as we proved in the Second Book.2 Therefore God alone can move the will, as an agent, without violence.

This is expressed in the words of Prov. 21:1: The heart of the King is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it: and Philip 2:13: It is God who worketh in us3 both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.

Chapter LXXXIX

that the movement of the will, and not only the power of the will, is caused by god

Some, nevertheless, unable to understand how God can cause in us the movement of the will without prejudice to liberty, have endeavoured to give a false exposition to the authorities quoted.4 They say, in fact, that God causes in us to will and to accomplish, by causing in us the power to will, and not by causing us to will this or that. This is the exposition of Origen (3 Peri Arch. i.) who defended free-will in a sense contrary to the aforesaid authorities.

Apparently this was the source of the opinion of some who maintained that providence does not regard things subject to free-will, namely our elections, but only external happenings. For he who chooses to get or do something, for instance to build or get rich, is not always able to succeed; and so the outcome of our actions is not subject to our free-will, but is ordained by providence.

But the authority of Scripture is in manifest opposition to all this: for it is said (Isa. 26:12): O Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in1 us. Hence we receive from God not only the power to will, but also our very operations.

Further. The very words of Solomon, Whithersoever He will He shall turn it,2 show that the divine causality extends not only to the will, but also to its act.

Again. Not only does God give things their powers, but also nothing can act by its own power, unless it act by His power, as we proved above.3 Therefore man cannot use the will-power given to him, except forasmuch as he acts by God’s power. Now the thing by whose power the agent acts, is the cause not only of the power but also of the act. This is apparent in the craftsman, by whose power the instrument acts, even though it may not have received its form from the craftsman in question, and is merely applied by him to action. Therefore God is the cause not only of our will but also of our willing.

Further. Order in spiritual things is more perfect than in corporeal things. Now in corporeal things every movement is caused by the first movement. Therefore in spiritual things every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is God’s.

Besides. We proved above4 that God is the cause of every action, and that He works in every agent. Therefore He is the cause of the movements of the will.

Again. Aristotle argues in the same sense (8 Ethic. Eudem.)5 as follows. There must be some cause of a person understanding, taking counsel, choosing and willing, because everything new must have a cause. And if the cause of these acts was another act of counsel and another act of will, since in such things we cannot proceed to infinity, we must come at length to something first. And this first thing must be something better than the reason. And nothing but God is better than the intellect and the reason. Therefore God is the first principle of our counsels and wills.

Chapter XC

that human choice and will are subject to divine providence

Hence it follows that human will and choice are subject to divine providence.

For whatsoever God does, He does according to the order of His providence. Wherefore, since He is the cause of our choice and will,1 these are subject to divine providence.

Moreover. All corporeal things are governed by means of spiritual things, as we have shown above.2 Now spiritual things act on corporeal things by their will. Consequently if the acts of choice and will in intellectual substances are not the concern of God’s providence, it follows that corporeal things also are withdrawn from His providence: so that there will be no providence at all.

Besides. The higher a thing is placed in the universe, the more must it participate in the order in which the good of the universe consists. Hence Aristotle (2 Phys. iv.) reproaches the ancient philosophers for admitting chance and luck in the scheme of the heavenly bodies, but not in the things of the lower world. Now intellectual substances hold a higher place than corporeal substances. Therefore if corporeal substances, as regards their essence and operation, are included in the order of providence, much more so are intellectual substances.

Again. Those things which are nearest to the end are more subject to the order whereby things are directed to the end, since by their means even other things are ordered to the end. Now the actions of intellectual substances are more intimately ordered to God in their end, than the actions of other things, as we have proved above.3 Therefore the actions of intellectual substances come under the order of providence, whereby God directs all things to Himself, more than the actions of other things.

Further. The government of providence proceeds from God’s love for the things created by Him: for love consists chiefly in this, that the lover desires the good of the beloved.1 Consequently the more God loves a thing, the more it comes under His providence. This is the teaching of Holy Writ, Ps. 144:20 where it is said: The Lord keepeth all them that love Him: and the Philosopher also says (10 Ethic. viii.) that God cares most for those who love the intellect, as being His friends: from which we may conclude that He loves intellectual substances most of all. Therefore their acts of will and choice are the object of His providence.

Moreover. Man’s interior goods which depend on his will and action, are more proper to man than external goods, such as acquiring wealth, and the like: wherefore a man is said to be good in respect of the former and not of the latter. Consequently if human choice and the movements of man’s will do not come under divine providence, but only external happenings, it will be truer to say that human affairs are not the concern of providence than that they are. But the former saying is put into the mouth of blasphemers (Job 22:14): He doth not consider our things, and he walketh about the poles of heaven, and (Ezech. 9:9): The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not, and (Lament. 3:37): Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not?

Some passages in the Holy Doctrine might seem to give utterance to that opinion. Thus it is said (Ecclus. 15:14): God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel, and further on (17, 18): He hath set water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him. Also (Deut. 30:15): Consider that I have set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand death and evil.—But these words indicate that man has a free-will, not that his choice is withdrawn from divine providence.

Likewise the statement of Gregory of Nyssa in his book On Man:1 Providence regards those things that are not in our power, and not those that are: and the saying of Damascene, who followed him, in the Second Book,2 that God knows but does not predetermine the things which are in our power, are to be understood as meaning that the things which are in our power are not subject to the divine predetermination in such a way as to be necessitated thereby.

Chapter XCI

how human affairs may be referred to higher causes

From what has been proved we are able to gather how human affairs are to be referred to higher causes, and do not happen by chance.

For acts of choice and will are under the immediate governance of God.3 Human knowledge pertaining to the intellect is directed by God through angelic intermediaries.4 While things pertaining to the body, whether internal or external, and adapted to man’s use, are governed by God by means of the angels and heavenly bodies.5 There is one general reason for this. Because every thing that is multiform, changeable and defectible must be referred to a principle that is uniform, unchangeable and indefectible. And every thing connected with us is multiform, changeable and defectible.

For it is clear that our choice is made in many different ways: since different people choose different things in different circumstances. Again our choice is changeable: both through the instability of the mind which is not firmly fixed on the last end; and because things themselves change in the midst of which we live. That man’s choice is defectible is proved by his sins. On the other hand the divine will is uniform, since by willing one he wills all things, and is unchangeable and indefectible, as we proved in the First Book.6 Therefore all movements of will and choice must be traced to the divine will: and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our willing and choosing.1

In like manner our intelligence is manifold, since from many sensible objects we gather into one, as it were, the intelligible truth. It is also changeable since by discoursing it passes from one thing to another, from the known to the unknown. Again it is defectible, through admixture of imagination and sense, as the errors of men testify.—On the other hand the cognition of the angels is uniform, because they receive the knowledge of truth from the one fount of verity, namely God.2 It is also unchangeable, because they see the truth about things, not by discoursing from effects to cause or vice versa, but by simple intuition.3 It is also indefectible, since they see intuitively the very natures or quiddities of things in themselves,4 about which the intellect cannot err, as neither can the senses about their proper sensible objects: whereas we gather the nature of a thing from its accidents and effects. Therefore our intellectual knowledge must be ruled by the knowledge of the angels.

Again, as to human bodies and the external things of which men make use, it is evident that they are blended together and contrary to one another in many ways: also that they are not always moved in the same way, because their movements cannot be continual: and that they are defectible by alteration and corruption.—Whereas heavenly bodies are uniform, being simple and devoid of all contrariety. Also, their movements are uniform, continual and unchangeable. Nor can there be corruption or alteration in them. Consequently our bodies and whatever else serves for our use must be ruled by the movements of the heavenly bodies.

Chapter XCII

how a man may be said to be fortunate, and how he is assisted by higher causes

It may be seen from what has been said how a man is said to be fortunate.

For a man is said to have good luck when something good happens to him beside his intention:1 for instance when a man, while digging in a field, finds a treasure which he was not seeking. Now a man, while working, may do something beside his own intention, yet not beside the intention of someone above him: for instance, if a master send a servant to a place whither he had already sent another servant without the knowledge of the former, the finding of the latter is unintentional to the former, but not to the master who sent him: and therefore although in relation to this servant the meeting is fortuitous and casual, it is not so in relation to the master, but is intentional. Since then man, as to his body, is subordinate to the heavenly bodies; as to his intellect, to the angels; and as to his will, to God: it is possible for something to happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order of the heavenly bodies, or the influence of the angels or even of God. And although God’s action alone has a direct bearing on man’s choice, nevertheless the angel’s action has a certain bearing on man’s choice by way of persuasion; and the action of a heavenly body by way of disposition, insomuch as the corporeal impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies dispose us to choose in certain ways. Accordingly when, through the influence of higher causes, in the aforesaid manner, a man is led to choose such things as turn to his profit without his being aware of the utility by his own reason; and besides this, his understanding is enlightened from the light of intellectual substances to the effect of doing those same things; and through the divine operation his will is inclined so as to choose that which is profitable to him, without knowing why it is so; he is said to be fortunate; and on the contrary he is said to be unfortunate, when through the influence of higher causes his choice is inclined to contrary things; as it is said of someone (Jer. 22:30): Write this man barren, a man that shall not prosper in his days.

Yet herein we must observe a difference. For the impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies cause in us natural dispositions of the body. Consequently from the disposition left in our body by a heavenly body, one is said not only to be fortunate or unfortunate, but also to have a good or a bad natural disposition, in which sense the Philosopher says (Magn. Moral., loc. cit.), that to be fortunate is to have, a good natural disposition. For it is inconceivable that the fact of one person choosing what is useful and another what is hurtful, without their knowing it, be due to these people differing in understanding, since the nature of understanding and will is the same in all: because a formal difference would cause a specific difference, and a material difference causes a difference of individuals. Consequently forasmuch as the human intellect is enlightened for the purpose of operation, or the will instigated by God, a man is not said to be well disposed by nature, but to be well guarded or well governed.

Again, another difference is to be observed here. For the operation of an angel and of a heavenly body merely disposes a man to choose, whereas the operation of God gives completion to his choice. And since the disposition arising from a quality affecting the body, or from the persuasion of the intellect, does not necessitate his choice, man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, nor that to which the heavenly body inclines him: whereas he always chooses in accord with God’s operation in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated, according to Jer. 51:9: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: and much more so the influence of heavenly bodies: whereas divine providence never fails.

Yet another difference must be observed. For since a heavenly body does not dispose a man to choose, except forasmuch as it makes an impression on our bodies, so that a man is influenced in his choice, in the same way as he is led by his passions to choose; every disposition towards choosing resulting from the influence of the heavenly bodies, is by way of a passion, as when one is led to make a certain choice, through hate, love, or anger and the like.—On the other hand, a man is disposed by an angel to make a certain choice, by way of intellectual consideration, without passion. And this happens in two ways. Sometimes man’s understanding is enlightened by an angel so as to know only that a certain thing is good to do, without being instructed as to the reason for its being good, which reason depends on the end. Consequently sometimes a man thinks it good to do a certain thing, and yet were he asked why, he would answer that he did not know.1 Hence when he achieves the useful end, to which he had given no thought, it will be fortuitous for him. Sometimes he is instructed by the angel who enlightens him, both as to the goodness of a thing to be done, and as to the reason why it is good, which reason depends on the end. And so, when he achieves the end to which he looked forward, it will not be fortuitous.—It must also be noted that the active force of a spiritual nature surpasses that of a corporeal nature in being wider in its scope even as it is higher in its kind. Consequently the disposition caused by a heavenly body does not extend to all those things that come under the scope of man’s choice.

Again. The power of the human soul or even of an angel is restricted in comparison with the divine power, which extends universally to all beings. Hence some good can happen to a man both beside his intention, and beside the influence of heavenly bodies, and beside the angelic enlightenment, but not beside divine providence which is the governor, even as it is the maker of being qua being, wherefore it must hold all things in its power. Consequently some good or evil may happen to a man by chance both in relation to himself, and in relation to heavenly bodies, and in relation to the angels, but not in relation to God. Because in relation to God not only in human affairs but in all things whatsoever, there then can be nothing fortuitous or unforeseen.

And since fortuitous things are those which are unintentional: and moral goods cannot be unintentional, because they are founded on choice, in their respect no man can be described as fortunate or unfortunate, although in their respect one may say that he has by nature a good or evil disposition, when through the natural dispositions of his body he is inclined to the choice of virtue or vice. With regard to external goods, which can accrue to man beside his intention, he may be described both as having a natural disposition for them, and as having good fortune, and as governed by God, and as guarded by the angels.

Man receives yet another assistance from the higher causes, with regard to the performance of his actions. For whereas man has the faculty to choose and to prosecute his choice, in either case he is sometimes helped by higher causes, and sometimes hindered. With regard to his choice, as we have said, in so far as a man is either disposed to choose a certain thing through the influence of heavenly bodies, or enlightened as it were through the guardianship of angels, or led through the operation of God.—With regard to the execution, in so far as man receives from some higher cause strength and efficiency to accomplish his choice. These things may come not only from God and the angels, but even from heavenly bodies, in so far as the aforesaid efficiency may be seated in the body. For it is evident that even inanimate bodies receive certain forces and efficiencies from heavenly bodies, even besides those which result from the active and passive qualities of the elements, which qualities, without any doubt, are subject to the heavenly bodies; thus that the magnet attracts iron is due to the power of a heavenly body, and in the same way certain stones and plants have occult powers. Wherefore there is no reason why one man should not receive through the influence of a heavenly body, a certain efficiency for certain corporeal effects, that is not possessed by another man: for instance, a physician for healing, a farmer for planting, a soldier for fighting. But this efficiency is bestowed on man by God much more perfectly for the purpose of accomplishing His works. Accordingly, as regards the first kind of assistance, which man receives in choosing, God is said to direct him: and as to the second, He is said to strengthen him. These two assistances are indicated in the Psalms,1 where it is said, in reference to the first: The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom shall I fear? and in reference to the second: The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid?

There is, however, a twofold difference between these two assistances. The first is that by the first man is assisted both in things subject to his skill, and in others: whereas the second assistance extends only to such things for which man’s skill is available. Thus if a man while digging a grave, find a treasure, this does not result from any skill of his: wherefore with a view to such a result a man may be assisted through being instigated to seek where the treasure is, but not by receiving the skill for finding treasures. But that a physician heal, or that a soldier conquer in battle, may result both from assistance received in the choice of means adopted to the end, and from skill received from a higher cause for the success of their actions. Hence the first assistance is more universal.—The other difference is that the second assistance is given for the purpose of accomplishing what one intends to do. Wherefore since the fortuitous is unintentional, a man cannot properly speaking be said to be fortunate through receiving such assistance, as he can through receiving the former kind of assistance, as we have shown above. Now, a man is fortunate or unfortunate sometimes when he acts alone, as when he finds a hidden treasure while he is digging: and sometimes through the concurrent action of another cause, as when a man while going to market intent on buying, meets a debtor whom he did not expect to meet. In the first instance the man was assisted to his good fortune, solely in that he was directed in the choice of something to which a profit was accidentally attached beside his intention. In the second instance both agents need to be directed to choose an action or movement resulting in their mutual encounter.

There is yet another observation to be made about the foregoing. For it has been said that the happening of good or bad fortune to a man, both is from God, and may be from a heavenly body: inasmuch as man is led by God to choose a thing to which some advantage or disadvantage is attached without being considered by the chooser; and in so far as he is disposed by a heavenly body to make such a choice. This advantage or disadvantage, in reference to man’s choice, is fortuitous; in reference to God, it is no longer fortuitous, whereas it is so in reference to the heavenly body. This is proved as follows. An event does not cease to be fortuitous until it is referred to its per se cause. Now, the power of a heavenly body is an active cause, not by way of understanding or choosing, but by way of nature: and it is proper to nature to tend to one thing. Accordingly if a certain effect is not one thing, no natural power can be its per se cause. And when two things are united together accidentally, they are one not really, but only accidentally. Wherefore no natural cause can be the per se cause of such a conjunction. Suppose then that the man in question is led through the impression of a heavenly body, as by a passion, as we said before, to dig a grave. Now the grave and the place of the treasure are not one thing save accidentally, because they have no mutual connection. Consequently the power of the heavenly body cannot cause an inclination per se to this effect considered as a whole, namely that the man in question should dig a grave and a place where a treasure is. Whereas one that acts through the intellect can cause an inclination to this whole, because it belongs to an intelligent being to direct many things to one. It is also plain that a man who knew the treasure to be there, might send another who knew it not, to dig a grave in the same place, so that he might find the treasure unintentionally. Accordingly such fortuitous events when referred to the divine causality, cease to be fortuitous, but not when they are referred to a heavenly cause.

The same argument shows that a man cannot be fortunate in every possible way through the influence of a heavenly body, but only in this or that respect. When I say in every way, I mean that a man is not by nature such that through the influence of a heavenly body, he chooses always or nearly always, those particular things to which some advantage or disadvantage is accidentally connected. For nature is directed to one thing only: and the things in regard to which man is fortunate or unfortunate are not reducible to one, but are indeterminate and infinite in number; as the Philosopher says (2 Phys. v.), and is evident to any one with sense. Therefore it is impossible for anyone to be of such a nature as invariably to choose those things which have some advantage incidental to them. But one may be inclined by a heavenly body to choose something to which an incidental advantage is attached, and by some other inclination, to choose something else, and by yet a third inclination, to choose yet another thing, but not by one inclination to choose them all. Whereas man can be directed to all things by the one divine disposition.

Chapter XCIII

is there such a thing as fate, and what is it?

We may gather from the foregoing what we should think about fate. For observing that many things happen in this world accidentally, if particular causes be taken into consideration, some have maintained that such things are not subordinate to any superior causes. According to this opinion there is no such thing as fate. Others, however, endeavoured to refer such things to certain higher causes, asserting that they are directed thereby so as to proceed from them in orderly fashion. These held that there is fate, as though things which appear to happen by chance were effata, that is foretold or preordained by someone.1

Some of these pretended to ascribe all contingent occurrences of this world to the causality of heavenly bodies, not excluding human elections, and they held that all such things are subject to the directing force of the stars, which force they called fate. This opinion is impossible and contrary to faith, as we have already shown.2

Others, however, wished to assign to the direction of divine providence, all such things as appear to happen by chance in this lower world. Wherefore they maintained that all these things are subject to fate, this being the name given by them to the disposition which divine providence causes to be in things. Hence Boethius says3 that fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which providence connects each one with its proper order. In this definition disposition stands for order; the words inherent to things are included to differentiate fate from providence, because the order as existing in the divine mind and not yet impressed on things is providence, but as already expressed in things, is called fate; changeable is added to show that the order of providence does not deprive things of contingency and changeableness, as some maintained.

In this sense to deny fate is to deny divine providence. Since, however, we should not use even names in common with unbelievers, lest use of the same expressions lead us into error: the faithful should not use the word fate, lest they seem to agree with those who having false notions about fate, subject all things to the force of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, v., 1): If anyone gives the name of fate to God’s will or power, let him keep his opinion, but hold his tongue: and Gregory in the same sense says:4 Far be it from the minds of the faithful to think that fate is anything real.

Chapter XCIV

of the certainty of divine providence

A difficulty, however, arises from what has been said. For if all, even the contingent, happenings of this lower world, are subject to divine providence, it would follow seemingly that either providence is uncertain, or all happenings necessary.

For the Philosopher proves (6 Metaph.)1 that if we suppose every effect to have a per se cause, and again that given any per se cause, we must of necessity grant the effect: it will follow that all future events happen of necessity. For if every effect has a per se cause, every effect will be reducible to some cause either present or past. Thus if it be asked whether a certain man will be killed by robbers, this effect is preceded by a cause which is his being met by the robbers; and this effect is again preceded by another cause, namely that he went out; and this again was preceded by another cause, namely that he went to fetch some water; and this by another cause, namely that he was thirsty; and this was caused by his partaking of salt meat; which he is either eating now or has ate already. Accordingly if given the cause we must necessarily grant the effect: if he eats the salt meat, he is of necessity thirsty; if he thirsts, it is necessary that he wish to seek water; and if he wish to seek water, that he leave his house; and if he go out, that the robbers meet him; and if they meet him, that they kill him. Therefore from first to last, it is necessary that this eater of salt meat be killed by robbers. The Philosopher concludes then that it is untrue that given the cause, the effect must of necessity be granted also, since some of these causes may be ineffective. Nor again is it true that every effect has a per se cause: because that which is accidental, namely that the man who wants water should meet some robbers, has no cause.

This argument proves then that all effects reducible to a per se cause, whether present or past, which being given, the effect follows of necessity, happen themselves of necessity. Either therefore we must say that not all effects are subject to divine providence: and thus providence would not be about all things, contrary to what was proved above1: or we must say that granted providence, it is not necessary for its effects to follow: and then providence will not be certain: or that all things must needs happen of necessity: for providence is not only in the present and the past, but from eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal.

Further. If divine providence be certain this conditional proposition must be true: If God foresaw this, it will be. Now the antecedent of this proposition is necessary, for it is eternal. Therefore the consequence is necessary: because whenever the antecedent of a conditional proposition is necessary, the consequence is likewise necessary; so that the consequence is like a conclusion of the antecedent, and whatever follows from a necessity is itself a necessity. Accordingly if divine providence is certain, all things must happen of necessity.

Moreover. Supposing a thing to be foreseen by God, for instance that so and so will reign. Either then it is possible for it to happen that he does not reign, or it is not possible. If it be not possible for him not to reign, then it is impossible: therefore it is necessary that he will reign. On the other hand, if it be possible that he will not reign, then, since given a possibility nothing impossible follows,2 and whereas it does follow that divine providence is at fault, it remains that it is not impossible for divine providence to fail. Consequently it follows, if all things are foreseen by God, that either divine providence is uncertain, or that all things happen of necessity.

Again. Tully argues thus (2 De Divin., vii.):3 If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain. If this be true all things are subject to fate. If all things are subject to fate, nothing is subject to our power, and there is no such thing as free-will. Therefore if divine providence is certain, there is no free-will. And it will also follow that there is no such thing as a contingent cause.

Besides. Divine providence does not exclude intermediary causes, as we have proved.1 But some causes are contingent and defectible. Therefore the effect of divine providence may fail. Therefore God’s providence is uncertain.

In order to solve these difficulties, we must recall some points already laid down: so as to make it clear that nothing escapes from divine providence; and that the order of divine providence is utterly unchangeable; and that, notwithstanding, it does not follow that whatever results from divine providence, must happen of necessity.

First, we must observe that as God is the cause of all existent things by giving them their very being, the order of His providence must needs include all things: because to those things to which He has given being, He must grant a continuance of being, and perfection by attaining their last end.2

Now in everyone that exercises providence there are two points for consideration,3 namely forethought about the order of things, and establishment of the premeditated order in the things subject to providence, the former pertaining to the cognitive, and the latter to the executive faculty: and there is this difference between them, that in designing the order, providence is so much the more perfect, as its order is more able to reach the most minute things. For it is owing to our defective knowledge which cannot comprise all individual things, that we are unable to arrange beforehand all the particulars; and a man is considered more fit to make provision according as his foresight extends to more particulars: and one whose foresight extends only to general considerations, has but a small share of prudence. The same may be observed in all productive arts. On the other hand, as regards the causing of the premeditated order to be in things, the providence of the governor is the higher in order and perfection, according as it is more universal, and brings about the realization of its forethought through more ministers: in fact the mere organization of these ministers has a large place in the order of providence.—Now God’s providence must be supremely perfect, because He is simply and universally perfect, as we proved in the First Book.1 Consequently in his providence He orders all things, even the most trivial, by the eternal forethought of His wisdom: and whatsoever things operate, do so as instruments moved by Him,2 and serve Him obediently, so as to bring forth into the world the order of providence excogitated, as it were, from eternity.—And if all things that are capable of action, must needs act as His ministers, it is impossible that any agent hinder the execution of divine providence, by acting contrary thereto. Nor again is it possible for divine providence to be hindered through a defect in any agent or patient, since every power, active or passive, is caused in things according to God’s disposition.3 Again it is impossible for the execution of divine providence to be prevented through a change in the author of providence, since God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved.4 It follows therefore that divine providence cannot possibly fail.

Secondly it must be observed that every agent aims at a good, and at a greater good so far as it is able, as we have proved.5 Now, the good and the better are not the same as considered in the whole and as considered in the parts.6 For in the whole the good consists in integrity which results from the order and composition of parts. Consequently for the whole it is better that there be disparity of parts, which is necessary for the order and perfection of the whole, than that all the parts be equal, each one being on a level with the most excellent part; whereas each part of inferior degree would be better, considered in itself, if it were on the same level as a higher part. Take, as an example, the human body: the foot would be a more excellent part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye: but the whole body would be more imperfect, if it were deprived of the service of the foot. Accordingly the intention of the particular agent differs from that of the universal agent: for the particular agent aims at the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can; whereas the universal agent aims at the good of the whole. Consequently a defect is beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. Thus the generation of a female is clearly beside the intention of a particular nature, namely, of this particular virtue in this particular seed, the tendency of which is to make the embryo as perfect as possible: on the other hand it is the purpose of universal nature, namely of the power of the universal cause of generation in inferior beings, that a female be generated, which is a necessary condition for the generation of many animals. In like manner corruption, diminution, and every defect is in the purpose of universal nature, but not of the particular nature: because each thing shuns deficiency and, for its own part, aims at perfection. It is clear, then, that the particular agent aims at the greatest possible perfection of its effect in its kind; while the universal nature aims at a particular perfection in a particular effect, for instance the perfection of a male in one effect, that of a female in another.—Among the parts of the whole universe the first distinction to be observed is between the contingent and the necessary:1 since the higher beings are necessary, incorruptible and unchangeable: and the lower a thing is, the more it falls short of this condition: so that the lowest are corruptible in their very being, are changeable in their disposition, and produce their effects, not of necessity but contingently. Wherefore every agent that is a part of the universe has a tendency to remain firm in its being and natural disposition, and to establish its effect: while God, who governs the universe, intends to establish some of His effects by way of necessity, and others by way of contingency. Accordingly He adapts various causes to those effects, to some necessary, to others contingent causes. Therefore it belongs to the order of divine providence, not only that such and such an effect be produced, but that it be caused necessarily, and that some other effect be produced contingently: and consequently some of the things subject to divine providence are necessary, and some contingent, and not all necessary.—It is therefore evident that although divine providence is the per se cause of a particular future effect; and although it is present and past, yet more truly eternal: it does not follow, as the first argument pretended, that this particular effect necessarily will be; for the divine providence is the per se cause that this particular effect will happen contingently. And this cannot fail.

Wherefore it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: If God foresaw that this would happen, it will be so, as the second argument stated. But it will be as God foresaw that it would be. Now, He foresaw that it would happen contingently. It follows then infallibly that it will be, contingently and not of necessity. It is also clear that if this thing which we suppose to be foreseen by God as future, be of a contingent nature, it will be possible for it not to happen considered in itself: for it is foreseen in such a way as to be contingent, and possible not to be. Yet the order of divine providence cannot fail but that it will happen contingently. Thus the third argument is solved. Consequently we may say that the man in question will not reign if we consider the statement in itself, but not if we consider it as foreseen.

Again the argument advanced by Tully appears of small account in the light of what we have said. For seeing that not only effects but also causes and modes of being are subject to divine providence, as is clear from the foregoing, it does not follow, if all things are ruled by divine providence, that nothing is under our control: for they are foreseen by God so as to be freely done by us.

Nor can the defectibility of second causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, deprive divine providence of certainty, as the fifth objection argued. For God Himself works in all things according to the decree of His will, as we proved above.1 Consequently it belongs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from failing.

Such arguments as might be used to prove the necessity of things foreseen by God from the certitude of His knowledge, were solved above when we were treating of the divine knowledge.2

Chapters XCV and XCVI

that the unchangeableness of divine providence does not exclude the usefulness of prayer

We must also observe that as the unchangeableness of providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it exclude the usefulness of prayer. For we do not pray that the external disposition of His providence may be changed, since this is impossible, but that He may grant what we desire. For it is fitting that God should assent to the pious yearnings of the rational creature, not that our desires have the effect of changing a God who is unchangeable, but as an effect befitting His goodness in granting our desires. Because since all things naturally desire the good, as we have proved,3 and since it belongs to the supereminent divine goodness to bestow being and well-being on all things in a certain order, it follows that He fulfils, according to His goodness, the pious desires of which our prayers are the expression.

Again. He who causes a thing to move, should lead that thing to the end: so that by the same nature, a thing is moved to its end, attains to that end and rests therein. Now every desire is a movement to a good: and it cannot be in a thing except it come from God, who is good in His essence, and the source of goodness: for every mover moves to its like. Therefore it belongs to God, according to His goodness, to bring to a fitting issue the reasonable desires which are expressed by means of one’s prayers.

Besides. The nearer things are to their mover, the more effectively do they receive the mover’s impression: thus the things nearer to a fire are more heated thereby. Now intellectual substances are nearer to God than inanimate natural substances. Consequently the impression of the divine motion is more efficacious in intellectual substances than in other natural substances. Now natural bodies participate in the divine motion to this extent that they receive therefrom a natural appetite for the good, as well as the fulfilment of that appetite, which is realized when they attain to their respective ends. Much more therefore do intellectual substances attain to the fulfilment of their desires which are proffered to God in their prayers.

Moreover. It is essential to friendship that the lover wish the desire of the beloved to be fulfilled, inasmuch as he seeks his good and perfection: hence it has been said that friends have but one will.1 Now we have proved2 that God loves His creature, and so much the more as it has a greater share of His goodness, which is the first and chief object of His love.3 Hence He wills the desires of the rational creature to be fulfilled, since of all creatures it participates most perfectly in the divine goodness. Now it is from His will that things derive their being, because He is the cause of things through His will, as was proved above.4 Therefore it belongs to God’s goodness to fulfil the rational creature’s desires, as laid before him in our prayers.

Besides. The creature’s good flows from the divine goodness, in a kind of likeness thereto. Now it is seemingly a most praiseworthy trait in a man if he grant the prayers of those who ask aright; since for this reason is he said to be liberal, gentle, merciful and kind. Therefore it belongs in a special manner to the divine goodness to grant pious prayers.

Wherefore it is said in the Psalm (144:19): He will do the will of them that fear Him, and He will hear their prayers and save them: and (Matth. 7:8) our Lord says: Every one that asketh receiveth: and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened.

1And yet it is not unfitting that sometimes the petitions of those who pray be not granted by God.

For it was proved that God fulfils the desires of the rational creature, inasmuch as the good is the object of the creature’s desire. Sometimes, however, it happens that what we seek is good not truly but apparently, and is simply evil. Such a prayer, therefore, cannot be granted by God: hence it is said (James 4:3): You ask and you receive not, because you ask amiss.

Again, it was shown to be fitting that God fulfils our desires, because he moves us to desire. Now the thing moved is not brought to the end of its movement unless the movement continue. Accordingly if the movement of desire be not continued by repeated prayer, it is not unfitting if the prayer be ineffectual. Thus our Lord says (Lk. 18:1) that we ought always to pray and not to faint: and (1 Thess. 5:17) the Apostle says: Pray without ceasing.

Further. We proved that God fittingly fulfils the desire of the rational creature on account of its being near to God. Now a man approaches to God by contemplation, devout affections, and humble but firm resolutions. A prayer, therefore, that lacks these conditions in its approach to God, does not deserve to be granted by Him. Hence it is said in the Psalm (101:18): He hath had regard to the prayer of the humble; and (James 1:6): Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.

Moreover. We proved that God grants the prayers of the devout on the score of friendship. Consequently if a man rejects God’s friendship, his prayer is unworthy of being granted. Hence it is said (Prov. 28:9): He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination: and (Isa. 1:15): When you multiply prayer, I will not hear, for your hands are full of blood. It is on the same principle that sometimes a friend of God is not heard when he prays for those who are not God’s friends: thus it is said (Jer. 7:16): Therefore do not thou pray for this people, nor take to thee praise and supplication for them: and do not withstand me: for I will not hear thee.

It happens, too, sometimes that through friendship a man refuses his friend’s request, because he knows it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him: even as a physician will sometimes refuse a sick man what he asks, knowing that it is not good for his health. Wherefore, since it has been proved that God, for love of the rational creature, fulfils the desires set forth in his prayers, we must not be surprised if sometimes He fulfil not the prayers of those even who are most dear to Him, that He may accomplish what is best for the welfare of the suppliant. For this He removed not from Paul the thorn in his flesh, though thrice he prayed for this, because he foresaw that this would be good for him by keeping him humble, as related in 2 Cor. 12:8, 9. Hence also (Matth. 20:22) our Lord said to some: You know not what you ask: and (Rom. 8:26) it is said: For we know not what we should pray for as we ought. For this reason Augustine says (Ep. ad Paulin. et Theras.):1 The Lord is good, for often He grants not what we want, that He may give what we want more.

It is clear then from what has been said, that prayers and pious desires are the cause of some of the things done by God. Now it has been shown2 that God’s providence does not exclude other causes: rather indeed does He dispose of them so that the order appointed by His providence may be established in things. Consequently second causes are not inconsistent with providence, in fact they accomplish the effect of providence. Accordingly prayers are efficacious before God: yet they do not upset the unchangeable order of divine providence: since even the granting of each suppliant’s prayer is included in the order of divine providence. To say, therefore, that we must not pray that we may obtain something from God, because the order of His providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we must not walk in order to arrive at a place, nor eat that we may have nourishment, both of which are clearly absurd.

By the foregoing we refute a twofold error about prayer. For some have said that prayer has no fruit. This was asserted both by those who, like the Epicureans, utterly denied divine providence; and by those who like certain Peripatetics1 withdrew human affairs from the providence of God; and again by those who with the Stoics2 contended that all things subject to providence happen of necessity. For it results from all these opinions that prayer produces no fruit, and that consequently all worship of the Godhead is in vain. There is an allusion to this error in Malach. 3:14: You have said: He laboureth in vain that serveth God. And what profit is it that we have kept His ordinances, and that we have walked sorrowful before the Lord of hosts? On the other hand some have contended that the divine ordinance can be changed by our prayers: thus the Egyptians said that fate was averted by prayers, certain images, incensings or incantations. Certain passages in Holy Writ would seem at the first glance to admit of being taken in this sense. For it is related (Isa. 38:1–5) that Isaias, at God’s command, said to King Ezechias: Thus saith the Lord: Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and shalt not live, and that after Ezechias had prayed, the word of the Lord came to Isaias saying: Go and say to Ezechias … I have heard thy prayer … behold I will add to thy days fifteen years.—Also (Jerem. 18:7, 8) it is said in the name of God: I will suddenly speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, to root out, to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them. And (Joel 2:13, 14): Turn to the Lord your God; for He is gracious and merciful.… Who knoweth but He will return and forgive?

These passages, if taken in their superficial sense, lead to an impossibility. For, in the first place, it follows that God’s will is changeable. Also, that God acquires something from the course of time. Further, that things happening in time to creatures cause something that is in God. These are all impossible as appears evidently from what has been already laid down.1

They are also contrary to Holy Writ which contains the expression of infallible truth. For it is said (Num. 23:19): God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as the son of man that He should be changed. Hath He said then, and will He not do? Hath He spoken, and will He not fulfil? And (1 Kings 15:29): The triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for He is not a man that He should repent. And (Malach. 3:6): I am the Lord and I change not.

Now it suffices to consider carefully what we have said above for one to realize that every error occurring in the present matter is due to one’s overlooking the difference between the universal and the particular orders. For, since all effects are ordained one to another, forasmuch as they have one common cause, this order must needs be the more general, as the cause is more universal. Hence the order appointed by the universal cause which is God must of necessity include all things. There is nothing therefore to prevent a particular order being changed through prayer or in some other manner: because there is outside that order something that can change it. Wherefore it is not strange that the Egyptians, who referred the ordering of human affairs to the heavenly bodies, held that fate, having its origin in the stars, can be changed by certain prayers and rites; because outside and above the heavenly bodies there is God, who can hinder the heavenly bodies from producing the effect which was to have taken place in this lower world as a result of their influence.—But outside that order which includes all things, it is not possible to assign a thing whereby the order depending on the universal cause can be subverted. For this reason the Stoics who referred the ordering of all things to God as the universal cause, held that the order appointed by God is utterly unchangeable. But these again failed to consider the universal order, in that they held prayers to be altogether useless, thus implying that man’s volitions and desires, which lead him to pray, are not included in that universal order. For, when they say that whether we pray or not, the result is the same on account of the universal order of things, it is clear that they exclude the suppliant’s prayers from that order. For if they were contained in that order, effects would follow through the divine ordinance from these even as they follow through other causes. Accordingly to deny the efficacy of prayer is to deny the efficacy of all other causes. And if the unchangeableness of the divine order does not deprive other causes of their efficacy neither does it destroy the efficacy of prayer. Therefore prayers are useful, not as though they brought about a change in the order appointed from eternity, but as included in that very order. On the other hand, there is no reason why the particular order of an inferior cause should not be changed by God through the efficacy of prayer: for He transcends all causes, so that He is not bound by the order of any cause, but on the contrary all necessity imposed by the order of a lower cause is subject to Him, because it originated from Him. Accordingly when some change is brought about by prayer, in the order of inferior causes, God is said to return or to repent: not that His eternal ordinance is changed, but that some effect of His is changed. Hence Gregory says1 that God changes not His mind although at times He changes His sentence: not that, mark you, which expresses His eternal decree, but that which expresses the order of lower causes, in keeping with which Ezechias was to die, and a nation was to be exterminated for its sins. Such a change of sentence is described metaphorically as repentance in God, forasmuch as He behaves like a penitent, who shows himself penitent by changing his behaviour. In the same way He is said figuratively to be angry, forasmuch as by punishing He does what an angry man does.2

Chapter XCVII

how there is a reason for divine providence

From what has been said, one can see clearly that things are arranged by divine providence for a definite reason.

For we have proved that God, by His providence, directs all things to His goodness as their end:1 not indeed as though His goodness gained any thing from the things that are made, but in order that the likeness of His goodness may be impressed on things as far as possible.2 And since every created substance must needs fall short of the perfection of the divine goodness; it was necessary, in order that the divine goodness might the more perfectly be bestowed on things, that there should be diversity among them, so that what could not be perfectly represented by one single thing, might be more perfectly represented in various ways by things of various kinds. Thus when man finds that he cannot adequately express an idea by one word, he uses several words so as to express his idea in several ways. In this too we are able to consider the eminence of the divine perfection, since perfect goodness, which in God exists in a united and simple manner, cannot be in creatures otherwise than in many ways and many subjects. Now things are diversified through having divers forms whence they derive their species. Consequently the reason for diversity in the forms of things is taken from the end.

Again the reason of the order in things is taken from the diversity of forms. Because, as it is from the form that a thing has its being; and as a thing, forasmuch as it has being, approaches to a likeness to God, who is His own simple being: it follows of necessity that the form is nothing else than a participation of the divine similitude in things. Wherefore Aristotle, speaking of the form, rightly says (1 Phys. ix.) that it is something godlike and desirable. Now likeness to one simple thing cannot be diversified except through the resemblance being more or less close, or more or less distant. And the closer a thing approaches to the divine resemblance the more perfect it is. Consequently diversity of forms must be according as one is more perfect than another: for which reason Aristotle (8 Metaph.)1 likens definitions, whereby the natures and forms of things are indicated, to numbers wherein species are diversified by addition or subtraction of unity, thus giving us to understand that diversity of forms requires divers degrees of perfection. This is evident to anyone who studies the natures of things. For, if he consider carefully, he will find that the diversity of things is made up of degrees; since above inanimate bodies he will find plants, and above these irrational animals, above these intelligent substances; and in each one of these he will find diversity according as some are more perfect than others; so much so, that the highest members of a lower genus appear to be close to the higher genus, and conversely: thus animals that cannot move are like plants. Hence Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. vii.) that divine wisdom has joined together the last things of higher degree to the first things of lower degree. Therefore it is clear that the diversity of things requires that all be not equal; and that there be order and degrees.

From the diversity of forms whence things derive their specific differences, there follows the difference of operations. For since things act according as they are actual, because those that are in potentiality, as such, are devoid of action; and since a thing is actual by its form: a thing’s operation must needs follow its form. Accordingly if there be divers forms, these must have divers operations.

Again, since each thing attains to its proper end by its proper action, it follows that there must be divers proper ends in things: although there is one common end of all.

Moreover, from the diversity of forms there results in matter a diversity of habitude in relation to things. For since forms are diverse according as some are more perfect than others, some of them are perfect to the extent of being subsistent and complete in themselves, having no need of matter as a support. Whereas some are unable to subsist perfectly by themselves, and require matter to uphold them, so that what subsists is not a form only, nor matter only,—which by itself is not an actual being,—but something composed of both.

Now matter and form would be unable to concur in making one thing unless they were mutually proportionate. And if they need to be proportionate, it follows that divers matters correspond to divers forms. Consequently certain forms require simple, while others require complex matter; and to divers forms there must correspond divers composition of parts, in keeping with the species and operation of the form.

From the divers habitudes in relation to matter there results diversity of agents and patients. For since a thing acts by reason of its form, it follows that things which have more perfect and less material forms, act on those that are more material and have more imperfect forms.

Again, from diversity of forms, matters and agents there results diversity of properties and accidents. For since substance is the cause of accident, as the perfect of the imperfect, it follows that divers proper accidents must result from divers substantial principles. Moreover, since divers agents produce divers impressions on patients, it follows that a diversity of agents must result in a diversity of accidents resulting from their activity.

From what has been said then, it is clear that it is not without reason that divine providence has appointed to creatures divers accidents, actions, passions and orders. Wherefore Holy Writ ascribes the formation and government of things to the divine wisdom and prudence. Thus it is said (Prov. 3:19, 20): The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth: He hath established the heavens by prudence. By His wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew. Again (Wis. 8:1) it is said, that divine wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly. And (ibid. 11:21): Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight, where by measure we are to understand the quantity, mode, or degree of perfection in each thing: by number, the multitude and diversity of species resulting from the various degress of perfection; and by weight the various inclinations of things to their respective ends and operations, agents and patients, and such accidents as result from diversity of species.

In this same order wherein we find the reason of divine providence, we have stated that the first place must be assigned to the divine goodness, as being the last end, which is the first principle in practical matters; after this comes the multiplicity of things, and this cannot result but from a diversity of grades in forms and matters, agents and patients, actions and accidents. Accordingly as the fundamental reason of divine providence, absolutely speaking, is the divine goodness, so the fundamental reason in creatures is their multiplicity, to the making and preservation of which all other things are apparently subordinate. In this sense Bœthius, it would seem, rightly said (1 Arith. ii.) that number seems to have been the aim of nature in the original formation of things.

We must, however, observe that practical and speculative reason partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that as speculative reason starts from a principle, and employs means to reach the intended conclusion, so the practical reason begins from some first principle and through certain means arrives at the intended operation or product of operation. In speculative matters the principle is the form and what a thing is; whereas in practical matters it is the end, which sometimes is a form, at other times something else. Moreover, the principle in operative matters must always be necessary, whereas in practical things it is sometimes necessary and sometimes not: thus it is necessary that man desire happiness as his end, but it is not necessary that he desire to build a house. Likewise in demonstrations, that which follows is always a necessary sequel to that which precedes, but in practical matters not always, and only when the end cannot be obtained except by the way indicated: thus he who would build a house must needs get some wood, but it depends on his simple will, and not on his will to build a house, that he gets deal.

Accordingly that God love His own goodness is something necessary, but it does not necessarily follow from this that it should be reflected in creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without this. Consequently although the divine goodness is the reason why creatures were originally brought into being, yet this depends on the simple will of God.—Supposing, however, that God wishes to communicate His goodness to His creatures by way of likeness as far as it is possible, this is the reason why creatures are of divers kinds: although there is no necessity for this diversity being according to this or that degree of perfection, or this or that number of things.—And supposing it to be God’s will to establish a particular number in things, and to bestow on each thing a particular measure of perfection, this is the reason why a particular thing has such and such a form and such and such matter: and so on in like manner. It is therefore clear that the dispensations of providence are according to a certain reason, and yet this reason presupposes the divine will. Accordingly a twofold error is refuted by what we have said. First, there is the error of those who maintained that all things are the result of God’s simple will without any reason. This is the error of the Moslem theologians in the law of the Mohammedans, as Rabbi Moses relates,1 according to whom the sole reason why fire heats rather than chills is because God so wills. Secondly, we refute the error of those who assert that the ordering of causes proceeds from divine providence by way of necessity.2 Both of which are false, as is clear from what has been said.

There are certain expressions of Scripture that would seem to ascribe all things to God’s simple will. But such things are said, not to remove reason from the dispensations of providence, but to show that God’s will is the first principle of all things, as we have already shown. Such are the words of the Psalm:3 Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done, and of Job 9:12: Who can say: Why dost Thou so? and of Rom. 9:19: Who resisteth His will? Augustine likewise says (3 De Trin. iii., iv.): God’s will alone is the first cause of health and sickness, reward and punishment, grace and retribution. Accordingly if we be asked the wherefore of a particular natural effect, we can assign the reason to some proximate cause: provided, however, that we refer all things to the divine will as their first cause. Thus if it be asked: Why was the wood heated at the presence of fire? we reply: Because to heat is fire’s natural action: and this, because heat is its proper accident: and this results from its proper form: and so on until we come to the divine will. Hence if we reply to the question Why was the wood made hot? by saying: Because God so willed: we shall answer rightly, if we intend to trace the question back to its first cause, but incorrectly if we intend to exclude all other causes.

Chapter XCVIII

how it is possible, and how it is impossible, for god to do something outside the order of his providence

From what has been said we are able to consider a twofold order: the one, dependent on the first cause of all things, so that it comprises all; the other, a particular order, dependent on a created cause, and comprising such things as are subordinate to that cause. The latter order is manifold, in accordance with the diversity of causes to be found among creatures. Yet one such order is subordinate to another, even as one cause is subordinate to another. Consequently all these particular orders are comprised under that universal order, and are subordinate to that order whereby things are dependent on the first cause. We have an example of this in civil affairs. For there is a certain order among all the members of a household according as they are subject to the head of the house: again the head of the house together with all the other heads of houses in the same city have a certain order among themselves, and in relation to the governor of the city; and he again together with all the other governors in the kingdom is subordinate to the king.

This universal order in respect whereof all things are ordered by divine providence, may be considered in two ways: namely, with regard to things subject to that order, and with regard to the reason of the order, which depends on the principle of the order.

Now we proved in the Second Book1 that the things themselves which are placed in order by God, proceed from him as from an agent that is not necessitated either by nature or by anything else, but from his simple will, especially as regards the original establishment of things. Consequently God can do certain things besides those which are comprised under the order of divine providence: since his power is not bound to the latter.

On the other hand if we consider the aforesaid order with respect to the reason dependent on the principle, then it is not possible for God to do anything outside that order. Because this order, as we have proved,2 proceeds from the knowledge and will of God who directs all things to his goodness as their end. Now, it is not possible that God do anything that is not willed by him: since creatures proceed from him, not because it is natural that they should, but because he wills them to, as we have proved.3 Nor is it possible for anything to be done by him that is not included in his knowledge, since nothing can be willed that is not known. Nor again is it possible for him to do anything as regards creatures, that is not directed to his goodness as its end, since his goodness is the proper object of his will.4 Likewise, since God is utterly unchangeable,5 he cannot possibly will that which he willed not before, or begin to know something anew, or direct it to his goodness. Therefore God can do nothing but what is comprised in the order of his providence, even as he cannot do but what is subject to his operation. And yet, if we consider his power absolutely, he can do other things besides those that are subject to his providence or operation: but he cannot do what has not been eternally contained in the order of his providence, because he is unchangeable. Through failing to observe this distinction some have fallen into various errors. Some in an endeavour to extend to things themselves the unchangeableness of the divine order, said that all things must of necessity be as they are; so much so, that some declared that God is unable to do except what he does. Against this we have the words of Matth. 26:53: Cannot I ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels?

On the other hand, some, thinking in their carnal wisdom that God, like carnal man, is inconstant of will, ascribed the changeableness of things subject to divine providence, to changeableness in divine providence itself. Against this it is said (Num. 23:19): God is not as a man that he should lie; nor as the son of man that He should be changed.

Others again withdrew contingent things from divine providence.1 Against these it is said (Lament, 3:37): Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not?

Chapter XCIX

that god can work outside the order imposed on things, by producing effects without their proximate causes

It remains to be proved that he can act outside the order imposed on things by himself.

For the order imposed on things by God is that lower things be moved by higher, as was shown above.2 Now God can act independently of this order: in other words he can himself produce an effect in inferior things, without a higher agent doing anything towards that effect. For the agent that works by natural necessity differs from the agent that acts by will, in that the effect cannot result from the former except according to the mode of its active power; so that the agent which has very great power cannot produce immediately a small effect, but produces an effect proportionate to its power. In this effect, however, there will be sometimes less power than in its cause, so that at length through many intermediaries a small effect results from the highest cause. But it is not so in the agent that acts by its will. Because the agent that acts by its will can at once without any intermediary produce any effect that does not surpass its power: thus the most perfect craftsman can produce a work such as an imperfect craftsman would produce.

Now God works by his will, and not by necessity of nature, as we proved above.1 Therefore he can produce minor effects, that are produced by inferior causes, immediately without their proper causes.

Again. The divine power is compared to all active powers as a universal power to particular powers, as is clear from what has been said above.2 Now an active universal power may be determined to the production of a particular effect, in two ways. First, by a particular intermediary cause: thus the active power of a heavenly body is determined to the effect which is the begetting of a man, by the particular power seated in the semen: and thus again, the power of the general proposition in a syllogism is determined to a particular conclusion, by the application of a particular proposition. Secondly, by an intellect which apprehends a particular form and produces it in the effect. Now the divine intellect knows not only its own essence which is like a universal active power; and not only universal and first causes, but also all particular causes, as we have proved above.3 Therefore God can produce immediately every effect that is produced by any particular agent.

Further. Since accidents result from the essential principles of a thing, it follows that he who is the immediate cause of the essence, is able to produce in a thing whatever results from its essence: for the generator which gives the form, gives likewise all the resultant properties and movements. Now, we have shown1 that God, in the original production of things, brought all things into being immediately by creation. Therefore he can cause an effect to result in anything whatsoever independently of middle causes.

Besides. The order of things emanates from God into things according to the forecast of His intelligence: thus in human affairs we see that the head of the state imposes on the citizens the order preconceived by him. Now the divine intellect is not necessarily confined to this particular order, so as to be unable to conceive any other: since even we are able by our intellect to apprehend another order: for it is intelligible to us that God might make a man of earth and not of seed. Therefore God can produce an effect without the inferior causes to which that effect is proper.

Moreover. Although the order imposed on things by divine providence reflects the divine goodness according to its mode, yet it does not reflect it perfectly: since the creature’s goodness does not reach to an equality with the goodness of God. Now, that which is not perfectly represented by one copy, can be represented again in some other way besides. And the representation of the divine goodness in things is the end of their production by God, as above stated.2 Therefore God’s will is not confined to this particular order of causes and effects, as though he could not choose to produce an effect in lower things immediately and independently of other causes.

Further. All creatures are more subject to God, than man’s body is to his soul: for the soul is proportionate to the body as its form, whereas God surpasses all proportion to the creature. Now, sometimes when the soul imagines a thing and is strongly drawn towards it, there results a change in the body in the direction of health or sickness, independently of any action on the part of those bodily principles, whose natural function is to cause sickness or health in the body. Much more, therefore, by the divine will can an effect be produced in creatures, independently of the causes which in the course of nature produce that effect naturally.

Further. According to the order of nature, the active forces of the elements are subordinate to the active powers of heavenly bodies. Now, sometimes the power of a heavenly body produces an effect proper to elemental forces without the action of an element: thus the sun heats without the action of fire. Much more therefore can the power of God produce the effects of created causes without any action on their part.

If, however, anyone were to say that since God has implanted this order in things, he cannot produce in them effects apart from their proper causes without a change in himself: he can be answered by referring to the very nature of things. For the order imposed on things by God is in keeping with that which is wont to occur in things for the most part, but it is not everywhere in keeping with what always occurs: because many natural causes produce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; since sometimes, though seldom, it happens otherwise, whether on account of a defect in the power of the agent, or through indisposition of the matter, or by reason of a stronger agency: as when nature produces a sixth finger in a man.

Yet the order of providence does not therefore fail or change: because the very fact that the natural order, established according to what happens for the most part, happens at times to fail, is subject to divine providence. Wherefore if it be possible for the natural order to be changed by a created power from that which is of frequent to that which is of rare occurrence, without any change in divine providence, much more can the divine power at times work apart from the order assigned by God to nature, without prejudice to His providence. In fact He does this sometimes in order to manifest His power. For by no other means can it better be made manifest that all nature is subject to the divine will, than by the fact that sometimes He works independently of the natural order: since this shows that the order of things proceeded from Him, not of natural necessity, but of His free will.

Nor should it be deemed a paltry reason, that God should produce something in nature in order to manifest Himself to the minds of men: since it was shown above1 that all corporeal creatures are in some way directed to an intellectual nature as their end; while the end of the intellectual creature itself is the knowledge of God, as we have proved.2 It is not strange, then, if some change be wrought in a corporeal substance, in order to bring the intellectual nature to the knowledge of God.

Chapter C

that what god does beside the order of nature is not contrary to nature

It would seem, however, necessary to observe that although God sometimes does something beside the order assigned to things, he does nothing contrary to nature.

For since God is pure act, whereas all other things have some admixture of potentiality, it follows that God must be compared to all things as the mover to the thing moved, and as the active to the potential. Now, when that which in the natural order is in potentiality with regard to a certain agent, is acted upon by that agent, this is not contrary to nature simply, although sometimes it is contrary to that particular form which is corrupted by such action: thus when fire is generated, and air is corrupted through the action of the fire, both generation and corruption are natural. Consequently whatever is done by God in created things is not contrary to nature, although it may seem to be contrary to the order proper to a particular nature.

Again. Since God is the first agent, as we have proved,3 all subsequent agents are likened to His instruments. Now, the purpose of an instrument is to serve the action of the principal agent while it is being moved by it: wherefore the matter and form of an instrument must be such as to be suitable for the action intended by the principal agent. Hence it is not contrary but most becoming to the nature of an instrument to be moved by the principal agent. Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature, that creatures be moved by God in any way whatsoever: since they were made that they might serve Him.

Further. Even in corporeal agents we observe that the movements resulting in inferior bodies from the influence of higher bodies, are neither violent nor unnatural, although they may seem unbecoming to the natural movement which the inferior body has, as being proper to its form: for we do not say that the ebb and flow of the sea is a violent movement, since it results from the influence of a heavenly body, although the natural movement of water is only in one direction, namely to the centre. Much less, therefore, can whatsoever God does in any creature, be described as violent or unnatural.

Besides. The first measure of every essence and nature is God, as the first being, which is the cause of being in all other things. Since then we judge of everything by its measure, we must regard as natural to a thing, that whereby it is conformed to its measure. Hence whatever is implanted in a thing by God, is natural to that thing. Therefore if something else be implanted by God in that same thing, it will not be unnatural.

Moreover. All creatures are compared to God, as works of art are compared to the artist, as appears from what we have already said.1 Hence all nature is the work of the divine art. Now it is not inconsistent with a work of art that the artist make some alteration in his work, even after giving it its first form. Neither, therefore is it contrary to nature if God does something in natural things, other than that which occurs in the ordinary course of nature. Wherefore Augustine says:2 God the creator and author of all natures, does nothing unnatural: because to each thing, that is natural which is caused by Him from whom is all measure, number and order in nature.

Chapter CI

of miracles

These works that are sometimes done by God outside the usual order assigned to things are wont to be called miracles: because we are astonished (admiramur) at a thing when we see an effect without knowing the cause. And since at times one and the same cause is known to some and unknown to others, it happens that of several who see an effect, some are astonished and some not: thus an astronomer is not astonished when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he knows the cause; whereas one who is ignorant of this science must needs wonder, since he knows not the cause. Wherefore it is wonderful to the latter but not to the former. Accordingly a thing is wonderful simply, when its cause is hidden simply: and this is what we mean by a miracle: something, to wit, that is wonderful in itself and not only in respect of this person or that. Now God is the cause which is hidden to every man simply: for we have proved above1 that in this state of life no man can comprehend Him by his intellect. Therefore properly speaking miracles are works done by God outside the order usually observed in things.

Of these miracles there are various degrees and orders. The highest degree in miracles comprises those works wherein something is done by God, that nature can never do: for instance, that two bodies occupy the same place, that the sun recede or stand still, that the sea be divided and make way to passers by. Among these there is a certain order: for the greater the work done by God, and the further it is removed from the capability of nature, the greater the miracle: thus it is a greater miracle that the sun recede, than that the waters be divided. The second degree in miracles belongs to those whereby God does something that nature can do, but not in the same order: thus it is a work of nature that an animal live, see and walk: but that an animal live after being dead, see after being blind, walk after being lame, this nature cannot do, but God does these things sometimes by a miracle. Among these miracles also, there are degrees, according as the thing done is further removed from the faculty of nature.

The third degree of miracles is when God does what is wont to be done by the operation of nature, but without the operation of the natural principles: for instance when by the power of God a man is cured of a fever that nature is able to cure; or when it rains without the operation of the principles of nature.

Chapter CII

that god alone works miracles

From what has been said it can be shown that God alone can work miracles.

For whatever is entirely subject to an order cannot do anything above that order. Now, every creature is placed under the order established in things by God. Therefore no creature can do anything above that order: which is to work miracles.

Again. When a finite power produces its proper effect to which it is confined, it is not a miracle: although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand that power: thus to an ignorant person it is wonderful that the magnet attracts iron, or that a small fish should stop a ship.1 Now every creature’s power is limited to one definite effect, or to some. Therefore whatever is done by the power of any creature whatsoever, cannot be properly described as a miracle, although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand the power of the creature in question. But that which is done by the power of God, which, being infinite, is incomprehensible, is truly a miracle.

Moreover. Every creature requires in its action a subject on which to act: for it belongs to God alone to make something out of nothing, as we proved above.2 Now, that which requires a subject in its action, can do nothing but those things to which that subject is in potentiality: since the agent acts on the subject in order to bring it from potentiality to act. Therefore even as a creature cannot create, so neither can it do in a thing, save what is in the potentiality of that thing. But in many miracles wrought by God, something is done in a thing, that is not in that thing’s potentiality: for instance that the dead live again, that the sun recede, that two bodies occupy the same place. Wherefore such miracles cannot be wrought by any created power.

Further. The subject acted upon is ordered both to the agent that brings it from potentiality to act, and to the act to which it is brought. Accordingly just as any particular subject is in potentiality to a particular definite act, and not to any act, so it cannot be brought from potentiality to a definite act, except by some definite agent: for agents must needs differ according as they introduce different acts: thus, whereas air is potentially fire or water, one agent makes it to be actually fire, and another makes it to be actually water. Likewise it is clear that corporeal matter is not brought to a perfect actuality by the sole action of a universal power, and there must needs be some proper agent, whereby the action of the universal power is determined to a definite effect. Nevertheless corporeal matter can be brought to a less perfect actuality by the universal power alone, without a particular agent: thus perfect animals are not formed by the power of a heavenly body alone, but determinate seed is necessary; whereas the power of a heavenly body, without any seed, suffices for the generation of certain imperfect animals. Accordingly, effects produced among these lower things, if they be of a nature to be wrought by universal higher causes, without the action of particular inferior causes, can be produced in this way without any miracle: thus it is not a miracle that animals be formed from putrefaction without seed. But if they be not of a nature to be produced by superior causes alone, then particular inferior causes are required for their perfect formation. Now there is no miracle if an effect be produced by a higher cause, by means of its proper principles. Therefore it is altogether impossible for miracles to be wrought by the power of the higher creatures.

Moreover. Seemingly these amount to the same:—the production of a work out of a subject;—the production of that to which the subject is in potentiality;—and the orderly production of something through definite intermediary stages. Because a subject is not in proximate potentiality to the ultimate effect, until it has arrived at the middle stage: thus food is not in immediate potentiality flesh, but only when it is changed into blood. Now, every creature needs a subject in order to produce something: nor can it produce other than that to which the subject is in potentiality, as we have shown. Therefore it cannot produce anything without bringing the subject to actuality through definite intervening stages. Therefore miracles which consist in something being done without observing the order in which it is naturally feasible, cannot be worked by the power of a creature.

Also. There is a natural order to be observed in the various kinds of movement. The first is local movement; hence it is the cause of other movements, because in every genus that which is first is the cause of all that follows in that genus.1 Now every effect that is produced in this lower world, must needs result from some generation or alteration: and consequently it must be caused through something that is moved locally, if it be the effect of an incorporeal agent which, properly speaking, is incapable of local movement. Moreover, no effect that is caused by incorporeal substances through corporeal instruments is a miracle; since bodies have no operation that is not natural. Therefore created incorporeal substances cannot work miracles by their own power: and much less corporeal substances whose every action is natural.

Therefore it belongs to God alone to work miracles. For He is above the order which contains all things, as one from whose providence the whole of this order is derived. Moreover His power, being absolutely infinite, is not confined to any special effect, nor to the producing of its effect in any particular way or order.

Wherefore it is said of God in the Psalm:1 Who alone doth great wonders.

Chapter CIII

that spiritual substances do wonders which, however, are not miracles properly speaking

It was the opinion of Avicenna that matter is more obedient to separate substances in the production of an effect, than to contrary agents in matter. Hence he states that sometimes, at the apprehension of the aforesaid substances, an effect ensues in this lower world, such as rain, or the health of a sick person, without any corporeal agent intervening.

He regards as a sign of this the fact that when our soul is of strong imagination, the body is affected by mere thought: thus a man while walking on a plank at a height, easily falls, because through fear he imagines himself to fall: whereas he would not fall, were the plank placed on the ground, so that he would not fear to fall. It is also clear that the body is heated at a mere apprehension of the soul, for instance in lustful or angry persons; or again, becomes cold, as happens in those who are seized with fear. Sometimes too, through a strong apprehension, it is inclined to some illness, for instance fever or even leprosy. In this way, says he, if the soul be pure and not subject to the passions of the body, and strong of apprehension, not only its own body is obedient to its apprehension, but even external bodies: so much so that a sick man be healed or something similar occur, at its mere apprehension. He holds this to be the cause of fascination: because, to wit, a certain person’s soul being deeply affected with malevolence, exercises a baneful influence on someone, especially on a child, who by reason of the softness of the body is most impressionable. Hence he maintains that much more, without the action of a corporeal agent, do certain effects result in these lower bodies, at the apprehension of separate substances, which, he says, are the souls or movers of the spheres.

This theory is consistent enough with other opinions of his. For he holds that all substantial forms emanate from a separate substance into these lower bodies; and that corporeal agents merely dispose matter to receive the impression of the separate agent. But this is untrue according to the teaching of Aristotle, who proves (7 Metaph.),1 that the forms which are in matter, do not come from separate forms, but from forms in matter: for thus it is that we find a likeness between the maker and the thing made.

Moreover, the comparison with the soul’s impression on the body does not advance his theory very much. For no impression is made on the body as a result of an apprehension, unless united to the apprehension there be some emotion, as of joy, fear, desire, or of some other passion. Now these passions are accompanied by a certain definite movement of the heart, the result being an impression on the entire body, either as to local motion, or as to some alteration. Hence it still remains that the apprehension of a spiritual substance does not make an impression on the body, except by means of local movement.2

As to his remark about fascination, this is not due to the apprehension of one affecting immediately the body of another: but it results from that apprehension affecting the conjoined body through the movement of the heart, the influence of which reaches even to the eye, which is able to work evil on an external object, especially if it be easily impressionable: thus the eye of a woman in her menses infects a mirror.3

Accordingly, except through the local movement of a body, a created spiritual substance cannot, by its own power, induce any form into corporeal matter, as though matter were in this obedient thereto, so as to become actuated by a certain form. For it is in the power of a created spiritual substance, that a body should be obedient to it in respect of local movement. And by moving a particular body locally, it applies certain natural forces to the production of certain effects: thus the art of the smith applies fire to make the iron malleable. But this is not miraculous, properly speaking. It follows, therefore, that created spiritual substances do not work miracles by their own power. And I say by their own power: because nothing prevents these substances from working miracles, in so far as they work by divine power. This indeed may be seen from the fact that as Gregory states one order of angels is especially deputed to the working of miracles.1 He also says that certain saints sometimes work miracles by power, and not merely by intercession.2

We must observe, however, that when angels or demons apply natural things in order to produce certain definite effects, they employ them as instruments, just as a physician uses certain herbs as instruments for the purpose of healing. Now, from an instrument there proceeds an effect, not only in proportion to its power, but also in excess thereof, forasmuch as it acts by the power of the principal agent: thus a saw or an axe could not produce a bedstead except through being applied by craftsmanship for that particular effect: nor could natural heat produce flesh, except by the power of the vegetative soul, that employs it as an instrument. It is therefore reasonable that certain higher effects should result from these same natural things, through spiritual substances employing them as instruments.

Accordingly, although such effects cannot be called miracles absolutely, since they result from natural causes, yet are they wonderful to us in two ways. First, because these causes are applied for the production of their proper effects by spiritual substances in a way that is strange to us: even so the works of skilful craftsmen seem wonderful to others who see not how the work is done.—Secondly, because the natural causes employed for the production of certain effects are invested with a certain power through serving as instruments of spiritual substances: and this comes nearer to the nature of a miracle.

Chapter CIV

that the works of magicians result not only from the influence of heavenly bodies

Some there were who averred that such works as seem wonderful to us, being wrought by the magic art, are done, not by certain spiritual substances, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. This would seem to be indicated by the fact that those who practise works of this kind, observe the position of the stars: and are assisted by the employment of certain herbs and other corporeal things, for the purpose, as it were, of preparing matter of lower degree to receive the influence of the celestial power.

But this is in contradiction with the apparitions (in the works of magicians). For as it is impossible that an intellect be formed from corporeal principles, as we proved above,1 it is impossible for effects that are caused exclusively by the intellectual nature, to be produced by the power of a heavenly body. Now in these works of magicians, things appear that are exclusively the work of a rational nature; for instance, answers are given about stolen goods, and the like, and this could not be done except by an intelligence. Therefore it is not true that all such effects are caused by the mere power of a heavenly body.

Further. Speech is an act proper to the rational nature. Now in these works people appear to men and speak to them on various matters. Therefore such things cannot be done by the mere power of heavenly bodies. If, however, someone say that these apparitions are present, not to the sensorial organ, but only to the imagination:—this is, in the first place, apparently untrue. For imaginary forms do not seem real to anyone, unless his external senses be suspended: since it is not possible for a person to look on a likeness as a reality, except the natural judgements of the senses be tied. Now these conversations and apparitions are addressed to those who have free use of their external senses. Therefore these apparitions and speeches cannot be imaginary.

Besides, no imaginary forms can lead a person to intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired faculty of his intellect: this is evident in dreams; since even if they contain some indication of the future, it is not every dreamer that understands the meaning of his dreams. Now, in these apparitions and speeches that occur in the works of magicians, it frequently happens that a person obtains knowledge of things surpassing the faculty of his intelligence, such as the discovery of hidden treasure, the manifestation of the future, and sometimes even true answers are given in matters of science. Either, therefore, these apparitions or speeches are not purely imaginary; or at least it is the work of some higher intelligence, and not only of a heavenly body, that a person obtain the aforesaid knowledge through these imaginings.

Again. That which is done by the power of heavenly bodies, is a natural effect: since they are natural forms that are caused in this lower world by the powers of heavenly bodies. Hence that which cannot be natural to anything, cannot be caused by the power of the heavenly bodies. And yet some such things are stated to be caused by the aforesaid works: for instance, it is averred that at the mere presence of a certain person all doors are unlocked, that a certain man become invisible, and many like occurrences are related. Therefore this cannot be done by the power of heavenly bodies.

Further. The reception, through the power of heavenly bodies, of that which follows, implies the reception of what precedes. Now movement of its very nature, is the result of having a soul: since it is proper to animate things to move themselves. Therefore it is impossible for an inanimate being to be moved by itself, through the power of a heavenly body. Yet it is stated that by the magic art an image is made to move of itself, or to speak.1 Therefore it is not possible for the effects of the magic art to be caused by a celestial power.

And if it be said that the image in question is endowed with some vital principle by the power of the heavenly bodies; this is impossible. For the principle of life in all living things is the substantial form, because, as the Philosopher says (2 De Anima, iv.) in living things to be is to live. Now, it is impossible for anything to receive anew a substantial form, unless it lose the form which it had previously, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.1 But in the making of an image no substantial form is discarded, and there is only a change of shape which is an accident: since the form of copper or something of the kind remains. Therefore the image in question cannot possibly be endowed with the vital principle.

Further. If anything is moved by a principle of life it necessarily has sensation, for the principle of movement is sensation or understanding. But understanding is not found without sensation in things that come to be and pass away. Now there cannot be sensation where there is not the sense of touch; nor the sense of touch without an organ of mean temperature. Such a temperature, however, is not found in the stone or wax or metal out of which the statue is made. It is not possible, therefore, that statues of this sort should be moved by a principle of life.

Besides. Perfect living things are generated not only by a celestial power, but also from seed: for man and the sun generate man:2 and such as are generated by a celestial power alone without seed, are animals formed by putrefaction, and such belong to a lower grade than the others. Accordingly if these images be endowed with the vital principle by a celestial power alone, so as to move themselves, it follows that they belong to the lowest grade of animals. And yet this would be false if they worked by an intrinsic principle of life: since among their operations some are of a high degree, for they give answers about hidden things. Therefore it is not possible that their operations and movements proceed from a principle of life.

Again. We find sometimes a natural effect produced by the power of heavenly bodies without the operation of art: thus, although one may produce frogs, or something of the kind by means of some artifice, frogs do happen to be produced without any artifice. Consequently if these images that are made by necromancy, are endowed with the vital principle by the power of heavenly bodies, it will be possible for them to be formed without the operation of art. But this is not the case. Therefore it is evident that such images have not the principle of life, nor are they moved by the power of heavenly bodies.

Hereby we refute the opinion of Hermes who, according to Augustine (8 De Civ. Dei xxiii.) expressed himself thus: As God is the cause of the heavenly gods, so man fashions the gods that reside in temples, being satisfied to live near men. I refer to those animal images, endowed with sense and spirit, that do great and wonderful things, images gifted with knowledge of the future, and who foretell by dreams and many other things; who afflict men with ailments and heal them, who bring sorrow and joy to them according to their merits.

This opinion is also refuted by divine authority. For it is said in the Psalm (134:15 seqq.): The idols of the Gentiles are silver and gold, the works of men’s hands. They have a mouth but they speak not … neither is there any breath in their mouths.

Yet seemingly we must not absolutely deny the possibility of some kind of efficacy being in these things through the power of the heavenly bodies: but only for such effects as certain lower bodies are able to cause by the power of the heavenly bodies.1

Chapter CV

whence the works of magicians derive their efficacy

It remains for us to inquire whence the magic arts derive their efficacy: a question that will present no difficulty if we consider their mode of operation.

For in the practice of their art they make use of certain significative words in order to produce certain definite effects. Now, words, in so far as they signify something, have no power except as derived from some intellect; either of the speaker, or of the person to whom they are spoken. From the intellect of the speaker, as when an intellect is of such great power that it can cause things by its mere thought, the voice serving to convey, as it were, this thought to the things that are to be produced. From the intellect of the person to whom the words are addressed, as when the hearer is induced to do some particular thing, through his intellect receiving the signification of those words. Now, it cannot be said that these significative words uttered by magicians derive efficacy from the intellect of the speaker. For since power follows essence, diversity of power indicates diversity of essential principles. Moreover, man’s intellect is invariably of such a disposition that its knowledge is caused by things, rather than that it is able by its mere thought to cause things. Consequently if there be any men that are able of their own power to transform things by words expressive of their thoughts, they will belong to another species, and it would be an equivocation to call them men.

Further. By learning we acquire, not the power to do a thing, but the knowledge of how to do it. Yet some, by learning, are rendered able to perform these magic works. Therefore they must have not only knowledge but also the power to produce these effects.

If someone say that these men, by the influence of the stars, are born with the aforesaid power, while others are excluded from it; so that however much the others, who are born without this power, may be instructed, they cannot succeed in performing these works; we reply, first that, as shown above,1 heavenly bodies cannot make an impression on the intellect. Therefore a man’s intellect cannot, through the influence of the stars, receive a power whereby the vocal expression of its thoughts is productive of something.

And if it be said that the imagination produces an effect in the utterance of significative words, and that heavenly bodies can work on the imagination, since its operation is performed by a bodily organ:—this does not apply to all the results produced by this art. For we have shown1 that these effects cannot all be produced by the power of the stars. Neither, therefore, can anyone by the power of the stars, receive the power to produce those effects. Consequently it follows that these effects are accomplished by an intellect to whom the discourse of the person uttering these words is addressed. We have an indication of this in the fact that the significative words employed by the magician are invocations, supplications, adjurations, or even commands as though he were addressing another.

Again. Certain characters and definite figures are employed in the observances of this art. Now a figure cannot be the principle of either action or passion; else, mathematical bodies would be active and passive. Therefore matter cannot, by definite figures, be disposed to receive a certain natural effect. Therefore magicians do not employ figures as dispositions. It remains, then, that they employ them only as signs, for there is no third solution. But we make signs only to other intelligent beings. Therefore the magic arts derive their efficacy from another intelligent being, to whom the magician’s words are addressed.

And if someone say that certain figures are appropriate to certain heavenly bodies; and so the lower bodies are determined by certain figures to receive the impressions of certain heavenly bodies:—seemingly this is an unreasonable statement. For the patient is not directed to receive the impression of the agent, except through being in potentiality. Hence those things alone determine it to receive a particular impression, that cause it to be somehow in potentiality. Now figures do not cause matter to be in potentiality to any particular form, because a figure, as such, abstracts from all matter and sensible forms, since it is something mathematical. Therefore a body is not determined by figures or characters to receive the influence of a heavenly body.

Besides. Certain figures are appropriate to heavenly bodies as the effects thereof; for the figures of the lower bodies are caused by heavenly bodies. Now, the aforesaid arts do not use characters or figures as produced by heavenly bodies, in fact they are produced by man in the practice of the art. Therefore the appropriateness of figures to certain heavenly bodies has nothing to do with the question.

Further. As we have shown, matter is nowise disposed to form by means of figures. Hence the bodies on which these figures are impressed, are as capable of receiving the influence of heavenly bodies, as other bodies of the same species. Now, that a thing act on one rather than another of several equally disposed, by reason of something appropriate to be found in it, is a mark of its operating not by natural necessity, but by choice. Hence it is clear that these arts which employ figures in order to produce certain effects, derive their efficacy, not from something that acts by nature, but from some intellectual substance that acts by intelligence. This is also proved by the very name of character which they apply to these figures: for a character is a sign. Whereby we are given to understand that they employ these figures merely as signs shown to some intellectual nature.

Since, however, in the products of art figures are like specific forms, someone might say that there is no reason why, through the influence of a heavenly body, some power should not shape the figure that gives an image its species, not indeed as a figure, but as specifying the product of art, which acquires this power from the stars. But as to the letters that form an inscription on an image, and other characters, nothing else can be said of them, but that they are signs: wherefore they are directed to an intelligence only.—This is also proved by the sacrifices, prostrations and other similar practices, which can be nothing else than signs of reverence shown to an intellectual nature.

Chapter CVI

that the intellectual substance which gives efficacy to the practices of magic is not good according to virtue

We must furthermore inquire what is this intellectual nature by whose power these works are done.

And in the first place it is plain that it is not good and praiseworthy: for it is the mark of an ill-disposed mind to countenance things contrary to virtue. Now this is done in these arts: for they are often employed in order to further adultery, theft, murder and like malefices, wherefore those who practise these arts are called malefics. Therefore the intellectual nature on whose assistance these arts depend is not well disposed according to virtue.

Again. It is not the mark of a mind well disposed according to virtue, to befriend and assist men of evil life, rather than every upright man. Now those who practise these arts are often men of evil life. Therefore the intellectual nature from whose assistance these arts derive their efficacy is not well disposed according to virtue.

Further. It is the mark of a well disposed mind to guide men towards those goods that are proper to man, namely the goods of reason. Consequently to lead men away from these, and to draw men to goods of the least worth, shows a mind of evil disposition. Now by these arts men progress, not in the goods of reason, which are science and virtue, but in goods of least account, such as the discovery of stolen goods, the capture of thieves, and so forth. Therefore the intellectual substances whose assistance these arts employ, are not well disposed according to virtue.

Moreover. There is a certain deception and unreasonableness in the works of these arts: for they require a man indifferent to lustful pleasure, whereas they are frequently employed to further lustful intercourse. But there is nothing unreasonable or contradictory in the work of a well-disposed mind. Therefore these arts do not employ the assistance of an intellect that is well disposed as to virtue.

Besides. It is an ill-disposed mind that is incited by the commission of crime to lend his assistance to another. But this is done in these arts: for we read of innocent children being slain by those who practise them. Therefore the persons by whose assistance such things are done have an evil mind.

Again. The proper good of the intellect is truth. Since therefore it belongs to good to lead others to good, it belongs to any well-disposed intellect to lead others to truth. In the works of the magicians, however, many things are done by which men are mocked and deceived. The intellect whose help they use, therefore, is not morally well disposed.

Further. A well-disposed intellect is allured by truth in which it takes delight, but not by lies. The magicians, however, in their invocations make use of various lies, whereby they allure those whose help they employ; for they threaten certain impossible things, as for instance that, unless the one who is called upon gives help, he who invokes him will shatter the heavens or displace the stars, as Porphyry narrates in his Letter to Anebontes.1 Those intellectual substances, therefore, with whose help the works of the magicians are performed do not seem to be intellectually well disposed.

Moreover. That a superior should be subject as an inferior to one that commands him; or that an inferior should allow himself to be invoked as a superior, would seem to indicate a person of an ill-disposed mind. Now, magicians call upon those whose assistance they employ, as though these were their superiors: and as soon as they appear they command them as inferiors. In no way therefore are they seemingly of a well-disposed mind.

Hereby we refute the error of pagans who ascribed these works to the gods.

Chapter CVII

that the intellectual substance whose assistance is employed in the magic arts is not evil in its nature

It is impossible that there be natural malice in the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed in the practice of the magic arts.

For if a thing tends to something by its nature, it tends thereto not accidentally but per se: as a heavy body tends downwards. Now if these intellectual substances are evil essentially, they tend to evil naturally: and, consequently, not accidentally but per se. But this is impossible: for We have proved1 that all things tend per se to good, and nothing tends to evil except accidentally. Therefore these intellectual substances are not naturally evil.

Again. Everything that exists must be either cause or caused: otherwise there would be no order between it and other things. Hence the substances in question are either causes only, or are also caused. If they be causes; since evil cannot cause a thing save accidentally, as proved above;2 and since whatever is accidental must be traced to something per se;3 it follows that there must be in them something preceding their malice, whereby they are causes. Now in each thing it is the nature and essence that comes first. Therefore these substances are not evil by nature.

The same follows if they be caused. For no agent acts except with a good purpose. Therefore evil cannot be the effect of a cause except accidentally. Now that which is caused only by accident, cannot exist naturally: since every nature has a definite mode of coming into being. Therefore it is impossible for the substances in question to be evil by nature.

Besides. Every being has its proper existence proportionate to its nature. Now existence, as such, is good: a sign of which is that all things desire existence.1 Consequently if these substances were evil by nature, they would have no existence.

Moreover. We have proved2 that nothing can exist that has not existence from the first being: and that the first being is the sovereign good.3 Since then every agent, as such, produces its like,4 whatever proceeds from the first being must be good. Therefore the aforesaid substances, forasmuch as they exist, and have a certain nature, cannot be evil.

Further. There cannot possibly exist a thing that is altogether deprived of a participation of good: for since the good and the appetible are the same, if a thing were utterly void of good, there would be nothing appetible in it; and its own existence is appetible to everything. Consequently if anything be described as evil in its nature, this must be not because it is simply evil, but because it is evil to some person, or in some respect: thus poison is not evil simply, but to one to whom it is harmful: wherefore one man’s poison is another man’s meat. Now, this happens because the particular good that is proper to one, is contrary to the particular good that is proper to another: thus heat, which is the good of fire, is contrary to cold which is the good of water, and destroys it. Accordingly, that which by its nature is directed, not to this or that good, but to good simply, cannot possibly, even in this way, be called evil by its nature. And such is every intellect: because its good is in its own operation, the object of which is the universal, and things that exist simply. Therefore no intellect can be evil in its nature, either simply or in relation to something else.

Again. In every intellectual subject, the intellect moves the appetite, in the natural order; because the proper object of the will is the good understood. Now the good of the will consists in its following the intellect: thus, in us, good is that which is according to reason, and whatever is beside this is evil. In the natural order, therefore, the intellectual substance wills the good. Consequently it is impossible that the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed by magical arts, be naturally evil.

Besides. Since the will tends naturally to the good understood, as its proper object and end, it is impossible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil, unless its intellect err naturally in its judgement of good. Now, there can be no such intellect: because false judgements in the acts of the intelligence are like monstrosities in natural things, for they are not according to but beside nature: since the good and natural end of the intellect is the knowledge of truth. Therefore there cannot be an intellect that is naturally deceived in its judgement of truth. Neither, consequently, is it possible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil.

Further. No cognitive faculty fails in the knowledge of its object, save on account of being defective or corrupted, since by its very nature it is directed to the knowledge of that object: thus the sight does not fail in the perception of colour, unless the sight itself be injured. Now, every defect and corruption is beside nature: because nature aims at the being and perfection of a thing. Therefore no cognitive faculty can fail in the right judgement of its object. Now, the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore there cannot be an intellect that errs naturally in the knowledge of truth. Neither, therefore, can any will stray naturally from the good.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (1 Tim. 4:4): Every creature of God is good: and (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.

Hereby also we refute the error of the Manicheans who held that these intellectual substances, whom we are wont to call demons or devils, are naturally evil.1

We also exclude the error described by Porphyry in his letter to Anebontes,2 where he says that some are of opinion that there is a genus of spirits, whose speciality it is to grant the prayers of magicians: spirits naturally deceitful, appearing under all kinds of forms, pretending to be gods, or demons, or souls of the departed. It is they who cause all these effects that seem either good or evil. As to those that are really good, they give no assistance; in fact they know nothing about them. But they counsel evil, and impugn and sometimes hinder those who are intent on leading a virtuous life: they are full of presumption and arrogance; they delight in vanities, and are fascinated by flattery. These words of Porphyry indicate clearly enough the malice of the demons, whose assistance the magic arts employ. In this alone are his words reprehensible that he states this malice to be natural to the demons.

Chapter CVIII

arguments that would seem to prove that there can be no sin in the demons

Since malice in the demons is not natural to them; and since it has been proved1 that they are evil: it follows of necessity that the evil in them is voluntary. Accordingly, we must inquire how this can be.

Because it would seem altogether impossible. For we proved in the Second Book2 that no intellectual substance is naturally united to a body, except the human soul: or according to some, the souls of the heavenly bodies,3—which it is unreasonable to deem evil, since the movement of heavenly bodies is most orderly, and, in a sense, is the principle of the entire natural order. Now, every other cognitive power, except the intellect, employs animate corporeal organs. Therefore the substances in question cannot have any cognitive power besides the intellect. Therefore whatever they know they understand. Now one does not err in what one understands: since all error results from lack of understanding. Therefore there can be no error in the knowledge of those substances. But there can be no sin in the will without error: because the will always tends to the apprehended good; so that unless there be error in the apprehension of a good, there cannot be sin in the will. Therefore seemingly there can be no sin of the will in those substances.

Again. In us, sin occurs in the will about matters of which we have true knowledge in general; through the judgement of the reason being hindered by a passion that shackles the reason in a particular instance. But there can be no such passions in the demons; because passions belong to the sensitive faculty which exercises no operation without a corporeal organ. Consequently, if these separate substances have right knowledge in general, it is impossible for their will to tend to evil through defective knowledge in a particular matter.

Moreover. No cognitive faculty is deceived about its proper object, but only about one that is outside its purview: thus the sight is not deceived in its judgement about colours; whereas deception may occur if a man judge by sight of taste, or of the species of a thing. Now, the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing. Consequently there can be no deception in the knowledge of the intellect, if it were to apprehend the mere quiddities of things, and all deception of the intellect would seem to occur through its apprehending forms mingled with phantasms, as is the case with us. But this mode of knowledge is not in intellectual substances that are not united to bodies; since there can be no phantasms apart from a body. Therefore there can be no error in the knowledge of separate substances, and consequently neither can there be sin in the will.

Besides. In us, falsehood occurs in the intellectual operations of synthesis and analysis, through the intellect not absolutely apprehending the quiddity of a thing, and coupling something with the thing apprehended. Now in the operation whereby the intellect apprehends what a thing is, falsehood does not occur except accidentally, in so far as, in this operation also, there is a certain mixture of the intellectual operation of synthesis and analysis. This happens because our intellect attains to the knowledge of the quiddity of a thing, not at once but in a certain order of inquiry: thus, at first we apprehend animal, then we divide it by opposite differences, and setting one of these aside, add the other to the genus, until we come to the definition of the species. In this process there may be falsehood, if we take as a difference of the genus, one that is not a difference of the genus. Now, to proceed thus to the knowledge of what a thing is, belongs to an intellect that discourses from one thing to another by reasoning: and is not becoming to separate intellectual substances, as we proved above.1 Seemingly, therefore, there can be no error in the knowledge of suchlike substances: and, consequently, neither can there be sin in their will.

Moreover. Since nothing desires other than its own good, it would seem impossible for that which has but one single good, to err in its appetite. For this reason, although faults happen in natural things through some defect occurring in the execution of the appetite, they never happen in the natural appetite: thus a stone always tends to a lower place, whether it reach it, or be hindered. Now, in us, sin happens in the act of appetite, because, as our nature is composed of spiritual and corporeal elements, there is more than one good in us: for one thing is our good in relation to the intellect, another is our good in relation to the senses, or in relation to the body. And among these various things that are man’s goods there is an order, so that what is of less account must be subordinate to that which is of more account. Hence sin of the will occurs in us, when in defiance of this order, we desire that which is good for us in a restricted sense in preference to that which is good simply. But this composition and diversity of goods is not in separate substances: in fact their very good is in relation to the intellect. Therefore, seemingly, no sin of the will is possible in them.

Again. In us, sin of the will results from excess or deficiency, between which virtue stands.2 Consequently in matters that do not admit of excess and deficiency, but only of the mean, the will cannot sin: thus no man can sin in desiring justice, since justice itself is a kind of mean. Now separate substances cannot desire other than intellectual goods, for it is absurd to say that things by nature incorporeal desire corporeal goods, or that those which have no senses desire sensible goods. But in intellectual goods there can be no excess; for by their very nature they are a mean between excess and deficiency: thus the truth is a mean between two errors, one of which is on the side of excess, the other on that of deficiency; wherefore sensible and corporeal goods are in the mean forasmuch as they are according to reason. Therefore, seemingly, intellectual separate substances cannot sin in the will.

Moreover. An incorporeal substance is, seemingly, more remote from defects than a corporeal substance. Now, no defect can occur in these corporeal substances that are remote from contrariety, namely the heavenly bodies. Much less therefore can any sin occur in separate substances that are remote both from contrariety, and from matter, and from movement, which seem to be the sources of any possible defect.

Chapter CIX

that sin is possible in the demons, and how

That sin of the will is in the demons is clear from the authority of Scripture. For it is said (1 Jo. 3:8) that the devil sinneth from the beginning; and (Jo. 8:44) it is said that the devil is a liar, and the father of lies, and that he was a murderer from the beginning: and (Wis. 2:24) that by the envy of the devil, death came into the world.

If anyone chose to follow the opinions of the Platonists, he would easily explain these authorities. For they assert that demons have a body composed of air: and so, since they have a body united to them, there can be a faculty of sense in them. Hence they ascribe to them passions which in us are a cause of sin, namely anger, hate and the like, wherefore Apuleius says that they are passive in mind.

Moreover, independently of their being united to bodies, as the Platonists aver, perhaps yet another kind of knowledge might be assigned to them besides that of the intellect. For, according to Plato, the sensitive soul also is incorruptible:1 so that it must have an operation in which the body does not concur. Consequently, nothing prevents the operation of the sensitive soul, and therefore the passions, from being in an intellectual substance, even though it be not united to a body. Hence the same source of sin is seated in them as in us.

But both of these explanations are impossible. For it has been proved above2 that with the exception of human souls no other intellectual substances are united to bodies.—And that the operations of the sensitive soul are impossible apart from a body, is clear from the fact, that when a sensorial organ is destroyed, the one operation of the sense is destroyed: thus sight ceases with the loss of an eye. For this reason as soon as the organ of touch is destroyed, the animal must die, for it cannot live without it.3

In order to solve the question proposed, then, we must observe that, just as there is order among active causes, so too is there in final causes: so that, to wit, the secondary end depends on the principal end, even as the secondary agent depends on the principal agent. Now, a fault occurs in active causes when the secondary agent strays from the order of the principal agent; just as, when the tibia fails to accomplish the movement commanded by the appetitive power through being crooked, the result is a limping gait. In the same way, therefore, in final causes also, when the secondary end is not subordinate to the principal end, there is sin in the will, the object of which is the good and the end.

Now every will naturally desires that which is the proper good of the wilier, namely perfect being, nor can it will anything contrary to this. Accordingly, no sin of the will can occur in a wilier whose proper good is the ultimate end, which is not subordinate to any other end, and to which all other ends are subordinate. Such a wilier is God, whose being is the sovereign good, which is the ultimate end. Therefore in God there can be no sin of the will.

But in every other wilier, whose proper good must needs be subordinate to another good, sin of the will can occur, if we consider him in his nature. For, though the natural inclination of the will in every wilier be to will and love his own perfection, so that it cannot will anything contrary thereto; yet it is not naturally implanted in him so that he directs his perfection to another end unfailingly: since the higher end is not his proper end, but that of the superior nature. Wherefore it is left to his discretion to direct his own perfection to a higher end. For beings endowed with a will differ from those which are not so endowed, in that the former direct themselves and what is theirs to an end, wherefore they are said to have free-will: whereas the latter do not direct themselves to an end, but are directed by a higher agent, being, as it were, moved to the end by another’s action, and not by their own.

Hence there could be sin in the will of a separate substance, through his not directing his own good and perfection to his last end, and adhering to his own good as his end. And since rules of action must needs be taken from the end, the consequence was that, through making himself his own end, he pretended to submit other things to his rule, and that his will was not subject to another higher than himself. But this belongs to God alone. In this sense then we are to understand that he desired to be equal to God:1 not that his good might be equal to the divine good; because such a thing could not come into his mind; and because by desiring it he would desire not to be, since the distinction of species is according to the various degrees of things, as is clear from what has been said above.2—Now, the will to rule others, and the refusal to submit one’s will to the ruling of a superior, is the will to be supreme and, so to say, not to be subject, which is the sin of pride. Hence it is reasonably said that the demon’s first sin was pride.—But as from one error about a principle, errors various and manifold result, so from the first disorder in the demon’s will, there arose all manner of sins in his will: both of hate towards God as resisting his pride, and most justly punishing his fault; and of envy towards man; and of many such sins.

We must also observe that, as the proper good of a thing is subordinate to several higher goods, the wilier is free to depart from the order of one superior, and not from the order of another that is either higher or lower than the former: thus a soldier who is subordinate both to his king and to his general, can direct his will to the good of the general, and not that of the king, or vice versa. But if the general depart from the order of the king, the will of the soldier will be good, if he depart from the will of his general, and direct his own will to his king; and the will of the soldier who obeys the will of his general against the will of his king will be evil: because the order of the lower principle depends on the order of the higher. Now, separate substances are not only subordinate to God, but one of them is subordinate to another, from the first to the last, as we proved in the Second Book.1 And since in every wilier under God there can be sin of the will, if he be considered in his nature, it was possible for one of the higher separate substances, or even the highest of all, to sin in his will. And this indeed is not improbable; for he would not have rested in his good as his end unless that good were very perfect. Possibly then, some of the lower separate substances, of their own will, directed their good to him, thus departing from the divine order, and so sinned even as he did: while others adhering, by the movement of their will, to the divine order, rightly departed from the order of the one who sinned, although he was higher than they in the natural order. In the Fourth Book2 we shall show how in either case that will of theirs continues unchangeable: for this regards the punishments or rewards of the good or wicked.

There is, however, this difference between a man and a separated substance that in any one man there are several appetitive powers which are subordinated one to the other. But this is not the case with separate substances, although one substance is subordinated to another. Now sin occurs in the will whenever the inferior appetite is turned aside. Just as sin, therefore, would be brought about in a separate substance either by its being turned aside from the divine order or because an inferior substance is turned aside from its order to a superior one, which latter remains under the divine order, so in a man sin occurs in two ways. It occurs in one way from the fact that the human will does not direct its proper good to God; and this sin is common both to man and to separate substances. It occurs in another way from the fact that the lower appetite is not regulated with regard to the higher, as for instance when we will the delights of the flesh, towards which the concupiscible appetite tends, not in accordance with reason. But this kind of sin is not found in separate substances.

Chapter CX

solution of the aforesaid arguments

Consequently it is not difficult to solve the objections that have been raised.1

For we are not forced to say that there was error in the intellect of the separate substance by judging a good not to be good; but through not considering the higher good to which his own good should have been referred. His will through being intent on his own good could be the cause of this lack of consideration: for it is free to the will to turn to this or that.

It is also clear that he desired but one good, and that was his own good: but his sin consisted in his disregarding the higher good, to which his own should have been directed. For just as in us there is sin through our desiring inferior goods, those namely of the body, outside the order of reason, so in the devil was there sin through his not referring his own good to the divine.

It is also clear that he strayed from the mean of virtue, inasmuch as he did not submit to the order of his superior, and so to himself gave more than his due, and to God less than was due to Him, as the sovereign rule to whose order all things should be subject. Consequently it is evident that in this sin the mean was not missed through excess of passion, but merely through inequality of justice which is about operations. For in separate substances there can be operations, but passions not at all.

Nor does it follow, that because in the higher bodies there can be no defects, there can be no sin in separate substances. Because bodies and all irrational beings are acted upon, and do not put themselves in action, for they have no dominion over their actions. Wherefore they cannot escape the first rule that puts them in action and moves them; unless they be unable to receive adequately the rectitude of the supreme rule, owing to an indisposition of matter. Wherefore the higher bodies in which there cannot be any indisposition of matter, can never depart from the rectitude of the first rule. But rational or intellectual substances are not only acted upon, but they also move themselves to their own actions. And this applies to them all the more, according as their nature is the more perfect: since the more perfect a thing’s nature, the more perfect is its power for action. Consequently the perfection of their nature does not prevent the possibility of sin in them in the manner explained above; namely, through adhering to themselves, and disregarding the order of the superior agent.

Chapter CXI

that rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a special manner

From what has been proved up to now,1 it is evident that divine providence extends to all things. And yet there must be some special kind of providence bestowed on intellectual and rational creatures, in preference to others. For they surpass other creatures both in the perfections of their nature, and in the excellence of their end. In the perfection of their nature,—because alone the rational creature has dominion over its action, since it moves itself freely to act: whereas other creatures are moved to their proper actions rather than act themselves; as was proved above.1 In the excellence of their end,—because alone the intellectual creature by its operation attains to the last end of the universe, namely by knowing and loving God: whereas other creatures cannot attain to the last end except by a certain participation of His likeness. Now, actions vary in kind according to the diversity of end and of their subject matter: thus in art the operations vary according to the difference of end and matter: for a physician acts differently to expel sickness, and to confirm health; and differently, again in bodies of different temperament. In like manner in the government of a state, a different kind of order must be observed according to the different status of the subjects, and according to the different ends to which they are directed: for there must be a different rule for soldiers to make them ready to fight, and for craftsmen to make them able to work. Accordingly there is one kind of order whereby rational creatures are subject to divine providence; and another whereby other creatures are subject thereto.

Chapter CXII

that rational creatures are governed for their own sake, and other creatures, as directed to them

In the first place then, the very condition of the rational creature, in that it has dominion over its actions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake: whereas the condition of other things that have not dominion over their actions shows that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. Because that which acts only when moved by another, is like an instrument; whereas that which acts by itself, is like a principal agent. Now an instrument is required, not for its own sake, but that the principal agent may use it. Hence whatever is done for the care of the instruments must be referred to the principal agent as its end: whereas any such action directed to the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is for the sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly intellectual creatures are ruled by God, as though He cared for them for their own sake, while other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures.

Again. That which has dominion over its own act, is free in its action, because he is free who is cause of himself:1 whereas that which by some kind of necessity is moved by another to act, is subject to slavery. Therefore every other creature is naturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government provision is made for the free for their own sake; but for slaves that they may be useful to the free. Accordingly divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature.

Moreover. Whenever certain things are directed to a certain end, if any of them are unable of themselves to attain to the end, they must needs be directed to those that attain to the end, which are directed to the end for their own sake. Thus the end of the army is victory, which the soldiers obtain by their own action in fighting, and they alone in the army are required for their own sake; whereas all others, to whom other duties are assigned, such as the care of horses, the preparing of arms, are requisite for the sake of the soldiers of the army. Now, it is clear from what has been said,2 that God is the last end of the universe, whom the intellectual nature alone obtains in Himself, namely by knowing and loving Him, as was proved above.1 Therefore the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake.

Further. In every whole, the principal parts are requisite on their own account for the completion of the whole, while others are required for the preservation or betterment of the former. Now, of all the parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because they approach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore divine providence provides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake.

Besides. It is clear that all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole: since the whole is not on account of the parts, but the parts on account of the whole. Now, intellectual natures are more akin to the whole than other natures: because, in a sense, the intellectual substance is all things, inasmuch as by its intellect it is able to comprehend all things; whereas every other substance has only a particular participation of being. Consequently God cares for other things for the sake of intellectual substances.

Besides. Whatever happens to a thing in the course of nature happens to it naturally. Now, we see that in the course of nature the intellectual substance uses all others for its own sake; either for the perfection of the intellect, which sees the truth in them as in a mirror; or for the execution of its power and development of its knowledge, in the same way as a craftsman develops the conception of his art in corporeal matter; or again to sustain the body that is united to an intellectual soul, as is the case in man. It is clear, therefore, that God cares for all things for the sake of intellectual substances.

Moreover. If a man seek something for its own sake, he seeks it always, because what is per se, is always: whereas if he seek a thing on account of something else, he does not of necessity seek it always but only in reference to that for the sake of which he seeks it. Now, as we proved above,2 things derive their being from the divine will. Therefore whatever is always is willed by God for its own sake; and what is not always is willed by God, not for its own sake, but for another’s. Now, intellectual substances approach nearest to being always, since they are incorruptible. They are, moreover, unchangeable, except in their choice. Therefore intellectual substances are governed for their own sake, as it were; and others for the sake of intellectual substances.

The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion: since all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, in so far as one part serves another. Thus in the human body it is clear that the lungs belong to the body’s perfection, in that they serve the heart: wherefore there is no contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart, and for the sake of the whole animal. In like manner that other natures are on account of the intellectual is not contrary to their being for the perfection of the universe: for without the things required for the perfection of the intellectual substance, the universe would not be complete.

Nor again does the fact that individuals are for the sake of the species militate against what has been said. Because through being directed to their species, they are directed also to the intellectual nature. For a corruptible thing is directed to man, not on account of only one individual man, but on account of the whole human species. Yet a corruptible thing could not serve the whole human species, except as regards its own entire species. Hence the order whereby corruptible things are directed to man, requires that individuals be directed to the species.

When we assert that intellectual substances are directed by divine providence for their own sake, we do not mean that they are not also referred to God and for the perfection of the universe. Accordingly they are said to be provided for on their own account, and others on account of them, because the goods bestowed on them by divine providence are not given them for another’s profit: whereas those bestowed on others are in the divine plan intended for the use of intellectual substances. Hence it is said (Deut. 4:19): Lest thou see the sun and the moon and the other stars,1 and being deceived by error, thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven: and (Ps. 8:8): Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover, the beasts also of the field: and (Wis. 12:18): Thou, being master of power, judgest with tranquillity, and with great favour disposest of us.

Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for man’s use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever. For this reason the Lord said to Noe (Gen. 9:3): As the green herbs I have delivered all flesh to you.2

And if any passages of Holy Writ seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young:3 this is either to remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings: or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another: or on account of some signification: thus the Apostle expounds4 the prohibition against muzzling the ox that treadeth the corn.5

Chapter CXIII

that the rational creature is directed to its action by god not only in its relation to the species, but also in its relation to the individual

Hence it is clear that the rational creature alone is directed to its actions by God, with due regard not only to the species, but also to the individual. For, seemingly, everything is on account of its operation: since operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing. Wherefore each thing is directed to its action by God, according as it stands under divine providence. Now, the rational creature stands under divine providence as being governed and cared for, on its own account, and not, as other corruptible creatures, on account of the species only: because the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species, is not governed for its own sake; whereas the rational creature is governed for its own sake, as we have made clear.1 Accordingly, rational creatures alone are directed by God to their actions for the sake, not only of the species, but also of the individual.

Besides. Things that are directed in their actions only so far as these refer to the species, have not the power to act or not to act: since whatever results from the species, is common and natural to all the individuals contained in the species; and we have no choice about natural things. Hence if man were directed in his actions in reference only to the demands of the species, he would not have the power to act, or not to act, and he would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as is the case with all irrational creatures. It is therefore clear that rational creatures are directed in their actions, with regard not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Moreover. As we proved above,2 divine providence extends to every single thing, even the least. Therefore whatever things have actions outside the inclination of nature, must needs in such actions receive from divine providence a direction besides that which regards the species. Now, many actions are apparent in the rational creature, for which the inclination of the species is not sufficient: and a sign of this is that they are not the same in all, but differ in different subjects. Therefore the rational creature must needs be directed to its actions by God, with reference not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Again. God provides for every nature according to its capacity: for He made each creature such that He knew it to be adapted to obtain its end through being governed by Him. Now, the rational creature alone is capable of being directed to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual: because it has intellect and reason, so as to be able to perceive the different ways in which a certain thing is good or evil in relation to various persons, times, and places. Therefore the rational creature alone is directed by God to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual.

Besides. The rational creature is subject to divine providence in such a way, that not only is it governed thereby, but is able to know something of the nature of providence: so that it is capable of providence and government in respect of others. This is not the case with other creatures, for they only participate in providence by being subject to it. Now, through being capable of providence, a man can direct and govern his own actions also. Therefore the rational creature participates in divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing: for it governs itself in its own actions, and other things too. Now, every lower providence is subject to divine providence as supreme. Therefore the government of a rational creature’s acts, as personal acts, belongs to divine providence.

Again. The personal acts of a rational creature are properly those that proceed from the rational soul. Now, the rational soul is capable of perpetuity, not only in respect of the species, like other creatures, but also in respect of the individual. Therefore the actions of a rational creature are directed by divine providence, not only in the point of their belonging to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal.

Hence it is that, though all things are subject to divine providence, yet Holy Writ ascribes the care of men to it in a special manner; according to Ps. 8:5: What is man that thou art mindful of him? and 1 Cor. 9:9: Doth God take care of oxen? These things are said because God watches over man’s actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts.

Chapter CXIV

that laws are given by god to man

It is evident from this that it was necessary for man to receive laws from God. For, as we have shown,1 just as the acts of irrational creatures are directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the species, so are man’s actions directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the individual. Now, in so far as they are actions belonging to the species, actions of irrational creatures are directed by God by a certain natural inclination, which is consequent to the specific nature. Therefore in addition to this something must be given to man whereby he is directed in his personal actions. And this is what we call law.

Again. The rational creature, as stated above,2 is subject to divine providence, in such a way as to participate in a certain likeness of divine providence, inasmuch as it is able to govern itself in its own actions, and other things also. Now, that by which the actions of people are governed is a law. Therefore it was reasonable that a law should be given to man by God.

Besides. Since a law is nothing else than a reason and rule of action, it is reasonable that to those alone a law be given, who know the reason of their action. Now, this applies only to the rational creature. Therefore it was fitting that a law should be given to the rational creature alone.

Further. A law should be given to those in whom is the power to act or not to act. But this belongs to the rational creature alone. Therefore only the rational creature is adapted to receive a law.

Moreover. Since a law is nothing else than a reason of action: and the reason for everyone’s action is his end: everyone who is capable of receiving a law must receive the law from the one who guides him to his end: even as the inferior craftsman is guided by the master-craftsman, and the soldier by the commander-in-chief. Now, the rational creature obtains his last end in God and from God, as we have already shown.1 Therefore it was reasonable that a law should be given to men by God.

Hence it is said (Jerem. 31:33): I will give My law in their hearts, and (Osee 8:12): I shall write to him my manifold laws.

Chapter CXV

that the divine law directs man chiefly to god

From this we may gather what is the principal intention of the divine law.

For it is evident that every lawgiver intends by his law to direct men to his own end: as the commander-in-chief leads to victory, and the governor of a state, to peace. Now the end intended by God, is God Himself. Therefore the chief intention of the divine law is to lead men to God.

Again. Law, as stated above,2 is a rule which God’s governing providence sets before the rational creature. Now the government of God’s providence leads each thing to its proper end. Consequently the law given by God directs man chiefly to his end. But the end of the human creature is to adhere to God: since in this does his happiness consist, as we have proved above.3 Therefore the divine law directs man chiefly to union with God.

Also. The intention of every lawgiver is to make those good for whom he legislates: hence precepts of law should be about acts of virtue.4 Therefore the divine law aims at those acts that are best. Now, of all human acts the best are those whereby man adheres to God, as being most akin to His end. Therefore the divine law directs man to these acts before all others.

Besides. That which gives a law its force should hold the chief place in the law. But the law given by God derives its force with men from men being subject to God; for no one is bound by the law of a king whose subject he is not. Therefore the union of man’s mind with God should be the chief thing in the divine law.

Hence it is written (Deut. 10:12): And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul.

Chapter CXVI

that the end of god’s law is the love of god

Since the chief intention of God’s law is that man adhere to God; and since man adheres most firmly to God by love: it follows of necessity that the principal purpose of the law is directed to love.

It is evident that man adheres to God principally by love. In man there are two things whereby he can adhere to God, his intellect and his will: for by the inferior faculties of his soul he cannot adhere to God, but to lower beings. But the adhesion of the intellect is completed by the adhesion of the will, because by his will man, as it were, rests in that which the intellect apprehends. Now, the will adheres to a thing either by love or by fear, but not in the same way. For when it adheres to a thing through fear, it adheres on account of something else, namely in order to avoid an evil that threatens unless it adhere to that thing. But when it adheres to a thing through love, it adheres for its own sake. Now, that which is for its own sake is of more account than that which is for another’s sake.1 Therefore to adhere to God by love is to adhere to Him in the closest way possible: and consequently this is the chief intention of the divine law.

Again. The end of every, and especially the divine, law is to make men good. Now, man is said to be good because he has a good will, whereby he brings into act whatever good is in him. Also, a will is good through willing the good, and above all the greatest good, which is the end. Therefore the more his will wills this good, so much the better is the man. Now a man wills more that which he wills on account of love, than that which he wills on account of fear alone: for when he wills a thing only through fear, he is partly unwilling: as when a man, through fear, wills to cast his cargo overboard. Therefore above all the love of the Sovereign Good, namely God, makes men good, and is intended by the divine law above all else.

Further. Man’s goodness results from virtue: since it is virtue that makes its possessor good.1 Hence the law intends to make men virtuous; and the precepts of the law are about acts of virtue.2 But a condition of virtue is that the virtuous act with both firmness and pleasure. Now, this is especially the effect of love: because through love we do a thing steadfastly and pleasurably. Therefore love of the good is the ultimate aim of the divine law.

Besides. Lawgivers move those to whom the law is given by the command of the law which they promulgate. Now, in all things moved by a first mover, the more a thing participates in that movement, and the nearer it approaches to a likeness to that first mover, the more perfectly is it moved. Now God, the divine lawgiver, does all things on account of His love. Consequently he who tends to Him in that way, namely by loving Him, tends to Him in the most perfect manner. Now, every agent intends perfection in what he does. Therefore the end of all legislation is that man love God.

Hence it is said (1 Tim. 1:5): The end of the commandment is charity: and (Matth. 22:37, 38) that the greatest and first commandment in the law is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.

Hence too, the New Law, as being more perfect, is called the law of love, whereas the Old Law, as being less perfect, is called the law of fear.3

Chapter CXVII

that we are directed by the divine law to the love of our neighbour

From this it follows that the divine law aims at the love of our neighbour.

For there should be union of affection between those who have one common end. Now, men have one common last end, namely happiness, to which they are directed by God. Therefore men should be united together by mutual love.

Again. Whosoever loves a man, loves those whom he loves, and those who are his kindred. Now, men are loved by God, since He prepared for them a last end consisting in the enjoyment of Himself. Therefore as a man is a lover of God, so must he be a lover of his neighbour.

Moreover. Since man by nature is a social animal,1 he needs assistance from other men in order to obtain his own end. Now this is most suitably done if men love one another mutually. Hence the law of God, which directs men to their last end, commands us to love one another.

Again. In order to apply himself to divine things, man needs calm and peace. Now mutual love, more than aught else, removes the obstacles to peace. Seeing then that the divine law directs men to apply themselves to divine things, we must conclude that this same law leads men to love one another.

Further. The divine law is offered to man in aid of the natural law. Now it is natural to all men to love one another: a proof of which is that a man, by a kind of natural instinct, comes to the assistance of anyone even unknown that is in need, for instance by warning him, should he have taken the wrong road, by helping him to rise, should he have fallen, and so forth: as though every man were intimate and friendly with his fellow-man.2 Therefore mutual love is prescribed to man by the divine law. Wherefore it is said (Jo. 15:12): This is My commandment that you love one another: and (1 Jo. 4:21): This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother: and (Matth. 22:39) that the second commandment is, Thou shalt love thy neighbour.

Chapter CXVIII

that the divine law binds men to the true faith

From this it is clear that the divine law binds men to the true faith.

For just as the beginning of material love is sight exercised through the material eye, so the beginning of spiritual love is the intellectual vision of a spiritual lovable object. Now, the vision of that spiritual lovable object which is God, is impossible to us in the present life except by faith, because it surpasses natural reason, and especially inasmuch as our happiness consists in the enjoyment thereof. Therefore we need to be brought to the true faith by the divine law.

Again. The divine law directs man to perfect subjection to God.1 Now, as man is subject to God as to His will by loving Him, so is he subject to Him as to his intellect by believing in Him. Not indeed by believing anything false: since God, who is truth, cannot propose anything false to man; wherefore he that believes something false, believes not in God. Therefore the divine law directs man to the true faith.

Also. He who errs about something essential to a thing, knows not that thing: thus if anyone in apprehending an irrational animal were to think it a man, he would not know man. It would be different were he to err about the accidentals of a thing. In composite things, however, he who errs about any of the essential principles, though he know not the thing simply, yet he knows it in some respect; thus if he thinks a man to be an irrational animal, he knows him in respect of his genus. But this cannot apply to simple things, and any error whatever removes all knowledge of the thing. Now, God is supremely simple. Therefore to err about God, is not to know God: thus he who believes that God is a body, knows not God at all, but apprehends something else instead of God. Now, a thing is loved and desired according as it is known. Therefore he that errs about God, can neither love God, nor desire him as his end. Consequently, since the aim of the divine law is to make men love and desire God,1 that law must needs bind men to a true faith in God.

Moreover. False opinion in matters of intelligence, is like vice opposed to virtue in moral matters: for the true is the good of the intellect.2 Now, it belongs to the divine law to prohibit vice. Therefore it belongs to it also to proscribe false opinions about God and things divine. Hence it is said (Heb. 11:6): Without faith it is impossible to please God. Moreover (Exod. 20)3 before other commandments are given, a right faith in God is prescribed when it is said: Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy4 God is one.

Hereby is refuted the error of those who maintained that it matters not for man’s salvation with what faith he serves God.

Chapter CXIX

that our mind is directed to god by certain sensible things

Since it is connatural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, and since it is most difficult to arise above sensible things, divine providence has appointed sensible things as a reminder to man of things divine, so that thus man’s intention might the more readily be recalled to divine things, not excluding the man whose mind is not equal to the contemplation of divine things in themselves.

For this reason sensible sacrifices were instituted; since man offers these to God, not because God needs them, but that man might be reminded that he must refer both himself and all that is his to God as his end, and as the Creator, Governor and Lord of all.

Again, sensible things are employed for man’s sanctification, in the shape of washings, anointings, meat and drink, and the uttering of sensible words, as signifying to man that he receives intelligible gifts from an external source, and from God whose name is expressed by sensible words.

Moreover man performs certain sensible actions, not to arouse God, but to arouse himself to things divine: such as prostrations, genuflexions, raising of the voice and singing. Such things are not done as though God needed them, for He knows all things, and His will is unchangeable, and He looks at the affection of the heart, and not the mere movement of the body: but we do them for our own sake, that by them our intention may be fixed on God, and our hearts inflamed. At the same time we thereby confess that God is the author of our soul and body, since we employ both soul and body in the worship we give Him.

Hence we must not wonder that heretics who deny that God is the author of our body, decry the offering of this bodily worship to God. Wherein it is clear that they forget that they are men, inasmuch as they deem the presentation of sensible objects to be unnecessary for interior knowledge and affection. For experience shows that by acts of the body the soul is aroused to a certain knowledge or affection. Wherefore it is evidently reasonable that we should employ bodies in order to raise our minds to God.

The offering of these bodily things to God is called the worship (cultus) of God. For we speak of cultivating those things to which we give our thought in the shape of deeds. Now, we give our thought to God in our actions, not indeed that we may be of advantage to Him, as when we cultivate other things by our actions: but because by such actions we advance towards God. And since by internal acts we tend to God directly, therefore properly speaking we worship God by internal acts. Nevertheless external acts also belong to the divine worship, forasmuch as by these acts the mind is raised to God, as we have said.

This divine worship is also called religion: because by these acts man tethers (ligat) himself, as it were, lest he stray from God. Also, because by a kind of natural instinct he feels himself obliged in his own way to show reverence to God, from whom flows His being and every good.

Wherefore religion is called piety. Because by piety we give due honour to those who begot us. Hence it would seem reasonably to belong to piety to honour God the Father of all. For this reason those who are averse to the worship of God are said to be impious.

And since not only is God the cause and source of our being, but also our whole being is in His power, and all that we have we owe to Him, and because of this He is truly our master, that which we do to honour Him is called service. Now, God is Lord not accidentally, as man of his fellow-man, but by nature. Hence we owe service to God otherwise than to a fellow-man, to whom we are subject accidentally, and who wields over things a restricted dominion, that he receives from God. Wherefore the service due to God is called by the special name of latria by the Greeks.

Chapter CXX

that the worship of latria is due to god alone

Some there have been who deemed that the worship of latria should be given not only to the supreme author of all, but to all things, even creatures, that are above man. Hence some, whilst holding God to be the one universal cause of all, considered that we should offer latria, first—after the supreme God—to the heavenly intellectual substances, which they called gods, whether such substances were entirely separate from bodies, or animated the spheres or stars.

Secondly, to other intellectual substances which they believed to be united to aerial bodies, and called demons: nevertheless, deeming them to be above men, even as an aerial body is above an earthly one, they maintained that these substances should be honoured by men with a divine worship, and that in comparison with men they were gods, as being between men and the gods.—And as they believed that the souls of good men, through being separated from their bodies, passed to a higher state than that of the present life, they held that divine worship should be given also to the souls of the dead, whom they called heroes or manes.

Others, believing God to be the soul of the world, held that divine honour should be given to the whole world and each part thereof; not indeed on account of the body, but on account of the soul, which they said was God: even as we honour a wise man, not for his body but for his soul.

Others, again, thought that divine honour should be given even to things which, though beneath man by nature, participate in the power of a higher nature. Wherefore, believing that certain images, made by men, receive a certain supernatural power, either through the influence of a heavenly body, or through the presence of certain spirits, they said that such images should receive divine honour. These images they called gods: for which reason they are called idolaters, because they offered latria to idols, i.e. images.

But it is absurd for those who hold that there is but one separate first cause, to give divine honour to another. For we worship God, as stated above,1 not because He needs it, but that true notions about God may be confirmed in us by means of sensible things. Now, the notion that there is but one supreme God, cannot be confirmed in us by means of sensible objects, except by our offering Him something distinct, and this we call the divine worship. It is clear, then, that a true notion about the one cause, is weakened if divine worship be given to several.

Further. As we said above,2 this external worship is necessary for man in order that his soul be roused to give spiritual homage to God. Now, custom is of great weight in moving the human mind to action, for we are more easily inclined to that which is customary. And the custom among men is that the honour given to the head of the state, e.g. the king or the emperor, be given to no other. Therefore the human mind should be urged to realize that there is one supreme cause of all, by rendering to it something that it renders to no other. This is what we call the worship of latria.

Again. If the worship of latria were due to a being as superior and not as supreme: since one man, and one angel, is higher than another, it would follow that a man ought to give the worship of latria to another man, and one angel to another angel. And since he who is superior in one respect, is inferior in another, the result would be that men would worship one another mutually: which is absurd.

Besides. It is customary among men that a special return be due for a special boon. Now, there is a special boon that man receives from the most high God, namely his creation: for we proved in the Second Book1 that God alone creates. Therefore man must make to God a special return in recognition of this special boon: and this is the worship of latria.

Moreover. Latria means service: and service is due to a master. Properly and truly, a master is one who orders others to work, and receives orders from none: for he who carries out the orders of another is servant rather than master. Now, God the supreme cause of all, orders all things to their respective actions, by His providence, as we proved above:2 wherefore Holy Writ describes the angels and higher bodies as serving both God, whose orders they carry out, and us for whose good they work.3 Therefore the worship of latria which is due to the sovereign Lord, should be given to none but the supreme cause of all.

Also. Of all things pertaining to latria, sacrifice would seem to hold a special place: for genuflections, prostrations, and other like signs of honour, may be given even to men, albeit with another intention than when given to God: whereas no one has thought that a sacrifice should be offered except to one whom he looked upon, or pretended to look upon, as God. Now the external sacrifice is a representation of the interior true sacrifice in which the human mind offers itself to God. And our mind offers itself to God, as the principle of its creation, as the author of its operation, as the end wherein lies its happiness. This can only apply to the supreme cause of all: for it was shown above1 that God is the sole cause of the rational soul; that He alone can incline the will of man whithersoever He will;2 and that man’s final happiness consists in the enjoyment of Him alone.3 To God alone, therefore, must man offer sacrifice and the worship of latria, and not to any spiritual substances whatsoever.

Although the opinion which holds that the most high God is nothing else but the soul of the world, is false, as we have proved;4 while that is true which holds God to be a separate being, from whom all other intellectual substances, both separate or embodied, originate; yet the offering of latria to various things is more consistent with the former opinion. Because, by offering the worship of latria to various things, one would seem to offer the same worship to the one most high God, to whom, according to this opinion, the various parts of the world are compared, as the various members of the human body are compared to the soul.—But reason again is in contradiction with this opinion. For they assert that the worship of latria should be given to the world not on account of its body but on account of its soul, which they hold to be God. And though the body of the world is divisible into various parts, the soul is indivisible. Therefore divine honour is not to be given to many things, but to one only.

Again. If we suppose the world to have a soul that animates the whole and every part thereof, this cannot mean the nutritive or sensitive soul: since the operations of these faculties of the soul are not competent to all the parts of the universe. In fact, granted that the world has a sensitive and nutritive soul, the worship of latria would not be due to it on account of a like soul, since neither is it due to animals or plants.—It follows then that in saying that God, to whom latria is due, is the soul of the world, they mean the intellectual soul. But this soul is not a perfection of certain definite parts of the body, but in some way regards the whole. This is clearly the case with our soul which is of lower degree: for the intellect does not employ an organ of the body, as is proved in 3 De Anima, iv. Consequently according to their principle, divine honour would not have to be shown to the various parts of the world, but to the whole, on account of its soul.

Moreover. If, according to their opinion, there is but one soul animating the whole world and all its parts; and if the world is not to be called God save on account of its soul: therefore there will be but one God. Consequently divine honour is due to one only.—And if there be but one soul of the whole, and the various parts again have various souls, they must admit that the souls of the parts are subordinate to the soul of the whole: for the same proportion is between perfections, and the things perfected. Now, where there is order among several intellectual substances, the worship of latria is due only to the one that has the highest place, as we proved against the other opinion.1 Consequently the worship of latria would have to be given, not to the parts of the world, but to the whole alone.

Again. It is evident that certain parts of the world have no soul of their own: consequently worship would not have to be given to them. Yet these people worshipped all the elements of the world; namely earth, water, fire and other like inanimate bodies.

Besides. It is clear that a superior does not owe the worship of latria to an inferior. Now man, in the order of nature, is superior to all inferior bodies at least, according as he has a more perfect form. Therefore man would not have to give the worship of latria to inferior bodies, if such worship were due to them by reason of their own souls.

The statement that each part of the world has its own soul, and that the whole world has not one common soul, leads to the same inconsistencies. For it would follow that the highest part of the world has the highest kind of soul, to which alone, according to what we have said, the worship of latria would be due.

These opinions are surpassed in unreasonableness by the one which states that the worship of latria is to be given to images. For if these images derive power or excellence from the heavenly bodies, this is no reason for giving them the worship of latria; since it is not given those bodies themselves, except perhaps on account of their souls, as some have asserted.1 And these images are supposed to receive a certain power from the heavenly bodies in respect of their bodily power.

Besides. It is clear that they do not receive from the heavenly bodies a perfection equal to the human soul. Therefore they are inferior in excellence to any individual man. Consequently man does not owe them any kind of worship.

Again. The cause is more potent than the effect. Now, men are the makers of these images. Therefore man owes them no worship.

And if it be said that these images derive power or excellence through association with some spiritual substance; this again is insufficient, for the worship of latria is due to no spiritual substance except only to the highest of all.

Moreover. The rational soul is associated in a more excellent way with the human body, than a spiritual substance with the aforesaid images. Therefore man still remains in a position of greater excellence than those images.

Again. As these images are sometimes made for producing baneful effects, it is clear that if such effects are brought about by spiritual substances, those spiritual substances are wicked. This is still more clear from the fact that they are deceitful in their answers, and demand of their worshippers things that are contrary to virtue. Hence they are inferior to good men; and consequently the worship of latria is not due to them. It is therefore evident from what has been said that the worship of latria is due to the one most high God alone. Hence it is said (Exod. 12:20): He that sacrificeth to the gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord: and (Deut. 6:13): The Lord thy God shalt thou adore,2 and Him only shalt thou serve. Again it is said of heathens (Rom. 1:22, 23): Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God, into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things: and further on (1:25): Who changed the truth of God into a lie: and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is (above all things God)1 blessed for ever. Since then it is wrong to give the worship of latria to any other but the first principle of all; and to incite to do wrong belongs only to an ill-disposed rational creature: it is clear that men were urged to the aforesaid unlawful forms of worship, at the instigation of the demons, who coveting divine honour even offered themselves to man’s worship in the place of God. Hence it is said (Ps. 95:5): All the gods of the gentiles are devils: and (1 Cor. 10:20): The things which the heathens sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God. Wherefore, since the principal intention of the divine law is that man be subject to God, and give Him a peculiar reverence not only in thought, but also in word and deeds of the body: hence, first of all (Exod. 20.) when God’s law is set forth, the worship of more than one God is forbidden, where it is said: Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me: thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything. Secondly, man is forbidden to utter irreverently the name of God, in order, to wit, to confirm a falsehood: and this is expressed in the words: Thou shalt not take the name of … God in vain. Thirdly, a certain time is prescribed for rest from external works, in order that the mind may have leisure to think of God: hence it is said: Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath-day.

Chapter CXXI

that the divine law directs man according to reason as regards things corporeal and sensible

Just as the human mind can be raised to God by corporeal and sensible things, provided one make right use of them for God’s honour, even so their abuse either wholly withdraws the mind from God, if the will place its end in lower things; or distracts the mind’s intention from God, when we are too attached to those things. Now, the divine law was given chiefly that man might adhere to God.1 Therefore it belongs to the divine law to direct man in his love and use of corporeal and sensible things.

Again. Just as the mind of man is subordinate to God, so is the body subordinate to the soul, and the lower powers to reason. Now, it belongs to divine providence, which God sets before man under the form of the divine law,2 that everything should retain its order. Therefore man should be directed by the divine law, in such wise that the lower powers be subject to reason; the body to the soul; and external things be employed for man’s needs.

Further. Every law that is framed aright, is conducive to virtue.3 Now, virtue is the reason’s rule applied to both interior affections and the use of corporeal things. Therefore this should be prescribed by the divine law.

Moreover. Every lawgiver should legislate for those things that are necessary for the observance of the law. Since, then, the law is proposed to the reason, man would not obey the law, unless all that is in man be subject to reason. Therefore it is for the divine law to command that all that is in man be subject to reason.

Hence it is said (Rom. 12:1): Your reasonable service: and (1 Thess. 4:3): This is the will of God, your sanctification.

Hereby we refute the error of those who assert that there is on sin unless our neighbour be injured or scandalized.

Chapter CXXII

how, according to the divine law, simple fornication is a sin: and that matrimony is natural

Hence it is clear how futile is the reasoning of those who say that simple fornication is no sin. For they say: Take, for instance, a woman who is not bound by the marriage tie, or under any authority, paternal or otherwise. If with her consent, a man have intercourse with her, he does her no wrong: since she pleases herself, and has the disposal of her own body. He does not wrong a third party: because, in the supposition, she is under no one’s authority. Therefore there is no sin.

Nor, seemingly, is it enough to reply that he does a wrong to God.—Because we do not wrong God unless we wrong our own good as stated above.1 But this would not seem to be contrary to man’s good. Consequently no wrong, seemingly, is done to God thereby.

Likewise, it would not seem to meet the case if one reply that the man wrongs his neighbour by scandalizing him.—For one may be scandalized at something that is not a sin in itself, so that it becomes a sin accidentally. But the point at issue is whether simple fornication be a sin, not accidentally, but in itself.

Accordingly we must seek the solution from what has been said above. For it has been stated2 that God cares for everything in respect of what is good for it. Now, it is good for everything that it obtain its end: and its evil is that it turn from its end. This applies to the parts as well as to the whole: so that man’s every part, even as his every act, should attain to its due end. Now, though the seed be superfluous for the preservation of the individual, it is necessary for the propagation of the species. Other superfluities such as excretions, urine, sweat and the like are not necessary for anything, and so it is only their discharge that is good for man. Seed, however, has another end in view, since it is emitted for the purpose of generation, which is the object of coition. Moreover generation would be in vain, if due nourishment were not to follow: because the offspring would not survive if deprived of its due nourishment. Hence the emission of seed should be ordered in such wise, that befitting generation, and rearing of the offspring may follow.

It is therefore clearly contrary to man’s good that the seed be emitted in such a way that generation cannot ensue: and if this be done deliberately it must needs be a sin.—I mean, if it be done in a way that is directly opposed to generation, such as every emission of seed without the natural union of male and female: hence sins of this kind are said to be against nature. If, however, it be accidental that generation cannot ensue, it is not on this account contrary to nature, or sinful: for instance if the woman be sterile.

In like manner it must be contrary to man’s good, if, though seed be emitted so that generation can ensue, the proper upbringing of the offspring is hindered. For it must be observed that in those animals in which the female alone suffices for the rearing of the offspring,—dogs for instance—the male and female do not remain together after coition. On the other hand, in all cases in which the female does not suffice to rear the offspring, the male and female remain together after coition, as long as may be necessary for the rearing and development of the young. We have an instance of this in certain birds, whose young are unable to seek food as soon as they are hatched. For since the bird does not feed its young on milk,—which is ready at hand through being prepared by nature, as in the case of quadrupeds—and needs to go in search of food for them, and besides this fosters them by incubation; the female alone would not suffice for all this. Wherefore divine providence has given the male of such animals the natural instinct to remain with the female for the rearing of the offspring.—Now it is clear that in the human species the female is far from sufficing alone for the rearing of the children, since the needs of human life require many things that one person alone cannot provide. It is therefore in keeping with human nature that the man remain with the woman after coition, and not leave her at once, indulging in promiscuous intercourse, as those do who have the habit of fornication.

Nor is this argument weakened because some woman has sufficient means to rear her offspring by herself. Because natural rectitude in human acts depends, not on what is accidentally in one individual but on that which is proper to the whole species. Again, we must observe that, in the human species, the offspring needs not only nourishment for its body, as with other animals, but also instruction for its soul. For other animals have their natural forethought which enables them to provide for themselves: whereas man lives by reason, which can attain to forethought only after long experience: so that children need to be instructed by their parents who are experienced.

Moreover children are not capable of this instruction as soon as they are born, but only after a long time, and especially when they reach the age of discretion. Besides, this instruction requires a long time. And even then, on account of the assaults of the passions whereby the judgement of prudence is perverted,1 they need not only instruction but correction. Now a woman is insufficient for these things, in fact there is more need for a man for such things, for his reason is more perfect for instruction, and his arm is stronger for punishment. Consequently a short space of time such as suffices for birds is not sufficient for the education of the offspring in the human species, and a great part of life is required for the purpose. So that, as in all animals it behoves the male to remain with the female as long as the father is needed by the offspring, it is natural in the human race that the man should have not a short-lived but a lasting fellowship with a definite woman: and this fellowship is called matrimony. Therefore matrimony is natural to man: and the intercourse of fornication, which is apart from matrimony, is contrary to man’s good. For this reason it must needs be a sin.

Moreover, the emission of seed without the requisite intention of procreation and education, must not be thought a slight sin, for that it is a small sin, or none at all, to use some part of one’s body for some other purpose than that for which nature intended it: for instance if one walk on one’s hands, or use one’s feet to do what the hands should do. Because by suchlike actions man’s good is not prejudiced very much; whereas the inordinate discharge of semen is perversive of a natural good, which is the preservation of the species. Wherefore, after the sin of murder, whereby human nature is deprived of actual existence, this kind of sin, whereby the generation of human nature is hindered, holds, seemingly, the second place.

The foregoing conclusions are confirmed by divine authority. That the discharge of semen in such wise that no offspring can ensue, is unlawful, is clear from the words of Levit. 18:22, 23: Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind … thou shalt not copulate with any beast; and of 1 Cor. 6:10: Nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind … shall possess the kingdom of God.

Again, that fornication and all intercourse with other than one’s own wife, is unlawful, is evident from the words of Deut. 23:17: There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel: and of Job 4:13: Take heed to keep thyself … from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime: and of 1 Cor. 6:18: Fly fornication.

Hereby we exclude the error of those who denied that there was a greater sin in the emission of seed than in the discharge of other superfluities: and of those who said that fornication is no sin.

Chapter CXXIII

that matrimony should be indissoluble

If one consider the matter rightly, it will be seen that the foregoing arguments not only show that the fellowship of male and female in human nature, which we call matrimony, should be lasting, but also that it should endure throughout life.

For possessions are directed to the preservation of the natural life: and since the natural life which cannot be preserved in the person of an undying father, is preserved, by a kind of succession, in the person of the son, it is naturally befitting that the son succeed in things belonging to the father. Therefore it is natural that the father’s care for his son should endure to the end of his life. If, then, the father’s care for his son causes, even among birds, the continued fellowship of male and female, the natural order demands that in the human species father and mother should remain together to the end of life.

It would seem also contrary to equity for the aforesaid fellowship to be dissolved. For the female requires the male, not only for procreation, as in other animals, but also for governance: because the male excels both in intelligence and in strength. Now, the woman is taken into partnership with the man for the purpose of procreation. Consequently when the woman ceases to be fruitful and fair, this is an obstacle against her being taken by another man. Hence, if a man after taking a wife in her youth, while she is yet fair and fruitful, can put her away when she has aged, he does her an injury, contrary to natural equity.

Again. It is clearly unfitting that the woman be allowed to put away the man: since she is naturally subject to the man’s authority: and one who is subject to another is not free to withdraw himself from his authority. Hence it would be contrary to the natural order if a wife could leave her husband. Consequently, if the husband could leave his wife, there would not be just fellowship between husband and wife, but a kind of slavery on the part of the latter.

Also. There is in man a certain natural anxiety to be assured of his offspring: and this is necessary, because the child needs the father’s authority for a long time. Hence whatever prevents him from being assured of having children, is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species. Now, if the husband may put away his wife, or the wife leave her husband, and take another man, thus being copulated first to one, and afterwards to another, the certainty of offspring would be hindered. Therefore it is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species that husband and wife be separated: and in consequence the union of male and female in the human race must be not only long lasting but indissoluble.

Moreover. The greater the friendship the more stable and lasting is it. Now, seemingly between husband and wife there is the greatest friendship: for they are made one not only in the act of carnal intercourse, which even among dumb animals causes an agreeable fellowship, but also as partners in the whole intercourse of daily life: so that, to indicate this, man must leave father and mother (Gen. 2:24) for his wife’s sake. Therefore it is right that matrimony should be altogether indissoluble. It must also be observed that among natural acts generation alone is directed to the common good: since eating, and the discharge of other superfluities, regard the individual: whereas procreation regards the preservation of the species. Hence, as the law is made for the common good, whatever regards procreation should be regulated, before other things, by laws both divine and human. Now positive laws should be based on natural instinct, if they be human: even as in demonstrative sciences, all human discoveries must needs be founded on principles naturally known. And if they be divine, not only do they express the instinct of nature, but they also supply the defect of natural instinct: even as the things that God reveals, are beyond the grasp of natural reason. Since, then, the natural instinct of the human species is that the union of male and female be indissoluble, and that one man be united to one woman, it behoved this to be ordered by human law. Moreover, the divine law adds a kind of supernatural reason taken from the representation of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, which is union of one with one.1 Wherefore inordinateness in the act of generation not only is contrary to the natural instinct, but it also transgresses laws both divine and human. Hence, this kind of disorder is more sinful than that which may occur in taking food, or in similar things.

And since in man all other things should be subordinate to what is best in him, the union of male and female is ordered by law not only in the point of its relation to the procreation of children, as in other animals, but also in its relation to good morals, which right reason regulates, both as regards man in himself, and considered as a member either of a private family, or of the civil community. Now, the indissolubility of the union of male and female belongs to good morals. Because their mutual love will be the more constant if they know that they are indissolubly united. They will also be more carefully provident in the conduct of the household, when they realize that they are always to remain together in possession of the same things. Again, this precludes the origin of quarrels which must needs arise between the husband and his wife’s relatives, if he were to put his wife away: and those who are connected through affinity have a greater regard for one another. Moreover it removes the occasions of adultery which would occur, were the husband free to put away his wife, or vice versa: for this would encourage the seeking of further marriage.

Hence it is said (Matth. 5:31; 19:9; 1 Cor. 7:10): But I say to you that the wife depart not from her husband.1

Hereby we condemn the custom of putting a wife away. Nevertheless this was permitted to the Jews in the Old Law by reason of the hardness of their heart:2 because, to wit, they were prone to wife-murder. Hence the lesser evil was allowed, in order to avoid the greater.

Chapter CXXIV

that matrimony should be the union of one man with one woman

It is also to be observed, seemingly, that all animals that are used to copulate, have a natural instinct to resist another’s intercourse with their consort: wherefore, animals fight on account of copulation. And as regards all animals there is one common reason for this, because every animal desires to indulge at will in the pleasure of copulation, even as in the pleasure of eating: and this freedom ceases if many males have access to one female, or vice versa: just as an animal is deprived of the free enjoyment of its food, if another animal despoil it of the food it desires to consume. Hence animals fight both for food and for copulation. But with regard to men there is a special reason: because, as already stated,1 man naturally desires to be assured of his offspring: and this assurance would be altogether nullified in the case of promiscuous copulation. Therefore the union of one man with one woman comes from a natural instinct.

A difference, however, is to be noted here. For as regards one woman not being united to several men, both the foregoing arguments avail. But as regards one man not being joined to several women, the second argument is of no use: since the certainty of having offspring is not removed if one man be joined to several women. The first argument, however, avails against this: for just as freedom of access to the woman is denied, if she have another man, so too the same freedom is denied the woman, if the man have several women. Hence, as certainty of having offspring is the chief good sought from marriage, no human law or custom has permitted polyandry. This was considered to be wrong even among the ancient Romans, of whom Maximus Valerius2 relates that they deemed that not even on account of barrenness should the marriage bond be severed.

Again. In every animal species where the father has a certain care for his offspring, the one male has but one female, as may be seen in birds, where both unite in feeding their young: for one male would not suffice to rear the progeny of several females. On the other hand where the male animal has not the care of the offspring, we find indifferently union of one male with several females, or of one female with several males: such is the case with dogs, hens, and so forth. Since then of all animals the male of the human species is pre-eminent in the care of his offspring, it is clearly natural to man that one man should have one wife and vice versa.

Besides. Equality is a condition of friendship. Hence if a woman may not have several husbands, because this removes the certainty of offspring; were it lawful for a man to have several wives, the friendship of a wife for her husband would not be freely bestowed, but servile as it were. And this argument is confirmed by experience: since where men have several wives, the wives are treated as servants.

Further. In perfect friendship it is impossible to be friends with many, according to the Philosopher (8 Ethic. vi.). Hence if the wife has but one husband, while the husband has several wives, the friendship will not be equal on either side: and consequently it will be not a freely bestowed but a servile friendship as it were.

Moreover. As we have already stated1 matrimony among men should be so ordered as to be consistent with good morals. Now it is contrary to good morals that one man have several wives, for this leads to discord in the family, as shown by experience. Therefore it is not right for one man to have several wives.

Hence it is said (Gen. 2:24): They shall be two in one flesh.

Hereby polygamy stands condemned, as also the opinion of Plato2 who said that wives should be possessed in common: which opinion was adopted by Nicolas, one of the seven deacons.3

Chapter CXXV

that marriage should not be contracted between relatives

For these reasonable motives the laws have decreed that certain persons belonging to a common stock should be debarred from marriage.

Because, as marriage is the union of different persons, those who should consider themselves as one through having a common ancestor, are rightly debarred from marriage, that they may have a greater regard for each other, through realizing that for that reason they are one.

Again. Since in the relations between husband and wife there is a certain natural shame, relations should be forbidden between those who through being united in blood should revere each other. This motive seems to be indicated in the law, where it is said:1 Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy sister, and so on.

Further. That men be too much given to the pleasure of copulation is corruptive of good morals: because, since, more than any other, this pleasure absorbs the mind, the reason would be hindered in things pertaining to rectitude. Now there would result an abuse of pleasure if man were allowed to be united in copulation with those, in whose society he must needs live, such as sisters and other relatives: for it would be impossible to remove the occasion of intercourse with such persons. It was therefore in keeping with good morals that the laws should forbid such unions.

Moreover. The pleasure of copulation corrupts entirely the judgement of prudence.2 Therefore frequency of that pleasure is contrary to good morals. Now, this pleasure is increased by the mutual love of those who are thus united. Hence it would be contrary to good morals for relatives to marry: for then there would be in them the love arising from community of blood and nourishment in addition to the love of desire; and, in consequence, through multiplicity of loves the soul would be all the more a slave to pleasures.

Besides. It is most necessary in human society that friendship be among many. Now friendships among men are multiplied if marriage be contracted between persons of different stock. Therefore it was becoming for the laws to direct that marriage be contracted with those of different stock, and not between relatives.

Also. It is unsuitable that a person be united socially with those to whom he should naturally be subject. Now, it is natural for a man to be subject to his parents. Therefore it is unfitting for one to marry one’s parent, since marriage is a social union.

Hence it is said (Levit. 18:6): No man shall approach to her that is near of kin to him.

Hereby stands condemned the custom of those who contract bonds of the flesh with persons of their kindred. We must observe, however, that just as the natural inclination is to what occurs most frequently, so too is the law made to fit the majority of cases. The foregoing arguments are not invalidated by any possible exceptions: for the good of many should not be foregone for the sake of the good of one, since the common good is ever more god-like than the good of one.1 Lest, however, a defect that may occur in a single instance, be altogether irremediable, lawgivers and the like have the power to dispense in the statutes that are made for the generality, according to the requirements of a particular case. If the law be made by man, those who have the same power can dispense therein. But if the law be of God, dispensation can be granted by divine authority: just as in the old law polygamy, concubinage and divorce were seemingly allowed by dispensation.

Chapter CXXVI

that not all carnal intercourse is sinful

Just as it is contrary to reason to indulge in carnal intercourse so as to frustrate the begetting and rearing of children, so is it in keeping with reason to make use of it in a manner consistent with procreation and upbringing. Now, the divine law forbids only those things that are contrary to reason, as we have shown above.2 Therefore it is unreasonable to say that all carnal intercourse is sinful.

Again. Since the members of the body are instruments of the soul, the end of each member, as of any other instrument, is its use. Now, the use of certain members of the body is carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is the end of certain members of the body. But that which is the end of any natural thing, cannot be evil in itself: since that which is according to nature, is directed to an end by divine providence, as stated above.1 Therefore carnal intercourse cannot possibly be evil in itself.

Further. Natural inclinations are implanted in things by God, who moves all things. Therefore the natural inclination of a species cannot be to that which is evil in itself. Now, in all perfect animals there is a natural inclination to carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse cannot be evil in itself.

Moreover. That which is a necessary condition for something good and very good, is not evil in itself. But the preservation of the animal species cannot be enduring except by means of generation by carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse cannot be evil in itself.

Hence it is said (1 Cor. 7:28): A woman sins not if she marries.2

Hereby we refute the error of those who say that all carnal intercourse is unlawful: wherefore they utterly condemn matrimony and nuptials. Some of them are led to this assertion because they believe that bodies were made not by a good but by an evil principle.3

Chapter CXXVII

that no food is in itself sinful for one to take

Even as venery, so also food, may be made use of without sin, if the order of reason be observed. And a thing is done according to the order of reason when it is directed in a befitting manner to its due end. Now, the end due to the consumption of food is the preservation of the body by nourishment. Therefore one may partake of any food that is adapted to this purpose. Therefore no food is in itself sinful for one to take.

Again. It is not in itself sinful to use a thing that is not evil in itself. Now, no food is evil by nature: because everything, in its nature, is good, as we have proved above.4 A certain food may, however, be bad for a certain person, as being harmful to the well-being of his body. Therefore no food, considered as a thing of such and such a nature, is sinful for one to take: but it may be sinful if one use it unreasonably, so as to injure one’s health.

Moreover. To put a thing to the use for which it is intended, is not, in itself, a sin. Now, plants are intended for animals; of animals, some are intended for others; and all things are intended for man, as we have already proved.1 Therefore it is not sinful in itself to make use of either plants or of the flesh of animals, whether for food or for any other purpose useful to man.

Besides. The defect of sin spreads from the soul to the body, and not vice versa: because sin is a disorder of the will. Now food concerns the body immediately, and not the soul. Therefore the consumption of food cannot be sinful in itself, except in so far as it is contrary to rectitude of the will. This happens in one way, through incompatibility with the end for which food is taken: for instance when, for the sake of the pleasure afforded thereby, a man partakes of a food injurious to his health, whether on account of the kind of food, or by reason of the quantity consumed.

In another way, this may happen through the food being inconsistent with the condition either of the consumer or of those among whom he lives: for instance, if a man be so fastidious about his food, as to go beyond his means, or singularize himself by not conforming to the manner of food customary to those around him.—In a third way, this may happen if certain foods are forbidden by law for some special reason: thus, in the old law, certain foods were prohibited on account of their signification: in Egypt it was forbidden of old to eat beef, lest agriculture should be hindered. Or again, because certain regulations forbid the use of certain foods, for the taming of the flesh. Hence our Lord said (Matth. 15:11): Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man. Again it is said (1 Cor. 10:25): Whatsoever is sold in the shambles, eat: asking no questions for conscience’ sake. And again (1 Tim. 4:4): Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving.

Hereby we refute the error of those who say the use of certain foods is illicit in itself; of whom St. Paul says (1 Tim. 4:1–3): In the last times some shall depart from the faith: forbidding to marry, to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving.

Since, then, the use of food and venery is not unlawful in itself, and can be unlawful only as evading the order of reason; and whereas external possessions are necessary for the consumption of food, the rearing of children, support of the family, and other bodily needs; it follows that neither is the possession of wealth unlawful in itself, if the order of reason be observed: in such wise, namely, that man possess justly what he has; that he place not therein the end of his will; that he use it aright, for his own and others’ good. Hence the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17, 18) condemns not the rich, but lays down for them a definite rule for the use of riches, when he says: Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches … to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others. Again it is said (Ecclus. 31:8): Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish: and that hath not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor in treasures.

Hereby we also refute the error of those who, as Augustine states (De Haeres., xl.), most arrogantly styled themselves Apostolics, because they admitted to their community, neither married men, nor possessors of property, such as are in the Catholic Church as well as monks, and clerks in great number. The reason why these are heretics is because they sever themselves from the Church, and consider that those are without hope, who use these things which they themselves lack.

Chapter CXXVIII

how by the divine law man is directed to his neighbour

Accordingly, from what has been said,1 it is clear that man is led by the divine law to observe the order of reason in all things that may be of use to him. Now, of all things that may be useful to man, other men hold the first place, since man is by nature a social animal:2 for he needs many things that cannot be provided by one man alone. Therefore it behoves man to be instructed by divine law so as to behave towards other men according to the order of reason.

Again. The end of the divine law is that man may adhere to God.3 Now, in this, one man is assisted by another both in his knowledge and in his affections: because one man helps another to know the truth; and one urges another to good, and withdraws him from evil. Hence it is said (Prov. 27:17): Iron sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend; and (Eccles. 4:9–12): It is better … that two should be together, than one: for they have the advantage of their society: if one fall he shall be supported by the other. Woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth, he hath none to lift him up. And if two lie together, they shall warm one another; how shall one alone be warmed? And if a man prevail against one, two shall withstand him. Therefore it behoved the divine law to direct the mutual relations between man and man.

Moreover. The divine law is a rule of divine providence for the governance of men.4 Now, it belongs to divine providence to keep all things subject to it within the bounds of right order: so that, to wit, each thing be in its place and degree. Accordingly, the divine law directs men to one another in such wise that each one remains in his own order: which is for men to be at peace with one another, for peace among men is nothing else but rightly ordered harmony, as Augustine says.5

Besides. Whenever a number of things are subordinate to one, they ought to be harmoniously ordered to one another: else they would hinder one another in the prosecution of the common end: thus, an army is harmoniously ordered to victory which is the end of the commander-in-chief. Now, every man is ordered to God1 by the divine law. Therefore it behoved the divine law to establish an ordered harmony, which is peace,2 among men, lest they be a hindrance to one another.

Hence it is said in the psalm:3 Who hath placed peace in thy borders: and our Lord said (Jo. 16:33): These things I have spoken to you, that in me you may have peace.

Now ordered harmony is observed among men when to every one is given his due: and this belongs to justice.4 Wherefore it is said (Isa. 32:17): The work of justice shall be peace. Therefore it behoved the divine law to give precepts of justice, that every one might give others their due, and refrain from doing them wrong.

Among men our greatest debt is to our parents. Wherefore the first of the legal precepts (Exod. 20:12–17) that order us to our neighbour is: Honour thy father and thy mother, whereby we are to understand that each one is commanded to give their due both to his parents and to others, according to Rom. 13:7: Render to all men their dues.—The next place is given to the precepts that forbid wrong-doing to one’s neighbour: to harm him by deed either in his own person, for it is said: Thou shalt not kill; or in a person united to him, for it is said: Thou shalt not commit adultery; or in external things, for it is said: Thou shalt not steal. We are also forbidden to wrong our neighbour by word: for it is written: Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. And since God is judge also of hearts, we are forbidden to injure our neighbour in thought, by coveting his wife or his goods.

Now man is moved in two ways to observe this justice that is prescribed by the divine law: first, from within; secondly, from without. From within, when man is willing to observe the precepts of the divine law. This is the result of man’s love of God and his neighbour: for whoso loves another, gives him his due willingly and with pleasure, and gives even more with liberality. Hence the entire fulfilment of the law depends on love, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 13:10): Love is the fulfilling of the law. Again, our Lord says (Matth. 22:40) that on … two commandments,—i.e., on the love of God and our neighbour, dependeth the whole law. But as some have not the inward disposition to do what the law commands, willingly and of their own accord, they need to be drawn from without to fulfil the justice of the law. This is done when they fulfil the law through fear of punishment, not as freemen but as slaves. Hence it is said (Isa. 26:9): When thou shalt do thy judgements on the earth, namely, by punishing evil-doers, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice.

The former, then, are a law to themselves,1 for they have charity, which moves them instead of the law, and makes them act as men who are free. Wherefore it was necessary for the external law to be made not on their account, but on account of those who are not inclined to well-doing of their own accord. For this reason it is said (1 Tim. 1:9): The law is not made for the just man, but for the unjust. But this does not mean that the just are not bound to fulfil the law, as some have wrongly understood; but that they are inclined of their own accord to do justice, even without the law.

Chapter CXXIX

that some human acts are right by nature, and not because they are prescribed by law

From what has been said it may be seen that the things prescribed by the divine law are right not only because they are prescribed by law, but also by their very nature.

For the divine law subjects the human mind to God, and all the rest of man, to reason.2 Now, the natural order demands that the inferior be subject to the superior. Therefore the precepts of the divine law are in themselves right by nature.

Further. Divine providence has endowed man with the natural tribunal of reason, as the principle of his own acts. Now, natural principles are directed to things that are naturally. Hence there are certain actions naturally becoming to man, and in themselves right by nature, and not merely because they are prescribed by law.

Moreover. Whatsoever has a determinate nature must have determinate actions, becoming to that nature: since the proper operation of a thing is consequent to its nature. Now, it is clear that man has a determinate nature. Therefore there must needs be certain actions that are in themselves becoming to man.

Besides. If a thing is natural to a man, that also must be natural to him, without which he cannot have that thing: for nature is not wanting in necessaries.1 Now, it is natural to man to be a social animal,2 and this is proved by the fact that one man alone does not suffice to procure all the necessities of human life. Consequently whatever is necessary for the maintenance of human society, is naturally becoming to man: such are to observe the rights of others, and to refrain from doing them any harm. Therefore in human acts some things are naturally right.

Also. It has been shown above3 that it is natural for man to use things beneath him for the needs of his life. Now, there is a certain measure according to which the use of the aforesaid things is expedient for human life, and if that measure be ignored, a wrong is done to man, as in the inordinate consumption of food. Therefore certain human acts are naturally right, and some naturally wrong.

Again. According to the natural order, the body is on account of the soul, and the lower powers of the soul are on account of the reason: even as in other things, matter is for the form, and instruments for the sake of the principal agent. Now, if a thing be ordered to another, it should be a help to it and not a hindrance. Therefore it is naturally right that man should so care for his body and the lower powers of the soul, that they be not a hindrance but a help to the act of reason and to his own good; if it happen otherwise, it will be evil by nature. Therefore wine-bibbing and feasting; inordinate use of venery which hinders the use of reason; and submission to the passions which thwart the free judgement of reason, are all evil by nature.

Moreover. Those things are natural to every man, whereby he tends to his natural end: while those which are of a contrary nature, are naturally unbecoming to him. Now, we have proved above1 that man is by nature directed to God as his end. Consequently those things whereby man is brought to the knowledge and love of God, are naturally right: and whatever things have a contrary result, are naturally bad for man.

It is therefore clear that good and evil in human acts result not only from the prescription of the law, but also from the order of nature.

Hence it is said in the Psalm (28:10) that the judgements of the Lord are true, justified in themselves.

Hereby we refute the statement of those who assert that the just and the right are prescribed by law only.

Chapter CXXX

of the counsels given in the divine law

Since man’s greatest good is that he adhere with his mind to God and divine things: and whereas it is impossible for him to give undivided attention to things diverse: in order that his mind may more freely turn to God, there are given in the divine law counsels whereby men are withdrawn from the occupations of the present life, as far as this is possible to one whose life is on the earth. Now, this is not so necessary for man’s righteousness, that without it righteousness were impossible: since virtue and righteousness are not destroyed, if man make use of things corporal and earthly according to the order of reason. Wherefore these admonitions of the divine law are called counsels, and not precepts, inasmuch as man is counselled to forego the lesser goods for the sake of the greater. Now man’s cares, as regards the general mode of human life, are occupied with three things: first, about his person, as to what he shall do, where he is to live; secondly, about persons united to him, especially his wife and children: thirdly, about providing himself with those external things which he needs for the support of life. In order to do away with his care for external things, the divine law gives the counsel of poverty: namely, that he should renounce the goods of this world, which are apt to entangle his mind with anxieties. Hence our Lord said (Matth. 19:21): If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all1 thou hast and give to the poor, and come, follow me. In order to remove the care of wife and children, man is given the counsel of virginity or continence. Hence it is said (1 Cor. 7:25): Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel. And in order to give the reason for this counsel he adds (verse 32 sq.): He that is without a wife, is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided. In order to remove man’s care of himself, the counsel of obedience is given, whereby he surrenders the disposal of his own acts into the hands of his superior. Wherefore it is said (Heb. 13:17): Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. For they watch as being to render an account of your souls.

And whereas the highest perfection of human life is that man’s mind be occupied with God, and as these three are apparently the best dispositions to that occupation, it would seem that they rightly belong to the state of perfection; not as though they were themselves perfections, but because they are dispositions to perfection which consists in being busy about God. This is clearly indicated by the words of our Lord in counselling poverty, when he said:1 If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow me, as though he declared the perfection of life to consist in following him.

They may also be described as the effects and signs of perfection. For when the mind is strongly affected with love and desire of a certain thing, the result is that it thinks less of other things. Wherefore if man’s mind be borne with love and desire towards divine things, wherein perfection clearly consists, the result is that he renounces all that may hinder his movement towards God, not only the care of possessions, and love of wife and children, but also love of himself. This is signified by the words of Scripture. For it is said (Cant. 8:7): If a man should give all the substance of his house for love, he shall despise it as nothing: and (Matth. 13:45, 46): The kingdom of heaven is like to a merchant seeking good pearls: who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went his way, and sold all that he had, and bought it: and (Philip. 3:7, 8): The things that were gain to me.… I count … as dung, that I may gain Christ.

Since then these three are dispositions to perfection, and the effects and signs of perfection, it is seemly that those who vow these three things should be said to be in the state of perfection.

Now, the perfection to which the things in question dispose a man, consists in the mind being occupied with God. Wherefore those who make profession of them are called religious, as dedicating themselves and their possessions as a sacrifice to God: their possessions, by poverty; their body, by continence; their will, by obedience. For religion consists in the worship of God, as stated above.2

Chapter CXXXI

concerning the error of those who condemn voluntary poverty

Some, in contradiction of the Gospel teaching, have condemned intentional poverty. The first of these was Vigilantius, who was followed by others, pretending1 to be teachers of the law, understanding neither the things they say, nor whereof they affirm. They based their contention on the following and similar arguments.

The natural appetite demands that every animal should provide itself with the necessities of life. Hence those animals which are unable to find the necessities of life at all times of the year, by natural instinct, gather such things together at the time they are to be found, and store them, for instance bees and ants. Now, men need many things for the support of life, which cannot be found at all times. Hence it is natural to man to procure and keep the things he needs. Therefore it is contrary to the natural law to scatter by poverty all the things one has gathered.

Again. Everything has a natural liking for those things by which its being is preserved, inasmuch as all things seek to exist.2 Now man’s life is supported with the substance of external things. Wherefore, by the natural law every man is bound to maintain the substance of external things even as life itself. Hence, it is as much against the natural law for a man to deprive himself of the necessities of life by voluntary poverty as it is to lay hands on himself.

Moreover. Man is by nature a social animal,3 as stated above.4 Now, society cannot endure among men unless one help another. Consequently it is natural to men for one to help another in his need. But they make it impossible for themselves to afford this help, if they renounce the substance of external things, whereby especially assistance is given to others. Therefore it is contrary to the natural instinct, and to the good of pity and charity that a man, by voluntary poverty, renounce all worldly substance.

Besides. If it be an evil to possess the substance of this world; and if it be good to free one’s neighbour of an evil, and evil to bring evil upon him: it follows that it is evil to give of the substance of this world to one who is in want, and good to take it away from one who has it: which is absurd. Therefore it is good to possess the substance of this world: and to renounce it altogether by voluntary poverty is evil.

Again. Occasions of evil should be avoided. Now, poverty is an occasion of evil, for through it men are led to thieving, flattery and perjury,1 and the like. Therefore poverty should not be deliberately embraced; rather should we avoid it lest it befall us.

Further. Since virtue follows the mean, it is destroyed by either extreme. Now, liberality is a virtue which gives what should be given, and holds to what should be retained. And illiberality is a vice on the side of deficiency, holding to what should be retained, and to what should not be retained. It is also a vice on the side of excess when all is given: and this is done by those who embrace voluntary poverty. Therefore it is sinful and allied to prodigality.

These arguments would seem to be confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (Prov. 30:8, 9): Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessaries of life. Lest perhaps being filled I should be tempted to deny, and say: Who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal, and forswear the name of my God.

Chapter CXXXII

of the ways of life followed by those who embrace voluntary poverty

This question would seem to be yet more relevant if one consider the ways in which those must needs live, who embrace voluntary poverty.

One way of living is for the goods of each one to be sold, and for all to live together on the proceeds. This seems to have been done in Jerusalem under the apostles: for it is said (Acts 4:34, 35): As many as were owners of lands. or houses, sold them, and brought the price of the things they sold, and laid it down before the feet of the apostles. And distribution was made to everyone, according as he had need.

Now, in this way it would seem that sufficient provision was not made for man’s livelihood. First, because it is not probable that many with great possessions would embrace this kind of life. And the proceeds from the sale of the possessions of a few wealthy men, after being divided among many, would not last very long.

Also, because it is possible and easy for the price received to be lost, through fraud on the part of the dispensers, or through theft or robbery. Consequently those who embrace this kind of poverty will be left without a livelihood.

Besides. Many things happen which compel a man to change his abode. Hence it will be difficult to provide for those who may possibly be scattered about in various places, if the proceeds of the sale be assigned to them all in common.

There is another mode of life observed in many monasteries, where the possessions are held in common, and provision made for each one according to his needs.

But neither does this way of life seem to be expedient. For earthly possessions are attended by anxieties: both in the acquisition of revenue, and in protecting them against fraud and violence: and these anxieties are so much the greater and involve so many more persons, according as greater possessions are needed to suffice for the upkeep of the greater number. In this way, therefore, the motive of voluntary poverty is frustrated: at any rate as regards many who must needs be solicitous in looking after the property.

Again. Possession in common is wont to occasion discord. For apparently people who, like the Spaniards and Persians, have nothing in common, are not given to litigation, but those who hold something together in common: for which reason there are quarrels among brothers. Now, discords are a very great hindrance to the mind being occupied with divine things, as stated above.1 Therefore this way of living would seem to frustrate the end of voluntary poverty.

There is again a third way of life, where those who embrace voluntary poverty live by manual labour. The apostle Paul followed this manner of living and by his example and institution counselled others to observe it. For it is said (2 Thess. 3:8–10): Neither did we eat any man’s bread for nothing, but in labour and in toil we worked night and day, lest we should be chargeable to any of you: not as if we had not power, but that we might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us. For also when we were with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work, neither let him eat. Yet neither does this manner of life seem expedient. For manual labour is necessary as a means of livelihood, forasmuch as something is acquired thereby. Now it seems futile to renounce what is necessary, and then work to get it back. Consequently, if after embracing voluntary poverty a man has to regain the means of livelihood by working with his hands, it were useless for him to renounce all that he had with which to support his life.

Also. Voluntary poverty is counselled that thereby a man may be disposed to follow Christ with greater promptitude, through being free from worldly cares. Now, it would seem to involve greater solicitude that a man should gain a livelihood by his own toil, than that he should live on what he already had: especially if he were moderately rich, or were possessed of movable goods, with which it were easy for him to gain the necessaries of life. Therefore to live by manual labour would seem inconsistent with the purpose of those who embrace voluntary poverty.

To this we must add that our Lord apparently forbade His disciples manual labour when, using the comparison of the birds and the lilies of the field, He warned them against solicitude for earthly things. For He said (Matth. 6:26): Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns. And again (verse 28): Consider the lilies of the field how they grow: they labour not, neither do they spin.

But this manner of life is seemingly inadequate. For many desire perfection who have neither the ability nor the skill, so as to be able to spend their life in toil, because they have neither been brought up nor taught to do such things. For thus peasants and labourers would be in a better position for the attainment of the perfection of life, than those who have studied wisdom, and have been brought up in wealth and ease, which they renounce for Christ’s sake.—It also happens that some who embrace voluntary poverty, lose their health, or are hindered in some other way from working. Consequently they would be left deprived of the means of livelihood.

Again. No little time suffices that one may work for the necessities of life; as evidenced in the number of men who pass the whole of their time so doing, and yet are scarcely able to gain an adequate livelihood. But, if those who embrace voluntary poverty have to live by manual labour, the result would be that they would spend the greater part of their life in this kind of work: and, consequently, they would be debarred from actions of greater importance, which also require much time, such as the study of wisdom, teaching and other like spiritual occupations. And so voluntary poverty would be a hindrance rather than a disposition to the perfection of life.

If someone say that manual labour is necessary in order to banish idleness: this is not to the point. For it were better to banish idleness by being busy in the exercise of moral virtues, which riches serve instrumentally,1 for instance in giving alms, and the like, rather than by manual labour.—Besides: it were useless to counsel poverty merely that men, after becoming poor, might abstain from idleness by occupying their time in manual labour, unless the counsel were given that they might give themselves to higher occupations than those belonging to man’s ordinary life.

And if someone say that manual labour is necessary to tame the desires of the flesh; this is not to the point. For the question at issue is whether it be necessary for those who embrace voluntary poverty to live by manual labour.—Besides: there are many other ways of taming carnal concupiscence: namely, by fasting, watching, and the like.—Moreover, even the rich, who need not work in order to live, might use manual labour for that purpose.

There is yet another way of life, where those who embrace voluntary poverty live by the ministrations of others, who wish to be of service to the perfection of voluntary poverty, by retaining their riches. This way, seemingly, was followed by our Lord and His disciples: for we read (Lk. 8:2, 3) that certain women followed Christ, and ministered unto Him of their substance.

But neither does this way of life seem to be expedient. For apparently it is unreasonable to renounce one’s own goods, in order to live on another’s.

Moreover. It would seem unfitting to receive from another without making him a return: since the equality of justice is observed in giving and taking.—It is, however, allowable to live on the alms of others, for those who tender them some kind of service. Hence it would not seem unreasonable that the ministers of the altar, and preachers, who give the people doctrine and other godly things, should receive their livelihood from them: for the workman is worthy of his meat, as our Lord says (Matth. 10:10). For this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:13–14) that the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel, should live by the Gospel: and that they that serve the altar partake with the altar. Consequently it were unfitting for those who perform no ministerial duty for the people, to receive from the people the necessaries of life.

Further. This mode of living would seem to be harmful to others. For some there are who need to be supported by the bounty of others, through being unable to support themselves by reason of poverty or sickness. And this bounty would needs be lessened, if those who embrace voluntary poverty had to be supported by the offerings of others: since people are both unable and unwilling to support a large number of poor. Hence the Apostle (1 Tim. 4.)1 commands that if a man have a widow related to him, let him minister to her, that the Church may look after those who are widows indeed. It is therefore unseemly that those who choose voluntary poverty should follow this way of living.

Moreover. A free mind is a most necessary condition for perfect virtue: for without it a man easily becomes a partaker of other men’s sins: either by express consent, or by flattering approval, or at least by dissimulation. Now, this freedom is considerably prejudiced by the aforesaid manner of life: for a man cannot but fear to offend one on whose kindness he lives. Consequently this manner of life is a hindrance to perfect virtue, which is the end of voluntary poverty: and so it would seem inexpedient to those who are voluntarily poor.

Besides. We cannot be sure of that which depends on another’s will. Now, the giving of his own depends on the will of the giver. Therefore this way of living does not provide sufficiently for the voluntarily poor as regards their being sure of a livelihood.

Further. The poor who have to live on what others give them, have to make their needs known to others, and ask for what they need. Now such begging renders the beggar contemptible, and even burdensome: for people deem themselves better than those who need their support; and many are slow to give. But those who choose the perfect life, should be respected and loved, so that men may imitate them more readily, and embrace the state of virtue: and if the contrary be the case, even virtue itself is despised. Therefore to live by begging is harmful in those who prefer voluntary poverty for the sake of perfect virtue.

Again. Perfect men should avoid not only evil, but even what has the appearance of evil: for the Apostle says (Rom. 12):2 From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves: and the Philosopher says3 that a good man should shun not only what is wrong, but also what seems wrong. Now begging has the appearance of evil: since many beg for the sake of gain. Therefore such a mode of life ought not to be embraced by the perfect.

Besides. Voluntary poverty is counselled that a man’s mind, being withdrawn from earthly cares, may be more at liberty to give itself to God. But this way of living by begging is full of cares: for seemingly more care is attached to getting others’ goods, than to using one’s own. Therefore this way of living would seem unbecoming to those who make profession of voluntary poverty.

If, however, someone be desirous of praising beggary on account of humility, his contention would seem altogether unreasonable. For we praise lowliness according as we despise worldly eminence, which consists in riches, honours, renown, and the like: but not through contempt of the eminence of virtue, in respect of which we should be magnanimous. Therefore humility would be blameworthy if for the sake of humility one were to do something derogatory to the eminence of humility. Now, begging is derogatory thereto in this way: both because it is better to give than to receive:1 and because it has the appearance of wrong. Therefore beggary is not to be praised on account of humility.

There were some, too, who said to those who profess perfection of life that they should have no solicitude, neither by begging, nor by toiling, nor by keeping something back for themselves, and that they should look to God alone for their livelihood: because it is said (Matth. 6:25).: Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat (and drink)2 nor for your body what you shall put on: and again (verse 34): Be not solicitous for tomorrow.

But this seems utterly unreasonable. For it is foolish to desire the end, and omit the means. Now, eating is the end to which is directed man’s solicitude, whereby he procures his food. Hence those who cannot live without eating, must needs be solicitous about getting their food.—Besides. Solicitude about earthly things is not to be avoided except because it hinders the contemplation of things eternal. But as long as he is clothed in mortal flesh man cannot live without doing many things that hinder contemplation, such as sleeping, eating, and the like. Neither therefore should he omit to be solicitous about the necessaries of life on account of their being a hindrance to contemplation.—Moreover this leads to a strange absurdity. For a man might with equal reason say that he would not walk, or open his mouth to eat, or avoid a falling stone or the thrust of a sword, but that he would wait for God to act: and this is to tempt God. Therefore solicitude about one’s food is not to be avoided altogether.

Chapter CXXXIII

how poverty is good

In order to elucidate the truth about what we have been saying, we must form our judgement of poverty, by considering riches. External riches are necessary for the good of virtue: since by them we support the body, and help others. Now, things directed to an end must take their goodness from that end. Consequently external riches must be a good of man; not his chief, but, as it were, his secondary, good: because the end is a good principally; and other things, according as they are directed to the end. For this reason some have thought that virtues are man’s greatest good, and external riches, goods of least account. Now, things directed to an end, must take their measure from the exigency of the end. Wherefore riches are good forasmuch as they serve the use of virtue: and if this measure be exceeded, so that they hinder the practice of virtue, they are no longer to be reckoned as a good but as an evil. Hence it happens that the possession of riches is good for some who use them for virtue: while to others it is an evil, because they are withdrawn thereby from virtue, through being either too anxious about them, or too much attached to them, or self-conceited about them.

Whereas, however, there are virtues of the active and of the contemplative life, both need external riches in different ways. For the contemplative virtues need them only for the support of nature: whereas the active virtues need them both for that purpose, and to support others who share the same life. Hence the contemplative life is the more perfect in that it has fewer needs. To this life indeed it would seem to belong that man occupy himself wholly with divine things: and this perfection Christ’s teaching counsels to man. Consequently those who seek this perfection are content with a minimum of external riches, as much, to wit, as suffices to support nature. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:8): Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.

Accordingly, poverty is commendable so far as it frees man from those vices in which some are enmeshed through wealth. In so far as it removes the anxiety that is occasioned by riches, it is useful to some, those namely who are disposed to occupy themselves with the better things: but it is harmful to some, who being freed from this anxiety, betake themselves to worse occupations. Hence Gregory says (6 Moral. xxxvii): It often happens that people who are busy in doing well while living as men are used to live, are slain by the sword of retirement.—In so far as poverty removes the good resulting from riches, namely the assistance of others, and one’s own support, it is simply an evil: except, forasmuch as the assistance whereby one’s neighbour is relieved in temporal things, may be compensated by a greater good, in that a man, through lacking wealth, can more freely give himself to the affairs of God and his soul. But the good of one’s own support is so far necessary, that it cannot be compensated by any other: for man should not deprive himself of his livelihood for the sake of obtaining any other good.

Such poverty is therefore commendable when a man being freed thereby from worldly solicitude, is enabled more freely to occupy himself with divine and spiritual things; yet so as to retain the possibility of lawfully supporting himself, for which purpose not many things are needful. And according as the manner of living in a state of poverty demands less solicitude, so much the more is poverty to be commended: but not according as the poverty is greater. For poverty is not good in itself: but in so far as it frees a man from that which hinders him from being intent on spiritual things. Hence its measure of goodness depends on how far it frees man from the aforesaid obstacles.—In fact this applies to all external things in common, that they are so far good as they are serviceable to virtue, but not in themselves.

Chapter CXXXIV

solution of the arguments given above against poverty

Keeping these observations before our mind, we shall easily solve the foregoing arguments whereby poverty was impugned. For though man has a natural desire to gather together the necessaries of life, as the first argument stated, this does not imply that each individual must be occupied in so doing. In fact, neither is every bee occupied in the same duty: but some gather honey, some build their dwelling with wax, while the queens do none of these things: and it must needs be so likewise with man. For as many things are needed for man’s livelihood, for which one man is not sufficient by himself, it is necessary for different things to be done by different men: for instance, that some cultivate the land, that some have charge of animals, that some build houses, and so forth. And since man’s life demands not only goods of the body, but also, and still more, goods of the soul, it is necessary for some to be busy about spiritual things for the betterment of others: and such must needs be exempt from the care of temporal things. This division of divers duties among divers persons is made by divine providence, according as some are more inclined to one duty than to others.

It is thus clear that those who renounce temporal goods, do not deprive themselves of a livelihood: as the second argument contended. For they still have the probable hope of maintenance, either from their own work, or from the kindness of others, whether in the shape of common property, or as their daily bread. For even as that which is possible by means of our friends, is possible, in a sense, to ourselves,1 as the philosopher says, so what our friends have is, in a sense, ours.

Now among men there should be that mutual friendship whereby they assist one another either in spiritual or in earthly duties. Again, it is better to help another in spirituals than in temporals: forasmuch as spirituals are more excellent than temporals, and more necessary for the attainment of that end which is beatitude. Hence the man who by voluntary poverty deprives himself of the possibility of helping others in temporal things, that he may obtain spiritual things, whereby he can be of more useful service to others, does not, as the third argument concluded, counteract the good of human society.

From the foregoing it is clear that riches are a good of man forasmuch as they are directed to the rational good, but not in themselves. Wherefore nothing prevents poverty from being better, if by it a man is directed to a more perfect good. Thus the fourth argument is answered. And since neither wealth nor poverty, nor anything external is in itself man’s good, but only forasmuch as it is directed to reason’s good; nothing prevents them from being a source of sin, when they are not employed by man according to reason’s rule. And yet they are not therefore to be reckoned as simply evil, but only when they are put to an evil use. Hence neither is poverty to be condemned on account of certain vices that are sometimes occasioned thereby: as the fifth argument endeavoured to prove. Wherefore we must also observe that the mean of virtue does not depend on the quantity of external goods employed, but on the rule of reason. So that it happens sometimes that what is an extreme in point of quantity of an external thing, is the mean according to reason’s rule. For neither does anyone tend to greater things than the magnanimous man, nor surpass in amount the magnificent man’s expenditure. Wherefore they follow the mean not by the quantity of expenditure, or the like, but by not exceeding or falling short of the rule of reason. This rule, in fact, measures not only the quantity of the thing used, but also the condition of the person, and his intention, the fitness of place and time, and such things that are required in acts of virtue. Consequently a man through voluntary poverty does not frustrate virtue, even if he renounce all things. Nor is he prodigal in so doing: since he does it for a due end, and observing other due circumstances. For it is more to expose oneself to death,—which nevertheless a man does through the virtue of fortitude, observing the due circumstances,—than to renounce all one’s goods for a due end. Thus the sixth argument is answered.

The words quoted from Solomon are not in contradiction with this. For it is clear that he speaks of compulsory poverty, which is wont to be the occasion of theft.

Chapter CXXXV

solution of the objections urged against the various ways of life followed by those who embrace voluntary poverty

We must, in sequel to the foregoing, consider the ways in which those who embrace voluntary poverty have to live.1 the gospel, should live by the gospel,—but also for the poor in Jerusalem, who renounced their own property, and lived in poverty, but did not preach to the gentiles; yet their spiritual administration could profit those by whom they were maintained. Hence the Apostle counsels that such people be maintained by alms, given, not of necessity,2 but freely, which counsel is nothing else than begging.—This beggary does not render men contemptible, if it be done in reason, for the sake of need, not of excess, and without importunity: with due consideration both of the person besought, and of place and time: all of which must be observed by those who seek perfection of life.

It is, consequently, clear that there is no appearance of wrong-doing in begging thus: although there would be if it were done with importunity and indiscreetly for the sake of self-indulgence or greed.

Now, it is evident that begging implies a certain abasement. For as to be passive is inferior to being active, so too, is receiving inferior to giving; and subjection and obedience, to governing and commanding: although there may be a set-off in the shape of a concomitant circumstance.

Now, to make a deliberate choice of that which implies abasement, is an act of humility; not indeed simply, but according as there is need for it. For, since humility is a virtue, it does nothing indiscreetly: so that it is a sign, not of humility, but of folly, if a man adopt every kind of abasement. On the other hand if a man does not shrink on account of abasement from doing what virtue requires of him;—for instance, if charity requires him to perform a humiliating service for his neighbour,—through humility he will not shrink from doing it. Accordingly, if, in order to embrace the life of poverty, it be necessary to beg, it is an act of humility to suffer this abasement.—Again, it is an act of virtue sometimes to take upon ourselves things that are degrading, although our duty does not bind us to do so, that by our example we may encourage others who are so bound, that they may more easily suffer them: thus the officer sometimes does the work of a common soldier, so as to encourage others.—Sometimes too the virtuous use of humiliation serves as a remedy. For instance, if a man’s mind be inclined to immoderate self-conceit, it is good for him to have recourse, with due moderation, to acts of self-abasement, either of his own choice, or as enjoined by others, in order to repress the elation of his soul: since by so doing he brings himself to the level of the lowest of men, whose duties are of the baser kind.

Those who hold that our Lord forbade all solicitude in seeking one’s bread, are guilty of an utterly unreasonable error. Because every act requires solicitude. Hence, if man should have no solicitude about the things of the body, it follows that he must perform no bodily action: which is both impossible and unreasonable. For God has appointed to each thing an action in proportion to its nature. Now, man is formed of a nature both spiritual and corporal. Wherefore, according to the divine ordinance, it is necessary that man both perform actions of the body, and attend to the things of the soul: and he is the more perfect, the more he attends to spiritual things: yet man’s perfection does not depend on his performing no actions of the body; because, since the actions of the body are directed to what is needful for the maintenance of life, if a man omit them, he neglects his life, which everyone is bound to maintain. Now a man is a fool and tempts God, if he does nothing himself and looks to God to provide him with those things to which he can help himself by his own action. For it belongs to the divine goodness, to provide for everything, not by doing all things immediately, but by moving each other thing to its proper action, as we have proved above.1 Therefore man must not expect that God will provide for him, without his doing any action whereby he is able to provide for himself: for this is contrary to the divine ordinance and goodness.

But because, though it is in our power to do, it is not through us that our actions attain to their due end, on account of the obstacles that may occur; the outcome of everyone’s action is subject to the divine disposition. Accordingly, our Lord commanded us not to be solicitous about what concerns God, namely concerning the outcome of our actions: but He did not forbid us to be solicitous about what concerns us, namely our actions. Therefore a man does not disobey our Lord’s command, if he be solicitous about what he has to do himself: but if he be solicitous about the possible result, even if he does what pertains to him, so that he omits to do what he ought in order to avoid such results, against which we should hope in the providence of God, who gives sustenance even to birds and plants. For to be solicitous in this way, seemingly savours of the error of the heathens, who deny divine providence. Hence, our Lord concludes:2 Be not solicitous for tomorrow. By these words He does not forbid us to keep till the morrow what is necessary in its proper time, but to be solicitous about future happenings, despairing, as it were, of the divine assistance: or to anticipate to-day the solicitude that we should reserve for the morrow, since each day has its own cares; wherefore it is added: Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.

It is clear, then, that those who embrace voluntary poverty may live in various suitable ways. And among these ways, one is more commendable than the others, according as it exempts man’s mind more from the solicitude of earthly things, and from being occupied with them.

Chapters CXXXVI and CXXXVII

concerning the error of those who condemn perpetual continence

Men of distorted judgement have spoken against the good of continency, even as they have impugned the perfection of poverty. Some of these endeavour to proscribe perpetual continency by the following and like arguments.

The union of man and woman is directed to the good of the species. Now, the good of the species is more godlike than the good of the individual.1 Therefore it is a greater sin to abstain from an act whereby the species is preserved, than to abstain from an act whereby the individual is maintained, such as eating, drinking, and the like.

Again. By divine ordinance man has received members apt for generation; also the faculty of desire that incites thereto, and other like things directed to the same end. Therefore one who refrains altogether from the act of generation would seem to counteract the divine ordinance.

Also. If it be good for one to be continent, it is better for many, and best that all be continent. But this would result in the extinction of the human race. Therefore it is not good for one man to be continent.

Besides. Chastity like the other virtues takes a middle course. Consequently as a man acts contrary to virtue and is intemperate if he yield altogether to his desires; even so he acts against virtue if he refrain from his desires altogether, and falls into the vice of insensibility.

Furthermore. It is impossible for a man to be without all sexual emotions; since they are natural to him. Now it is more disturbing to the soul to resist concupiscences totally, and to fight against them unceasingly, than to enjoy them with moderation. Since then disturbance of the mind is most inconsistent with perfection of virtue, it would seem incompatible with perfection of virtue to observe perpetual continence.

These arguments then would seem to militate against perpetual continence. And to them may be added the command of the Lord which, we read, was given to our first parents (Gen. 1:28, 9:1): Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. This was never revoked, in fact rather was it confirmed by our Lord in the gospel (Matth. 19:6) where it is said in reference to the marriage bond: What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. Now those who observe perpetual continence disobey this precept. Therefore it would seem unlawful to keep perpetual continence.

However, bearing in mind what we have said above,1 we shall easily reply to these objections. For we must observe that in matters regarding the needs of the individual we must not reason in the same way as in matters which regard the needs of the community. For when it is a question of the needs of the individual, each one must be provided for. Such things are meat and drink, and other things that concern the maintenance of the individual: wherefore everyone needs to take meat and drink. But when it is a question of what is necessary to the community, it is not necessary, nor indeed is it possible, that such things should be the concern of each member of the community. For it is plain that many things are needful to the human community, such as meat, drink, clothing, dwelling and the like, which cannot be provided by one man. Hence the necessity of various men having various duties: even as in the body various members are appointed for various acts. Since, then, procreation is connected with the needs, not of the individual, but of the entire species, it is not necessary that all men be employed in procreating; but some, refraining from it, are appointed to fulfil other duties, such as military service, or contemplation.

Hence the reply to the second objection is clear. For divine providence has bestowed on man all things necessary for the whole species: and yet it is not necessary that each man use each one of those things. Thus man has been given the art of building, the strength to fight: yet there is no need for every man to be a builder or a soldier. In like manner, though man has received from God the power and means of procreation, there is no need for every man to attend to the act of procreating.

Wherefore the reply to the third argument is also clear. Since though for each individual it be better to abstain from what is needful for the community, and to occupy himself with better things; it is not good that all so abstain. The same applies to the order of the universe: since, although a spiritual substance is better than a body, yet it would be not a better but a less perfect universe, wherein there were none but spiritual substances. And though, in the animal’s body, the eye is better than the foot, the animal would not be perfect unless it had both eye and foot. So too, neither would the human community be in a perfect state, unless there be some who attend to the act of procreation, and others who abstain therefrom and give themselves to contemplation.

The fourth objection based on the necessity of virtue taking a middle course, may be solved from what has been said above1 concerning poverty. Because the mean of virtue does not always depend on the quantity of the thing regulated by reason, but on the rule itself of reason, which compasses the due end, and measures the requisite circumstances. And thus, unreasonable abstinence from all sexual emotions is called the vice of insensibility. But if it be done in reason, it is a virtue surpassing man’s usual mode of life: since it gives man a special likeness to the godhead: for which reason virgins are said to be like angels.1

To the fifth objection we reply that the solicitude and occupation of married people about wife, children and necessaries of life, is continuous: whereas the disturbance to which a man is subject through resisting concupiscence is transitory. Moreover the less he consents, the less is he disturbed: since the more a man indulges in pleasure, the greater becomes his desire for pleasure.2 Also, desires are weakened by abstinence, and other bodily exercises suitable for those who propose to be continent.—Again, indulgence in pleasures of the body is more lowering to the mind, and a greater obstacle to the contemplation of spiritual things, than is the disturbance consequent upon the resistance to the desire for these pleasures: because through indulgence in pleasures, especially those of venery, the mind becomes most attached to carnal things: since pleasure causes the appetite to be at rest in the pleasurable object. Consequently for those who would apply themselves to the contemplation of things divine, and of any truth whatsoever, it is most harmful to indulge in venery, and most useful to abstain therefrom.—However, though it may be said in general that for one man it is better to remain continent than enjoy the use of marriage, nothing prevents the latter alternative from being better for a particular individual. Hence, our Lord, speaking of continence, said:3 All men take not this word.… He that can take it, let him take it.

From what has been said it is clear how to answer the last objection taken from the command given to our first parents. For this precept regards the natural inclination that man has to maintain the species by the act of procreation: which all need not fulfil, but only some, as we have said. And as it is not expedient for everyone to refrain from marriage, so neither is it befitting at all times, when the increase of the species is at stake: either because there are few individuals, as when in the beginning the human race began to multiply; or on account of the small number of the faithful, when it behoved them to increase by carnal generation, as was the case in the Old Testament. Hence the counsel to keep perpetual continence was reserved to the New Testament, when the faithful increase by spiritual generation.

1 There were also others who, while not condemning perpetual continence, maintained that the married state is equal to it: which is the heresy of Jovinian. The falsity of this error is plain from what we have said: since continence renders man more able to raise his mind to spiritual and divine things; and lifts him, in a sense, above his state, by likening him to the angels.

Nor does it matter that men of most perfect virtue have embraced the married state, for instance Abraham, Isaac and Jacob: because the stronger the mind is rendered by virtue, the less is it liable to fall from its height through any cause whatsoever. And again, because they enjoyed the use of matrimony, it does not follow that they loved less the contemplation of truth and divine things: but according to the needs of the time, they made use of matrimony to increase the number of the faithful. However, the perfection of a particular individual does not prove the perfection of his state: since a man may apply a more perfect mind in the use of a lesser good, than does another in the use of a greater good. Hence, the fact that Abraham or Moses was more perfect than many who are continent, does not argue that the married state is more perfect than, or even equal to the state of continency.

Chapter CXXXVIII

against those who condemn vows

Some have thought it foolish to bind oneself by vow to obey a particular person, or to abide by any particular purpose. For, seemingly, any good action whatsoever, the more freely it is done, so much the more virtuous is it. Now the greater the necessity whereby one is bound to do a thing, so much the less freely is it done apparently. Consequently it would seem that virtuous acts are deserving of less praise through being necessitated by obedience or vow.

Now those who argue thus, apparently, know not the meaning of necessity. For necessity is twofold. There is a necessity of compulsion: and this lessens the praise due to virtue, since it is opposed to what is voluntary; for compulsion is contrary to the will.—But there is another necessity resulting from an interior inclination. This does not diminish but increases the praise due to a virtuous act: because it makes the will tend to the act of virtue more tensely. For it is clear that the more perfect is a habit of virtue, the more strongly does it make the will tend to the virtuous good, and the less liable to deflect from it. And when virtue has attained its perfect end, it brings with it a kind of necessity for good action, for instance in the Blessed, who cannot sin, as we shall show further on:1 and yet the will is not, for that reason, any the less free, or the act less good.

There is yet another kind of necessity arising from an end: as when a ship is said to be necessary for a man, that he may cross the sea. And it is plain that neither does this kind of necessity diminish the freedom of the will, or the goodness of actions. Rather indeed, what a man does as being necessary for an end, for this very reason is commendable, and so much the more, as the end is better.

Now, it is evident that the necessity of abiding by a vow, or of obeying a person to whom one has submitted oneself, is not a necessity of compulsion, nor one that comes from an interior inclination, but arises from direction to an end: because when a man has taken a vow it is necessary for him to do this or that, if the vow is to be kept, or obedience observed. Hence, since these ends are praiseworthy, inasmuch as thereby man submits himself to God, the necessity in question takes nothing from the praise due to virtue. In addition, we must observe that when a man does what he has vowed to do, or fulfils the commands of one to whom he has submitted himself for God’s sake, his deed is worthy of yet greater praise and reward. For sometimes one deed belongs to two vices, when the act of one vice is directed to the end of another vice: thus, when theft is committed for the purpose of fornication, the act is, in its species, one of covetousness, but in intention is one of lust.1 It is the same with virtues: so that the act of one virtue may be directed to another virtue: thus, when a man gives of his own, that he may be bound to another in the friendship of charity, his act, in its species, is one of liberality, but on account of its end, is an act of charity. Now, an act of this kind deserves the greater praise from the greater virtue, namely charity, than from liberality. Hence even if the act were diminished in the point of liberality, still, through being directed to charity, it will call for greater praise and reward, than an act of greater liberality not directed to charity.

Let us, then, suppose a man to do an act of virtue, by fasting, for instance, or by abstaining from venery:—if he do these things apart from a vow, it will be an act of chastity or abstinence; but if he do these things by vow then they are referred to some other virtue, to which it belongs to make vows to God, namely religion, which is a greater virtue than chastity or abstinence, since it makes us behave rightly to God. Consequently an act of abstinence or continency will be more praiseworthy in one who keeps it by vow, even though he does not take such pleasure in abstaining or in being continent, because he takes greater pleasure in a greater virtue which is religion.

Again. The most important thing in a virtue, is the due end: because the character of goodness is derived chiefly from the end. Consequently where the end is higher, even if a man be somewhat remiss in his act, his act will be more virtuous: thus, if one man proposes to go a long way for the sake of a virtuous good, and another, to go a short way, he who proposes to do the greater thing for the sake of virtue will deserve the greater praise; although he may make slower progress on the way. And if a man do something for God, he offers that act to God: but if he does it by vow, he offers God not only his act, but even his very power to act. Hence he clearly purposes to offer God something greater. Therefore his act will be more virtuous by reason of the greater good intended, although another man may appear to be more fervent in the execution.

Besides. The will that precedes the act remains virtually for the whole time that the act is carried on, and makes it praiseworthy, even when a man, while he is performing an action, no longer thinks of the purpose for which he began the action: thus, a man who undertakes a journey for God, need not think actually of God at every stage of his way. Now, it is clear that a man who vowed to do a thing, willed to do so more inflexibly than one who simply proposed to do it: since not only willed he to do it, but he willed so to strengthen himself lest he should fail to do it. Accordingly, this intention of the will renders praiseworthy the execution of the vow by reason of a certain inflexibility, even where the will is not actually directed to the deed, or is directed negligently.

Therefore that which is done by vow is more praiseworthy than what is done without a vow: other things, however, being equal.

Chapter CXXXIX

that neither merits nor sins are equal

It is clear from what has been said that neither all good deeds, nor all sins, are equal. For a counsel is only about a greater good.1 Now, counsels in the divine law, are about poverty, continence and the like, as stated above.1 Hence these things are better than the use of marriage, and the possession of earthly goods: and yet with these one may live a virtuous life, if one keep within the bounds of reason, as we have proved.2 Therefore acts of virtue are not all equal.

Again. Acts take their species from their objects. Therefore the better the object, the more virtuous too will the act be in its species. Now, the end is better than the things directed to the end: and of these one is better than another, the nearer it is to the end. Consequently, the best of human acts is that one which is directed to the last end, namely God, immediately. After this, the act will be so much the better in its species, according as its object is nearer to God.

Besides. In human acts the good depends on their being regulated by reason. Now, it happens that some acts are more akin to the reason than others: forasmuch as acts of the reason itself have a greater share in reason’s good, than the acts of the lower powers, which reason commands. Therefore some human acts are better than others.

Also. The precepts of the law are best fulfilled through love, as stated above.3 Now a man may happen to fulfil an obligation through greater love than another man does. Hence one virtuous act will be better than another.

Further. If a man’s actions are made good by virtue;4 and since the same virtue is more intense in one than in another: it follows that one human act is better than another.

Moreover. If human acts are made good by virtues, the better act must needs be that which proceeds from the better virtue. Now we see that one virtue is better than another: as magnificence than liberality, and magnanimity than moderation. Thus one human act will be better than another.

Hence it is said (1 Cor. 7:38): He that giveth his virgin in marriage, doth well: and he that giveth her not doth better.

The same reasons show that all sins are not equal: since by one sin a man strays more from his end than by another: and the order of reason is more subverted: and a greater harm done to one’s neighbour.

Hence it is said (Ezech. 16:47): Thou hast done … more wicked things than they in all thy ways.

Hereby we refute the error of those who say that all merits and sins are equal.

However there seemed to be some reason for saying that all virtuous acts are equal, because every act is virtuous that tends to the end of the good. Hence, if all good actions have the same good as their end, they must all be equally good.

But, though there is one last end of the good, the acts which derive their goodness from it, receive various degrees of goodness. Because there is a difference of degrees in the goods that are directed to the last end, forasmuch as some are better than others, and approach nearer to the last end. Hence both in the will and in its acts there will be degrees of goodness, according to the diversity of goods that are the term to which the will and its acts are directed, although the last end is the same.

In like manner, there would seem to be reason for asserting that all sins are equal, because in human acts sin results only through someone transgressing the rule of reason. Now, one transgresses the rule of reason by deviating therefrom slightly just as by doing so greatly. Seemingly, then, the sin is equal, whether one sin in small or in great things.

This argument is, apparently, confirmed by the practice in human judgement. For if a person is forbidden to go beyond a certain limit, it makes no difference to the judge whether he goes beyond it little or much: thus it matters not, as soon as the boxer goes outside the ring, whether he go yet further. Therefore from the moment that one transgresses the rule of reason, it matters not whether one transgress little or much.:

Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, wherever perfection and good consist in a certain balance, the greater the deviation from the requisite balance, the greater the evil. Thus, health consists in a proper balance of the humours beauty in due symmetry of members: truth in equation between thought or word and thing. And it is clear that the greater the disproportion in the humours, the greater the disease; and the greater the lack of symmetry in the members, the more unsightly the deformity: and the greater the deviation from the truth, the greater the falsehood: for there is not so much falsity in thinking three to be five, as in thinking it to be a hundred. Now, the virtuous good consists in a certain proportion, for it is the mean, according to the due modification of circumstances, set between contrary vices.1 Consequently the greater the divergence from this harmony, the greater the malice.

There is no comparison between transgressing a virtue and transgressing the bounds appointed by a judge. Because virtue is a good in itself: wherefore transgression of a virtue is an evil in itself: and consequently a greater deviation from virtue is a greater evil. But to break the particular bounds appointed by a judge, is not an evil in itself, but accidentally because, to wit, it is forbidden. Now when one thing is predicated accidentally of another, it does not follow of necessity, if A be predicated of B simply, that more A should be predicated of more B,2 but only when the predication is per se: for it does not follow, if a white being is a musical being, that what is more white is more musical: whereas it does follow, if white dazzles the sight, that more white dazzles the sight yet more.

There is, however, this difference to be observed among sins, that some are mortal, and some venial. Mortal sin is that which deprives the soul of spiritual life. What this life consists in may be gathered from two things, by comparing it with natural life. For the body lives naturally through being united to the soul which is the principle of its life: and the body, quickened by the soul, is moved of itself: whereas a dead body either remains without movement, or is moved only by an extrinsic cause. So too, the human will is not only alive when, by its right intention, it is united to its last end,—which union is its object and, as it were, its form,—but also is moved by an intrinsic principle to do what is right—when by love man adheres to God and his neighbour. But without the intention of the last end and without love, the soul is dead, as it were: since it is not moved of itself to do what is right, but either leaves off so doing altogether, or is only instigated to do so by some extrinsic principle, namely the fear of punishment. Therefore all sins that are opposed to the intention of the last end, and to love, are mortal. On the other hand, if a man, without detriment to these, fails in a particular right order of the reason, it will not be a mortal, but a venial sin.

Chapter CXL

that man’s actions are punished or rewarded by god

It is clear from the foregoing that man’s actions are punished or rewarded by God. Because to punish or reward belongs to him who imposes the law: since legislators induce men to obey the law, by rewards and punishments. Now, as we have shown above,1 it belongs to divine providence to set a law for men. Therefore it belongs to God to punish or reward men.

Again. Wherever a certain order is requisite to an end, that order must needs lead to that end, and infringement of that order debars from it: since those things that are on account of the end, take their necessity from the end; so that, to wit, they are necessary, if the end has to follow; and, given them, if there be no obstacle, the end will follow. Now, God appointed to man’s actions a certain order in relation to the end of the good,2 as we have already proved.3 Consequently, given that this order is rightly followed, those who comply with it attain the end of good, which consists in being rewarded: while those who forsake that order through sin, are debarred from the end of good, which is to be punished.

Also. As natural things are subject to the order of divine providence, so too are human acts, as we have shown.1 In either case, the due order may happen to be observed or disregarded: but there is this difference, that observance or disregard of the due order, is left in the power of the human will: whereas it is not in the power of natural things to deflect from the right order, or to follow it. Now, between effect and cause there should be a certain fitting correspondence. Wherefore, as when the requisite order of natural principles and actions obtains in natural things, the result is that, of necessity, their nature is sustained, and their good ensured, whereas corruption and evil result in them, when the natural and requisite order is not observed; so too in human affairs it must needs be that, when man voluntarily keeps the order of the law imposed by God, a good accrues to him, not of necessity as it were, but by the appointment of his Lord; and this is to be rewarded: and conversely, that his lot is evil, when the order of the law has been infringed; and this is to be punished.

Besides. It belongs to God’s goodness that he leaves nothing out of order: hence we may observe in natural things, that every evil is contained in the order of some good: thus corruption of the air is generation of fire, and the slaying of the sheep is the meal of the wolf. Since, then human acts are subject to divine providence, even as natural things are: it follows that whatever evil occurs in human actions must be included in the order of some good. This is most fittingly done in the punishment of sins. For thus things that exceed in due quantity are included in the order of justice, which reduces them to equality. Now, man exceeds the mark of his right quantity, when he prefers his own will to God’s, by gratifying it against the divine ordinance. And this inequality is removed when, against his will, man is compelled to suffer something according to the divine ordinance. Therefore man’s sins need to be punished by God: and for the same reason his good deeds should be rewarded.

Further. Divine providence not only appoints the order of things, but also moves all things to the execution of the order by himself appointed, as we have already proved.1 Now, the will is moved by its object, which is either good or evil. Hence it belongs to divine providence, to set good things before man as his reward, that his will may be moved to proceed aright; and to set evil things before him as his punishment, that he may avoid falling out of order.

Moreover. Divine providence has ordered things in such wise that one is of profit to another.2 Now, it is most fitting that a man should advance to the end of good, both through the good and through the evil of another man, in that he is urged to do well through seeing that well-doers are rewarded, and is recalled from evil doing, through seeing that evil-doers are punished. Therefore it belongs to divine providence that the wicked be punished, and the good rewarded.

This is what is said (Exod. 20:5, 6): I am … thy God … visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children … and showing mercy … to them that love Me, and keep My commandments. Also in the psalm:3 Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. Again (Rom. 2:6, 8): Who will render to every man according to his works. To them indeed, who, according to patience in good work … glory and honour: but to them that … obey not the truth, but give credit to iniquity, wrath and indignation.

Hereby we refute the error of some who said that God punishes not. For Marcion and Valentine said that the God who is good is another from the God who is just, and punishes.

Chapter CXLI

of the difference and order of punishments

Since, then, as we have shown,1 a reward is something proposed to the will, as an end whereby it is urged to do well, and on the other hand punishment, as an evil to be avoided, is set before the will, to withdraw it from evil; just as it is essential to a reward that it be a good in harmony with the will, so is it a necessary condition of punishment, that it be an evil, and in opposition to the will. Now, evil is the privation of good. Consequently, the difference and order of punishments must be in keeping with the difference and order of goods.

Now, the sovereign good is man’s beatitude, which is his last end: and the nearer a thing approaches to this end, the higher must it be placed as a good of man. The nearest thing to that end is virtue,2 and everything else that is of use to man in well-doing, whereby he attains to beatitude. After this comes the right disposition of reason, and of the powers subject thereto. And after this the well-being of the body, which is requisite for facility of action. Lastly come those things that are without, which we employ as helps to virtue.

Accordingly man’s greatest punishment will be his exclusion from beatitude. After this, privation of virtue, and of any perfection of the soul’s natural powers, that conduces to well-doing: then, disorder in the natural powers of the soul: then, injury to the body: lastly, loss of external goods.

But as it is a necessary condition of punishment to be not only the privation of a good, but also opposed to the will: and as not every man’s will appreciates goods at their true value: it happens sometimes that the privation of a greater good is less opposed to the will, and for this reason seems to be less penal. Hence it is that many people who esteem higher and know better sensible and bodily goods than intellectual and spiritual goods, fear corporal punishment more than spiritual. And in the estimation of such men the order of punishments is apparently the reverse to that given above. For to these, injuries to the body and loss of external goods seem the greatest punishment: while they think little or nothing of the disorder of their soul, the decay of virtue, and the loss of the divine fruition, wherein man’s ultimate beatitude consists.

Hence it is that they think that God punishes not the sins of man: because they see that sinners for the most part are sound of body, and outwardly prosperous, while virtuous men sometimes are none of these things.

But this should not be a matter of surprise to anyone who considers the matter aright. For since external goods are directed to internal, and the body to the soul; external and bodily goods are so far good for man, as they are conducive to the good as appointed by reason: while, in so far as they stand in the way of reason’s good, they become, for man, evil. Now God the disposer of things, knows the measure of human power. Wherefore at times he apportions bodily and external goods to a virtuous man as a help to virtue, and in this he bestows a favour on him. But sometimes he withdraws those things from him, because he sees them to be a hindrance to virtue and to his enjoyment of God: since for this reason external goods become evil for man, as we have stated; so that, for the same reason, their loss becomes a good for man. If, then, every punishment is an evil; and if it is not an evil for man to be deprived of external and bodily goods, according as this is expedient for his advance in virtue: it will be no punishment for a virtuous man if he be deprived of external goods, to the profit of virtue. On the other hand, for the wicked it will be a punishment if they be granted external goods whereby they are incited to evil-doing. Hence it is said (Wis. 14:11), that the creatures of God are turned to an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men, and a snare to the feet of the unwise.—Since, however, it belongs to punishment not only to be an evil, but to be opposed to the will; the loss of bodily and external goods, even when it profits man unto virtue, and is not an evil for him, is called a punishment, by a misuse of the term, because it is opposed to the will.

The result of man being out of order is that he does not appreciate things at their true value, and prefers the things of the body to those of the soul. This disorder is either sinful, or arises from a preceding sin. Hence it is clear that punishment is not in man, even as contrary to the will, without some preceding fault.

Another reason proves this. Because things good in themselves, would not become evil for men by their abuse, unless some disorder already existed in man.

Again, that man needs to be deprived, for the good of virtue, of what the will accepts because it is naturally good, arises from some disorder in man, which is either a sin, or results from sin. For it is evident that the preceding sin produces a certain disorder in man’s affective faculty, so that he is afterwards more easily inclined to sin. Therefore, we must suppose some sin in man if he needs to be assisted towards the good of virtue, by means of something, in a sense, penal to him, inasmuch as it is contrary to his will, although sometimes it is voluntary, inasmuch as his reason looks to the end. However, we shall speak further on1 of this disorder that affects human nature on account of original sin. But for the present be it clearly understood that God punishes men for their sins, and that He punishes not unless there be a fault.

Chapter CXLII

that punishments and rewards are not all equal

Since then divine justice demands that, for the maintenance of equality among things, punishments be dealt for sins, and rewards for good deeds;2 it follows that if, as we have shown,3 there are degrees in acts of virtue and in sins, there must also be degrees in rewards and punishments. For, otherwise, equality would not be observed, if he that sins more received not greater punishment, or he that performs better deeds, received not a greater reward: because, in requiting, there is the same reason, apparently, for discriminating between good and bad, as between good and better, or between bad and worse.

Moreover. The equality of distributive justice consists in giving unequal things to those who are unequal among themselves. Consequently the requital by punishments and rewards would not be just, were all rewards and punishments equal.

Again. Rewards and punishments are appointed by the lawgiver, that men may be drawn away from evil to good, as proved above.1 Now, not only do men need to be drawn to good things, and withdrawn from evil, but also good men need to be enticed to better, and wicked men withdrawn from worse things. But this would not be the case, were rewards and punishments equal. Therefore both punishments and rewards should be unequal.

Further. As a thing is disposed to its form by its natural dispositions, so is a man disposed to punishments and rewards by good and evil deeds. Now, the order which divine providence has established in things is such that things which are more disposed receive a more perfect form. Therefore, there must needs be a difference in punishments and rewards corresponding to the difference of good and evil deeds.

Besides. Excess occurs in good and evil deeds in two ways: first, in point of number, through one man doing more good or evil deeds than another: secondly, in point of the quality of the deed, through one man performing a better or a worse deed than another. Now, there ought to be an excess of rewards or punishments corresponding to the excess in number of deeds: else recompense would not be made in the divine judgement for all a man’s deeds, if some evil deeds were left unpunished, and some good deeds unrewarded. Equally, therefore, inequality in rewards and punishments corresponds to excess in regard to inequality of deeds.

Hence it is said (Deut. 25:2): According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be: and (Isa. 27:8): In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off I shall punish it.1

Hereby we refute the error of some who say that, in the life to come, all rewards and punishments are equal.

Chapter CXLIII

of the punishment due to mortal and venial sin in relation to the last end

It is clear from what has been said,2 that sin may happen in two ways. In one way, so that the intention of the mind altogether breaks away from its order to God, who is the last end of the good: and this is mortal sin. In another way, so that, without prejudice to the human mind’s order to its last end, some obstacle is placed, whereby it is hampered in tending freely to its end: and this is called venial sin. If, then, punishments must differ according to the difference of sins,3 it follows that he who sins mortally, should be punished so as to forfeit man’s end: but that he who sins venially, should be punished not to the extent of forfeiting it, but so as to be hampered, or experience difficulty, in obtaining the end. For thus is the equality of justice maintained: so that in the same way that man by sinning voluntarily turns aside from his end, so by way of punishment, against his will, should he be hindered in the attainment of his end.

Again. The will in man corresponds to the natural inclination in natural things. Now, if a natural thing be deprived of its natural inclination to its end, it is quite unable to reach that end: thus a heavy body, if it lose its weight by corruption, and becomes light, will never reach the centre. Whereas if it be hindered in its movement, while retaining its inclination to the end, it will reach its end, when the obstacle is removed. When a man sins mortally, the intention of his will is altogether turned away from his last end: whereas, when he sins venially, his intention remains turned towards his end, yet somewhat hampered, by reason of his adhering more than he ought, to those things that are directed to the end. Consequently the punishment due to one who sins mortally is that he be altogether debarred from obtaining his end; while the punishment due to one who sins venially, is that he experience difficulty before attaining his end.

Moreover. When a man gets a good thing unintentionally, this is by luck and chance.1 If, then, a man whose intention is turned away from his last end, obtains that last end, it will be by luck and chance. But this is unreasonable. Because the last end is a good of the intelligence: whereas luck is incompatible with intelligence: since things that happen by chance, occur without the bidding of the intellect. And it is unreasonable that the intellect obtain its end otherwise than in an intelligent way. Therefore a man who, by sinning mortally, has his intention turned away from his last end, will not obtain his last end.

Again. Matter does not receive a form from the agent unless it be disposed to that form. Now the end and the good are the perfection of the will, as form is of matter. Consequently the will does not obtain the last end, unless it be fittingly disposed. But the will is disposed to the end by intending and desiring the end. Therefore a man will not obtain his end if his intentions be averted from the end.

Moreover. In things ordained to an end, we find that if the end is or will be obtained, we must of necessity presuppose the things required for obtaining it: and if those things be not granted, neither will the end be obtained: for if the end can be obtained without the things directed to the end, it is useless to seek the end by such means. Now, all are agreed that man obtains his last end, which is beatitude, by deeds of virtue, the chief of which is the intention of the right end. Therefore, if a man act against virtue, through turning away from the intention of the last end, it is fitting that he be deprived of his last end.

Hence it is said (Matth. 7:23): Depart from Me, all you that work iniquity.

Chapter CXLIV

that by mortal sin man forfeits his last end for eternity

The punishment whereby a man forfeits his last end must be endless. For one is not deprived of a thing unless it be something one ought to have: thus a kitten newly born is not said to be deprived of sight. Now, in this life, man has not a natural aptitude to obtain his last end, as we have proved above.1 Therefore privation of this end must be a punishment after this life. But, after this life, man is no longer able to obtain his last end. For the soul needs the body in order to obtain its end: inasmuch as through the body it acquires perfection both in knowledge and in virtue. And the soul, once separated from the body, does not return to this state wherein it attains to perfection through the body, as those maintained who held the transmigration of souls, against whom we have argued above.2 Therefore the man who is punished by being deprived of his last end, must needs remain punished eternally.

Again. When a thing is deprived of that for which it has a natural aptitude, it cannot be repaired unless it return to pre-existing matter, so as to be generated anew: as when an animal loses its sight or another sense. But it is impossible for a thing that is already generated, to be generated again, unless it first be corrupted: and then from the same matter, it will be possible for another to be generated in its entirety, the same, not identically but in kind. Now, a spiritual being, such as the soul or an angel, cannot return to pre-existing matter, so that another be generated anew, the same as before in kind. Consequently if it be deprived of that for which it has a natural aptitude, it must needs remain eternally thus deprived. Now, in the nature of the soul and of an angel there is the order to the last end, namely God. Therefore if it be punished by privation of that order, such punishment will remain for ever.

Besides. Natural equity would seem to demand that everyone be deprived of that good against which he has acted: since thereby he renders himself unworthy of that good. Hence it is that according to civil justice, he who sins against the state, is altogether deprived of the society of his fellow citizens, either by being put to death, or by being condemned to exile for life: nor is any account taken of the time taken in sinning, but of that against which he sinned. Now, the same comparison stands between the whole of the present life and the earthly state, as between the whole of eternity and the society of the Blessed who, as we showed above,1 possess their last end eternally. Therefore he that sins against his last end, and against charity, which is the bond of the society of the Blessed, and of those who are tending to beatitude, ought to be punished eternally, although his sins may have occupied but a short time.

Moreover. In the divine judgement the will counts for the deed,2 because as man seeketh the things that appear, so the Lord beholdeth the heart.3 Now, a man, who for the sake of a temporal good, has turned away from his last end, the possession of which is eternal, has preferred the enjoyment of that temporal good to the eternal fruition of his last end: so that evidently much more would he have preferred to enjoy that temporal good eternally. Therefore, in the divine judgement, he should be punished as though he had sinned eternally. Now, there can be no doubt that for an eternal sin an eternal punishment is due. Therefore eternal punishment is due to the man who turns away from his last end.

Further. For the same just reason punishment is rendered for sins, and reward for good deeds.1 Now, beatitude is the reward of virtue:2 and beatitude is everlasting, as we have shown.3 Therefore the punishment also whereby one is deprived of beatitude should be everlasting.

Hence it is said (Matth. 25:46): These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting.

Hereby we refute the error of those who assert that the punishment of the wicked will at length have an end. This statement seems to have originated in the opinion of certain philosophers, who maintained that all punishment is remedial, and therefore terminable at some time.

There seemed to be reasons for this assertion:—both because it is customary among men, that punishments be inflicted by men’s laws for the correction of vice, so that they are like medicine:—and for the reason that if the punisher inflicts punishment, not for a further purpose but for its own sake, it follows that he delights in punishing for its own sake, which is inconsistent with the divine goodness. Therefore punishments must be inflicted for a further purpose; and no end seems more fitting than the correction of vice. Consequently it would seem reasonably stated that all punishments are remedial, and therefore terminable at some time: since what can be remedied is accidental to the creature, and is removable without the substance being destroyed.

It must be granted that God inflicts punishments, not for his own sake, as though he took pleasure in them, but for the sake of something else: namely on account of the order that must be imposed on creatures, in which order the good of the universe consists. Now, the order of things demands that all things be dispensed by God proportionally; for which reason it is said (Wis. 11:21) that God does all things in weight, number and measure. And, as rewards correspond proportionally to acts of virtue, so do punishments to sins: and to some sins eternal punishment is proportionate, as we have proved. Therefore for certain sins God inflicts eternal punishment, that in things there may be maintained the right order which shows forth His wisdom.

Even if we were to grant that all punishments are intended for the amendment of morals, and for no further purpose: we would not, for that reason, have to assert that all punishments are remedial and terminable. For even according to human laws, some are punished with death, for the amendment, not of themselves, but of others. Hence it is said (Prov. 19:25): The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser. Again, according to human laws, some are banished from the state into perpetual exile, that by being rid of them the state may be purified. Wherefore it is said (Prov. 22:10): Cast out the scoffer, and contention will go out with him, and quarrels and reproaches shall cease. Consequently, even if punishments be inflicted only for the amendment of morals, nothing forbids certain men being, according to the divine judgement, separated forever from the fellowship of good men, and being punished eternally, so that men, for fear of eternal punishment, may refrain from sin, and the society of the good may be purified through being purged of their presence. Thus it is said (Apoc. 21:27): There shall not enter into it, namely the heavenly Jerusalem, whereby is designated the society of good men, anything defiled, or that worketh abomination, or maketh a lie.

Chapter CXLV

that sins are punished also by the sinner being subjected to some kind of pain

Those who sin against God are to be punished not only by forfeiting beatitude for ever, but also by being subjected to some kind of pain. For punishment should be proportionate to fault, as we proved above.1 Now when a man sins, his mind not only turns away from his last end, but also turns unduly to other things as ends. Therefore the sinner should be punished not only by being debarred from his end, but also by experiencing hurt from other things.

Again. Punishments are inflicted for sins that, through fear of being punished, men may be withdrawn from sin, as stated above.1 Now no one fears to lose what he desires not to get. Consequently, those whose will is turned away from their last end, fear not to lose it. Hence they would not be recalled from sinning by the mere loss of their last end. Therefore some other punishment, which sinners would fear, should be inflicted on them.

Also. If a man abuses the means to an end, not only is he debarred from the end, but he incurs some other hurt besides: for instance, food taken injudiciously, not only does not strengthen, but even causes sickness. Now the man who places his end in creatures, does not use them as he should, namely by referring them to his last end. Therefore he should be punished, not only by forfeiting beatitude, but also by undergoing some hurt from them.

Besides. As good things are due to well-doers, so evil things are due to evil-doers. Now those who do aright, reap perfection and joy in the end intended by them. Therefore, on the other hand, such a punishment is due to sinners, that they reap pain and hurt from the things wherein they place their end.

Hence it is that Holy Writ threatens sinners not only with exclusion from glory, but also with affliction from other things. For it is said (Matth. 25:41): Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels: and (Ps. 10:7): He shall rain snares upon sinners; fire, and brimstone, and storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup.

Hereby we refute the opinion of Algazel, who said that the only punishment meted to sinners is their loss of their last end.

Chapter CXLVI

that it is lawful for judges to inflict punishments

Whereas some belittle the punishments inflicted by God, forasmuch as, being attached to sensible things, they care only for outward appearances: divine providence has ordered that on earth there be men who, by inflicting sensible and present punishments, compel certain people to do right. Now, it is clear that they sin not in punishing the wicked. For no man sins through doing right: and it is right for the wicked to be punished, since by punishment sin is righted, as we have shown above.1 Therefore judges do not sin by punishing the wicked.

Again. Men who are placed over others on earth, are executors, as it were, of divine providence: because God, by the ordinance of His providence, accomplishes lower things through higher things, as we have proved.2 Now, no man sins through carrying out the order of divine providence. And divine providence has ordained that the just be rewarded, and the wicked punished, as we have shown.3 Therefore men who are placed over others do not sin, by rewarding the good and punishing the wicked.

Besides. The good needs not the evil, but conversely. Therefore that which is necessary in order to maintain the good, cannot be evil in itself. Now, it is necessary for punishment to be inflicted on evil-doers, for the maintenance of peace among men. Therefore punishment of evil-doers is not an evil in itself.

Also. The good of the community surpasses a particular good of the individual.4 Therefore the particular good must give way, that the common good may be maintained. Now, the life of a few pestilential individuals is a hindrance to the common good, which is the harmony of the human community. Therefore such men should be cut off by death from the society of their fellows.

Besides. As the physician in his operation aims at health consisting in the ordered harmony of the humours, so the governor of a state, in his operation, aims at peace, which is the ordered harmony of the citizens.1 Now, the surgeon rightly and usefully cuts off the unhealthy member, if it threatens the health of the body. Justly, therefore, and rightly the governor of the state slays pestilential subjects, lest the peace of the state be disturbed.

Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:6): Know you not that a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump? And a little further on he adds (verse 13): Put away the evil one from among yourselves. Again speaking of earthly authority he says (Rom. 13:4) that he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God’s minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Again it is said (1 Pet. 2:13, 14): Be ye subject … to every human creature for God’s sake: whether it be to the king as excelling: or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of the good. Hereby we refute the error of those who say that capital punishment is unlawful. They base their error on the words of Exod. 20:13, Thou shalt not kill, which are quoted Matth. 5:21.—They also quote the saying of our Lord (Matth. 13:30) in reply to the servants who wished to gather the cockle from the midst of the wheat: Suffer both to grow until the harvest: for the cockle signifies the children of the wicked one, and the harvest is the end of the world, as stated in the same passage.2 Therefore the wicked should not be cut off from the midst of the good, by being condemned to death.

They also point out that as long as he is on earth man may be converted to better ways. Therefore he should not be put away from the world, but should be kept there that he may repent.

But these arguments are of no account. For the same law that says, Thou shalt not kill, afterwards adds:3 Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live. Hence we are to understand that the prohibition is against the unjust slaying of a man. This is also evident from our Lord’s words in Matth. 5. For after saying, You have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not kill, He added:1 But I say to you that whosoever is angry with his brother, etc. Whereby He gives us to understand that it is forbidden to kill through anger, but not through zeal for righteousness.—How we ought to take our Lord’s words, Suffer both to grow until the harvest, is clear from what follows:2 Lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it. Hence, it is forbidden to slay the wicked, when this cannot be done without danger to the good. And this is often the case, when the wicked are not yet discernible from the good by notorious sins; or when it is to be feared lest the wicked draw many good men after them. The fact that the wicked, while alive, are able to amend, does not prevent their being justly slain: because the peril that threatens through their remaining alive, is greater and more certain than the good to be expected from their amendment. Moreover, in the very hour of death they are able to repent and be converted to God. And if they be so obstinate, that even in the hour of death their heart abandons not its wickedness, it may be reckoned with sufficient probability that they will never recover from their evil ways.

Chapter CXLVII

that man needs the divine assistance in order to obtain beatitude

Whereas it is clear from the foregoing,3 that divine providence governs rational creatures otherwise than other things, inasmuch as they differ from others in natural condition, it remains to be proved that also on account of the excellence of their end, a more exalted mode of government is applied to them by divine providence.4

It is evident that in keeping with their nature, they attain to a higher participation of the end. For, since they are of an intellectual nature, they are able by their operation to be in touch with intelligible truth: which is impossible for other things, since they lack intelligence. And, forasmuch as they attain to intelligible truth by their natural operation, it is clear that God provides for them otherwise than for other things: in that to man is given intelligence and reason, that thereby he may be able both to discern and to discover the truth: also to him are given the sensitive powers, both interior and exterior, that by them he may be assisted to discover the truth: also to him is given the use of speech, so that by making use of it, one who has conceived the truth in his mind, may be able to impart it to another: so that men may thus assist one another in the knowledge of truth, even as in other necessaries of life, since man is by nature a social animal.1

Furthermore, the knowledge of truth that is appointed as man’s last end is one which surpasses his natural faculty: for it consists in his seeing the First Truth itself in itself, as we have proved above.2 Now this is not competent to lower creatures, namely that they be able to reach an end surpassing their natural faculty. Consequently, there arises from this end an additional reason why a different manner of government should be accorded to men, and to other creatures of a lower nature. Because the means should be proportionate to the end. So that, if man be directed to an end surpassing his natural faculty, he stands in need of a supernatural assistance from God, to enable him to tend to that end.

Moreover. A thing of inferior nature cannot attain to what is proper to a higher nature except by virtue of that higher nature: thus the moon, that shines not of itself, is made to shine by the power and action of the sun: and water that is not hot of itself, becomes hot by the power and action of fire. Now, to see the First Truth itself in itself, so far surpasses the faculty of human nature, that it belongs to God alone, as we have shown above.3 Therefore man needs the divine assistance in order to reach that end.

Again. Everything obtains its last end by its own operation. Now, an operation derives its efficacy from the operating principle: wherefore by the action of the seed something is produced in a definite species, through the efficacy pre-existing in the seed. Therefore man cannot, by his own operation, attain to his last end, which surpasses the faculty of his natural powers, unless his operation be enabled by the divine power to bring him thereto.

Besides. No instrument can achieve ultimate perfection by virtue of its own form, but only by virtue of the principal agent: although by virtue of its own form it can cause some disposition to the ultimate perfection. Thus a saw, by reason of its own form, causes the cutting of the wood, but the form of the bench is produced by the art that employs the instrument: likewise in the body of an animal, resolution and consumption is the result of the animal heat, but the formation of flesh, and regulation of increase and other such things, come from the vegetative soul, which uses heat as its instrument. Now, to God the first agent by intellect and will, all intellects and wills are subordinate,1 as instruments under the principal agent. Consequently their operations have no efficacy in respect of their ultimate perfection, which is the attainment of final beatitude, except by the power of God. Therefore the rational nature needs the divine assistance in order to obtain its last end.

Further. Many obstacles prevent man from reaching his end. For he is hindered by the weakness of his reason, which is easily drawn into error which bars him from the straight road that leads to his end. He is also hindered by the passions of the sensitive faculty, and by the affections whereby he is drawn to sensible and inferior things, since the more he adheres to them, the further is he removed from his last end: for such things are below man, whereas his end is above him. Again he is often hindered by weakness of the body from doing acts of virtue, whereby he tends to beatitude. Therefore he needs the help of God, lest by such obstacles he turn away utterly from his last end.

Hence it is said (Jo. 4:44): No man can come to Me, unless the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him: and (15:4): As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in Me. Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who asserted that man can merit the glory of God by his free-will alone.

Chapter CXLVIII

that the assistance of divine grace does not compel man to virtue

Possibly, it might appear to some that the divine assistance compels man to do well, since it is said (Jo. 4:44): No man can come to Me unless the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him: and on account of the saying (Rom. 8:14): Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God: and again (2 Cor. 5:14): The charity of Christ presseth us. And it would seem that compulsion is implied in being drawn, led and pressed.

But it is evident that this is not true. For divine providence provides for all things according to their mode, as we have proved above.1 Now, it is proper to man and every rational nature, to act voluntarily and to be master of his actions, as we have shown:2 and compulsion is incompatible with this. Therefore God by assisting man does not compel him to do right.

Again. When we say that the divine assistance is given to man that he may do well, we mean that it does our works in us, even as the first cause does the works of second causes, and the principal agent produces the action of the instrument, wherefore it is said (Isa. 26:12): Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in3 us. Now, the first cause produces the operation of the second cause, according to the latter’s mode. Therefore God also causes our works in us according to our mode, which is that we act freely and not by compulsion. Therefore the divine assistance does not compel a man to do right.

Besides. Man is directed to his end by his will: because the object of the will is the good and the end. Now, the divine assistance is given to us chiefly that we may obtain the end. Therefore this assistance does not deprive us of the act of the will, but in a special way is the cause of this act in us: hence the Apostle says (Philip. 2:13): It is God who worketh in us1 both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. But compulsion excludes from us the act of the will: for we do under compulsion that which is against our will. Therefore God does not, by His assistance, compel us to do right.

Further. Man reaches his last end by acts of virtue: for beatitude is said to be the reward of virtue.2 Now compulsory actions are not acts of virtue: because virtue’s principal condition is choice, which is impossible unless it be voluntary, to which compulsion is opposed. Therefore God does not compel man to do right.

Moreover. The means should be proportionate to the end. Now, the last end which is happiness is not becoming except to those who act voluntarily, and are masters of their own actions: hence neither inanimate beings nor dumb animals are said to be happy, as neither are they said to be lucky or unlucky,3 save metaphorically. Therefore the assistance which God gives man that he may obtain happiness, does not compel him.

Hence it is said (Deut. 30:15–18): Consider that the Lord hath4 set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand, death and evil: that thou mayest love the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways.… But if thy heart be turned away, so that thou wilt not hear … I foretell thee this day that thou shalt perish. Again it is said (Ecclus. 15:18): Before man is life and death, good and evil. That which he shall choose shall be given him.

Chapter CXLIX

that man is unable to merit the divine assistance

It can be clearly shown from what has been said, that man is unable to merit God’s assistance. For everything is in the position of matter in regard to what is above it. Now matter does not move itself to its perfection, but needs to be moved by another. Therefore man does not move himself to the effect of obtaining the divine assistance, for this is above him: rather indeed is he moved for this purpose by God.1 Now the motion of the mover precedes the movement of the thing moved both logically and causally. Consequently the divine assistance is not given to us because by our good deeds we previously move ourselves to obtain it, but rather do we advance by our good deeds, because of God’s prevenient help.

Again. An instrumental agent does not produce a disposition for the introduction of perfection by the principal agent, except in so far as it acts by virtue of the principal agent: thus animal heat does not prepare matter for the form of flesh any more than for another form, save in so far as it acts by virtue of the soul. Now, our soul works under God as the instrumental under the principal agent.2 Consequently the soul is unable to prepare itself to receive the effect of the divine assistance, save forasmuch as it acts by virtue of God. Therefore it is anticipated by the divine assistance, rather than anticipates it, as though it merited it, or prepared itself for it.

Also. No particular agent can in every case anticipate the action of the first universal agent: because every action of a particular agent originates from a universal agent: thus here below every movement is anticipated by the heavenly movement. Now, the human soul is subordinate to God as the particular to the universal agent. Therefore there cannot be a right movement in the soul that is not anticipated by the divine action. Hence our Lord said (Jo. 15:5): Without me you can do nothing.

Besides. Meed is proportionate to merit: because equality of justice is observed in giving rewards. Now, since the effect of God’s assistance surpasses the faculty of nature, it is not proportionate to the acts that man performs by his natural faculty. Therefore man cannot by such acts merit the aforesaid assistance.

Further. Knowledge precedes the movement of the will. Now, knowledge of his supernatural end comes to man from God: because man cannot obtain such knowledge by his natural reason, since it surpasses his natural faculty. Therefore the movement of our will towards our last end needs to be anticipated by the divine assistance.

Hence it is said (Tit. 3:5): Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He hath saved us. And (Rom. 9:16): It is not of him that willeth, namely to will, nor of him that runneth, namely to run, but of God that showeth mercy: because, to wit, in order that he may will and do well, man needs God’s prevenient assistance: even as an effect is not usually ascribed to the proximate agent but to the first mover: thus victory is attributed to the general, although it is achieved by the work of the soldiers. Hence these words do not exclude free-will, as some have misunderstood them to do, as though man were not master of his own actions both internal and external: but they indicate the subjection of the free-will to God. Moreover, it is said (Lament. 4.):1 Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted: whence it is clear that our conversion to God is anticipated by the assistance of God when he converts us.

Yet we read (Zach. 1:3) as said in the person of God: Turn ye to me … and I will turn to you: this does not however deny the anticipating of our conversion by God’s operation which we have affirmed, but it means that after our conversion, whereby we turn to him, he maintains it by strengthening it so as to make it effective, and by upholding it, that it may reach its due end.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who said that this assistance is given to us on account of our merits: and that the beginning of our justification is from us, but the consummation from God.

Chapter CL

that this same assistance is called grace; and what is meant by sanctifying grace

Seeing that what is given to a man apart from his merits, is said to be given to him gratis: and since the divine assistance given to man anticipates all human merit, as we have said;1 it follows that this assistance is bestowed on man gratuitously, and therefore is fittingly known by the name of grace. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6): And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace. There is also another reason for which the aforesaid assistance of God has received the name of grace. For one man is said to be pleasing (gratus) to another, because he is beloved by him, wherefore he who is beloved of another, is said to be in his grace. Now it is essential to love that the lover be a well-wisher and a well-doer to the one whom he loves. And indeed the good of every creature is the object of God’s will and operation: since the creature’s very being and its every perfection come from God willing and operating, as we have proved above:2 wherefore it is said (Wisd. 11:25): Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made. But a special kind of divine love offers itself to our consideration; it is that which is bestowed on those whom he assists to obtain a good which surpasses the order of their nature, namely the perfect enjoyment, not of any created good, but of his very self. Accordingly this assistance is fittingly named grace: not only because it is given gratis, as we have shown; but also because by this assistance man, by a special favour, is rendered pleasing (gratus) to God. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 1:5, 6): Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children … according to the purpose of His will: unto the praise of glory in which He hath graced us in His beloved Son.

Now this same grace must needs be something in the man who is graced, something by way of form and perfection. For that which is being directed to an end, must have a continuous order thereto: because the mover causes a continuous change in the thing moved, until the latter by its movement reaches the end. Since then man, as we proved above,1 is directed to his last end by the assistance of the divine grace, it follows that he must possess this assistance continuously, until he reach his end. But this would not be the case were man to share in this assistance by way of motion or passion, and not by way of a form, abiding and reposing, as it were, within him: for such motion and passion would not be in man except when he is actually turned towards his end, and this is not always so in man, as may be seen especially when he is asleep. Therefore sanctifying grace is a form and perfection abiding in man, even when he is doing nothing.

Again. God’s love causes the good that is in us: even as man’s love is evoked and caused by some good in the beloved. Now, man is incited to love someone especially, on account of some good already existing in the beloved. Consequently where there is special love of God for man, we must suppose some special good bestowed on man by God. Since, then, according to what we have been saying, sanctifying grace denotes God’s special love for man, it must in consequence imply the presence of some special goodness and perfection in man.

Also. Everything is directed to a suitable end in proportion to its form: since different species have different ends. Now, the end whereto man is directed by the assistance of divine grace is above human nature. Therefore man needs, over and above, a supernatural form and perfection, so as to be suitably directed to that same end.

Besides. It behoves man to reach his last end by means of his own actions. Now, everything acts in proportion to its form. Therefore, in order that man may be brought to his last end by means of his own actions, he needs to receive an additional form, whereby his actions may be rendered effective in meriting his last end.

Further. Divine providence provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature, as we have shown above.1 Now, the mode proper to man is that, for the perfection of his operations, he needs, besides his natural powers, certain perfections and habits, to enable him to do the good well as it were connaturally and with both ease and pleasure. Therefore the assistance of grace which man receives from God that he may obtain his last end, denotes a form and perfection abiding in man.

Hence God’s grace is designated in Scripture as being a kind of light; for the Apostle says (Ephes. 5:8): You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. And it is fitting that the perfection whereby man is assisted towards his last end, which consists in seeing God, be named light, which is a principle of vision.

Hereby we refute the opinion of those who say that grace places nothing in man: even as nothing is posited in a man by saying that he has the king’s favour (gratiam), but only in the king himself who loves him. It is clear, then, that they were deceived through not observing the difference between divine and human love. For God’s love causes the good which He loves in a man: whereas human love does not so always.

Chapter CLI

that sanctifying grace causes in us the love of god

From what has been said it follows that by the assistance of sanctifying grace man is enabled to love God.2 For sanctifying grace is an effect in man of the divine love.3 Now, the proper effect of the divine love in man would seem to be that man loves God. Because the chief thing in the intention of one who loves, is that he be loved in return: since the endeavour of the lover tends especially to draw the beloved to love of him: and unless he accomplishes this, love must cease. Consequently the effect of sanctifying grace in man is that he loves God.

Again. Things that have a common end must be united in so far as they are directed to that end: hence in a state men are joined together in concord that they may ensure the good of the commonwealth; and soldiers, when engaged in battle, must needs be united together, and act in unison in order to achieve the victory which is their common end. Now, the last end to which man is conducted by the assistance of divine grace, is the vision of God in His essence, which vision is proper to God himself: so that this final good is communicated to man by God. Consequently man cannot attain to this end unless he be united to God by conformity of will. And this is the proper effect of love; since it is proper to friends to like and dislike the same things, and to have common joys and griefs.1 Therefore by sanctifying grace man becomes a lover of God: because by it man is directed to an end communicated to him by God.

Also. Since the end and the good is the proper object of the appetite or affections, it follows that man’s affective faculty is perfected chiefly by sanctifying grace which directs man to his last end. Now, the chief perfection of the affective faculty is love. A sign of which is that every affective movement originates in love: for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, save on account of a good that he loves; and in like manner no one shuns, or fears, or grieves, or is angry, except on account of something contrary to that which he loves. Therefore the principal effect of sanctifying grace is that man loves God.

Further. The form by virtue of which a thing is directed to its end, likens that thing somewhat to that end: thus a body by virtue of the form of gravity assumes a certain likeness to and conformity with the place to which its movement tends naturally. Now, we have already shown1 that sanctifying grace is a form residing in man, and directing him to his last end, which is God. Therefore grace makes man like to God. But likeness is the cause of love; because like loves like.2 Therefore grace makes man a lover of God.

Moreover. Operation, to be perfect, must be constant and prompt. Now, this is the chief effect of love, which makes even hard things seem light. Since then sanctifying grace is needed for the perfection of human actions, as stated above,3 it follows of necessity that this same grace produces in us the love of God.

Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us. Moreover our Lord promised the vision of Himself to those who love Him, saying (Jo. 14:21): He that loveth me, shall be loved of My Father: and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him.

It is evident, then, that grace which directs us to that end which is to see God, causes in us the love of God.

Chapter CLII

that grace causes faith in us

Forasmuch as grace causes charity in us,4 it follows that faith also is caused in us by grace.

Because the movement whereby we are directed by grace to our last end, is voluntary and not compulsory, as we have shown.5 Now there cannot be voluntary movement towards the unknown. Consequently, for us to be directed voluntarily to our last end, grace must first of all provide us with knowledge of that end. But this knowledge cannot be one of clear vision, in this state of life, as we have already proved.6 Therefore it must be knowledge by faith.

Moreover. The mode of cognition in every cognitive being follows the mode of that being’s nature: hence the mode of cognition differs in the angel, man and dumb animals, according to the diversity of their several natures, as we have shown.1 Now, that man may attain to his last end, he receives a perfection in addition to and surpassing his nature, namely grace, as we have proved.2 Consequently, it behoves man to receive over and above his natural knowledge, a knowledge surpassing his natural reason. This is the knowledge of faith, which is of things unseen by natural reason.

Again. Whenever a thing is moved by an agent to that which is proper to that agent, the thing moved must needs at the outset be imperfectly subject to the impressions of the agent, such impressions being as it were foreign and improper thereto, until they become proper to it in the term of the movement: thus wood is at first heated by fire, and such heat is not proper to the wood, but something outside its nature; but in the end, when the wood is incandescent, the heat becomes proper and connatural to it. In like manner, when one is taught by a master, at first he must needs receive the master’s ideas, not as understanding them by himself, but as taking them in faith, through their being above his capacity, so to speak: but in the end, when he has been thoroughly taught, he will be able to understand them. Now, as we have shown already,3 we are directed to our last end by the assistance of divine grace. And our last end is the clear vision of the First Truth in itself, as we have proved.4 Therefore, before obtaining this end, man’s mind, with the assistance of divine grace, must needs be subject to God by believing.

Further. At the beginning of this work we set down the advantages for which it is necessary that man should receive the divine truth by believing therein.5 Whence we may conclude that it was necessary for faith to be produced in us by divine grace.

Hence the Apostle says (Ephes. 2:8): By grace you are saved through faith: and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians who said that the beginning of faith in us is not from God, but from ourselves.

Chapter CLIII

that divine grace causes hope in us

In the same way it can be proved that grace must needs cause in us the hope of future bliss.

Because the love which a man has for others, arises from his love for himself, inasmuch as a man looks upon his friend as his other self.1 Now, a man loves himself, in that he wishes good for himself; even as he loves another, in that he wishes good for him. Consequently, a man through having an affection for his own good, is led to have an affection for another’s good. So that when a man hopes for a good from another he is on the way to love him in himself, of whom he hopes some good: for a man is loved in himself, when the lover wills his good, even though he gain nothing from it. Wherefore, since sanctifying grace causes man to love God for himself,2 the consequence is that grace also causes man to hope in God.—Friendship whereby one loves another in himself, although it be not for one’s own profit, nevertheless turns to one’s profit in many ways, in so far as one friend helps another as he would help himself. Consequently, when one man loves another and knows that he is beloved of him, the result is that he has hope of him. Now, grace makes man a lover of God, according to the love of charity, so that at the same time he knows by faith that God already loves him, as expressed by the words of 1 Jo. 4:10: In this is love:3 not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us. The effect, therefore, of the gift of grace is that man hopes in God.—Hence it is evident that, as hope prepares man for true love of God, so conversely by charity man is strengthened in hope.

Moreover. There arises in every lover the desire to be united as far as possible with the beloved: hence nothing gives greater pleasure to friends than living together.1 Since, then, grace makes man a lover of God, it must also make him desire union with God, as far as this is possible. Now, faith which originates from grace,2 affirms it to be possible for man to be united to God in perfect enjoyment wherein beatitude consists. Wherefore the desire of this enjoyment arises in man from his love of God. But the desire of a thing troubles the soul of the desirer unless he have the hope of obtaining it. Accordingly, as grace gives rise in man to the love of God and faith, it was fitting that it should also give rise to the hope of obtaining beatitude in the life to come.

Again. If any difficulty offers itself to those who are being directed to an end desired by them, they are comforted by the hope of obtaining it: thus one puts up with the bitter medicine through the hope of being restored to health. Now, many difficulties have to be faced on the way in which we fare towards beatitude, that is the bourn of all our desires: since virtue, which is the road to beatitude, is about difficult things.3 In order, then, that man might tend to beatitude with a lighter heart and greater readiness, it was necessary to give him the hope of obtaining beatitude.

Further. No man is moved towards an end which he deems impossible to obtain. Hence that a man may proceed towards a certain end, it is necessary for him to think of that end as something possible for him to have: and this thought is afforded by hope. Since, then, man is directed by grace to the last end which is beatitude, it was necessary for the hope of obtaining beatitude to be engraved on man’s thoughts by grace. Hence it is said (1 Pet. 1:3, 4): Who … hath regenerated us unto a lively hope … unto an inheritance incorruptible … reserved in heaven: and (Rom. 8:24): We are saved by hope.

Chapter CLIV

of the gifts of gratuitous grace: wherein it is treated of the divinations of demons

Whereas what things man sees not by himself, he cannot know unless he receive them of one who sees them; and as faith is of things unseen by us: it behoves the things that are of faith to be received from one who sees them himself. Now, this one is God, who comprehends Himself perfectly, and sees His own essence naturally:1 for our faith is of God. Hence the things that we hold by faith must come to us from God. And whereas the things that are of God are enacted in a certain order, as we have shown above,2 it behoved a certain order to be observed in the revelation of those things that are of faith: so that, to wit, some should receive them immediately from God, and others from these, and thus in orderly fashion down to the very last.

Now, wherever there is any kind of order in a number of things the nearer a thing is to the first principle the greater its efficacy. This is to be observed in the order of divine manifestations.3 Because the invisible things to see which is beatitude, and to believe is faith, are revealed first of all to the blessed angels, so that they see them clearly, as we have already said.4

Afterwards, by the ministry of the angels, they are made known to certain men, not so as to be seen clearly, but so as to be known with a certain assurance arising from the divine revelation.

Now, this revelation is made by a certain interior and intellectual light, which raises the mind to the perception of things that it cannot reach by means of its natural light. For just as by its natural light the intelligence is assured of what it knows in that light, for example first principles; so too of the things it knows in a supernatural light is it assured. And this assurance is necessary in order that things known by divine revelation be proposed to other men: for we have no assurance in proffering to others what we do not hold with certainty. Now, in addition to this same light that enlightens the mind inwardly, there are present sometimes in divine revelation, some outward or inward aids to knowledge; as when the words formed by divine power are heard outwardly by sense, or through God’s agency are perceived inwardly by the imagination; or again as when God causes things to be seen outwardly by the eyes, or to be imagined inwardly: from which man, aided by the inward light that is shed on his mind, derives knowledge of divine things. Hence suchlike aids, without the inward light, do not suffice for the knowledge of divine things; whereas the inward light suffices without them. This revelation of the invisible things of God belongs to wisdom, which, properly speaking, is the knowledge of divine things. Wherefore it is said (Wis. 7:27, 28) that divine wisdom through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls: … for God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom: and again (Ecclus. 15:5): The Lord hath filled1 him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.

But whereas the invisible things of God are clearly seen … being understood by the things that are made,2 by divine grace not only are divine things revealed to men, but also some things about creatures; and this apparently belongs to knowledge. Hence it is said (Wis. 7:17): He hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are: to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements. Again the Lord said to Solomon (2 Paralip. 1:12): Wisdom and knowledge are granted to thee. Again, man cannot conveniently communicate his knowledge to others except by speech. Since, then, according to the order established by God, those who receive God’s revelation have to instruct others, it was also necessary that they should receive the grace of the word, in so far as it was required for the profit of those to be instructed. Hence it is said (Isa. 50:4): The Lord hath given me a learned tongue, that I should know how to uphold by word him that is weary. And our Lord said to His disciples (Luke 21:15): I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries will not be able to resist and gainsay.—For this same reason, as long as the truth of faith had to be preached in various countries by a few, certain ones were equipped with the gift of speaking in divers tongues, according to Acts 2:4: They were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak. Since, however, the proffered speech needs confirmation that it may be accepted, unless it be manifest in itself; and whereas things that are of faith are not clear to human reason: it was necessary to provide some means of confirming the utterances of those who preached the faith. But they could not be confirmed by being demonstrated from principles of reason, since matters of faith are above reason. Therefore the preachers’ words needed to be confirmed by some kind of signs, whereby it was made evident that their words were from God, and that the preacher should do such works as healing the sick, and performing other deeds of power, which God alone can do. Hence our Lord, on the point of sending His disciples to preach, said (Matth. 10:8): Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out devils: and (Mark 16:20) it is said: But they, going forth, preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.

There was also another manner of confirmation1 in that when the heralds of truth were found to speak the truth about such hidden things as could subsequently be made manifest, they were believed because they spoke truthfully of things beyond the ken of man. Hence the necessity of the gift of prophecy, whereby through divine revelation they were able to know and announce to others, the things that were to happen, and such things as are commonly hidden from man’s knowledge: so that as they were found to speak the truth in these matters, they were believed in matters of faith. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:24, 25): If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all: (for) the secrets of his heart are made manifest, and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed.

Nevertheless the gift of prophecy were not a sufficient guarantee of faith, unless it be about things which God alone can know: even as miracles are such as God alone can do.1 The like here below are especially our secret thoughts, which God alone can know, as we proved above:2 and future contingencies, which also are a matter of God’s knowledge only, because he sees them in themselves, since to Him they are present by reason of His eternity, as we proved above.3

Some future contingencies, however, can be known by men also: not indeed as future, but as already existing in their causes: for when causes are known, whether in themselves or in certain manifest effects thereof that are called signs, it is possible for men to have foreknowledge of certain future effects. Thus a physician foresees death or health from the state of the forces of nature which he diagnoses from the pulse, urine, and other like signs. Such knowledge of the future is indeed partly certain, and partly uncertain. Because there are some pre-existent causes from which subsequent effects follow of necessity: thus death follows of necessity from the pre-existent composition of contrary elements in the animal. On the other hand, from some pre-existent causes subsequent effects follow, not of necessity, but frequently: thus from the seed of the male being discharged into the matrix, there results a perfect human being in the majority of cases: and yet sometimes monsters are begotten on account of some obstacle hindering the action of the forces of nature. Of the former effects one has certain foreknowledge: but of the latter no knowledge is infallibly certain. On the other hand the foreknowledge of the future, that is acquired from divine revelation by the grace of prophecy, is altogether certain; even as the divine foreknowledge is certain. For God foresees future things not only as in their causes, but infallibly as they are in themselves, as we have already proved.1 Wherefore in the same way prophetic knowledge of the future is given to man together with perfect certitude.—Nor is this certitude incompatible with the contingent nature of future things, as neither is the certitude of God’s knowledge, as was proved above.2

Sometimes, however, future effects are revealed to prophets, not as they are in themselves, but as they are in their causes. And then if the causes are hindered from producing their effects, nothing prevents the prophets’ foretelling from undergoing a change: thus Isaias foretold to the dying Ezechias (Isa. 38:1): Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live, and yet he recovered: and the prophet Jonas foretold (Jonas 3:4) that after forty days Nineveh shall be destroyed, and yet it was not destroyed. Accordingly, Isaias foretold the future death of Ezechias with reference to the relation of his bodily condition and of other inferior causes to that effect; and Jonas foretold the destruction of Nineveh with reference to the exigency of its merits; but in each case the event proved otherwise according to God’s operation of deliverance and healing. Hence prophetic foretelling of the future is a sufficient argument of faith: because, though men know some future things, foreknowledge, such as that of prophecy, of future contingencies has no certitude. For, even if at times a prophet receives a revelation according to the relation of certain causes to a certain effect, nevertheless at the same time, or afterwards, it is revealed to him how the fulfilment of the future effect is to be changed: thus the recovery of Ezechias was revealed to Isaias,3 and the deliverance of the Ninevites to Jonas.4

Now, as we proved above,5 wicked spirits, in the endeavour to corrupt the true of faith: abuse the working of miracles in order to lead men into error, and to weaken the proofs of the true faith: not however by working real miracles, but by doing things which appear to men miraculous. In the same way they abuse the foretellings of prophecy, not indeed by uttering real prophecies, but by foretelling things in accordance with an order of causes unknown to man, so as to appear to foresee future events in themselves. And though contingent effects arise from natural causes, these same spirits, by the acuteness of their intelligence, are able to know better than men when and how the effects of natural causes can be hindered: and so, in foretelling the future, they seem to be more wonderful and truthful than the wisest of men. Now, among natural causes, the highest and furthest removed from our knowledge are the powers of heavenly bodies: and that these are known to the aforesaid spirits as regards the property of their nature, has been shown above.1 Since, then, all bodies in this lower world are ruled through the powers and movement of higher bodies,2 the spirits in question are able, much better than any astrologer, to forecast future winds and storms, changes of weather, and other like events which occur through changes in these lower bodies brought about by the movement of the bodies above. And although heavenly bodies are unable to cause a direct impression on the intellective part of the soul, as we have proved,3 yet many there are who follow the bent of their passions and their bodily inclinations, which the heavenly bodies are clearly able to influence: for none but the wise, who are few, are able to curb these passions by their reason. Hence also they are able to foretell many things regarding human actions: albeit sometimes even they fail in their forecast, on account of free-will.

Moreover when they foretell what they foresee, they do not enlighten the mind, as God does when He reveals anything: for it is not their intention to perfect the human mind unto the knowledge of truth, but on the contrary to turn it away from the truth.

Their forecasts are sometimes connected with the working of the imagination; either during sleep, as when they draw indications of the future from dreams; or in waking, as when people in a trance or a fit foretell certain future events: sometimes their forecast is taken from external signs, for instance, by observing the flight and chattering of birds, by studying the entrails of animals, or the combination of certain dots, and by like practices, all of which seemingly depend on chance: and sometimes from visible apparitions, and foretelling the future in audible words. And although in the last instance it is evident that wicked spirits must intervene, they strive to account for the other cases by referring them to natural causes. For they contend that since a heavenly body conduces by its movement to certain effects in this lower world; by the same agency, there appear signs of these effects in certain things: because different things receive the celestial influence in different ways. Accordingly, say they, the impression made by a heavenly body on one thing may be taken as a sign of the impression made on another. And so they assert that movements which are independent of the reason’s deliberation, such as things seen by dreamers and lunatics, the flight and twittering of birds, and arrangements of dots when made at haphazard, are consequent to the impressions made by a heavenly body. And consequently they say that such things can be signs of the future events that are caused by the heaven’s movement.

Since, however, there is but little reason in all this, we should judge rather that the forecasts made from such signs have their foundation in some intellectual substance, by whose power the aforesaid indeliberate movements are controlled, so as to be in keeping with the reading of the future. And though such things are sometimes controlled by the divine will through the ministry of good spirits, for God reveals many things by means of dreams, for instance to Pharaoh1 and Nabuchodonosor;2 and in the words of Solomon:3 Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord: yet they do result sometimes from the operation of wicked spirits; for such is the teaching of holy doctors, and the opinion even of the heathens. Thus Valerius Maximus4 says that the observing of omens and dreams and the like belongs to a religion wherein idols are worshipped. Hence in the old Law, all these were forbidden together with idolatry, for it is said (Deut. 18:9–11): Lest thou have a mind to imitate the abominations of these nations, who, to wit, worshipped idols; neither let be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire; or that consulteth soothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens; neither let there be any wizard, nor charmer; nor any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. Prophecy bears witness1 also in another way to the preaching of the faith: when, namely, the preacher proclaims as articles of faith, events that take place in the course of time, such as Christ’s birth, passion and resurrection, and the like: and lest people think such things to be invented by the preacher, or to have happened by chance, they are proved to have been foretold by the prophets a long time in advance. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 1:1–3): Paul a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated unto the gospel of God, which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy scriptures, concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh.

Next in rank2 to those who receive revelation from God immediately, another degree of grace is necessary. For since God vouchsafes revelation to man not only for the present time, but also for the instruction of all in the time to come, it was necessary that the things revealed should be delivered not only by word of mouth to the present generation, but also by the written word for the instruction of the future generation. Hence the need for someone to interpret these writings. And this must be a divine grace, even as revelation itself was made by the grace of God. Wherefore it is said (Gen. 40:8): Doth not interpretation belong to God?

Then comes the last degree; of those, namely, who faithfully believe the things to others revealed, and by others interpreted:3 and that this is God’s gift has been shown above.1 Nevertheless, whereas the wicked spirits do works like those by which faith is confirmed, both in working signs and in revealing the future, as stated above;2 lest men be deceived by such things and believe in falsehoods, it is necessary that, by the aid of divine grace, they be instructed in the discerning of suchlike spirits: according to 1 Jo. 4:1: Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God.

These effects of grace intended for the instruction and confirmation of faith are enumerated by the Apostle, 1 Cor. 12:8–10, where he says: To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom: and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit: to another, faith in the same Spirit: to another, the grace of healing in one Spirit: to another, the working of miracles: to another, prophecy: to another, the discerning of spirits: to another, divers kinds of tongues: to another, interpretation of speeches.

Hereby we refute the error of certain Manicheans, who deny that miracles worked on bodies are done by God.—Likewise we refute the error of those who said that the prophets did not speak by the Spirit of God.—We also refute the error of Priscilla and Montanus, who said that the prophets, like men in a trance, understood not what they said. For this is incompatible with divine revelation, whereby the mind chiefly is enlightened.

Now we must observe a certain difference in the aforesaid3 effects of grace. For though the name of grace befits them all, in that they are bestowed gratis, without any preceding merit: the effect alone of love deserves furthermore the name of grace for this other reason, that it makes man pleasing (gratum) to God: for it is said (Prov. 8:17): I love them that love Me. Consequently faith and hope, and other things directed to faith, can be in sinners who are not pleasing to God: but love alone is the peculiar gift of the righteous, because he that abides in charity, abideth in God, and God in him (1 Jo. 4:16). But there is yet another difference to be noticed in the aforesaid effects of grace. Because some of them are necessary to man during his whole life, seeing that without them he cannot be saved: for instance, faith, hope, charity, and obedience to God’s commandments. For such effects man needs to have certain habitual perfections within him, in order that when it is time for him to do so, he may be able to act according to them.—Whereas the other effects are necessary, not during the whole of man’s life, but at certain times and places: such as working miracles, foretelling the future, and so forth. For the like habitual perfections are not bestowed, but certain impressions are made by God which cease as soon as the act ceases; and must be repeated when there is need for the act to be repeated: thus the prophet’s mind is enlightened with a new light in each revelation; and in each miraculous work there must be a renewal of the activity of the divine power.

Chapter CLV

that man needs the divine aid in order to persevere in good

Man also needs the aid of divine grace in order to persevere in good.

Because everything that is changeable of itself, needs the aid of an immovable mover, in order to stand fast to one thing. Now, man is changeable from evil to good, and from good to evil. Therefore, that he may persevere unchangeably in good, in a word, that he may persevere, he needs the divine assistance.

Again. Man needs the aid of divine grace for that which exceeds the strength of free-will. But the free-will is not sufficiently strong to persevere in good to the end. This is proved as follows. The power of the free-will extends to things which are a matter of choice: and that which is chosen is some particular thing to be done. A thing to be done in particular is something here and now. Therefore the power of the free-will is confined to something to be done now. But perseverance does not denote something to be done now, but a continuous operation that lasts all the time. Consequently this effect, namely to persevere in good, is above the power of the free-will. Therefore man needs the aid of divine grace, to persevere in good.

Besides. Although, by his will and faculty of self-determination, man is master of his actions, he is not master of his natural powers. And, consequently, though he is free to will or not to will a thing, in willing he is unable to make his will so will a thing that it stands fast to what it wills or chooses. Yet this is requisite for perseverance: namely, that the will stand fast in the good. Therefore perseverance is not in the power of the free-will: and consequently man needs the help of divine grace, in order to persevere.

Moreover. If there be several successive agents, one of which, namely, acts after the action of another: the continuation of their activity cannot result from any one of them, since none of them is always in action: nor can it result from them all, because they do not act together. Consequently it must result from some higher agent that is always in action. Thus the Philosopher (8 Phys. vi.) proves that the continuity of generation in animals is caused by some everlasting higher being. Now, let us suppose a man to be persevering in good. It follows that in him there are many movements of the free-will tending to the good, one after the other, until the end. Hence no one of these movements can be the cause of this continuity of good, namely perseverance; because none of them lasts continually. Nor can they all together be the cause of it: since, as they are not together, they cannot together be the cause of anything. Therefore this continuity is caused by some higher being: and consequently man needs the aid of grace from above in order to persevere in good.

Further. If many things be ordered to one end, their whole order, until they reach the end, is from the first agent directing them to the end. Now, in the man who perseveres in good there are many movements and actions tending to one end. Consequently the whole order of these movements and actions must needs be directed by the first director to that end. But it has been shown above1 that men are directed to the last end by the aid of divine grace. Therefore in him who perseveres in good the whole order and continuation of good works is through the assistance of divine grace.

Hence it is said (Philip. 1:6): He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus: and (1 Pet. 5:10): The God of all grace, who hath called us unto His eternal glory … after you have suffered a little, will Himself perfect you, and confirm you, and establish you.

Moreover we find in Holy Writ many prayers by which perseverance is besought of God, for instance in Ps. 16:5, Perfect thou my goings in Thy paths, that my footsteps be not moved; and 2 Thess. 2:15, 16, God our Father … exhort your hearts, and confirm you in every good work and word. The same petition is made in the Lord’s prayer, especially when we say, Thy kingdom come: for God’s kingdom will not come to us, except we persevere in good. Now, it would be absurd to ask of God that whereof He is not the giver. Therefore man’s perseverance is from God.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who said that the free-will suffices for man to persevere in good, and that he needs not the assistance of grace in order to do so.

It must be observed, however, that since even one who has grace, asks of God that he may persevere in good; just as the free-will is not sufficient for this effect which is perseverance in good, without the external aid of God, so neither is an infused habit sufficient for the purpose. Because the habits that are infused into us by God, in the present state of life, do not wholly remove from the free-will its proneness to evil: albeit they do give the free-will a certain stability in good. Hence, when we say that man needs the help of grace for final perseverance, we do not mean that, in addition to habitual grace previously infused in order that he may do good works, he needs another grace besides in order to persevere: but we mean that even when he has all the infused gratuitous habits, man still needs the assistance of divine providence governing him externally.

Chapter CLVI

that he who falls away from grace by sin, can recover again by means of grace

Hence it may be shown that by the assistance of grace, even when a man has not persevered, and has fallen into sin, he can be restored to good.

For it belongs to the same force to maintain a man’s health, and to mend it when broken: thus health is maintained in the body by the forces of nature, and by the same forces is restored when it is impaired. Now, as we have shown,1 man perseveres in good by the aid of divine grace. Therefore, if he has fallen through sin, he can be restored by the same assistance of grace.

Again. An agent that requires no disposition in the subject, is able to produce its effect in a subject no matter how disposed: and for this reason God, who in His action requires no disposition in the subject, is able to produce a natural form in a subject, without that subject being thereto disposed: as when He gives sight to the blind, and life to the dead, and so forth. Moreover, as He requires no natural disposition in a corporeal subject, so neither does He require merit in the will, in order to bestow grace, since this is given apart from merit, as we have proved.2 Therefore God is able to give man sanctifying grace, whereby sins are taken away, even after his fall from grace by sin.

Further. Those things alone is man unable to recover after their loss, which he acquires in birth, such as his natural powers and limbs: because man cannot be born again.3 Now, the aid of grace is given to man not in birth, but when he is already in existence. Therefore after losing grace through sin, he can regain it so that his sins be wiped out.

Moreover. Grace is an habitual disposition in the soul, as we have shown.4 But habits acquired by means of acts, if they be lost, can be acquired anew by means of the acts whereby they were acquired. Much more, therefore, if we lose the grace which unites us to God and frees us from sin, can we regain it by the divine operation.

Moreover. In God’s works, as in nature’s, nothing is without a purpose; for even nature owes this to God. Now it would be useless for a thing to be moved, unless it were able to reach the end of the movement. Hence that which has a natural aptitude for being moved towards a certain end, must needs be able to reach that end. Now, after man has fallen into sin, as long as he remains in this state of life, he retains the aptitude for being moved to good: this is indicated by his desire for good, and his grief for evil, which remain in him after he has sinned. Therefore after he has sinned it is possible for man to return once more to good: and this is the effect of grace in man.

Further. In all nature there is not to be found a passive potentiality that is not reducible to actuality by some natural active power. Much less therefore is there in the human soul a potentiality that cannot be brought to act by the active power of God. Now, even after sin, the human soul retains the potentiality for good: because sin does not deprive the soul of its natural powers whereby it is ordered to its good. Therefore, by God’s power it can be restored to good, and consequently, by the aid of grace, man can receive forgiveness of his sins. Hence it is said (Isa. 1:18): If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as snow: and (Prov. 10:12): Charity covereth all sins. This also we daily ask not in vain of the Lord, when we say: Forgive us our trespasses.

Hereby we refute the error of the Novatians who said that a man cannot obtain forgiveness for the sins committed by him after Baptism.

Chapter CLVII

that man cannot be freed from sin save by grace

From the same premisses it can be shown that man cannot arise from mortal sin except by grace.

Because by mortal sin man turns away from his last end: and by grace alone is man directed towards his last end.1 Therefore by grace alone can he arise from sin.

Again. Offence is not removed save by love. Now, by mortal sin man offends God: for it is written that God hateth sinners,2 inasmuch as it is His will to deprive them of the last end, which He prepares for those whom He loves. Therefore man cannot arise from sin except by grace, which causes a kind of friendship between God and man.

The same conclusion follows from all the arguments given above3 to prove the necessity of grace.

Hence it is said (Isa. 43:25): I, even I, am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake: and (Ps. 84:3): Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of Thy people; Thou hast covered all their sins.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians who said that man can arise from sin by his free-will.

Chapter CLVIII

how man is freed from sin

Whereas man cannot return to one of two opposites unless he go away from the other; in order by the aid of grace to return to the state of righteousness, he must withdraw from sin whereby he had abandoned the path of rectitude. And since it is chiefly by his will that man is directed to his ultimate end and turned away from it, it is necessary that he not only withdraw from sin in his external actions, by ceasing to sin, but also that he withdraw by his will, in order to rise from sin by grace. Now man withdraws from sin by his will, in repenting of the past sin, and purposing to avoid it for the future. Therefore in order to rise from sin man must both repent of past sins and purpose to avoid future sins. For did he not propose to sin no more, sin would not, in itself, be contrary to his will. And if he were willing to sin no more without repenting of his past sin, the sin itself that he committed would not be contrary to his will.—Now, the movement of recession from a thing is contrary to the movement of approach, as whitening is contrary to blackening. Hence in withdrawing from sin the will must take the contrary road to that which led it into sin. Now, it was led into sin by the desire and pleasure of things beneath it. Therefore it needs to turn away from sin by certain punishments, whereby it suffers for having sinned: for even as the will was drawn by pleasure to consent to sin, so by punishment it is confirmed in the detestation of sin.

Again. Fear of the whip deters even dumb animals from their greatest delights.1 Now the man who arises from sin must not only detest his past sin, but also avoid future sin. It is, therefore, right that he should be punished for his sin, that he may be the more strengthened in his purpose to avoid sin.

Besides. The things we acquire with toil and pain are dearer to us, and we are more careful about keeping them: thus men who have enriched themselves by their own labours spend less than those who have received their riches from their parents or in any other way without labour. Now for the man who arises from sin it is most necessary that he be most careful to keep in the state of grace, which he carelessly lost by sinning. Therefore it is fitting that he suffer labour and pain for the sins he committed.

Further. The order of justice demands that punishment be awarded for sin. Now, the wisdom of God’s government appears in the maintenance of order among things. Therefore it belongs to the manifestation of God’s goodness and glory that punishment be the reward of sin. But the sinner by sinning acts against the divinely established order, for he transgresses the laws of God. Therefore it is right that he make compensation by punishing in himself that which had previously sinned: for thus he will be wholly freed of his disorder.

It is clear then that after man has by grace obtained the forgiveness of sin, and been restored to the state of grace, he remains, by virtue of God’s justice, bound to suffer punishment for the sin he has committed. And if he, of his own accord, take this punishment on himself, he is said thereby to satisfy God: inasmuch as with labour and pain he follows the divinely established order by punishing himself for his sin, which same order by sinning he of his own accord had abandoned.—On the other hand if he fails to take this punishment on himself, since the things subject to divine providence cannot remain in disorder, this punishment will be inflicted on him by God. Nor will this punishment come under the name of satisfaction, since it will not be of the sufferer’s choice: but it will be described as purgatorial, because he will be purged, as it were, by another punishing him, and whatever was disorderly in him will be brought back to the right order.—Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:31, 32): If we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But whilst we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord; that we be not condemned with this world.

We must observe, however, that when the mind turns away from sin, it is possible for its detestation of sin to be so strong, and for it to cling so closely to God, that there remains no obligation to punishment. For, as may be gathered from what has been said, the punishment that one suffers after sin has been forgiven, is necessary in order that the mind may adhere to good more firmly, through being chastised by punishment; for punishment is a kind of medicine; and again that the order of justice may be maintained by the sinner being punished. Now, the love of God suffices to strengthen man’s mind in good, especially if it be vehement; and when the intense detestation of past sin causes great sorrow. Consequently great love of God, and great hatred of past sin remove the need of punishment whether satisfactory or purgatorial: and even if the vehemence be not so great as to exclude all punishment, yet the greater the vehemence, the less punishment will be required.

Now, what we do by our friends, we do apparently by ourselves:1 because friendship, especially the love of charity, binds two persons together as one. Wherefore as a man can satisfy God by himself, so can he by another; especially when there is urgent need for it. For a man looks upon the punishment which his friend suffers for his sake, as though he suffered it himself: and so he is not without punishment, seeing that he suffers with his suffering friend, and he suffers all the more, according as he is the cause of his friend’s suffering. Again, the love of charity in him who suffers for his friend makes the satisfaction more acceptable to God, than if he suffered for himself: for the former comes of the eagerness of charity, but the latter comes of necessity. Hence we infer that one man may satisfy for another, so long as both remain in charity: wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 6:2): Bear ye one another’s burdens, and so ye shall fulfil the law of Christ.

Chapter CLIX

that, although man cannot be converted to god without god’s grace, yet it is reasonably imputed to him, if he be not converted

Since, without the aid of divine grace, man cannot be directed to his last end, as we have shown in the preceding chapters;2 and seeing that without it man can have none of the things required that he may tend to his last end, such as faith, hope, love, and perseverance; someone might think that man is not to be blamed if he lack the things in question: and especially because man cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: since no one is blamed for what depends on another. But, if this be granted, it is clear that several absurdities follow, For it would follow that a man without faith, or hope, or love of God, or perseverance in good, is not deserving of punishment: whereas it is said expressly (Jo. 3:36): He that believeth not in the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.—And since no man obtains beatitude without these things, it would also follow that there are some who neither obtain beatitude from God, nor suffer punishment from Him. Whereas the contrary is proved from the words of Matth. 25:34–41, where we are told that to all who are present at God’s judgement it will be said, Come … possess the kingdom prepared for you; or Depart … into everlasting fire.

In order to clear away this doubt, we must take note that, though a man is unable, by the movement of his free-will, to merit or acquire the divine grace, nevertheless he can hinder himself from receiving it. For it is said of some (Job 21:14): Who have said to God: Depart from us; we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways: and (ibid. 24:13): They have been rebellious to the light. And since it is in the power of the free-will, to hinder or not to hinder the reception of divine grace, he who places an obstacle in the way of his receiving grace is deservedly to be blamed. Because God, for His own part, is prepared to give grace to all, for He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. 2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace, who place in themselves an obstacle to grace: thus he who shuts his eyes while the sun is shining is to be blamed if an accident occurs, although he is unable to see unless the sun’s light enable him to do so.

Chapter CLX

that a man who is in sin cannot avoid sin without grace

The statement that it is in the power of the free-will to offer no obstacle to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power retains its integrity. If however, through some previous disorder, it has turned aside to evil ways, it will not be wholly in its power to place no obstacles to grace. For though man, by his own power, is able to refrain at a certain moment, from a particular sinful act: yet if he be left to himself for long, he will fall into sin, whereby an obstacle to grace is set up. Because when the human mind has turned aside from the path of rectitude, it is clear that it has abandoned the direction to its due end. Consequently that which should stand first in its affections, as its last end, becomes less loved than the thing to which the mind has inordinately turned as though it were its last end. Hence whenever something presents itself that is suitable for an inordinate end, and incompatible with the right end, it will be chosen, unless the mind be brought into right order, so that it places its last end before all: and this is the effect of grace. But as long as a thing is chosen that is incompatible with the last end, an obstacle is opposed to grace which directs us to our end. Wherefore it is evident that, after having sinned, man cannot refrain from all sin, before being restored to the right order by grace.

Again. Once the mind is inclined to something, it is no longer equally disposed towards either of two opposites, but is more disposed to that one to which it is inclined. Now, the mind chooses the thing to which it is more disposed, unless through the reason discussing the matter, it become disinclined thereto from motives of precaution: hence it is chiefly under unforeseen circumstances that a person’s conduct is a sign of his interior disposition.1 Now, it is not possible for a man’s mind to be continually so wide awake as to deliberate about everything that is to be willed or done. Hence it follows that sometimes the mind chooses the object to which it is inclined, because the inclination remains. And so, if it be inclined to sin, it will not stay long without sinning, through placing an obstacle to grace, unless it be restored to the state of rectitude.

To this also the impulse of the bodily passions conduces; also objects of sensible appetite, and occasions of evil-doing: for by these things man is easily incited to sin, unless he be held in check by a firm adherence to his last end, which is the effect of grace.

Hence we can see the absurdity of the opinion of the Pelagians, who held that man, while in a state of sin, is able to avoid sin without grace. The contrary of this may be gathered from the petition of the Psalm (70:9): When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me. Moreover our Lord taught us to pray: And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.

However, albeit those who are in sin cannot, of their own power, avoid placing an obstacle to grace, as we have proved, unless they be assisted by prevenient grace; nevertheless this is imputed to them as sin, because the defect in question remains in them through their preceding fault: even so a drunken man is not excused from murder committed through his being in a drunken state, which he incurred through his own fault.

Moreover, although a man who is in sin, has it not in his power to avoid sin altogether, yet it is in his power to avoid a particular sin at a given moment, as we have said. Hence, whatever sin he commits, he commits it deliberately. Consequently it is not undeservedly imputed to him as a sin.

Chapter CLXI

that god delivers some from sin, and leaves some in sin

Now, though he that sins places an obstacle to grace, and so far as the order of things demands, ought not to receive grace: yet, since God can act independently of the order implanted in things,1 as when He enlightens the blind, or raises the dead, sometimes of the richness of his bounty, He comes to the assistance of those who put an obstacle in the way of grace, turns them from evil, and converts them to good. And even as He enlightens not all the blind, nor heals all the sick, in order that in those whom He restores the work of His power may be evidenced, and in the others, the order of nature be maintained; so too, He comes not to the assistance of all who hinder grace, that they may turn away from evil, and be converted to good; but of some, in whom He wishes His mercy to appear; while in the others the order of justice is made manifest. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 9:22): God willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory. And if of those who are held in thrall by sins God converts some by His prevenient grace, while others He suffers or allows, in the ordinary way, to continue sinning, we are not to ask why He converts certain ones and not others. For this depends on His simple will: even as it came from His simple will, that whereas all things were made out of nothing, some were made to rank higher than others: and just as it depends on the simple will of the craftsman that of the same matter similarly conditioned, He make some vessels for dignified purposes, and some for common purposes. Hence the apostle says (Rom. 9:21): Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?

Hereby we refute the error of Origen who said that these are converted to God and not those, on account of certain works done by their souls before they were united to bodies. In the Second Book,2 we gave more particular attention to the refutation of this opinion.

Chapter CLXII

that god is not the cause of any man sinning

Although God converts not certain sinners to Himself, but leaves them in their sins, as they deserve to be, yet He does not lead them to sin.

For man sins through wandering away from Him who is his last end, as we have already shown.1 Now, as every agent acts for an end proper and proportionate to it, it is impossible that God, by His own action, turn anyone away from his last end, which is God. Therefore it is impossible that God make any man sin.

Again. Good cannot be a cause of evil. Now sin is man’s evil: for it is contrary to man’s proper good, which is to live according to reason. Therefore God cannot be the cause of a man sinning.

Further. All human wisdom and goodness flow from the divine wisdom and goodness, and are a kind of likeness thereof. Now it is incompatible with human wisdom and goodness, to make a man sin. Much more therefore is it incompatible with divine wisdom.

Moreover. All sin arises from a fault in the proximate agent, and not from the influence of the first agent: thus the fault of limping is due to a defect in the tibia, and not to the motive power; to which, however, is due whatever there is of the perfection of movement in limping. Now, the proximate agent in human sin is the will. Therefore the defect of sin arises from man’s will and not from God, who is the first agent: although whatever pertains to the perfection of action in the sinful act is due to Him.

Hence it is said (Ecclus. 15:12): Say not: He hath caused me to err: for He hath no need of wicked men: and further on (verse 21): He hath commanded no man to do wickedly, and He hath given to no man license to sin. Also (James 1:13): Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils.

There are, however, a few passages in Scripture which would seem to indicate that, to some, God is the cause of their sinning. For it is said (Exod. 10:1): I have hardened Pharaoh’s heart and the heart of his servants: and (Isa. 6:10): Blind the heart of this people, make their ears heavy: lest they see with their eyes … and be converted, and I heal them: and (ibid. 63:17): Thou hast made us to err from Thy ways: … thou hast hardened our heart, that we should not fear Thee. Again it is said (Rom. 1:28): God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. All these passages are to be understood in the sense that God does not assist some to avoid sin, whereas He does assist others.

This assistance is not only the infusion of grace, but also external protection whereby occasions of sin are warded off by divine providence, and incentives to sin restrained. God also assists man against sin by the natural light of reason and the other natural goods which He bestows on man. Hence when He withdraws these aids from some men, as their actions merit, according to the demands of His justice, He is said to harden their hearts or blind their eyes, or deal with them in some other way as described in the passages above quoted.

Chapter CLXIII

of predestination, reprobation, and the divine election

Whereas we have proved1 that by the divine operation some are with the assistance of grace directed to their last end, while others fail to reach their last end through being deprived of grace: and since all that God does has been foreseen and ordered from eternity by His wisdom, as we have proved:2 it follows of necessity that the aforesaid distinction among men has been ordered by God from eternity. Inasmuch as from eternity He has preordained some to be directed to their last end, He is said to have predestined them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Ephes. 1:5): Who hath predestined us unto the adoption of children … according to the purpose of his will.—Those to whom from eternity He has decreed not to give grace, He is said to have reprobated, or to have hated, according to the words of Malachi 2, 3, I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.—By reason of this very distinction, in that He has reprobated some and predestined others, we have the divine election, of which it is said (Ephes. 1:4): He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.

Wherefore it is clear that predestination, election and reprobation form a part of divine providence, in reference to man’s direction to his last end by divine providence. Consequently it may be shown that predestination and election do not involve necessity, for the same reasons as were employed to show that divine providence does not deprive things of their contingent nature.1

That predestination and election are not founded on any human merits may be made clear, not only from the fact that God’s grace, which is an effect of predestination, is not preceded by merits, but itself precedes all human merits, as we have proved:2 but also from the fact that the will and providence of God are the first cause of whatever is done; and nothing can be the cause of the divine will and providence,3 although among the effects of providence, as also of predestination, one may be the cause of another. For, as the apostle says, WHO HATH FIRST GIVEN HIM, AND RECOMPENSE SHALL BE MADE HIM? FOR OF HIM, AND IN HIM, AND BY HIM ARE ALL THINGS: TO HIM BE HONOUR AND GLORY FOR EVER. AMEN.

Chapter I

foreword

Lo, these things are said in part, of his ways: and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of his word, who shall be able to behold the thunder of his greatness? (Job 26:14).

For as much as the human intellect acquires knowledge in a manner conformable with its nature, it cannot by itself arrive at an intuitive knowledge of the divine substance in itself, since the latter infinitely transcends the whole range of things sensible, nay all other beings whatsoever.

Nevertheless, seeing that man’s perfect good consists in his knowing God in some way, lest so noble a creature should seem to be utterly void of purpose, through being unable to obtain its own end, man has been given the means of rising to the knowledge of God. For, since all the perfections of things come down from God the summit of all perfection, man begins from the lowest things and rising by degrees advances to the knowledge of God: thus too, in corporeal movements, the way down is the same as the way up, and they differ only as regards their beginning and end.

Now this descent of perfections from God presents a twofold aspect. In the first we look at it from the viewpoint of the origin of things: since divine wisdom, that there might be perfection in things, established a certain order among them, so that the universe might be made up of the highest as well as the lowest things. The second aspect is that of the things considered in themselves; for, since causes rank higher than effects, the things caused first fall short of the first cause, namely God, while they transcend their own effects, and so on until we come to those things that are caused last. And because in God, the summit of all things, there is found the most perfect unity; and since the more a thing is one, the greater its power and worth, it follows that the further we recede from the first principle, the more do we find things to be diversified and varied. Consequently the things that proceed from God must needs derive unity from their principle, and multiplicity from the ends to which they are ordained. Accordingly from the diversity of things we consider the diversity of ways, as beginning from one principle and terminating in different things.

Wherefore our intellect is able to mount by these ways to the knowledge of God; and yet by reason of the weakness of our intellect we are unable to know perfectly the very ways themselves. Because, as our senses, wherein our knowledge begins, are directed to exterior accidents, such as colour, smell, and the like, which are by themselves sensible, the intellect is scarcely able through suchlike externals to arrive at the knowledge of what lies within, even in those things whose accidents it grasps perfectly through the senses. Much less, therefore, will it be able to succeed in comprehending the nature of those things, of whose accidents but few can be grasped by the senses, and still less the nature of those things whose accidents cannot be grasped, although it may be partly gathered from certain effects that fall short of those things. But, even though the very natures of things were known to us, nevertheless their order, in so much as by divine providence they are both referred one to another and directed to their end, could be but little known to us, since we cannot succeed in knowing the purpose of divine providence.

Wherefore, if the ways themselves are known by us but imperfectly, how can they serve us as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge of their principle, which transcends them out of all proportion? Even if we knew those same ways perfectly, not yet should we have perfect knowledge of their principle.

Since then it was but a meagre knowledge of God that man was able to obtain in the above ways by a kind of intellectual insight, God of His overflowing goodness, in order that man’s knowledge of Him might have greater stability, revealed to man certain things about Himself which surpass the human intelligence. In this revelation a certain order is observed, in keeping with human nature, so that the imperfect leads to the perfect, as happens in other things subject to movement.

Accordingly, at first, these things are revealed to man, yet so that he understands them not, but merely believes them as things heard by him, because his intellect, in this state of life wherein it is connected with sensibles, is utterly unable to rise so as to behold such things as transcend all proportion to the senses: but, when freed from this connection with the senses, then it will be raised so as to behold the things revealed.

Hence man’s knowledge of divine things is threefold. The first is when man, by the natural light of reason, rises through creatures to the knowledge of God. The second is when the divine truth which surpasses the human intelligence comes down to us by revelation, yet not as shown to him that he may see it, but as expressed in words so that he may hear it. The third is when the human mind is raised to the perfect intuition of things revealed.

This threefold knowledge is indicated by the words of Job quoted above.—The words, These things are said in part of his ways refer to the knowledge in which our intellect rises to the knowledge of God by the way of creatures. And because we know these ways but imperfectly, he rightly adds in part: since we know in part, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:9). The words that follow, And seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of his word, refer to the second knowledge, wherein divine things are revealed to our belief by way of speech: because faith, as it is said, is by hearing, and hearing is by the word of Christ,1 of which it is also said (Jo. 17:17): Sanctify them in truth. Thy word is truth. Wherefore, since the revealed truth in divine things is offered not to our sight but to our belief, he rightly says we have heard. And whereas this imperfect knowledge flows from that perfect knowledge whereby the divine truth is seen in itself, when revealed to us by God by means of the angels who see the face of the Father, the expression drop is appropriate: hence it is said (Joel 3:18): In that day the mountains shall drop down sweetness. But since not all the mysteries which the angels and blessed know through seeing them in the first truth, are revealed to us, but only a certain few, he says pointedly a little. For it is said (Ecclus. 43:35, 36): Who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning? There are many things hidden from us, that are greater than these: for we have seen but a few of his works. Again the Lord said to his disciples (Jo. 16:12): I have yet many things to say to you: but you cannot bear them now. Moreover these few things that are revealed to us are proposed to us figuratively and obscurely, so that only the studious can succeed in understanding them, while others revere them as things occult, and so that unbelievers are unable to deride them. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner; wherefore Job adds significantly the word scarce, to indicate difficulty.—When he goes on to say, Who shall be able to behold the thunder of his greatness? he is referring to the third knowledge, whereby the first truth shall be known as an object not of belief but of vision, for we shall see him as he is (1 Jo. 3:2), wherefore he says behold. Nor shall a small portion of the divine mysteries be perceived, but the divine majesty itself shall be seen, and the entire perfection of good things: hence the Lord said to Moses (Exod 33:19): I will show thee all good; wherefore he says rightly greatness. Nor will the truth be revealed to man obscurely, but made clearly manifest: wherefore our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. 17:25): The hour cometh when I will no more speak to you in proverbs, but will show you plainly of the Father; hence the word thunder is significant as indicating manifestation.

Now the passage quoted is suitable to our purpose: because hitherto we have spoken of divine things, in as much as natural reason is able to arrive at the knowledge of them through creatures; imperfectly however and as far as its own capacity allows, so that we can say with Job: Lo, these things are said in part, of his ways.

It remains then for us to speak of those things that God has proposed to us to be believed, and which surpass the human intelligence. In what manner we are to proceed in this matter we are taught by the words quoted above. For seeing that we scarce hear the truth in the words of Holy Writ, coming down to us like a little drop, and since, in this state of life, no man is able to behold the thunder of His greatness, we must proceed in such sort that the things delivered to us in the words of Holy Writ shall serve as principles. Thus we shall endeavour in some fashion to grasp what is delivered to us in a hidden manner by the aforesaid words, and to defend them from the attacks of unbelievers; yet so as not to presume that we understand them perfectly. For such things are to be proved by the authority of Holy Writ, and not by natural reason: and yet we must show that they are not opposed to natural reason, so as to defend them from the attacks of unbelievers. This manner of procedure has in fact already been decided on at the outset of this work. And since natural reason rises to the knowledge of God through creatures, while on the other hand the knowledge of God by faith comes down to us by divine revelation, and since the way of ascent is the same as that of descent, we must needs proceed by the same way in those things above reason which are an object of faith, as that which we followed hitherto in those matters concerning God which we investigated by reason.

Accordingly we shall treat in the first place of those things concerning God which are above reason and are proposed to our belief, such as belief in the Trinity (Ch. ii–xxvi).

Secondly we shall treat of those things above reason that have been done by God, such as the work of the Incarnation and things that follow in sequence thereto (Ch. xxvii–lxxviii).

Thirdly we shall treat of those things above reason to which we look forward in man’s last end, such as the resurrection and glory of the body, the eternal happiness of souls, and matters connected therewith (Ch. lxxix–xcvii).

Chapter II

that in god there are generation, paternity, and filiation

Let us then commence our treatise with the mystery of divine generation, and lay down first of all what we must hold according to the teaching of Holy Writ: after which we shall put forward the arguments set up by unbelievers in opposition to the truth of faith; by answering which we shall ensure the purpose of this treatise.

Accordingly Holy Writ delivers to us the names of paternity and filiation in God, when it declares Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, and this occurs very often in the New Testament. For it is said (Matth. 11:17): No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son. Again Mark begins his gospel with the words: The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, Son of God: and John the Evangelist says this frequently: for it is said (3:35): The Father loveth the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand, and (5:21): As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life; so also the Son giveth life to whom he will. Again the Apostle Paul frequently makes use of similar expressions: thus he says (Rom. 1:1–3): Separated unto the gospel of God, which he had promised before by his prophets in the holy scripture, concerning his Son, and (Heb. 1:1–2): God who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son. This is also expressed, albeit less frequently, in the writings of the Old Testament, for it is written (Prov. 30:4): What is his name, and what is the name of his Son if thou knowest? and we read (Ps. 2:7): The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son, and again (Ps. 88:27): He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father. And though some would twist the last two passages into a different meaning, so that the words The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son be referred to David himself; and the words He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father be ascribed to Solomon, the context in each passage shows the case to be wholly otherwise. For neither are the succeeding words applicable to David, This day have I begotten thee, nor again the words that follow, I will give thee the Gentiles for thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession, since his kingdom did not extend to the utmost parts of the earth, as attested by the story of the Books of Kings. Nor again can the words He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father be applied to Solomon, since the text goes on (verse 30): I will make his seed to endure for evermore, and his throne as the days of heaven. Hence we are given to understand that since in the passages quoted certain things may apply to David and Solomon, and some things not at all, these words are said of David and Solomon, according to the custom of Scripture, as figures of someone else in whom the whole passage is fulfilled.

And seeing that the names Father and Son are consequent to some sort of generation, Scripture has not failed to mention the name of the divine generation. For in the psalm, as we have remarked, we read: This day have I begotten thee, and it is also written (Prov. 8:24, 35): The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived … before the hills I was brought forth, or, according to another reading,1 Before the hills, the Lord begot me. It is also said (Isa. 66:9): Shall not I that make others to bring forth children, myself bring forth? saith the Lord. Shall I that give generation to others, be barren? saith the Lord thy God. And though one might say that this should be referred to the multiplication of the children of Israel after their return from captivity into their own land, seeing that it was said before (verse 8): Sion hath been in labour and hath brought forth her children, yet this does not conflict with our purpose. For in whatever sense the text be taken, the argument that is quoted as urged by God remains firm and stable, namely, that if He gives generation to others, He himself should not be barren. Nor would it be becoming that He who makes others to beget in reality, Himself should beget, not really, but figuratively; since a thing should be more excellent in the cause than in the effect, as we have proved above.2 Moreover it is said (Jo. 1:14): We have seen his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father, and again (verse 18): The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. Again Paul says (Heb. 1:6): When he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith: Let all the angels of God adore him.

Chapter III

that the son of god is god

We must also observe that Holy Writ employs the aforesaid expressions to denote the creation of things: for it is said (Job 38:28, 29): Who is the father of rain? or who begot the drops of dew? Out of whose womb came the ice? and the frost from heaven, who hath gendered it? Lest, therefore, the words paternity, filiation, and generation should convey nothing but the idea of the efficacy of the creation, the authority of Scripture does not omit to declare the Godhead of Him whom it describes as son and begotten, so that the aforesaid generation denotes something more than creation. For it is said (Jo. 1:1): In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. And that the name Word designates the Son is shown from what follows, for he adds: And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us: and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father. Again Paul says (Tit. 3:4): When the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour appeared. Nor did the Scripture of the Old Testament leave this unsaid, since it calls Christ by the name of God: for it is said (Ps. 44:7, 8): Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: the sceptre of thy kingdom is a sceptre of uprightness. Thou hast loved justice, and hatedst iniquity: and that these words refer to Christ is clear from what follows: Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows. It is also written (Isa. 9:6): For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us: and the government is upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace. Accordingly we are taught from Holy Writ that the Son of God, begotten of God, is God. And Peter confessed that Jesus Christ is the Son of God when he said (Matth. 16:16): Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. Therefore He is not merely the only-begotten, but is also God.

Chapter IV

the opinion of photinus concerning the son of god: and its refutation

Certain perverse men have presumed to measure the truth of the above doctrine according to their own ideas, and have devised various inept opinions about the aforesaid matter. Some of these observed that Scripture is wont to call sons of God those who are sanctified by grace, according to the words of Jo. 1:12: He gave them the power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name, and of Rom. 8:16: The Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God, and of 1 Jo. 3:1: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed on us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. Moreover Scripture declares the like to be born of God, for it is said (James 1:18): For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth, and (1 Jo. 3:9): Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin: for his seed abideth in him. Again, what is more remarkable still, the divine name is ascribed to them: thus the Lord said to Moses (Exod. 7:1): Behold I have appointed thee the God of Pharao, and (Ps. 81:6): I have said: You are gods, and all of you sons of the most High: and as the Lord said (Jo. 10:35): He called them gods, to whom the words of God were spoken. Thus then, in their opinion, Jesus Christ was a mere man born of the Virgin Mary, and through the merits of His holy life was accorded, above all others, the honour of the Godhead; and they reckoned that, like other men, He was a son of God by the spirit of adoption, and begotten of Him by grace, and that the Scriptures call Him God by reason of His being in some way like to God; not by nature, but by a kind of fellowship in the divine goodness: even as it is said of the saints (2 Pet. 1:4): That … you may be made partakers of the divine nature, flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world.

They strove to strengthen their position by the authority of Holy Writ. For the Lord said (Matth. 28:18): All power is given to me in heaven and on earth: since had He been God before time, He would not have received power in time.

Again, it is said of the Son that He was made to him (i.e., to God) of the seed of David according to the flesh and that He was predestinated the Son of God in power; and that which is predestinated and made is seemingly not eternal.

Again the Apostle says (Philip. 2:8, 9): He became1 For the present, in the matter of the divine generation, let it suffice that we have shown that, according to the Scriptures, Christ is called the Son of God, and God, not only as a mere man by the grace of adoption, but also on account of His divine nature.

Chapter V

the opinion of sabellius concerning the son of god: and its refutation

For as much as all who have a right conception of God are firmly persuaded that there can be but one who is God by nature, some, gathering from the Scriptures that Christ is truly and naturally God and the Son of God, confessed indeed that Christ the Son of God and God the Father are one God; yet that God is not called Son by nature or from eternity, but assumed the appellation of Son from the moment that He was born of the Virgin Mary in the mystery of the Incarnation: so that whatever Christ underwent in the flesh was ascribed by them to the Father; for instance, that He was the son of a virgin, conceived by and born of her, that He suffered, died, and rose again, and whatever else Scripture relates of Him in the flesh.

They endeavoured to confirm this contention by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (Deut. 6:4): Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord: and (Deut. 32:39): See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me: and (Jo. 14:9–11): He that seeth me seeth the Father also … the Father who abideth in me, he doth the works.… I am in the Father, and the Father in me. From all these texts they imagined that God the Father Himself is called the Son, after being born of the Virgin.

This was the opinion of the Sabellians, who were also styled Patripassionists, because they contended that the Father suffered, and believed that Christ was the Father Himself.

Now, though this opinion differs from the former in the matter of Christ’s Godhead (since the latter confesses that Christ was God in truth and nature, whereas the former denied this), nevertheless as to the question of generation and sonship both opinions agree. Because, just as the former opinion asserts that the sonship and generation, whereby Christ is called Son, did not precede Mary, so also does the latter. Consequently neither opinion refers generation and sonship to the divine nature, but only to the human. The latter opinion has this also peculiar to it that it asserts that when we speak of the Son of God we do not indicate a subsistent person, but a property adventitious to a pre-existing person: since the Father assumed the appellation of Son by reason of His having taken flesh from the Virgin, not as though the Son were a subsistent person distinct from the Father. The falseness of this position can be clearly proved by the authority of Scripture.

For the Scriptures call Christ not only the son of the Virgin, but also the Son of God, as we have shown above.1 But it is impossible for a person to be his own son: for, since the son is begotten of his father, and the begetter gives being to the begotten, it would follow that the giver of being would be identified with the receiver, and this is quite impossible. Therefore God the Father is not the Son, but the Father and Son are distinct.

Again. The Lord said (Jo. 6:38): I came down, from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me: and (Jo. 17:5): Glorify me thou, O Father, with thyself. From these and like passages it is clear that the Son is other than the Father.

It might be said, however, according to this opinion, that Christ is called the Son of God the Father in respect only of His human nature, because, to wit, God the Father created and sanctified the human nature that Christ assumed. Accordingly as God He is Father of Himself as man: wherefore there is nothing to prevent the same one as man being distinct from Himself as God.

But, in that case, it would follow that Christ is styled the Son of God even as other men, by reason either of creation or of sanctification. But we have shown that Christ is not called the Son of God for the same reason as other holy men. Therefore it cannot be understood in the aforesaid manner that the Father is Christ and His own Son.

Further. Where there is one subsistent supposit plural predication is inadmissible. Yet Christ spoke of Himself and the Father in the plural, when He said (Jo. 10:30): I and the Father are one. Therefore the Son is not the Father.

Again. If the Son is not distinct from the Father, except through the mystery of the Incarnation, before the Incarnation they were not distinct at all. Yet we find from Scripture that the Son was distinct from the Father even before the Incarnation. For it is said (Jo. 1:1): In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. Hence the Word that was with God was in some way distinct from Him: for we are wont to speak of one person as being with another. The Begotten of God says (Prov. 8:30): I was with him forming all things, and this implies some kind of fellowship and distinction. It is also said (Osee 1:7): I will have mercy on the house of Juda, and I will save them by the Lord their God, where God the Father speaks of the people to be saved by God the Son, as by a person distinct from Himself and worthy of the name of God. It is also said (Gen. 1:26): Let us make man to our image and likeness, where the plurality and distinction of man’s makers are expressly indicated; and Scripture teaches that man was created by God alone. Consequently God the Father and God the Son were two distinct Persons even before Christ became man. Therefore the Father is not called the Son by reason of the mystery of the Incarnation.

Moreover. True sonship refers to the supposit which is called son: for the hand and foot are not properly called sons, but the man whose parts they are. Now the terms paternity and sonship denote distinction in those of whom they are said, even as begetter and begotten. Hence if one is really a son, he must be a distinct person from his father. Now, Christ is truly the Son of God, for it is said (1 Jo. 5:20): That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ. Consequently Christ must be a supposit distinct from the Father; and therefore the Father is not the Son.

Besides. After the mystery of the Incarnation the Father bore witness to the Son (Matth. 3:17): This is my … Son. Now in pointing Him out thus He referred to the supposit. Therefore Christ is a distinct supposit from the Father.

The arguments whereby Sabellius endeavoured to establish his position do not prove his contention, as we shall show more fully further on.1 For the fact that God is one, or that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, does not prove that the Father and Son are one supposit: because two things that are distinct supposits may be one in some respect.

Chapter VI

concerning the opinion of arius about the son of god

While it is inadmissible according to sacred doctrine that the Son of God should have had His origin in Mary, as Photinus said, or that He who was God and Father from eternity should begin to be the Son by taking flesh, as Sabellius contended, there were others who accepted the teaching of Scripture, that the Son of God existed before the mystery of the Incarnation, and even before the creation of the world. And since this Son is distinct from God the Father, they deemed Him not to be of the same nature as God the Father: for they were unable to understand, and unwilling to believe, that any two, distinct in personality, should have one essence and nature. And seeing that, according to the teaching of faith, the nature of God the Father is alone believed to be eternal, they thought that the nature of the Son did not exist from eternity, though He was the Son before other creatures. And since whatever is not eternal is made out of nothing and created by God, they taught that the Son of God was made out of nothing, and a creature.

Since, however, they were forced by the authority of Scripture to acknowledge the Son as God, as we have observed above, they said that He was one with God the Father, not indeed by nature, but by a certain unity of mind, and by a participation of the divine likeness surpassing that of other creatures. Wherefore seeing that in the Scriptures the highest creatures, which we call angels, are styled gods and sons of God—for instance (Job 38:4, 7): Where wast thou … when the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody? and (Ps. 81:1): God hath stood in the congregation of gods,—it follows that He must be styled God and Son of God, above the others, as being of higher rank than other creatures; so much so that God the Father created all other creatures through Him. They strove to confirm this opinion by the teaching of Holy Writ. For addressing the Father the Son says (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God. Therefore the Father is the only true God: so that as the Son is not the Father He cannot be true God.

Again. The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:14–16): Keep the commandment without spot, blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Which, in his times, he shall show who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords. Who only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible. In these words we find indicated the distinction between God the Father represented as showing and Christ represented as shown. Therefore God the Father alone, represented as showing, is Mighty, King of kings and Lord of lords, He alone hath immortality and inhabiteth light inaccessible. Therefore only the Father is true God and consequently the Son is not.

Further. The Lord said (Jo. 14:28): The Father is greater than I; and the Apostle said that the Son is subject to the Father (1 Cor. 15:28): When all things shall be subdued unto him, then the Son also himself shall be subject unto him, namely the Father, that put all things under him. If however the nature of the Father and the Son were one, there would also be one greatness and one majesty; for the Son would not be less than, nor subject to, the Father. In their opinion then it follows from the Scriptures that the Son is not of the same nature with the Father.

Again. The nature of the Father cannot be subject to want. But want is found in the Son; for Scripture declares that He receives from the Father: and to receive is a sign of want. Thus, it is written (Matth. 11:27): All things are delivered to me by my Father, and (Jo. 3:35): The Father loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into his hand. Therefore seemingly the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Moreover. To be taught and to be helped are signs of need. Now, the Son is taught and helped by the Father. For it is said (Jo. 5:19, 20): The Son cannot do anything of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing, and so the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things which himself doth. Again, the Son said to the disciples (Jo. 15:15): All things, whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you. It would seem, therefore, that the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Further. To receive a commandment, to obey, to pray, and to be sent are, apparently, signs of subjection. Now, these things are related of the Son. For the Son says (Jo. 14:31): As the Father hath given me commandment, so do I; and it is said (Philip. 2:8): Being made obedient (to the Father) unto death: and (Jo. 14:16): I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete. Again, the Apostle says (Gal. 4:4): When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son. Therefore the Son is less than the Father and subject to Him.

Again. The Son is glorified by the Father, as He Himself declares (Jo. 12:28): Father, glorify my name; and the text goes on: A voice … came from heaven: I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again. Also the Apostle says that God raised Jesus Christ from the dead (Rom. 8:11), and Peter declared that He was exalted by the right hand of God (Acts 2:33). From these texts it would seem to follow that He is less than the Father.

Moreover. There can be no defect in the nature of the Father. But in the Son we find a lack of power; for He says (Matth. 20:23): But to sit at my right or left hand is not mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared by my Father. Also a lack of knowledge: for He says (Mark 13:32): But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. We also find in Him a lack of mental composure, since Scripture asserts that He was affected by sorrow, anger, and like passions. Therefore seemingly the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Again. It is expressly stated in Scripture that the Son of God is a creature: for it is said (Ecclus. 24:12): The Creator of all things … said to me: and he that made me rested in my tabernacle: and again (verse 14): From the beginning and before the world was I created. Therefore the Son is a creature.

Further. The Son is numbered among creatures, for it is said in the person of Wisdom (Ecclus. 24:5): I came out of the mouth of the most High, the first-born before all creatures. Also, the Apostle says that the Son is the First-Born of all creatures (Coloss. 1:15). It would seem then that the Son is of the same order as creatures, being placed in the first rank among them.

Moreover. The Son said, when He prayed to the Father for His disciples (Jo. 17:22): The glory which thou hast given to me I have given to them: that they may be one as we also are one. Hence He wished His disciples to be one, even as the Father and Son are one. Now, He did not wish His disciples to be one in essence. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one in essence: and thus the Son is a creature and subject to the Father.

This is the opinion of Arius and Eunomius; and apparently it arose from the statements of the Platonists, who said that the supreme God is the Father and Creator of all, and that from Him first of all there emanated a Mind containing the forms of all things, and transcending all: and this mind they called the Paternal Intelligence. Below this they placed the World-Soul, and beneath this other creatures. Accordingly, they referred to this Mind whatever is said in the Scriptures concerning God the Son, especially because Holy Writ calls the Son of God by the names of Wisdom and Word of God. The opinion of Avicenna is in agreement with this view; for above the Soul of the first heaven he placed the First Intelligence that moves the first heaven, and higher still above all he placed God. Hence the Arians supposed the Son of God to be a creature transcending all other creatures, and that by His means God created all things. This was especially in keeping with the opinion of certain philosophers who held that things proceeded from the first principle in a certain order, so that by the first creature all other things were created.

Chapter VII

refutation of the opinion of arius

One has only to study carefully the statements of Holy Writ to perceive that this opinion is clearly in opposition to the divine Scriptures. For Holy Scripture gives the name of son of God to Christ in one sense, and to the angels in another. Wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 1:5): To which of the angels hath he said at any time: Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee? affirming that this was said of Christ. But according to the aforesaid opinion the angels would be called sons of God in the same sense as Christ: since the same appellation of sonship would apply to both in respect of the sublime nature wherein they were created by God. Nor does it matter if Christ were of a more exalted nature than the angels, since even among the angels there are various orders, as we have shown above;1 and yet the same degree of sonship applies to all. Therefore Christ is not said to be the Son of God in the sense laid down by the aforesaid opinion.

Again. Since, by reason of creation, the appellation of divine sonship applies to many, for it applies to all the angels and saints, it follows that if Christ were called Son for the same reason, He would not be the Only-Begotten, although, on account of the sublimity of His nature, He might be called the First-Born among the others. But Scripture states that He is the Only-Begotten (Jo. 1:14): We have seen his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-Begotten of the Father. Therefore He is not called the Son of God by reason of creation.

Further. The name son is aptly and truly given to one born of living beings, among whom the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter: in other cases, the appellation of sonship is applied not literally, but metaphorically, as when disciples or wards are called sons. Hence, if Christ were called Son merely by reason of creation, since what is created by God does not emanate from His substance, Christ would not truly be called Son. But He is called truly Son (1 Jo. 5:20): That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ. Therefore He is called Son of God, not as though He were created by God with however sublime a nature, but as begotten of God’s substance.

Moreover. If Christ be called the Son by reason of creation, He is not true God, because no creature can be called God, save by reason of a certain likeness to God. Now Jesus Christ is true God. For John, after saying (1 Jo. 5:20): That we may be in his true Son, adds: This is the true God and life eternal. Therefore Christ is not called the Son of God by reason of creation.

Further. The Apostle says (Rom. 9:5): Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever, Amen, and (Tit. 2:13): Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ. Moreover it is said (Jerem. 23:5, 6): I will raise up to David a just branch, and immediately afterwards: And this is the name they shall call him: The Lord, our just one; where the Hebrew has the tetragrammaton, the name that is certainly applied to God alone. Wherefore it is clear that the Son of God is truly God.

Moreover. If Christ is the true Son, it follows of necessity that He is true God: because he who is born of another cannot truly be called his son, even if begotten of the latter’s substance, unless he issue from him in likeness of species: for the son of a man must needs be a man. Accordingly, if Christ be the true Son of God, He must needs be true God: therefore He is not a creature.

Again. No creature receives the whole fulness of divine goodness, because, as we have already made clear, perfections come from God to creatures by a kind of descent. Now, in Christ is the whole fulness of divine goodness: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 2:9): In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead. Therefore Christ is not a creature.

Besides. Although an angel’s intelligence has more perfect knowledge than a man’s, it is far below the divine. Now, Christ’s intelligence is not inferior to the divine: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 2:3) that in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Therefore Christ, the Son of God, is not a creature.

Moreover. As we have proved above,1 whatever God has in Himself is His essence. Now, the Son has whatever the Father has: for the Son said (Jo. 16:15): All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine: and addressing the Father (Jo. 17:10): All my things are thine, and thine are mine. Therefore Father and Son have the same essence and nature: and consequently the Son is not a creature.

Further. The Apostle says (Philip. 2:6, 7) that the Son was in the form of God, before He emptied Himself. Now the form of God can have no other meaning but the nature, of God, even as the form of a servant means the nature of man. Therefore the Son is of divine nature, and consequently He is not a creature.

Again. Nothing created can be equal to God. Now, the Son is equal to the Father, for it is said (Jo. 5:18): The Jews sought to kill him, because he did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was his father, making himself equal to God. Thus the evangelist, whose testimony is true, tells us that Christ said He was the Son of God, and equal to God, and that for this reason the Jews persecuted Him. Nor can any Christian doubt that what Christ said of Himself was true, since also the Apostle declares that it was not robbery that He deemed Himself equal to God (Philip. 2:6). Hence the Son is equal to the Father, and therefore He is not a creature.

Moreover. We read that there is none like to God, not even among the angels, who are called the sons of God: Who, says the Psalmist (Ps. 88:7) among the sons of God shall be like to God? and (Ps. 82:2): O God, who shall be like to thee? Now this must be taken as referring to perfect likeness, as is proved from what has been said in the First Book.1 But Christ declares His perfect likeness to the Father, even as living, for He said (Jo. 5:26): As the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son also to have life in himself. Therefore Christ must not be reckoned among the created sons of God.

Further. No created substance resembles God in His essence: for any perfection found in any creature whatsoever is less than what God is: so that it is impossible to know through any creature what God is. Now, the Son resembles the Father: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:15) that He is the image of the invisible God. And lest we should think this to mean an imperfect image, that does not reflect the essence of God, so that it would not be possible to know by it what God is—as when a man is said to be God’s image (1 Cor. 11:7)—the Apostle shows that He is a perfect image reflecting the very substance of God when he says (Heb. 1:3): Being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance. Therefore the Son of God is not a creature.

Again. Nothing contained in a genus is the universal cause of the things contained in that genus; thus, the universal cause of mankind is not a man, because nothing is its own cause; whereas the sun, which is outside the human genus, is the universal cause of human generation, and still more so is God.

Now, the Son is the universal cause of creatures: for it is said (Jo. 1:8): All things were made by him; and Begotten Wisdom says (Prov. 8:30): I was with him forming all things: and the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:16): In him were created all things in heaven, and on earth. Therefore He is not of the genus of creatures.

Besides. From what has been proved in the Second Book,1 it is clear that the incorporeal substances called angels cannot be formed otherwise than by creation: and it has also been proved that no substance but God can create.2 Now Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the cause of the angels, by giving them their being: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:16): Whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers. All things were created by him and in him. Therefore the Son is not a creature.

Further. Since the action of a thing is consequent to its nature, the proper action of A cannot be assigned to B, if the nature of A is not proper to B: thus a thing that has not human nature, cannot produce a human action. Now, actions proper to God are also proper to the Son, such as to create, as we have already proved, to uphold and conserve all things in being, and to wash away sins. And these things are proper to God, as we have shown above. Now, it is said of the Son (Coloss. 1:17) that by him all things consist, and (Heb. 1:3): Upholding all things by the word of his power, making purgation of sins. Therefore the Son of God is by nature divine, and not a creature. An Arian indeed might say that the Son does these things, not as the principal agent, but as the latter’s instrument, and that He acts, not by His own power, but only by that of the principal agent; but this view is precluded by the words of our Lord (Jo. 5:19): What things soever he doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. Thus even as the Father works of Himself and by His own power, so too does the Son.

We may further conclude from this that Father and Son have the same might and power. For not only does He say that the Son works in like manner as the Father, but that He does the same things in like manner. Now, if the same work proceed from two agents in like manner, this can happen either when they have dissimilar parts in the action—thus the same work proceeds from the principal agent and the instrument—or when they have similar shares in the action, and then they must combine together in one power: and this power sometimes results from the combined forces of the various agents at work, as when many hands row a boat; for all row alike, and while each one is not strong enough to produce the required result, their combined strength suffices to urge the boat forward. But this cannot be said of the Father and the Son, for the Father’s power is not imperfect but infinite, as we have proved.1 Therefore the power of Father and Son must be identical. And, since power is consequent to nature, it follows that nature and essence must be identical in Father and Son.

This follows also from what we have said above. For if the Son is divine in nature, as we have proved in many ways, since the divine nature cannot be manifold, as we proved above,2 it follows of necessity that the nature and essence of Father and Son are numerically the same.

Again. Our ultimate happiness is in God alone, who must be the sole object of our hope and worship.3 Now our happiness is in God the Son: for He said (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life: That they may know thee, namely the Father, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent. It is also said (1 Jo. 5:20) of the Son, that He is true God and life eternal. And it is certain that by eternal life Holy Writ means final beatitude: for Isaias, quoted by the Apostle (Rom. 15:12), says: There shall be a root of Jesse, and he that shall rise up to rule the Gentiles: in him the Gentiles shall hope. Again, it is said (Ps. 71:11): All kings of the earth shall adore him: all nations shall serve him: and (Jo. 5:23): That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father; and (Ps. 96:7): Adore him, all you his angels, which words the Apostle applies to the Son (Heb. 1:6). Therefore it is evident that the Son of God is true God.

Moreover this same conclusion follows from the arguments adduced above to prove against Photinus, that Christ is God, not by creation but in very truth.

Accordingly the Catholic Church, taught by the foregoing and like texts of Holy Writ, confesses that Christ is in truth and by nature the Son of God, co-eternal with and equal to the Father, true God having the same essence and nature with the Father, born, neither created nor made. Hence it is clear that the Catholic faith alone confesses true generation in God, since it refers the generation of the Son to the Son’s receiving His divine nature from the Father. On the other hand, heretics refer this generation to some extraneous nature; Photinus and Sabellius referring it to the human nature, while Arius refers it not to the human nature, but to a created nature, of higher rank than other creatures. Arius differs also from Sabellius and Photinus, in that he asserts this generation to have been anterior to the world, while the latter deny that it was before the Virgin-Birth. Sabellius differs too from Photinus, in that he confesses Christ to be God in truth and by nature, while this is denied by Photinus and Arius, the former holding Christ to be a mere man, while the latter contends that He was a most excellent creature combining together the divine and human natures in a kind of fusion. These allow a distinction of person between Father and Son, whereas Sabellius denies it. Accordingly the Catholic faith, taking the middle way, confesses with Arius and Photinus, and against Sabellius, that Father and Son are distinct Persons, and that the Son is begotten, but the Father unbegotten: and with Sabellius, but against Photinus and Arius, that Christ is God in truth and by nature, and of the same nature with the Father, yet distinct from Him in person. Even from such things may we gather the Catholic truth: since, as Aristotle says, even error bears witness to truth: and error is at variance, not only with truth, but also with itself.

Chapter VIII

solution of the arguments adduced by arius in support of his view

Since then truth cannot be opposed to truth, it is evident that the texts of the Written Truth which the Arians quote in support of their error cannot be in agreement with their opinion. For, as we have shown from the divine Scriptures, that Father and Son have but one identical divine essence and nature, in respect of which each of them is true God, it follows that Father and Son are not two Gods, but only one God. Because, if they were two Gods, it would follow that the divine essence is shared between them, just as in two men there are two numerically distinct human natures: especially seeing that the divine nature and God are not distinct, as we have proved above:1 whence it follows of necessity, since there is one divine nature in Father and Son, that Father and Son are one God. Accordingly, though we confess both the Father to be God, and the Son to be God, we do not abandon the position that there is but one God, which we proved in the First Book,1 that in God intelligence and being are one and the same. Wherefore communication of divine nature is also communication of intelligence. Now, communication of intelligence may be called showing, speaking, or teaching. Therefore, since by His birth the Son received the divine nature from the Father, we may speak either of Him as hearing from the Father, or of the Father as showing to Him, or employ other like expressions of Scripture: not as though the Son were previously ignorant or nescient, and was afterwards taught by the Father. For the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 1:24) that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God: and it is impossible for wisdom to be ignorant, or power to be weak.

Therefore the words: The Son cannot do anything of himself (Jo. 5:19) do not argue weakness of action in the Son: but, as in God to act is the same as to be, and action is identified with essence, as we have proved above,1

When the Son is said to be the First-Born of creatures, this does not imply that the Son is to be reckoned among creatures, but that the Son proceeds from the Father, and receives from the Father from whom creatures proceed and receive. The Son however receives identity of nature, whereas creatures do not: wherefore the Son is called not only the First-Born, but also the Only Begotten, on account of the singular mode of that reception.

The words of our Lord to His Father in reference to His disciples, That they may be one, as we also are one (Jo. 17:22), prove that Father and Son are one in the same way as it behoves the disciples to be one, namely, by love. But this manner of union does not exclude unity of nature, rather does it prove it. For it is said (Jo. 3:35): The Father loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into his hand: and this shows that the fulness of the Godhead is in the Son, as we have already stated. Hence it is clear that the authority of Scripture invoked by the Arians in support of their view is in no way opposed to the truth as declared by the Catholic Faith.

Chapter IX

explanation of the texts quoted by photinus and sabellius

In sequence to the foregoing animadversions it is clear that the texts also of Holy Scripture quoted by Photinus and Sabellius fail to support their errors.

For our Lord’s words after His resurrection, All power is given to me in heaven and in earth (Matth. 28:18), do not imply that He received this power then for the first time, but that the power which the Son of God had received from eternity began to be manifested in Him after He had become man, through His victory over death in His resurrection.

When the Apostle says in reference to the Son (Rom. 1:3), Who was made to him of the seed of David, the sense is clear from the words that follow, according to the flesh. For he did not say that the Son of God was made absolutely, but that He was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by taking human nature: even so it is said (Jo. 1:14): The Word was made flesh. Wherefore it is plain that the words that follow (verse 4), Who was predestinated the Son of God, refer to the Son in His human nature. Because it was not of human merits, but of the grace of God predestinating, that human nature was united to the Son of God, so that a man could be called the Son of God.

Likewise when the Apostle (Philip. 2:8) says that God exalted Christ on account of the merits of His Passion, we must refer this to His human nature, in which was the abasement of His Passion. Consequently the subsequent words, He gave him a name, which is above all other names, refer to the fact that the name appropriate to the Son from His eternal birth was to be manifested, in the faith of the multitude, as appropriate to the Son incarnate.

Wherefore again, it is evident that Peter’s statement that God made Jesus both Christ and Lord (Acts 2:36) must be referred to the human nature, wherein Christ began to have in course of time, that which He had from eternity in His divine nature.

Again, the passages invoked by Sabellius in support of the unity of the Godhead (Deut. 6:4), Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord, and, See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me (ibid. 32:39), are not opposed to the view of the Catholic Faith, which declares that Father and Son are not two Gods, but one God, as we have said.

Likewise the words The Father, who abideth in me, he doth the works, and, I am in the Father, and the Father in me (Jo. 14:10), prove not unity of person, as Sabellius pretended, but of essence, which Arius denied. For if Father and Son were one person, it would not be right to say that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, since, properly speaking, a supposit is not said to be in itself, but only by reason of its parts. Because, as the parts are in the whole, and that which is proper to the parts may be ascribed to the whole, sometimes a whole is spoken of as being in itself. But this manner of speaking does not apply to things appertaining to God, in whom there are no parts, as we have proved.1 Consequently, since the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, the Father and Son are not one in person: but it follows that they are one in nature. For this being once granted, it is quite evident how the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father. Because, as the Father is His own essence, since in God there is no distinction between the essence and the one who has the essence, as proved above,1 it follows that whoever has the essence of the Father, is the Father, and in like manner, that whoever has the essence of the Son, is the Son. Hence, as the essence of the Father is in the Son, and the essence of the Son is in the Father, since both have the same essence, as the Catholic Faith teaches, it clearly follows that the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father. Thus the same text refutes the errors of both Sabellius and Arius.

Chapter X

arguments against the divine generation and procession

Now that we have considered the whole question carefully, we see clearly that Holy Writ requires us to believe that the Father and Son, though distinct in Person, are nevertheless one God, having one essence or nature. Since however, it is far removed from the nature of creatures, that any two things should be distinct supposits and yet have but one essence, human reason, which takes its principles from the properties of creatures, encounters many difficulties in this mystery of the divine generation.

For, seeing that the generation which comes under our observation, is a kind of change, and that corruption is contrary thereto, seemingly there can scarcely be generation in God who is unchangeable, incorruptible, and eternal, as we have proved above.2

Again. If generation is a change, then whatever is generated must be changeable. Now, that which is changed passes from potentiality to act, because movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such. Accordingly, if the Son of God is begotten, seemingly He is not eternal, for He would pass from potentiality to act: neither would He be God, because He would not be pure act, but something with an admixture of potentiality.

Further. That which is begotten receives its nature from the begetter. Therefore, if the Son is begotten of God the Father, it follows that He receives His nature from the Father. But it is impossible that He received from the Father a nature numerically distinct from the Father’s, yet specifically the same, as happens in univocal generations, for instance, when man begets man, or fire generates fire. For it has been shown above1 that there cannot be several Godheads in number. Seemingly also it is impossible that He received a nature numerically the same as the Father’s, since if He received a part thereof, it would follow that the divine nature is divisible; and if He received the whole, seemingly it would follow, if the divine nature were wholly transfused into the Son, that it would cease to be in the Father, who in begetting would therefore be corrupted. Nor could it be said that the divine nature overflows from the Father into the Son by way of superabundance, as the spring water flows into the stream, and yet the spring does not run dry, because the divine nature not only cannot be divided but also cannot increase. It would seem to follow therefore, that the Son received from the Father a nature neither numerically nor specifically the same as the Father’s, but altogether different in kind: as happens in equivocal generation—for instance, when animals begotten of putrid matter are engendered by the power of the sun, without attaining to the specific nature of the sun. It follows, then, that God’s Son is neither His true Son, since He has not His Father’s nature, nor true God, since He receives not the divine nature.

Besides. If the Son receives His nature from God the Father, we must distinguish in Him the receiver and the nature received: for nothing receives itself. Therefore the Son is not His own essence or nature: and consequently, He is not true God.

Moreover. If the Son of God is not distinct from the divine essence, since the divine essence is subsistent, as we have proved1 (meanwhile it is clear that the Father is the divine essence), it would seem to follow that Father and Son are identical with the same subsistent thing. Now a person is a subsistent intellectual nature. Therefore, if the Son is the divine nature, it follows that Father and Son are identical in person. On the other hand, if the Son is not the divine essence, He is not true God: for we have proved that God is the divine essence.2 Seemingly then, either the Son is not true God, as Arius stated, or He is not personally distinct from the Father, as Sabellius asserted.

Again. That which is the principle of individuality in A cannot be in B, if A and B are individually distinct from each other; since what is common to many things cannot be a principle of individuality. Now it is by His own essence that God is individualized: because it is not a form in matter, so that it could be individualized by matter. Consequently there is nothing in God the Father to individualize Him, except His essence. Therefore His essence cannot be in any other supposit. Either then it is not in the Son, and consequently the Son is not true God, as Arius asserts: or the Son is not personally distinct from the Father, and both are the same person, as Sabellius contends.

Further. If Father and Son are two supposits or persons, and nevertheless one in essence, there must be in them, besides the essence, something whereby they are mutually distinct: for the essence is stated to be common to both, and what is common cannot be a principle of distinction. Hence, that whereby Father and Son are distinct must be distinct from the divine essence. Consequently the Person of the Son is composed of two things, and likewise the Person of the Father, namely, the common essence and a principle of distinction. Both, therefore, are composites, and neither of them is true God.

Someone, however, might say that they are distinguished by sole relation, because one is the Father, and the other, the Son; and that relative predication seemingly implies, not some other thing in the subject, but only a relation; and consequently that we cannot conclude that there is composition in the divine persons. But this reply would seem insufficient to solve the above objection.

For there can be no relation without something absolute: because in every relative term there must be an absolute foundation besides the notion of relativity: thus a servant is something absolute besides his relationship to his master. Accordingly, the relation whereby Father and Son are mutually distinct, must be founded on something absolute. Either then this absolute something is one only, or there are two absolute things. If there is but one, it cannot be the foundation of a twofold relation, unless we except the relation of identity, which cannot cause a distinction: thus A is the same as A. If then the relation be such as to require distinction, we must presuppose a distinction of absolutes. Therefore it would seem impossible for the Persons of Father and Son to be distinguished by relations alone.

Moreover it must be admitted that the relation which distinguishes Father from Son is either real or merely logical. If it be real, it is not, seemingly, to be identified with the divine essence, since this is common to Father and Son. Consequently there will be something in the Son, that is not His essence, and so He will not be truly God; because we have proved1 that there is nothing in God besides His essence. On the other hand, if this relation be merely logical, it cannot effect a personal distinction between Son and Father, since distinction of persons implies a real distinction.

Again. Every relative depends on its correlative. But that which depends on another cannot be true God. Consequently, if the Persons of Father and Son are distinguished by their relations, neither will be true God.

Further. If the Father be God, and if the Son be God, it follows that God is predicated substantially of Father and Son, since the Godhead cannot be an accident. Now, a substantial predicate is truly that about which it is predicated: because, when I say: Man is an animal, the thing that is truly a man is an animal; so, too, when I say: Socrates is a man, that which is really Socrates is a man. Hence it would seem to follow that there cannot be plurality of subjects, since there is unity on the part of the substantial predicate: for Socrates and Plato are not one man, though they are one in point of human nature, nor are man and ass one animal, though they are one in animality. Therefore if Father and Son are two Persons, it is seemingly impossible that they be one God.

Moreover. Opposite predicates indicate plurality of the things about which they are predicated. Now, opposites are predicted of God the Father and God the Son; thus the Father is God unbegotten and begetting, whereas the Son is God begotten. Therefore seemingly, it is not possible that Father and Son be one God.

From these and similar arguments certain men, presuming to measure the mysteries of God by their own reasoning, endeavour to impugn the doctrine of divine generation. Since, however, truth is mighty in itself, and is not weakened by any assault, we must proceed to show that the truth of faith cannot be overthrown by reason.

Chapter XI

the meaning of generation in god, and of the scriptural references to the son of god

To carry out this purpose we must begin by observing that where things differ in nature, we find different modes of emanation, and further, that from the higher nature things proceed in a more intimate way. Now, of all things the inanimate obtain the lowest place, and from them no emanation is possible except by the action of one on another: thus, fire is engendered from fire when an extraneous body is transformed by fire, and receives the quality and form of fire.

The next place to inanimate bodies belongs to plants, whence emanation proceeds from within, for as much as the plant’s intrinsic humour is converted into seed, which being committed to the soil grows into a plant. Accordingly, here we find the first traces of life: since living things are those which move themselves to act, whereas those which can only move extraneous things are wholly lifeless. It is a sign of life in plants that something within them is the cause of a form. Yet the plant’s life is imperfect because, although in it emanation proceeds from within, that which emanates comes forth by little and little, and in the end becomes altogether extraneous: thus the humour of a tree gradually comes forth from the tree and eventually becomes a blossom, and then takes the form of fruit distinct from the branch, though united thereto; and when the fruit is perfect it is altogether severed from the tree, and falling to the ground, produces by its seminal force another plant. Indeed if we consider the matter carefully we shall see that the first principle of this emanation is something extraneous: since the intrinsic humour of the tree is drawn through the roots from the soil whence the plant derives its nourishment.

There is yet above that of the plants a higher form of life, which is that of the sensitive soul, the proper emanation whereof, though beginning from without, terminates within. Also, the further the emanation proceeds, the more does it penetrate within: for the sensible object impresses a form on the external senses, whence it proceeds to the imagination and, further still, to the storehouse of the memory. Yet in every process of this kind of emanation, the beginning and the end are in different subjects: for no sensitive power reflects on itself. Wherefore this degree of life transcends that of plants in so much as it is more intimate; and yet it is not a perfect life, since the emanation is always from one thing to another. Wherefore the highest degree of life is that which is according to the intellect: for the intellect reflects on itself, and can understand itself. There are, however, various degrees in the intellectual life: because the human mind, though able to know itself, takes its first steps to knowledge from without: for it cannot understand apart from phantasms, as we have already made clear.1 Accordingly, intellectual life is more perfect in the angels whose intellect does not proceed from something extrinsic to acquire self-knowledge, but knows itself by itself. Yet their life does not reach the highest degree of perfection because, though the intelligible species is altogether within them, it is not their very substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the same thing, as we have already shown.2 Therefore, the highest perfection of life belongs to God, whose understanding is not distinct from His being, as we have proved.3 Wherefore the intelligible species in God must be the divine essence itself. By intelligible species I mean that which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is expressed by external speech. Wherefore the intelligible species is known as the inner word, that is signified by the outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the thing which we understand, is evident from the fact that to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding its intelligible species; and the intellect does this when it reflects on its action: for which reason sciences that treat of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas.

Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as understood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its act. Hence as in God to be is to understand, the intelligible species in Him is His act of understanding; and since in Him the act of understanding is the thing understood (for by understanding Himself He understands all other things, as we have proved1), it follows that in God understanding Himself, understanding, the thing understood, and the intelligible species are all one and the same.

With these principles before our eyes, we can to some extent understand the meaning of generation in God. For it is clear that in God generation cannot possibly have the same meaning as in inanimate beings, where the generator impresses its likeness on extraneous matter. Because as our faith declares the Son begotten of God must have true Godhead and be true God: and the Godhead is not a form adhering to matter, nor is God a material being, as we have proved.2

Again, generation in God cannot be of the same kind as that which we observe in plants; or again in animals, which in common with plants have the powers of nutrition and generation: because something that was in the plant or animal is severed so as to engender a being of like species and, when finally engendered, is wholly extraneous to the generator. But nothing can be severed from God, since He is indivisible; and the Son begotten of God is not extraneous to the Father who begets Him, but is in Him, as proved by the authorities quoted above. Nor again can the divine generation be taken to signify an emanation such as we find in the sensitive soul: for God does not receive from without the ability to cause an impression on another thing, since otherwise He would not be the first agent. Again, the operations of the sensitive soul are performed by means of bodily instruments; whereas God is manifestly incorporeal. Consequently generation in God must be understood to indicate an intellectual emanation. It behoves us to explain this as follows.

It is evident from what has been already proved1 that God understands Himself. Now every understood thing, as such, must be in the one who understands: because to understand means the apprehension of the object understood by the intellect: wherefore our intellect in understanding itself, remains within itself, not only as essentially one with itself, but as understanding the object of its apprehension. Therefore God must needs be within Himself as the understood object is in the one who understands. Now the understood object in the one who understands is the intelligible species and word. Accordingly, in God understanding Himself is God’s word, or God understood, even as in the intellect the idea of a stone is a stone understood. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:1): The Word was with God. But since the divine intellect does not pass from potentiality to act, but is always in act, as we proved above,2 it follows of necessity that God has always understood Himself. Now for the very reason that He understands Himself His Word must be in Him, as we have shown. Therefore God’s Word must have been in Him always: and consequently His Word is co-eternal with Him, and does not come to Him in course of time, as the word that we conceive within ourselves—namely, the intelligible species—comes into our intellect in course of time. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:1): In the beginning was the Word. And since the divine intellect is not only always in act, but is also pure act, as we have proved,3 it follows that the very substance of the divine intellect is its own understanding, or act of the intellect. Now the being of the word conceived within the mind, otherwise of the intelligible species, consists in its being understood. Therefore the same being is that of the divine Word and of the divine Intellect, and therefore of God Himself, since He is His own act of intelligence. Now God’s being is His essence or nature, which is God Himself, as we proved above.1 Therefore the Word of God is the divine Being and Essence, and God in very truth.

It is not so with the word of the human intellect. For when our intellect understands itself, the being of the intellect is not identified with its act of understanding; because the substance of the intellect was in potentiality to the act of understanding, ere it understood actually. Consequently the being of the intelligible species is distinct from the act of understanding, since its being consists in its being understood. Therefore in the man who understands himself, the inwardly conceived word is not a real man, having the natural being of a man, but is merely a man understood, that is, the likeness of a true man, apprehended by the intellect. Whereas the Word of God, for the very reason that it is God understood, is true God having by nature the divine being, because the natural being of God is not distinct from His act of understanding, as we have already stated. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:1): The Word was God: which shows, since the statement is absolute, that the Word of God signifies God in very truth. For man’s word cannot be called a man simply and absolutely, but only with a qualification, namely a man understood. Hence this statement would be untrue, The word is a man, whereas this may be true, The word is a man understood. Accordingly when it is stated, The Word was God, this shows that the divine Word is not merely an intelligible species as our word is, but that it is indeed a real and subsistent being: because the true God is subsistent, since He is supremely per se being. Nevertheless the Godhead is not in the Word so as to be the same in species and distinct numerically; because the Word has the nature of God, in as much as God’s understanding is His being, as we have said. Now understanding is the very being of God. Therefore the Word has the divine essence itself, identical not merely in species, but even in number. Again, a nature that is one specifically is not divided numerically save by reason of matter. But the divine nature is wholly immaterial. Wherefore it is impossible that the divine nature be one in species and be differentiated in number. Consequently the divine Word has the one identical nature in common with God: so that the Word of God, and God whose Word He is are not two Gods, but one God. That with us, two having human nature are two men, is because human nature is divided numerically in two subjects. Now it was shown above1 that things which in creatures are divided, in God are one simply: thus in creatures essence and existence are distinct; and in some, that which subsists in its essence is distinct from its essence or nature: for an individual man is neither his humanity nor his existence, whereas God is His essence and His existence.

And, though these two in God are one, yet whatever pertains to His subsistence, essence, or existence, is most truly in God: for it befits Him not to be in another, in as much as He is subsistent; to be a particular thing, in as much as He is an essence; and to be in act, by reason of His existence. Consequently as in God intelligent being, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species, which is His Word, are all one and the same thing, whatever pertains to the intelligent subject, or to the act of intelligence, or to the intelligible species or Word must be most truly in God. Now it belongs to the interior word or intelligible species, to proceed from the intelligent being through the latter’s act of intelligence, since it is the term of its intellectual operation; for the intellect by understanding conceives and forms the understood species or idea which is the interior word. Therefore God’s Word must needs proceed from Him by reason of His act of intelligence. Hence God’s Word stands in relation to God understanding, whose Word He is, as to Him from whom He proceeds; for such a relation is implied by the very nature of a word. Since then in God the intelligent subject, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species or word, are essentially one, and since for this reason each one of these must needs be God, it follows that there is only a distinction of relation between them, for as much as the Word is referred to the cause of His conception, as to the source whence He proceeds. Hence John the Evangelist, lest the phrase The Word was God should seem to remove any distinction whatsoever between the Word and God the speaker and conceiver of the Word, added (verse 2): The same was in the beginning with God, as though to say: “This same Word, whom I have stated to be God, is in some way distinct from God the speaker of the Word, and thus may be described as being with God.”

Now the inwardly conceived word is a kind of form and image of the thing understood: for when the likeness of a thing exists in something else, it is either an exemplar, if it is by way of being a principle; or else it is an image, if it be compared to the thing of which it is a likeness, as to its principle. We have an example of both cases in our own intellect: because in the mind of the craftsman there is the image of his handiwork. This image is the principle of the operation that produces the handiwork, and is compared to that handiwork as the exemplar to the exemplate. On the other hand the image which our mind conceives of a natural thing is compared to the thing of which it is an image as to its principle, because our act of intelligence takes its principle from the senses, which are impressed by natural things. Now since God understands both Himself and other things, as we have shown,1 His act of understanding is the principle of the things understood by Him, because they are caused by Him through His intellect and will: whereas to that intelligible being, which is Himself, He is compared as a thing to its principle: since this intelligible being is identical with the intellect understanding it, and the Word conceived is an emanation thereof. Consequently the Word of God is compared to other things understood by God as their exemplar, and to God Himself whose Word He is, as His image. Hence it is said of the. Word of God that He is the image of the invisible God (Coloss. 1:15).

There is however this difference between intellect and sense, that the latter apprehends the external accidents of things, such as colour, taste, quantity, and the like, whereas the former penetrates within: and since all knowledge is effected by reason of a likeness between knower and known, it follows that there must be in the senses a likeness of the accidents of the sensible object, and in the intellect a likeness of the essence of the object understood. Hence the word conceived in the intellect is the image or exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. And as the Word of God is the image of God, as we have shown, He must needs be God’s image in respect of the essence. Wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 1:3) that he is the figure of his substance. Now the image of a thing is twofold. There is the image that has not the same nature as that which it represents; whether it represent it as to its external accidents—thus a bronze statue is the image of a man, yet it is not a man—or whether it represent it as to its substance, for the intellect’s idea of a man is not a man, because the Philosopher says (3 De Anima, text. 38): Not a stone, but its image, is in the soul. But an image that has the same nature as the thing it represents, is like the king’s son, in whom we see his father’s image, and who has the same nature as his father. Now it has been shown that God’s Word is the image of the Speaker in His very essence, and that He has the same nature in common with Him. Consequently God’s Word is not only His image but also His Son: because it is not possible to be both the image of another and of the same nature as that other without being this other’s son, so long as we speak of living beings: because that which proceeds from a living being in likeness of nature is said to be its son. Hence it is said (Ps. 2:7): The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my Son.

Since then the Word of God is called the Son of God, we must also observe, seeing that in every nature the procession of son from father is natural, that the Son of God is begotten of and proceeds from the Father naturally: and this is in keeping with what we have been saying, and may be understood from the operation of our own intellect. For our intellect knows certain things naturally, such as the first principles of matters intelligible, whereof the intelligible concepts, or interior words, exist therein and proceed therefrom naturally. There are also certain intelligible matters which our intellect does not know naturally, but comes to know by reasoning. The concepts of these things are not in our intellect naturally, and it has to make an effort to seek them. Now it is evident that God understands Himself naturally, even as He exists naturally: since His act of intelligence is His being, as we have proved.1 Hence the Word spoken by God understanding Himself, proceeds from Him naturally; and as the Word of God is of the same nature with God speaking and is His image it follows that the term of this natural procession is the image of that from which it proceeds in identity of nature. Now the essence of true generation in living things is that the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter as its image and with the same nature. Therefore God’s Word is truly begotten of God’s utterance; and His procession may be called a begetting or birth. Hence it is said (Ps. 2:7): This day have I begotten thee; that is to say, “in eternity,” which is ever present, and contains no trace of past or future. It is therefore clear how false was the assertion of the Arians that the Father begot the Son by His will; because that which is done voluntarily is not natural. Since however what God understands of Himself is not less than what is in Him (else He would not understand Himself perfectly, nor would His being be His act of intelligence), the Word of God must needs be essential to God. Now this Word is the Son of God. Therefore the Son of God is essential to the Father.

This is also clear, because since the Son of God is His true Son, He has the species and nature of the Father. Now a certain quantity is due to every nature; wherefore here below a son is brought to equality with his father at the term of generation and growth, unless some defect occur through indisposition of matter and weakness of the active force in generation. That at first the son is born less than his father, is because animal generation passes from potentiality to act, and the animal is brought gradually from imperfection to perfection. Now none of these things can occur in the divine generation, because it is not a generation from matter, nor does it involve a process from potentiality to act, nor can there be a defect in the power of God generating, since His power is infinite. Hence the Son of God must be equal to the Father.

Again. If the Son be not equal to the Father, His greatness must be numerically distinct from the Father’s: because the same identical quantity cannot be greater or less than itself. Now God’s greatness is not distinct from His essence, as we made clear in the First Book.1 Consequently the essence of the Son will be numerically distinct from the Father’s: and we have proved the contrary to be the case. We must therefore say that the Son is equal to the Father. Hence it is said (Jo. 5:18) that Jesus said God was his Father, making himself equal to God: and (Philip. 2:6) that He thought it not robbery to be equal to God.

We must also take note that the thing begotten, so long as it remains in the begetter, is said to be conceived. Now, God’s Word is begotten of God in such wise that He does not depart from God but abides in Him, as stated above. Rightly therefore may God’s Word be described as conceived of God. Hence the Wisdom of God says (Prov. 8:24): The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived.

There is however a difference between the conception of God’s Word and the material conception which we observe in animals: because the offspring, during the period of conception and gestation, is as yet imperfect, and unable to subsist by itself apart from its begetter: wherefore when an animal’s body is begotten, the conception of the offspring is distinct from its birth, when it is severed from its begetter by being brought forth from the womb. On the other hand, God’s Word, abiding in God the Speaker, subsists perfectly in Himself, and distinct from God the Speaker: for no distinction of place is needed where, as stated above, there is only a distinction of relationship. Accordingly in the generation of the Word of God conception is the same as birth: wherefore after Wisdom had said: I was already conceived, the text, after a few words, continues (verse 25): Before the hills I was brought forth.

Yet because conception and birth in corporeal beings include movement and consequently some kind of succession—since the term of conception is the existence in the conceiver of that which has been conceived, and the term of birth, the separate existence of the offspring apart from the parent—it follows that in corporeal beings what is being conceived is not as yet, and that the offspring while in the womb is not distinct from the parent. On the other hand, when an intelligible word is conceived and brought forth, there is no movement or succession; hence it exists as soon as it is conceived, and it has a separate existence as soon as it is brought forth: thus the illuminated object is lit up as soon as there is light, since there is no succession in the diffusion of light.1 And if this is the case with our intelligible word, much more does it apply to the Word of God, not only because His conception and birth are in the intelligible order, but also because both are in eternity, where there can be no yesterday nor morrow. Hence after the words of Wisdom (Prov. 8:25): Before the hills I was brought forth, lest this might seem to imply that he did not exist until he was brought forth, the text continues (verse 27): When he prepared the heavens, I was present. Accordingly whereas in the carnal generation of animals there is first conception, then gestation and association without separate existence, of offspring with parent, in the divine generation all these things are simultaneous: since the Word of God is at once conceived, begotten, and present. And seeing that what is begotten is brought forth from the womb; even as the generation of God’s Word is called birth, in order to indicate His perfect distinction from His begetter, so in like manner it is called generation from the womb, according to Ps. 109:3, From the womb, before the day-star, have I begotten thee. Yet because the distinction between word and speaker is not such as to hinder the word from being in the speaker, as already stated, just as the Word is said to be begotten or brought forth from the womb, so as to indicate distinction, so is He said to be in the bosom of the Father (Jo. 1:18), to show that this distinction does not prevent the Word being in the speaker.

Now we must observe that the carnal generation of animals is effected by an active and a passive function: the father takes an active part, while the mother’s part is passive: so that the begetting of offspring belongs to the father as regards certain conditions, and to the mother as regards others. It belongs to the father to give his offspring its nature and species, while conception and gestation belong to the mother, whose part is passive and receptive. Accordingly since, as we have stated, the procession of the Word lies in the fact that God understands Himself (and God understands Himself, not by a passive power, but by an active power, so to speak, because the divine intellect is not in potentiality but in act only), it follows that in the generation of God’s Word, there is no place for a mother but only for a father. Consequently the parts which belong severally to father and mother in carnal generation, are all ascribed by Scripture to the Father in the generation of the Word: thus the Father is said to give life to the Son, and to conceive and beget Him.

Chapter XII

how the son of god is called the wisdom of god

Seeing that we have applied to the generation of the Word the things that are said of divine Wisdom, it remains to be shown how divine Wisdom, in whose person those things are said, may be taken to be the Word of God. And that we may obtain knowledge of things divine from human things, it behoves us to observe that in man wisdom is a habit perfecting our mind in the knowledge of the highest—namely divine—things. And when, through the habit of wisdom there arises in our intellect an idea of divine things, this very idea or inward word is wont to be called wisdom, by that figure of speech whereby acts and species are denominated from the habits from which they proceed: thus sometimes a just action is called justice, a brave action bravery, and a virtuous action is commonly called virtue: and in this way a man’s wise conceptions are called wisdom. Now in God wisdom must be referred to the fact that He knows Himself. But since He knows Himself not by an intelligible species but by His essence—indeed His very act of intelligence is His essence—therefore God’s wisdom cannot be a habit, but is the divine essence. Now it is evident from what has been said, that the Son of God is the Word and concept of God understanding Himself. Wherefore the Word of God is rightly called conceived or begotten Wisdom, as being the wise conception of the divine mind: hence the Apostle calls Christ the wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24). Now the word of wisdom conceived in the mind is a manifestation of the understander’s wisdom, even as all our habits are revealed by their acts. Since then divine Wisdom is called light, because it consists in a pure act of knowledge (for the manifestation of light is its refulgence, which proceeds from it), the Word of divine Wisdom is fittingly called the splendour of light, according to the words of the Apostle, who says of the Son (Heb. 1:3): Being the brightness of his glory. Hence the Son ascribed to Himself the manifestation of the Father, when He said (Jo. 17:5, 6): O Father … I have manifested thy name to men. Yet though the Son who is God’s Word is rightly called begotten Wisdom, the name Wisdom taken absolutely must needs be common to Father and Son, since the Wisdom that shines through the Word is the essence of the Father, as we have said above, and the Father’s essence is common to Him and the Son.

Chapter XIII

that there is only one son in god

Since God by understanding Himself understands all other things, as we proved in the First Book;1 and since He understands Himself in one simple glance, for His act of understanding is His being: it follows of necessity that there is only one Word of God. And as in God the generation of the Son is nothing else but the conception of the Word, it follows that there is but one generation in God, and but one Son begotten of the Father. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:14): We saw his glory, the glory, as it were, of the only-begotten of the Father, and again (verse 18): The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him to us.

It would seem however to follow from the foregoing that there is yet another word of the divine Word, and another son proceeding from the Son. For we proved that the Word of God is true God: consequently whatever belongs to God belongs to the Word of God. Now God of necessity understands Himself: therefore the Word of God also understands Himself. If then, because God understands Himself, there is in God the Word begotten of Him, it would seem to follow that we must ascribe to the Word also, yet another word, in as much as He understands Himself: and thus there will be a word of the Word, and a son of the Son. And this other Word, if it be God, will also understand Himself, and will have another Word, so that there will be an infinite process of divine generations.

This objection may be solved from what has already been said. For while we have proved that the Word of God is God, we have also shown that He is not another God distinct from the God whose Word He is, but is wholly one with Him, and distinct only as the Word proceeding from Him. Now as the Word is not another God, so neither is He another intellect, nor consequently has He another act of understanding. And yet it does not follow that the Word has His own word by reason of His understanding Himself: because, as stated above, the Word is distinct from the Speaker solely in that He proceeds from Him. Wherefore all other things must be ascribed in common to God who speaks—that is, the Father—and to the Word who is the Son, because the Word also is God. This alone is to be ascribed to the Father exclusively, that the Word proceeds from Him, and to the Son exclusively, that He proceeds from God speaking. Hence we gather that the Son is not impotent, though unable to beget a son, whereas the Father does beget a Son: because Father and Son have the same power, even as they have the same Godhead. And since in God generation is the intelligible conception of the Word, according as God understands Himself, it follows that in God the power of begetting is identical with His power of understanding Himself. And since in God the act of understanding Himself is one and simple, it follows that also His power of understanding Himself, which is identical with His act, is but one. By the same power therefore, both the Word is conceived, and the Speaker of the Word conceives; and consequently by the same power the Father begets and the Son is begotten. Therefore the Father has no power that the Son has not; yet the Father has the generative power for the purpose of begetting, but the Son for the purpose of being begotten: and these differ but relatively, as already explained.

Seeing however that the Apostle ascribes a word to the Son, whence it would seem to follow that the Son has a son, and that the Word has a word, we must inquire into the meaning of the Apostle when he makes this statement. For he says (Heb. 1:2, 3) that God in these days hath spoken to us by his Son, and afterwards: Who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, etc. Now we must gather the meaning of this passage from what we have been saying. For we said that the concept of Wisdom, namely, the Word, is rightly called Wisdom. We may go yet further so as to see that even the external effect, which results from the concept of Wisdom, may itself be called wisdom: in the same way as an effect may assume the name of its cause. Thus we call it wisdom not only when a man thinks wisely, but also when he works wisely: and therefore the manifestation of divine wisdom in creatures is called the Wisdom of God, according to Ecclus. 1:9, 10, He created her—that is, Wisdom—in the Holy Ghost; and afterwards adds: and he poured her out upon all his works. Accordingly the effect of the Word receives the name of word: for even with us the vocal expression of the inward word is called a word, being as it were the word of a word, because it indicates the inward word. Wherefore not only is the concept of the divine intellect called the Word, which is the Son, but also the revelation of the divine concept in visible works is called the Word’s word. In this way are we to understand that the Son upholds all things by the word of his power, as also the passage in Ps. 148:8, Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil his word; because, to wit, the effects of the divine concept are accomplished in the world by created forces.

Now since God in understanding Himself, understands all other things, as stated above, it follows that the Word conceived in God through His understanding Himself, is the only word expressing all things. Yet He is not in the same way the Word of God, as of other things: because He is the Word of God as proceeding from God, whereas He is the word of other things, not as proceeding from them, because God does not acquire knowledge from things, but rather brings things into being by His knowledge,1 as we have proved above. Consequently the Word of God must needs be the perfect type of all the things that have been made. In what way He can be the proper type of each single thing is plain from our treatise in the First Book,2 where it was shown that God has proper knowledge of all things. Now whosoever makes a thing with intelligence, works by means of the idea which he has of that thing as made: thus the material house is made by the builder from the idea of a house that is in his mind. And we have shown above that God brings things into being, not by natural necessity, but as an intellectual and voluntary agent. Wherefore God made all things by His Word, who is the type of things made by Him. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:3): All things were made by him: also in accord with this, Moses in his account of the creation uses such expressions of each of the works as: God said: Be light made, and the light was made … and God said: Let there be a firmament (Gen. 1:3, 6), and so on. All this is expressed in the words of the Psalmist (Ps. 148:5): He spoke, and they were made. For to speak is to utter a word. Accordingly the statement that God spoke, and they were made means that He spoke the Word whereby He brought things into being, as by the perfect idea of them.

And since the same cause conserves and brings things into being, as all things were made by the Word, so are they conserved in being by God’s Word: wherefore the Psalmist says (Ps. 32:6): By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and the Apostle says that the Son upholds all things by the word of his power (Heb. 1:3): and we have already stated how this is to be understood.

There is however a difference to be noted between the Word of God and the idea in the mind of the craftsman. The Word of God is God subsistent, whereas the craftsman’s idea of his handiwork is not a subsistent thing, but merely an intelligible form. Now a non-subsistent form is not, properly speaking, competent to act (since to act belongs to that which is perfect and subsistent), but is competent to be acted by, since it is a principle of action whereby the agents act. Hence the craftsman’s idea of the house does not make the house, but the craftsman makes the house by it. On the other hand since God’s word, who is the idea of things made by God, is subsistent, He acts and is not merely something acted by. Wherefore the Wisdom of God says (Prov. 8:30): I was with him forming all things, and our Lord said (Jo. 5:17): My Father worketh until now and I work.

It must also be observed that the thing made with the intelligence pre-exists in the mind even before it exists in itself: thus the house exists in the builder’s mind before it is actually built. Now, the Word of God is the type of all things made by God, as we have proved. Therefore all things made by God must have pre-existed in the Word of God, before existing in their own nature. Now, the mode of existence of that which is in another follows the mode of that in which it is, and not its own mode: thus the house in the mind of the builder has an ideal and immaterial existence. Hence things must have pre-existed in the Word of God according to the mode of the Word. And the mode of the Word is that He is one, simple, immaterial; and not merely living, but life itself, since He is His own being. Consequently things made by God, pre-existed in the Word from eternity, in a mode wholly devoid of matter and composition, since in Him they were nothing else but the Word Himself who is life. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:3, 4): That which was made, was life in him, namely, in the Word. Now, as he who works by intelligence and the idea that is in him, brings things into being, so too the teacher, by the knowledge that is in him, produces knowledge in his disciple, for the disciple’s knowledge is drawn from the knowledge of his teacher, as a copy thereof. Now, God by His intelligence is the cause not only of all things that subsist in nature, but also of all intellectual knowledge, as proved above.1 It follows, therefore, that the Word of God, who is the idea of the divine intellect, must be the cause of all intellectual knowledge: hence it is said (Jo. 1:4): Life was the light of men, because like a light the Word, who is life, and in whom all things are life, reveals the truth to men. Nor is it the fault of the Word that all men attain not to the knowledge of the truth, but that some remain in the dark. This is due to the fault of men who are not converted to the Word, and are unable to comprehend Him fully: wherefore darkness remains in them, more or less, according as they are more or less converted to the Word and comprehend Him. Hence John, in order to remove all deficiency from the Word’s manifestive power, after saying that he is the light of men, adds that he shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it: because darkness is due, not to the light not shining, but to the fact that some do not comprehend the light of the Word: even so, when the material sun is shining throughout the world, there is no darkness, save to one whose eyes are shut or weak.

This, then, is what to some extent we are able to learn from Holy Writ, concerning the divine generation and power of the Only Begotten Son of God.

Chapter XIV

solution of the foregoing objections against the divine generation

Since then truth excludes all error and banishes all doubt, it will be easy to solve the objections which seemed to raise difficulties in the matter of the divine generation.

For it is clear from what has been already established that in God we place an intelligible begetting, but not such as obtains in material things, the engendering of which is a kind of change and the antithesis of corruption. Because even the word of our intellect is conceived without change, nor is there a corruption that is antithetical to it: and we have already explained how the begetting of the Son of God is like to the conception of that same word. In like manner the word conceived in our mind does not pass from potentiality to act, except in so far as our intellect passes from potentiality to act; and yet the word is not begotten of our intellect, until the latter is in act, and once it is in act, the conceived word is there. But the divine intellect is never in potentiality, but only in act, as we have proved above.1 Therefore it begets the Word without passing from potentiality to act; just as one act gives rise to another; as, for example, light to brightness, and the intellect in act to the idea. Wherefore it is clear also that by being begotten the Son of God is none the less true God or eternal; rather in fact must He needs be coeternal with God whose Word He is, since the intellect in act is never without its word.

And because the Son of God is not begotten materially but intelligibly, it is foolish to doubt whether the Father gave Him His nature wholly or in part. For it is evident that if God understands Himself, the whole fulness of Him must be contained in the Word. And yet the substance given to the Son ceases not to be in the Father, for even with us the thing understood does not cease to have its proper nature, although the idea is the intelligible image of the very nature of the object understood. From the fact that the divine begetting is not material, it is clear that there is no need to distinguish in the Son of God the recipient and the nature received. In material generations it must be otherwise, inasmuch as the matter of the being begotten receives the form of the begetter. It is not so, however, with intelligible generations: because the word does not arise from the intellect in such a way that a part thereof be presupposed as receiving, while a part flows out of the intellect: but it originates entirely from the intellect, even as in us one word wholly arises from another, as a conclusion from principles. Now, when a thing in its entirety arises from another, it is impossible to indicate a recipient and a thing received, because all that arises issues from the source whence it arises. In like manner it is plain that the unity of the divine begetting is not destroyed, because there cannot be a distinction of several subsistent beings. For the divine essence, though subsistent, cannot be severed from the relation that we must needs ascribe to God for as much as the conceived Word of the divine mind proceeds from the divine utterance; because both the Word is the divine essence, as we have proved, and God who speaks the Word that proceeds from Him, is also the divine essence, nor are they distinct but identical. Moreover these relations are not accidents in God but subsistent; for nothing can be accidental to God, as we have proved above.1 Accordingly there are several subsistent beings, if we consider the relations; but one subsistent being if we consider the essence. Hence we say that there is one God, because there is one subsistent essence; and that there are three persons on account of the distinction between the subsistent relations. In human beings the distinction of persons regards not the specific essence, but certain things that are in addition to the specific nature; because in all human persons there is one specific nature, and yet there are many persons, since men are distinguished by things that are in addition to the nature. In God, therefore, we must not say that there is but one person by reason of the unity of the subsistent essence, but that there are several on account of the relations.

Hence it is clear that whatever is the principle of individuality in one is not necessarily in another: since neither is the divine essence in another God, nor paternity in the Son. And although two persons, namely Father and Son, are distinct not in essence but by relation, nevertheless this relation is not really distinct from the essence, seeing that relation in God cannot be an accident. Nor shall we find this impossible if we consider carefully our conclusions in the First Book,1 where we proved that in God are the perfections of all things, not by a kind of agglomeration, but by the unity of His simple essence. For the various perfections which in the creature are manifold in form, in God are one owing to the simplicity of His essence: thus man, as an animal, is by one form a living being, by another is wise, and by another, just: while all these things belong to God by His essence. Hence as wisdom and justice are accidents in man, whereas in God they are identified with the divine essence, so a relation such as paternity or sonship though an accident in man, in God is the divine essence.

Now we assert that God’s wisdom is His essence, while our wisdom is something additional to the essence, not as though the divine wisdom falls short of ours, but because God’s essence so transcends ours, that such things as wisdom and justice which in us are not essential to our being, belong to God perfectly by reason of His essence. Consequently whatever belongs to us in respect of our essence and wisdom as mutually distinct, must be ascribed to God in respect of His essence as identical: and the same applies to other matters. Accordingly, since the divine essence is identical with the relations of paternity or sonship, it follows that whatever belongs to paternity must belong to God, although paternity is in the essence. Now it is proper to paternity to be distinguished from sonship: because a father is related to his son as to some other man, and the notion of father is that he is the father of a son. Although then, God the Father is the divine essence, and so too is God the Son, He is distinct from the Son in so much as He is the Father, although He is one with Him, in so much as each is the divine essence. Whence also it is evident that though in God relation is not apart from something absolute, yet in God it is compared to the absolute otherwise than in creatures. Relation in creatures is compared to the absolute as accident to its subject; this is not so in God, in whom they are identical, even as in other things that are predicated of God. Now the same subject cannot have in itself contrary relations; for instance, a man cannot be both father and son in the same respect. The divine essence, however, on account of its absolute perfection, is identical with wisdom, justice, and other like things which in us belong to various species. And so nothing hinders the one essence being identical with both paternity and sonship, and Father and Son being one God, although the Father is not the Son: because it is the same essence that has being naturally, and its own intelligible Word.

From what has been said we may also conclude that relations in God are real and not merely logical. Because every relation which results from a thing’s proper operation, power, quantity, or the like, exists in that thing really, otherwise it would be merely a logical relation. Take for example knowledge and the thing known. The relation of knowledge to the thing known results from the action of the knower, and not from any action of the thing known: because the object known is unchanged in itself when it is understood and when it is not understood. Consequently the relation is really in the knower, and only logically in the object known: because that which is understood is said to be known in relation to knowledge, as a consequence of the relation which knowledge bears to it. The same is to be observed in right and left hand: for in animals there are distinct functions from which arise the relations of right to left. Wherefore that relation is really in the animal; so that whichever way the animal turns, the relation always remains the same: for its right side can never be called its left side. On the other hand, inanimate beings which are devoid of such functions, have no such relationship really in them; the relationship of right and left is ascribed to them in reference to some animal; thus the same pillar is said to be now on the right, now on the left, according to the different positions of the animal. Now the relation of the Word to God speaking, whose Word He is, is in God, for as much as God understands Himself; and this operation is in God, or rather is God Himself, as we have proved.1 It follows, then, that the aforesaid relations are really and truly in God, and not only according to our way of thinking.

Although there is relationship in God, it does not follow that in God there is something having a dependent existence. In us relations have a dependent existence, because their being is distinct from that of substance, wherefore they have their own mode of existence in accordance with their own nature, as other accidents have. For since all accidents are forms superadded to a substance, and caused by the principles of that substance, it follows that their existence is something additional to the existence of the substance and dependent thereon. Moreover each one of them will derive its order of precedence according as, in its proper nature, it is nearer to the substance, or more perfect. Hence a relation that is really adventitious to a substance, in point of existence comes last and is most imperfect. It comes last, because it presupposes not only the existence of the substance, but also that of other accidents, by which the relation is caused: thus oneness in quantity causes equality, and oneness in quality causes likeness. It is also most imperfect, because the proper notion of a relation consists in a habitude to something else: so that its proper being, which it adds to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but also on the being of something extraneous. Now this cannot occur in God, because in Him there is no other being besides His substance: since all that is in God is substance. Accordingly, as in God the being of wisdom is not dependent on the substance, because it is the being of His substance, so the being of relation is dependent neither on His substance nor on something extraneous, because even the being of relation is the being of His substance. Therefore, the fact that there are relations in God does not argue the presence of dependent being in Him, but only of a certain habitude, wherein the essence of relationship consists: thus because we ascribe wisdom to God, it does not follow that this is something accidental in Him, but only that it is a perfection, corresponding to our notion of wisdom.

Hence it is also evident that, although created relations are found to involve imperfection, it does not follow that the divine Persons, who are distinguished by relations, are imperfect, but it follows that this distinction is the least of all.

From what has been said, it is also manifest that, although God is predicated of Father and Son substantially, it does not follow, if Father and Son are two persons, that they are two Gods: for they are two by reason of the distinction of subsistent relations, yet they are one God on account of the unity of the subsistent essence. But among men it is not the case that several are one man, because the essence of human nature is not numerically one in both, nor is the essence of human nature subsistent so that human nature be called man. Since then in God there is unity of essence and distinction of relations, it clearly follows that there is no reason why there should not be opposites in the one God, but only such as result from the distinction of relations: such as Begetter and Begotten, which are mutually opposed relatively; and Begotten and Unbegotten, which are mutually opposed as affirmation and negation. For wherever there is distinction, there must needs be opposition of affirmation and negation: since there is no distinction, where there is no difference of affirmation and negation: because in all respects one must be the same as the other, and thus they are absolutely the same, and in no way distinct.

We have now treated sufficiently of the divine generation.

Chapter XV

of the holy ghost: that he is in god

The authority of Holy Writ not only reveals the existence in God of Father and Son, but also numbers the Holy Ghost with them. Thus our Lord says (Matth. 28:19): Going, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: and John declares (1 Jo. 5:7): There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. Moreover, Holy Writ witnesses to a kind of procession of this same Holy Spirit: for it says (Jo. 15:26): When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, he shall give testimony of me.

Chapter XVI

reasons for which certain men have deemed the holy ghost to be a creature

Some have deemed the Holy Ghost to be a creature, higher than other creatures: and they appealed to the authority of Scripture to confirm this assertion. For it is said (Amos 4:13) according to the Septuagint version: Behold he that formeth the mountains and createth the Spirit, and declareth his word to man. Again it is said (Zach. 12:1): Thus saith the Lord, who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man in him. Therefore it would seem that the Holy Spirit is a creature.

Again. Our Lord says, speaking of the Holy Ghost (Jo. 16:13): He shall not speak of himself: but what things soever he shall hear, he shall speak. Whence it would seem to follow that He never speaks on His own authority, but only in obedience to the commands of a master; for to speak what is heard seems to pertain to a minister. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is a creature subject to God.

Further. To be sent would seem to be the mark of an inferior: since authority is implied in one who sends. Now the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son: for our Lord said (Jo. 14:26): The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things: and (Jo. 15:26): When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is less than both Father and Son.

Also. Where Holy Scripture associates the Son with the Father in things pertaining to the Godhead, it makes no mention of the Holy Ghost; as when our Lord says (Matth. 11:27): No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, without mentioning the Holy Ghost. Again it is said (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent: and here again there is no mention of the Holy Ghost. Again, the Apostle says (Rom. 1:7): Grace to you, and peace from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ: and (1 Cor. 8:6): To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him: and here again nothing is said of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is not God.

Moreover. Whatsoever is in motion is a creature: for it was proved in the First Book1 that God is immovable. Now, Holy Scripture ascribes movement to the Holy Spirit: for it is said (Gen. 1:2): The spirit of God moved over the waters, and (Joel 2:28): I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh. Therefore, apparently, the Holy Ghost is a creature.

Further. Whatsoever can be increased or divided is changeable and created. Now this would seem to be ascribed to the Holy Ghost in the sacred writings. Thus the Lord said to Moses (Num. 11:16, 17): Gather unto me seventy men of the ancients of Israel … and I will take of thy spirit, and give to them. It is also stated that Eliseus besought Elias (4 Kings 2:9, 10): I beseech that in me may be thy double spirit, and Elias answered: If thou see me when I am taken from thee, thou shalt have what thou hast asked. Seemingly then, the Holy Ghost is subject to change, and is not God.

Again. There can be no sorrow in God, since it is a passion. But God is impassible. The Holy Ghost, however, is affected by sorrow; wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 4:30): Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God. It is also said (Isa. 63:10): They provoked to wrath and afflicted his Holy Spirit.1 Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is not God.

Besides. It is not fitting that God should pray, but rather that prayer should be addressed to him. Now prayer is becoming to the Holy Ghost, for it is said (Rom. 8:26): The Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings. Therefore the Holy Ghost is, seemingly, not God.

Moreover. No one gives fittingly that over which he has no dominion. But God the Father gives the Holy Ghost, and so too does the Son: for our Lord says (Lk. 11:13): Your Father in heaven will give the good Spirit to them that ask him: and Peter says that God gives the Holy Ghost to them that obey him (Acts 5:32). Wherefore it would seem that the Holy Ghost is not God.

Again. If the Holy Ghost be true God, He must needs have the divine nature: and so, since He proceeds from the Father (Jo. 15:26) it follows of necessity that He receives the divine nature from Him. Now, he that receives the nature of the one that produces him, is begotten by him: since it is proper to the one begotten to be brought forth in specific likeness to his principle. Therefore the Holy Ghost would be begotten, and consequently He would be the Son: and this is surely contrary to Faith.

Again. If the Holy Ghost receives the divine nature from the Father, and is not begotten, it follows that the divine nature is bestowed in two ways, namely by way of generation, as the Son proceeds, and by the way in which the Holy Ghost proceeds. Now, seemingly, it is inconsistent with unity of nature to be bestowed in two ways: as can be proved by a review of the various natures. Seeing then that the Holy Ghost does not receive the (divine) nature by way of generation, it must follow, apparently, that He does not receive it at all: and consequently that he is not God.

This was the opinion of Arius, who maintained that the Son and Holy Ghost are creatures: but that the Son is greater than the Holy Ghost, and that the Holy Ghost is subservient to the Son: even as he maintained that the Son is less than the Father. As regards his teaching about the Holy Ghost, he was followed by Macedonius, who rightly held the Father and Son to be of one and the same substance, but refused to believe this about the Holy Ghost, and contended that He is a creature. Hence by some the Macedonians are called Semi-arians, because they partly agree with the Arians, and partly disagree.

Chapter XVII

that the holy ghost is true god

It can be clearly shown by the authority of Holy Writ that the Holy Ghost is God.

No temple is consecrated save to God alone: wherefore it is said (Ps. 10:5): The Lord is in his holy temple. Now, temples are dedicated to the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:19): Know you not that your members are temples of the Holy Ghost? Therefore the Holy Ghost is God. This argument is enhanced by the fact that our members, which the Apostle declares to be the temple of the Holy Ghost, are also the members of Christ. For he had already said (verse 15): Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ? And it would be unfitting, since Christ is true God, as we have proved above, if Christ’s members were the temple of the Holy Ghost, unless the Holy Ghost were God also.

Again. The service of latria is given by the saints to God alone: for it is said (Deut. 6:13): Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and thou shalt serve him only. Now the saints serve the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (Philip. 3:3): We are the circumcision, who serve the divine spirit:1 and although some codices read: Who serve in the spirit of the Lord, the Greek and older Latin codices have: Who serve the divine Spirit:2 also, from the Greek, it is plain that the text refers to service of latria, which is due to God alone. Therefore the Holy Ghost is true God, and the worship of latria is due to Him.

Further. The sanctification of man is a work belonging exclusively to God: for it is said (Levit. 22:9): I am the Lord who sanctify them. Now, it is the Holy Ghost who sanctifies: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:11): You are washed … you are sanctified … you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the spirit of our God; and (2 Thess. 2:12): For that God hath chosen you first fruits unto salvation, in sanctification of the Spirit, and faith of the truth. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. As the body derives natural life from the soul, so does the soul derive the righteous life from God: wherefore our Lord says (Jo. 6:58): As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, the same also shall live by me. Now, this latter life comes to us through the Holy Ghost: hence it is added (ibid. 64): It is the Spirit that quickeneth: and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:13): If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live. Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Also. In order to prove His divinity against the Jews, who could not bear that He should make Himself equal to God, our Lord claimed the power of raising the dead to life. Here are His words (Jo. 5:21): As the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom he will. Now the power of raising the dead to life belongs to the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:2): If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Again. Creation is the work of God alone, as we have proved above.1

Moreover. It is proper to God to dwell in the souls of the saints: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:16): You are the temple of the living God: as God saith: I will dwell in them. And the same Apostle ascribes this to the Holy Ghost: for he says (1 Cor. 3:16): Know you not that you are the temple of God; and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is proper to God to be everywhere: for he says (Jerem. 23:24): Do I not fill heaven and earth? And this also belongs to the Holy Ghost: for it is said (Wis. 1:7): The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world: and (Ps. 138:7): Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I fly from thy face? and (ibid. 8): If I ascend into heaven thou art there, etc. Also, our Lord said to his disciples (Acts 1:8): You shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses to me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is everywhere, since he dwells in men in every part of the world. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Further. The name of God is expressly given to the Holy Ghost in Holy Writ. Thus Peter says (Acts 5:3): Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou shouldst lie to the Holy Ghost? and afterwards (verse 4): Thou hast not lied to men, but to God. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is said (1 Cor. 14:2): He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no man heareth. Yet the Spirit1 speaketh mysteries. Hence we are given to understand that the Spirit spoke in those who spoke in divers tongues. And further on (verse 21) he says: In the law it is written: In other tongues and other lips I will speak to this people: and neither so will they hear me, saith the Lord. Therefore the Holy Ghost, who speaks mysteries in various lips and tongues, is God.

Again. The above text continues further on (verses 24, 25): If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all. The secrets of his heart are made manifest, and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed. Now, it is clear from what had been said previously, viz., that the Spirit speaketh mysteries, that the revelation of the secrets of the heart is the work of the Holy Ghost. And this is a sign proper to the Godhead: for it is said (Jerem. 17:9, 10): The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable, who can know it? I, the Lord, who search the heart, and Prove the reins. Wherefore, even an unbeliever is led by this sign to conclude that he who speaks these secrets of hearts, is God. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. Further on the text continues (verses 32, 33): The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. For God is not the God of dissension, but of peace. Now, the graces of the prophets, indicated by the spirits of the prophets, are from the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost who distributes these graces so that they cause not dissension but peace, is shown to be God, from the words: He is the God, not of dissension, but of peace.

Moreover. It is the work of God alone, to adopt anyone as a son of God: for no spiritual creature is the son of God by nature, but only by the grace of adoption. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 4:4, 5) ascribes this work to the Son of God, who is true God: God sent his Son … that we might receive the adoption of sons. Now, the Holy Ghost is the cause of this adoption: for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:15): You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). Therefore the Holy Ghost is not a creature, but is God.

Again. If the Holy Ghost be not God, He must be a creature. Now, it is plain that He is neither a corporeal nor a spiritual creature. For no creature is infused into a spiritual creature, since it is impossible to participate in a creature, and rather it is the creature that participates. Now the Holy Ghost is infused into the souls of the saints, so that they participate in Him as it were: for we read that Christ,1 and also the Apostles,2 were filled with the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God, and not a creature.

If, however, anyone say that the aforesaid works which are proper to God, are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, not as though they were exercised by him authoritatively, as God, but ministerially, as a creature, we reply that this is clearly shown to be untrue, from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:6): There are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all: and afterwards having enumerated the various divine gifts, he continues (verse 11): All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. In these words he clearly indicates that the Holy Ghost is God, both by ascribing to Him works which previously he had ascribed to God, and by stating that the Holy Ghost does those works according as He will. Therefore it is evident that the Holy Ghost is God.

Chapter XVIII

that the holy ghost is a subsistent person

Some have denied that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person. Of these some have contended that He is the Godhead of Father and Son; an opinion ascribed to certain followers of Macedonius. Others maintained that He is merely some accidental perfection bestowed by God on our souls; for instance, wisdom, charity, or the like, in which we participate, as in any other created accidents. Against this view we must show that the Holy Ghost is nothing of the kind.

For, properly speaking, accidental forms have no operation; it is their subject that operates, according as he will: thus a wise man uses his wisdom when he chooses. Now, the Holy Ghost works according as He will, as we have shown.1 Therefore the Holy Ghost must not be reckoned an accidental perfection of the soul.

Again. The Scriptures teach us that the Holy Ghost is the cause of all the perfections of man’s soul. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us: and (1 Cor. 12:8): To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit: and so on. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not to be reasoned a mere accidental perfection of the human soul, since He is Himself the cause of all such perfections.

The teaching of Holy Writ is also opposed to the contention that the name of the Holy Ghost signifies the essence of Father and Son, so that in consequence He would be personally distinct from neither. For it is stated that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jo. 15:6), and that He receives from the Son (Jo. 16:14): neither of which can be referred to the divine essence, seeing that the divine essence does not proceed from the Father, nor does it receive from the Son. Therefore we must infer that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.

Again. Holy Writ clearly speaks of the Holy Ghost as of a subsistent divine person. Thus it is said (Acts 13:2): As they were ministering to the Lord, and fasting, the Holy Ghost said to them: Separate me Saul and Barnabas for the work whereunto I have taken them: and further on (verse 4): So they, being sent by the Holy Ghost, went. Again (Acts 15:28) the Apostles said: It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost, to lay no further burden upon you, etc. Now, these things would not be said of the Holy Ghost, were He not a subsistent person. Therefore the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.

Moreover. Seeing that the Father and the Son are subsistent divine persons, the Holy Ghost would not be numbered together with them, unless He also were a subsistent divine person. Now He is clearly numbered together with them, when our Lord says to His disciples (Matth. 28:19): Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Again it is said (2 Cor. 13:13): The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Ghost, be with you all: and (Jo. 5:7): There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. These texts show clearly that He is not only a subsistent person, even as the Father and the Son, but also that He has the one same essence with them.

Someone might endeavour to evade the foregoing arguments by drawing a distinction between the Spirit of God and the Holy Spirit: since some of the above quotations speak of the Spirit of God, and some, of the Holy Ghost.

Nevertheless the identity of the Spirit of God with the Holy Spirit is clearly indicated by the words of the Apostle in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, where after saying: To us God hath revealed them by the Holy Spirit,1 in confirmation of this he adds: For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God, and then concludes: So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God. Hence it clearly follows that the Holy Ghost and the Spirit of God are one and the same.

Again, this is clear from our Lord’s words (Matth. 10:20): It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh within you: in place of which Mark has (13:11): It is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost. Hence it is clear that the Holy Ghost and the Spirit of God are one and the same.

Accordingly, since it is evident in many ways from the foregoing passages that the Holy Ghost is not a creature, but is true God, it follows that we must not conclude that when we speak of the Holy Ghost filling the souls of holy persons and dwelling therein, the sense is the same as when we describe the devil as filling and inhabiting certain persons. Thus we read of Judas (Jo. 13:27) that after the morsel, Satan entered into him. Again, Peter, according to some versions, said (Acts 5:3): Ananias, why hath Satan filled2 thy heart? For, since the devil is a creature, as we have seen above,3 he cannot fill a man as though a man could participate of the devil; nor can he dwell in a man’s soul participatively or substantially. But he is said to fill some men by the effect of his wickedness: wherefore Paul said to a certain man (Acts 13:10): O full of all guile, and of all deceit, child of the devil! Whereas the Holy Ghost, being God, dwells in the soul by His substance, and makes us good by participation of Him: for He is His own goodness, since He is God: which cannot be true of any creature. This, however, does not hinder Him from filling the souls of holy men by the effect of His power.

Chapter XIX

the meaning of statements that are made about the holy ghost

For as much as we are taught by the authority of Holy Scripture, we firmly hold that the Holy Ghost is true God, subsistent and personally distinct from the Father and the Son. We must now consider how this truth is to be understood in both respects, so that we may be able to defend it against the attacks of unbelievers.

For greater clearness, we must begin by observing that in every intellectual nature there is a will: because the intellect is actuated by an intelligible form, in as much as it actually understands: even as a natural thing acquires the actuality of natural being, by its own form. Now, a natural thing, by the form that perfects it in its species, has an inclination to its proper operations, and to the proper end to which it attains by its operation: since, such as a thing is, such is its operation, and such the end to which it tends. Hence from the intelligible form there results in the intelligent being an inclination to its proper operations and end. This inclination of the intellectual nature is the will, and is the principle of those operations that are in our power, and whereby the intellect operates for the sake of an end: because the end and the good are the object of the will. Consequently in every intelligent being there is a will.

Now, since several acts are seen to belong to the will, such as desire, delight, hate, and so forth, we find that the one principle and root of all is love. This may be explained as follows:—The will, as stated above,1 is in intellectual beings, what the natural inclination is in natural beings: and this inclination is known as the natural appetite. Now the natural inclination arises from the natural thing having through its form (which we have stated to be the principle of its inclination) an association with or aptitude for the thing to which it is moved; for instance, a heavy body in reference to a lower position. Wherefore this too is the source of every inclination of the will, for as much as by the intelligible form something is apprehended as suitable or attractive. Now, to be attracted towards a thing, as such, is to love it. Wherefore every inclination of the will, as well as of the sensitive appetite, has its origin in love. Thus through loving a thing, we desire it if it be absent, we rejoice in it when it is present; we grieve when we are parted from it; whatever parts us from the object loved is to us an object of hate and anger. Consequently that which is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in his will: yet not in the same way. For it is in his intellect by its specific likeness: whereas it is in his will, as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle, by reason of the proportion and aptitude of the principle to that term. Thus, in a sense, the higher place is in the flame, because fire is volatile, and consequently is proportionate and apt for such a place: and the kindled fire is in the kindling fire by the likeness of its form.

Since, then, we have proved that there is a will in every intellectual nature, and since God is an intelligent being, as we have shown,1 it follows that there is a will in Him: not that His will is something over and above His essence, as neither is His intellect, as we have proved above:2 but that His will is His very substance:3 and seeing that God’s intellect also is His very substance, it follows that in God intellect and will are one and the same. It has been sufficiently explained in the First Book4 how things that elsewhere are many are one in God.

And since we have proved1 that God’s operation is His very essence, and that His will is His essence,2 it follows that in God will is not power or habit, but act. Now we have shown that every act of the will springs from love. Therefore there is love in God. Also since, as we proved in the First Book,3 the proper object of the divine will is the goodness of God, it follows that He Himself and His goodness are the first and principal object of His love. Now it has been shown that the beloved object must be, in a sense, in the lover’s will. Therefore, since God loves Himself, it follows that God is in His own will as the object loved is in the lover. Now the beloved object is in the lover, in as much as it is loved, and love is an act of the will: and the act of God’s will is His being. Therefore God’s being by way of love in His will is not accidental being, as in us, but essential being. Consequently God considered as existing in His will is truly and substantially God.

Moreover, the fact that a thing is in the will as a beloved object in a lover, bears a certain relation to the idea conceived by the intellect, and to the thing itself the idea of which is called the word: because a thing would not be loved, were it not known in some way: nor is it the mere idea of the beloved object that is loved, but the object in as much as it is a good in itself. Hence the love, whereby God is in His own will as the beloved in the lover, must proceed both from the Word of God, and from God who utters the Word.

And seeing that we have proved that the object loved is not in the lover as to its specific likeness, as the object understood is in an intelligent being: and, since whatever proceeds from another as begotten, proceeds from its begetter as to its specific likeness: it follows that the procession of a thing to its being in a will as the beloved object in the lover is not by way of generation, while the procession of a thing to its being in an intellect is by way of generation, as we have shown above. Therefore God proceeding by way of love, does not proceed as begotten: and consequently cannot receive the name of Son. Since however the beloved object exists in the lover as inclining and, as it were, inwardly impelling the lover to the thing loved, and since the breath (spiritus) is a living being’s impulse from within itself, it is becoming that God, proceeding by way of love, should receive the name of Spirit, because with God to breathe is to love.1 Hence the Apostle ascribes a certain impulse to spirit and love: thus he says (Rom. 8:14): Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God, and (2 Cor. 5:14): The charity of Christ presseth us. And as every intellectual movement is denominated from its term, and as the aforesaid love is that by which God Himself is loved, it is becoming that God, proceeding by way of love, be called the Holy Spirit: because things consecrated to God are wont to be called holy.

Chapter XX

of the effects ascribed by scripture to the holy ghost in respect of all creatures

In the light of what has already been said, we must now consider the effects ascribed by Scripture to the Holy Ghost.

We have already shown2 that God’s goodness is the reason for His willing other things to exist, and that by His will He brought things into being. Therefore the love whereby He loves His own goodness is the cause of things being created. Hence, as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics,3 certain philosophers of old said that the love of the gods was the cause of all things. Dionysius also says4 that God’s love did not allow him to be fruitless. Now we established in the foregoing chapter that the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love whereby God loves Himself. Hence the Holy Ghost is the cause of the creation: and this is indicated (Ps. 103:30): Send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created. Also, seeing that the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of love, and that love is an impelling and moving force, any movement that God causes in things is rightly appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Now the first change wrought by God in things is that whereby he produced the various species out of formless created matter. Wherefore Holy Scripture ascribes this work to the Holy Ghost: thus it is said (Gen. 1:2): The Spirit of God moved over the waters. For Augustine would have the waters to signify the primary matter over which the Spirit of the Lord is said to move, not as being in motion, but as the principle of movement.

Again. God’s government of the world is understood to be a kind of movement, forasmuch as God directs and moves all things to their respective ends. Accordingly if impulse and movement belong to the Holy Ghost as love, it is fitting that government and increase be ascribed to the Holy Ghost. Hence it is said (Job 33:4): The Spirit of God made me; and (Ps. 142:10): Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land. And, since to govern subjects is the proper function of a lord, it is fitting that lordship be ascribed to the Holy Ghost: thus the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:17): Now the Lord is a Spirit: and we say in the Creed: I believe in the Holy Ghost, Lord.

Again. Life is revealed especially in movement: for we say that a thing lives when it moves itself, and in a general way we ascribe life to all things that move themselves to action. If then impulse and movement are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as love, life also is fittingly ascribed to Him. Thus it is said (Jo. 6:64): It is the Spirit that quickeneth: and (Ezech. 37:6): I will give you Spirit and you shall live. Also, in the Creed we confess our belief in the Holy Ghost, the life-giver. This is in harmony with the name spirit: for an animal’s body lives by the vital spirit which is diffused throughout its members by the principle of life.

Chapter XXI

of the effects ascribed to the holy ghost, as regards the gifts bestowed by god on the rational creature

With regard to the effects wrought by God in the rational nature exclusively, it is to be observed that in whatsoever way we become like to a divine perfection, that particular perfection is said to be given to us. Thus God gives us wisdom, according as in any way we become like the divine wisdom. Hence, since the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love whereby God loves Himself, as we have shown;1 forasmuch as we become like this love, by loving God, the Holy Ghost is said to be given to us by God. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. It is however to be noted that things which we receive from God, must be referred to God as their efficient and exemplary cause. He is their efficient cause, in as much as an effect is produced in us by His operative power: and He is their exemplary cause, in as much as what we receive from Him, reflects Him in some way. Since then Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have one same power and one same essence, it follows that whatever God works in us, is wrought by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost together as its efficient cause. But the word of wisdom, whereby we know God, and which God implants in us, properly speaking, reflects the Son: and, in like manner, the love whereby we love God, properly reflects the Holy Ghost. Thus although the charity that is in us is the effect of Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost; in a special way it is said to be in us from the Holy Ghost. Now, the divine effects not only have their beginning in the divine operation, but also are upheld in their being thereby, as proved above.1 Again, nothing can work where it is not, because worker and work must needs be actually together, even as the mover and the thing moved. Hence, wherever we find a divine effect, God must be there as its efficient cause. Therefore, since charity whereby we love God, is in us from the Holy Ghost, it follows that the Holy Ghost is in us, so long as charity remains in us. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:16): Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? Seeing then that by the Holy Ghost we are made lovers of God, and that every beloved object is in its lover as such, it follows that by the Holy Ghost, the Father and Son also dwell in us. Hence our Lord said (Jo. 14:23): We will come to him, that is to him that loves God, and will make our abode within him: and (1 Jo. 3:24): In this we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us.

Again. It is clear that God must love very much those whom He makes lovers of Himself by giving them the Holy Ghost: for He would not bestow so great a good except through love. Hence it is said in the Lord’s Person: I love them that love me (Prov. 8:17), not as though we had first2 loved God, but because he hath first loved us (1 Jo. 4:10). Now everything that is loved is in its lover. Consequently the effect of the Holy Ghost is that not only is God in us, but also that we are in God. Hence it is said (1 Jo. 4:16): He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him: and again (ibid. 13): In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us; because he hath given us of his Spirit.

Now, it is proper to friendship that a man reveals his secrets to his friend: because friendship unites their affections, and of two hearts makes one; and consequently when a man reveals something to his friend, he would seem not to have taken it out of his own heart. Hence our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. 15:15): I will not now call you servants … but I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you. Since then we are made the friends of God by the Holy Ghost, it is fittingly said that the divine mysteries are revealed to men by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9, 10): It is written: That eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him: but to us God hath revealed them by his Spirit, etc.

Again, man’s speech is based on the things he knows: and therefore it is fitting that man should speak divine mysteries by the Holy Ghost, according to the texts (1 Cor. 14:2): By the Spirit he speaketh mysteries: and (Matth. 10:20): For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you. Also, it is said of the prophets (2 Pet. 1:21) that the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost. Hence the words about the Holy Ghost in the Creed: Who spoke by the prophets.

Now it is part of friendship not only that a man share his secrets with his friend, on account of the union of hearts, but the same union requires that he should share his belongings with him; because, since a man regards his friend as his other self, it follows that he will succour him as he would succour himself, by sharing his goods with him. Hence it is said to be a mark of friendship that a man in both will and deed should seek the good of his friend. Thus it is said (1 Jo. 3:17): He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him? This is especially true of God, whose will is efficacious in the production of its effect: and therefore all God’s gifts are fittingly stated to be given us by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit, and after enumerating many others, the text continues: All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will.

Again, it is manifest that in order to reach the place of fire, a body needs to be assimilated to fire and become light so as to acquire the movement of fire: so too, man in order to reach the happy state of divine fruition, which belongs to God by nature, needs first to be assimilated to God by spiritual perfections, and then to perform works in accordance with those perfections, and thus at length to reach the aforesaid state of happiness. Now spiritual gifts are bestowed on us by the Holy Ghost, as we have shown: and thus by the Holy Ghost we are conformed to God; by Him we are enabled to perform good works; and by Him the way is prepared to heaven. These three are insinuated by the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:21, 22): God hath anointed us, and hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts:1 and (Eph. 1:13, 14): You were sealed2 with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance. This sealing apparently alludes to the likeness of conformity; the anointing, to man’s being enabled to perform works of perfection; and the pledge, to the hope which spurs us on to our heavenly inheritance, which is perfect bliss.

And, since a man adopts another as his son because he wishes him well, so that the latter becomes his heir, the adoption of the sons of God is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. 8:15: You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).

Now, if a man becomes another’s friend, by this very fact all offence is removed: since friendship is opposed to offence: hence it is said (Prov. 10:12): Charity covereth all sins. Wherefore as we are made the friends of God by the Holy Ghost, it follows that God forgives us our sins through Him: hence our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. 20:22, 23): Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and for this reason those who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost are denied forgiveness of their sins (Matth. 12:31), because they have not that through which man receives forgiveness. Hence too, we are said to be renewed, and cleansed or washed by the Holy Ghost: Send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created: and thou shalt renew the face of the earth (Ps. 103:30), and: Be renewed in the Spirit of your mind (Eph. 4:23), and: If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Sion, and shall wash away the blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning (Isa. 4:4).

Chapter XXII

of the effects ascribed to the holy ghost, according as he moves the creature to god

Now that we have considered the works of God in us which the Scriptures ascribe to the Holy Ghost, it remains for us to consider how the Holy Ghost moves us to God. In the first place mutual intercourse would seem to belong to friendship in a very special manner. Now, man’s intercourse with God consists in contemplating Him: thus the Apostle says (Philip, 3:20): Our conversation is in heaven. Since, then, the Holy Ghost makes us to be lovers of God, it follows that by Him we are made contemplators of God. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord.

It also belongs to friendship that a man delight in the presence of his friend, and rejoice in his words and deeds: also that he find in him consolation in all his troubles: hence it is especially to our friends that we have recourse for comfort in time of sorrow. Since then the Holy Ghost makes us to be friends of God, and causes Him to live in us, and us in Him, as we have proved, it follows that it is through the Holy Ghost that we rejoice in God, and are comforted in all the hardships and afflictions of the world. Hence it is said (Ps. 50:14): Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with thy1 perfect Spirit, and (Rom. 14:7): The Kingdom of God … is justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost, and (Acts 9:31): The church had peace … and was edified, walking in the fear of the Lord, and was filled with the consolation of the Holy Ghost. For this reason, our Lord calls the Holy Ghost by the name of Paraclete or Consoler (Jo. 14:26): But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, etc.

It also belongs to friendship that a man consent to the things which his friend wills. Now God’s will is made known to us in His commandments. Therefore it belongs to our love for God, that we fulfil His commandments, according to Jo. 14:15: If you love me, keep my commandments. Wherefore, as the Holy Ghost makes us lovers of God, it is He also who leads us to fulfil the commandments of God, according to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 8:14): Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

We must observe, however, that the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost, not as though they were slaves, but as being free. For, since to be free is to be cause of one’s own actions, we are said to do freely what we do of ourselves. Now this is what we do willingly: and what we do unwillingly, we do, not freely but under compulsion. This compulsion may be absolute, when the cause is wholly extraneous, and the patient contributes nothing to the action, for instance, when a man is compelled to move by force: or it may be partly voluntary, as when a man is willing to do or suffer that which is less opposed to his will, in order to avoid that which is more opposed thereto. Now, the Holy Ghost inclines us to act, in such a way as to make us act willingly, inasmuch as He causes us to be lovers of God. Hence the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost to act freely and for love, not slavishly and for fear: wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 8:15): You have not received the Spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons.

Now the will is directed to that which is truly good: so that when, either through passion or through an evil habit or disposition, a man turns away from what is truly good, he acts slavishly, in so far as he is led by something extraneous, if we consider the natural direction of the will; but if we consider the act of the will, as inclined towards a seeming good, he acts freely when he follows the passion or evil habit, but he acts slavishly if, while his will remains the same, he refrain from what he desires through fear of the law which forbids the fulfilment of his desire. Accordingly, when the Holy Ghost, by love inclines the will to the true good to which it is naturally directed, He removes both the servitude whereby a man, the slave of passion and sin, acts against the order of the will, and the servitude whereby a man acts against the inclination of his will, and in obedience to the law, as the slave and not the friend of the law. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:17): Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty, and (Gal. 5:18): If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law. For this reason the Holy Ghost is said to mortify the deeds of the flesh, in as much as the sufferings of the flesh do not turn us from the true good, to which the Holy Ghost leads us by love, according to Rom. 8:13: If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.

Chapter XXIII

solution of the arguments given above,1 against the divinity of the holy ghost

It remains for us to reply to the arguments given above, whereby it was contended that the Holy Ghost is not God, but a creature.

Here we must remark in the first place that the word spirit is apparently derived from the respiration of animals, which is a certain movement of the air by inhalation and exhalation. Hence the name spirit is given to any impulse or movement of an aerial body. Thus the wind is called a spirit (Ps. 148:8): Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy spirits,2 which fulfil his word. Thus too the subtle vapour diffused throughout the members of the body to facilitate movement is called spirit. Again, since air is invisible, the name spirit is applied also to any kind of motive power or invisible substance. Hence both the sensitive and the rational soul, as well as angels and God Himself, are called spirits: and in a special way God proceeding by way of love, because love implies a certain motive power. Thus when Amos says (4:13): He that createth the spirit, he refers to the wind, as our translation more clearly expresses it: and this is in keeping with the context: He that formeth the mountains. When Zacharias says of God (12:1) that he formeth the spirit of man, he is speaking of the human soul: wherefore we cannot conclude that the Holy Ghost is a creature.

In like manner the words of our Lord in reference to the Holy Ghost (Jo. 14:13), He shall not speak of himself: but what things soever he shall hear, he shall speak, do not prove that the Holy Ghost is a creature. For we have proved3 that the Holy Ghost is God proceeding from God: whence it follows that He receives His essence from another, even as we have shown in reference to the Son.4 Wherefore since, in God, knowledge, power and operation are the divine essence, all knowledge, power, and operation of the Son and Holy Ghost are from another; but in the Son they are from the Father alone, whereas in the Holy Ghost, they are from Father and Son. Since, then, one of the operations of the Holy Ghost is to speak in holy men, as we have shown,1 for this reason He is said not to speak of Himself, because He does not work of Himself. In Him, to hear is to receive knowledge, even as He receives His essence, from Father and Son. Thus we acquire knowledge by hearing: and Scripture is wont to speak of divine things after the manner of human. Nor need we stress the use of the future tense when he says: He shall hear, because, in the Holy Ghost, to receive is eternal: for verbs of any tense can apply to eternity, since eternity embraces all time.

For the same reason it is clear that the mission whereby the Holy Ghost is said to be sent by the Father and the Son, is no proof that He is a creature. For it has been said1 that the Son of God is said to be sent in as much as He appeared to men by taking visible flesh: so that He began to be in the world after a manner in which He was not there hitherto, that is to say visibly, whereas He was always there invisibly as God. Now, it was owing to the Father that the Son did this: wherefore in this respect He is said to have been sent by the Father. Now, the Holy Ghost also appeared visibly, both in the form of a dove over Christ at the Baptism, and under the form of fiery tongues over the Apostles. And, though He did not become a dove or fire, as the Son became man, nevertheless He appeared under these visible forms as signs of Himself. Hence He also was in the world in a new way, that is to say, visibly: and this was owing to the Father and Son; for which reason He is said to be sent by the Father and the Son: and this does not indicate subjection in Him, but procession.

There is also another way in which both the Son and Holy Ghost are said to be sent, but invisibly. For it is clear from what has been said that the Son proceeds from the Father, as the Father’s knowledge of Himself, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son, as God’s love for Himself. Hence, as we have already said, when by the Holy Ghost a man becomes a lover of God, the Holy Ghost dwells in Him; and thus is in man in a new way, namely by dwelling in him in respect of a new effect. That the Holy Ghost produces this effect in a man is owing to the Father and the Son: and for this reason He is said to be sent invisibly by them. In like manner the Son is said to be sent invisibly into a man’s mind, when through his knowledge of God, a man comes to love God. Wherefore it is clear that neither does this kind of mission in the Son imply subjection on the part of the Holy Ghost, but only procession from another.

Nor does it argue against the divinity of the Holy Ghost, that Father and Son are sometimes associated without mention of the Holy Ghost, as neither is it an argument against the divinity of the Son, that the Father is sometimes spoken of without mention being made of the Son. For thus Scripture insinuates tacitly that when anything pertaining to the Godhead is said of one of the Three, it is to be referred to all of them, because they are one God. Nor indeed can God the Father be understood apart from His Word and Love, nor vice versa; and for this reason, in any one of the Three, all Three are implied, so that sometimes the Son is mentioned alone, in reference to that which is common to the Three, for instance (Matth. 11:27): Neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son: and yet both Father and Holy Ghost know the Father. In the same way it is said (1 Cor. 2:11) of the Holy Ghost: The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God: and yet it is certain that both Father and Son have this knowledge.

It is also evident that it cannot be proved that the Holy Ghost is a creature, from the fact that Holy Writ ascribes to Him things that savour of movement. Such things are to be taken metaphorically since Holy Writ sometimes ascribes movement to God: for instance (Gen. 3:8): When they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise; and (Gen. 18:21): I will go down and see whether they have done according to the cry. Hence, the words, The Spirit of the Lord moved over the water, must be taken as stated above, as when we say that the will inclines to its object, or that love pursues the beloved. Some however refer these words, not to the Holy Ghost, but to the air, the natural place of which is above the waters: wherefore to indicate the manifold changes of the air, it is said that it moved above the waters.—The words, I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh (Joel 2:28), must be taken as referring to the sending of the Holy Ghost by Father and Son, of which we have spoken above. The expression pour out indicates the abundant effect of the Holy Ghost, in that it will not confine itself to one person, but will reach many, from whom it will flow forth, as it were, on to others, as may be seen when corporeal things are poured forth.

In like manner the words (Num. 11:17), I will take of thy spirit, and will give to them refer, not to the essence or person of the Holy Ghost, since He is indivisible, but to His effects whereby He dwells in us, for they can increase and decrease in man. Yet the sense is not that the identical effect taken from one person is bestowed on another, but that the effect which is increased on the one hand is similar to that which is decreased on the other. Nor does this necessitate subtraction from one person, if another receive an addition, because a spiritual thing can be shared by several at once, without detriment to any one of them. Consequently it does not follow that Moses must have been deprived of any of his spiritual gifts, in order that they might be bestowed on others: this bestowal refers to the act or office, because the Holy Ghost accomplished through several persons, that which previously He had effected through Moses alone. Thus again Eliseus did not ask that the essence or person of the Holy Ghost might be doubled in him, but that he might receive the Holy Ghost’s twofold effect bestowed on Elias, namely prophecy and the working of miracles. Yet it is not unreasonable that one man should have a more abundant share of the Holy Ghost’s gifts than another, whether twice as much or in any other proportion of excess, since every man’s power is measurable and finite: but Eliseus would not have presumed to ask that he might surpass his master in a supernatural effect.

It is also plain that, as is customary in Holy Writ, human passions are ascribed to God metaphorically. Thus it is said (Ps. 105:40): The Lord was exceedingly angry with his people: for God is said to be angry, by reason of a likeness in the effect: because he punishes, and angry people do this: wherefore it is said (ibid. 41): And he delivered them into the hands of the nations. In the same way the Holy Ghost is said to grieve, on account of a likeness in the effect: because He abandons sinners, even as men who are grieved abandon those who grieve them.

It is also a usual mode of expression in Holy Writ, to ascribe to God that which God works in man, according to Gen. 22:12: Now I know that thou fearest God, that is, I have made thee know. In this sense it is said that the Holy Ghost asks, because He makes us ask: since He causes the love of God in our hearts so that we desire to enjoy Him, and through desire, we ask.

Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love with which God loves Himself; and with the same love God loves Himself and other things for the sake of His own goodness; wherefore it is evident that the love with which God loves us pertains to the Holy Ghost: also the love with which we love God, since it is he who makes us lovers of God, as proved above.1 As regards both of these, it is fitting that the Holy Ghost be given to us. As to the love with which God loves us, it is in keeping with our usual mode of speaking, when we say that a man gives his love to another when he begins to love him. It is true indeed that God does not begin to love anyone in time, if we consider the divine will with which He loves us: but the effect of His love is caused in us in time, when He draws us to Himself. As to the love with which we love God, it is fitting, because the Holy Ghost causes this love in us. Hence in respect of this love He dwells in us, as we have shown, and thus we possess Him as one in whose wealth we share. And because it is owing to the Father and the Son, that the Holy Ghost dwells in us and is possessed by us, through the love which He causes in us, He is fittingly said to be given to us by the Father and the Son. Nor does this prove Him to be less than the Father and the Son, but that He proceedeth from them. He is also said to give Himself to us, in as much as the love, by which He dwells in us, is caused in us by Him as well as by the Father and the Son.

Now, though the Holy Ghost is true God, and has the true divine nature from Father and Son, it does not follow that He is a Son. For a man is a son because he is begotten; and consequently if one thing receive from another the latter’s nature, otherwise than by being begotten, the conditions of sonship would be lacking. Thus if by a power granted him by God, one man were to fashion another from some part of his body, or from some extraneous matter like a work of art, the result would not be called his son, since he would not be born of him. Now, the procession of the Holy Ghost does not satisfy the conditions of birth, as we have shown.1 Therefore, although the Holy Ghost derives the divine nature from Father and Son, He cannot be called their Son. And it is reasonable that in God alone can the divine nature be communicated in several ways: because in God alone is operation identified with being. Hence, since in Him, as in every intellectual nature, there is intelligence and will, it follows that what proceeds in Him by way of intelligence, as a word does, and by way of love and will, as love does, must have divine being, and must be God. Consequently both Son and Holy Ghost are true God.

We have said enough about the divinity of the Holy Ghost. Any other difficulties touching His procession must be considered in the light of what we have said about the nativity of the Son.

Chapter XXIV

that the holy ghost proceeds from the son

Now some are in error about the procession of the Holy Ghost, and hold that He does not proceed from the Son. Accordingly, we must show that the Holy Ghost does proceed from the Son.

It is evident from Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son: for it is said (Rom. 8:9): If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his. And, lest anyone say that the Spirit proceeding from the Father is distinct from the Spirit of the Son, it is plain from the words of the same Apostle that the same Holy Spirit is the Father’s and the Son’s. For the words quoted above, If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his, are preceded by these: If so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now, the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of Christ, merely because Christ possessed Him as man, according to Lk. 4:1: Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan; since it is said (Gal. 4:6): Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: Abba (Father). Accordingly, the Holy Ghost makes us to be sons of God in as much as He is the Spirit of the Son of God. Now, we become sons of God by adoption, through being conformed to Him who is Son of God by nature, according to Rom. 8:29: Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son: that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Hence the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ in as much as He is the natural Son of God. But the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of Christ by reason of any other relationship, save that of origin, since this is the only distinction to be found in God. Therefore we must say that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ, in the sense that He proceeds from Him.

Again. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son, according to Jo. 15:26: When the Paraclete shall come, whom I will send from the Father. Now, the sender has a certain authority in respect of the person sent. Hence we must say that the Son has a certain authority in respect of the Holy Ghost; not an authority of dominion or greatness, but only in point of origin. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.—But someone might say that the Son also is sent by the Holy Ghost, because our Lord declares that in Himself was fulfilled the saying of Isaias (Lk. 4:18): The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: … to preach the Gospel to the poor he hath sent me. To this we reply that the Son is sent by the Holy Ghost in respect of His human nature. Now, the Holy Ghost did not assume a created nature in such wise that in respect of that nature He could be said to be sent by the Son, or that the Son has authority in relation to Him. It follows therefore that with regard to the eternal Person, the Son has authority over the Holy Ghost.

Moreover. The Son says of the Holy Ghost (Jo. 16:14): He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine, and shall show it to you. Now, He cannot be said to receive what is the Son’s, unless He receive from the Son—for example, if He be said to receive the divine essence (which is the Son’s) from the Father. Hence the text continues: All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine; therefore I said that he shall receive of mine. For if whatsoever the Father has, is the Son’s, it follows that the Father’s authority, in as much as He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, must be the Son’s also. Consequently as the Holy Ghost receives from the Father of what is the Father’s, so from the Son He receives of what is the Son’s.

Besides, we can quote the authority of the Doctors of the Church, even of the Greeks. Thus Athanasius says (Symbol. Fid.): The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. Cyril also in his epistle received by the Council of Chalcedon says: He is called the Spirit of Truth,1 and is the Spirit of Truth: for he proceeds therefrom, as also from God the Father. And Didymus says (De Spir. Sancto): Neither is the Son distinct, save in those things which he receives from the Father, nor is the Holy Ghost of another substance, besides what is conceded, namely that He is from the Son and proceeds from Him. For this word procession, among all those that indicate origin, is the widest in its signification. Thus, in whatever way anything is from anything else, it is said to proceed therefrom: and since divine things are better expressed in general than in special terms, the word procession as denoting the origin of the divine Persons is to be specially noted. Hence, if it be granted that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, or flows from the Son, it follows that He proceeds from Him.

Again. We read in the decree of the Fifth Council:1 Consequently, there will only be a logical distinction between the two processions, and the two proceeding Persons. Now, things that differ only logically are predicated of one another: for it is true that God’s will is His intellect and vice versa. Hence it will be true that the Holy Ghost is the Son, and vice versa: which is the impious statement of Sabellius. Therefore, to account for the distinction between the Holy Ghost and the Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by way of the intelligence, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will, unless we add that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Further. From the very fact that the Holy Ghost is said to proceed by way of the will, and the Son by way of the intellect, it follows that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son: because love proceeds from the word, since we cannot love a thing unless we first conceive it in the word of our hearts.

Again. If we consider the various species of things, we shall observe a certain order in them, in that living beings are above lifeless things, animals above plants, and man above other animals; and that there are various grades in each one of these, in respect of their various species. Hence Plato said that species are like numbers, which differ specifically by the addition or subtraction of unity. Consequently, in substances devoid of matter, there can be no distinction but by reason of order. Now, the divine Persons are immaterial, and in them there can be no order but that of origin. Therefore two Persons cannot proceed from one, unless one of them proceed from the other: and thus, the Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son.

Again. The Father and Son, as regards the unity of essence, do not differ save in that the one is the Father, and the other the Son. Whatsoever, therefore, is in addition to this, is common to Father and Son. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost is in addition to paternity and filiation: since the relation whereby the Father is father is distinct from that whereby He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, as stated above. Therefore it is common to Father and Son, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost.

Moreover. Whatsoever is not against the nature of a thing, can be ascribed to it, unless there be something accidental in the way. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost is not incompatible in the Son, neither as God (since the Father, who is God, is the principle of the Holy Ghost), nor as Son (since the procession of the Holy Ghost differs from that of the Son): and to proceed from a principle by one kind of procession is not incompatible with being the principle of another’s procession. Consequently, it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Ghost. Now, what is not impossible is possible: and in God, what is possible is not different from what is. Therefore the Son is the principle of the Holy Ghost.

Chapter XXV

arguments of those who would prove that the holy ghost proceeds not from the son; and their solution

Some men, in their obstinate opposition to the truth, adduce arguments to the contrary: but they scarcely deserve a reply. They say that when our Lord spoke of the procession of the Holy Ghost, He stated that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, and makes no mention of the Son, as when He says (Jo. 15:26): When the Paraclete shall come, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father. Therefore, as we must not believe anything about God save what we are taught by the Scriptures, we must not say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Now this is utter nonsense. By reason of the unity of essence, whatsoever the Scripture says about one Person, must be understood to apply to another Person, even though an exclusive term be employed, unless it be incompatible with the latter Person’s personal property. For, though it is said (Matth. 11:27): No one knoweth the Son, but the Father, neither the Son Himself, nor the Holy Ghost is excluded from knowledge of the Son. Hence, even were it said in the Gospel that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, this would not imply that He does not proceed from the Son, since this is not incompatible with the Son’s property, as we have proved.1 Nor need we wonder if our Lord said that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, without mentioning Himself, because He is wont to refer all things to the Father, from whom He has whatsoever He has. Thus He says (Jo. 7:16): My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me; that is, the Father’s: and we find many such utterances of our Lord, stressing the Father’s authority as principle. And yet, in the passage quoted above, He does not wholly omit to say that He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, for He calls Him the Spirit of Truth, and He had previously called Himself the Truth.1

They also object that in some Councils it was forbidden, under pain of anathema, to make any addition to the Creed approved by the Councils: and that in this Creed no mention is made of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son. Wherefore they argue that the Latins who made this addition to the Creed are anathematised.

But this avails nothing: because it is stated in the decree of the Council of Chalcedon,2 that when the Fathers assembled at Constantinople confirmed the doctrine of the Council of Nicea, they did not imply that the previous Council contained less doctrine, but their object was to explain the mind of the Fathers by quoting the authority of Scripture against those who denied that the Holy Ghost is the Lord. In like manner we must say that the procession of the Holy Ghost is implicitly recognized in the Creed of Constantinople, in as much as it states that He proceeds: because what applies to the Father, applies also to the Son, as we have said above. Moreover the authority of the Roman Pontiff suffices to make this addition: by which authority the early Councils were confirmed.

They also argue that since the Holy Ghost is simple, He cannot proceed from two Persons; and that if He proceed from the Father perfectly, He does not proceed from the Son; and adduce many similar arguments, which can easily be solved even by those who are not far advanced in theology.

For the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, on account of the unity of the divine power, and by one productive act produce the Holy Ghost. Thus too the three Persons are one principle of the creature, and create by one action.

Chapter XXVI

that there are no more than three persons in god, namely, the father, the son, and the holy ghost

We gather from what has been said in the preceding chapters that in the divine nature there subsist three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that these three are one God, being distinct in relations alone. The Father is distinct from the Son by the relation of paternity, and by innascibility: the Son from the Father, by the relation of sonship: the Father and the Son from the Holy Ghost by spiration, as it may be called: and the Holy Ghost from Father and Son, by the procession of love, whereby He proceeds from both.

Besides these three Persons there is no fourth in the divine nature.

Since the divine Persons agree in essence, they cannot be distinct save by relations of origin, as we have already made clear.1 Now these relations of origin do not arise from a procession tending to external things (for thus the thing that proceeds is not of the same essence as its principle), but from a procession that remains within. And it is only in the working of the intellect and will that a thing is found to proceed so as to remain within its principle, as we have explained.2 Wherefore the divine Persons cannot be multiplied except in so far as this is necessitated by the processions of intellect and will in God. Now in God there can be only one procession according to the intellect, because His act of intelligence is one, simple and perfect; since in understanding Himself, He understands all things else, so that in God there can be but one procession of the Word. In like manner there can be but one procession of love, since the divine volition is one and simple: because in loving Himself, He loves all other things. Consequently in God there can be no more than two proceeding Persons: one by way of intelligence, as word, namely the Son; the other by way of love, namely the Holy Ghost. There is also one Person who does not proceed, namely the Father. Therefore there are but three Persons in the Trinity.

Again. The Persons are distinguished according to procession. Now in respect of procession, there are but three modes possible in a Person: either He proceeds not at all, like the Father; or, as the Son, He proceeds from one that does not proceed; or, like the Holy Ghost, He proceeds from one who proceeds. Therefore there cannot be more than three Persons. And although, in other living beings, relations of origin can be multiplied—thus in human nature there can be many fathers, and many sons—in the divine nature this is quite impossible. For since in one nature filiation is of one species, it cannot be multiplied except in respect of its matter or subject, as in the case of other forms. Hence, as in God there is no matter or subject, and as the very relations are subsistent, as we have proved,1 there cannot be several filiations in God. The same applies to the other relations: and thus in God there are but three Persons.

Someone may object that since the Son is perfect God, He has perfect intellectual power, and consequently He can produce a Word; and in like manner, as there is infinite goodness in the Holy Ghost, whereby He is the principle of the communication of goodness, He will be able to bestow the divine nature on another.

To this we reply that the Son is God, as begotten, and not as begetting: wherefore the intellectual power is in Him as in one proceeding by way of word, and not as in the one producing the word: and, in like manner, since the Holy Ghost is God as proceeding, infinite goodness is in Him as the recipient, and not as communicating the infinite goodness to another. For they are not distinguished from one another except by the relations alone, as we have shown. Hence the whole fulness of the Godhead is in the Son, identically the same as that which is in the Father; but in the Son it is with the relation of birth; in the Father, with the relation of active generation: so that were the Father’s relation ascribed to the Son, there would no longer be any distinction between them: and the same applies to the Holy Ghost.

We may now consider the likeness to the divine Trinity in the human mind. The mind, by actually understanding itself, produces its word within itself: this word is the intelligible reflection of the mind, and is called the idea, existing in the soul: and when it loves itself, it reproduces itself in the will as loved. Further than this it does not proceed within itself, but completes the circle, when by love it returns to the very substance whence the procession began in the idea: there is however a procession towards external effects, when through love of self one proceeds to action. Thus there are three things in the mind; the mind itself in its natural existence, which is the starting-point of the procession; in the intellect, the conception of the mind; and in the will, the mind loved. Yet these three are not one nature, since the mind’s act of intelligence is not its being; and its volition is neither its being nor its act of intelligence. For this reason the mind understood and the mind loved are not persons, since they are not subsistent: nor is the mind, in its natural existence, a person, for it is not the whole subsistence, but only part of the subsistence, that is to say, of man. Accordingly, in our mind there is a likeness to the divine Trinity, as regards the processions which multiply the Persons. For we have sufficiently shown that in the divine nature there is God unbegotten, namely the Father, who is the principle of the whole divine procession: God begotten, as the word is conceived in the intellect, and this is the Son: and God proceeding as love, namely, the Holy Ghost. There are no further processions within the divine nature, but only those that terminate in external effects. This likeness, then, falls short of being a representation of the divine Trinity, in that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are of one nature, and each of them is a perfect Person, since God’s very being is intelligence and will, as we have shown. Hence the divine likeness is reproduced in man, as the likeness of Hercules is reproduced in stone, in respect of the form represented, but not by community of nature: wherefore God’s image is stated to be in the human mind (Gen. 1:26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness.

In other things also there is a likeness to the Trinity, inasmuch as each thing is one in its substance, informed by a certain species, and has a certain order. Now, as we have already clearly stated, the intellectual concept in intelligible being is like the information of the species in natural being: and love is like the inclination or order of a natural thing. Hence in natural things species represents the Son remotely, and order represents the Holy Ghost. Hence, on account of the likeness in irrational things being remote and obscure, we say that there is in them a trace but not an image of the Trinity, according to Job 11:7: Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly.

We have now said enough about the Trinity.

Chapter XXVII

of the incarnation of the word, as handed down in holy scripture

In speaking of the divine generation we observed that certain things are befitting the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, in respect of His divine nature, and others in respect of His human nature, by taking which in time the eternal Son of God wished to become incarnate. Wherefore we must now proceed to treat of the mystery of the Incarnation. Of all the divine works this surpasses reason more than any: since one cannot imagine God doing anything more wonderful, than that God the Son, true God, should become true man. And because it is the most wonderful of all, it follows that all other wonders are directed to faith in this the greatest of all wonders: since in every genus, what is greatest is the cause of the rest.

Our faith in the Incarnation is based on divine authority. For it is said (Jo. 1:14): And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt amongst us: and speaking of the Son of God, the Apostle says (Philip. 2:6, 7): Who, when he was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. The same is clearly indicated by the words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, since at times He ascribes to Himself lowly and human things that belong to Him in His assumed human nature, for instance, The Father is greater than I (Jo. 14:28), My soul is sorrowful unto death (Matth. 26:38): while sometimes He says of Himself sublime and divine things, such as certainly belong to Him in His divine nature: for instance, I and the Father are one (Jo. 10:30), and, All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine (Jo. 16:15).

The same is shown by the very things He is related to have done. That He feared, grieved, hungered, died, are things pertaining to His human nature: that by His own power He healed the sick, raised the dead, commanded the obedience of the earth’s elements, that He cast out devils, forgave sins, raised Himself from the dead when He willed, that at last He ascended into heaven—all these things point to a divine power in Him.

Chapter XXVIII

the error of photinus about the incarnation

Some, through abuse of the words of the Scriptures, have conceived false notions about the divine and human natures of our Lord Jesus Christ.

For instance Ebion and Cerinthus and, after them, Paul of Samosata and Photinus, said that Christ was a mere man: and they ascribed divinity to Him not as though He were God by nature but because by His deeds He had merited to surpass others in His share of divine glory, as we stated above.1 Now this view, in addition to what we have already said about it, destroys the mystery of the Incarnation.

In this view, God would not have taken flesh, and become man: but fleshly man would have become God: and consequently there would have been no truth in the sentence of John (1:14): The Word was made flesh, but rather should he have said that Flesh was made the Word. In like manner the Son of God would not have come down and emptied Himself, but man would have been raised and glorified, so that the Apostle could not say truly, Who, when he was in the form of God … emptied himself, taking the form of a slave (Philip. 2:6, 7): and it would have been only the man that was raised to divine glory; of which it is said (verse 9): For which cause God also hath exalted him.

Nor would our Lord’s words be true (Jo. 6:38), I came down from heaven, but only His words (Jo. 20:17), I ascend to my Father: and yet Scripture unites these two statements (Jo. 3:13) where our Lord says: No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, who is in heaven: and (Eph. 4:10): He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens. Again, in this case, it could not be said that the Son was sent by the Father, nor that He came out from the Father, in order to come into the world, but only that He went to the Father: and yet He unites both together (Jo. 16:5): I go to him that sent me: and (ibid. 28): I came out from the Father, and came into the world: again I leave the world, and go to the Father; and both of these bear witness to the human and divine natures.

Chapter XXIX

the error of the manicheans concerning the incarnation

Others there were who denied the true doctrine of the Incarnation, and invented a fictitious imitation of it. The Manicheans, in fact, said that the Son of God assumed not a real but an imaginary body: so that He could not be a real man, but only seemed to be one. They pretended that whatever He did as man—for instance, that He was born, that He ate, drank, walked, suffered, and was buried—was all unreal, though having some semblance of reality. Consequently they reduced the whole mystery of the Incarnation to a work of fiction. Now in the first place this view entirely sets at nought the authority of Scripture. For since the likeness of flesh is not flesh, and the likeness of walking is not walking, and so on; the Scripture lies when it says, the Word was made flesh, if it were but imaginary flesh: it lies again when it says that Jesus walked, ate, died, and was buried, if these things happened to a mere imaginary apparition. Now, if the authority of Scripture be allowed to suffer in the slightest degree, our faith loses all its stability, for it is based on Holy Writ, according to Jo. 20:31, These things are written that you may believe.

Someone, however, might say that Holy Scripture is not lacking in truth, if it records apparitions as though they were real facts: because the likenesses of things are equivocally and metaphorically called by the names of the things themselves; thus the picture of a man is called a man: and Holy Writ is wont to speak in this way, for instance (1 Cor. 10:4): The Rock was Christ. Thus in Scripture many corporeal terms are applied to God for no other reason but likeness: for instance, He is called a lamb, a lion, and so forth.

Yet, though it be true that the likenesses of things are sometimes called by the names of the things they represent: it is not becoming for Holy Scripture to relate an entire incident with such a double meaning, unless one were able to elucidate the truth from other passages of Scripture: because this would lead men, not to knowledge, but to deception: and yet the Apostle says (Rom. 15:4) that whatsoever things were written, were written for our learning, and (2 Tim. 3:16): All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach … and to instruct. Moreover the whole Gospel story would be a poem and a fable, if imaginary things were portrayed as being real: whereas it is said (2 Pet. 1:16): We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power … of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Moreover, whenever Scripture relates apparitions and not realities, this is quite clear from the manner of the narrative. Thus it is said (Gen. 18:2): And when he (that is, Abraham) had lifted up his eyes, there appeared to him three men: whereby we are given to understand that they were men in appearance only. Hence he adored God among them, and witnessed to his Godhead, saying (verse 27): I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes; and again (verse 25): Thou who judgest all the earth, wilt not make this judgment. When Isaias, Ezechiel, and other prophets describe their visions, we are not led into error, because such things are set down, not as an historical narrative, but as descriptive of the prophecy; moreover they always use some expression to indicate an apparition: for instance (Isa. 6:1), I saw the Lord sitting upon a high throne, (Ezech. 1:3, 4), The hand of the Lord was there upon him: and I saw, and behold a whirlwind came out of the north, etc., and (ibid. 8:3), The likeness of a hand was put forth, and took me … and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem.

Again, we ought not to be led into error, if Scripture uses metaphors in speaking of divine things. In the first place, these metaphors are taken from things of so little account, that it is clear that the statements are to be taken metaphorically and not literally. Secondly, what is hidden inside metaphors in one part of Scripture, is stated elsewhere in Scripture in proper terms, which express the truth clearly. Now this does not apply to the case in point: because Scripture nowhere affords authority for denying the reality of what it relates of Christ’s human nature.

Yet it might be said that Scripture does this implicitly when the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3): God, sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, or when he says (Philip. 2:7): Being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. But such an interpretation is forbidden by the context. For he does not say simply: In the likeness of flesh, but of sinful flesh, because Christ had real flesh—not sinful flesh, since there was no sin in Him, but like sinful flesh, since He had passible flesh, and such as man’s flesh had become through sin. In like manner, a fictional interpretation of the words, being made in the likeness of men is excluded by the addition of the words, taking the form of a servant: because it is clear that form here means nature and not semblance, since the Apostle had said, Who, being in the form of God; for it is not suggested that Christ was a semblance of God. The fictional sense is also excluded by the subsequent words, Becoming obedient unto death. Therefore likeness here does not indicate the likeness of simulation, but true likeness of species, just as all men are said to be like in species.

Still more emphatically does Holy Scripture exclude any suspicion of a ghostly apparition. For it is related (Matth. 14:26) that the disciples, seeing Jesus walking upon the sea, were troubled, saying: It is an apparition; and they cried out for fear. Our Lord took the right way to undeceive them; for thus the narrative continues: And immediately Jesus spoke to them saying: Be of good heart, it is I, fear not. Yet it hardly seems reasonable to suppose that the disciples would be unaware of it, if He had assumed only an imaginary body, seeing that He had chosen them that they might bear witness to the truth from what they saw and heard; and, if they were aware of it; then the thought that it was an apparition should not have made them afraid.

And still more did our Lord, after His resurrection, remove from the minds of His disciples any doubt of the reality of His body. Thus (Lk. 24:37–39) it is related that the disciples being troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit, when they saw Jesus: and He said to them: Why are you troubled, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? See my hands and feet, that it is I myself. Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have. For it would have been useless to tell them to feel, if He had but an imaginary body.

Again. The apostles show themselves to be suitable witnesses of Christ. Thus Peter says (Acts 10:40, 41): Him, that is, Jesus, God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with Him after He arose again from the dead: and the Apostle John says at the beginning of his epistle (1 Jo. 1:1, 2): To that which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life … we bear witness. Now it is impossible for a valid witness of the truth to be afforded by things that happen not really but only in appearance. Consequently, if Christ’s body was but imaginary, if He did not really eat and drink, if He was not really seen and handled, but only in imagination, it follows that the apostles’ witnessing of Christ was unfitting; and thus that their preaching was vain, and vain also our faith, as Paul says (1 Cor. 15:14).

Moreover, if Christ had not a real body, He did not really die. Therefore He did not really rise again. Consequently, the apostles are false witnesses, since they preached to the world that He had risen again: wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:15): We are found false witnesses of God: because we have given testimony against God; that he hath raised up Christ, whom he hath not raised up, if the dead rise not again.

Further. Falsehood is not the right way to the truth, according to Ecclus. 34:4, What truth can come from that which is false? Now Christ came into the world in order to manifest the truth: for He said (Jo. 18:37): For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth. Therefore there was nothing false in Christ. Yet there would have been, if what is related of Him was only imaginary: since that which is not what it seems to be, is false. Therefore all the things related about Christ happened in reality.

Again. It is stated (Rom. 3:24, 25) that we are justified in Christ’s blood, and (Apoc. 5:9) it is said: Thou hast redeemed us to God, in thy blood. Consequently, if Christ had not real blood, neither did He really shed it for us, and we are neither truly justified nor truly redeemed. Therefore it is useless for us to be in Christ.

Again. If Christ’s coming into the world was nothing but imaginary there was nothing new in His coming: since even in the Old Testament, God appeared to Moses and the prophets, under many figures, as the New Testament frequently declares. But this would void the entire teaching of the New Testament. Therefore the Son of God assumed a real, and not an imaginary, body.

Chapter XXX

the error of valentine about the incarnation

The opinion of Valentine about the mystery of the Incarnation was somewhat akin to the foregoing. He said that Christ’s body was not earthly but brought by Him from heaven: and that He received nothing from His Virgin Mother, but merely passed through her as water through an aqueduct.

He seems to have been led into this error by certain passages of Holy Scripture. Thus it is said (Jo. 3:13 and 31): No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the son of man, who is in heaven.… He that cometh from above, is above all. And our Lord said (Jo. 6:38): I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me. And (1 Cor. 15:47): The first man was of the earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly. They take all these texts to mean that we must believe Christ to have come down from heaven even as regards His body.

Now this opinion of Valentine, like that of the Manicheans mentioned above, comes from a false principle: for they believed that all earthly things were created by the devil. Wherefore, since the Son of God appeared that he might destroy the works of the devil (1 Jo. 3:8), it was not fitting that He should take a body formed from a creature of the devil. In fact Paul says (2 Cor. 6:14, 15): What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? And, since like fruits come from the same root, this view leads to the same false issue as the preceding.

Every species has fixed essential principles, namely its matter and form, which go to constitute the specific nature in things composed of matter and form. Now, just as human flesh and bone and the like are matter proper to a man, so fire, air, water, earth, and like objects of the senses, are the matter of flesh and bone and the parts thereof. Hence, if Christ’s body were not earthly, neither had He real flesh and bone, and He was wholly an imaginary being: and consequently He was not a real, but an imaginary man. And yet, as we have observed, He said: A spirit hath not flesh and bone, as you see me to have (Lk. 24:39).

Again. A heavenly body is naturally incorruptible and unchangeable, and cannot be moved from its connatural position. Now it was unbecoming that the Son of God should detract from the dignity of the nature He assumed, nay, rather was it becoming that He should raise it. Therefore He did not bring down from heaven a heavenly or incorruptible body, nay, rather was it an earthly and passible body which He assumed, and rendered incorruptible and heavenly.

Again. The Apostle says (Rom. 1:3) that the Son of God was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh. Now David’s body was of the earth. Therefore Christ’s body was also.

Moreover. The same Apostle says (Gal. 4:4) that God sent his Son, made of a woman; and it is said (Matth. 1:16) that Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ. But He would not be described as made or born of her, if He only came through her as through a channel, taking nothing from her. Therefore He took His body from her.

Further. Mary could not be called His mother, as the Evangelist declares her to have been, unless He had received something from her.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. 2:11, 12): Both he that sanctifieth, namely Christ, and they who are sanctified, namely Christians, are all of one. For which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying: I will declare thy name to my brethren;1 and further on (verse 14): Therefore, because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner hath been partaker of the same. Now, if Christ had but a heavenly body, it is plain that, since we have an earthly body, we are not all of one with Him: and consequently we cannot be called His brethren, nor was He a partaker of flesh and blood. For it is well known that flesh and blood are composed of the lower elements, and are not of a heavenly nature. Clearly, therefore, this opinion is opposed to the statement of the Apostle.

As to the arguments on which that view is based, they are evidently absurd. For Christ came down from heaven, not as to His body and soul, but as God. We may gather this from our Lord’s very words. Thus, after saying (Jo. 3:13): No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, He added, the Son of Man, who is in heaven: thereby showing that He came down from heaven in such wise as not to cease to be there. Now it is proper to God to be on earth and yet fill heaven also, according to the saying of Jeremias (23:24), I fill heaven and earth. Therefore the Son of God did not, as God, come down from heaven by local movement: since that which is moved locally approaches one place in such a way as to leave another place. Consequently, the Son of God is said to come down from heaven, in as much as He united an earthly substance to Himself: even so the Apostle says that He emptied Himself, in as much as He took the form of a servant, although He did not forfeit His Godhead by so doing.

As to the principle on which this view is based, we have already proved it to be erroneous: for it has been shown,1 that bodies were created not by the devil, but by God.

Chapter XXXI

the error of apollinaris concerning christ’s body

More absurd still was the error of Apollinaris concerning the mystery of the Incarnation. He agreed with the above mentioned errors, in that he asserted that Christ’s body was not taken from the Virgin: but his impiety went so far as to contend that Christ’s flesh was formed from some part of the Word. He was led into this error by the text (Jo. 1:14), And the Word was made flesh, which he understood to mean that the Word was transformed into flesh: just as the text (Jo. 2:9), When the chief steward had tasted the water made wine indicates that the water was transformed into wine. It is easy to see how impossible this is, if we take note of what was proved above.2

For we proved that God is utterly unchangeable. Now it is evident that whatsoever is transformed is changed. Since, then, the Word of God is true God, as we have proved,1 it was impossible for the Word of God to be transformed into man.

Again. Since the Word of God is God, He is simple: for it was proved2 that there is no composition in God. Accordingly, if some part of the Word was changed into flesh, it follows that the whole Word was changed. Now that which is changed into something else, ceases to be what it was before: thus water, changed into wine, is no longer water, but wine. Therefore, according to this view, after the Incarnation, the Word of God would utterly cease to be. But this is impossible, both because the Word of God is eternal, according to Jo. 1:1, In the beginning was the Word; and because, even after the Incarnation, Christ is called the Word, according to Apoc. 19:13, He was clothed with a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is called, the Word of God.

Further. Things that have not common matter and genus cannot be changed one into the other: you cannot change a line into whiteness, because they differ generically: and a body fashioned from the elements cannot be changed into a heavenly body, or into an incorporeal substance, or vice versa, since they are not of the same matter. Now, since the Word of God is God, He agrees neither in genus nor in matter with anything else: for God is not in a genus, and is void of matter. Therefore it was impossible for the Word of God to be changed into flesh or into anything else.

Again. Flesh, bones, and blood and the parts thereof are essentially composed of some determinate matter. Hence, if according to the above view the Word of God was changed into flesh, it would follow that in Christ there was no real flesh or anything else of the kind; and so He would not be a real, but only an imaginary man. Other equally absurd consequences would follow, all of which we have exposed when refuting Valentine.3

Accordingly it is evident that the text of John, And the Word was made flesh, does not mean that the Word was transformed into flesh: but that He took flesh in order to live among men and appear to them visibly. Hence the text continues, And dwelt amongst us, and we saw his glory, etc. Baruch too says of God (3:38) that he was seen upon earth, and conversed with men.

Chapter XXXII

the error of arius and apollinaris concerning christ’s soul

There have been false views not only about Christ’s body, but also concerning His soul.

Arius asserted that Christ had no soul, and that He assumed only a body, the Godhead supplying the place of a soul. Apparently he was forced to hold this view, through maintaining that the Son of God is a creature and less than the Father. For, in order to prove this latter statement, he chose those texts of Scripture that stress human weakness in Christ; and lest any one should refute his argument, by saying that these texts refer to Christ not in His divine, but in His human nature, he wickedly denied that Christ had a soul. Thus when things were said of Christ which could not be said of the human body, for instance, that He marvelled, feared, prayed, it was necessary to conclude that the Son of God was an inferior being. In support of his view he quoted the above text of John: The Word was made flesh; which, according to him, proved that the Word took flesh alone, and not a soul. In this particular point Apollinaris followed him.

From what we have already said it is clear that we cannot hold this opinion.

For we have proved1 that God cannot be the form of a body. Since then the Word of God is God,2 it is impossible for Him to be the form of a body, so as in a body to take the place of a soul. This argument avails against Apollinaris, who confessed that the Word of God is God: and, though Arius denied this, still the same argument avails against him, since it is impossible not only for God to be the form of a body, but also for any of the supercelestial spirits, supreme among whom Arius placed the Son of God—except according to the opinion of Origen, who held human souls to be of the same species as the supercelestial spirits, an opinion which we have refuted already.1

Again, if you subtract what is essential to man, that which remains is not a real man. Now evidently the soul especially is essential to man, since it is his form. Hence, if Christ had no soul, He was no real man. And yet the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:5): There is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.

Further. The essence not only of man, but of each of his parts depends on the soul: wherefore, when the soul has departed, the eyes, flesh, and bones of a dead man are so called equivocally, like an eye in a picture or statue. Accordingly, if Christ had no soul, it follows that neither His flesh nor any of His human parts were real. And yet our Lord witnesses to the contrary (Lk. 24:39): A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have.

Further. That which is engendered of a living being cannot be called its son, unless it be produced thereby in the same species: thus a worm is not the son of the animal in which it is engendered. Now, if Christ had no soul, He would not be of the same species as other men: because difference of form causes difference of species. Consequently, we would be unable to say that Christ is the son of the Virgin Mary, or that she is His mother: and yet this is asserted in the Gospels.

Moreover. It is explicitly stated in the Gospel that Christ had a soul: for instance (Matth. 26:38), My soul is sorrowful even unto death, and (Jo. 12:27), Now is my soul troubled. And, should they say that by soul is meant the Son of God, because in their opinion He takes the place of soul and flesh, we refer them to the words of our Lord (Jo. 10:18): I have power to lay it (namely, my soul1) down, and I have power to take it up again. From these words we gather that in Christ, besides His soul, there was something that had the power to lay down that soul, and to take it up again. But it was not in the power of His body to be united to the Son of God, or to be separated from God, since this surpasses the power of nature. Therefore we are given to understand that Christ’s soul was distinct from the Godhead of the Son of God, to whom rightly that power is ascribed.

Again. Sorrow, anger, and the like are passions of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher asserts.2 Now these things were in Christ, as the Gospels declare. Therefore in Christ there was a sensitive soul, which evidently differs from the divine nature of the Son of God.

Since, however, it might be said that the Gospels ascribe human things to Christ metaphorically, even as Holy Scripture in many places ascribes such things to God, we must needs refer to something that must be taken in its proper sense. For just as we must understand literally and not metaphorically the other bodily things which the Evangelists relate about Christ, so must we not give it a metaphorical interpretation when we read that He ate, or as a consequence, was hungry. Now hunger is only in one having a sensitive soul, since hunger is the appetite for food. Therefore Christ had a sensitive soul.

Chapter XXXIII

the errors of apollinaris, who said that christ had not a rational soul, and of origen, who said that christ’s soul was created before the world

Convinced by the authority of Scripture, Apollinaris confessed that there was in Christ a sensitive soul, but one without mind or intellect; so that the Word supplied the absence of mind and intellect in that soul. But neither does this suffice to avoid the absurdities mentioned above.

For man takes his human species from his having a human mind and reason. Accordingly, if Christ had no such thing, He was not really a man, nor of the same species as we are: because a soul devoid of reason belongs to a different species from that to which a rational soul belongs: since, according to the Philosopher,1 in definitions and species, the addition or subtraction of an essential difference changes the species, as unity in numbers. Now rational is a specific difference. Therefore, if in Christ the soul was sensitive, but not rational, it was of a different species from ours which is possessed of reason. Consequently Christ would not have been of the same species as we are.

Again. There are various species among irrational sensitive souls; as evidenced by irrational animals that differ specifically, each one of which is specified by its own soul. Hence the irrational sensitive soul is a genus containing many species. Now a thing cannot be in a genus without being in one of its species. Consequently, if Christ’s soul belonged to the genus of irrational sensitive souls, it must have belonged to one of the species of that genus, such as the soul of a lion, or horse, or some other beast: which is utterly absurd.

Further. The body stands in relation to the soul as matter to form, and as an instrument to the principal agent. Now matter must needs be proportionate to the form, and the instrument to the principal agent. Consequently there must be a diversity of bodies corresponding to the diversity of souls. Our very senses bear witness to the fact that various animals are provided with a variety of members according to the requirements of their respective souls. Hence if Christ had not a soul like ours, His body would not have been provided with the same members as ours.

Moreover. Apollinaris admits that the Word of God is truly God, therefore he must also admit that the Word of God cannot be astonished; since those things astonish us, the cause of which we know not. Now no astonishment could affect a sensitive soul, since it belongs not to a sensitive soul to trouble about knowing the causes of things. Yet Christ was astonished, as can be proved from the Gospels: for it is stated (Matth. 8:10) that Jesus hearing the words of the centurion, marvelled. Therefore in Christ, besides the divinity of the Word and a sensitive soul, there was something else which made it possible for Him to marvel: and this is a human mind. Hence it is clear from all that has been said, that Christ had a real human body, and a real human soul.

Accordingly, the text of John, The Word was made flesh, does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh: nor that the Word assumed flesh alone, or a sensitive and not a rational soul. According to the wonted manner of Scripture, the part is put for the whole: so that The Word was made flesh is the same as The Word was made man. In the same way soul is sometimes used by Scripture to indicate man. Thus (Exod. 1:5) it is said: All the souls that came out of Jacob’s thigh were seventy: and flesh also, thus (Isa. 40:5) it is said: All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken. Accordingly, in the text in question, flesh stands for the whole man, and indicates the assumption by the Word of the weakness of human nature.

Now if, as we have shown, Christ had human flesh and a human soul, it is evident that His soul did not exist before the conception of His body. For it has been proved1 that human souls do not exist before their respective bodies. Consequently it is clear that the teaching of Origen is false, in asserting that in the beginning and before the creation of the material world, Christ’s soul was created at the same time as all other spiritual creatures, and assumed by the Word: and that at length towards the end of time it was clothed with flesh for the salvation of mankind.

Chapter XXXIV

the error of theodore of mopsuestia concerning the union of the word with man

It is clear then from what has been said, that neither was the Godhead lacking in Christ, as Ebion, Cerinthus and Photinus contended; nor a true human body, as the Manicheans with Valentine erroneously maintained; nor again a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris asserted. Accordingly, since these three, viz. Godhead, human soul, and a real human body, were united in Christ, it remains for us to seek from the teaching of the Scriptures, what we are to hold in regard to this union.

Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius his follower explained this union in the following manner. They said that in Christ a human body and a human soul were joined together in a natural union, so that they formed a man of the same species as we are, and that God dwelt in this man as in His temple, that is to say by His grace, as in other men. Hence the words of Christ to the Jews (Jo. 2:19), Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up, which words the Evangelist expounds by saying (verse 21): But he spoke of the temple of his body. Hence too the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:19) that in him, it hath well-pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell. As a result there was between that man and God, a further union of affection, in that the man adhered to God by His good will, and God in His will accepted Him, according to Jo. 8:29: He that sent me is with me; and he hath not left me alone: for I do always the things that please him. Hence we may take the union between that man and God, to be the union of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:17): He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. And just as, by reason of this union, names which properly belong to God are applied to men, so that in various passages of Scripture they are said to be gods, and sons of God, also lords, Saints, and Christs: so too, divine names may be applied to this man, so that, by reason of God dwelling in Him and being united to Him in a bond of affection, He may be called God, the Son of God, Lord, the Holy One, and Christ. Yet, since there was a greater fulness of grace in this man than in other holy men, He was the temple of God more than the rest of men, and more closely united to God in the bond of affection, and by a special privilege shared in the divine names. For this reason, on account of the excellence of His grace, He received a share of divine honour and dignity, and was adored together with God.

It follows from all this that the Person of the Word of God is distinct from the person of this man who is adored together with God’s Word. And if we speak of them as being one person, this is on account of the aforesaid union of affections, so that this man and the Word of God would be called one person, as man and wife are said to be no longer two, but one flesh. Now a union of this kind does not allow of our saying of the one what we say of the other (for not all that is true of the husband is also true of the wife, or vice versa). And so, with regard to the union of the divine Word with this man, they think it necessary to observe that whatsoever is proper to that man, as being part of human nature, cannot be said truly of the divine Word or of God: for instance it is proper to that man to be born of the Virgin, that He suffered, died, and was buried, and so on: all such things, they assert, cannot be said of God or the Word of God.

Since, however, certain names, though belonging chiefly to God, are nevertheless applied to men, such as, Christ, Lord, Holy, and even Son of God, there is no reason why the aforesaid predicates should not be applied to them. Thus, according to them, it is quite correct to say that Christ, the Lord of glory, or the Holy of Holies, or the Son of God, was born of the Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried: wherefore they contend that the Blessed Virgin should be called, not the Mother of God or of the divine Word, but the Mother of Christ.

Careful consideration, however, will show that this view excludes the truth of the Incarnation. According to this view, the Word of God was united to that man merely by the indwelling of grace, resulting in a union of wills. Now the Word of God by dwelling in man does not become incarnate: for the divine Word, and God Himself, has dwelt in all holy men from the creation of the world, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:16): You are the temple of the living God, as the Lord saith: I will dwell in them. Such an indwelling cannot be styled incarnation, else God would have often become incarnate since the beginning of the world. Nor is the idea of incarnation realized by the divine Word, or God, dwelling in that man with a greater plentitude of grace, since more or less makes no difference in the kind of union. Seeing then that the Christian religion is based on faith in the Incarnation, it is clear that this view destroys the very foundation of the Christian religion.

Moreover. The falseness of this view is evident from the very terminology of Scripture. For Scripture is wont to indicate the indwelling of the divine Word in holy men, in the following manner: The Lord spoke to Moses, or The Lord said to Moses, or The Word of the Lord came to Jeremias, or some other prophet, The Word of the Lord came1 by the hand of Aggeus the prophet. But never is it said that the Word of God was made either Moses, or Jeremias, or any other. Yet it is in this singular way that the Evangelist describes the union of the divine Word with Christ’s flesh, when he says: The Word was made flesh, as we have observed above. Hence it is manifest that, according to the teaching of Scripture, the Word of God was not in the man Christ merely by dwelling in Him.

Again. That which has been made so-and-so, is whatever it has been made: thus that which has been made a man, is a man; and that which has been made white, is white. Now, the Word of God was made man, as stated above. Therefore the Word of God is man. But when two things are distinct in person, hypostasis, or supposits, one of them cannot be predicated of the other. Thus when I say, Man is an animal, the very same thing that is an animal is a man; and when I say, Man is white, the man himself is declared to be white, albeit whiteness is extraneous to the notion of humanity. Consequently by no means can I say that Socrates is Plato, or any other individual of the same or of another species. Accordingly, if the Word was made flesh, that is to say man, as the Evangelist declares, it is impossible for the divine Word and that man to be two persons, hypostases, or supposits.

Further. Demonstrative pronouns refer to a person, hypostasis, or supposit: for no one would say, I run, meaning that another runs, except metaphorically, if this other runs in his stead. Now this man, Jesus by name, says of Himself (Jo. 8:58): Before Abraham was, I am, and: I and the Father are one (Jo. 10:30), and many similar statements, which clearly refer to the divinity of the Word. Therefore it is manifest that the person and hypostasis of Him who said these things is the Person of the Son of God.

Moreover. It is evident from what has been said that neither did Christ’s body come down from heaven, which was the error of Valentine; nor His soul, as Origen erroneously asserted: wherefore it follows that it was the Word who is said to have come down from heaven, not by local movement, but in reference to His union with a lower nature, as we have already stated.1 Now this man speaking in His own person said that He came down from heaven (Jo. 6:51): I am the living bread, which came down from heaven. Therefore that man’s person or hypostasis must be the Person of the Word of God.

Again. It is evident that ascent into heaven applies to the man Christ who, while the Apostles looked on, was raised up (Acts 1:9): while descent from heaven applies to the Word of God. Now, the Apostle says (Eph. 4:10), He that descended is the same also that ascended. Therefore that man’s person and hypostasis is the Person and hypostasis of the Word of God.

Again. One whose origin is from the world, and who was not in existence before the world, cannot be said to come into the world. Now, the man Christ, as to His flesh, had His origin from the world, since He had a real human and earthly body, as we have proved:1 and as to His soul He was not in existence before the world, since He had a real human soul which, by its nature, does not exist before its union with the body. It follows then that it is not by reason of His human nature that this man is said to come into the world. Yet He says that He Himself came into the world (Jo. 16:28): I came forth from the Father, He says, and am come into the world. Thus then it is clear that something pertaining to the Word of God is truly said of this man: since it belongs to the divine Word to come into the world, as John the Evangelist expressly declares (Jo. 1:10, 11): He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. He came unto his own, etc. Therefore the person and hypostasis of the man who said the words quoted above, must be the Person and Hypostasis of the Word of God.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. 10:5): When he cometh into the world, he saith: Sacrifice and oblation thou wouldest not: but a body thou hast fitted to me. Now He that cometh into the world is the Word of God, as we have shown.2 Therefore it is to the Word of God that a body is fitted, in such wise to wit, that it was His own body. But this could not be said, unless the hypostasis of the Word of God were also the hypostasis of that man. Therefore the Word of God and this man have the one and the same hypostasis.

Moreover. Any change or suffering affecting the body of a man, can be ascribed to the person to whom that body belongs: thus if Peter’s body be wounded, scourged, or dies, it can be said that Peter is wounded, scourged, or dies. Now the body of this man was the body of God’s Word, as we have shown. Hence whatsoever that body suffered, the Word of God may be said to have suffered. Rightly, therefore, may we say that the Word of God, or God, suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried: whereas those men denied this.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. 2:10): It became him, for whom are all things, who had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation, by his passion. From this we gather that He for whom are all things, who brings men into glory, and who is the author of man’s salvation, suffered and died. Now these four things belong exclusively to God, and are ascribed to no one else. For it is said (Prov. 16:4): The Lord hath made all things for himself: and of God’s Word it is said (Jo. 1:3): All things were made by him: and (Ps. 83:12): The Lord will give grace and glory: and elsewhere (Ps. 36:39): But the salvation of the just is from the Lord. Therefore it is evidently right to say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.

Moreover. Though a man may be called a lord, by reason of his sharing in the divine lordship; no man, nor indeed any creature, can be called the Lord of glory: because God alone by nature possesses the glory of the happiness to come; while others possess it by the gift of grace. Hence it is said (Ps. 23:10): The Lord of hosts, he is the king of glory. Now the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:8) that the Lord of glory was crucified: For if they had known it, they never would have crucified the Lord of glory. Therefore it may be truly said that God was crucified.

Further. The Word of God is the Son of God by nature, as we have shown:

Chapter XXXV

against the error of eutyches

We have proved in many ways that the mystery of the Incarnation is to be understood in such a way that God’s Word, and man, are united in one and the same Person. Nevertheless, there still remains a difficulty in the study of this truth. The divine nature is necessarily accompanied by its personality. And the same would seem to apply to human nature: since that which subsists in an intellectual or rational nature is the definition of a person. Hence seemingly it is impossible that there be one person with two natures, divine and human.

In order to solve this difficulty, various explanations have been offered. Eutyches, in order to safeguard against Nestorius, the unity of Person in Christ, contended that there was also but one nature in Christ, so that, although before the union there were two distinct natures, divine and human, in the very union they coalesced into one. Hence he said that Christ’s Person was of two natures, but not subsisting in two natures. On this account he was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

The falseness of this view may be shown in many ways.

We have proved above1 that in Jesus Christ there was a body, a rational soul, and the Godhead. It is moreover evident that Christ’s body, even after the union, was not the Godhead of the Word; since that body, even after the union, was passible, visible to the eye, and confined within the lines of its members: all of which is foreign to the divine nature of the Word; as we have sufficiently proved above.1 Likewise Christ’s soul, after the union, was distinct from the divine nature of the Word, since, even after the union, it was affected by the passions of sorrow, fear, and anger, which in no way can be ascribed to the Godhead of the Word, as we have shown.2 Now the human soul and body constitute the human nature. Wherefore, even after the union, the human nature in Christ was distinct from the Godhead of the Word, which is the divine nature. Therefore, after the union, there were two natures in Christ.

Again. A thing is said to be natural in reference to nature. Now a thing is said to be natural by reason of its having a form, even as that which is made by art: for we do not call the building a house, until it has the form designed by art; nor is a thing a horse until it has the form pertaining to that nature. Accordingly, the form of a natural thing is its nature. Hence we must say that there were two forms in Christ, even after the union. Thus, speaking of Jesus Christ, the Apostle says (Philip. 2:6, 7) that when he was in the form of God … He took the form of a servant. Now we cannot say that the form of God is the same as the form of a servant. For nothing takes what it has already; so that, if the form of God and the form of a servant are the same, since He already had the form of God, He would not have taken the form of a servant. Nor can it be said that, through the union, the form of God in Christ was destroyed; because then, after the union, Christ would not be God. Nor again can it be said that the form of a servant was destroyed in the union, because then He would not have taken the form of a servant. But neither can it be said that the form of a servant was mixed with the form of God, because when things are made into a mixture, they lose their integrity, and each is partly destroyed; wherefore it could not be said that He took the form of a servant, but a part thereof. Therefore, according to the words of the Apostle, we must say that, after the union, there were two forms in Christ, and consequently two natures.

Further. The word nature was first employed to signify the coming into being of things by nativity, and thence it was transferred to indicate the principle of this kind of generation; and then further still to signify the intrinsic principle of movement in a movable thing: and since this principle is matter or form, nature also stands for the form or matter of a natural thing having within itself the principle of its movement. And, seeing that form and matter constitute the essence of a natural thing, the meaning of the word nature is made to extend to the essence of anything existing in nature; so that the nature of a thing is its essence indicated by its definition. It is in this sense that we are using the term now, and in which we say that there are a divine and a human nature in Christ. Accordingly if, as Eutyches maintained, the human and the divine nature were two before the union, and if through the union they combined together to form one nature, this must have been by one of the ways in which one thing is made out of many. This happens, first of all, by mere co-ordination: thus many houses make a town, and many soldiers make an army. Secondly, by co-ordination and composition: thus a house is made of many conjoined parts co-ordinated and bound together. These two ways, however, do not suffice to form one nature out of several. Accordingly, things that are formed by co-ordination or composition are not natural things; and their unity is not unity of nature. The third way in which one thing is made of several, is by mixture: thus a mixed body is formed from the four elements. Yet neither does this way apply to the case in point. First, because only those things can be mixed together which agree in matter, and which are of such a nature as to be active or passive in relation to one another. Now this does not apply to our case: since it has been proved1 that God is immaterial and wholly impassible. Secondly, because it is impossible to mix together two things, one of which far exceeds the other: thus if one were to put a drop of wine into a thousand gallons of water, there will be no mixture; but destruction of the wine. Thus again logs placed on a furnace are not said to be mixed with the fire; they are consumed by it, on account of its exceeding power. Now the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, because God’s power is infinite, as we have proved.2 Therefore a mixture of the two natures is quite impossible. Thirdly, because granted that such a mixture were made, neither nature would retain its integrity: because the ingredients do not remain entire in a real mixture. Consequently, after the two natures, namely the divine and human, have been mixed together, neither nature would remain, but a tertium quid: and so Christ would be neither God nor man. Therefore we cannot admit the explanation of Eutyches that, whereas there were two natures before the union, there was but one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ after the union, through the fusion of the two natures into one. Consequently it must be explained by saying that only one of the natures remained after the union. Either then in Christ there was only the nature of God, and what in Him seemed human was purely imaginary, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into the human, as Apollinaris maintained: both of which views we have already refuted.3 Therefore it is impossible that there were two natures before, and only one after, the union.

Further. Two complete natures never combine together to form one, because each is a whole in itself; whereas when one thing is made out of several, these come under the heading of parts. Hence, since one thing is made out of a soul and a body, neither soul nor body can be called a nature, in the sense in which we are now speaking; because neither has a complete species, but each is a part of a nature. Accordingly, as the human nature is a complete nature, and so likewise is the divine nature, they cannot possibly combine together to form one nature, unless both or one of them be corrupted. But this is impossible, since we have shown that the one Christ is both true God and true man.1 Therefore it is impossible that there be but one nature in Christ.

Again, one nature may result from two permanent things—either as from bodily parts; for instance an animal is made of various members: and this does not apply to the case in point, since the divine nature is not corporeal:—or as one thing is made from matter and form; for instance, an animal from soul and body: and neither does this apply to the case, since God is neither matter, nor can He be the form of anything, as proved above.2 Accordingly, if Christ is true God and true man, as we have proved,3 it is impossible that there be but one nature in Him.

Further. Subtraction or addition of an essential principle diversifies the species of a thing, and therefore changes the nature, which is nothing but the essence as indicated by the definition, as we have stated.4 For this reason we observe that a specific difference added to or subtracted from a definition causes a difference of species; thus a rational and an irrational animal differ in species: even so, in numbers, the addition or subtraction of unity gives us various species of numbers. Now the form is an essential principle. Hence every additional form makes another species and another nature, in the sense in which we speak of nature now.1 Therefore if the divine nature of the Word be added to the human nature as a form, another nature will be the result: and consequently Christ’s will be not a human nature, but some other: even as an animate body is of another nature from that which is a body only.

Moreover. Things that have not a common nature are not alike in species; as, for instance, man and horse. Now if Christ’s nature is composed of the divine and human natures, it is evident that other men will not have the same nature as Christ. Therefore He will not be like us in species: and this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 2:17): It behoved him, in all things, to be like unto his brethren.

Again. Form and matter always make together one species, which can be predicated of many individuals, actually or potentially, as far as the specific ratio is concerned. If then the divine nature be added, like a form, to the human nature, from this combination there must needs result some common species that can be predicated of several individuals. But this is clearly false: since there is but one Jesus Christ, God and man. Therefore the divine and human natures did not constitute one nature in Christ.

Moreover. The statement of Eutyches, that before the union there were two natures in Christ, is also seemingly against faith. For, since human nature is composed of soul and body, it follows that either Christ’s body, or Christ’s soul, or both, existed before His Incarnation: and this is shown to be false, by what we have said above. It is, therefore, against faith to say that there were two natures in Christ before the union, and that after the union, there was one.

Chapter XXXVI

the error of macarius of antioch, who said that there was only one will in christ

The opinion of Macarius1 of Antioch, who said that there were but one operation and will in Christ, seemingly amounts to the same as the foregoing. Each nature has its proper operation: because the form, which gives each nature its particular species, is the principle of operation: wherefore, as various natures have their respective forms, so have they their respective actions. Consequently, if in Christ there be but one action, it follows that He has but one nature: and this is the heresy of Eutyches. Therefore it is false that there is only one operation in Christ.

Again. In Christ the divine nature is perfect, whereby He is consubstantial with the Father; also a perfect human nature, whereby He is of the same species as we are. Now it belongs to the perfection of the divine nature to have a will, as we have proved.2 Likewise it belongs to the perfection of human nature to have a will, whereby a man is free. Therefore there are two wills in Christ.

Moreover. The will is a power of the soul even as the intellect. Therefore if Christ had no other will besides that of the Word, for the same reason, He had no other intellect besides the Word’s: and so we come back to the error of Apollinaris.

Further. If Christ had but one will, He must have had the divine will alone: because the Word could not lose the divine will which was His from all eternity. Now merit does not pertain to the divine will: since it belongs to one tending to perfection. Accordingly, by His passion, Christ would not have merited, either for Himself or for us: the contrary of which is taught by the Apostle (Philip. 2:8, 9) who says that Christ was made obedient to the Father, unto death … for which cause God hath exalted him.

Again. If there was not a human will in Christ, it follows that there would have been no free-will in Him in respect of the nature assumed: for by His will man is free, so that the man Christ would have acted not in the manner of a man, but in the manner of other animals that are void of free-will. Consequently His actions were neither virtuous nor worthy of praise or imitation. Therefore there was no point in His saying (Matth. 11:29): Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart; and (Jo. 13:15): I have given you an example that, as I have done to you, so you do also.

Again. Even an ordinary man, though he has but one personality, has several appetites and operations corresponding to his various natural principles. Thus in his rational faculty he has a will; in the sensitive faculty he has a concupiscible and an irascible appetite; and besides these he has a natural appetite resulting from the natural forces in him. Again, with his eyes he sees, with his ears he hears, with his mind he understands: and all these are different operations. The reason of this is that operations are differentiated not only according to the various operative subjects, but also according to the various principles of operation in one and the same subject, from which principles these various operations take their species. Now the divine nature is much further removed from human nature than the various principles of human nature are from one another. Therefore the divine and human natures in Christ have each their respective distinct will and operation, although Christ in the two natures is one Person.

Again. It is clearly proved by the authority of Holy Scripture that there were two wills in Christ. Thus He says (Jo. 6:38): I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me; and (Lk. 22:42): Not my will, but thine be done. Hence, it is clear that in Christ there was His own will, besides the will of His Father. Now there certainly was in Him a will common to Him and His Father: since, as Father and Son have the one nature, so have they the one will. Therefore there are two wills in Christ.

It is the same with His operations. Christ had one operation common to Him and the Father: for He says (Jo. 5:19): What things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. There is also in Him another operation that is not becoming to the Father, as, for instance, sleep, hunger, eating, and so forth, all of which both actions and passions are ascribed by the Evangelist to the man Christ. Therefore there was not only one operation in Christ.

Apparently this opinion originated through its authors being unable to distinguish between simple unity and unity of order. They observed that the human will in Christ was subordinate to the divine will, so that every act of the human will of Christ was in accordance with the disposition of His divine will. In like manner all Christ’s human operations, whether of action or of passion, were in accordance with the disposition of His divine will, as He says Himself (Jo. 8:29): I do always the things that please him. Besides, Christ’s human operation derived a certain divine efficacy through His union with the Godhead, even as the action of the secondary agent acquires efficacy from the principal agent. Consequently His every action or passion was salutary: for which reason Dionysius (De Div. Nom., ii.) calls Christ’s human operations theandric—i.e., God-man-like; as well as because it is the action of God and man. And so, observing that in Christ human will and operation are infallibly subordinate to the divine, they concluded that Christ has but one will and operation; although, in fact, unity of order and simple unity are not the same.

Chapter XXXVII

refutation of those who maintained that christ’s body and soul were not united together

In the foregoing chapters we have refuted the opinions of Nestorius and Eutyches, by proving that as laid down by our Faith, there is but one Person in Christ, and two natures. Seeing, however, that this would seem to be in contradiction with natural reason, certain later writers propounded the following view of the union. Man consists of a soul and body united together: and this particular soul together with this particular body constitutes this particular man, which signifies not only a hypostasis or a person, but a hypostasis and a person. Wherefore, lest they should have to admit in Christ a hypostasis or Person of the Word, they maintained that His body and soul were not united, so as to form one substance: and in this way they hoped to avoid the heresy of Nestorius. Again, it would seem impossible for that which was not part of a thing’s nature to become part of its substance, without a change taking place in that thing. Now the Word is altogether unchangeable. And so, lest they should be constrained to admit that the assumed body and soul belonged to the nature which the Word had from all eternity, they contended that the Word assumed a human soul and body accidentally, just as a man puts on his clothes. In this way they wished to avoid the error of Eutyches. This view, however, is utterly contrary to faith.

Soul and body, by being united, constitute a man, because the form, when added to the matter, makes the species. Consequently, if soul and body were not united in Christ, He was not a man: whereas the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:5): (One) mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.

Again. Each one of us is said to be a man, in the sense that a rational soul forms part of our being. Hence, if Christ is said to be a man, not in that sense, but merely because He had a soul and body, without their being united, it would be an equivocation to call Him a man, and He would not belong to the same species as we do: which is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 2:17) that it behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren.

Further. Not any kind of body, but only a human body, belongs to human nature. Now a body is not human unless it be quickened by union with the soul: and it is an equivocation to speak of eyes, hands, feet, flesh, and bone when they are no longer united to the soul. Consequently it would not be true to say that the Word assumed human nature, if He assumed a body and soul that were not united together.

Again. The human soul is naturally disposed to be united to the body. Hence a soul that is never united to a body, so as to constitute a being, is not a human soul: because that which is natural must be always. Hence, if Christ’s soul is not united to the body, so as to constitute a being, it follows that it is not a human soul, and that human nature was not in Him.

Further. If the Word was accidentally united to the soul and body, as though it were clothed with them, human nature was not the nature of the Word. Consequently, after the union, the Word did not subsist in two natures, as neither does a man, when clothed, subsist in two natures: and Eutyches, for saying this, was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

Moreover. That which happens to a man’s clothes does not happen to him: thus he is not said to be born, when he puts his clothes on, nor to be wounded, if his coat is torn. If then the Word donned a soul and body, as a man puts on his clothes, we cannot say that God was born, or suffered, by reason of the body He assumed.

Again. If the Word took human nature merely as a cloak, so as to be seen by human eyes, it was useless for Him to take a soul, which is naturally invisible.

Moreover. According to this view, the Son would have taken human flesh, in the same way as the Holy Ghost assumed the form of a dove, under which He appeared. Now, this is clearly false: since neither do we say that the Holy Ghost was made a dove, nor that He is less than the Father in respect of the nature assumed.

Again. If we regard the matter carefully, it is evident that this view leads to the absurdities involved in various heresies. For as much as it asserts that the Son of God was accidentally united to soul and flesh, as a man to his clothes, it agrees with the opinion of Nestorius who held this union to signify the indwelling of the Word of God in man: since God could not clothe man by bodily contact, but only by His indwelling grace. For as much as it holds the union of the Word with human soul and flesh to be accidental, it follows that, after the union, the Word was not subsistent in two natures, which was the opinion of Eutyches: since a thing does not subsist in that which is united to it accidentally. For as much as it maintained that soul and flesh were not united so as to constitute a being, this view agrees partly with Arius and Apollinaris, who said that Christ’s body was not animated by a rational soul; and partly with the Manicheans, who contended that Christ was not a real man, but only an imaginary one. For if the soul be not united to the body, so as to constitute a being, whatever appeared in Christ to make Him like other men, made of soul and body, was merely imaginary.

This view seems to have been based on the words of the Apostle (Philip. 2:7), In habit found as a man: for they did not realize that this was said metaphorically. Now we must not look for likeness in every detail in metaphorical expressions. Accordingly the assumed human nature bears a certain resemblance to a man’s clothes, in so far as the Word was made visible in the flesh, as man is seen in his clothes. But the comparison does not imply that in Christ the union of the Word with human nature was accidental.

Chapter XXXVIII

refutation of those who hold that in the person of christ there are two hypostases or supposits

In order to avoid the absurdities involved in the foregoing opinion, some others held that in our Lord Jesus Christ one substance resulted from the union of soul and flesh, a man namely, of the same species as other men. They say that this man is united to the Word of God, not indeed in nature, but in person: so that there would be one person of God’s Word and of this man. But, since this man is an individual substance, that is to say a hypostasis and supposit, they draw a distinction between this hypostasis and the Word of God, although they admit that both are but one person. On account of this unity, they admit that we say that this man is the Word of God, or that the Word of God is this man, the sense being: The Word of God is a man—i.e., the person of the Word of God is the person of the man and vice versa. For this reason they state that whatever may be predicated of the Word of God, may be predicated of this man, and vice versa: but with a qualification, so that when it is said: God suffered, the sense is: The man who is God, by reason of the unity of person, suffered: and when it is said: A man created the stars, the sense is: He who is a man, etc.

This opinion, however, must necessarily fall into the error of Nestorius.

If we observe the difference between hypostasis and person, we shall see that they do not differ altogether; in fact, person is a kind of hypostasis, since it is a hypostasis of a particular nature, namely rational. This may be seen from the definition given by Boethius: Person is an individual substance of rational nature. Hence, though not every hypostasis is a person, every hypostasis of rational nature is a person. Accordingly, if from the mere union of soul and body there resulted in Christ a particular substance which is a hypostasis, namely this man, it follows that from this union there resulted a person. Consequently there would be two persons in Christ—the newly constituted person of this man, and the Person of the Eternal Word: and this is the error of Nestorius.

Again. Even though the hypostasis of this man were not a person, still the hypostasis of the Word of God is the same as His Person. Hence, if the hypostasis of the Word of God is not the hypostasis of this man, neither will the Person of the Word be the person of this man; and so it will be false that, as they say, the person of this man is the Person of the Word of God.

Moreover. Granted that there be a distinction between the Person and the hypostasis of the Word of God, or of this man, the only conceivable difference would be that the person adds some property to the hypostasis. For it cannot add anything of the genus of substance, since hypostasis is the chief thing in the genus of substance, being called a first substance. Accordingly if the union be effected in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that it is effected in an accidental quality: and this again is the error of Nestorius.

Further. Cyril says in a letter to Nestorius that was approved in the Council of Ephesus:1 If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with his flesh is one, the same person being both God and man, let him be anathema. In fact nearly all the decrees of the councils declare that this savours of the error of Nestorius, who said that there were two hypostases in Christ.

Again. Damascene says:2 We acknowledge the union of two perfect natures, united not only in the προσῶπον, i.e. person, as Nestorius the enemy of God maintained, but hypostatically. Whence it is clear that Nestorius maintained that there was one person, but two hypostases.

Further. Hypostasis and supposit must needs be the same: since, according to the Philosopher,3 all the other things are predicated of the first substance, that is to say hypostasis, namely both universals in the genus of substance, and accidents. Consequently, if there are two hypostases in Christ, there are also two supposits.

Moreover. If the Word and this man have different supposits, neither supposit presupposes the other. Now, if the supposits be distinct, things predicated of them are also distinct: since divine predicates do not apply to the supposit of the man, except by reason of the Word, nor vice versa. Consequently we must make a distinction in the things that Scripture says of Christ, that is to say between divine and human predicates. Now this is against the declaration of Cyril, which was confirmed in the Council:1 If anyone ascribe to two persons or subsistences, such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by himself of himself, and applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and others (as though they were true of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema.

Again. According to this view, things that are applicable to the Word of God by reason of His nature could not be predicated of the man, save on account of their being associated in one Person. And this they indicated by inserting a qualifying phrase, where they explain the sentence, This man created the stars, thus, The Son of God who is this man, etc. And so on in like manner with other such sentences. So that when we say, This man is God, the sense is, The Word of God, who is this man, is God. Now Cyril condemns these expressions:2 If anyone dare to say that the assumed humanity is to be co-adored, and co-glorified, and co-named God, together with the Word of God, as one with another (since the prefix “co-” always signifies this) instead of giving one and the same adoration and one and the same glory to the Emmanuel, as the Word made flesh, let him be accursed.

Further. If this man differs in supposit from the Word of God, He can have no association with the Person of the Word, except through the fact of His being assumed by the Word. But this is foreign to the right sense of faith. Thus Felix, Pope and martyr, is quoted in the Council of Ephesus,1 as saying: We believe that Jesus our God, born of the Virgin Mary, is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there be another besides him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there was another besides him; but while he remained perfect God, he became a perfect man, and took flesh of the Virgin.

Again. Things that differ in supposit are several simply, and they are not one except relatively. If then in Christ there are two supposits, it follows that He is simply two, and not one, except relatively. In that case Jesus would be no more, since a thing exists in so far as it is one: so that whatsoever is not one simply is simply non-existent.

Chapter XXXIX

the teaching of the catholic church on the incarnation of christ

From the foregoing chapters it is plain that according to the tradition of Catholic faith we must confess that in Christ there is one perfect divine nature, and a perfect human nature composed of a rational soul and human flesh. Also that these two natures are united in Christ, not by mere indwelling, nor accidentally as a man to his clothes, nor by mere personal habitude and property, but in one hypostasis and one supposit. In this way alone can we safeguard the teaching of the Scriptures about the Incarnation.

We have already observed that Holy Scripture, without making any distinction, ascribes divine things to the man; and to God, things pertaining to the man: wherefore in both cases it is the same one to whom reference is made. But, seeing that opposite statements cannot be true about the same subject in the same respect, and whereas the divine and human things that are said about Christ are opposed to one another,—for instance, that He suffered and was impassible, that He died and was immortal, and so on,—it follows that divine and human things must be said of Christ in different respects. Accordingly, as regards the subject of which these things are predicated, we must make no distinction, and hold to unity; but as regards the things in respect of which these predications are made, a distinction is to be observed. Natural properties are attributed to a thing in respect of its nature: thus, a stone falls down in respect of its nature as a heavy body. Accordingly, since divine and human things are attributed to Christ in different respects, it follows that in Christ there are two distinct unmixed natures. Now natural properties are attributed to something that belongs by its own nature to the genus of substance, and this is a hypostasis or supposit of that nature. And, since human and divine things predicated of Christ are attributed to one undivided subject, it follows that Christ is one hypostasis and one supposit subsisting in the human and divine natures. In this way divine things are truly and properly attributed to that man, in as much as that man indicates a supposit of both natures, human and divine: while, vice versa, human things are attributed to the Word, in as much as He is a supposit of human nature. Hence also it is clear that although the Son took flesh, it does not follow that either Father or Holy Ghost became incarnate, since the Incarnation was effected by union, not in the nature common to the three Persons, but in the hypostasis or person, wherein the three Persons are distinct; and thus, even as in the Trinity there are several Persons subsisting in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation is there one Person subsisting in two natures.

Chapter XL

objections against faith in the incarnation

This view of the Incarnation, as laid down by the Catholic Faith, is beset with a number of difficulties which have led the enemies of the Faith to impugn this mystery. It has been proved1 that God is neither a body nor a force in a body. But, if He took flesh, it follows that, after the Incarnation, either He was transformed into a body, or that He became a force in a body. Therefore it would seem impossible for God to be incarnate.

Again. Whatsoever acquires a new nature, is subject to substantial change: because when a thing is generated, it acquires a nature. Hence, if the Person of the Son of God became subsistent in human nature, it would seem that He was substantially changed.

Further. No hypostasis extends beyond the nature in which it subsists; rather does nature extend beyond the hypostasis, seeing that it includes many hypostases. And thus, if by the Incarnation the hypostasis of the Son of God became a hypostasis of human nature, it would follow that, after the Incarnation, the Son of God was not everywhere, since human nature is not everywhere.

Moreover. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, for this is its essence, which is one in each one thing. Now the quiddity of a thing is its nature, because its nature is indicated by its definition. Therefore, seemingly, one hypostasis cannot subsist in two natures.

Again. In things devoid of matter, the quiddity is not distinct from the thing, as we proved above:2 and this is especially true of God, who is not only His own quiddity, but also His own being. Now human nature cannot be the same as a divine hypostasis. Therefore, seemingly, a divine Person cannot subsist in human nature.

Again. Nature is more simple and more formal than the hypostasis that subsists in it: since the common nature is confined to a particular hypostasis by the addition of something material. If then a divine hypostasis subsists in human nature, it would appear to follow that human nature is more simple and more formal than the divine hypostasis: and this is altogether impossible.

Further. It is only in things composed of matter and form that the singular differs from its quiddity, in that the singular is individualized by signate matter, which is not included in the quiddity and specific nature: for this or that matter is included in the designation of Socrates, but not in the definition of human nature. Consequently every hypostasis that subsists in human nature is constituted by signate matter: and this cannot be said of a divine hypostasis. Therefore it would seem impossible for the hypostasis of the Word of God to subsist in human nature.

Moreover. In Christ the soul and body were not less effective than in other men. Now by their union, in other men, they constitute supposit, hypostasis, or person. Hence, in Christ also, a supposit, hypostasis, or person results from the union of soul and body. But this is not the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God, because this is eternal. Therefore in Christ there is, seemingly, another supposit, hypostasis, or person besides the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God.

Further. As human nature in general consists of a soul and body, so do this soul and this body make this man, or a human hypostasis. Now in Christ there were this soul and this body. Therefore from their union apparently there resulted a hypostasis: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

Again. This man Christ considered as formed merely of soul and body, is a substance. But He is not a substance in general. Therefore He is a particular substance; and consequently a hypostasis.

Moreover. If in Christ there is but one supposit of both human and divine natures, it follows that the divine hypostasis is included in the definition of this man Christ. But it is not included in the definition of other men. Therefore man is predicated equivocally of Christ and of other men: so that He would not be of the same species as we are.

Further. We have proved1 that in Christ are these three, body, soul, and divinity. Now the soul, being a more noble thing than the body, is not the body’s supposit but its form. Neither, therefore, is something divine a supposit of human nature; but rather ought we to say that it informs human nature.

Further. Whatsoever accrues to a thing that is already complete in being, is accidental thereto. Now, since the Word of God is eternal, it is clear that the flesh assumed by Him, accrued to Him when He was already complete in being. Therefore He came by it accidentally.

Chapter XLI

how we are to understand that the son of god was incarnate

In order to reply to these objections, we must begin by going into the question a little more deeply. While Eutyches maintained that the union of God with man was effected in the nature, whereas Nestorius held that it was effected neither in the nature nor in the person, the Catholic Faith teaches that it was effected in the person, and not in the nature. And so it would seem necessary to know first of all what is meant by being united in the nature, and by being united in the person.

The word nature has various meanings. It may mean either the birth of a living being, or the principle of generation and movement, or matter and form. It is also sometimes used to signify a thing’s essential definition, which contains all that belongs to the species of that thing; thus we say that human nature is common to all men, and so on. Accordingly, those things are united in nature which go to form the complete species of a thing; thus, for instance, the soul and body are united together to form the species of an animal; and, generally speaking, whatsoever things are the parts of a species. Now it is impossible for anything extraneous to be united in unity of nature to a species that is already complete, without doing away with the species. For, since species are like numbers, in which either the addition or the subtraction of unity changes the species, if any addition be made to an already complete species, the result must needs be another species. Thus, if you add sensibility to a substance that is only animate, you have another species: because animal and plant are different species. On the other hand something not belonging to the integrity of the species may be found in an individual of another species; for instance white or clothed in Socrates or Plato, or a sixth finger, and so forth. Consequently nothing hinders things from being united in an individual, that are not united in one complete species: for instance, human nature, whiteness, and music in Socrates, and whatsoever things may be united together in one subject. And, since an individual substance is called a hypostasis, and an individual rational substance is called a person, it is reasonable to say that all these are united together in the hypostasis, or person. Hence it is possible for things not to be united in the nature, and yet united in the hypostasis or person.

Accordingly, taking the union of God and man in Christ as a fact, heretics, disregarding the path of truth, have explained this fact in various ways. Some deemed this union to be like the union of things in one nature. Such were Arius and Apollinaris, who contended that the Word supplied, in Christ’s body, the place of the soul or mind. Such also was Eutyches, who held the existence of the two natures of God and man before the Incarnation, but of only one after the Incarnation. But their view involves an utter impossibility. For it is evident that the nature of the Word, from all eternity, was most perfectly complete, and wholly incorruptible and unchangeable. Therefore it is impossible for anything extraneous to the divine nature, such as human nature or a part of it, to be joined to the Word in unity of nature.

Others, realizing the impossibility of this view, adopted the contrary position. For when a thing of a certain nature receives the addition of something that does not belong to the integrity of its nature, this would seem either to be an accident, such as whiteness or music, or to bear an accidental relationship to that thing, such as a ring, clothes, a house, and the like. Seeing then that human nature is joined to the Word of God, and yet does not belong to the integrity of His nature, they concluded that human nature was united to the Word accidentally. And since it is evident that it cannot be an accident in the Word of God, both because in God there cannot be any accidents, as we have proved,1 and because human nature, through being in the genus of substance, cannot be the accident of anything; it seemed to follow that human nature was joined to the Word, not as an accident, but as bearing an accidental relationship thereto. Wherefore Nestorius maintained that Christ’s human nature was, as it were, the temple of the Word, so that the union of the Word with human nature would be reduced to a kind of indwelling. And since a temple is individually distinct from one who dwells in it, and since individuality in human nature is personality, he concluded that human nature and the Word had distinct personalities: so that the Word and the man were two persons.

In order to avoid this difficulty, others imagined that human nature was so assumed that properly speaking, it could have no personality. They said, in effect, that the soul and body, in which the integrity of human nature consists, were assumed by the Word in such a way, that the soul was not united to the body so as to form a substance: and they said this lest they should be forced to admit that the substance thus formed was a person. They maintained that the Word is united to the soul and body, as though these were related to it accidentally, even as clothes are related to the one who is clothed: thus somewhat following in the footsteps of Nestorius.

Since all this has been refuted above,1 we must hold that the union of the Word with man is such that neither are the two natures fused into one; nor does the Word stand related accidentally to human nature, as a substance—a man for instance—to something extraneous, as, for instance, his house or his clothes. But we hold that the Word subsists in human nature, as made His own nature by the Incarnation, so that the body is truly the body of the Word of God, and the same with the soul: and that the Word of God is truly man. And though man cannot perfectly explain this union, we shall nevertheless endeavour as best we can to say something for the building up of faith, so as to defend the Catholic Faith from the attacks which unbelievers direct at this mystery.

In all created things nothing bears so great a resemblance to this union, as the union of soul and body. Greater still would be the resemblance, as Augustine says (Contra Felician.), were there but one intellect in all men, as some indeed have maintained. If this were true we should have to say that the already existing intellect would become united to the human concept in such a way that the two together would form one person, just as we say that the already existing Word was joined to human nature in one person. Hence, on account of this resemblance between the two unions, Athanasius says in his Creed: As a rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ. Now the body is united to the rational soul, both as the matter and as the instrument of the soul. But the above resemblance does not regard the former mode of union. For thus there would be one nature made of God and man, since matter and form are the proper constituents of the specific nature. The resemblance, therefore, regards the union of soul with the body as its instrument. In fact, the statements of the early Doctors are in agreement with this, who considered the human nature in Christ to be an instrument of the Godhead, even as the body is the instrument of the soul. For the body and its parts are the instruments of the soul otherwise than extraneous instruments: thus a man’s spade is not so much his own instrument as his hand is, since many can work with that spade, whereas that hand is employed for the special work of that man’s mind. Hence a man’s hand is an instrument united and proper to him, whereas the spade is distinct from him and common to many. Now let us apply this to the union of God with man. All men in comparison with God are instruments of His works, for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will, as the Apostle says (Philip. 2:13). Now other men are employed by God as extraneous and separate instruments, so to speak, since He moves them not only to their own proper operations, but also to those that are common to all rational creatures, such as understanding the truth, loving what is good, doing what is right. But human nature was assumed by Christ, that it might be an instrument in works belonging to God alone, such as cleansing from sins, enlightening our minds by grace, and perfecting us unto eternal life. Accordingly Christ’s human nature is compared to God as a proper and united instrument, as the hand is compared to the soul.

Nor is it out of keeping with the usual course of nature, that a thing be naturally the proper instrument of that which is not its form. Thus the tongue, as the instrument of speech, is the proper instrument of the understanding, and yet, as the Philosopher proves (3 De Anima), the understanding is not the form of any part of the body. In like manner, there may be an instrument that does not belong to the specific nature, and yet belongs to the individual on the part of the matter, as, for instance, a sixth finger, or something of the kind. In this way, therefore, nothing prevents our saying that human nature by its union with the Word became, as it were, the Word’s instrument, not separate but united: and yet human nature does not belong to the nature of the Word, nor is the Word its form; but it does belong to the Person of the Word.

We must not, however, look for perfect resemblance in the above examples. We must realize that the Word of God was able to unite Himself to human nature in a manner far more sublime and penetrative than that of the union of the soul with any proper instrument whatsoever: especially seeing that He is united to the whole human nature through the intellect. And, although the Word of God by His power penetrates all things, as preserving and upholding them, it is possible for Him to be united in a much more sublime and ineffable manner with intellectual creatures, in as much as they are able properly to enjoy Him and participate in Him.

Chapter XLII

that it was most becoming to the word of god that he should take human nature

From what has been said it is clear that it was most becoming that the Person of the Word should assume human nature.

Since the assumption of human nature was directed to the salvation of mankind, and since the ultimate salvation of man is that man should be perfected in his intellectual faculty by the contemplation of the First Truth, it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word who proceeds from the Father by an intellectual emanation.

Again. There would seem to be a certain affinity between the Word and human nature: since man derives his species from his being rational. Now the Word is akin to reason; hence the Greek λόγος stands for word or reason. Therefore the Word was most fittingly united to the rational nature: since it is also on account of this affinity that Holy Scripture ascribes the expression image both to the Word and to man. Thus the Apostle says that the Word is the image of the invisible God (Coloss. 1:15), and that man … is the image and glory of God (1 Cor. 11:7).

Moreover. The Word bears a certain affinity not only to rational nature, but also to all creatures in general: because the Word contains the types of all things created by God, just as the craftsman has in his mind the types of all his handiwork. Accordingly, all creatures are just the real expression and reproduction of the types contained in the concept of the divine Word: for which reason all things are said to have been made by Him. It was fitting, therefore, that the Word should be united to a creature, namely human nature.

Chapter XLIII

that the human nature assumed by the word did not exist before it was assumed, but was assumed by the word at the moment of its conception

Since the Word assumed human nature into unity of Person, as we have proved,1 it follows that human nature did not exist before it was united to the Word.

For, if it was already in existence, there must have existed, before the union, an individual with that human nature; because a nature cannot exist except in an individual. Now an individual of human nature is a hypostasis and a person. Consequently we shall have to say that the human nature to be assumed by the Word pre-existed in some hypostasis or person. Therefore if this already existing hypostasis or person remained after the nature was assumed, there would have been two hypostases or persons, one of the Word, the other, of a man: so that the union would not have taken place in the hypostasis or person: and this is against faith. On the other hand, if that hypostasis or person did not remain in the nature wherein it existed before being assumed by the Word, it must have been destroyed: for no individual can cease to be what it is, without being corrupted. Hence this man who was in existence before the union, must have been destroyed: and consequently the human nature in Him must have been destroyed also. Therefore it was impossible for the Word to assume an already existing man, in unity of person.

Moreover. It would derogate from the perfection of the Incarnation of the Word of God, if He lacked any of those things that are natural to man. Now it is natural to man to be born in human fashion: and the Word of God would not have been born in human fashion if He had assumed an already existing man. For this man would have been a perfect man from his birth: and consequently his birth could not be ascribed to the Word of God, nor would the Blessed Virgin be called the mother of the Word. Now our faith holds that He was like us in all natural things save sin; and that the Son of God, as the Apostle declares, was made and born of a woman, and that the Virgin is the Mother of God. Therefore it was not fitting that He should assume an already existing man.

Hence it follows that He united human nature to Himself from the first moment of His conception. Just as it behoved the Word of God to have a human birth, in order to be a real natural man, like us in all natural things, so was it fitting that He should have a human conception: since in the order of nature a man is conceived before he is born. Now, if the human nature about to be assumed had existed in any state whatever before being united to the Word, that conception could not be ascribed to the Word of God, so that He might be said to have a human conception. Therefore it behoved the Word of God to be united to human nature from the very beginning of its conception.

Again. In the generation of a human being, the active form aims at completing human nature in a definite individual. But, if the Word of God did not assume human nature at the very beginning of its conception, the active force, before the union, would have been directed to the formation of another human individual, that is a human hypostasis or person; and, after the union, it would have directed the whole process of generation to another hypostasis or person, namely the Word of God, who was being born in human nature. Accordingly, there would not have been one generation, since it would have been directed to two persons; nor would the whole process have been uniform, and this would seem foreign to the order of nature. Therefore it was fitting that the Word of God should assume human nature, not after conception, but at the moment of conception.

Further. The order of human generation would seem to demand that the same one should be born as was conceived, and not another: seeing that conception is directed to birth. Consequently, if the Son of God had a human birth, it was fitting that He should have a human conception, and not assume an already existing man.

Chapter XLIV

that the human nature assumed by the word was perfect in body and soul at the moment of conception

Hence it follows that the rational soul was united to the body at the very beginning of the conception.

The Word of God assumed the body through the medium of the rational soul: because the human body is not more adapted to be assumed by God than other bodies, except on account of the rational soul. Therefore the Word of God did not assume a body without a rational soul. Since then the Word of God assumed the body at the very moment of its conception, it follows that at that very moment the rational soul was united to the body.

Again. Given that which comes later in the process of generation, we must grant what comes before in that process. Now the last thing in the process of generation is a complete being, and this complete being is the individual thing generated, which in human generation is a hypostasis or person for the completion of which both a soul and body are required. Given, then, the personality of the man that is begotten, both rational soul and body must be in existence. Now the personality of the man Christ is no other than the personality of the Word of God: and the Word of God took to Himself a human body in the very moment of conception. Therefore the personality of that man was there: and consequently the rational soul must have been there also.

It would, moreover, have been unbecoming for the Word, who is the fount and origin of all perfections and forms, to be united to that which lacked form and natural perfection. Now a body in the making is, before animation, without form and natural perfection. Therefore it was unfitting for the Word of God to be united to a body without a soul: and consequently it behoved that soul to be united to the body from the very beginning of conception.

From this we may also conclude that the body assumed, was formed from the very beginning of its conception, since it was not meet for the Word of God to assume anything unformed. Now the soul, like any natural form, requires its proper matter: and the proper matter of the soul is a body with organs, since the soul is the active principle of a physical, organic body that is potentially a living being. Hence if, as already proved,1 the soul, from the first moment of conception, was united to the body, it follows that this same body had limbs and form from the first moment of conception. Even in the order of generation the body is limbed before the advent of the rational soul: so that if this latter has taken place, the former must have taken place already. Nor is there any reason why the body should not continue to grow until it has reached its appointed stage of development, even after the advent of the soul. Accordingly, with regard to the man assumed, we must hold that at the first moment of His conception, His body was limbed and formed, though it was not yet fully developed.

Chapter XLV

that it was fitting that christ should be born of a virgin

Hence it follows that it behoved this man to be born of a virgin mother, without natural seed.

The seed of the male is required as the active principle in human generation, on account of the active power it contains. Now, according to what has been said, the active power, in the generation of Christ, could not be natural, since the natural power does not instantly cause the entire formation of the body, but needs time for that purpose: and the body of Christ was formed and limbed from the first moment of its conception, as we have proved.1 Therefore the human generation of Christ was without natural seed.

Again. In the generation of any animals whatsoever the seed of the male draws to itself the matter provided by the female: as though the power therein contained aimed at its own perfection as the end of the whole process of generation: hence, as soon as this process is complete, the seed itself, developed and complete, is the offspring that is born. Now, in the human generation of Christ, the ultimate term of generation was union with the divine Person, but not the formation of a human person or hypostasis, as proved above.2 Therefore, in this generation, the active principle could not be the seed of a man, but the power of God alone, so that even as, in the ordinary generation of man, the seed of the male attracts to itself the matter provided by the female, so, in the generation of Christ, the Word of God took the same matter into union with Himself.

In like manner it is clear that even in the human generation of God’s Word, there should be evidence of some property of the spiritual generation of the Word. Now a word, as produced by the utterer, whether by interior concept, or by outward speech, causes no detriment to the utterer, rather indeed does it perfect him. Therefore it was fitting that, in the process of His human generation, the Word of God should be so conceived and born, that the integrity of His Mother should remain intact. Besides it clearly behoved the Word of God, by whom all things were made and preserved in their integrity, to be born in such a manner that His Mother’s integrity remained wholly unimpaired. Consequently it was fitting that He should be born of a virgin.

Nor is this manner of generation derogatory to the true and natural human nature of Christ, although He was begotten otherwise than other men. For, seeing that God’s power is infinite, as proved above,1 and that all causes derive from it their power of producing an effect, it is evident that any effect whatsoever that is produced by any cause can, in the same species and nature, be produced by God, without the aid of that cause. Wherefore, just as the natural power in human seed produces a real man, having the human species and nature, so too the divine power which endowed the seed with that power, can produce the effects of that power, without its assistance, by forming a real man, having the human species and nature.

Someone, however, may object that, to be begotten naturally, a man’s body must be fashioned naturally from the seed of a man, and from whatever it is that the woman supplies; and therefore Christ’s body was not of the same nature as ours, if it was not begotten of a man’s seed. But this objection is easily answered according to Aristotle’s opinion,2 who held that the seed of the male does not form a substantial part of the embryo, but is merely the active principle; and that the whole matter of the body is supplied by the mother. Accordingly, as regards its matter, Christ’s body differs not from ours: because our bodies also are formed from the material supplied by the mother.

But even if one were not to admit this opinion of Aristotle, the above objection would not stand. For likeness or unlikeness, as regards matter, depends not on the condition of the matter at the beginning of generation, but on its condition when generation is terminated: thus air generated from earth does not differ from air generated from water, because though earth and water differ at the beginning of the process, the action of the generator brings them to a same state of being. Accordingly, the material that is taken from the woman only, can by God’s power be brought to the same state, when the process of generation is terminated, as would result were the material taken from both man and woman. Consequently there will be no unlikeness through difference of material, between Christ’s body which was formed by God’s power, from material taken from His mother only, and our bodies which are formed by Nature’s power, although the material from which they are fashioned is taken from both parents. Thus the slime of the earth from which God formed the first man (who without doubt was a real man, and like us in every way) surely differs more from the material taken from both parents, than does the material taken from the woman only, from which Christ’s body was formed.

Consequently Christ’s birth of a virgin is nowise derogatory either to the reality of His human nature, or to His likeness to us. For, although the forces of nature require definite material for a definite effect to be produced therefrom, the power of God, that can produce all things out of nothing, is not confined, in His action, to definite material. Neither does it derogate from the dignity of Christ’s Mother, that she was a virgin both in conceiving and in giving birth, so as to forbid us to hail her as the true and natural Mother of God’s Son. Through the agency of the divine power she supplied the natural matter for the generation of Christ’s body: and this is all that is required on the mother’s part. Whereas all that conduces to the loss of virginity in other mothers is directed, not to motherhood, but to fatherhood, its purpose being that the seed of the male may reach the place adapted for generation.

Chapter XLVI

that christ was conceived by the holy ghost

Although every divine work that has its effect among creatures is common to all the Trinity, as we have shown above,1 the fashioning of Christ’s body by divine power, although common to the three Persons, is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

This is, seemingly, becoming to the Incarnation of the Word. For, just as our word, which is conceived in our mind, is invisible but becomes perceptible to the senses when it is spoken; so the Word of God is invisible as regards His eternal generation in the bosom of the Father, but became visible to us through the Incarnation. Wherefore the Incarnation of God’s Word is like the vocal utterance of our word. Now we give expression to our word by means of the breath (per spiritum) whereby we form words expressive of our thoughts. It is therefore fitting that the flesh of the Son of God should be formed by His Spirit. This is also in keeping with human generation. For the active power of human seed is actuated by the spirit in drawing to itself the material provided by the mother; the same power being derived from the spirit whose purity accounts for the whiteness of the foam-like semen. Accordingly, when the Word of God took to Himself a body from a virgin, it was fitting that this body should be fashioned by the Holy Ghost.

This was also fitting, as indicating the motive of the Incarnation of God’s Word. For this motive could be no other but God’s love for man whose nature He wished to unite to Himself in unity of person. Now, in God, it is the Holy Ghost who proceeds as love, as proved above.1 Therefore the work of the Incarnation is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

Moreover, Holy Scripture is wont to ascribe all graces to the Holy Ghost; because that which is freely given would seem to be bestowed through the love of the giver. Now no grace has been bestowed on man greater than his union with the divine Person. Therefore this work is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

Chapter XLVII

that christ was not the son of the holy ghost according to the flesh

Although we speak of Christ as having been conceived by the Holy Ghost and the Virgin, the Holy Ghost cannot be called His father, in respect of His human generation, as the Virgin is called His Mother.

For the Holy Ghost did not produce the human nature in Christ out of His own substance, but by His power alone was He the active principle in its production. Consequently the Holy Ghost cannot be called Christ’s father in respect of His human generation.

Moreover we should be led to a false conclusion if Christ were called the son of the Holy Ghost. For it is clear that the Word of God has a distinct personality in as much as He is the Son of God the Father. Hence, if He were called son of the Holy Ghost, according to his human nature, we might conclude that Christ was two sons: since the Word of God cannot be the son of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, since sonship refers to the person and not to the nature, it would follow that there are two persons in Christ, which is contrary to the Catholic Faith. It would also be unfitting if the Father’s authority and name were transferred to another Person: and this would be the case if the Holy Ghost were called the Father of Christ.

Chapter XLVIII

that we must not say that christ is a creature

It is also evident that, although the human nature assumed by the Word is a creature, it cannot be said, without qualification, that Christ is a creature.

To be created is to be made. Now, since being made terminates in being simply, it belongs to that which has substantial being, and this is the complete individual substance, which, if it be of intellectual nature, is called a person or again a hypostasis. On the other hand forms, accidents, even parts are not said to be made, save in reference to something, because they are not self-subsistent, but subsist in something else; hence, when a thing is made white, it is said to be made, not simply, but relatively. Now in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person besides that of the Word of God, who is uncreated, as proved above.1 Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature; although we can say so, with a qualification; for instance, that He is a creature, as man, or in respect of His human nature. Now, although the statement that an individual substance is made one of its proper attributes—accidents, for instance, or parts—cannot be made simply, but only relatively; nevertheless we can predicate of a subject simply whatever results naturally and appropriately from its accidents or parts: thus seeing is predicated of a man simply, as a consequence of his having eyes: curly haired, by reason of his hair, and visible, because he is coloured. Hence whatsoever results properly from human nature can be predicated simply of Christ; for instance, that He is a man, that He is visible, that He walked, and so on: whereas, whatsoever is proper to the Person cannot be attributed to Christ in reference to His human nature, except with a qualification, expressed or implied.

Chapter XLIX

reply to the objections given above against the incarnation

Bearing these things in mind, we can now easily reply to the above objections1 against faith in the Incarnation.

We have shown that the Incarnation of the Word does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh, or united to the body as its form.2 Therefore from the fact that the Word became incarnate, it does not follow, as the first objection maintained, that God is really a body, or a bodily power.

Likewise, from the fact that the Word assumed human nature, we cannot conclude that He was substantially changed. No change took place in God’s Word Himself, but only in the human nature assumed by the Word. It was in reference to that nature that the Word was both begotten and born in the course of time, but not in reference to Himself.

The third objection proves nothing. A hypostasis does not extend beyond the nature from which it has its subsistence. Now the Word of God does not derive subsistence from human nature; nay rather He draws human nature to His own subsistence or personality: since He subsists, not through it, but in it. Hence nothing prevents the Word of God from being everywhere, although the human nature assumed by the Word of God is not everywhere.

This helps us to reply to the fourth objection. Every subsistent thing must have but one nature, through which it has being simply: wherefore the Word of God has being simply, through the divine nature alone, and not through human nature. It is owing to the latter that He has a particular kind of being, namely that He is a man.

The fifth objection is solved in the same way. It is impossible that the nature through which the Word subsists, be other than the Person of the Word. Now He subsists through the divine and not through the human nature: drawing the latter to His own subsistence, so as to subsist therein, as we said before. It does not follow, then, that the human nature is identified with the Person of the Word.

Wherefore the sixth objection also is answered. For the hypostasis is less simple, either in reality or as existing in the mind, than the nature whereby it has being;—in reality, when the hypostasis is not its own nature; in the mind only, in those things where the hypostasis is identical with the nature. Now the hypostasis of the Word is not constituted simply by human nature, so as to exist by it: by it, the Word had this only, that He was a man. Hence it does not follow that the human nature is more simple than the Word, considered as Word, but only in as much as the Word is this man.

Hence follows the reply to the seventh objection. It does not follow that the hypostasis of God’s Word is simply constituted by signate matter: but only in as much as He is this man. For it is only in this sense that He is constituted by human nature, as stated above.

That the human soul and body in Christ were drawn into the personality of the Word, without constituting another person besides the Person of the Word proves, not that they were less effective, but that they had greater excellence. For a thing has better being, when united to its betters, than when it is by itself: thus the sensitive soul has better being in man than in other animals: in these it is the principal form, but not in man.

Hence again we gather the reply to the ninth objection. This soul and this body were truly in Christ, and yet they did not give Him another personality from that of the Word of God, since they were assumed into the personality of the divine Word. Even so the body, when it is without the soul, has its own species: but when it is united to the soul, it takes its species from the soul.

Hereby is indicated the reply to the tenth objection. It is clear that this man Christ is a substance, not a universal but a particular, substance: also that He is a hypostasis, and yet not a distinct hypostasis from that of the Word: because human nature was assumed by the hypostasis of the Word, that the Word might subsist in the human as well as in the divine nature. Now that which subsists in human nature is an individual man. Therefore, when we say, This man, the Word is indicated.—If however someone were to apply this same argument to human nature, so as to say that it is a substance, not universal, but particular, and consequently a hypostasis, he would clearly be in the wrong. For human nature, even in Socrates or Plato, is not a hypostasis: it is that which subsists in human nature that is a hypostasis. When it is said that it is a substance, and a particular substance, the sense is not the same as when we say that a hypostasis is a particular substance. According to the Philosopher,1 substance has a twofold signification. In the first place it may indicate a subject in the genus of substance, namely a hypostasis; secondly, it may mean what a thing is, namely its nature. Nor are the parts of a substance called particular substances as though they subsisted of themselves: but they subsist in the whole. Hence they cannot be called hypostases, seeing that none of them is a complete substance: otherwise there would be as many hypostases in a man as there are parts.

The eleventh objection is answered thus. Equivocation consists in applying the same name to various forms, but not to different supposits. Thus there is no equivocation if man stands at one time for Plato, at another time for Socrates. Accordingly, the term man, whether applied to Christ or to other men, always indicates the same form, namely human nature, and consequently the predication here is univocal. The only way in which it has a different signification is that when it is applied to Christ, it stands for the uncreated hypostasis, whereas when it is applied to other men, it stands for the created hypostasis.

And yet the hypostasis of the Word is not said to be the supposit of the human nature, as though it were the subject, and the latter were its form, as the twelfth objection suggested. This would indeed be necessary, if the hypostasis of the Word were constituted in being simply, by the human nature, which we have shown to be false. The hypostasis of the Word is said to be the supposit of human nature, as drawing it to His own subsistence; even as a thing is drawn to something better, to which it is united.

From the fact that the Word already existed from eternity, it does not follow that human nature is joined to the Word accidentally, as the last objection concluded. The Word assumed human nature in order to be truly man. Now to be a man is to be a kind of substance. Since then the hypostasis of the Word is a man through being united to human nature, this nature is not joined to Him accidentally: for accidents do not give substantial being.

Chapter L

that original sin is transmitted by our first parent to his posterity

In the preceding chapters we have shown there is nothing impossible in what the Catholic Faith affirms concerning the Incarnation of the Son of God: and consequently we must now show that it was fitting for the Son of God to take to Himself human nature. Seemingly, the Apostle assigns as a reason of this fittingness, original sin which was contracted by all men. Thus he says (Rom. 5:19): As by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just. Since, however, the Pelagian heretics denied original sin, we must prove that men are born in original sin. In the first place we must quote the words of Gen. 2:15, 17: The Lord God took man, and put him into paradise … And he commanded him saying: Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat: but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. Seeing, however, that Adam did not actually die on the very day on which he ate, the words, Thou shalt die the death must be understood to mean, Thou shalt be under the ban of death. Now there would be no purpose in saying this if man were created with the necessity of dying. Consequently we must say that death and the necessity of dying is a punishment inflicted on man for sin. Now a punishment is not inflicted justly except on those who are guilty. Therefore in all who are thus punished there must be some guilt. Now all men are punished thus, even from the moment of their birth: for as soon as he is born man is under the ban of death, so that some die as soon as they are born, and are taken from the womb to the grave. Therefore some kind of sin is in them. But this is not actual sin, for infants have not the use of free-will, without which no sin is imputed to a man, as appears from what we have stated above.1 We must conclude, then, that they have contracted original sin.

This is expressly indicated in the words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. Now it cannot be said that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, because in that case sin would only enter into those who, by sinning, imitate the first man; and since through sin death entered into the world, only those would die who sin in imitation of the first man. But the Apostle excludes this interpretation when he goes on to say (verse 14): Death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who have not sinned, after the similitude of the transgression of Adam. Hence the Apostle did not mean that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, but by way of origin. Moreover, if the Apostle were speaking of the entrance of sin into the world by mere imitation, he would have said that sin had entered into the world by the devil rather than by one man. Thus it is said explicitly (Wis. 2:24, 25): By the envy of the devil, death came into the world: and they follow him that are of his side.

Again. David says (Ps. 50:7): Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me. Now this cannot refer to actual sin, seeing that David was conceived and born of lawful wedlock. Therefore his words must refer to original sin.

Moreover. It is said (Job 14:4): Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only art? Whence it is clearly to be gathered that man contracts uncleanness through being conceived of seed. And this must refer to the uncleanness of sin, for which alone is man brought into judgement: because the preceding verse reads: And dost thou think it meet to open thy eyes upon such an one, and to bring him into judgement with thee? Therefore man from his very origin contracts a guilt that is called original sin.

Again. Baptism and the other sacraments of the Church are remedies for sin, as we shall prove further on. Now it is the universal custom of the Church to give baptism to children soon after birth. Consequently there would be no purpose in doing so unless they were stained with some sin. But this is not actual sin, because they have no free-will without which no one is accounted guilty of sin. Therefore, since God and the Church do nothing without a purpose, we must conclude that they have contracted original sin. Someone, however, may say that infants are baptized, not that they may be cleansed from sin, but that they may enter the kingdom of heaven. For they cannot enter the kingdom of heaven, unless they are baptized: since our Lord said (Jo. 3:5): Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. But this objection is futile. No one is excluded from the kingdom of God, save on account of sin. For the end of every rational creature is to obtain beatitude, which is nowhere but in God’s kingdom. And this kingdom is the orderly society of those who enjoy the vision of God, wherein true beatitude consists, as proved above.1 Now nothing fails to obtain its end except through some sin. Therefore, if children before being baptized, cannot enter into the kingdom of God, we must admit that there is some sin in them: and consequently, according to the teaching of Catholic faith, we must hold that men are born with original sin.

Chapter LI

arguments against original sin

There are, however, some points that would seem to be in contradiction with the truth. One man’s sin is not imputed to others: wherefore it is said (Ezech. 18:19): The son beareth not the iniquity of his father.2 The reason for this is that we are neither praised nor blamed for that which is not in our power. Now those things are in our power, that we do freely. Therefore the sin of the first man is not imputed to all mankind.

Someone, however, might reply that through one man sinning, all men sinned in him, as the Apostle seems to say (Rom. 5:19): and thus it is not a case of one man’s sin being imputed to another. Yet, seemingly, this reply is not conclusive; because when Adam sinned, those who were born of him were not yet in existence; they only existed virtually as in their first origin. Now only one who is actually in existence can sin, since to sin is to act. Therefore we did not all sin in Adam. And if it be said that we sinned in Adam, in the sense that he transmitted his sin to us together with our nature; this again is apparently impossible. An accident does not pass from one subject to another, and therefore it cannot be transmitted, unless its subject be transmitted. Now the subject of sin is the rational soul, which is not transmitted to us from our first parent, but is created by God for each one separately, as we have proved.1 Therefore sin cannot be transmitted to us from Adam through our origin.

Again. If other men contract sin from their first parent, because they trace their origin to him, it would seem that Christ must have been subject to original sin, seeing that He also traces His origin to him: and this is contrary to faith.

Moreover. That which a thing receives through its natural origin, is natural to it: and that which is natural to a thing is not its fault: thus it is not a mole’s fault that it is blind. Therefore sin could not be contracted from the first man by other men. If someone reply that sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity through their origin, considered not as natural but as vitiated; this reply will not stand. A fault does not occur in nature’s work, except through a fault in a natural principle: thus a defect in the seed of animals leads to the birth of monstrosities. Now we cannot assign any defect of a natural principle in human seed. Consequently a vitiated origin cannot account for the transmission of original sin from our first parent to his posterity.

Again. Faults in the works of nature, due to a defective principle, do not occur always or even frequently, but in the minority of cases. Therefore, if sin is transmitted by the first parent to his posterity through a vitiated origin, it will be contracted, not by all, but by a few.

Further. If a vitiated generation occasions the transmission of a defect to the offspring, this defect must be of the same kind as the fault in the origin, because like effects have like causes. Now the origin or generation of man is an act of the generating power, which has no part in the reason; and consequently it cannot be the subject of a fault of a sinful kind, since virtue and vice can only be in acts that are to some extent subject to reason: thus a man is not blamed if, on account of a vitiated generation, he is born a leper or blind. Therefore it is quite impossible for a culpable fault to be transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, through a vitiated generation.

Again. Sin does not destroy the good of nature: wherefore natural good remains even in the demons, according to Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv.). Now generation is an act of nature. Therefore human generation could not be vitiated by the first man’s sin, in such a way that his sin would be transmitted to his posterity.

Moreover. Man begets his like in species. Hence a son is not necessarily like his parents in things that are not connected with the nature of the species. Now sin has no connection with the specific nature, since it is not according to nature; in fact, it is a corruption of the natural order. Therefore it does not follow that, because the first man sinned, other sinners should be born of him.

Again. Children take after their proximate rather than their remote progenitors. Now it may happen that the immediate progenitors are sinless, and commit no sin in the act of procreation. Therefore all men are not born sinners on account of the sin of their first parent.

Besides, if sin was transmitted by the first man to his posterity, since good is more effective in its action than evil, as we have proved,1 much more were Adam’s repentance and righteousness transmitted by him to others.

Moreover. If the sin of the first man is transmitted to his posterity by generation, for the same reason the sins of other parents are transmitted to their children. Thus the burden of sin would be greater in the later descendants than in the first. And this would be the case all the more if sin were transmitted from parent to child, whereas repentance cannot be transmitted.

Chapter LII

reply to the above arguments

We must, in the first place, observe that there are certain probable signs of original sin in the human race. For since God watches over men’s actions, so as to assign rewards to good deeds, and punishments to evil deeds, as we have already shown,1 we can conclude that where there is punishment, there has been sin. Now the whole human race suffers various punishments, both bodily and spiritual. Of bodily punishments the chief is death, to which all others are conducive and subordinate, such as hunger, thirst, and so on. Of spiritual punishments, the principal is weakness of reason, the result being that man encounters difficulty in acquiring knowledge of the truth, and easily falls into error; also that he is unable wholly to overcome his animal propensities, which sometimes even obscure his mental vision. Someone however might reply that these defects, whether of body or of soul, are not penalties but natural defects, and a necessary consequence of the conditions of matter. For the human body, being composed of contrary elements, must needs be corruptible; and the sensitive appetite must needs incline to things in which the senses delight, and which at times are contrary to reason. Again, the possible intellect is in potentiality to all things intelligible, and has none of them actually, but has by its very nature to acquire them through the senses, and therefore with difficulty acquires the knowledge of truth, and is easily led astray by the imagination.

Nevertheless, if we look at the matter rightly, it will appear sufficiently probable that, divine providence having fitted each perfection to that which is to be perfected, God has united a higher to a lower nature in order that the former might dominate the latter, and, should any obstacle to this dominion arise through a defect of nature, God by a special and supernatural act of kindness would remove it. Wherefore, since the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, we believe that it was united to the body under such conditions, that there can be nothing in the body to oppose the soul whereby the body lives: and in like manner, if reason in man is united to his sensual appetite and his other sensitive powers, that reason is not hindered by the sensitive powers, but, on the contrary, dominates them. Hence, according to the teaching of faith, we affirm that man was, from the beginning, so fashioned that as long as his reason was subject to God, not only would his lower powers serve him without hindrance; but there would be nothing in his body to lessen its subjection; since whatever was lacking in nature to bring this about God by His grace would supply. Whereas no sooner did his reason turn away from God than his lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it receives from the soul. Accordingly, although these defects seem natural to man absolutely, if we consider his nature from its lower side, nevertheless, if we consider divine providence, and the dignity of the higher part of man’s nature, it can be proved with sufficient probability that these defects are penal, and consequently that the human race was originally infected with sin. Having made these remarks, let us now turn our attention to the objections.

It is not unreasonable, as the first objection affirmed, to say that because one man sinned all men have contracted sin through their origin, although each one is praised or blamed for his own actions. For we must not speak in the same way of things that regard the individual, as of things that regard the nature of the whole species: because, as Porphyry says,1 by sharing the same species, many men are like one man. Accordingly, a sin belonging to one individual or person, is not imputed to the fault of any other but the sinner, because they are different persons. But if there be a sin that pertains to the whole specific nature, it is not unreasonable that it be transmitted from one man to another, even as the specific nature is. Now sin is an evil of the rational nature, and evil is the privation of good, and, consequently, if we are to judge whether a certain sin pertains to the common nature or to a particular person, we must see what good it deprives one of. Accordingly, actual sins which are committed by mankind in general, deprive the person of the sinner of a good, such as grace and the right order among the parts of the soul: consequently they are personal sins, and when one man sins, another is not blamed. On the other hand, the first sin of the first man deprived the sinner not only of his own personal good—namely, grace and due order in the soul, but also of the good belonging to the common nature. For, as we said above,1 human nature was so fashioned when it was first brought into being that the lower powers were perfectly subject to the soul, the reason to God, and the body to the soul, God supplying by grace that which nature lacked for the purpose. Now this boon, which some call original justice, was bestowed on the first man in such wise that he was to transmit it together with human nature to his posterity. But when the first man sinned, his reason rebelled against God, and the consequence was that his lower powers ceased to be perfectly subject to reason, and his body to his soul. And this, not only in the first man that sinned, but also in his posterity, who were to have inherited the aforesaid original justice. Hence the sin of the first man, from whom all others are descended, according to the teaching of faith, was not only a personal sin, in so far as it deprived the first man himself of his own good, but also a sin of nature, in as much as the result of that sin was that both he and his posterity were deprived of a gift bestowed on the entire nature. Wherefore this defect transmitted by our first parent to others, is culpable also in those others, in as much as all men are reckoned as one man, through sharing in one common nature. And this sin proves to be voluntary in reference to the will of our first parent, just as the hand’s deed may be sinful, on account of the will of the first mover—namely, the reason: so that in reference to the sin of nature we look upon the members of the human race as being parts of the common nature, just as in the case of a personal sin there are various parts in one man.

Accordingly, it is true to say with the Apostle (Rom. 5:19) that, because one man sinned, all others sinned in him, as the second argument1 stated: not that other men were actually in him, but virtually, as in their first origin. Nor are they said to have sinned in him by their own deed, but as sharing in his nature which was corrupted by sin.

The third objection argued thus: If sin is transmitted by our first parent to his posterity, seeing that the rational soul is the subject of sin, it follows that the rational soul is transmitted together with the semen. But this does not follow. This sin of nature, which we call original sin, is transmitted in the same way as the specific nature, and although the rational soul completes that nature, it is not transmitted with the semen: the body alone is thus transmitted, being naturally adapted to receive such a soul, as proved above.2

Although, according to the flesh, Christ was descended from our first parent, he did not contract the stain of original sin, as the fourth objection argued: because from our first parent he received only the matter of a human body, and the power which fashioned his body was not derived from our first parent, but from the Holy Ghost, as we have proved.3 Consequently he received human nature from Adam, not as from its efficient cause, but as from its material principle.

We must also note that the reason why these defects are transmitted to us through our natural origin, is that our nature is deprived of the assistance of grace, bestowed on it in our first parent, and destined, together with nature, to be transmitted to his posterity: and since this privation was the consequence of his deliberate sin, the defects resulting therefrom took the form of sin. Accordingly, these defects are both culpable in reference to their first principle, which was Adam’s sin, and natural, in reference to nature already destitute: wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 2:3): We were by nature children of wrath. Thus the fifth objection is answered.

Thus it is clear that the vicious origin which is the Cause of original sin, is due to the lack of a principle—namely the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its creation. In a sense this gift was natural, not because it resulted from the principles of nature, but because it was bestowed on man in such a way that it was to be transmitted by him together with his nature: the sixth objection took natural as signifying that which results from natural principles.

In the same sense the seventh objection speaks of the defect of a natural principle as belonging to the specific nature: and it is true that whatever results from this defect occurs in the minority of cases. But the defect of original sin results from our being deprived of a principle that is additional to the principles of the species, as stated above.

We must also observe that the act of the generative power cannot be an actual sin, for this depends on the will of the individual, whereas the act of the generative power is not obedient to reason or the will, as the eighth objection argued. But original sin pertains to nature; so that there is nothing to prevent its being in the act of the generative power, seeing that such acts are said to be natural.

The ninth objection can easily be solved from what has been said. By sin man is not deprived of the natural good which belongs to his specific nature: but he could, by the sin of his first parent, be deprived of the gratuitous good bestowed on his nature, as already stated.

Again, from what we have been saying, we can easily reply to the tenth objection. Since being deprived and being in want are correlatives, it follows that children resemble their parents as regards original sin, in as much as the gift bestowed on nature in the beginning would have been transmitted by parents to their posterity. Although this gift was not included in the species, nevertheless, it was given by God gratuitously to the first man, that he might transmit it to the entire species. In the same way the sin which caused man to lose that good is transmitted to the whole species. We must also observe that although a man is cleansed from original sin by the sacraments of grace, so that it ceases to be imputed to him as a sin, this cleansing regards him personally; nor is he entirely healed: whereas original sin is transmitted to posterity by an act of nature. Accordingly, even though there be no original sin in the one who generates, considered as an individual, and though there may be no sin in the act of generation, as the eleventh objection suggested, nevertheless, original sin, through infecting the nature, infects both the generator, who is nature’s principle of generation, and the act whereby he generates.

Again we must note that the actual sin of the first man affected the whole nature, because on account of the gift bestowed on it this nature was still perfect: but when this nature, through his sin, was deprived of that gift, his act became simply natural. Hence by his act he could neither satisfy for the whole nature, nor restore the gift of nature: but he could only make satisfaction, to a certain extent, for himself. This suffices as a reply to the twelfth objection.

In like manner the thirteenth objection is solved. When subsequent parents sin, nature is already deprived of the gift originally bestowed on it: and consequently their sin does not cause a defect to be transmitted to their posterity, but only one that affects them personally.

Accordingly, it is neither unfitting nor unreasonable that men should have contracted original sin, as the Pelagian heresy which denied original sin declared.

Chapter LIII

arguments that would seem to show that it was not fitting that god should be incarnate

Since unbelievers look upon the doctrine of the Incarnation as folly, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:21), It pleased God by the foolishness of our preaching to save them that believe, and whereas it is foolish to preach not only what is impossible, but also what is unfitting, they attack the Incarnation not only on the ground that Catholic faith teaches what is impossible, but also because it is unreasonable and unbecoming the divine goodness. It becomes the divine goodness that all things should retain their order. Now the order of things requires that God should be exalted above all, and that man’s place should be among the lower creatures. Therefore it becomes not the divine majesty to be united to human nature.

Again. If it were fitting that God should become man, this must have been on account of some consequent benefit. But whatever this benefit was, God, since He is almighty, could have brought it about by His mere will. Seeing then that whatever is done fittingly, should be done as quickly as possible, it was not fitting that God should unite human nature to Himself, for the sake of that benefit.

Further. Since God is the universal cause of all, it behoves Him especially to seek the good of the universe. But the assumption of human nature pertains only to the good of man. Therefore, if it behoved God to take some other nature, it was not fitting that He should take human nature only.

Moreover. The more things are like to each other, the more fittingly are they united together. Now the angelic nature is more like and akin to God than human nature is. Therefore it was not fitting that God should pass over the angelic nature and be united to human nature.

Again. If God took human nature, this would seem to provide an obstacle to man’s understanding of the truth, which in him is a principle of knowledge. For he would be liable to fall into the error of those who deny that God is exalted above all bodies. Therefore it was of no profit to human nature that it should be assumed by God.

Moreover. We know by experience that many errors have arisen concerning the Incarnation. Therefore it would seem that it was not good for man’s salvation that God should become incarnate.

Again. Of all God’s works the Incarnation is apparently the greatest. Now one would expect that the greatest work would be productive of the greatest benefit. Hence if the Incarnation of God was directed to the salvation of all, it would seem fitting that He should have saved the whole human race: in fact, the salvation of all men would seem a fitting result to expect from so great a work.

Further. If God took human nature in order to save mankind, it would seem proper that His divine nature should have been made clear to men by adequate signs. Now this apparently was not the case, since other men, by God’s power alone, and without God being united to their nature, worked miracles like those that Christ worked, and even greater. Therefore God’s Incarnation seemingly did not provide sufficiently for man’s salvation.

Again. If it was necessary for man’s salvation, that God should take flesh; seemingly He ought to have taken human nature at the very beginning of the world, and not towards the end of time, seeing that there have been men since the world’s beginning: for it would seem that the salvation of all previous men was neglected.

Further. For the same reason He ought to have continued to dwell with men until the end of the world, so as to teach and guide men by His presence.

Moreover. It is most profitable to man that His hope of future bliss should have a strong foundation. Now God incarnate would have inspired man with this hope much more, had He taken an immortal, impassible, and glorious flesh, and shown it to all men. Therefore, seemingly, it was unfitting that He took a body subject to death and infirmities.

Moreover. It would seem proper that He should have enjoyed an abundance of worldly possessions, and have lived in the midst of wealth and the highest honours in order to show that all the things in the world come from God. Nevertheless we are told that the contrary was the case, that He lived the life of a poor and humble man, and suffered a shameful death. Therefore, the teaching of faith concerning God incarnate would seem to be unbecoming.

Further. By suffering humiliations He hid His divinity very considerably, and yet it was most necessary that men should acknowledge His Godhead, if He was God incarnate. Therefore the teaching of faith is, seemingly, out of keeping with the salvation of mankind.

Someone might reply that the Son of God suffered death out of obedience to His Father; but this does not seem reasonable.

Obedience consists in conforming oneself to the will of one who commands. Now the will of God the Father cannot be unreasonable. Consequently, if it was not becoming for God made man to die, since death is seemingly incompatible with the divinity that is life itself, His death is not sufficiently explained by saying that He died out of obedience to the Father.

Again. God’s will is not inclined to the death of men, even of sinners, but rather that they should live, according to Ezech. 33:11, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live. Much less, therefore, could it be God’s will that the most perfect man should die.

Moreover. It seems wicked and cruel to command an innocent man to be put to death, and especially to be put to death for sinners, who deserve themselves to die. Now the man Christ Jesus was innocent. Therefore it would have been wicked, if he had suffered death at the command of God the Father.

Someone might say that this was necessary in order to show forth His humility: thus the Apostle says (Philip. 2:8): He humbled himself being become obedient unto death. But neither is this reply to the point. In the first place, humility is commended in one who has a superior to whom he can be subject, and this cannot be said of God. Therefore it was unfitting for the Word of God to be humbled unto death. Secondly, men could be sufficiently taught humility by divine words, which they are bound to believe, and by human examples. Therefore it was not necessary, as an example of humility, that the Word of God should either take flesh or submit to die.

And if it be replied again that it was necessary for Christ to suffer death and other ignominies, according to the Apostle, who says that He was delivered up for our sins (Rom. 4:25), and that He was offered … to exhaust the sins of many: neither is this to the point.

First, because only God’s grace cleanses man from sin.

Secondly, if any atonement was required, it was proper for the one who had sinned to atone: since, according to God’s just judgement, every one shall bear his own burden.1

Again, if it was fitting that someone more than a mere man should atone for mankind, it were enough, seemingly, if an angel had taken flesh and offered satisfaction: since an angel has a higher nature than man.

Further. Sin is not expiated by sin; on the contrary, it is aggravated thereby. Hence, if Christ was to atone by His death, His death should have been one in which sin had no part: in other words, He should have died, not a violent, but a natural death.

Again. If it behoved Christ to die for the sins of men, He should have died more than once, since men sin often.

Someone, however, might reply that it was especially on account of original sin that it behoved Christ to be born and to suffer: since that was the sin which had infected the whole of the human race, on account of the first man’s sin. But this does not seem possible. For if other men do not suffice to atone for original sin, neither, apparently, was Christ’s death sufficient to atone for the sins of mankind, since He died in His human, and not in His divine, nature.

Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, it were surely unjust that men should still suffer punishments which Scripture declares to have been inflicted for sin.

Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, there would be no need to seek further forgiveness of one’s sins. And yet all who have their salvation at heart seek forgiveness. Therefore Christ did not take away the sins of mankind sufficiently. These and like arguments might appeal to some as indicating that the doctrine of the Catholic Faith about the Incarnation is inconsistent with the majesty and wisdom of God.

Chapter LIV

that it was fitting for god to be incarnate

Nevertheless, if we consider the mystery of the Incarnation carefully and reverently, we shall discover such a depth of divine wisdom, as will surpass all human knowledge; according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:25), The foolishness of God is wiser than men. Hence it is that those who study this mystery with reverence discover more and more its marvellous secrets.

In the first place we must note that the Incarnation of God was a most effective assistance to man in his road to heaven. For we have proved1 that man’s perfect happiness consists in seeing God face to face. Now, on account of the immeasurable distance between his nature and God’s, a man might deem it impossible for him to reach a state, wherein the human intellect is immediately united to the divine essence, as the intellect is united to its idea. Consequently he would be discouraged in his search after happiness, and would hold back in despair. But when he knows that God consented to personal union with human nature, he is convinced that he can be united to God by his intellect, so as to see Him face to face. Therefore it was most fitting for God to assume human nature, in order to raise in man the hope of finding happiness; and hence it is that after Christ’s Incarnation men began to have greater hopes of obtaining the happiness of heaven, according to His own words (Jo. 10:10), I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly. At the same time man is freed of the obstacles that hinder him from gaining happiness. For, since his perfect beatitude consists solely in the enjoyment of God, as we have proved, it follows that whosoever seeks his end in things beneath God, places an obstacle to his obtaining a share in true beatitude. Now, if man remained in ignorance of his own worth, he would easily be led to place his end in things beneath God. For it is through considering themselves in their corporeal and sensitive nature, which they have in common with other animals, that some seek a kind of animal happiness in things pertaining to the body and carnal pleasures. Others, considering the superiority in some respects of certain creatures over man, made such things the object of their religion, by worshipping either the world and its parts, on account of their great size and duration; or spiritual substances, angels and demons, by reason of their surpassing man, both in immortality and intellectual acumen: and so man deemed that his happiness is to be found in such things, for as much as they are above him. Now, though in certain respects man is indeed below some creatures, and in some ways like the very lowest, nevertheless, in the order of the end, nothing is above man, save only God, in whom alone man’s perfect happiness consists. Accordingly, man’s worth in that he is destined to be blessed with the immediate vision of God, is most fittingly indicated by God, by His taking human nature immediately to Himself. Hence we find that, as a result of the Incarnation of God, a great number of people gave up the worship of angels, demons, and all manner of creatures, renounced even the pleasures of the flesh and all bodily goods, and gave themselves to the worship of God alone. To Him alone they look for perfect happiness, in accordance with the Apostolic exhortation (Coloss. 3:1, 2), Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God: mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth.

Again. Whereas man’s perfect happiness consists in a knowledge of God, surpassing the faculty of every created intellect, as proved above,1 it was necessary that man should have a foretaste of this knowledge, so that he might be directed towards that same knowledge in its fulness: and we have shown that this is provided by faith.2 Now the knowledge whereby man is directed to his last end ought to be most certain, since it is the principle on which all things are directed to the last end: so, too, those principles that we know naturally are most certain. Now we cannot have absolutely certain knowledge about a thing, unless it is either evident in itself, like the first principles of demonstration, or is resolved into self-evident premisses, like the conclusion of a demonstration. Since then faith teaches us to believe concerning God things which cannot be self-evident to us, because they surpass the faculty of the human intellect, it was necessary for these things to be revealed to man by one to whom they are self-evident. And though they are to a certain extent self-evident to all those who see the divine essence, nevertheless, in order that man’s knowledge might be absolutely certain, it was necessary that it should be derived from its first principle—namely, God—to whom it is naturally self-evident, and by whom it is manifested to all. Even so, scientific certainty is not attained without recourse to the first indemonstrable principles. Therefore, that man might obtain perfect certitude about the truth of faith, it was fitting that he should be instructed by God made man, so as to receive divine instruction in a human way. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:18): No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him: and our Lord Himself says (Jo. 18:37): For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth. And for this reason we find that, after Christ’s Incarnation, men had greater evidence and more certain knowledge of divine things, according to Isa. 11:9, The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord.

Again. Since man’s perfect happiness consists in the enjoyment of God, it was necessary for man’s affections to be disposed to desire it, since he has a natural desire for happiness. Now the desire for the enjoyment of a thing is caused by love of it. Hence it was necessary for man, who seeks perfect happiness, to be urged to the love of God. But nothing is a greater incentive to love someone than the experience of his love for us. And God’s love for man could not be proved more effectively than by His consenting to personal union with man: since it is peculiar to love that it unites lover and beloved, as far as this is possible. Therefore, since man seeks perfect happiness, it was necessary for God to become man.

Moreover. Friendship is based on a certain equality, and consequently it would seem that those who are very unequal cannot be united in friendship. And so, that friendship between man and God might be more intimate, it was well for man that God should become man—since friendship between man and man is natural—in order that by knowing a God made visible to us, we might be drawn to the love of things invisible.

It is also evident that heaven is the reward of virtue. Consequently those who are on their way to heaven should be disposed by virtue. Now we are incited to virtue by word and example; and a man’s example and word incite us to virtue so much the more efficaciously, as we are firmly convinced of his goodness. But it was not possible to be infallibly certain of a mere man’s goodness, since even the most holy men have at times been found wanting. Wherefore, that man might be strengthened in virtue, it was necessary for him to be taught virtue by the word and example of God incarnate. For which reason our Lord said (Jo. 13:15): I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do also.

Again. Just as virtue prepares man for heaven, so sin debars him therefrom. Now sin, which is opposed to virtue, debars man from heaven, not only because it brings disorder into the soul, by leading it away from its due end, but also because it offends God, to whom, as the director of human actions, man looks for this heavenly reward. Moreover, sin is contrary to divine charity, as we have fully proved.1 Again, when a man is conscious of sin, he loses hope, which he needs in order to go to heaven. Therefore, as sin abounds in the human race, man needs a remedy for it. But none can provide this remedy, save God alone, who is able not only to move man’s will to good, so as to bring him back to the right order, but also to condone the offence committed against Himself; since an offence is not forgiven, save by the person offended. In order that man’s conscience may be eased of his past sin, he must be certified of God’s forgiveness. But he cannot be certified of this except by God Himself. Therefore it was fitting to the human race, and expedient for the obtainment of heavenly bliss, that God should become man, so that man would both receive from God forgiveness of his sins, and be certified of that forgiveness by God made man. Hence our Lord said (Matth. 9:6): That you may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins: and the Apostle says (Heb. 9:14) that the blood of Christ … shall cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God.

Again. We are taught by the tradition of the Church that the whole human race is infected with sin. Now it has been proved2 that the order of divine justice requires that without atonement sin be not forgiven by God. But no mere man was able to atone for the sin of the whole human race, because any single mere man is something less than the whole assembly of the human race. Therefore, in order that the human race might be delivered from the common sin, it was necessary for atonement to be made by one who was both man, from whom atonement was due, and something more than man, so that his merit would suffice to atone for the sin of the whole human race. Now in the order of heavenly bliss nothing is greater than man, save God alone: because the angels, although they are above man, as regards their natural condition, are not above him in the order of the end, since their heaven is the same as his. Consequently, for man to obtain heaven, it was necessary that God should become man, in order to take away the sin of the human race. This is expressed in the words of John the Baptist concerning Christ (Jo. 1:29): Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sin of the world. And, again, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:18): Therefore, as by the offence of one, unto all men unto condemnation, so also by the justice of one, unto justification of life.

From these and like arguments we may conclude that far from being inconsistent with the divine goodness, it was most expedient for man’s salvation that God should become man.

Chapter LV

reply to the arguments given above against the fittingness of the incarnation

There should be no difficulty in solving the objections given above.1

It is not contrary to the order of the universe, as the first objection maintained, that God should become man. Although the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, nevertheless, according to the order of his nature, man has God for his end, and is adapted for union with God by his intellect. The personal union of God with man exemplifies and endorses that union, although each nature retains its own property, so that neither did the divine nature lose anything of its excellence, nor was the human nature raised above the limits of its species. We must also note that, by reason of the perfection and unchangeableness of the divine goodness, God suffers no loss of dignity through the approach, however near, of any creature, although this is a gain to the creature: even so, He communicates His goodness to creatures, without any detriment to Himself. Likewise, though God’s will suffices to make all things, His wisdom requires that each individual thing, according as it is expedient for it, should be the object of His providence: thus to each thing He has fittingly appointed its appropriate cause. Consequently, although God was able by His will alone to bring about all the benefits that we ascribe to the Incarnation, as the second objection stated, it was nevertheless expedient for human nature that they should be brought about by God made man, as we may gather somewhat from the arguments given above.1

The third objection is easily answered. Man is composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, standing as it were on the boundaries of both, so that whatsoever is done for man’s good would seem to affect all creatures. Thus the lower material creatures are employed by man and, to a certain extent, are subject to him: while the higher spiritual creature—namely, the angel—has the same last end to obtain as man, as we have already shown.2 Accordingly, it would seem fitting that the universal cause of all should assume, in unity of person, the creature in whom, more than in any other, He unites Himself to all creatures.

We must also observe that the rational creature alone acts of itself: for irrational creatures are driven by their own bias, rather than act of themselves: so that they are to be regarded as instruments rather than principal agents. Now it was fitting that God should assume a creature capable of acting of itself, as principal agent: because an instrumental agent acts through being moved to action, whereas the principal agent acts itself and of itself. Accordingly, if God were to do anything by means of an irrational creature, all that is required in accordance with that creature’s natural condition is that it be moved by God, and there is no need for it to be assumed into personal union, so as to act itself, since this would be inconsistent with its natural condition, and is consistent with the rational nature alone. Hence it was fitting that God should assume not an irrational, but a rational creature—that is to say, either an angel or a man. And though the angelic nature, as regards its natural properties, is more excellent than human nature, as the fourth objection argued, it was nevertheless more expedient for the human nature to be assumed.—First, because in man sin is reparable, in as much as his choice is not set upon a thing unchangeably, but may turn from good to evil, and return from evil to good; and man’s reason, gathering the truth from sensible objects and signs, can be led in opposite directions. On the other hand, just as an angel’s apprehension is unchangeable, since he has unchangeable knowledge by simple intuition, so too is his choice unchangeable. Consequently he is either not moved at all to evil, or if he is so moved, he is moved unchangeably: and therefore his sin is irreparable. Since then, as we learn from Scripture, the expiation of sins was apparently the chief motive of the Incarnation, it was more fitting that God should assume the human than the angelic nature.—Secondly, because God assumed the creature in unity of person, not of nature, as we have already proved.1 Hence it was more fitting that He should assume the human than the angelic nature; because, in man, nature and person are distinct, in as much as he is composed of matter and form; whereas, in the angel, they are not distinct because he is immaterial.—Thirdly, because an angel, by a property of his nature, is nearer to knowing God than man, whose knowledge arises from the senses. Hence, for an angel, it was enough that, through his intelligence, he learned divine things from God: whereas man’s natural condition required that through his senses he should learn about himself from God: and this was done by the Incarnation. Moreover, the very distance between man and God seemed to make it more difficult for him to arrive at the enjoyment of God; wherefore he needed, more than the angel, to be assumed by God, so that he might conceive the hope of going to heaven. Again, since man was the terminus of creation, as though postulating all other creatures in the natural order of generation, he was fittingly united to the first principle of things, so as to complete the circle of creation.

The assumption of human nature by God does not prove an occasion of error, as the fifth argument suggested. The assumption of human nature, as we have stated,1 was made in unity of person, and not in unity of nature. Consequently there is no occasion for us to agree with those who held that God is not above all, and said that He is the soul of the world, or something of the kind. It is true, as the sixth objection states, that many errors arose concerning God’s Incarnation; yet, surely, many more came to an end after the Incarnation. Even as, in keeping with the defectible nature of the creature, some evils resulted from the creation of things, although it proceeded from the divine goodness; so neither is it a matter for astonishment, if after the manifestation of the divine truth, some errors arose through the defectible nature of the human mind. And yet these errors sharpened the wits of the faithful for a more diligent search of the truth in divine things: even so does God direct to some good the evils that occur among creatures.

Although all created good is small in comparison with the divine goodness, nevertheless nothing among created things can be greater than the salvation of the rational creature, consisting, as it does, in the enjoyment of that same divine goodness. Now the salvation of mankind was the result of God’s Incarnation. Therefore, as the seventh objection argued, the world derived no little benefit from the Incarnation. But it does not follow that all men should be saved through God’s Incarnation, but only those who would adhere to the Incarnation by faith and the sacraments of faith. The efficacy of the Incarnation is indeed sufficient to save all men: that not all are saved is due to their evil disposition, in that they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the Incarnation, by adhering to God incarnate by faith and love. For man was not to be deprived of his free-will, whereby he can adhere to God incarnate or not adhere to Him: else man’s good would be compulsory, and would be rendered unmeritorious and undeserving of praise.

The Incarnation of God was made known to man by adequate signs. The Godhead cannot be better evidenced than by those things that are proper to God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the laws of nature, by performing a work that is above nature, whose author He is. Hence it is a most appropriate proof of divinity, if works are done that transcend the laws of nature, such as giving sight to the blind, cleansing lepers, raising the dead to life. Now, Christ performed such works as these: hence, when He was asked (Lk. 7:20), Art thou he that art to come, or look me for another? He proved His divinity by these works, replying, The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, etc. And there was no need to create another world, for this was neither in the plan of divine wisdom, nor in the nature of things. If, however, it be contended that like miracles are related to have been done by others, as the eighth argument suggested, we must observe that Christ’s way of doing them was very different, and more God-like. Others did these things by praying; Christ, by commanding, as acting by His own power. Moreover, not only did He do these things Himself, but gave the power to do these and greater things still, to others who worked miracles by merely calling on His name. Again, Christ worked miracles not only on men’s bodies, but also on their souls: which latter works are much greater. Thus, for instance, through Him and the invocation of His name, the Holy Ghost was given, by Whom men’s hearts were kindled with the fire of divine love, their minds suddenly filled with the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of simple men made eloquent in declaring God’s truth to the people. Such works are an evident proof of Christ’s divinity, for no mere man could have done them. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:3, 4) that the salvation of mankind having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard him: God also bearing them witness by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost.

Although God’s Incarnation was necessary for the salvation of all mankind, there was no need, as the ninth objection states, for God to become incarnate from the very beginning of the world.—In the first place, a God incarnate was necessary that man might have a remedy for sin, as stated above.1 Now it is not expedient to offer a man a remedy for sin, unless he first acknowledge his fault, so that no longer trusting in himself, he puts his trust in God, who alone can heal him of his sin, as stated above.2 Now man could presume on himself, in point of knowledge, and in point of strength. Hence it was expedient that he should be left to himself for a time, that he might learn by experience his inability to save his soul. His natural knowledge was insufficient, since, before the time of the written law, he disobeyed the law of nature: and his own strength was inadequate, since even when, by the law, he knew what was sinful, he sinned through weakness. Thus, when at length man no longer presumed either on his knowledge or on his own strength, it was expedient that he should be given an efficacious assistance against sin by Christ’s Incarnation: the grace of Christ, to wit, supplying his lack of knowledge, by removing his doubts, and strengthening him against the assaults of temptation, lest he fail through weakness. Hence it is that the human race has experienced three states, before the law, under the law, and under grace.—Secondly, perfect law and doctrine were to be given to man by God incarnate. Now such is the condition of human nature, that it does not reach perfection at once, but is led through a stage of imperfection before it reaches that of perfection. We have an example of this in the education of children: we instruct them at first in very little things, because they cannot grasp the great things from the very beginning. In like manner, if a man were to tell his audience things they have never heard before, or that are above their intelligence, they would not grasp them at once; he must prepare their minds beforehand with things that are less out of the ordinary. Accordingly, it was expedient that in things concerning his salvation, man should receive at first a slight and elementary instruction, through the patriarchs, the law, and the prophets; and that at length in the fulness of time, the perfect teaching of Christ should be published on earth. Hence, the Apostle says (Galat. 4:4): When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son into the world: and (ibid. 3:24, 25): The law was our pedagogue in Christ … but … we are no longer under a pedagogue.—It must also be noted that just as the coming of a great king should be preceded by heralds, that his subjects may be ready to receive him with due respect; so was it proper that the coming of God on earth should be heralded by many things, in order that men might be ready to receive God incarnate. This was done by promises and admonitions preceding him, whereby man’s mind was prepared to believe the more easily in one who was already announced, and to receive Him the more earnestly on account of the promises made of old.

Although the coming of God incarnate into the world was so necessary for man’s salvation, there was no need for Him to live among men until the end of the world, as the tenth objection contended. This would have been detrimental to the reverence which men owe to the incarnate God, since, seeing Him in the flesh and like the rest of men, they would have esteemed Him no better than others. On the other hand, when He withdrew His presence from among men, after doing wonders on earth, they began to revere Him all the more. For this very reason He did not give His disciples the fulness of the Holy Ghost, while as yet He lived among them, because His absence would make their souls more ready to receive the gifts of the spirit. Hence He said to them (Jo. 16:7): If I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you: but, if I go, I will send him to you.

It was not expedient for God to take impassible and immortal flesh, as the eleventh objection stated, but rather that He should assume a flesh that was subject to suffering and death.—In the first place, it was necessary for man to know of the blessing bestowed on him through the Incarnation, in order that he might be inflamed with divine love. Now, that the truth of the Incarnation might be evident to man, it was necessary that God should take flesh like that of other men—namely, passible and mortal. For, had He taken impassible and immortal flesh, men who were unacquainted with flesh of that kind would have deemed it to be imaginary and not real.—Secondly, it was necessary for God to take flesh, in order to atone for the sin of mankind. Now, as we have shown,1 one man can atone for another; on the condition, however, that he take upon himself willingly the punishment due to another and not due to himself. And the punishment resulting from the sin of the human race is death as well as other sufferings of the present life, as indicated above.2 Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12) that by one man sin came into the world, and by sin death. Hence it was expedient that God should take suffering and mortal flesh without sin, so that by suffering and dying for us He would make atonement and take sin away. This is expressed in the words of the Apostle (Rom. 8:3), God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh—that is to say, “having flesh like to that of sinners, passible and mortal”: and he adds, that of sin he might condemn1 sin in the flesh—that is to say, “that by the pain He bore in His flesh for our sins He might take our sins away.”—Thirdly, since His flesh was subject to suffering and death, He was the more able to give us an example of virtue, by His fortitude in overcoming the sufferings in the flesh, and by the godly use He made of them.—Fourthly, we are the more raised to the hope of immortality, seeing that He was transformed from the state of suffering and mortal flesh, to that of a flesh that knows neither suffering nor death: and so we also hope that it will be the same with us, who are now clothed in flesh, passible and mortal. Whereas had He taken impassible and immortal flesh from the very first, we who know ourselves to be mortal and corruptible would have had no reason to hope for immortality.—Moreover, the office of Mediator required that He should be a partner with us in suffering and mortal flesh, and with God in power and glory, so that He might take away from us that which He shared with us—namely, suffering and death; and lead us to that which He shared with God: since for this was He Mediator, that He might unite us to God.

In like manner it was not expedient that God incarnate should, in this world, lead a life replete with wealth and the highest honour or dignity, as the twelfth objection argued.—In the first place, seeing that man’s mind was given to earthly things, He came to withdraw it from them, and to raise it to heavenly things. Hence it behoved Him, by His example, to draw men to the contempt of riches and of other things on which worldly men set their heart, and that He should lead a poor and hidden life in this world.—Secondly, if He had abounded in riches, and occupied a high position, the works He did as God would have been put down to His worldly power rather than to His Godly might. Hence it was a very strong proof of His divinity that, without the help of the secular arm, He converted the whole world to better things.

Hence, it is plain how the thirteenth objection is to be answered. It is, indeed, far from being untrue that, according to the Apostle’s teaching, the incarnate Son of God suffered death in obedience to His Father’s command. God’s commands to men concern acts of virtue; and according as a man’s virtuous acts are more perfect, the more is he obedient to God. Now the greatest of the virtues is charity, to which all the others are referred. Hence Christ, whose act of charity was most perfect, was most obedient to God: for no act of charity is more perfect than that a man die for love of another, as our Lord Himself declared (Jo. 15:13), Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Therefore Christ, by dying for the salvation of man, and for the glory of God the Father, performed an act of perfect charity, and was most obedient to God.

Nor was this incompatible with His Godhead, as the fourteenth objection averred. For the union was so made in the Person that both natures retained their respective properties, divine, namely, and human, as we have stated above:1 hence, though Christ suffered even death, besides those things which belonged to His human nature, His Godhead remained impassible, although on account of the unity of person, we say that God suffered and died. This is exemplified in ourselves, since although the body dies, the soul remains immortal.

It must also be observed that although God wills not the death of man, as the fifteenth objection stated, nevertheless He wills the virtue whereby man suffers death with fortitude and braves the danger of death through charity. Thus did God will Christ’s death, in as much as Christ accepted death through charity, and bore it with fortitude.

Hence it is clear that it was not wicked and cruel for God the Father to have willed Christ’s death, as the sixteenth objection argued. For He did not compel Him against His will, but it pleased Him that Christ should accept death through charity: indeed He wrought this charity in Christ’s soul.

Likewise there is nothing unseemly in saying that Christ was willing to suffer death on the cross, in order to give an example of humility. It is true, as the seventeenth objection asserted, that humility is not in God: since the virtue of humility consists in this, that a man keeps to his own place, and does not reach out to things above him, but is subject to his superior. Hence it is evident that humility is not becoming to God, who has no superior, but is above all. If however someone out of humility, subject himself at times either to an equal or to an inferior, this is because he looks upon as superior to himself in some respect, one who is simply his equal or inferior. Accordingly, though the virtue of humility is not becoming to Christ in His divine nature, it is becoming to Him in His humanity. And His humility is rendered the more praiseworthy by reason of His divine nature: because personal worth adds to the praise of humility, as for instance when a great man has through necessity to suffer an indignity. Now no man is of greater worth than one who is God: and consequently most praiseworthy was the humility of the Man-God, who suffered the infamies which it behoved Him to suffer for man’s salvation. For pride had made men lovers of worldly glory. Wherefore, that He might transform man’s mind from the love of worldly glory to the love of divine glory, He was willing to suffer death, not any kind, but the most humiliating death. There are those who, though they fear not death, abhor an ignominious death, and it was that men might despise even this that our Lord heartened men by the example of His death.

Again, although men might have been taught humility by divine discourses, as the eighteenth objection urged, nevertheless deeds incite more to action than words, and all the more effectively, as the goodness of the doer is known with greater certainty. So that however many other men might be examples of humility, it was still most expedient that we should be incited by the example of a Man-God, who certainly could not err, and whose humility is all the more wonderful as His majesty is the more sublime.

It is also clear from what has been said that it behoved Christ to suffer death, not only that He might give an example of the contempt of death for love of the truth, but also that He might wash away the sins of others. This was done when He who was sinless was willing to suffer the death due to sin, in order that He might take upon Himself the punishment due to others by atoning for them. And, though God’s grace alone suffices for the remission of sins, as the nineteenth objection argued, nevertheless when sin is remitted something is required of him whose sin is forgiven—namely, that he offer satisfaction to the one he offended. And seeing that other men were unable to do this for themselves, Christ did so for all, by suffering a voluntary death through charity.

And although in the punishment of sins the sinner himself should be punished, as the twentieth objection urged, nevertheless in the atonement for sin, one man can bear the punishment of another. The reason is that when a punishment is inflicted for sin, we consider the wickedness of the person to be punished: whereas when it is a question of atonement, when a person, in order to placate one whom he has offended, accepts punishment willingly, we look at the charity and good-will of him who atones; and especially when one man atones for another. Consequently one man’s atonement for another man is acceptable to God, as we have shown.1

No mere man can make satisfaction for all mankind, as proved above:2 nor could an angel suffice for the purpose, as the twenty-first objection suggested. An angel, though superior to man in certain natural properties of his, in the participation of heavenly bliss, to which man was to be restored by means of atonement, is man’s equal. Moreover, man’s dignity would not be fully repaired if he were beholden to an angel for his atonement.

It must be borne in mind, however, that Christ’s death derived its power of atonement from His charity whereby He accepted death voluntarily, and not from the wickedness of His executioners, who sinned by slaying Him: for, as the twenty-second objection states, sin is not blotted out by sin.

Although Christ’s death atoned for sin, there was no need for Him to die as often as men sin, as the twenty-third objection maintained. Christ’s death sufficed to expiate the sins of all men; both by reason of the sublime charity whereby He suffered death, and on account of the dignity of the person who made satisfaction, since He was both God and man. And it is clear that even in human affairs, the higher a person is placed, of so much greater account is the punishment suffered by him, whether in reference to the humility and charity of the sufferer, or to the guilt of the offender.

Christ’s death sufficed to atone for the sins of all mankind: because, although He died only in His human nature, as the twenty-fourth objection argued, yet His death was rendered precious by the dignity of the person who suffered, the Person, namely, of God the Son. For, just as it is a greater crime to injure a person of greater dignity,1 so is it a mark of greater virtue and of greater charity, that a person of higher rank suffer willingly for others.

Yet although by His death Christ made sufficient satisfaction for original sin, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-fifth objection argued, that the penalties resulting from original sin still remain in all, even in those who have become participators in Christ’s redemption. It was fitting and profitable that the punishment should remain after the guilt had been removed. In the first place, that the faithful might be conformed to Christ, as members to their head. Wherefore, just as Christ bore many sufferings before entering into everlasting glory, so was it fitting that His faithful should suffer before attaining to immortality. Thus they bear in themselves the emblems of Christ’s suffering, that they may obtain the likeness of His glory; according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 8:17), Heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ: yet so if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him.—Secondly, if man were to become immune from death and suffering, as soon as he comes to Christ, many would come to Him for the sake of these advantages of the body rather than for the sake of the good of the soul: and this is against Christ’s purpose, since He came into the world to draw men away from the love of bodily goods to spiritual things.—Thirdly, if men became impassible and immortal as soon as they came to Christ, they would be compelled, in a sense, to believe in Christ: and this would diminish the merit of faith.

Although Christ, by His death, atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, as the twenty-sixth objection argued, each one must seek the means of his own salvation. Christ’s death is by way of being a universal cause of salvation, just as the sin of the first man was like a universal cause of damnation. Now a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual, that the latter may have its share in the effect of the universal cause. Accordingly, the effect of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through carnal origin: and the effect of Christ’s death reaches each individual through spiritual regeneration, whereby man is united to and incorporated with Christ. Therefore each one must seek to be regenerated by Christ, and to receive the other things in which the power of Christ’s death is effective.

Hence it follows that the outflow of salvation from Christ to mankind is not through the channel of natural procreation, but through the endeavour of the good-will whereby a man adheres to Christ; consequently that which each one receives from Christ is his own personal good; so that it is not transmitted by him to his children, as the sin of our first parent is, through having its source in natural procreation. Hence it is that although parents be cleansed of original sin by Christ, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-seventh objection argued, that their children be born in original sin, and need the sacraments of salvation.

In some measure then we have shown that the teaching of the Catholic faith concerning the mystery of the Incarnation is neither impossible nor unreasonable.

Chapter LVI

of the necessity of the sacraments

We have already observed1 that Christ’s death is a kind of universal cause of man’s salvation, and that a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual effect. Consequently it was necessary for man to be supplied with certain remedies, so that thereby the benefit of Christ’s death might be brought to him. These remedies are called the sacraments of the Church: and it was expedient that they should be supplied to man under the guise of visible signs.

First, because God provides for man, as for other things, according to the condition of his nature. Now it is a condition of man’s nature that he be naturally led to things spiritual and intelligible by objects of sense. Therefore it was expedient for man to receive spiritual remedies under the guise of sensible signs.

Secondly, Instruments should be proportionate to the first cause. Now the first and universal cause of man’s salvation is the incarnate Word, as we have already stated.2 Wherefore it was fitting that the remedies whereby the power of the universal cause reaches mankind should bear some likeness to that cause—namely, that in them the divine power should work invisibly under visible signs.

Thirdly, man had fallen into sin by adhering to visible things unduly. Lest therefore it might be thought that visible things are evil by nature, and that for this reason it was sinful to adhere to them; it was expedient that by means of visible things man should receive salutary remedies. For thus it was made evident that visible things are by their nature good, as being created by God; and that they become hurtful to man, through his adhering to them inordinately; whereas they are beneficial to him, as long as he makes proper use of them.

Hereby we refute the error of certain heretics, who would remove all such visible elements from the sacraments of the Church. And naturally so, since they deem all visible things to be evil by nature, and to be produced by an evil author. We have refuted this in the Second Book.1

Nor is it unreasonable that spiritual well-being be dispensed by means of visible and corporeal things; since these visible elements are, as it were, instruments of God’s Incarnation and Passion. Now an instrument is effective not by virtue of its nature, but by virtue of the principal agent, by whom it is applied to act. So too these visible elements effect spiritual well-being, not by any property of their nature, but by Christ’s institution, from which they derive their instrumental efficacy.

Chapter LVII

of the difference between the sacraments of the old and of the new law

The next point to consider is that since these visible sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion, and in a certain way represent it, they ought to be of such a nature as to be in keeping with the salvation wrought by Christ. Now this salvation, before Christ’s Incarnation and death, was indeed promised, but not actually realized: the Word by His Incarnation and Passion wrought this salvation. Accordingly, the sacraments which preceded Christ’s Incarnation needed to be such as to signify, and, so to speak, promise salvation: whereas the sacraments that followed Christ’s Passion needed to be such as to give salvation to man, and not merely signify it.

Thus we avoid the opinion of the Jews, who believe that the sacraments of the law, as being instituted by God, ought to be observed for ever, since God repents not, neither does He change. But it does not argue change or repentance in a man, if he makes various arrangements to fit various times. Wherefore, even as a father gives certain commands to his son when a child, and others when he is grown up, so too God delivered one kind of sacraments and precepts before the Incarnation, to signify the future, and another kind after the Incarnation, to show forth the present and commemorate the past.

Still more absurd is the error of the Nazarenes and Helonites, who held that the sacraments of the law are to be observed together with (those of) the Gospel: since such an error implies a contradiction. By observing the sacraments of the Gospel they admit that the Incarnation and other mysteries of Christ are things of the past: whereas, by observing the sacraments of the law, they hold that those things are yet to come.

Chapter LVIII

the number of the sacraments of the new law

Since, as stated above,1 the remedies of spiritual welfare have been given to man under sensible signs, it follows that the remedies which give life to the soul differ from one another in a manner that corresponds with the life of the body.

In the life of the body there is a twofold order. There are those who propagate and direct this life in others, and there are those who are propagated and directed, with this life in view. Three things are essentially necessary to the life of the body, and a fourth is required accidentally. In the first place, a thing needs to receive life by generation or nativity; secondly, it needs growth so as to attain to its proper size and strength; thirdly, it needs nourishment, for the preservation of the life thus generated and developed. These are essentially necessary to natural life, since without them the body cannot live: hence to the vegetative soul which is the principle of life, are assigned the three natural forces of generation, growth, and nutrition. Since, however, the life of the body meets with obstacles, which cause the body to ail, a fourth thing is necessary accidentally, and this is that the living being be healed of its ailments.

Accordingly, there are also in the spiritual life—first, spiritual regeneration by Baptism; secondly, spiritual growth bringing the soul to perfect strength by Confirmation; thirdly, spiritual nourishment by the sacrament of the Eucharist; and fourthly, spiritual healing, which is given either to the soul only, by the sacrament of Penance, or, when it is expedient, to the body through the soul, by the sacrament of Extreme Unction. These concern those who are propagated and safeguarded in the life of the soul. The propagators and directors of the life of the body are required from two points of view—namely, in respect of natural origin, which concerns the parents, and in respect of state control, whereby man is assured a peaceful life, and this regards kings and governors. Thus is it also in the life of the soul. There are those who propagate and safeguard the spiritual life, by a purely spiritual administration; to these corresponds the Sacrament of Orders; and these are those who propagate and safeguard the spiritual life by ministering to both body and soul: this is the object of the sacrament of Matrimony in which husband and wife are joined together, in order to beget children, and bring them up in the fear of God.

Chapter LIX

baptism

In accordance with what we have been saying, we shall be able to gather what are the peculiar effects and the appropriate matter of each sacrament. And first, with regard to spiritual regeneration, which is the result of Baptism.

The generation of a living thing is the change of a lifeless into a living being. Now man is deprived of spiritual life in his origin, by original sin, as we have already stated,1 and whatsoever sins a man commits in addition to this, deprive him of life. Hence it was necessary that Baptism, which is spiritual birth, should have the power to remove original sin and all the actual sins a man has committed. Now the sensible sign in a sacrament should be adapted to signify the spiritual effect of that sacrament: and water is the easiest and handiest means of removing dirt from the body. Therefore Baptism is fittingly conferred with water, hallowed by the Word of God. Moreover, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and since that which is generated loses its previous form and the properties resulting therefrom, it follows that Baptism, which is spiritual generation, removes not only sins which are contrary to spiritual life, but also all guilt of sin: so that it not only washes sin away, but removes all debt of punishment. Hence no satisfaction for sin is demanded in the sacrament of Baptism.

Again. By generation a thing acquires its form; hence it acquires, at the same time, the operation that results from that form, and the place that is becoming to it: thus, as soon as it is kindled, fire tends upwards as towards its proper place. Wherefore, since Baptism is spiritual generation, as soon as a man is baptized he is fit for spiritual action, such as the reception of other sacraments and so forth; and a place befitting the spiritual life—namely, eternal happiness—is due to him. For this reason, if a man die immediately after being baptized, he is forthwith admitted into heaven; wherefore Baptism is said to open the gates of heaven.

Again we must observe that a thing can be born but once: so that, since Baptism is spiritual generation, a man is but once baptized. It is also evident that the disorder which, through Adam, came into the world, infects man but once: wherefore Baptism, which is chiefly a remedy for that disorder, may not be repeated. It is also a general rule that, when a thing is once consecrated, so long as it remains intact it must not be reconsecrated, lest the consecration seem to have been invalid. Consequently, since Baptism is a kind of consecration of the person baptized, it must not be repeated: and thus the error of the Donatists or Rebaptizers1 is refuted.

Chapter LX

confirmation

The perfection of spiritual strength is attained, properly speaking, when a man dares to confess his faith in Christ in the presence of anyone, whosoever it be; and is not held back by confusion or fear: since fortitude dispels inordinate fear. Accordingly, the sacrament whereby spiritual strength is conferred on one who is regenerate, makes him a soldier of Christ’s faith. And, as soldiers carry the banner of the prince under whom they fight, those who receive the sacrament of Confirmation receive the banner of Christ—namely, the sign of the cross—by which he fought and conquered. They receive this sign on their brow, to indicate that they are not ashamed to make public profession of their faith in Christ. Moreover, the cross is signed on them with a mixture of oil and balsam, called chrism: the reason of which is as follows. Oil signifies the power of the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ, as the word implies, was anointed: so that Christians take their name from Christ, as fighting under Him. Balsam, on account of its fragrance, signifies a good name, which those should have, who live among worldly people, that marching forth on to the field of battle from the hidden stronghold of the Church, they may make public profession of their faith in Christ. Moreover, this sacrament is fittingly conferred by bishops only. For they are the commanding officers of the Christian army: and in worldly warfare it belongs to the commander-in-chief to choose those whom he appoints to military service. Hence those who receive this sacrament are chosen for service in the spiritual combat: for which reason the bishop lays his hand upon them, to signify that they receive strength from Christ.

Chapter LXI

the eucharist

Just as the life of the body needs material nourishment, not only that the body may grow, but also for its natural upkeep, lest it wear away through continual dissolution, and lose all its strength: so too was spiritual nourishment needed for the spiritual life, so that those who have been born again may both be sustained and grow in virtue. And since spiritual effects are bestowed under visible symbols, as stated above,1 it was fitting that this spiritual element should be given to us under the forms of those things which man uses most commonly for the nourishment of the body. Such are bread and wine: wherefore this sacrament is conferred under the appearances of bread and wine.

We must take note however that in corporeal things there is a difference between the union of begetter with begotten, and that of nourishment with the subject nourished. The begetter and the begotten need not be united in substance, but only in likeness and power: whereas nourishment needs to be united to the body nourished in its very substance. Consequently, that the material symbols may correspond to their spiritual effects, in Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, the mystery of the Incarnate Word is united to us in one way; and in another way in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual nourishment. The Word Incarnate is present in the sacrament of Baptism by His power only: whereas we believe Him to be present in the sacrament of the Eucharist, in His very substance. And because our salvation was consummated by Christ’s passion and death, wherein His blood was separated from His body, the sacrament of His body is delivered to us separately under the form of bread, and His blood under the form of wine: so that this sacrament is a memorial and representation of our Lord’s Passion. Thus were fulfilled our Lord’s words (Jo. 6:56), My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed.

Chapter LXII

the error of unbelievers concerning the sacrament of the eucharist

Even as, when Christ spoke the above words, some of the disciples were troubled and exclaimed (Jo. 6:61): This saying is hard; and who can hear it? so again heretics have arisen and denied the truth of the Church’s teaching. They say that this sacrament contains the body and blood of Christ, not in reality, but only in signification. Thus, when Christ said, This is my body, His meaning would be, “This signifies or represents My body,” in the same way as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:4), And the rock was Christ—i.e., represented Christ. To support this interpretation they quote all the similar expressions of Scripture.

As a plea for holding this opinion, they allege the words of our Lord who, wishing to allay the scandal occasioned to His disciples by His speaking of His body and blood as meat and drink, explained Himself by saying (Jo. 6:64): The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life, as though His previous statement were to be taken, not literally, but in a spiritual sense.

Moreover, they are led to hold this view by the many difficulties which would seem to follow from the teaching of the Church in this matter, and on account of which this saying of Christ and of the Church seems hard to them.

In the first place, it is hard to see how the true body of Christ begins to be present on the altar. A thing begins in two ways, to be where it was not before: either by local movement, or by something else being changed into it: thus fire begins to be in a place, either by being kindled there, or by being brought there. Now it is clear that the true body of Christ was not always present on this or that altar: since the Church declares that Christ ascended bodily into heaven. And it is seemingly impossible for anything here below to be changed anew into Christ’s body. For surely nothing is changed into that which is already in existence, since that into which a thing is changed, acquires existence by that change. And it is evident that Christ’s body was already in existence, through having been conceived in the Virgin’s womb. Consequently it is seemingly impossible that He begin to be present on the altar through something else being changed into Him.—But neither could He begin to be there by local movement; since whatsoever is moved thus begins to be in another place in such a way as not to be where it was before. And so, since Christ begins to be present on this altar where this sacrament is being enacted, we shall have to say that He is no longer in heaven whither He had ascended. Moreover no local movement terminates in two places at the same time. Now it is clear that this sacrament is celebrated on several altars simultaneously. Therefore it is impossible that Christ begin to be present there by local movement.

A second difficulty is one of place. As long as a thing remains entire, its parts are not scattered about in various places. Now, in this sacrament, it is plain that the bread and wine exist apart in separate places. If then Christ’s flesh be under the appearance of bread, and His blood under the appearance of wine, it would seem to follow that Christ does not remain entire, but that whenever this sacrament is enacted His blood is separated from His body.—Moreover it seems impossible for a greater body to be enclosed in the space of a smaller body. And yet it is evident that Christ’s body is greater in quantity than the bread that is offered on the altar. Therefore seemingly it is not possible for the whole body of Christ to be where there seems to be bread. And if His whole body is not there then, but only part of it, we come back to the first difficulty, namely, that whenever this sacrament is enacted, the parts of Christ’s body are separated.—Further, one body cannot be in several places. Yet it is clear that this sacrament is celebrated in several places. Therefore, seemingly, it is impossible for Christ’s body to be truly present in this sacrament: unless one were to say that one part of Him is here, and another part there. And thus again it follows that the celebration of this sacrament involves the division of Christ’s body into parts: whereas it would seem that the size of Christ’s body is insufficient to be divided into as many parts as there are places in which this sacrament is enacted.

A third difficulty arises from what our senses perceive in this sacrament. Even after the consecration, we clearly perceive all the accidents of bread and wine, namely, colour, taste, smell, shape, quantity, and weight: and about these things we cannot be deceived, because the senses are not deceived about their proper sensible objects. Now these accidents cannot be subjected in Christ’s body: nor can they be in the air immediately surrounding it: since several of them are natural accidents, and require a subject of a certain particular nature differing from that of the human body or the air. Nor can they exist by themselves, seeing that the very essence of an accident is to be in something: and accidents, since they are forms, cannot be individualized, save by a subject: so that, apart from a subject, they are universal forms. It follows then that these accidents are in their respective determinate subjects, namely, the substances of bread and wine. Therefore the substance of bread and wine is present, and not the substance of Christ’s body: since two bodies, seemingly, cannot be in the same place.

A fourth difficulty arises from the fact that the bread and wine have the same action, and undergo the same changes, after the consecration, as before. Thus the wine, if it were taken in great quantity, would heat and inebriate: the bread would strengthen and nourish. Moreover, if they be kept for a long time and carelessly, they are liable to putrefy, and to be consumed by mice. Again, they can be burnt and turned into ashes and steam. All these things are incompatible with Christ’s body, which according to faith is impassible. Therefore it would seem that the substance of Christ’s body cannot be present in this sacrament.

A fifth difficulty regards especially the breaking of the bread: since this breaking is apparent to the senses; and is impossible without a subject. And it is absurd to say that the subject of that breaking is Christ’s body. Therefore, seemingly, Christ’s body is not there, but the substance of bread and wine.

For these and like reasons the teaching of Christ and the Church appears to be hard.

Chapter LXIII

solution of the foregoing difficulties: and first with regard to the changing of the bread into christ’s body

Although the operation of the divine power in this sacrament is too sublime and hidden for human research, lest unbelievers should deem the teaching of the Church on this question to be impossible, we must endeavour to show that it involves no impossibility whatsoever.

The first point to consider, then, is how Christ’s body begins to be present under this sacrament. It is, in fact, impossible for this to take place by local movement of Christ’s body: both because it would follow that it ceases to be in heaven, whenever this sacrament is enacted; and because then this sacrament could only be celebrated in one place at a time, since the same local movement cannot terminate in more than one place; and because local movement cannot be instantaneous but needs time, whereas the consecration is effective in the last instant of the pronouncement of the words. It remains, therefore, to be said that the true body of Christ begins to be present in this sacrament, through the substance of the bread being changed into the substance of His body, and the substance of the wine into the substance of his blood.

Hence we see how false are the opinions of those who say that in this sacrament the substance of the bread exists together with the substance of Christ’s body, as well as the opinion of those who say that the substance of the bread is annihilated, or that it is reduced to primal matter. In either case it follows that, in this sacrament, Christ’s body begins to be present by local movement: and we have proved this to be impossible.

Moreover, if the substance of the bread is present in this sacrament together with Christ’s body, He should have said, Here is my body, rather than, This is my body: because Here points to the substance seen, which would be the substance of bread, if it remains in this sacrament together with Christ’s body.

Likewise it is seemingly impossible that the substance of the bread be wholly annihilated. It would follow that a considerable portion of matter originally created has returned into nothingness, on account of the frequent celebration of this mystery. Nor is it becoming that the divine power should annihilate anything in the sacrament of salvation.

It is impossible for the substance of the bread to be reduced to primal matter, since primal matter cannot exist without a form. Unless indeed primal matter be taken to signify the elementary bodies: but then, if the substance of the bread is resolved into these, this would, of necessity, be perceptible to the senses; seeing that the corporeal elements are objects of sense. Moreover this would involve local change and the corporeal alteration of contraries, which cannot occur instantaneously.

It must however be observed that this changing of the bread into Christ’s body is brought about in a manner different from all natural changes. In all natural changes, the subject remains, in which various forms succeed one another: and these forms may be either accidental—as when white is changed into black—or substantial—as when air is changed into fire: hence these are called formal changes. But in the aforesaid change, one subject passes into another, and the accidents remain: wherefore this is called a substantial change. How and why these accidents remain, we shall discuss later on. At present we have to inquire how one subject is changed into another: since nature cannot do this. For every work of nature presupposes matter, whereby subjects are individualized: so that nature cannot make this substance to be that substance; for instance, that this finger be that finger. But matter is subject to the divine power; since by it was it brought into being: wherefore it is possible, by the divine power, for this or that individual substance to be changed into this or that already existing substance. For just as, by the power of a natural agent, whose operation does not go beyond the changing of a form in an already existing subject, the whole of one thing is changed into the whole of another by a change of species or form (for instance this air into this already kindled fire), so by the power of God, which presupposes no matter, but produces it, this matter is changed into that matter and, consequently, this individual into that; for matter is the principle of individuality, just as form is the principle of the species. Now it is clear that in the aforesaid change of the bread into Christ’s body there is no common subject remaining after the change, seeing that a change is wrought of the primal subject which is the principle of individuality. And yet something must remain, in order that it should be true to say, This is my body: which words both signify and effect this change. And since, as we have proved, neither the substance of the bread, nor any prior matter remains, it follows that there remains that which is besides the substance of the bread: namely, that which is accidental to it. Therefore the accidents of the bread remain even after the aforesaid change.

Among these accidents a certain order is to be noted. Of all accidents, dimensive quantity adheres most closely to substance: afterwards, with quantity as a medium, the substance is affected with qualities: for instance with colour by means of the surface. Hence the division of the other accidents is incidental to the division of quantity. Further, qualities are the principles of actions and passions, as well as of certain relationships, for instance of father and son, master and servant, and so on; while some relationships are founded immediately on quantity, for instance greater and lesser, double and half, and the like. Accordingly, after the aforesaid change, the accidents of the bread must be said to remain in such wise, that dimensive quantity alone remains without a subject, while the qualities are founded thereon as their subject, and consequently actions, passions, and relations also. Wherefore, in this change, the contrary happens to that which is the rule in natural transmutations, where the substance remains as the subject of change, while the accidents are changed: whereas here, on the contrary, accident remains and subject passes away. This change cannot, properly speaking, be described as a movement in the physical sense, that requires a subject: it is a kind of sequence of substances, just as in creation existence follows non-existence, as stated above.1

This then is one reason why the accident of the bread must needs remain, so that something may be found to remain in the aforesaid change. But there is yet another cogent reason. If the substance of the bread be changed into Christ’s body, and the accidents of the bread pass away, the result of such a change would be that Christ’s body, in its substance, is not where the bread was before; since Christ’s body would bear no relation to that place. On the other hand, after the change, the dimensive quantity, whereby the bread occupied that place, remains; while the substance of the bread is changed into Christ’s body, which thus comes to be under the dimensive quantity of the bread, and consequently occupies the place of the bread; by means however of the bread’s dimensions.

Other reasons might be assigned, both from the point of view of faith which is of things invisible, and from the point of view of merit, which is so much greater as this sacrament is more invisibly enacted: for Christ’s body is hidden under the accidents of bread, with a view to a more handy and more fitting use of this sacrament. It would indeed be revolting to the partakers, and repulsive to the beholders, if the faithful received Christ’s body under its own form. Wherefore Christ’s body is offered as meat, and His blood as drink, under the appearance of bread and wine, which are man’s most common form of meat and drink.

Chapter LXIV

solution of the difficulties as regards place

Now that we have made these observations regarding the mode of the change, the way is, to a certain extent, prepared for the solution of the other difficulties. We have already stated that when this sacrament is enacted Christ’s body occupies a place in reference to the dimensions of the bread, which remain after the substance of the bread has been changed into Christ’s body. Hence whatever belongs to Christ must needs be in that place, according to the exigencies of the aforesaid change.

We must observe, then, that in this sacrament something is present by virtue of the change, and something by natural concomitance. By virtue of the change there is, in this sacrament, that which is the natural term of the change. Thus under the appearance of bread is Christ’s body, into which the substance of the bread is changed, as indicated by the words of consecration, This is my body. Likewise, under the appearance of wine is Christ’s blood, as signified by the words, This is the chalice of my blood, etc. By natural concomitance all other things are there, which are not the term of the change but are really united to that term. For it is plain that Christ’s Godhead or His soul are not the term of the change; and yet both Christ’s soul and His divinity are present under the appearance of bread, because both are united to His body.—If however this sacrament had been celebrated during the three days succeeding Christ’s death, Christ’s soul would not have been present under the appearance of bread, since it was not then really united to His body. Neither would His blood have been present under the appearance of bread, nor His body under the appearance of wine, since they were both separated in death. Now, however, since Christ’s body, in His natural form, is not without His blood, both His body and His blood are present under either species: but, under the appearance of bread, His body is present by virtue of the change, and His blood, by natural concomitance: and conversely under the species of wine.

Thus it is plain how to solve the difficulty about the inequality between Christ’s body and the place occupied by the bread. The substance of the bread is directly changed into the substance of Christ’s body. But the dimensions of Christ’s body are in the Sacrament, by natural concomitance, and not by virtue of the change, since the dimensions of the bread remain. Hence Christ’s body is related to that place, not through its own dimensions, so that it need to be equal to the place, but through the dimensions of the bread which remain, and to which the place is equal.

Hence also it is clear how to reply to the objection about plurality of places. Christ’s body, as regards its own dimensions, is in but one place, but through the dimensions of the bread which has been changed into His body, it is present in as many places as this change is celebrated in: not indeed by being divided into parts, but remaining entire in each place: since each consecrated host is changed into the whole body of Christ.

Chapter LXV

solution of the objections on the part of the accidents

Having solved the difficulty about place, we have now to reply to the objection that arises out of the remaining accidents. For there is no denying that the accidents of bread and wine remain, seeing that one’s senses are an infallible witness thereto. And yet Christ’s body and blood are not affected by them, since this could not happen without their being altered: nor are they susceptible of such accidents; as neither is the substance of air. It follows then that they are without a subject, but as explained above; namely, that only dimensive quantity subsists without a subject, and affords a support to the other accidents. Nor is it impossible that an accident be without a subject, by the divine power. We must judge of the upholding of things, as of their production into being. Now the divine power can produce the effects of any second causes whatsoever, without these second causes, even as it could fashion man without seed, and cure a fever without the operation of nature. This is because God’s power is infinite, and because He bestows on every second cause its active energy; so that He can uphold the existence of the effects of second causes, without the second causes themselves. Thus then, in this sacrament, He upholds the accident in its being, although the subject that upheld it is no longer there. This is especially applicable to dimensive quantities (which the Platonists held to subsist even of themselves), since we can think of them as separate. Now it is evident that God can do more in His works, than the mind can in its thoughts. And it is peculiar to dimensive quantity, as compared with other accidents, that it is individualized by itself: the reason being that position, i.e., the order of the parts in the whole, is included in the very notion thereof; since it is defined as quantity having position.1 Now, wherever it is possible to understand various parts of the same species, we must needs understand individual distinction: since many things of the same species must needs be many individuals. For this reason we cannot apprehend several whitenesses, except in as much as they are in various subjects: but we can apprehend several lines, even as considered in themselves, because, since position is contained in the notion of a line, difference of position suffices for distinction of lines. And, since dimensive quantity alone is by its very nature sufficient to occasion a multiplicity of individuals in the same species, it would seem to be the foundation of this multiplicity: thus in the genus of substance multiplicity is according to material dimensions; in fact, it is inconceivable in matter apart from dimensions; seeing that without quantity, all substance is indivisible, as the Philosopher states.1 Now it is evident that as regards other accidents, the number of individuals in the same species depends on the number of subjects. Consequently, since in this sacrament we postulate per se subsistent dimensions, which are the foundation of the other accidents, it does not follow that these accidents are not individualized: because they retain the dimensions which are the foundation of individuality.

Chapter LXVI

solution of the objections on the part of action and passion

Having made these observations, we come to deal with the fourth objection. In some ways it presents no difficulty: in one respect however the solution is not quite so easy.

From what we have already said, it is surely fitting that, in this sacrament, we should observe the same action (of the elements) after (the consecration), as was to be noticed before in the substance of bread and wine, for instance it affects the senses in the same way, or the surrounding air or anything else, by its odour, or colour. We said, in fact,2 that the accidents of bread and wine remain in this sacrament: and among those accidents are the sensible qualities, which are the principles of these actions. Again, as regards certain passions, i.e., alterations in these accidents, there is no great difficulty, so long as we bear in mind what has already been said. We stated that the dimensions are the subject of the other accidents, and consequently these other accidents must be considered to be subject to alteration, in the same way as though the substance (of bread and wine) were actually present: thus, for instance, the wine would be subject to heating, or cooling, or a change of taste, and so on.

A greater difficulty, however, is presented by the generation and corruption which are observed to happen in this sacrament. Thus, were a man to partake of the sacramental food in any quantity, he could be nourished, and he could even be made drunk with the wine, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:21), One indeed is hungry, and another is drunk. Now these things would be impossible, unless flesh and blood were produced by this sacrament: since nourishment is changed into the substance of the body nourished. It is true that some reply that this sacrament cannot nourish a man, but can only strengthen and refresh him, as the smell of wine stimulates him. But refreshment only lasts for a time, and does not suffice to nourish him, if he remain for a long time without food: and it is easy to prove by experiment that it is possible for a man to be nourished with this sacramental food for a considerable time. Moreover it is astonishing that they should deny that a man can be nourished with the sacramental elements through refusing to admit that they can be changed into flesh and blood: for it is apparent to the senses, that by putrefaction or burning they are changed into another substance, namely ashes and dust: and yet this would seem difficult, since apparently it is impossible for accidents to be transformed into substance, and it is unbelievable that Christ’s body, which is impassible, be changed into another substance.

Perhaps someone will say that, as the bread is changed miraculously into Christ’s body, so are the accidents miraculously changed into a substance. But, in the first place, it would seem inconsistent with the miraculous, that this sacrament should putrefy, or be destroyed by burning. Secondly, the putrefaction and burning that happen to this sacrament observe the ordinary course of nature, which is out of keeping with the course of miraculous effects. Accordingly, to solve this difficulty a well-known explanation has been devised, which finds favour with many. They say that when this sacrament is changed into flesh or blood by the process of nutrition, or into ashes by burning or putrefaction, neither the accidents nor the substance of Christ’s body are changed into another substance, but, by a divine miracle, the substance of the bread that was there before, returns, and therefrom are generated the things into which this sacrament is observed to be changed. But this is utterly impossible.

We have already proved1 that the substance of the bread is changed into the substance of Christ’s body. Now that which has been changed into something else cannot return unless this other thing be changed back again into it. Hence, if the substance of bread returns, it follows that the substance of Christ’s body is changed into bread: and this is absurd.

Again. If the substance of bread returns, it follows that it returns either while the appearances of bread are still there, or after they have disappeared. But as long as the appearances of bread are there, the substance of bread cannot return, since as long as they remain, the substance of Christ’s body remains present under them: so that it would follow that the substance of bread and the substance of Christ’s body are both there at the same time. Yet neither can the substance of bread return after the appearances of bread have disappeared: both because the substance of bread must have its proper appearances; and because, after the appearances of bread have disappeared, there is already another substance generated there, the generation of which was supposed to involve the return of the bread’s substance.

It would seem, therefore, better to say that in the consecration, just as the substance of the bread is miraculously changed into Christ’s body, so by a miracle the accidents are made to subsist, which is proper to a substance. Consequently they produce all the effects and undergo all the changes, which the substance would produce or undergo, if it were present: and therefore without any further miracle they can inebriate, nourish, be reduced to ashes or dust, in the same way and order, as though the substance of bread and wine were present.

Chapter LXVII

solution of the objections in regard to breaking of the host

The fifth objection now remains to be considered. From what has been said it is clear that as subject of the breaking we can postulate the dimensions that subsist of themselves. Nor does the breaking of these dimensions involve the breaking of the substance of Christ’s body, because Christ’s body remains entire in each portion. This may seem difficult, yet it may be explained in accordance with what has been already said.1 It has been stated that in this sacrament Christ’s body is present in its substance, by virtue of the sacrament; and that the dimensions of Christ’s body are present by natural concomitance with His substance, and in a manner contrary to that in which a body is in a place naturally. For a body is in a place naturally, through its dimensions whereby it is commensurate with the place. For the relation of a substantial thing to its container differs from that of a quantitative thing to that in which it is. A quantitative whole is contained by a whole, in such a way that it is not wholly in any single part, but each part is in itself, and the whole in the whole: hence a natural body is wholly in the whole place, and yet is not wholly in each part of the place, but each part of the body fits into its own part of the place; because a body is in a place through its dimensions. On the other hand, if a substantial totality is wholly in the whole of something, it is also wholly in each part of that thing. Thus the whole nature and species of water is in each part of the water, and the whole soul is in each part of the body. Since then Christ’s body is in the Sacrament by reason of its substance, into which the substance of the bread has been changed, while the bread’s dimensions remain; just as the whole species of bread was present in each part of the dimensions, so the whole body of Christ is present in each part of those same dimensions. Consequently the subject of this breaking or dividing is not Christ’s body, but the dimensions of bread and wine: which dimensions remain and, as already stated, are the subject of the other accidents that remain after the consecration.

Chapter LXVIII

explanation of the passage quoted above1

Having solved these difficulties, we see clearly that the tradition of the Church concerning the Sacrament of the Altar contains nothing impossible to God who can do all things. Nor is this tradition incompatible with the words of our Lord spoken to those disciples who appeared to be shocked at this doctrine, The words that I have spoken to you, are spirit and life (Jo. 6:64). By these words He did not intend to say that His real flesh is not given to be eaten by the faithful, but that it is not given to be eaten carnally; namely, that it is to be consumed, not piece-meal under its proper species, like other flesh-foods; but spiritually, and not as we are used to partake of other flesh-meats.

Chapter LXIX

what kind of bread and wine should be used in this sacrament

We have already said that this sacrament is celebrated with bread and wine: hence, the valid celebration of this sacrament requires that the bread and wine used for the purpose satisfy the essential conditions of bread and wine. Now wine is no other liquor but that which is pressed from grapes, and bread, properly speaking, must be made from grains of wheat. True, the name of bread is given to other kinds that supply the lack of wheaten bread; and other liquors are given the name of wine. But this sacrament cannot be celebrated with any other kind of bread or wine; nor with any bread or wine that is so mixed with other materials that the species of bread or wine is destroyed. On the other hand, if the bread or wine be affected by accidents that do not affect the species of bread or wine, it is clear that, notwithstanding such accidents, the sacrament may be validly performed. Thus, since it is not essential to bread that it be leavened or unleavened, and whichever it happens to be, the essential conditions of bread remain, the Sacrament may be validly celebrated with either. For this reason different Churches have different uses in this respect. Indeed either use is in keeping with the signification of the Sacrament. As Gregory says in his Register:1 The Roman Church offers unleavened bread, because our Lord took flesh without union of sexes: but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh, as leaven is mixed with the flour: and is true God and true man.

However, the use of unleavened bread is more becoming to the purity of the mystic Body, i.e., the Church; in as much as this purity is represented in this sacrament, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:7, 8), Christ, our pasch, is sacrificed: therefore let us feast … with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.

This excludes the error of certain heretics who say that this sacrament cannot be celebrated with unleavened bread: moreover, such a view is altogether opposed to the authority of the Gospels. For we are told (Matth. 26., Mark 14., Luke 22.) that our Lord, on the first day of the Azymes, partook of the pasch with His disciples, and afterwards instituted this sacrament. Now it was unlawful for the Jews to have leavened bread in their houses on the first day of the Azymes (Exod. 12:15): and as long as He was in the world our Lord kept the law. It is, therefore, evident that He changed unleavened bread into His body, and gave it to His disciples to eat. Consequently it is foolish to condemn, in the use of the Latin Church, that which our Lord observed in the institution of this sacrament.

It must be noted however that some say that He anticipated the first day of the Azymes on account of His imminent Passion, and that he therefore used leavened bread. In their attempt to prove this they offer two reasons. In the first place, we are told that our Lord, before the festival day of the pasch (Jo. 13:1), kept with His disciples the supper at which He consecrated His body, as the Apostle relates (1 Cor. 11:28). Hence it would seem that Christ kept the supper before the day of the Azymes, and consequently used leavened bread in consecrating His body. They think to confirm this by the fact that on the Friday, on which Christ was crucified, the Jews went not into the hall of Pilate, that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the pasch. Now pasch here means the Azymes. Therefore they conclude that the supper was celebrated before the Azymes.

To this we reply that according to the Lord’s commandment (Exod. 12:15), the feast of the Azymes was observed during seven days. The first of these, which was the fifteenth day of the month, was more holy and solemn than the others: but since the Jews commenced their festivals the evening before, they began to eat unleavened bread the evening of the fourteenth day, and continued to eat it during the seven following days. Hence we read (ibid. 18, 19): The first month, the fourteenth day of the month in the evening, you shall eat unleavened bread, until the one and twentieth day of the same month in the evening. Seven days there shall not be found any leaven in your houses. In the evening of that same fourteenth day the paschal lamb was slain. Accordingly, the fourteenth day of the month is called by the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark and Luke, the first day of the Azymes, because in the evening the Jews ate unleavened bread, and the pasch, namely the paschal lamb, was slain. This is what John means by saying: Before the festival day of the pasch, that is to say, before the fifteenth day of the month, which day was the most solemn of all. On this day the Jews desired to eat the pasch, that is the paschal unleavened bread, but not the paschal lamb. Consequently there is no disagreement among the Evangelists, and it is clear that Christ at the supper consecrated His body from unleavened bread. Therefore the Latin Church has good reason to use unleavened bread in this sacrament.

Chapter LXX

the sacrament of penance: and first, that it is possible for a man to sin after receiving sacramental grace

Although the aforesaid sacraments confer grace on man, the grace bestowed on him does not make him impeccable.

Gratuitous gifts are received into the soul like habitual dispositions: for man does not always act in accordance with them. Now nothing prevents the man who has a habit, from acting either in accordance with it, or against it: thus a grammarian may speak either grammatically or ungrammatically. It is the same with the habits of moral virtue: thus a man who has the habit of justice may perform just actions, and may act unjustly. The reason is because the use of habits is subject to our will: and the will may be borne to either of two opposite alternatives. It is therefore clear that the man who has received gratuitous gifts, can sin by acting against grace.

Again. There can be no impeccability in man without unchangeableness of will. Now man’s will cannot be unchangeable, except through his obtaining his last end: because the will is rendered unchangeable by being so wholly fulfilled, that there is nothing to turn it away from the object on which it is fixed. But such a fulfilment of his will is not becoming to man, unless he has obtained his last end: since, as long as something remains to be desired, the will is not fulfilled. Accordingly, man cannot be impeccable until he has reached his last end: and this is not granted to man by sacramental grace, because the sacraments are intended to assist man on his way to that end. Therefore sacramental grace does not make man impeccable.

Further. Every sin is the result of ignorance: wherefore the Philosopher says (3 Ethic. i) that every bad man is ignorant: and it is said (Prov. 14:22): They err that work evil. Consequently then only is man safe from sin, as regards his will, when he is safe from ignorance and error in his intellect. Now it is evident that sacramental grace does not deliver man from all ignorance and error: since this is the privilege of those whose intellectual gaze is fixed on that truth which is the supreme criterion of all truth; of those, namely, who have obtained their last end, as shown above.1 Therefore man is not made impeccable by the grace of the sacraments.

Moreover. Man’s changeableness in vice and virtue depends not a little on his changeableness in the soul’s passions: because, when those passions are curbed by his reason, man becomes and remains virtuous; whereas he becomes wicked when his reason obeys the impulse of his passions. Therefore, as long as man is subject to change in his passions, he is also changeable in vice and virtue. Now the changeableness which results from the soul’s passions is not removed by sacramental grace, but remains in man as long as his soul is united to a passible body. It is therefore evident that man is not made impeccable by sacramental grace.

Further. It would seem unnecessary to warn against sin those who cannot sin. Nevertheless the faithful who, through the sacraments, have already received the grace of the Holy Ghost, are admonished by the teaching both of the Gospels and of the Apostle. Thus it is said (Heb. 12:15): Looking diligently lest any man be wanting to the grace of God; lest any root of bitterness springing up do hinder: and (Eph. 4:30): Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby you are sealed: and (1 Cor. 10:12): He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall. Again the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 9:27): I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection: lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway. Therefore men are not rendered impeccable by the grace they receive in the sacrament.

This puts out of court the error of those heretics who say that a man cannot sin after receiving the grace of the Holy Ghost: and that if a man sins, he never had that grace.

They base their error on 1 Cor. 13:8, Charity never falleth away: and on 1 Jo. 3:6, Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not; and whosoever sinneth, hath not seen him, nor known him: and on ibid. 3:9, which is still more explicit, Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin: for his seed abideth in him and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. These texts however do not avail to support their contention. Charity is said never to fall away, not as though a man who has charity cannot lose it, since it is said (Apoc. 2:4): I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity; but because the other gifts of the Holy Ghost imply some kind of imperfection,—as, for instance, the spirit of prophecy and the like,—and therefore are made void, when that which is perfect is come, whereas charity will remain in that state of perfection.—The sense of the texts quoted from the epistle of John is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost, by which man is adopted or is born again as a son of God, as far as they are concerned, have such great power that they can keep man from sin: and man cannot sin as long as he lives in accordance with them; but he can act against them, and sin by abandoning them. Thus it is said that whosoever is born of God cannot sin in the same sense as one might say that what is hot cannot make a thing cool (yet it can become cool, and then it will cool something else); or that a just man does not perform unjust actions; that is, as long as he acts as a just man.

Chapter LXXI

that a man who has sinned after receiving the grace of the sacrament can return to grace

It follows from what has been said in the preceding chapter that a man who falls into sin after receiving sacramental grace can be restored to grace.

As already stated, as long as we live here below, the will is changeable as to vice and virtue. Consequently, just as man can sin after receiving grace, so too, seemingly, he can return to virtue. Again. It is evident that good is more powerful than evil: since evil acts not, save by virtue of a good, as we proved above.1 Hence, if a man’s will is turned away from the state of grace by sin, much more can he be recalled from sin, by grace.

Further. As long as he is a wayfarer, man’s will is not unchangeable. Now, as long as he is here below, a man is on the way to his last end. Therefore his will is not so unchangeably turned to evil, as to be unable by divine grace to return to that which is good.

Moreover. It is evident that sacramental grace delivers a man from the sins committed by him before he received the grace of the sacraments. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:9–11): Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers … shall possess the kingdom of God.… And such some of you were; but you are washed; but you are sanctified, but you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God. It is also clear that the grace bestowed in the sacraments does not lessen, but increases the good of nature. Now it is part of the good of nature that a man can be restored from the state of sin to the state of righteousness; since the possibility for good is a good in itself. Therefore if a man happen to sin after receiving grace, he can still return to the state of righteousness.

Again. If those who sin after baptism cannot return to grace, they lose all hope of salvation. Now despair is the road to greater liberty in sinning: for it is said of some (Ephes. 4:19) that despairing they have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness, unto covetousness. Therefore the above is a most dangerous opinion, since it leads man into a very sewer of sin.

Further. We have proved1 that the grace which man receives in the sacraments does not render him impeccable. Consequently, if after receiving sacramental grace the sinner were unable to return to the state of righteousness, it would be dangerous to receive the sacraments: and this is clearly unreasonable. Therefore a return to justice is not denied those who sin after receiving the sacraments.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (1 Jo. 2:1, 2): My little children, these things I write to you, that you may not sin. But if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just. And he is the propitiation for our sins: and it is evident that these words were addressed to the faithful who were already baptized. Paul also writes, in reference to the Corinthian who had been guilty of fornication (2 Cor. 2:6, 7): To him that is such a one, this rebuke is sufficient, that is given by many: so that contrariwise you should rather Pardon and comfort him. Again he says further on (7:9): Now I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance. It is also said (Jerem. 3:1): Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers: nevertheless, return to me, saith the Lord: and (Lam. 5:21): Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted: renew our days, as from the beginning. From all these texts it is evident that, if the faithful fall after receiving grace, the way back to salvation is still open to them.

Hereby we exclude the error of the Novatians, who refused forgiveness to those who sinned after receiving Baptism. In support of their error they quoted Heb. 6:4–6: It is impossible for those who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, have moreover tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, and are fallen away, to be renewed again unto penance. But it is clear from the context, in what sense the Apostle says this, for he continues: Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God, and making him a mockery. Hence the reason why those, who fall away after receiving grace, cannot be renewed again unto penance, is that the Son of God is not to be crucified again. Consequently that renewal unto penance is denied, whereby man is crucified with Christ, namely, by Baptism, according to Rom. 6:3, All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in his death. Therefore, just as Christ is not to be crucified again, so he that sins after Baptism is not to be baptized again; yet he can be restored to grace by penance. Hence the Apostle did not say that it is impossible for those who have once fallen to be recalled or restored to penance, but to be renewed, which expression is generally applied to Baptism: According to his mercy, he saved us, by the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost (Tit. 3:5).

Chapter LXXII

the necessity of penance and of its parts

Accordingly, if a man sin after being baptized, his sin cannot be mended by Baptism: and, since the abundance of divine mercy, and the efficacy of Christ’s grace, do not allow man to remain without a remedy, another sacramental antidote has been provided for the cleansing of sins. This is the sacrament of Penance, which is a kind of spiritual healing. When those who have acquired natural life through generation contract a disease that is contrary to the perfection of life, they can be cured, not by being born again, but by being healed, which is a process of alteration. So too when a man sins after Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, his sin is remedied, not by a repetition of Baptism, but by Penance, which is a kind of spiritual alteration.

We must observe, however, that the body’s healing proceeds sometimes entirely from within, as when a man is cured by his own natural forces; and sometimes both from within and without, as when nature’s efforts are assisted by external help of medicine. But a body is never healed entirely from without; for it still retains the principles of life, which are the cause of its having health. On the other hand, spiritual healing cannot proceed entirely from within. For we have proved1 that a man cannot be delivered from sin without the assistance of grace. Yet neither can spiritual healing proceed entirely from without: since the mind would not be restored to health, unless the will be moved in the right direction. Therefore, in the sacrament of Penance, spiritual health must come from within and from without. This happens as follows. In order that a man be perfectly cured of a bodily sickness, he needs to be delivered from all the mischief he incurs through the disease. So too the spiritual healing of Penance would not be perfect, unless man were relieved of all the mischief he has incurred through sin. The first mischief that afflicts man through sin, is disorder in his mind, in as much as it is turned away from the unchangeable good, namely, God, and is turned towards sin. The second mischief is that he incurs a debt of punishment; because, as proved above,2 it is due to each sin that God, the most just ruler, should punish it. The third mischief is a certain weakness in man’s natural good, in as much as by sinning he becomes more prone to sin, and less inclined to good works.

Accordingly, the first thing required in Penance is to restore order in the mind; namely, that the mind be turned to God, and turned away from sin, that it grieve for the sin committed, and resolve not to commit it again: this is what is meant by contrition. Now this restoration of the mind to order cannot be brought about without grace: because our minds cannot be turned to God aright without charity, and there is no charity without grace, as we have already proved.1 Accordingly contrition removes God’s anger, and man is freed from the debt of eternal punishment: which is incompatible with grace or charity, since eternal punishment consists in separation from God, to whom man is united by grace and charity. For this restoration of the mind to order by contrition proceeds from within, that is, from the free will assisted by grace. Since however it has been proved2 that the merit of Christ’s sufferings for the human race is sufficient to expiate all sins, it is necessary for man’s deliverance from sin, that he adhere with his mind not only to God, but also to the Mediator of God and man, Jesus Christ, in whom is given the remission of all sins. For spiritual health consists in the mind turning to God: and we cannot obtain this health except through the physician of our souls, Jesus Christ, who saved His people from their sins, and whose merit suffices to take away wholly all sins: for He it is who taketh away the sin of the world (Jo. 1:29). Nevertheless all do not receive the effect of perfect remission; each one receives a share in proportion to his union with Christ suffering. Since then our union with Christ in Baptism is effected, not by any internal operation on our part (since nothing brings itself into being), but by Christ, who regenerates us into a living hope: it follows that the forgiveness of sins in Baptism is the effect of Christ’s power, who unites us to Himself perfectly and wholly, so that not only is the stain of sin washed away, but all debt of punishment is also remitted: except accidentally in those who are deprived of the effect of the sacrament, through receiving the sacrament insincerely. By this spiritual healing we are united to Christ by means of our own action informed with divine grace; and consequently we do not always entirely, nor do we all equally, receive the remission which is the effect of this union. For the mind may turn to God, and turn away from sin with such strength that man receives complete forgiveness of sin, so that not only is he cleansed from the stain, but is released from the whole punishment. But this does not always happen. Sometimes contrition removes the stain and remits the debt of eternal punishment, as we have said, yet there still remains an obligation to some temporal punishment, that God’s justice may be secured, in as much as sin is brought to order by punishment.

Now, infliction of punishment for a fault requires some kind of judgment, wherefore the penitent who comes to Christ to be healed must look to Christ for the assessment of the punishment: and Christ prescribes the remedy through His minister, as He does in the other sacraments. No one, however, can judge of sins of which he is not informed. Consequently, it was necessary to institute confession as the second part of this sacrament, that Christ’s minister may be informed of the penitent’s sin. Therefore the minister, to whom confession is made, needs to have judiciary power, as occupying the place of Christ, who is appointed judge of the living and the dead.1 Now two things are requisite for judiciary power, namely the authority to take cognizance of a fault, and the power to absolve or condemn. These two are called the keys of the Church, discerning knowledge, and the power to bind and loose, which our Lord committed to Peter when He said (Matth. 16:19): To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. But we must not suppose that He entrusted the keys to Peter, that Peter alone might have them, but that others might have them through him: otherwise sufficient provision would not have been made for the spiritual welfare of the faithful. Now these keys derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion, whereby He opened to us the gate of the heavenly kingdom. Consequently, just as there is no salvation for man without Baptism, in which Christ’s Passion is efficacious, received either in reality or in desire (namely, when necessity and not contempt excludes the sacrament), so is there no salvation for those who sin after Baptism, unless they submit themselves to the keys of the Church, either by actual confession and acceptance of the judgement of the Church’s ministers, or at least by purposing to do so when the opportunity offers. For thus Peter declares (Acts 4:12): There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved, except the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hereby we exclude the error of those who say that man can obtain forgiveness of his sins without confession, or the purpose to confess, or that the authorities of the Church can dispense a man from the obligation of going to confession. Ecclesiastical superiors cannot override the Church’s power of the keys wherein all their powers consist, nor make it possible for a man to obtain forgiveness of his sins without the sacrament that derives its efficacy from Christ’s Passion: this Christ alone can do: who is the institutor and author of the sacraments. Wherefore, just as the Ecclesiastical superiors cannot dispense a man so that he be saved without Baptism, so neither can they dispense a man so that he obtain forgiveness of sin without confession and absolution.

It must be observed, however, that Baptism has a certain efficacy for the remission of a man’s sins, even before he actually receives it, and while he has the purpose to receive it; and afterwards, indeed, when actually received, it bestows an effect more plentiful in grace and forgiveness: whereas sometimes grace is bestowed and sin is remitted, in the actual reception of Baptism by one whose sin has not yet been remitted. In the same way, the keys of the Church produce their effect in a man even before he actually submits himself to them; provided he has the intention of so doing. But he receives grace and forgiveness more plentifully when he actually submits himself to them, by confessing his sins, and receiving absolution. And sometimes, by the power of the keys a man after confessing his sins may obtain grace even at the moment of the absolution whereby his sins are remitted. Since then at the time of confession and absolution grace and forgiveness are more plentifully bestowed on a man who has already obtained both on account of his good intention, it is clear that, by the power of the keys, the minister of the Church, by absolving him, remits some of the temporal punishment which was still due to the penitent after his contrition. As to what remains of that punishment, he binds the penitent thereto by enjoining a penance, the fulfilment of which is called satisfaction, which is the third part of Penance. Hereby man is wholly freed from the debt of punishment, since he has paid the penalty which he deserved. More than this, the weakness of his natural good is repaired: for then he refrains from evil things, and habituates himself to good things by humbling his spirit to God in prayer, training his flesh by fasting that it should be subject to the spirit, and using his external possessions to give alms to his neighbour, to whom he thus unites himself, whereas he had been separated from him by sin. Hence it follows that the minister of the Church exercises a kind of judgement by using the keys. Now no man is appointed judge except over those who are subject to him. Consequently, it is not true, as some falsely assert, that a priest can absolve anyone from his sins; but only those over whom he exercises that power.

Chapter LXXIII

the sacrament of extreme unction

The body is the instrument of the soul. Now an instrument is intended for the use of the principal agent; wherefore the instrument needs to be disposed so as to be suitable to the principal agent. Consequently the body is disposed so as to be suitable to the soul. By dispensation of the divine judgement it happens sometimes that the disease of the soul, which is sin, spreads to the body; and this bodily ailment is sometimes profitable to the soul’s health, in so far as a man bears his bodily infirmity with humility and patience; since this is credited to him as punishment as it were in satisfaction for his sins. Moreover bodily infirmity is sometimes a hindrance to the health of the soul, in so far as it is an obstacle to virtue. It was, therefore, fitting that a spiritual remedy should be applied against sin, in so far as sin is an occasion of bodily infirmity: and sometimes this remedy heals the bodily ailment; that is to say, when it is good for the soul’s health. For this purpose the sacrament of Extreme Unction was instituted; of which it is said (James 5:14, 15): Is any man sick among you? Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith shall heal1 the sick man. Nor is the efficacy of the sacrament prejudiced if sometimes the sick who have received this sacrament are not completely cured of their bodily ailment, because the healing of the body is not always good for the soul, even for those who have received this sacrament worthily. Nor do they receive it in vain, although they do not recover the health of the body. For while this sacrament is directed against bodily sickness as a result of sin, it is evidently directed also against other consequences of sin, namely proneness to evil, and difficulty in respect of good; and all the more so, as these latter infirmities of the soul are more akin to sin than sickness of the body. It is true that these infirmities should be repaired by penance, in as much as the penitent is withdrawn from evil and inclined to good, by deeds of virtue, which he does in satisfaction for sin. But, seeing that man does not completely repair these defects in himself, either through negligence or the manifold business of this life, or the shortness of time, and so forth; he is fortunately provided with a sacrament which completes his cure and delivers him from the debt of temporal punishment. Thus when his soul departs from his body, there is no longer anything in him to prevent his entering into glory; wherefore James adds: And the Lord shall raise him up. It also happens that a man is not cognizant or mindful of all the sins he has committed, so as to be cleansed of them all in Penance: moreover, these are his daily sins, from which this life cannot be free. From all these man needs to be cleansed by this sacrament in the hour of death, so that nothing remain in him to prevent his entrance into glory: and therefore James adds: If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him. It is evident, therefore, that this sacrament is the conclusion and consummation of the whole spiritual healing, since it prepares man for a participation in glory: and for this reason it is called Extreme Unction.

Wherefore it is plain that this sacrament is not to be given to any sick person, but only to those who, through sickness, are likely to be near death. And if they get well again, they can receive this sacrament a second time, if they return to the same state of danger. The reason is that the anointing in this sacrament is not one of consecration, as the anointing of Confirmation, the washing of Baptism, and certain other anointings. These latter are never repeated, because consecration remains for always, so long as the consecrated thing remains, on account of the efficacy of the divine power which consecrates. Whereas the anointing of this sacrament is directed to healing: and a healing remedy should be repeated as often as the sickness recurs.

Now there are some who, without being sick, are near death (as for instance a man condemned to die) and who need the spiritual effects of this sacrament; yet to none may it be given, save to those who are in sickness, for it is given under the form of a bodily remedy: which is unsuitable except for one who is sick of body: and the signification of the sacraments must be observed. Consequently, just as a bodily washing is required in Baptism, so in this sacrament is there required the application of a remedy for bodily infirmity. Hence oil is the special matter of this sacrament, because by easing pain it is useful for healing the body, even as water, that washes the body, is the matter of the sacrament in which the soul is cleansed.

Hence again we may see that as bodily remedies are applied to the source of the disease, so is this unction applied to those parts of the body that are the source of the disease which is sin. Such are the organs of sense, the hands, and feet, with which sins are committed: also, as is the custom in some places, the thighs which are the seat of lust.

Again seeing that sins are remitted in this sacrament, and that sin is not remitted without grace, it is evident that grace is bestowed in this sacrament.

Now those things which bestow illuminating grace may be given by none but a priest, whose order is light-giving, according to Dionysius (Eccles. Hier. vi.). A bishop is not necessary, since this sacrament does not confer excellence of state, as is the case in those things of which a bishop is the minister.1 Since however this sacrament has the effect of producing a complete cure, and requires an abundance of grace, it becomes the sacrament that many priests be present, and that the prayers of the whole Church combine to secure the effect of this sacrament: hence James says (5:14, 15): Let him bring in the priests of the Church … and the prayers of faith shall save the sick man. Yet, if there be only one priest present, he is understood to confer this sacrament as proxy of the whole Church, whose minister he is, and who speaks through him.—As in the other sacraments, the effect of this sacrament is hindered by insincerity on the part of the recipient.

Chapter LXXIV

the sacrament of order

From what has been said, it is clear that, in all the sacraments of which we have spoken hitherto, spiritual grace is bestowed under the sacred sign of visible things. Now every action should be proportionate to the agent. Hence these same sacraments should be dispensed by visible men having spiritual powers. For angels are not competent to dispense sacraments: but men clothed in visible flesh, according to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 5:1), Every high priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God.

This may be proved in yet another way. Sacraments derive their institution and efficacy from Christ; of whom the Apostle says (Eph. 5:25, 26): Christ loved the Church, and delivered himself for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life. It is also clear that at the Supper He gave the Sacrament of His body and blood, and instituted it for our frequent use: and this is the greatest of all sacraments. Seeing then that He was about to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, it was necessary that He should institute others as His ministers, who would dispense the sacraments to the faithful, according to the Apostle’s words (1 Cor. 4:1): Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God. For this reason He entrusted His disciples with the consecration of His body and blood, saying (Luke 22:19): Do this for a commemoration of me: to them He gave the power to forgive sins (Jo. 20:23): Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: and on them He conferred the office of teaching and baptizing, saying (Matth. 28:19): Going, teach ye all nations, baptizing them. Now the minister is compared to his master as an instrument to the principal agent: for, just as the instrument is moved by the agent in order to produce an effect, so a minister is moved by his master to execute his will. Again, the instrument should be proportionate to the agent. Therefore Christ’s ministers should be conformed to Him. Now Christ wrought our salvation, as master, by His own authority and power, in as much as He is God and man: in that, as man, He suffered for our redemption, and, as God, His sufferings were made efficacious for our salvation. Consequently Christ’s ministers needed to be men, and to share in His Godhead by a kind of spiritual power: since the instrument shares in the power of the principal agent. Of this power the Apostle says (2 Cor. 13:10) that the Lord gave him power unto edification, and not unto destruction.

Now it cannot be said that this power was given to Christ’s disciples, yet so that it would not be derived from them by others: for it was given to them unto the edification of the Church, according to the Apostle’s words. Therefore this power must last as long as the Church needs to be edified: that is to say from after the death of Christ’s disciples until the end of the world. Consequently spiritual power was given to Christ’s disciples in such wise that others were to receive it from them. Hence our Lord spoke to His disciples as representatives of the rest of the faithful, as we may see from His words (Mark 13:37), What I say to you, I say to all. Again He said to His disciples (Matth. 28:20): Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.

Accordingly, this spiritual power flows from Christ to the ministers of the Church, and the spiritual effects accruing to us from Christ are conferred under certain sensible signs, as explained above;1 and consequently it was proper that this spiritual power also should be conferred on men by means of sensible symbols. These are certain forms of words, certain actions, as for instance laying on of hands, anointing, delivery of book or chalice or something of the kind pertaining to the execution of a spiritual power. Now, whenever something spiritual is bestowed under a bodily symbol, this is called a sacrament. It is clear, therefore, that in the bestowal of spiritual power, a sacrament is enacted: and this is known as the Sacrament of Order. Now it is a part of the divine liberality that whosoever receives power to perform a certain work, receives also whatsoever is required for the suitable execution of that work. Since then the sacraments that are the purpose of this spiritual power, cannot be becomingly administered without the assistance of divine grace: it follows that grace is conferred in this sacrament, even as in the others.

Whereas the power of Order is directed to the dispensing of the sacraments, and since of all the sacraments the Eucharist is the most sublime and perfect, as was indicated above,1 it follows that we must consider the power of Order chiefly in its relation to that sacrament: for a thing takes its name from its end. Now seemingly the same power bestows a perfection, and prepares the matter to receive that perfection: thus fire has the power to communicate its form to a thing, and to prepare the material for the reception of its form. Since then the power of Order extends to the production of Christ’s body and the distribution thereof to the faithful, it follows that the same power should extend to the preparation of the faithful, that they be made apt and worthy to receive this sacrament. Now the faithful are made apt and worthy to receive this sacrament, by being freed from sin: otherwise spiritual union with Christ is impossible, in one who is united to Him sacramentally by receiving this sacrament. Consequently the power of Order must extend to the forgiveness of sins, by the dispensation of those sacraments that are directed to the remission of sin: such as Baptism and Penance, as is evident from what we have said above.2 Wherefore, as we have already stated,3 our Lord, having entrusted to His disciples the consecration of His body, gave them also the power to forgive sins, which power is indicated by the keys, of which He said to Peter (Matth. 16:19): To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. For heaven is closed and opened to a man according as he is shackled with, or freed from sin; and for this reason the use of these keys is expressed as binding and loosing, namely from sins. Of the keys themselves we have already spoken.

Chapter LXXV

the different kinds of order

A power directed to a principal effect naturally has lesser powers administering to it. This may be clearly seen in the arts: the arts which dispose the material are subservient to the art which introduces the art-form: and the art that introduces the art-form is subservient to the art which is concerned with the end of the art-product: and again the art that is concerned with an anterior end is subservient to the art that is concerned with the ultimate end. Thus the art of wood-cutting serves the ship-building art; and the latter serves the art of sailing; and this latter serves the art of commerce or war or the like, in so far as sailing may be directed to various ends. Since then the power of Order is directed chiefly to the consecration of Christ’s body, and to its distribution to the faithful, and likewise to the cleansing of the faithful from their sins, there is need for a principal order, whose power extends chiefly to these things, and this is the Priesthood; and for other orders that serve it by preparing the matter in one way or another; these are the Orders of the lower ministers.

Accordingly, since the priestly power, as we have stated,1 extends to two things, namely the consecration of Christ’s body and the preparation of the faithful, by absolving them from their sins, that they may be worthy to receive the Eucharist, it follows that the lower orders should minister to the priestly order, either in both, or in one of these things. And it is clear that among the lower orders, the higher is the one that serves the priestly order in more ways, or in a higher way. The lowest orders then serve the priestly order, only in the preparation of the people: the Door-keeper by excluding unbelievers from the assembly of the faithful; the Readers by instructing catechumens in the rudiments of the faith; wherefore the Old Testament Scriptures are committed to them to read: the Exorcists by cleansing those who are already instructed, if in any way they be hindered by the devil from receiving the sacraments. The higher orders serve the priestly order, both in the preparation of the people and in the celebration of the Sacrament. Acolytes exercise their ministry over the non-sacred vessels, in which the matter of the Sacrament is prepared, wherefore the cruets are delivered to them at their ordination: Subdeacons exercise their ministry over the sacred vessels, and the preparation of the matter before consecration: Deacons exercise a ministry over the already consecrated matter, in as much as they distribute Christ’s blood to the faithful. Wherefore these three, the priesthood, diaconate, and sub-diaconate, are called Sacred Orders, because they confer a ministry over sacred things. These higher orders serve also in the preparation of the people: hence deacons are entrusted with the proclamation of the Gospel teaching; subdeacons, with the teaching of the Apostles; while the acolytes serve by conducing to the solemnity of that teaching, by bearing lighted candles, and in other like ministrations.

Chapter LXXVI

of the episcopal dignity: and that one bishop is over all

It has been stated1 that all these orders are conferred by a certain sacrament, and that the sacraments of the Church have to be dispensed by certain ministers: consequently, there must be in the Church a still higher power of some higher ministry, to confer the sacrament of Order. This is the episcopal power, which, while it does not surpass the priestly power in the consecration of Christ’s body, nevertheless does surpass it in things concerning the faithful: for the priest himself derives his power from the bishop: while all difficult matters regarding the faithful are reserved to bishops, by whose authority even the priests are able to do what they are appointed to do. Thus in his priestly actions, the priest uses things consecrated by a bishop; for instance in the celebration of the Eucharist, he uses chalice, altar and pall. Hence it is evident that the supreme power in the direction of the faithful belongs to the episcopal dignity. Now although the people are distributed among various dioceses and cities, nevertheless there is but one Church, and therefore only one Christian people. Consequently, just as a bishop is appointed as the head of a certain people and a particular Church, so must the whole Christian people be subject to one who is the head of the whole Church.

Again. The unity of the Church requires that all the faithful be of one faith. Now questions are wont to arise about matters of faith: and the Church would be divided by differences of opinion, unless its unity were safeguarded by the pronouncement of one. Therefore, in order to safeguard the unity of the Church, it is necessary that there be one who presides over the whole Church. Now Christ loved the Church and shed His blood for her, wherefore He did not fail her in her needs, seeing that it is said even of the Synagogue (Isa. 5:4): What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to it? There can be no doubt, therefore, that Christ provided His Church with a head.

Further. We cannot doubt that the government of the Church was perfectly provided for, since it was devised by one through whom kings reign and lawgivers decree just things (Prov. 8:15). Now the best form of government is when a people is governed by one: because the end of government is peace; since peace and unity of the subjects is the end of the governing authority: and unity is more fittingly ensured by one than by many. Therefore the government of the Church is so arranged that one presides over the whole.

Moreover. The Church militant originates from the Church triumphant by its likeness to it: hence in the Apocalypse, John saw Jerusalem coming down out of heaven;1 and Moses was bidden to make all things according to the pattern that was shown him in the mountain.2 Now there is one who presides over the Church triumphant, namely God, Who also presides over the whole universe; for it is said (Apoc. 21:3): They shall be his people: and God himself with them shall be their God. Therefore, in the Church militant, there is one who presides over all. Hence it is said (Osee 1:11): The children of Juda and the children of Israel shall be gathered together, and they shall appoint themselves one head: and our Lord said (Jo. 10:16): There shall be one fold, and one shepherd.

Someone, however, may say that the one head and the one shepherd is Christ, who is the one bridegroom of the one Church: but this reply is not sufficient. It is evident that Christ Himself accomplishes all the Church’s sacraments: He it is who baptizes; He it is who forgives sins; He is the true priest, who offered Himself on the altar of the cross, and by whose power His own body is consecrated daily on the altar. And yet, because He was not to remain bodily present to all the faithful, He chose ministers, that through them He might give that same body to the faithful, as we have shown above.3 For this very reason then, that He was about to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, He needed to appoint one to take His place in governing the whole Church. Wherefore, before His Ascension, He said to Peter (Jo. 21:17): Feed my sheep; and before His Passion (Luke 22:32): Thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren; and to him alone He made the promise (Matth. 16:19): To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, in order to show that the power of the keys was to be received from him by others, so as to safeguard the unity of the Church. It cannot be said that, although He conferred this dignity on Peter, it does not pass from him to others. For it is evident that Christ so instituted His Church, that it would endure to the end of the world according to Isa. 9:11, He shall sit upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom; to establish it, and strengthen it with judgement and with justice, from henceforth and for ever. Hence it is evident that those He appointed to the ministry then and there, were, for the good of the Church, to communicate their powers to their successors, until the end of time: especially, since He says (Matth. 28:20): Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.

This suffices to refute the presumptuous error of those who dare to withdraw from obedience and submission to Peter, by refusing to acknowledge his successor, the Roman Pontiff, as the shepherd of the universal Church.

Chapter LXXVII

that the sacraments can be dispensed by wicked ministers

We have said enough to show that the ministers of the Church, at their ordination, receive from above power to dispense the sacraments to the faithful. Now that which a thing acquires by being consecrated, remains in it for ever: wherefore that which is consecrated once, is not consecrated again. Therefore the ministers of the Church retain for ever the power of their Orders: and, consequently it is not taken away from them by sin. Therefore the sacraments of the Church can be administered by sinners and wicked men, provided they be in Orders.

Again. Nothing can produce an effect exceeding its faculty, unless it receive the power from elsewhere. This is evident both in nature and in civil matters: water cannot give heat, unless it receive from fire the power to do so: nor can a magistrate imprison a citizen without having received power from the sovereign. Now the sacramental effects surpass the powers of man, as stated above.1 Therefore no man, however good, can administer the sacraments unless he has received the power to do so. Now wickedness and sin are opposite to goodness. Therefore neither does sin prevent a man, who has received the power, from being able to administer the sacraments.

Again. A man is good or bad in reference to virtue and vice, which are habits. Now habit differs from power in that power makes it possible for us to do a certain thing, whereas habit does not make it possible for us to do a thing, but confers a certain ability or inability for doing well or ill that which it is possible for us to do. Consequently habit neither gives nor removes the possibility of doing, but gives the facility of doing a certain thing well or ill. Therefore the fact that a man is good or bad does not make it possible or impossible for him to administer the sacraments, but it makes him fit or unfit to administer them well.

Moreover. That which acts by the power of another agent does not assimilate the material to itself, but to the principal agent: thus a house is not made in likeness to the instruments used by the builder, but is likened to his art. Now the ministers of the Church in dispensing the sacraments, act not by their own, but by Christ’s power, of whom it is said (Jo. 1:33): He it is that baptizeth. Wherefore the minister acts as a kind of instrument: for he is an animated instrument, as it were. Therefore the wickedness of a minister does not prevent the faithful from being saved by Christ through the sacraments.

Further. It is not for man to judge of another man’s goodness or wickedness: this belongs to God alone, who searches the secrets of the heart. Consequently, if the wickedness of a minister could prevent a sacrament from taking effect, man would be unable to be confident of his soul’s welfare, nor would his conscience be relieved of sin. Therefore it would be unseemly, were he to base his hope of salvation on the goodness of a mere man: for it is said (Jerem. 17:5): Cursed be the man that trusteth in man. And if a man had no hope of obtaining salvation through the sacraments, unless they were dispensed by a good minister, he would seem somewhat to trust in man for his salvation. Wherefore, in order that we may place our hope of salvation in Christ, who is both God and man, we must acknowledge that the sacraments are salutary through Christ’s power, whether they be dispensed by good or by wicked ministers.

This is also made evident by the fact that our Lord bade us obey even wicked superiors, although we must not imitate their works (Matth. 23:2, 3): The Scribes and Pharisees have sitten on the chair of Moses. All things therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do: but according to their works, do ye not. And much more ought we to obey men by reason of their having been appointed ministers by Christ, than by reason of their sitting in the chair of Moses. Therefore even wicked ministers should be obeyed: and this would not be the case unless they retained the power of Orders, which is the reason why they should be obeyed. Therefore even the wicked have the power to dispense the sacraments. This disposes of the error of those who said that all good men, but no wicked men, can administer the sacraments.

Chapter LXXVIII

the sacrament of matrimony

Although the sacraments restore grace to man, they do not at once give him back immortality: the reasons for which we have already given.1 Now whatsoever things are corruptible cannot be perpetuated save by generation. Since then believers were to be perpetuated till the end of the world, this had to be done by means of generation, whereby also the human race is carried on.

We must observe that when a thing is directed to several ends, it needs several directors to those ends: because the end is proportionate to the agent. Now human generation is directed to several ends, namely, the continuation of the species, or the securing of some good of the state, such as the preservation of the people in some particular country: again it is directed to the perpetuity of the Church which is the assembly of the faithful. Wherefore the generation in question needs to receive its direction from various sources. In so far as it is directed to the good of nature, namely the perpetuation of the species, it is directed by nature which inclines to this end, and thus it is called an office of nature. In so far as it is directed to the good of the state, it is subject to the control of the civil authority. But in so far as it is directed to the good of the Church, it must be subject to ecclesiastical power. Now those things which are dispensed by the ministers of the Church are called sacraments. Therefore matrimony, as consisting in the union of a man and woman who intend to beget and educate children for the glory of God, is a sacrament of the Church: and hence it is that the bridal pair receive a blessing from the ministers of the Church. And just as in the other sacraments, something spiritual is symbolized by external actions, so in this sacrament the union of husband and wife signifies the union of Christ with the Church, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 5:32): This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church. And seeing that the sacraments cause what they signify, we must believe that the sacrament of matrimony confers on those who are joined in wedlock, the grace to take part in the union of Christ with His Church: since it is most necessary that they should so seek carnal and earthly things, as not to be separated from Christ and His Church.

Since then the union of husband and wife signifies the union of Christ and the Church, the figure must needs correspond to the thing signified. Now the union of Christ with the Church is the unending union of one with one, for the Church is one according to Cant. 6:8, One is my dove, my perfect one. Nor will Christ ever be separated from His Church, for He said (Matth. 28:20): Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world: and again it is said (1 Thess. 4:16): So shall we be always with the Lord. Therefore Matrimony, as a sacrament of the Church, must needs be the indissoluble union of one man with one woman: and this pertains to the mutual troth which binds husband and wife together.

Accordingly there are three blessings attaching to Matrimony as a sacrament of the Church: namely, children, to be begotten and brought up to worship God; faithfulness, in as much as one husband is bound to one wife; and the sacrament, in as much as it is an indissoluble union, symbolising the union of Christ with the Church. Other matters connected with matrimony have been treated above.1

Chapter LXXIX

that our bodies will rise again through christ

It has been proved2 that Christ has delivered us from those things we have incurred through the sin of the first man; from whom we have contracted not only sin, but also death, the punishment of sin, according to the Apostle (Rom. 5:12), By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death. Consequently Christ delivered us from both, namely, sin and death: wherefore the Apostle says (Ibid., 17): For if by one man’s offence death reigned through one: much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one Jesus Christ. And in order to afford us a proof of both in Himself, He chose both to die and to rise again. He chose to die, in order to free us from sin, wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 9:27, 28): As it is appointed unto men once to die … so also Christ was offered once to exhaust the sins of many. He chose to rise again, in order to free us from death; wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:20, 21): Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep: for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of life. Accordingly, we obtain the effect of Christ’s Passion, as to the forgiveness of sin: for it has been already stated1 that the sacraments produce their effect through the efficacy of Christ’s Passion. But we shall obtain the effect of Christ’s Resurrection, by being delivered from death, at the end of the world, when by the power of Christ, we shall all rise again. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:12–14): If Christ be preached, that he arose again from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection from the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again. And if Christ be not risen again, then our preaching is vain, and your faith is also vain. Therefore it is of faith to believe in the future resurrection of the dead. There are some, however, who disbelieve in the future resurrection of the body: such is the perversity of their mind that when, in the Scriptures, they read about the resurrection, they refer such statements to the spiritual resurrection of those who, through grace, arise from sin.

This error is condemned by the Apostle (2 Tim. 2:16–18): Shun profane and vain babblings: for they grow much towards ungodliness. And their speech spreadeth like a canker: of whom are Hymenœus and Philetus; who have erred from the truth, saying that the resurrection is past already: which could only refer to a spiritual resurrection. Therefore it is against faith to substitute a spiritual for a bodily resurrection.

Moreover. It is evident from other passages in the Epistle to the Corinthians that, in this particular one quoted above, the Apostle is speaking of the resurrection of the body. Thus, after a few words he goes on to say (verse 44): It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body: thus clearly indicating the body’s resurrection, and then he adds (verse 53): This corruptible must put on in-corruption: and this mortal must put on immortality. Now this corruptible and this mortal refer to the body. Therefore it is the body that will arise again.

Further. Our Lord foretold both resurrections. He said (Jo. 5:25): Amen, amen I say unto you, that the hour cometh and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. These words, seemingly, refer to the spiritual resurrection of souls, which was already beginning when people believed in Christ. But afterwards He referred to the resurrection of the body, when He said (Ibid., 28): The hour cometh wherein all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God: since it is clear that they who are in the graves are not souls but bodies. Therefore the resurrection of bodies is foretold here.

It is also expressly foretold by Job (Job 19:25, 26): I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth: and I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God.

Reason also supplies an evident proof of the resurrection: provided we bear in mind what has already been proved. Thus we have shown1 that the human soul is immortal: so that it survives the body after its separation from it. It is also manifest from what has been stated,2 that the soul is united to the body naturally: since it is by its essence the form of the body: wherefore it is unnatural for the soul to be without the body. Now nothing unnatural can last for ever: and consequently the soul will not remain for ever without the body. Therefore, since the soul is immortal, it must needs be reunited to the body: and this is to rise again. Hence the immortality of the soul would seem to demand the future resurrection of the body.

Again. It has been proved1 that man’s natural desire tends to happiness. Now ultimate happiness is the perfection of the happy one. Consequently whosoever lacks something for perfection, is not yet perfectly happy, since his desire is not yet wholly at rest: and all imperfect things naturally seek to attain to perfection. Now the soul when separated from the body is, in a way, imperfect: even as any part is when severed from its whole: and the soul is naturally part of human nature. Therefore man cannot obtain ultimate happiness, unless his soul be reunited to his body: and this is all the more true, seeing that as we have shown2 man cannot reach ultimate happiness in this life.

Again. It was proved above3 that divine providence punishes evil-doers and rewards those who do well. Now, in this life man, who is composed of soul and body, either sins or lives aright. Therefore reward or punishment is due to man in respect of his body and of his soul. But it is plain that in this life man cannot obtain the reward of ultimate felicity, as we have shown above.4 Moreover, in many cases sins are not punished in this life: nay more, for it is said (Job 21:7): Why then do the wicked live, are they advanced, and strengthened with riches? Therefore we must postulate a reunion of soul and body, in order that both in soul and body man may be rewarded or punished.

Chapter LXXX

objections against the resurrection

Belief in the resurrection encounters a certain number of objections.

In nature, that which is destroyed, does not return to existence, identically the same as before: just as the habit that one acquires after losing it, is not identically the same habit as before: and for this reason the purpose of nature is, by means of generation, to preserve the species of that which is destroyed. Accordingly, since death deprives man of life, and the human body is resolved into the primary elements, it would seem impossible for the same identical man to come back to life.

Again. A thing cannot be identically the same, if any of its essential principles be not identically the same: since the change of an essential principle always induces a change in a thing’s essence, whereby a thing is, and is one. Now, when a thing is utterly annihilated it cannot resume existence as identically the same thing: a new thing, indeed, will be created; but the same thing will not be restored. And seemingly death annihilates several of man’s essential principles.

In the first place, his corporeity and the form of the mixture of elements, since the body is evidently dissolved; secondly, the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul, which cannot exist without the organs of the body; in fact, there would seem to be nothing left of humanity, which is the form of all that remains after the soul has left the body. Therefore it would seem impossible for the same man to rise again.

Moreover. It would seem that continuity is an essential condition of identity, not only in quantities and movements, but also in qualities and forms: thus when a healthy person falls sick and is restored to health, the health which he recovers is not identically the same as his previous health. Now death clearly deprives man of being, since corruption is the change of being into non-being. Therefore it is impossible for man to recover the same identical being as he had before. Consequently he will not be the same man: because things that are identical have the same being.

Moreover. If the same human body returns to life, it follows that whatsoever was in the body must be restored to it. But this leads to most unseemly consequences; as regards not only the hair on the head, and distributed about the body, and the nails, all of which clearly are frequently cut away: but also other parts of the body which are dissolved by the hidden action of natural heat: and if all these things were to be restored to man when he rises again, the result would be most unseemly. Therefore, apparently, man will not rise again after death.

Further. There are to be found men who eat human flesh and nothing else; and men thus nourished have children. Consequently the same flesh will be in several men. But it cannot possibly rise again in several men: and yet the resurrection would surely not be universal and entire, if each one did not regain what he had before. Therefore it would seem impossible that men will rise again.

Again. That which is common to all the individuals of one species would seem to be natural to that species. But the resurrection is not natural to man; because no natural agent is of sufficient power to cause the resurrection of all mankind. Therefore all mankind will not rise again.

Further. If we are delivered by Christ from sin, and from death the result of sin, seemingly those alone are to be delivered from death by rising again, who have partaken of the mysteries of Christ, whereby they are delivered from sin. But this does not apply to all men. Therefore it would seem that not all men will rise again.

Chapter LXXXI

solution of the foregoing objections

In order to solve these difficulties, we must observe that, in fashioning human nature, God, as we have already stated,1 bestowed on the human body something in addition to that which was due to it by virtue of its natural principles. This was a kind of incorruptibility, the result of the body being so proportioned to its form, that as the soul’s life is everlasting, so was it possible for the body, through the soul, to live for ever. This incorruptibility, although it was not natural in relation to a natural principle, was nevertheless natural, so to say, in relation to the end; in as much as the matter was proportioned to its natural form, which is the end of matter. Accordingly, when the soul, against the order of its nature, turned away from God, the body was deprived of that God-given disposition which made it proportionate to the soul, and death was the result. If then we consider the state in which human nature was created, death is incidental to man through sin. But this accident was removed by Christ, who through the merits of His Passion destroyed death by dying. We conclude then that the body is restored from death to life, by the same divine power that created the body incorruptible.

Accordingly, we reply to the first objection thus. The power of nature falls short of the divine power, even as the power of the instrument falls short of that of the principal agent. Hence, although nature is unable to restore a dead body to life, this can be done by the power of God. The reason why nature cannot do this is that nature always works through a form: and that which has a form already exists. Wherefore a thing cannot generate itself; but it generates something else that is its like in species. And when it has been destroyed, it has lost its form, by which it could be a principle of action. Consequently that which has been destroyed cannot be restored to its identity by the operation of nature. But the divine power, which brought things into being, so works through nature that, without it, it can produce an effect of nature, as we have proved above.1 Therefore, since the divine power changes not though things themselves be destroyed, it can restore integrity to things which have been corrupted.

The second objection does not prove that the same man cannot rise again. None of man’s essential principles is utterly annihilated by death: because the rational soul, which is man’s form, remains after death, as we have shown.1 The matter also which was subject to that form remains under the same dimensions that individualized it. Accordingly, the same man will be restored as a result of the union of the same identical matter with the same identical form.—As to corporeity, it can be taken in two ways. In one way it signifies the substantial form of the body, considered as a substance: and thus the corporeity of any body whatever is its substantial form, whereby that thing belongs to such and such a genus and species, and owing to which a body has the three dimensions. For there are not, in one and the same thing, several substantial forms, by one of which it belongs to a supreme genus, substance for example, and by another, to its proximate genus, such as bodies or animals, and by yet another, to its species, such as man or horse. For, if the first form makes it a substance, the subsequent forms would be additions to that which is already an actual individual, subsisting in nature, so that they would not be constituents of that individual, but like accidental forms would be in the subject which is that individual. Consequently corporeity taken as meaning the substantial form in man, is nothing else but the rational soul, which requires the three dimensions in its matter: since it is the actuating principle of a body.—In another sense, corporeity signifies an accidental form in regard to which a body is said to be in the genus of quantity: so that corporeity is identified with the three dimensions that enter into the definition of a body. Wherefore, although this corporeity returns to nothingness, when the body is corrupted, this cannot prevent a man from being identically the same when he rises again, since corporeity, taken in the first sense, does not return into nothing, but remains the same.

The form of a mixture can also be taken in two ways.—In one way, it signifies the substantial form of a mixed body: and thus, since in man there is no other substantial form besides the rational soul, as we have proved,1 neither can it be said that the form of the mixture, considered as his substantial form, is annihilated when a man dies.—In another way, when a number of simple qualities are mixed and attempered so as to form a composite quality, this latter may be called the form of the mixture, and stands in the same relation to the substantial form of the mixed body, as a simple quality does to the substantial form of a simple body. Wherefore, if the form of the mixture, thus understood, comes to nothing, this is no proof against the identity of the body that rises again.—This same applies to the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul. If by these we mean the sensitive and nutritive powers, which are natural properties of the soul or rather of the composite, they cease to be when the body ceases to be: and this does not interfere with the body’s identity in the resurrection. If, however, by these parts we mean the very substance of the sensitive and nutritive soul, each of these is identical with the rational soul: for man has not three souls, but one only, as we have proved.2—As to the humanity, we must not imagine this to be a form resulting from the union of the form with the matter, and distinct from both: because, since the form makes the matter to be something actually (2 De Anima, text. viii.), this additional form would not be substantial, but accidental. There are some who say that the form of the part is also the form of the whole; but that it is said to be the form of the part, in as much as it actuates the matter; and the form of the whole, in as much as it completes the species. Thus humanity is really nothing else but the rational soul; so that clearly it is not annihilated when the body is destroyed. But, seeing that humanity is the essence of man, and that the essence of a thing is indicated by the definition, and that the definition of a natural thing indicates not the form only, but the form and the matter, it follows that humanity signifies something composed of matter and form, just as man does, but not in the same way. Humanity signifies the essential principles of the species, both formal and material, with abstraction of the individualizing principles: for humanity is that by which someone is a man; whereas it is not by the principles of individuality, but only by the essential principles of the species, that someone is a man. Wherefore humanity signifies nothing else besides the essential principles of the species; so that its signification is only partial. On the other hand man signifies the essential principles of the species, without excluding the principles of individuality from its signification: since man signifies one having humanity, and this does not exclude his having other things: wherefore its signification is complete, because it signifies the essential principles of the species actually, and the individualizing principles potentially. But Socrates signifies both actually, even as the genus includes the difference potentially, whereas the species includes it actually. From this it follows that both the very same man and the very same humanity rise again, by reason of the survival of the rational soul, and the unity of matter.

The third objection in stating that identity of being depends on continuity, is based on a false premiss. For it is evident that matter and form have one being, since matter has not actual being except through a form. In this respect, however, the rational soul differs from other forms: because the being of other forms is nothing else but their adherence to matter: for they do not transcend matter, either in being or in operation: whereas it is clear that the rational soul transcends matter in operation, since by its operation of understanding it is independent of any bodily organ: and consequently its being is not merely adherence to matter. Therefore the soul’s being, which was that of the composite, remains after the dissolution of the body; and when the body is restored at the resurrection, it receives again the same being, which has remained in the soul.

The fourth objection proves nothing against the identity of those who rise again. That which is not an obstacle to man’s identity in this life, is clearly no obstacle to his identity when he rises again. Now, while a man lives, the parts of his body do not always remain the same as to matter, but only as to species: in fact, as regards matter, the parts come and go. Yet this does not prevent a man from retaining his identity from the beginning of his life to the end. Take fire for an example; as long as it continues to burn, we say that it is the same fire, because its species remains: and yet the logs have been consumed, and fresh ones have been put on. It is the same with the human body: since each single part retains its form and species during the whole of a lifetime: whereas their matter is both dissolved by the action of natural heat, and renewed by means of nourishment. Now a man remains the very same man, as to his various parts and stages of life, although the matter of his body changes from one stage to another. Accordingly, for a man to rise again identically the same as before, there is no need that he should have restored to him all the matter that was in him during his whole lifetime: but only as much as would suffice for the quantity due to him: and especially such matter as is closely connected with form and species. If there be anything lacking to a man’s proper quantity, whether because he died before reaching maturity, or because he has lost a limb, the divine power will supply the deficiency. Nor will this prevent the identity of the rising body; seeing that nature too, makes additions to a child’s body from extraneous sources, so that the body attains to maturity; and such an addition does not change its identity: since the child and the adult are the same man.

Hence we gather that even if some people partake of human flesh, this is no proof against identity in the resurrection; as the fifth objection argued. In fact, as we have already proved, there is no need that whatever was in man materially should rise again in him; and that if anything be lacking, it can be supplied by God’s power. Accordingly, the flesh consumed will rise again in the man in whom it was first perfected by a rational soul; the second man—if he partook of other food besides human flesh—will rise again with only such matter as he acquired from this other food, and in such quantity as is required for the proper size of his body. But if he partake of no other food, he will rise again with what he received from his parents, and the deficiency will be supplied by the omnipotence of his Creator. And if his parents also partook of none but human meat, so that this seed would also be engendered therefrom, their children will rise again with that seed, and he whose flesh was consumed will be supplied from another source. In the resurrection it will be the rule that if any matter belong to several in common, it will rise again in him to whose perfection it most intimately belonged: so that if it were in one as the radical seed from which he was generated, and in another as the result of nourishment, it will rise again in the man who was generated from it as from seed. But if it were in one as belonging to the perfection of the individual, and in another as directed to the perfection of the species, it will rise again in him to whom it belonged as a perfection of the individual. Hence the seed will rise again in the begotten and not in the begetter: and Adam’s rib will rise again in Eve, and not in Adam, in whom it was as in the principle of nature. And if it be in both on the same count, it will rise again in the one to whom it first belonged.

The reply to the sixth objection is clear from what we have already said. Resurrection is natural, if we look at its final cause, in as much as it is natural for the soul to be united to the body: but its efficient cause is not natural, since it is caused by the power of God alone.

Nor should we deny that all will rise again, although all men do not believe in Christ, nor are partakers in His mysteries. The Son of God took human nature that He might restore it. Accordingly, the natural defect that is shared by all will be repaired, and the dead will rise again. But this defect will not be repaired perfectly, save in those who adhere to Christ, either by their own action in believing in Him, or at least by the sacrament of faith.

Chapter LXXXII

that man will rise again immortal

It follows that man will so rise as not to die again.

The necessity of dying is a defect that nature has contracted from sin. Now Christ by the merits of His Passion, repaired the defects which nature contracted from sin: for as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15), not as the offence, so also the gift: for if by the offence of one many died: much more the grace of God, and the gift, by the grace of one man Jesus Christ, have abounded unto many. From this we gather that Christ’s merit is more efficacious in destroying death, than Adam’s sin in causing it. Therefore those who rise again, being delivered from death by the merits of Christ, will not die again.

Further. That which is to endure for ever has not been destroyed. Wherefore, if after rising from the dead men are to die again, so that death will go on for ever, death was in no sense destroyed by the death of Christ. Yet it has been destroyed now indeed in its cause, as the Lord foretold by the prophet Osee (13:14), O death, I will be thy death: and at last it will be actually destroyed, according to 1 Cor. 15:26, And the enemy death shall be destroyed last. It is therefore part of the Church’s faith that those who arise will not die again.

Moreover. The effect is likened to its cause. Now Christ’s resurrection is the cause of the resurrection to come, as stated above.1 But Christ so rose from the dead that He will not die again, according to Rom. 6:9, Christ rising from the dead, dieth now no more. Therefore men will so rise, that they will die no more.

Again. If after rising from the dead men are to die again: either they will rise again from this latter death, or they will not. If not, their souls will remain for ever separated from their bodies; and we have proved this to be unfitting, and for this reason it is granted that they will rise again: otherwise if they were not to rise again after dying a second time, there would be no reason for their rising after dying the first time. On the other hand, if they rise again after this second death, either this second resurrection will be followed by yet another death, or not. If not, the same argument applies, as to their first resurrection. And if they are to die again, there will be an indefinite alternation of death and life in the subject. But this is unseemly, because God must have some definite end in raising the dead to life: while alternate death and life is a kind of succession and change which cannot be an end: for movement of its very nature cannot be an end, since all movement tends towards something else.

Further. The purpose of nature’s action in this lower world tends to perpetuity; because that action is directed to generation, which aims at the perpetuation of the species: hence nature does not intend this or that individual as its last end, but the preservation of the species in the individual. It is thus with nature, because nature acts by the power of God, the fount of perpetuity: wherefore the Philosopher (2 De Gen. et Corr.) says that the purpose of generation is that the participation of the divine being may be perpetuated in the things generated. Much more therefore does the action of God himself tend to something perpetual. Now resurrection is not directed to the perpetuity of the species: since this might have been secured by generation. Therefore it is directed to the perpetuation of the individual. But not in respect of the soul only: for the soul has this without the resurrection. Therefore in respect of the composite; and consequently man will live for ever after the resurrection.

Again. If we compare the soul and body from the point of view of a man’s first generation on the one hand and of his resurrection on the other, we shall find a different order between them. In man’s first generation, the creation of the soul follows the generation of the body: for at first the matter is prepared, by the power of the disconnected seed, and then God creates and infuses the soul: whereas in the resurrection the body will be united to the pre-existing soul. Now the first life, which man obtains by generation, follows the condition of the mortal body, in that death puts an end to it. Therefore the life which he obtains by the resurrection will be everlasting, in accordance with the condition of the immortal soul.

Again. If there be an indefinite succession of life and death in the same man, this alternating life and death will form a kind of circle. Now, in things subject to generation and corruption, every circle originates from the first circle of incorruptible bodies: for the first circle is composed of local movement, and this is communicated thence by way of imitation to other kinds of movement. Consequently the alternation of death and life would be caused by a heavenly body: but this is impossible, since the restoration of life to a dead body is beyond the scope of nature’s action. Hence we cannot admit this alternation of death and life, nor consequently that bodies will die after rising from the dead.

Further. Whatsoever things succeed one another in the same subject, last for a certain time: and all such things are subject to the heavens’ movement, of which time is a result. But the separated soul is not subject to the movement of the heavens, because it is above all corporeal nature. Consequently its alternate separation from and union with the body is not subject to the heavens’ movement. Therefore there is no such rotation of alternate death and life, as would result if those who rise from death were to die again. Therefore they will rise to die no more. Hence it is said (Isa. 25:8): The Lord shall cast death down headlong for ever; and (Apoc. 21:4): Death shall be no more.

Hereby we reject the error of certain heathens of old, who held that the history of times and temporal things repeats itself. For instance, just as once upon a time the philosopher Plato taught at Athens in the school known as the Academy, so during a space of countless previous centuries, at long but certain intervals, we shall find again and again the same Plato, and the same city, and the same disciples, and we shall go on finding them during ages without number: so Augustine relates (12 De Civ. Dei). To this, says he (ibid.) some would refer the words of Ecclesiastes 1:9, 10, What is it that hath been? The same thing that shall be. What is it that hath been done? The same that shall be done. Nothing under the sun is new: neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: for it had already gone before it in the ages that were before us. This however does not mean that the same identical things occur over again, but the same kind of thing, as Augustine explains (ibid.). Aristotle also (De Generat.) taught this in opposition to the foregoing view.

Chapter LXXXIII

that after the resurrection there will be no use of food or venery

From what has been said it follows that men after rising again will have no use of venery or food. When corruptible life is no more there will be an end of those things that minister to it. Now it is evident that the use of food ministers to the corruptible life: since the reason why we partake of food is to avoid the corruption that might result from the consumption of the natural humidity. Moreover in the present life food is necessary for growth; whereas after the resurrection men will not grow, since they will rise again of the size that is due to them, as we have already stated.1 Likewise the alliance of male with female administers to the corruptible life; for its purpose is generation, whereby that which cannot last for ever in the individual may be preserved in the species. Now we have shown2 that the life of those who rise again will be everlasting. Therefore after the resurrection there will be no use for food or venery.

Again. The life of those who will have risen again will not be less orderly than the present life: in fact, it will be more so, since they will obtain that life through the agency of God alone, whereas the present life is acquired through the co-operation of nature. Now in this life food is consumed for a certain purpose, namely that it may be transformed into the body by the process of digestion. Wherefore, if then there will be a use for food, it will be that it may be transformed into the body. Since then the body will suffer no dissolution, because it will be incorruptible, we shall have to admit that whatever a man will derive from nourishment will add to his size: and seeing that, as we have shown above,1 he will rise again in the size due to him, it follows that he will become of immoderate size: for that which is more than due is immoderate.

Further. Man after rising again will live for ever. Either then he will continue always to take food, or only for a certain time. If he continue always to take food, his growth will be according to a certain measure, since his food will have been transformed into his body, in which nothing will be dissolved: and consequently his body will grow indefinitely. But this is impossible, because growth is a natural movement: and a natural motive force never aims at the indefinite, but always at something definite. The reason is that as Aristotle says (2 De Anima, text. xli.). there is a limit to the size and increase of all things in nature. On the other hand if man who is to live for ever is not always to partake of food after the resurrection, there will be a time during which he will not partake of it: and so should he have done from the beginning. Therefore there will be no use for food after the resurrection.

And if he will have no use for food, neither will he have any use for venery, which requires emission of seed. Now after the resurrection there can be no emission of seed: neither from the substance of a man’s body, since this is incompatible with the nature of seed: for it would involve corruption and a subtraction from man’s nature, so that it could not be a principle of nature, as the Philosopher says (1 De Gener. Anim., xviii.). Another reason is because no resolution will be possible in the incorruptible bodies of those who rise again. Nor will it be possible for the seed to be the product of the surplus nourishment, since after the resurrection man will not partake of food, as we have shown. Therefore man will have no use for venery after the resurrection.

Again. The use of venery aims at generation. Consequently, if it be used after the resurrection, and to some purpose, it follows that men will be begotten then, even as now. Hence, there will be many, after the resurrection, who were not in existence before. And thus there will be no use in deferring the resurrection of the dead, that all who have the same nature may receive life together.

Moreover. If, after the resurrection, men will be begotten, either they too will die, or they will be incorruptible and immortal.—If they are to be incorruptible and immortal, many difficulties will result. In the first place, we shall have to say that those men will be born without original sin, seeing that the necessity of dying is the punishment resulting from original sin. And this is against the statement of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12) that by one man, sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men. Secondly, it follows that not all men need to be redeemed by Christ, if some are to be born without original sin and the necessity of dying. Thus Christ would not be the head of all; and this is contrary to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:22) that as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive. There is also yet another incongruity, in that men having like generation should have different terms of generation: since men begotten of seed now acquire a corruptible life, whereas then they will acquire an immortal life.—On the other hand if the men to be born then, are to be corruptible and die:—either they will not rise again, and, in consequence, their souls will remain for ever separated from their bodies: and this is unreasonable, seeing that they are of the same species as the souls of those who rise again:—or they will rise again, and then the others should wait for them, so that all who share in the same nature may, at the same time, receive the benefit of resurrection, which belongs to the reparation of nature, as stated above.1 Moreover there would, seemingly, be no reason for some to wait until they rise together, if all do not wait alike.

Moreover. If after the resurrection men are to have sexual intercourse and beget, this will either be for always, or only for a time. If it is to go on for ever, men will increase in numbers indefinitely. Now after the resurrection the intention of nature in the begetter can be for no other end but the increase in numbers: for it cannot be for the preservation of the species by means of generation, seeing that man’s life will be incorruptible. Consequently the intention of nature in the begetter will be for something indefinite: and this is impossible. On the other hand if they are not to go on for ever begetting, but only for a certain time; then after that time they will no longer beget: and so we ought to say that neither will they from the beginning have sexual intercourse and beget.

Someone, however, might say that there will be use for food and sexual intercourse, not for the preservation and increase of the body, nor for the preservation of the species and the increase of mankind, but merely for the pleasure accompanying those acts, lest in the final reward something should be lacking to man’s enjoyment.

But there are many ways of showing that such a statement is devoid of reason:—First, because, as we have already observed, life after the resurrection will be better ordered than the present life, as stated above. Now, in this life it is inordinate and sinful to make use of food or venery for mere pleasure, and not for the purpose of supporting the body, and begetting children. And there is reason in this: since the pleasure attaching to these actions is not their end; but contrariwise, nature has made them pleasant, lest man should not take the trouble to perform acts that are necessary to nature; and that might happen unless the pleasure urged him. Consequently to do these things with the sole object of pleasure is altogether out of order and unbecoming. Therefore this cannot be said of those who will rise again, whose life will be most orderly.

Again. The life of those who rise again will have perfect beatitude for its object: and man’s perfect happiness does not consist in pleasures of the body, such as those that are derived from food and sexual intercourse, as we proved.1 Therefore we must not ascribe such pleasures to life after the resurrection.

Moreover. Acts of virtue are directed to happiness as their end. Therefore, if the state of future bliss includes the pleasures of the table and sexual intercourse, as pertaining to happiness, it would follow that those who act virtuously, must in some way include those pleasures in their intention. But this would exclude temperance, since it is inconsistent with that virtue to abstain from pleasures now, in order the more to enjoy them hereafter: every chaste man would be a rake, and every abstainer a glutton. If however the said pleasures are to be present in the state of bliss, but not as belonging thereto, so that those who act virtuously would not have to intend them; this is impossible, because whatsoever is at all, is either for the sake of something else, or for its own sake. Now the said pleasures will not be for the sake of something else, since they will not be for the sake of actions directed to nature’s end, as we have already shown. Consequently they will be for their own sake. But all such things are either happiness itself, or part of it. Hence, if those pleasures are to be present in the life of those who rise again, they will form part of their happiness: and we have proved this to be impossible. Therefore in no sense will those pleasures have any place in the life to come.

Further. It seems ridiculous to seek pleasures of the body, that are common to us and dumb animals, in a place where the highest pleasures are to be found consisting in the vision of God, which we shall have in common with the angels, as stated above;

Chapter LXXXIV

that the bodies of those who rise again will have the same nature as before

The preceding matter gave some an occasion for erring about the condition of those who rise again. Seeing that a body composed of contrary elements is seemingly of necessity subject to corruption, some have maintained that the bodies of those who rise again will not be composed of contrary elements. Of these, some held that our bodies will not rise again with a corporeal nature, but will be transformed into spirits: and they were induced to hold this view by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:44), It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body. Others, moved by the same text, asserted that our bodies, in the resurrection, will be rarefied, like air and wind: for the air is called spiritus, so that the spiritual body would mean an air-like body. Others again said that in the resurrection our souls will resume, not earthly, but heavenly bodies: and they were brought to hold this view, by the words of the Apostle speaking of the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:40), And there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial. And all these would seem to find a support in the words of the Apostle (ibid. 50), Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God: so that, seemingly, the bodies of those who rise again will not contain flesh and blood, nor consequently any other humours. These views, however, are manifestly erroneous.

For our resurrection will be in conformity with Christ’s, according to the Apostle (Philip, 3:21), Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory. Now, after His resurrection, Christ had a palpable body, consisting of flesh and bone: since as it is related, He said to His disciples after the Resurrection (Luke 24:39): Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have. Therefore other men, also, when they rise again, will have palpable bodies, consisting of flesh and bone.

Again. The soul is united to the body as form to matter. Now every form has its definite matter, since act must be proportionate to potentiality. Since then the soul will be of the same species, seemingly it will have the same specific matter. Therefore the body will be the same specifically after the resurrection as before: so that it will consist of flesh and bone and other like parts.

Further. Since the definition of natural things, which signifies the specific essence, includes matter, it would seem to follow that a specific change of matter must involve a specific change of the natural thing. Now man is a natural thing. Accordingly if, after the resurrection, he will not have, as now, a body consisting of flesh and bone and like parts, those that rise again will not be of the same species as now, and they will be called men but equivocally.

Again. The soul of one man is more distant from a body of another species, than from the body of another man. Now the soul cannot be united to the body of another man, as we have proved.1 Much less then can it be united, in the resurrection, to a body of another species.

Further. For a man to be the selfsame when he rises again, his essential parts must be the selfsame. If then, his body will not consist of flesh and bone when he rises from the dead, he will not be the very same man.

Job most clearly rejects all these false opinions when he says (19:26, 27): I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God, whom I myself shall see … and not another.

Moreover, each of the above opinions is objectionable in its own way.

It is quite impossible for a body to be transformed into a spirit. For things which are transformable into each other must have common matter: and there can be no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things, since the former are utterly immaterial, as we have proved.1 Therefore the human body cannot be changed into a spiritual substance.

Again. If the human body be changed into a spiritual substance, it will either be transformed into the spiritual substance of the soul, or into some other. If it be changed into the former, then after the resurrection there will be nothing in man besides his soul, even as before the resurrection: and consequently his condition will not be altered in the resurrection. And if it be transformed into another spiritual substance, it would follow that two spiritual substances would combine to form one thing in nature: and this is altogether impossible, since every spiritual substance is self-subsistent.

It is likewise impossible for the body of the man who rises again to be akin to air or wind. For the body of a man, or of any animal, must have definite configuration, both in the whole and in its parts. And a body with a definite figure must be terminable: since a figure is that which is comprised within its term or terms: whereas air is not of itself terminable, but is confined by the terms of something else. Therefore the body of a man, in the resurrection, cannot be akin to air or wind.

Further. The body of the man who rises again must have the sense of touch: since no animal is without it; and when he rises again he must needs be an animal, if he is to be a man. Now, an air-like body cannot have the sense of touch, nor indeed can any simple body, since a body that is perceptive of contact needs to be in the mean of tangible qualities, so as to be in potentiality to them, as the Philosopher states (2 De Anima, text. ci.). Therefore the body of a man who rises again cannot be akin to air or wind.

Hence neither can it be a celestial body. For the body of a man or of any animal, must be susceptible to tangible qualities, as we have just stated. Now this is incompatible with a celestial body, which is neither hot, nor cold, nor damp, nor dry, nor anything else of the kind, either actually or potentially, as is proved in 1 De Cœlo. Therefore man’s body, in the resurrection, will not be a celestial body.

Again. The celestial bodies are incorruptible, and consequently cannot be changed from their natural disposition: and they are naturally spherical in figure (1 De Cœlo et Mundo). Therefore they cannot be given the figure which is naturally due to the human body. Consequently the bodies of those who rise again cannot possibly have the nature of celestial bodies.

Chapter LXXXV

that the bodies of those who rise again will have a different disposition from that which they had before

Although the bodies of those who rise again will be of the same species as our bodies are now, they will be of a different disposition. In the first place in the resurrection the bodies of all men, both good and wicked, will be incorruptible. There are three reasons for this.

The first is taken from the end of the resurrection. Both good and bad will rise again, in order that they may, in their own bodies, receive the reward or punishment due to the works they performed while yet they lived in the body. Now the reward of the good, namely beatitude, will be everlasting: likewise eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Both these points have been proved.1 Therefore, in both cases, must they receive an incorruptible body.

Another reason may be found in the formal cause of those who rise again, namely the soul. We have already said2 that the soul will resume its body at the resurrection, lest it should remain for ever separated from it. Since then the body is restored to the soul for the sake of the soul’s perfection, it is becoming that the body should be disposed in a manner suitable to the soul. Hence, seeing that the soul is incorruptible, an incorruptible body will be restored to it.

The third reason may be taken from the active cause of the resurrection. God will restore to life bodies already corrupt, wherefore a fortiori will he be able to preserve for ever the life which he will restore to those bodies. Thus, when he so willed, he guarded from corruption even corruptible bodies, for example the bodies of the three children in the fiery furnace.

Accordingly, the incorruptibility of the life to come is to be understood in the sense that the body which is now corruptible will, by divine power, be made incorruptible, in that the soul in giving life to the body will exercise perfect dominion over it, nor will anything be able to hinder the soul in this life-giving effect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:53): This corruptible must put on incorruption: and this mortal must put on immortality. Consequently man will rise immortal, not through resuming another and an incorruptible body, as the aforesaid opinions maintained, but because that which is corruptible now will be rendered incorruptible. Wherefore we are to understand the saying of the Apostle (ibid. 50), Flesh and blood cannot possess the Kingdom of God, in the sense that in the life after the resurrection there will be no corruption of flesh and blood, but that these things will remain in substance: wherefore he adds, Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.

Chapter LXXXVI

the quality of glorified bodies

Although, by the merits of Christ, the defect of nature will be taken away from all, both good and bad, in the resurrection, there will still be a difference between good and bad, as regards things that belong to them personally. Now it pertains to nature that the human soul is the body’s form, quickening and preserving it in being: but it is by personal deeds that the soul merits to be raised to the glory of the beatific vision, or to be excluded from this glory on account of sin. Accordingly, the bodies of all without exception will be disposed in a manner becoming the soul, so that the incorruptible form will impart its incorruptible being to the body, notwithstanding the latter’s formation from contrary elements; because by the divine power the matter of the human body will be altogether subject to the soul in that respect: besides which, on account of the glory and power of the soul, when raised to the vision of God, the body united to it will acquire something more. For the divine power will have the effect of making the body wholly subject to the soul, not only in its being, but also in its actions, and passions, and movements, and bodily qualities.

Accordingly, just as the soul that enjoys the sight of God will be filled with spiritual brightness, so by a kind of overflow from the soul to the body, the latter will be, in its own way, clothed with the brightness of glory. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:18): It is sown, namely the body, in dishonour, it shall rise in glory: because now this body of ours is impervious to light, whereas then it will be full of light, according to Matth. 13:43, Then shall the just shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father.

Again, the soul which, united to its last end, will enjoy the sight of God, will find its every desire fulfilled: and since the body moves in obedience to the soul’s desire, the result will be that the body’s movements will be in perfect obedience to the spirit. Hence the bodies of the blessed, after the resurrection, will be agile: and this is indicated by the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:43): It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power. For we feel the body’s weakness, when we find it unable to satisfy the soul’s desire, in the movements and actions commanded by the soul. This weakness will then be wholly removed, because the body will receive an overflow of power from the soul united to God: wherefore again is it said of the just (Wis. 3:7) that they shall run to and fro, like sparks among the reeds. Their movements, however, will not be occasioned by need, since those who possess God need nothing, but they will be exhibitions of power.

Moreover, just as the soul that enjoys God will have its desire fulfilled, through having obtained possession of all good, so also will its desire be fulfilled as to the removal of all evil, since there can be no evil where the sovereign good is. Accordingly, the body that is perfected by that soul will, in conformity with it, be free from all evil, both in act and in potentiality. In act, since in it there will be neither corruption, nor deformity, nor defect of any kind: in potentiality, because nothing will be able to do it any harm; so that it will be impassible. This impassibility, however, does not imply insensibility: for they will use their senses for such pleasures as are not incompatible with a state of incorruption. The Apostle indicates this state of impassibility, when he says (1 Cor. 15:42): It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.

Again. The soul that enjoys God will adhere to Him most completely, and will participate in His goodness in the highest degree possible that is consistent with its mode of being. Wherefore both the body will be perfectly subject to the soul, and it will share in the soul’s properties, as far as possible, in acuteness of sense, in the orderliness of the bodily appetite, and in the superlative perfection of its nature. For a thing is so much the more perfect in nature, as its matter is more completely subject to its form. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:44): It is sown a natural (animal) body; it shall rise a spiritual body. In the resurrection, the body will be spiritual, not that it will be a spirit, as some wrongly understood (whether spirit mean a spiritual substance, or air or wind), but because it will be completely subject to the spirit. Even so, we speak of the animal body, not that it is an animal, but because it is subject to animal passions, and needs food.

From the foregoing it follows that just as man’s soul will be raised to the glory of the heavenly spirits, by seeing God in His essence, as above stated,1 so will his body be uplifted to the properties of the heavenly bodies, in brightness, impassibility, easy and unwearying movement, and in being perfected by its most perfect form. This is what the Apostle meant when he said that man will rise again with a celestial body, celestial indeed not in nature, but in glory. Hence, after saying that there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial, he adds that one is the glory of the celestial, and another the glory of the terrestrial (1 Cor. 15:40). And just as the glory to which the human soul is uplifted surpasses the natural power of the heavenly spirits, as we have proved,2 so does the glory of risen bodies surpass the natural perfection of heavenly bodies in greater brightness, more changeless impassibility, and more perfect agility and dignity of nature.

Chapter LXXXVII

the place of the glorified bodies

Since a place should be proportionate to that which is in it, it follows that, as the bodies of those who rise again acquire the properties of heavenly bodies, they have a place in heaven also, or rather above all the heavens, in order that they may be together with Christ, by whose power they will be brought to that glory; and of whom the Apostle says (Eph. 4:10) that he ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things.

It seems stupid to argue against this divine promise, from the natural position of the elements, as though it were impossible for the human body to be raised above the lighter elements, in that it is made of earth, and by nature should occupy the lowest place. For it is evident that, owing to the soul’s power, the body, perfected by the soul, does not follow the inclinations of the elements. Even in this life the soul, by its power, holds the body together, lest it be dissolved through being composed of contrary elements: and again by the motive power of the soul, the body is moved upwards, and so much the more as the motive power is stronger. Now it is evident that the soul’s power will be perfect, when it is united by vision to God. Therefore it should not seem difficult for the body, by the power of the soul, to be preserved from all corruption, and to be raised above all other bodies. Nor is this divine promise proved to be impossible by the fact that the heavenly bodies are unbreakable,1 and prevent the glorified bodies from being raised above them; because the divine power will enable the glorified body to be in the same place as a heavenly body. We have already an indication of this in Christ’s body which came in to the disciples, the doors being closed.

Chapter LXXXVIII

the sex and age of those who will rise again

We must not deem, however, as some have done, that the female sex will be lacking in the bodies of those who rise again. Since defects of nature are to be repaired in the resurrection, the bodies of those who will rise from the dead will lack none of the things that belong to the perfection of nature. Now, just as other members of the body belong to the integrity of the human body, so do those that serve the purpose of generation, both in man and in woman. Therefore bodies will rise again with these members.

Nor is this obviated by the fact that there will be no use for these members, as we have proved:2 for if that were a sufficient reason for dispensing with those members, the members that are used for taking nourishment would equally be absent in those who will rise again, since neither will there be any use for food after the resurrection: and thus a considerable number of members would be lacking in the bodies of those who will rise from the dead.

Wherefore none of those members will be lacking, although they will not have their use; yet not without purpose, since they will serve to restore the integrity of the human body. Nor does the weakness of the female sex prejudice the perfection of those who will rise again, because that is not a weakness in default of nature, but intended by nature. Moreover this very distinction in nature by extending to all things, will serve as a proof of nature’s perfection, and as an indication of divine wisdom disposing all things in order.

Nor need we be moved to think otherwise, by the words of the Apostle (Eph. 4:13), Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of age of the fulness of Christ. This does not mean that at this meeting, when those who will rise from the dead shall go into the air, to meet Christ, each one will belong to the male sex; but is intended to indicate the perfection and power of the Church. The whole Church will be like a perfect man going forth to meet Christ, as is clear from what we have been saying, and from what we have yet to say.

All will rise again at the age of Christ, which is the age of youth, because it is only at that age that nature is perfect: for the child has not yet grown so as to have reached the perfection of nature, and old age has overpassed it through decay.

Chapter LXXXIX

the quality of the bodies in the resurrection as regards the damned

We have now sufficient to go on, to realize what will be in the resurrection the condition of the bodies of the damned. For those bodies will needs be proportionate to the souls of those about to be condemned. Now the souls of the wicked have a good nature, since it was created by God; but their will is disordered, and turned away from its proper end. Wherefore their bodies, in whatever belongs to their nature, will be restored to integrity, since they will rise again of a perfect age, without any diminution of members, and without any defect or corruption, occasioned by the erring or weakness of nature. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:52): The dead shall rise again incorruptible, which evidently refers to all, both good and wicked, as the context shows. Since however their souls will be, as to the will, turned away from God and deprived of their proper end, their bodies will not be spiritual, and altogether subject to the spirit, but will be carnal in their affections. Nor will their bodies be agile, as obeying the soul without difficulty, but will be heavy and unwieldy: and, in a way, they will be insupportable to their souls, even as their souls will be averted from God by disobedience. They will also remain passible as now, or even more so; and yet while being afflicted by sensible things, they will not be corrupted, even as their souls will be tormented by the utterly frustrated desire for happiness. Moreover their bodies will be impervious to light, and darksome; even as their souls will be strangers to the light of divine knowledge. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:51): We shall all indeed rise again; but we shall not all be changed: because the good alone will be changed unto glory; whereas the bodies of the wicked will rise again without glory.

Someone might deem it impossible for the bodies of the wicked to be passible without being also corruptible: since excess of passion causes loss of substance:1 thus if a body remain long in the fire, it is at length consumed; and if pain be too intense, the soul quits the body.

But all this postulates the changeableness of matter from one form to another: whereas, after the resurrection, the human body both of good and wicked will not be changeable from one form to another, since in both cases it will be completely perfected in its natural being by the soul. Wherefore it will no longer be possible for this form to be removed from this body, and for another form to take its place, because the divine power will completely subject the body to the soul. Hence the potentiality of primal matter to all forms will remain in the human body, restrained, as it were, by the power of the soul from the possibility of being actuated by another form. Since however the bodies of the damned in respect of certain conditions, will not be wholly subject to their souls, they will suffer pain from the antagonism of sensible objects: for they will suffer from the material fire, in as much as the quality of fire, by reason of its predominance, counteracts the equilibrium of the humours and the mutual adjustment that are connatural to the senses, although it cannot destroy them altogether. And yet this pain will be unable to separate the soul from the body, because the body is under the necessity of remaining for ever under the same form.

Moreover, just as the bodies of the blessed, through being renewed unto glory, will be raised above the heavenly bodies, so in due proportion, the bodies of the damned will be consigned to the nether regions, a place of darkness and torment. Hence it is said (Ps. 54:16): Let death come upon them, and let them go down alive into hell: and (Apoc. 20:9, 10): The devil who seduced them, was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beast and the false prophet shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.

Chapter XC

how incorporeal substances can suffer from a material fire

A doubt may arise as to how the devil, who is incorporeal, and, before the resurrection, the souls of the damned, can suffer from the material fire, which, according to our Lord’s words (Matth. 25:41), will torment the souls of the damned in hell. For He said: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.

We must not think that incorporeal substances can be affected by a material fire, so that their nature be corrupted or altered, or in any way changed by the fire, in the same way as our corruptible bodies are affected by fire. For incorporeal substances have not a material nature, so as to be able to be changed by material substances. Nor are they receptive of the forms of sensible objects, except by understanding them: and such a reception is not penal, but perfecting and pleasure-giving. Nor can it be said that they suffer from the material fire, by reason of a certain antagonism, as bodies will after the resurrection: since incorporeal substances have no organs of sense, and have no use for sensitive powers. Accordingly, incorporeal substances suffer from the material fire by being coupled with it in some way. For a spirit can be coupled with a body either as its form;—thus the soul is coupled with the body to give it life:—or without being its form; thus necromancers, by the power of the demons, couple spirits with apparitions and the like. A fortiori, therefore, can the divine power bind the souls of the damned to a material fire: and thus it is painful to them to know themselves to be united to the lowest things as a punishment.

Moreover it is reasonable that the souls of the damned be punished with material pain.

Every sin of the rational creature results from disobedience to God. Now the punishment should correspond with the fault, so that the will may receive a punishment in contrast with that for love of which it sinned. Therefore it is reasonable that the rational nature should be punished for its sin, by being in a way bound to things beneath it, and thus made subject to them.

Again. Sin that is committed against God, deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense, as we have proved.1 For the pain of sense corresponds to sin with respect to the inordinate conversion to a mutable good, even as the pain of loss corresponds to sin, as regards the aversion from the immutable good. Now the rational creature, and especially the human soul, sins by turning inordinately to material things. Therefore it is fitting for it to be punished by means of material things.

Further. If sin deserves the painful punishment which is called the pain of sense, as proved above,1 this punishment must come from something that can cause pain. Now nothing causes pain except in so far as it is contrary to the will. And it is not contrary to the natural will of the rational creature, to be united to a spiritual substance; on the contrary it gives it pleasure and conduces to its perfection. For it is the union of like to like, and of the intelligible object to the intelligence: since every spiritual substance is, in itself, intelligible. On the other hand it is contrary to the natural will of a spiritual substance, that it be subject to a body, from which, according to the order of its nature, it should be free. Therefore it is fitting that a spiritual substance should be punished by means of material things.

Hence it follows that, although the material things spoken of by Scripture to describe the rewards of the blessed, are to be understood in a spiritual sense, as we have stated in regard to the promise of meat and drink, nevertheless some of the corporal punishments with which Scripture threatens the sinner are to be understood in the material and strict sense. For it is not fitting for the higher nature to be rewarded by using a lower nature, but by being united to a yet higher nature: whereas it is fitting for it to be punished by being consigned to the society of things beneath it. However this does not forbid our giving a spiritual and metaphorical interpretation to certain material expressions of Scripture in reference to the punishments of the damned. For instance, it is said (Isa. 66:24): Their worm shall not die: since by the worm we may understand the remorse of conscience, with which also the wicked will be tortured: for a material worm can eat neither into a spiritual substance, nor into the bodies of the damned, which will be incorruptible. Again, weeping and gnashing of teeth cannot be ascribed, save metaphorically, to spiritual substances; although they can be applied in the material sense to the bodies of the damned after the resurrection. By weeping however we must not understand the shedding of tears, since nothing will be resolved from those bodies; but this signifies the constriction of the heart, the convulsion of the eyes and brow, which are associated with weeping.

Chapter XCI

that the soul will receive its punishment or reward, as soon as it departs from the body

From what we have said, it may be gathered that immediately after death, the souls of men are punished or rewarded according to their merits.

The separated soul is susceptible to pain both spiritual and bodily, as we have proved.1 It is also clear from what was said in the Third Book2 that it is capable of being glorified: because as soon as the soul departs from the body, it is capable of seeing God, which it could not do, so long as it was united to a corruptible body: and man’s ultimate happiness, which is the reward of virtue, consists in seeing God. Now there is no reason for deferring a punishment or reward, after the moment in which the soul is capable of receiving them. Therefore, as soon as the soul departs from the body, it receives its punishment or reward, for those things which it did while yet in the body.

Again. This life is the time for merit or demerit: wherefore it is compared to military or domestic service: thus it is said (Job 7:1): The life of man upon earth is a warfare, and his days are like the days of a hireling. Now reward or punishment is due to those who have served well or ill, as soon as their service is ended: wherefore it is said (Levit. 19:13): The wages of him that hath been hired by thee, shall not abide with thee until the morning: and the Lord said (Joel 3:4): I will very soon return you a recompense upon your own head. Therefore the soul will receive its reward or punishment immediately after death.

Again. The order in punishment and reward should correspond to the order in fault and merit. Now merit and fault are not ascribed to the body except through the soul: since nothing is deserving of praise or blame, except in so far as it is voluntary. Consequently both reward and punishment are awarded to the body through the soul: and not to the soul on account of the body. Hence there is no reason why the punishment or reward of the soul should await its reunion with the body: indeed it would seem more fitting that the soul which was the first to be the subject of sin or merit, should be the first to be punished or rewarded.

Moreover. By the same divine providence rewards and punishments are due to the rational creature, as natural things are provided with the perfections due to them. Now natural things receive at once each one the perfection of which it is capable, unless there be an obstacle, either on the part of the recipient, or on the part of the agent. Since then the soul as soon as it departs from the body, is capable of receiving either glory or punishment: it follows that the reward of the good, and the punishment of the wicked, are not delayed until the reunion of soul and body.

We must observe, however, with regard to the good, that there may be something to prevent their souls from receiving, as soon as they are separated from the body, their ultimate reward, consisting in the vision of God. The rational creature cannot be raised to that vision, unless it be wholly purified, since that vision surpasses the entire natural faculty of the creature. Hence it is said (Wis. 7:25) of wisdom, that no defiled thing cometh into her, and (Isa. 35:8): The unclean shall not pass over it. Now the soul is defiled by sin, whereby it adheres inordinately to things beneath it: and in this life it is cleansed from this defilement by Penance and the other sacraments, as stated above.1 Sometimes, however, it happens that this cleansing is not entirely completed in this life, but the soul still owes a debt of punishment, through either neglect, or occupations, or because it has been surprised by death. Nevertheless, it does not for this reason deserve to be wholly deprived of its reward, since these things may happen without mortal sin, which alone takes away charity, to which the reward of eternal life is due, as we have stated in the Third Book.2 Consequently, after this life, that soul will need to be cleansed before it can receive its final reward. Now this cleansing is effected by means of punishment, even as in this life the soul might have been cleansed by satisfactory punishment: otherwise the negligent would be better off than the prudent, if in the next life they were not to suffer for their sins the punishment they failed to undergo in this life. Therefore the souls of the just, who have something that could have been cleansed in this world, are debarred from receiving their reward, until they have suffered a purgatorial punishment: and this is why we hold that there is a Purgatory.

We are justified in this statement by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:15), If any man’s work burn he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. This is confirmed by the universal custom of the Church in praying for the dead: since such prayers would be useless if there were no Purgatory after death. For the Church prays not for those who are already in the final term of a good or evil life, but for those who have not yet reached it.

That the soul receives its pain or punishment immediately after death, provided there be no obstacle, is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. Of the wicked it is said (Job 21:13): They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment they go down to hell: and (Luke 16:22): The rich man also died; and he was buried in hell: for hell is the place where souls are punished. The same is clear with regard to the just: thus according to Luke 23:43, our Lord, while hanging on the cross, said to the thief: This day shalt thou be with me in paradise: and by paradise is meant the reward that is promised to the just, according to Apoc. 2:7, To him that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the paradise of my God.

Some say however that paradise does not mean the final reward that will be in heaven, according to Matth. 5:12, Be glad and rejoice for your reward is very great in heaven, but an earthly reward, because paradise would seem to indicate a place on earth, on account of its being said (Gen. 2:8) that the Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning: wherein he placed man whom he had formed.

Nevertheless, if we consider the words of Holy Scripture, we shall find that the final reward which is promised in heaven to the saints, is bestowed immediately after this life. For the Apostle after speaking of the final glory says (2 Cor. 4:17, 18): That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly, an eternal weight of glory. While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal: but the things which are not seen are eternal: where he evidently is speaking of the final glory which is in heaven. Then, in order to show when and how this glory is to be bestowed, he adds (ibid. 5:1): For we know, if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in heaven. This evidently means that, the body being delivered to corruption, the soul is taken into the eternal and heavenly mansion, which is no less than the enjoyment of the Godhead, together with the angels in heaven.

And if someone choose to contradict this by maintaining that the Apostle did not say that, as soon as the body is given over to dissolution, we are to have an eternal dwelling in heaven in reality, but only in hope, and that at length we are to have it in reality, it is clear that this is contrary to the meaning of the Apostle. For even while we live here below, we are to have a heavenly habitation, according to divine predestination, so that we have it already in hope, according to Rom. 8:24, For we are saved by hope. Consequenty, there would be no purpose in his adding, If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, since it would have sufficed him to say, We know that we have a building of God, etc. This is made clearer still by what he says further on (8:6–8), Knowing that while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. (For we walk by faith and not by sight.) But we are confident, and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Now there would be no use in our desiring to be absent, that is separated, from the body, unless we were to be at once present with the Lord. But we are not present, unless He is present to our sight: since as long as we walk by faith and not by sight, we are absent from the Lord (ibid.). Therefore as soon as the soul of the just man is separated from the body, it sees God; and this is final beatitude, as we have proved in the Third Book.1 The same conclusion is proved by the words of the same Apostle (Philip. 1:23), Having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ. Now Christ is in heaven; and therefore the Apostle desired to go to heaven as soon as his body was dissolved.

This disposes of the error of certain Greeks who deny Purgatory and say that souls, before the resurrection of the bodies, neither ascend into heaven nor are cast into hell.

Chapter XCII

that immediately after death the souls of the just have their will fixed unchangeably on the good

It follows from what we have said that the soul, as soon as it is separated from the body, becomes unchangeable in its will, so that it can no more be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good.

As long as the soul can be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in a state of conflict and warfare: since it needs either to be watchful in resisting evil lest it be overcome by it, or to strive to be delivered from it. As soon, however, as it is separated from the body, it will no longer be in a state of warfare or conflict, but of receiving the reward or punishment according as it has striven rightly or wrongly: for it has been proved1 that it will receive its reward or punishment at once. Therefore the soul will no longer have a changeable will as regards good and evil.

Again. It has been proved2 that happiness, consisting in the vision of God, is everlasting. It has also been proved3 that eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Now the soul cannot be happy, if its will be not right; for it ceases to be right through being turned away from its end, and it is right by enjoying its end: and it cannot be turned away from it and enjoy it at the same time. Therefore the rectitude of the will in the beatified soul must needs be everlasting, and cannot turn away from good to evil.

Further. The rational creature naturally desires to be happy. Hence it cannot desire not to be happy: and yet it can, by its will, turn from that in which true happiness consists, and then its will is perverse. The reason for this is because instead of apprehending that in which true happiness consists, as being happiness, it takes for happiness something else, to which the disordered will turns as though that thing were its end. Thus, for instance, the man who places his end in bodily pleasures, takes them to be the best thing: and this is what is meant by happiness. On the other hand the blessed apprehend that in which true beatitude consists, as being their happiness and last end: otherwise their appetite would not rest therein, and they would not be truly happy. Therefore whosoever is in the state of heavenly bliss cannot turn his will away from that in which is true happiness. Consequently his will cannot be perverse.

Again. Whosoever has sufficient for himself seeks for nothing else. Now that in which true happiness consists is enough for each of the blessed: otherwise his desire would not be fulfilled. Therefore every one of the blessed seeks nothing that does not pertain to that in which true happiness consists. But no one has a perverse will, unless he desire something incompatible with that in which true happiness consists. Therefore the will of the blessed cannot be changed to evil.

Further. There is no sin in the will without ignorance in the intellect: for we will nothing but what is either really good or seemingly good: wherefore it is said (Prov. 14:22): They err, that work evil; and the Philosopher declares (3 Ethic. iii.) that every wicked man is ignorant. But the truly beatified soul cannot be ignorant: since, in God, it sees whatever pertains to its own perfection: and consequently by no means can it have an evil will, especially seeing that the beatific vision is always actual, as we proved in the Third Book.1

Moreover. Our intellect can err about conclusions, before tracing them back to first principles: but when this has been done its knowledge of the conclusion is scientific, and in such knowledge error is impossible. Now, as the principle of demonstration is in speculative matters, so is the end in matters relating to the appetite. Wherefore, as long as our will has not obtained its last end, it can be perverse, but not after it has attained to the enjoyment of the last end, which is desirable for itself, even as the first principles of demonstration are evident in themselves.

Again. The good, as such, is lovable: wherefore that which is apprehended as supremely good is most lovable. Now the beatified rational substance, in seeing God, apprehends him as supremely good: therefore it loves God above all things. Moreover, it is a part of love that those who love each other should be of one will. Therefore the will of the blessed is perfectly conformed to God, since the divine will is the supreme rule of all wills: and consequently the will of those who see God cannot be perverse.

Further. As long as a thing can acquire something else it has not reached its final end. Wherefore, if a beatified soul can be changed from good to evil, it has not reached its ultimate end: and this is inconsistent with beatitude. Consequently the soul that is beatified immediately after death, becomes unchangeable in its will.

Chapter XCIII

that the souls of the wicked after death have their will fixed unchangeably on evil

In like manner the souls which, immediately after death, are punished by being deprived of happiness, become unchangeable in their will.

It has been proved1 that, for mortal sin, the soul is condemned to eternal punishment. But this punishment of the soul would not be everlasting if its will could be changed for the better: since it would be unjust if its punishment continued after its will is good. Therefore the will of a lost soul cannot turn towards the good.

Further. The very disorder of the will is a punishment, and is most painful: since when a man has a disordered will, good deeds are displeasing to him: and the damned will be distressed to see in all things the fulfilment of God’s will, which by sinning they had resisted. Therefore they will never lose their disordered will.

Again. The will does not turn from sin to goodness except by God’s grace, as we have proved.1 Now, whereas the souls of the just are admitted to perfect participation in the divine goodness, the souls of the damned are utterly excluded from grace. Therefore the lost souls are unable to change their will for the better.

Again. Whereas the just, whilst in the flesh, look to God as the end of all their deeds and desires, the wicked look to an unlawful end which turns them away from God. Now the separated souls of the just will adhere unchangeably to God as the end to which they looked in this life. Therefore the souls of the wicked will adhere unchangeably to the end which they have chosen for themselves. Hence, as the will of the just will be unchangeable to evil, so the will of the wicked will be unchangeable to the good.

Chapter XCIV

the unchangeableness of will of the souls in purgatory

However, some souls do not attain beatitude as soon as they depart, and yet are not damned. Such are those who depart with something that needs to be cleansed, as stated above.2 We must prove then that neither do these souls admit of a change in their will, after they have been separated from the body.

We have shown3 that both blessed and damned have an unchangeable will, as regards the end to which they adhered. Now the souls that finally depart with something that needs to be cleansed, differ not from the souls of the blessed, in that they depart in charity, whereby we adhere to God as our end. Therefore they also have an unchangeable will.

Chapter XCV

the common cause of this unchangeableness in all souls after their departure from the body

This unchangeableness of the will in all souls after their departure from the body is to be traced to the end as its cause.

This may be proved as follows. As already stated1 the end is, in matters of appetite, what the first principles of demonstration are in speculative matters. These principles are known naturally, and any error that may occur about such principles must be traced to some corruption in nature. Hence a man who understands these principles aright cannot come to understand them wrongly, or vice versa, unless his nature be changed. For one who errs about those principles cannot be set right by more certain principles as would be possible if he erred about some conclusion. Nor is it possible for one who grasps these principles aright, to be led astray by anything more certain. The same applies to the end: since everyone naturally desires the ultimate end; and in consequence the rational nature desires happiness in general. But that it desire this or that thing as happiness and its last end, depends on some special condition of nature; hence the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. viii.) that such as a man is, such does he deem his end to be. Accordingly if this disposition which makes a man desire a certain thing as his last end, cannot be removed from him, his will cannot be changed from its desire for that end. Now these dispositions can be removed from us so long as the soul is united to the body. The desire for something as our last end, is occasioned sometimes through our being disposed thereto by a passion, which is of short duration: wherefore our desire for that end is easily removed: and this is especially evident in contingent matters. And sometimes we are disposed to desire something as an end, good or evil, by a habit. But this disposition is not easily removed: and consequently such a desire for an end has a firmer hold on us: and of this we have an example in the temperate. Nevertheless an habitual disposition can be removed in this life.

It is evident then that as long as the disposition remains that causes the desire for a certain thing as the ultimate end, the desire for that end cannot be removed; because the ultimate end is desired above all; so that one cannot be turned back from the desire for the ultimate end, by something more desirable. Now, so long as the soul is united to the body, it is in a changeable state; but not after its separation from the body. For a disposition of the soul is accidentally subject to change in accordance with some change in the body: because, since the body serves the soul in the soul’s proper operations, it is natural that while the soul is in the body, it should be perfected by being moved to perfection. Hence, when it departs from the body, it will no longer be in a state of mobility towards the end, but of quiescence in the end. Consequently the will, as regards the desire for the ultimate end, will be immovable. Now the goodness or badness of the will depends entirely on the ultimate end, since whatsoever goods a man desires in relation to a good end, he desires well, and whatsoever he desires in relation to a bad end, he desires ill. Therefore the will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from the desire for one thing to the desire for another, provided the order to the ultimate end be observed.

Hence it is evident that this immobility of the will is not inconsistent with free-will, the act of which is to choose: since we choose things that are directed to the end, but not the ultimate end itself. Therefore, just as it is not inconsistent with free-will that we desire happiness and shun unhappiness, in general, with an unchangeable will, so will it not be incompatible with free-will that the will be fixed immovably on a particular object as its last end. For, just as now our common nature adheres to us unchangeably, whereby we desire happiness in general, so too that special disposition whereby we desire this or that as our last end, will remain in us unchangeably. Now the separate substances, that is the angels, as regards the nature wherein they were created, are nearer to ultimate perfection than souls: because they do not need to gain knowledge through senses, nor to reach conclusions by arguing from principles as souls do; but reach the contemplation of truth at once through the ideas implanted in them. Consequently, as soon as they adhere to an end, due or undue, they abide therein immovably.

It must not be imagined that the soul ceases to have an immovable will, after being reunited to the body. On the contrary, it will remain thus, because as we have already said,1 at the resurrection, the body will be disposed according to the exigencies of the soul, and the soul will not be influenced by the body, but will remain unchangeable.

Chapter XCVI

the last judgement

We gather from what has been said that a twofold award is assigned to men’s deeds in this life: one with respect to the soul is received as soon as the soul departs from the body: the other will be when the soul returns to the body, and some will return to an impassible and glorious body, some to a passible and base body.

The first award is made to each one separately, in as much as each one dies separately; but the second award will be made to all at the same time, in as much as all will rise together. Now there must needs be a judgement whenever different awards are made according to difference of merits. Consequently there must be a twofold judgement: one in which each soul receives separately its reward or punishment; while the other is a general judgement, when all at the same time will receive as to soul and body, the award due to their merits. And since Christ in His human nature, by His Passion and Resurrection, merited for us resurrection and eternal life, it is fitting that He should preside at this general judgement, in which those who have risen from the dead will be rewarded or punished: hence it is said of Him (Jo. 5:27): He hath given him power to do the judgement, because he is the Son of man. Now the judgement should be in keeping with the things that are judged. And, seeing that the last judgement will refer to the rewards and punishments due to visible bodies, it is fitting for that judgement to be carried out visibly. Wherefore Christ will judge in His human form, which all will be able to see, both good and wicked: whereas the sight of His divinity is beatific, as we have proved:1 so that thus He can be seen by the good alone. On the other hand, the judgement of souls, since it is about things invisible, will be enacted invisibly.

Moreover although Christ, at the last judgement, will exercise the authority of judge, others nevertheless will judge with Him as assessors: and these will be those who were most closely united to Him, namely the Apostles, to whom it was said (Matth. 19:28): You, who have followed me … shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel: which promise extends to those who follow in the footsteps of the Apostles.

Chapter XCVII

the state of the world after the judgement

After the last judgement has taken place, human nature will have reached its term. But, since all corporeal things were made for man, as we have shown,2 it will be fitting that the state of all corporeal creatures should be changed, so as to be in conformity with the state of men, as they will be then. And, seeing that men will then be incorruptible, all corporeal creatures will cease to be in the state of generation and corruption. This is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. 8:21): The creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. Now since generation and corruption in the lower bodies is caused by the movement of the heavens, it follows that the heavens’ movement must also cease, if generation and corruption in the lower bodies is to come to an end: whence it is said (Apoc. 10:6): Time shall be no longer. Nor ought it to be deemed impossible for the heavens’ movement to cease. This movement, in fact, is natural, not as proceeding from an interior active principle, like the movement of heavy and light bodies; but because the heavens have, by nature, an aptitude for such a movement: while the principle of that movement is our intellect, as we have proved.1 Hence the heavens are moved like things moved by the will: and the will moves for the sake of an end. Now the end of the heavens’ movement is not that they be moved: for, since movement always tends to something else, it cannot be a last end. Nor can it be said that the end of the heavens’ movement is that it be moved from potentiality to actuality in point of its whereabouts: because such a potentiality can never wholly be reduced to actuality, since while a heavenly body is in one place, it is potentially in another: and the same applies to the potentiality of primal matter in respect of forms. Consequently, just as the end of nature in generation is not to reduce matter from potentiality to actuality, but something that results from this, namely the perpetuation of things, whereby they approach to the divine likeness, so the end of the heavens’ movement is not that the heavens may be reduced from potentiality to actuality, but something resulting therefrom, namely, to be like God in causality. Now all the things subject to generation and corruption, that are caused by the heavens’ movement, are, in a sense, directed to man as their end, as we have proved.2 Therefore the movement of the heavens is chiefly for the sake of the generation of mankind: for it is especially in this that it approaches to a divine likeness in point of causality, since the form of man, namely the rational soul, is immediately created by God, as proved above.1 Now the indefinite increase in the number of souls cannot be an end, since the indefinite is incompatible with the nature of an end. Therefore there is nothing unreasonable in saying that the movement of the heavens will cease when the number of men is complete.

Nevertheless, when the heavens cease to move, and the elements cease to generate and corrupt, their substance will remain, because God’s goodness is unchangeable. For He created things that they might be: wherefore things that have an aptitude for perpetuity will remain for ever. The heavenly bodies have this aptitude both in whole and in part: whereas the elements have it in whole but not in part, since, in part, they are corruptible: and men have it in part, but not in whole; since the rational soul is incorruptible, whereas the composite is corruptible. Accordingly, those things will remain, in their substance, in that last state of the world, which in any way whatever have an aptitude for perpetuity: for God, by His power, will supply what is lacking to them through their own infirmity. Other things, animals, plants and mixed bodies, which are entirely corruptible, both in whole and in part, will nowise remain in the state of incorruption. Thus then are we to understand the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:31), The fashion of this world passeth away, because the present outward appearance of the world will pass away, while its substance will remain. In the same sense we are to understand the saying of Job (14:12), Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not awake till the heavens be broken, that is, until the present disposition of the heavens ceases, whereby the heavens move and cause movement in other things.

Moreover, since of all the elements fire is the most active, and the most destructive of corruptible things, the destruction of those things which will not remain in the future state, will be fittingly brought about by fire. Wherefore it is of faith that the world will be finally cleansed by fire, not only from corruptible bodies, but even from the contamination which this world has contracted through being the abode of sinners. Thus it is said (2 Pet. 3:7): The heavens and the earth, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgement: where by the heavens, we are to understand, not the firmament wherein are the stars, whether fixed or planets, but the atmosphere contiguous to the earth.

Since then the corporeal creature is disposed of finally in a manner that is in keeping with man’s state, and man himself will not only be delivered from corruption, but also clothed in glory, as we have stated;1 it follows that even the corporeal creature will acquire a certain glory of brightness befitting its capacity. Wherefore it is said (Apoc. 21:1): I saw a new heaven and a new earth: and (Isa. 65:17, 18): I create new heavens, and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in remembrance, and they shall not come upon the heart. But you shall be glad and rejoice for ever. Amen.

1. A few examples will suffice to illustrate to what extent the text of Uccelli’s edition wanders from the true reading. The ordinary print is Uccelli’s version, the correct text is in italics: Et hoc de facto. Et hoc Deus est. Bk. I., ch. xviii. Deus autem est ipsius similitudo. Deus autem est ipsum suum esse. Ibid., ch. xxxvii. In rerum autem profligatione. In rerum autem propagatione. Bk. II., ch. xxviii. Ut fatalitas habet. Ut forte veritas habet. Ibid., ch. xlii.

1. D. 1a. 1, 2. In future references D. stands for the Didot edition of Aristotle’s and Plato’s works.

3. Interminabilis. S. Hilary wrote inopinabilis—i.e., of that which surpasses our ken.

4. Bk. II., xxiv. See above, ch. lxv.: Moreover. God’s intellect … p. 137.

3. Juvenibus. Ferrariensis and the majority of the codices read viventibus, i.e., in the living, or in the soul while still united to the body.

3. Cf. Greg. Nyss., De Anima (Migne, P.G. xlv., p. 205); Nemesius De Anima (De Nat. Hominis) ii. 6.

2. “The word liberality is rightly derived from spending: because when a man spends money, he liberates it from his keeping, and shows his mind to be liberated from affection for it.” (Commentary of Ferrariensis, who for magnificence reads munificence, which is derived from munus, a gift.)

1. Vulg., Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God. St. Thomas invariably quotes this passage as rendered above.

2. Namely, the end from which all things derive their goodness (Commentary of Ferrariensis).

1. πρὸ δὲ πάντων βουνῶν γεννᾶ με (Sept. Version, Prov. 8:25).

1. At the time of St Thomas it was thought that the movement of light was instantaneous.

1. Ejus spiratione quasi quadam aspiratione existente: literally, His Spiration being a kind of aspiration.

1. According to the physical system in vogue at the time of St Thomas the heavenly bodies or spheres were solid.